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## **ABSTRACT**

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We find that forecasts from DSGE models are not more accurate than either times series models or official forecasts, but neither are they any worse. We also find that all three types of forecast failed to predict the recession that started in 2007 and continued to forecast poorly even after the recession was known to have begun. We investigate why these results occur by examining the structure of the solution of DSGE models and compare this with pure time series models. We show that the main factor is the dynamic structure of DSGE models. Their backward-looking dynamics gives them a similar forecasting structure to time series models and their forward-looking dynamics, which consists of expected values of future exogenous variables, is difficult to forecast accurately. As a result we suggest that DSGE models should not be tested through their forecasting ability.

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# How Useful are DSGE Macroeconomic Models for Forecasting?

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June 2012

## Abstract

We find that forecasts from DSGE models are not more accurate than either times series models or official forecasts, but neither are they any worse. We also find that all three types of forecast failed to predict the recession that started in 2007 and continued to forecast poorly even after the recession was known to have begun. We investigate why these results occur by examining the structure of the solution of DSGE models and compare this with pure time series models. We show that the main factor is the dynamic structure of DSGE models. Their backward-looking dynamics gives them a similar forecasting structure to time series models and their forward-looking dynamics, which consists of expected values of future exogenous variables, is difficult to forecast accurately. As a result we suggest that DSGE models should not be tested through their forecasting ability.

## 1. Introduction

Increasingly, DSGE models are being used by central banks not only for policy analysis, but also for forecasting. In this paper we examine how successful DSGE

models are for forecasting. We find that forecasts from DSGE models are not more accurate than either times series models or official forecasts, but neither are they any worse. We also find that all three types of forecast failed to predict the recession that started in 2007 and continued to forecast poorly even after the recession was known to have begun.

An important question is why these results occurred. We investigate this by examining the structure of the solution of DSGE models and compare this with pure time series models. We show that there are three key elements to the answer. First, the solution to a DSGE model consists of both backward-looking and a forward-looking dynamics. The forward-looking terms are expected values of future exogenous variables. Being able to accurately forecast these is crucial to the overall forecasting performance of DSGE models. As they are exogenous, however, we have no theory for them. We might use announcements as our forecasts of these exogenous variables. Alternatively, we might use forecasts obtained from a backward-looking time series model of the exogenous variables. This would be equivalent to including this model for the exogenous variables as part of our solution procedure for the DSGE model. The solution would then be a backward-looking time series model of the full data set. The only way that this solution differs from a conventional pure time series model is that it incorporates the restrictions implied by the structural DSGE model. It follows that the DSGE model would only out-forecast a pure time series model if these restrictions were valid. Our finding that the forecasts from DSGE models are no better (or worse) than those from pure time series forecasts suggests that including the restrictions adds little but, at the same time, they don't grossly violate the data either.

These results also have an interesting implication for testing macroeconomic

models. If the accuracy of the model's forecasts depends heavily on those of the current and future exogenous variables whose generating process is not part of our theory, then we may reject a theory when it is not the theory that is at fault. In effect, we have a joint hypothesis: the theory and the exogenous generating process, and not a simple hypothesis consisting just of the theory of interest. It may, therefore, be best to test a DSGE model solely within-sample, and not out-of-sample.

The paper is set out as follows. In section 2 we examine the theoretical implications of using DSGE models for forecasting, drawing as examples on the standard neoclassical growth model and a New Keynesian inflation model. In section 3 we examine the forecasting performance of official forecasts and time series models. In section 4 we compare the forecasting records of several DSGE models - especially those used by official agencies - with pure time series models and official forecasts. Our conclusions are presented in section 4.

## 2. Theoretical issues in using DSGE models for forecasting

We illustrate the issues in using DSGE models for forecasting by considering two well-known models: the standard neoclassical growth model which is the basis of the real business cycle (RBC) model and the New Keynesian model.

### 2.1. RBC model

The representative economic agent is assumed to maximize

$$E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \frac{C_{t+s}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma}$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_t &= C_t + I_t \\
Y_t &= Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} \\
\Delta K_{t+1} &= I_t - \delta K_t \\
L_t &= (1+n)^t L_0 \\
A_t &= (1+\mu)^t Z_t \\
\ln Z_t &= z_t, \Delta z_t = e_t \sim i.i.d(0, \omega^2)
\end{aligned}$$

where  $Y$  is output,  $C$  is consumption,  $I$  is investment,  $K$  is capital,  $L$  is labour which grows at the rate  $n$ ,  $A$  is technical progress which grows in steady-state at the rate  $\mu$ , and  $Z$  is a permanent shock to technical progress.

It can be shown - the full details are in Wickens (2012) - that the log-linearized solution is

$$\begin{aligned}
E_t \Delta \ln c_{t+1} &= -\left(\eta + \frac{\delta + \theta}{\sigma}\right)(1 - \alpha) E_t \ln k_{t+1} + \left(\eta + \frac{\delta + \theta}{\sigma}\right) z_t \\
\ln k_{t+1} &= -[\theta + \eta(\sigma - 2)] \ln c_t + (1 + \theta + \sigma\eta) \ln k_t + \frac{\theta + \delta + (\sigma - \alpha)\eta}{\alpha} z_t.
\end{aligned}$$

This can be written in matrix form as

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \left(\eta + \frac{\delta + \theta}{\sigma}\right)(1 - \alpha) & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln k_{t+1} \\ E_t \ln c_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} =$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 + \theta + \sigma\eta & -[\theta + \eta(\sigma - 2)] \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln k_t \\ \ln c_t \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\theta + \delta + (\sigma - \alpha)\eta}{\alpha} \\ \eta + \frac{\delta + \theta}{\sigma} \end{bmatrix} z_t$$

This solution satisfies the general solution to a DSGE model which is

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_{t+1} \\ E_t y_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} = A \begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ y_t \end{bmatrix} + C z_t$$

where  $x_t$  are predetermined variables (stocks),  $y_t$  are "jump" variables (flows or asset prices) and  $z_t$  consists of exogenous variables (including policy variables) and structural disturbances. Denoting the canonical decomposition of  $A$  as  $A = Q\Gamma Q^{-1}$  then the solution has the form of a forward-looking VARX

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ y_t \end{bmatrix} = M \begin{bmatrix} x_{t-1} \\ y_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + N \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Gamma_{yy}^{-s} P_y E_t z_{t+s} + J z_{t-1} + K \xi_t$$

$$\xi_t = x_t - E_{t-1} x_t.$$

In order to forecast  $x_t$  and  $y_t$  it is therefore necessary to forecast the exogenous variables  $z_{t+s}$ ,  $s \geq 0$ . Hence the forecasting performance of a DSGE model depends on having good forecasts of the exogenous variables. If the exogenous variables are policy variables then we might be able to replace  $E_t z_{t+s}$  with credible policy announcements. Or, alternatively, there might be a policy rule, such as a Taylor rule, that is used to determine these variables, in which case these variables are no



longer exogenous and we would include the policy rule in the DSGE model. More generally, having no theory for the exogenous variables - otherwise they would be part of the DSGE model - we would need to use a pure time series model to forecast them. Thus testing a DSGE model by its forecasting performance may result in a rejection of the model just because the forecasts of the future exogenous variables are poor.

The solution also shows that  $\xi_t$ , shocks to the predetermined endogenous variables, are a further source of forecast error. However, in contrast to forecasting errors to the exogenous variables, these structural shocks are transitory and will disappear at a speed that depends on the internal dynamics of the model. The forecasting performance described later indicates that such shocks are not a major cause of persistent forecast error.

Suppose that the exogenous variables may be represented by the VAR

$$z_{t+1} = Rz_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}$$

when  $E_t z_{t+s} = R^s z_t$  ( $s \geq 0$ ). The solution is then the VARX

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ y_t \end{bmatrix} = M \begin{bmatrix} x_{t-1} \\ y_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + Hz_t + Jz_{t-1} + K\xi_t,$$

where  $H = N(\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \Gamma_{yy}^{-s} P_y R^s)$ , which is a purely backward-looking model. We can

also express the complete data set as the VAR(1)

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ y_t \\ z_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} I & 0 & -H_x \\ 0 & I & -H_y \\ 0 & 0 & I \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} M_{xx} & M_{xy} & J_x \\ M_{yx} & M_{yy} & J_y \\ 0 & 0 & R \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_{t-1} \\ y_{t-1} \\ z_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \\ + \begin{bmatrix} I & 0 & -H_x \\ 0 & I & -H_y \\ 0 & 0 & I \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} K_{xx} & K_{xy} & 0 \\ K_{yx} & K_{yy} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & I \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \xi_{xt} \\ \xi_{yt} \\ \varepsilon_t \end{bmatrix}$$

or

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ y_t \\ z_t \end{bmatrix} = F \begin{bmatrix} x_{t-1} \\ y_{t-1} \\ z_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + G \begin{bmatrix} \xi_{xt} \\ \xi_{yt} \\ \varepsilon_t \end{bmatrix}.$$

This solution has a number of implications. The difference between this solution and a pure time series VAR is that this solution has coefficient restrictions arising from the DSGE model whereas the pure time series version has no restrictions. This solution also shows that the internal dynamics of a DSGE model may be replicated by an unrestricted VAR. Thus an unrestricted VAR may be expected to provide at least as accurate forecasts as a DSGE model, especially if the coefficient restrictions are incorrect. Following our earlier observations on the problems of testing a DSGE model by its forecasting performance, we note that the alternative is to test the model in-sample by testing these restrictions. This may be carried out using classical statistical inference or using the method of indirect inference in which VAR estimates based on actual data are compared with those based on data simulated from the solution to the DSGE model.

To complete the solution to the RBC model, we note that as  $\Delta z_t = e_t$  we have

$E_t z_{t+s} = z_t$  (or  $R = I$ ), and so the solution is

$$\begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln k_t \\ \Delta \ln c_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \Gamma_{xx} & 0 \\ Q_{yx}\Gamma_{xx} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \Delta \ln k_{t-1} \\ \Delta \ln c_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} - \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ I \end{bmatrix} H e_t + \begin{bmatrix} C_{xx} \\ Q_{yx}C_{xx} \end{bmatrix} e_{t-1}$$

where  $H = Q_{yy}(I - \Gamma_{yy}^{-1})P$ . The solution is therefore the VARMA

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= Ax_{t-1} + u_t \\ u_t &= Be_t + Ce_{t-1}. \end{aligned}$$

## 2.2. New Keynesian model

The basic New Keynesian model may be written as

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= \phi + \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \gamma x_t + e_{\pi t} \\ x_t &= E_t x_{t+1} - \alpha(R_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - \theta) + e_{xt} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\pi$  is inflation,  $x$  is the output gap and  $R$  is the nominal interest rate,  $e_{\pi t}$  and  $e_{xt}$  are independent, zero mean iid processes and  $\phi = (1 - \beta)\pi^*$ , where  $\pi^*$  is target inflation. The solution for inflation under discretion (i.e when  $R$  is treated as an exogenous choice variable) is - see Wickens (2012) -

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= \frac{\alpha\gamma\theta}{(1 - \eta_1)(1 - \eta_2)} - \frac{\alpha\gamma}{\eta_1 - \eta_2} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\eta_1^{s+1} - \eta_2^{s+1}) E_t R_{t+s} \\ &\quad + \alpha\gamma(e_{\pi t} + \gamma e_{xt}). \end{aligned}$$

This is a forward-looking solution requiring forecasts of the interest rate, as consequently do forecasts of inflation. We note that the logic of this solution is that in steady-state  $R = \pi^* + \theta$ .

If instead we assume that the monetary authority uses the Taylor Rule

$$R_t = \theta + \pi^* + \mu(\pi_t - \pi^*) + vx_t + e_{Rt}$$

then the solution will depend on whether  $\mu$  is greater or less than unity.

(i)  $\mu < 1$

The solution is

$$\pi_t = \pi^* + \frac{1}{1 + \alpha(v + \mu\gamma)} [(1 + \alpha v)e_{\pi t} + \gamma e_{xt} - \alpha\gamma e_{Rt}].$$

The implication is that the best forecast of inflation is the target rate. Moreover, forecasts of inflation from this model should therefore be little different from those from a pure time series model.

(ii)  $\mu > 1$

The solution is

$$\pi_t - \pi^* = \frac{1}{\eta_1} (\pi_{t-1} - \pi^*) + \frac{1 - a_0\alpha\gamma - a_1\beta - \eta_2}{[1 + \alpha(v + \mu\gamma)]\eta_1} [(1 + \alpha v)e_{\pi t} + \gamma e_{xt} - \alpha\gamma e_{Rt}].$$

The solution is now backward-looking. Once again forecasts of inflation from this model should therefore be little different from those from a pure time series model. The two solutions illustrate the Lucas critique since different values for  $\mu$  give different reduced-form solutions. It can also be shown that the greater is  $\mu$ ,

the less is the variance of inflation, and hence the variance of the forecast error.

### **3. The forecasting record of official forecasts and time series models**

Most central banks and fiscal authorities use a variety of models in constructing their official forecasts. These include time series models, structural macroeconomic models and small DSGE models. Among the official agencies that use DSGE models as part of their forecasting round are the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England (the Bank is now also using CGE models), the New Zealand Reserve Bank and the Riksbank. Their published official forecasts are not simply those from a DSGE model but include additional discretionary input not revealed to the public. A very helpful analysis of the forecasting performance of several central banks that is drawn on in our discussion is that of Wieland and Wolters (2011). We also refer to several studies undertaken by the central banks themselves which compare official forecasts with forecasts from time series models and DSGE models. We focus mainly on the forecasting performance surrounding the recent recession that started in 2007.

#### *3.1. Shock decomposition*

Before analyzing these forecasts it is important to point out that forecasting was not the original objective in constructing DSGE models. This was primarily to describe the past behaviour of the economy. For example, the aim in the first DSGE models (the real business cycle model) was to see whether they could explain the business cycle. This was an exercise in within-sample analysis not out-of-sample analysis, as in forecasting. The other principal uses of DSGE models are policy analysis (as unlike standard macroeconomic models and pure time series

models, DSGE models are not subject to the Lucas Critique), and within-sample shock decomposition which can be used to explain the causes of past behaviour.

To illustrate the usefulness of decomposing a DSGE model's shocks we consider two examples based on the Smets-Wouters (2007) model of the United States. First we consider how this has been used to explain the causes of the recent recession, see Wieland and Wolters (2011). Figure 1 shows the annualized rate of growth of US GDP over the period 2006-2011 and its forecast for 2012 together with the estimated contributions from various shocks. This decomposition attributes the fall in growth rates from 2007 to 2009 to negative investment and risk premium shocks (high borrowing rates and a shortage of investment capital) and finds that negative money shocks (the failure of interest rates to go negative as required by a Taylor rule due to the zero lower bound) are likely to be the most important after 2011.




Figure 1. Shock decomposition of US growth

More recently, Gali, Smets and Wouters (2011) have used a modified version of the Smets-Wouters model that incorporates unemployment to analyze why the

recovery has been so slow. Their shock decomposition of unemployment in Figure 2 shows that initially the investment/risk premium shock was a principal cause of high unemployment, but that a wage mark-up (the failure of real wages to adjust downwards) is now much more important.




Figure 2 Shock decomposition of US unemployment

### 3.2. Official forecasts

#### US Fed

Edge, Kiley and Laforre (2009) have studied the performance of the "Greenbook" forecasts of the US Fed. and compared these with forecasts from the FRB/US macroeconometric model and a simple time series model, an AR(2), over the period 1996-2002. An example of their findings is reported in Table 1 which gives the root mean square forecast errors for growth, inflation and the Fed. funds rate of the Greenbook forecasts and those from the FRB/US model both relative to those from an AR(2).

Model	1Q	4Q	8Q
Growth			
Greenbook	1.153	1.189	1.104
FRB/US	1.066	1.158	1.138
Inflation			
Greenbook	1.063	0.701	0.934
FRB/US	0.941	0.918	0.865
FFR			
Greenbook	0.743	0.888	0.983
FRB/US	0.743	0.888	0.983

Table 1. US: RMSE relative to an AR(2) 1996-2002

For growth the AR(2) has the smaller RMSE. For inflation the FRB/US model has a smaller RMSE than the AR(2); the Greenbook forecasts are the best of all one year-ahead, but not for one quarter ahead. Perhaps not surprisingly, as the Fed. sets it, the Greenbook forecasts for the Fed funds rate are superior over a two-year forecasting horizon.

### **Bank of England**

Unlike the US Fed., the mandate of the Bank of England is to focus solely on controlling inflation. Its forecasting record on inflation is shown in Figure 3. The upper panel shows the path of inflation up to August 2011 and the Monetary Policy Committee's assessment afterwards. Starting in 2004, the lower panel compares successive inflation forecasts for the next three years of the MPC with actual inflation. Except for 2009 the MPC has consistently under-estimated inflation. Nonetheless, the MPC has kept bank rate at 0.5 percent since 2008.






Figure 3. MPC forecasts of inflation

### Riksbank

The Riksbank's official forecasts of GDP over the period 2000-2007 are given by Andersson, Karlsson and Svensson (2007). Their comparison of the official forecasts made each quarter with the outcomes is shown in Figure 4. In general, the forecasts tended not to pick up fluctuations in GDP. Sweden had an output downturn in 2001. The start of this downturn was clearly missed but, once observed, it was picked up afterwards by the lagged dynamic structure of their forecasting procedure.





Figure 4. The Riksbank's forecasts of GDP 2000-2007

### 3.3. Time series forecasts

Following Nelson (1972, 1982), who found that a univariate ARIMA model forecast better than the FMP macroeconomic model, it has been widely accepted that pure time series models often provide better forecasts than macroeconomic models. Multivariate time series forecasts are often based on a VAR. We note that omitting a variable from a VAR just adds to length of the lag structure of the VAR and creates a moving average error structure, making the model a VARMA. Christofferson and Diebold (1997) have shown that over long horizons an unrestricted VAR forecasts just as well as a VAR that takes account of any cointegration present in the VAR. As many terms in a VAR are insignificant, and including insignificant terms tends to worsen forecasting performance, Doan and

Litterman (1984) found that using a Bayesian VAR, which shrank poorly determined coefficients via the "Minnesota prior", improved VAR forecasts.

Wieland and Wolters (2011) compare the forecasting performance of an AR(4) and a BVAR(4). Their results for the US are shown in Figure 5. The growth forecasts consistently return growth to its long-run level and so miss the depth of the recession; the inflation forecasts flatline as do the unemployment forecasts; together the growth and inflation forecasts explain the over-estimate of interest rate forecasts.



Blue line: BVAR(4) forecast; red line: AR(4) forecast

Figure 5. AR and BVAR forecasts of US growth

Figure 6 compares the official forecasts of the Riksbank with those from an AR for the 2001 recession in Sweden. Both miss the recession, the AR forecasts (the dotted lines) more than the official forecasts. Once more, therefore, the VAR

forecasts are flatlining more than the data and more than the official forecasts which are also relatively flat.




Figure 6. Comparison of the Riksbank's forecasts with an AR model.

Castle, Fawcett and Hendry (2008), Clements and Hendry (2008) and Hendry (2005) have found that the most useful way of improving forecasts is to "robustify" them against structural breaks by taking account of shifts in the mean. This is especially helpful if there is cointegration. For the error correction model

$$\Delta y_t = \beta \Delta x_t - (1 - \alpha)[y_{t-1} - \mu - \theta x_{t-1}] + e_t$$

this entails robustifying the model through an intercept adjustment to  $\mu$  which also affects the rate of growth. In this way permanent deviations from the new

path of  $y_t$  are corrected. Rebasing forecasts by using the latest value of the lagged variables also helps.

### *3.4. Data problems*

The accuracy of forecasts also depend on using accurate data. Macroeconomic data is usually estimated initially and these estimates are then revised. Forecasters seeking timely forecasts therefore use data that is being changed. Acting as Special Adviser to the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee I investigated the extent of the revisions to UK GDP growth data made by the Office of National Statistics, House of Lords (2004). Over the period 1998q2-2004q1, 9 of the 19 preliminary estimates of growth were more than one standard deviation away from the final estimate, while only 4 out of 18 of the previous quarter's growth rates were more than one standard deviation away from the final estimate. The assumption of no change in the growth rate gave estimates that were twice as accurate as the worst interim estimate. In other words, over this period, using last period's growth rate gave the best estimate of the current growth rate.

Often the current value of a variable may exist and so must be estimated. This is known as the problem of nowcasting. Time series models are usually used to estimate these current values.

## **4. The forecasting record of DSGE models**

The focus of our attention is on the forecasting record of DSGE models used by the central banks in New Zealand and the United States. We also examine forecasts made by the IMF and the Smets-Wouters model. We draw upon Wieland and Wolters (2011) for some of this information.

### Reserve Bank of New Zealand

The RBNZ have estimated for New Zealand the following small open-economy DSGE model over the period 1990q1-2005q4. See Lees et al.(2007) for details.

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{y}_t = & E_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} - \chi(\tilde{R}_t - E_t \tilde{\pi}_{t+1}) - \rho_z \tilde{z}_t \\ & - \alpha \chi E_t \Delta \tilde{q}_{t+1} + \alpha(2 - \alpha) \frac{1 - \tau}{\tau} E_t \Delta \tilde{y}_{t+1}^* \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

$$\tilde{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} + \alpha \beta E_t \Delta \tilde{q}_{t+1} - \alpha \Delta \tilde{q}_t + \frac{\kappa}{\chi} (\tilde{y}_t - \tilde{\tilde{y}}_t) \quad (15)$$

$$\tilde{R}_t = \rho_R \tilde{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_R) [\psi_\pi \tilde{\pi}_t + \psi_y \tilde{y}_t + \psi_{\Delta e} \Delta \tilde{e}_t] + \varepsilon_t^R \quad (16)$$

$$A_t = A_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{z,t} \quad (17)$$

$$\Delta \tilde{q}_t = \rho_q \Delta \tilde{q}_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{q,t} \quad (18)$$

$$\tilde{y}_t^* = \rho_{y^*} \tilde{y}_{t-1}^* + \varepsilon_{y_t^*} \quad (19)$$

$$\tilde{\pi}_t^* = \rho_{\pi^*} \tilde{\pi}_{t-1}^* + \varepsilon_{\pi_t^*} \quad (20)$$

$$\Delta \tilde{e}_t = \tilde{\pi}_t - (1 - \alpha) \Delta \tilde{q}_t - \tilde{\pi}_t^* \quad (21)$$

$q$  is the terms of trade,  $e$  is the nominal exchange rate,  $A$  is productivity,  $z$  is a productivity shock,  $*$  denotes the rest of the world and  $\tilde{\cdot}$  denotes a deviation from equilibrium. Table 2 compares the mean square forecast errors (MSFE) of the DSGE model and those from and an unrestricted VAR (UNR), a Bayesian VAR with a Minnesota prior (MVAR) and a VAR constructed from data simulated from the DSGE model (DVAR) with the official forecasts over the period 1998q4-2003q3. The forecasts are made in real time. Gains over the official forecasts are positive and losses are negative.

**Percentage gain (loss) in MSFE over the real-time RBNZ forecasts**

<i>h</i>	GDP growth				Inflation			
	UNR	MVAR	DVAR	DSGE	UNR	MVAR	DVAR	DSGE
1	-33.7	5.6	19.6	6.4	-19.0	0.9	-10.0	-40.1
2	12.8	23.0	36.0	18.3	-49.2	-4.7	-26.3	-83.4
3	17.0	30.2	29.1	18.3	-43.1	4.0	-9.0	-75.0
4	8.5	42.5*	29.0	28.1	-17.2	15.5	2.1	-78.4
5	-10.3	43.2*	3.7	25.2*	-9.7	21.6*	10.1	-86.3
6	-22.2	42.2	-16.3	17.0	4.0	23.9*	13.8	-110.2
7	-27.4	47.6	-26.3	2.2	10.0	24.9	15.7	-106.8
8	-20.2	43.0*	-24.4	-20.5	12.5	22.9	13.3	-114.3

<i>h</i>	Interest rate				Exchange rate			
	UNR	MVAR	DVAR	DSGE	UNR	MVAR	DVAR	DSGE
1	-289.5	-74.9	-165.9	-144.7	-24.9	4.7	-10.0	-3.8
2	-274.2	-21.0	-47.1	-64.0	-32.9	-0.6	-22.0	-21.8
3	-119.0	5.7	13.2	-7.6	-14.8	1.4	-0.4	1.5
4	-31.1	33.8*	14.9	24.8	-14.4	0.7	4.6	15.9
5	-23.6	43.3**	23.5	26.0	-21.0	-9.9	-9.6	4.4
6	-47.4	39.6*	32.3	29.8	-21.8	-18.9	-24.2	-8.2
7	-86.8	33.8	33.6	17.7	-19.6	-26.7	-23.3	-6.7
8	-139.6	23.9	33.3	20.5	-22.6	-38.7	-30.3	-10.4

Table 2. Real time forecasts by the RBNZ 1998q4-2003q3

The results show that the MVAR forecasts are best across all forecast horizons for all variables. The DSGE model was considerably worse for growth and inflation but performed better for the exchange rate than the MVAR at longer horizons; its interest rate forecasts were only marginally worse.

### IMF New Keynesian model of the US

Wieland and Wolters (2011) report the forecasts of the IMF's small model for the United States for the period 2008-2011. It is basically a New Keynesian model with a Taylor rule and, in addition, an unemployment equation. The new variables are  $y$  which is the output gap,  $u$  is unemployment,  $rr$  is the real interest rate,  $rs$  is the nominal short rate and  $\pi_4$  is year-on-year inflation.

$$\begin{aligned}
y_t &= \beta_1 y_{t-1} + \beta_2 E_t y_{t+1} - \beta_3 (rr_t - \bar{r}r_t) - \theta \eta_t + \epsilon_t^y, \\
\pi_t &= \lambda_1 E_t \pi_{t+4} + (1 - \lambda_1) \pi_{t-1} + \lambda_2 y_{t-1} - \epsilon_t^\pi, \\
rs_t &= (1 - \gamma_1) [\bar{r}r_t + E_t \pi_{t+3} + \gamma_2 (E_t \pi_{t+3} - \pi^{tar} + \gamma_4 \gamma_t)] + \gamma_1 rs_{t-1} + \epsilon_t^{rs}, \\
u_t &= \alpha_1 u_{t-1} + \alpha_2 y_t + \epsilon_t^u.
\end{aligned}$$

The forecasts and the outcomes for quarterly (but annualized) and annual rates of growth - the rate of change in the output gap - are shown in Figure 7. Clearly the DSGE model misses the recession as it is attempting to eliminate the output gap




Figure 7. Forecasts of US quarterly and annual growth based on the IMF's NK model

**Riksbank**



Adolfson et al. (2008) compare the forecasting performance of a small open-economy DSGE model for Sweden with those from a BVAR and the official Riksbank forecasts over the period 1999q1-2005q4. The forecasts of GDP growth, inflation and the rate of interest in Figures 8-10 are updated each period. The top panel is the official forecast, the second panel is the DSGE model forecasts and the bottom panel is the BVAR forecasts.




Figure 8. GDP growth




Figure 9. CPI inflation




Figure 10. Interest rate

All three forecasts miss the growth downturn starting in 2000 and are generally too optimistic after the downturn. The DSGE and BVAR forecasts also miss the upturn that preceded the downturn. The forecasts of the DGSE and BVAR models are similar throughout, as they are for inflation, but less similar for the interest rate. Prior to 2004 the official forecasts tend to under-predict inflation whereas the DSGE and BVAR forecasts tend to over-estimate inflation. Both models tend to miss turning points in the rate of inflation. The official forecasts consistently over-estimate the interest rate throughout as does the DSGE model, but the BVAR, by flatlining, misses increases in the interest rate on the downside and decreases on the upside.

#### Smets-Wouters US model

Wieland and Wolters (2011) report forecasts for the US from the Smets-Wouters model for the period 2008-2011. These are shown in Figure 11. The same pattern emerges as before: the forecasts miss the recession and then the model tries to return the economy to its steady-state too quickly.




Figure 11. Forecasts of the US economy from the Smets-Wouters model

### US Federal Reserve

Edge et al (2009) report forecasts of the US economy for the period 1996.9-2004.11, comparing its RMSE with forecasts from an AR(2). The results for US growth and inflation are reported in Table 3 together with forecasts from a VAR and a BVAR over horizons from one to eight quarters. Table 4 reports the mean biases. Tables 5 and 6 report the RMSEs and mean biases for the Fed funds rate.

Model	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	8Q
<b>Real GDP Growth</b>					
AR(2)	0.470	0.521	0.497	0.547	0.551
Relative RMSE					
DSGE/Edo	0.953	0.920	0.948	0.917	0.976
VAR(1)	1.125	1.052	1.121	1.018	1.073
BVAR(2)	1.096	1.031	1.071	1.002	1.078
<b>GDP Price Inflation</b>					
AR(2)	0.276	0.258	0.243	0.281	0.288
Relative RMSE					
DSGE B	1.064	1.065	1.061	1.038	0.925
VAR(1)	1.139	1.175	1.222	1.231	1.258
BVAR(2)	1.088	1.137	1.150	1.192	1.177

Table 3 Relative RMSEs for forecasts of growth and inflation from various US Fed. models

Model	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	8Q
<b>Real GDP Growth</b>					
AR(2)	-0.037	-0.116	-0.056	-0.140	-0.175
DSGE/Edo	0.024	-0.050	-0.011	-0.104	-0.165
VAR(1)	-0.074	-0.091	-0.021	-0.088	-0.122
BVAR(2)	-0.040	-0.088	-0.021	-0.094	-0.124
<b>GDP Price Inflation</b>					
AR(2)	0.075	0.087	0.104	0.126	0.092
DSGE/Edo	0.072	0.094	0.108	0.125	0.079
VAR(1)	0.044	0.023	0.024	0.026	-0.038
BVAR(2)	0.032	0.020	0.016	0.021	-0.052

Table 4. Mean biases for forecasts of growth and inflation

from various US Fed. models

Nominal Funds Rate					
AR(2)	0.170	0.260	0.339	0.426	0.618
Relative RMSE					
DSGE/Edo	1.224	1.208	1.153	1.092	0.941
VAR(1)	0.986	1.068	1.116	1.144	1.248
BVAR(2)	1.006	1.054	1.084	1.104	1.058

Table 5 Relative RMSEs for forecasts of the Fed. funds rate

from various US Fed. models

Nominal Funds Rate					
AR(2)	0.050	0.089	0.129	0.178	0.309
DSGE/Edo	0.086	0.152	0.202	0.251	0.336
VAR(1)	0.048	0.087	0.127	0.177	0.282
BVAR(2)	0.057	0.099	0.138	0.185	0.255

Table 6. Mean biases for forecasts of the Fed. funds rate

from various US Fed. models

For the forecasts for growth the DSGE model has a slightly smaller RMSE than the AR(2) model, and the AR(2) model has slightly smaller RMSEs than either the VAR and BVAR. The DSGE model also has smaller mean bias except at the two-year horizon. Again, except at a two-year horizon, the AR(2) forecasts inflation better than all three models. The mean bias is, however, smallest for the BVAR model. In terms of the RMSE, apart from the two-year horizon, the DSGE model forecasts the Fed. funds rate worst and has the worst mean biases.

#### Various unofficial DSGE models for the US 2000–2002

We complete our examination of the forecasting performance of DSGE models by examining the record of a number of unofficial DSGE models over the period 2000-2002. These results are from Wolters (2011) and are for US growth, inflation and the Fed. funds rate. The forecasts from these models together with their fan-charts, the Greenbook forecasts (white line) and the outcomes are shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12. Forecasts for the US from unofficial DSGE models and the Greenbook forecasts

The results show that none of the forecasts are close the actual outcomes and no model consistently out-forecasts another for all variables, for all sub-periods or for all forecast horizons. The Greenbook forecasts are consistently better for output growth but the models give better forecasts of inflation than the Greenbook.

## 5. Conclusions

The forecasting record of all of the models, whether a DSGE model or a time series model, show a consistent pattern: having a tendency to flatline, they all fail to anticipate turning points, especially recessions, and they all try to return the economy to the steady-state too fast. The official forecasts have the same defects. The question of interest in this paper is why this occurs.

We have suggested that the answer may lie in the nature of the solution to a DSGE model. The solution has three features of potential relevance. First, in general, the solution involves the presence of expected future values of exogenous variables - the forward-looking dynamics - and so the accuracy of forecasts from a DSGE model may well depend critically on the accuracy of the forecasts of future exogenous variables. As they are exogenous, we have no theory about them. If they are policy variables, then we might we have official announcements about their future values. If these announcements are credible, we might use these as our forecasts. Alternatively, we are forced to use time series models to forecast them. Our results have, however, shown that such forecasts are unlikely to be very accurate, especially when there are sharp changes in the exogenous variables. An important reason why the DSGE models miss turning points is that the exogenous variables are not well-forecasted. The failure to forecast changes in the exogenous variables probably accounts for the tendency of DSGE models to flatline and give persistent forecast errors. Not surprisingly, when the economy is growing steadily, and there are no turning points, all of these forecasts perform much better.

Related conclusions about the role of exogenous variables in macroeconomic modelling were made some years ago by Adelman and Adelman (1959). They

asked what features of a macroeconometric model could cause business cycle-like behaviour. They found that the internal dynamics of the model produced cycles of far too small an amplitude, and that the disturbances were too small to produce plausible cycles. They therefore concluded that business cycles must be caused by fluctuations in the exogenous variables. Howrey (1967) came to a similar conclusion.

A second feature of the solution is its lag structure - the backward-looking dynamics. These are likely to be similar to those estimated from a time series model in the same variables which is why DSGE models forecast as badly as time series models, and vice-versa. The tendency of DSGE models to forecast a faster return to the long-run following a recession than has actually occurred may be partly due to misspecified dynamics, possibly because the lags are longer than specified, or because the estimates of the coefficients on the lags are biased downwards. Incorrect restrictions imposed by the DSGE model could also cause such biases. Due to the backward-looking dynamics observed in DSGE models, shocks to the structural equations do not appear to be a cause of persistent forecast error.

These conclusions have potentially important implications for how to test macroeconomic models. Models are usually tested from their predictions. But if the accuracy of a DSGE model's forecasts depends heavily on the accuracy of the forecasts of the current and future exogenous variables, whose generating process is not part of our theory, then we may reject a theory when it is not the theory that is at fault. In effect, we have a joint hypothesis: the theory and the exogenous generating process, and not a simple hypothesis consisting just of the theory of interest. It may, therefore, be best to test a macroeconomic model solely



within-sample, and not out-of-sample. Even within-sample the DSGE models will, in general, involve the expected future values of the exogenous variables and, although they are known, it would not be correct to use their actual values as these forecasts. Consequently, in-sample testing still involves forming forecasts. The difference from out-of-sample forecasts is that the lagged endogenous variables in the solution are known.

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