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POLICY IN A MICROFOUNDED NEW  
KEYNESIAN MODEL**

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# ROBUSTLY OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A MICROFOUNDED NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

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## ABSTRACT

### Robustly Optimal Monetary Policy in a Microfounded New Keynesian Model\*

We consider optimal monetary stabilization policy in a New Keynesian model with explicit microfoundations, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs close enough to model-consistency. We show how to characterize robustly optimal policy without restricting consideration a priori to a particular parametric family of candidate policy rules. We show that robustly optimal policy can be implemented through commitment to a target criterion involving only the paths of inflation and a suitably defined output gap, but that a concern for robustness requires greater resistance to surprise increases in inflation than would be considered optimal if one could count on the private sector to have 'rational expectations'.

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# 1 Introduction

A central issue in macroeconomic policy analysis is the need to take account of the likely changes in *people's expectations about the future* — not just what they expect is most likely to happen, but also the degree of certainty that they attach to that expectation — that should result from the adoption of one policy or another, and also from one way or another of *explaining* that policy to the public. This is a key issue because expectations are a crucial determinant of rational behavior, and to the extent that one seeks to analyze the consequences of a policy by asking how it changes the behavior that one expects from rational decisionmakers, one must consider the question of how one expects the policy to affect people's expectations about their future conditions and the future consequences of the alternative actions (for example, alternative investment decisions) available to them now.

The most common approach to this question in analyses of macroeconomic policy over the past 30-40 years has been to assume “rational” (or model-consistent) expectations on the part of all economic agents. In the case of each of some set of contemplated policies, one determines the outcome (meaning, the predicted state-contingent evolution of the economy over some horizon that may extend far, or even indefinitely, into the future) that would represent a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) according to one's model, under the policy in question. One then compares the outcomes under these different REE associated with the different policies, in order to decide which policy is preferable. Yet, there are important reasons to doubt the reliability of policy evaluation exercises that are based — or at least that are solely based — on models that assume that whatever policy may be adopted, everyone in the economy will necessarily (and immediately) understand the consequences of the policy commitment in exactly the same way as the policy analyst does.

While this is certainly a hypothesis of appealing simplicity and generality, it is both a very strong (i.e., restrictive) hypothesis and one of doubtful realism. Even if one is willing to suppose that people are thoroughly rational and possess extraordinary abilities at calculation, it is hardly obvious that they must forecast the economy's evolution in the same way as an economist's own model forecasts it; for even if the model is completely correct, there will be many other possible models of the economy's probabilistic evolution that are (i) internally consistent, and (ii) not plainly contradicted by observations of the economy's evolution in the past (in particular, over the relatively short sample of past observations that will be available in practice).

The assumption is an even more heroic one in the case that a change in policy is contemplated, relative to the pattern of conduct of policy with which people will have had experience in the past. Hence one should be cautious about drawing strong conclusions about the character of desirable policies solely on the basis of an analysis that maintains this assumption.

Here we explore a different approach, under which the policy analyst should not pretend to be able to model the precise way in which people will form expectations if a particular policy is adopted. Instead, under our recommended approach, the policy analyst recognizes that the public's beliefs might be anything in a certain set of possible beliefs, satisfying the requirements of (i) internal consistency, and (ii) not being *too grossly inconsistent* with what actually happens in equilibrium, when people act on the basis of those beliefs. These requirements reduce to the familiar assumption of model-consistent (“rational”) expectations if the words “not too grossly inconsistent” are replaced by “completely consistent.”<sup>1</sup> The weakening of the standard requirement of model-consistent expectations is motivated by the recognition that it makes sense to expect people's beliefs to take account of patterns in their environment that are clear enough to be obvious after even a modest period of observation, while there is much less reason to expect them to have rejected an alternative hypothesis that is not easily distinguishable from the true model after only a series of observations of modest length.<sup>2</sup>

Under this approach, the economic analyst's model will associate with each contemplated policy not a unique prediction about what people in the economy will expect under that policy, but rather a *range* of possible forecasts; and there will correspondingly be a range of possible predictions for economic outcomes under the policy, rather than a unique prediction. In essence, it is proposed that one's economic model be used to place *bounds* on what can occur under a given policy, rather than expecting a point prediction. This does not mean that there will be no ground for choice among alternative policies. While the economic analyst will not be able to assert with confidence that a better outcome *must* occur if a given policy is adopted, one

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<sup>1</sup>The more general proposal is termed an assumption of “near-rational expectations” in Woodford (2010).

<sup>2</sup>Of course, the content of the proposal depends on the precise definition that is proposed for the criterion of “not being too grossly inconsistent” with the true pattern — or more precisely, the pattern predicted by the economic analyst's own model.

may well prefer the range of possible outcomes associated with one policy rather than another. Woodford (2010) proposes, in the spirit of the literatures on “ambiguity aversion” and on “robust control”<sup>3</sup> that one should choose a policy that ensures as high as possible a value of one’s objective under *any* of the set of possible outcomes associated with that policy (or alternatively, that ensures that a certain “satisficing” level of the policy objective can be ensured under *as broad as possible* a range of possible departures from model-consistent expectations). Under a particular precise definition of what it means for expectations to be sufficiently close to model-consistency, this criterion again allows a unique policy to be recommended. It will, however, differ in general from the one that would be selected if one were confident that people’s expectations would have to be fully consistent with the predictions of one’s model.

As in Woodford (2010), we explore the consequences of such a concern for robustness under a particular interpretation of the requirement of “near-rational expectations.” We suppose that the policy analyst assumes that people’s beliefs will be absolutely continuous with respect to the measure implied by her own model<sup>4</sup> and that she furthermore assumes that their beliefs will not be too different from the prediction of her model, where the distance is measured by a relative entropy criterion. A policy can then be said to be “robustly optimal” if it guarantees as high as possible a value of the policymaker’s objective, under any of the subjective beliefs consistent with the above criterion. This very non-parametric way of specifying the range of beliefs that are “close enough” to the policy analyst’s own beliefs to be considered as possible is based on the approach to bounding possible model mis-specifications in the robust policy analysis of Hansen and Sargent (2005).<sup>5</sup> It has the advantage,

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<sup>3</sup>See Hansen and Sargent (2008, 2011) for a discussion of these ideas and their application to decision problems arising in macroeconomics.

<sup>4</sup>This implies that people correctly identify zero-probability events as having zero probability, though they may differ in the probability they assign to events that occur with positive probability according to her model.

<sup>5</sup>Our use of this measure of departure from model-consistent expectations is somewhat different from theirs, however. Hansen and Sargent assume a policy analyst who is herself uncertain that her model is precisely correct as a description of the economy; when the expectations of other economic agents are an issue in the analysis, these are typically assumed to share the policy analyst’s model, and her concerns about mis-specification and preference for robustness as well. We are instead concerned about potential discrepancies between the views of the policy analyst and those of the public; and the potential departures from model-consistent beliefs on the part of the public are not assumed to reflect a concern for robustness on their part. In Benigno and Paciello (2010), instead,

in our view, of allowing us to be fairly agnostic about the nature of the possible alternative beliefs that may be entertained by the public, while at the same time retaining a high degree of theoretical parsimony. Even given the proposed definition of “near-rationality,” there remains a decision to be made about how large a value of the relative entropy should be contemplated by the policy analyst; but this simply defines a one-parameter family of robustly optimal policies, indexed by a parameter that can be taken to measure the policy analyst’s degree of concern for the robustness of the policy to possible departures from model-consistent expectations.

Woodford (2010) illustrates the possibility of policy analysis in accordance with this proposal, in the context of a familiar log-linear New Keynesian model of the trade-off between inflation and output stabilization.<sup>6</sup> Here we re-examine the conclusions of that paper, in the context of a model with explicit choice-theoretic foundations. It is not obvious from the analysis in the earlier paper whether the allowance for near-rational expectations in a more explicit, non-linear model of the decision problems of economic agents would yield similar conclusions; for while the solution to the linear-quadratic policy problem assumed in Woodford (2010) can be shown to provide a local approximation to the dynamics under an optimal policy commitment in a microfounded New Keynesian model under rational expectations (Benigno and Woodford, (2005)), it is not obvious that the proposed modification of these equations when expectations are allowed not to be model-consistent can similarly be justified as a local approximation.<sup>7</sup> Here we derive exact, nonlinear equations that characterize a robustly optimal policy commitment in the context of our microfounded model, before log-linearizing those equations to provide a local linear approximation to the solution to those equations; this is intended to guarantee that the linear approximations that are eventually relied upon to obtain our final, practical characterizations are invoked in an internally consistent manner.

The analysis in Woodford (2010) also optimizes over only a family of linear policy rules of a particular restrictive form, namely ones involving an advance commitment

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optimal policy is computed under the assumption that members of the public are concerned about the robustness of *their own* decisions, and the policymaker correctly understands the way that this distorts their actions (relative to what the policymaker believes would be optimal for them). Hansen and Sargent (2012) consider a similar exercise.

<sup>6</sup>See section 5.4 for further discussion of the earlier paper.

<sup>7</sup>Benigno and Paciello (2010) criticize the analysis of Woodford (2010) on this ground. Tack Yun has raised the same issue, in a discussion of Woodford (2010) at a conference at the Bank of Korea.

to a particular inflation target that depends solely on the history of exogenous disturbances, assumed to be observed by the central bank. While restricting attention to this particular class of rules is known not to matter in the case of an analysis of optimal policy in the log-linear approximate model under rational expectations,<sup>8</sup> it is not obvious that there may not be advantages to alternative types of rules when one allows for departures from rational expectations. For example, one might expect it to be desirable for policy to respond to observed departures of public expectations from those that the central bank regards as correct — something that has no advantage under an REE analysis, since no such discrepancy can ever exist in an REE. Here we consider robustly optimal policy choice from among a much more flexibly specified class of policies, including allowance for the possibility of explicit response to measures or indicators of private-sector expectations. In fact — to the extent that our criterion for robustness is simply one of ensuring that the highest possible lower bound for welfare (across alternative “near-rational” beliefs) is achieved<sup>9</sup> — we find that there is no benefit from expanding the set of candidate policy commitments to include ones that are explicitly dependent on private-sector expectations. But it is an important advance of the current analysis that this can be shown rather than simply being assumed.

In section 2, we explain our general approach to the characterization of robustly optimal policy. In addition to introducing our proposed definition of “near-rational expectations,” this section explains in general terms how it is possible for us to characterize robustly optimal policy without having to restrict the analysis to a parametric family of candidate policy rules, as is done in Woodford (2010). Section 3 then sets out the structure of the microfounded New Keynesian model, showing how the model’s exact structural relations are modified by the allowance for distorted private-sector expectations. Section 4 begins the analysis of robustly optimal policy in the New Keynesian model by characterizing an evolution of the economy that represents an upper bound on what can possibly be achieved. Section 5 provides an approximate analysis of the upper-bound dynamics by log-linearizing the exact conditions established in section 4; section 6 then shows that (at least up to the linear approximation

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<sup>8</sup>See, e.g., Clarida, Gali and Gertler(1999), or section 1 in Woodford (2011).

<sup>9</sup>In section 7.1 below, we discuss a stronger form of robustness that is more difficult to achieve, and argue that robustness in this stronger sense *would* require a commitment to respond to fairly direct measures of belief distortions.



introduced in section 5) the upper-bound dynamics are attainable by a variety of policies, and hence solve the robust policy problem stated earlier. Section 7 then considers further extensions, including a stronger form of robustness and robustly optimal policy when policy must be conducted subject to partial information on the part of the central bank; section 8 concludes.

## 2 Robustly Optimal Policy: Preliminaries

Here we first describe the general strategy of the approach that we use to characterize robustly optimal policy. These general ideas are then applied to a specific New Keynesian model in section 3.

### 2.1 The Robustly Optimal Policy Problem

Our general strategy for characterizing robustly optimal policy can be usefully explained in a fairly abstract setting, before turning to an application of the approach in the context of a specific model. In particular, we wish to explain how it is possible to characterize robustly optimal policy without restricting consideration to a particular parametric family of policy rules, as is done in Woodford (2010).

Let us suppose in general terms that a policymaker cares about economic outcomes that can be represented by some vector  $x$  of endogenous variables, the values of which will depend both on policy and on private-sector belief distortions, with the latter parameterized by some vector  $m$ .<sup>10</sup> Among the determinants of  $x$  are a vector of structural equations, that we write as

$$F(x, m) = 0. \tag{1}$$

We assume that the equations (1) are insufficient to completely determine the vector  $x$ , under given belief distortions  $m$ , so that the policymaker has a non-trivial choice.

We further assume that in absence of any concern for possible belief distortions on the part of the private sector, i.e., if it were possible to be confident that private-sector beliefs would coincide with his own, the policymaker would wish to achieve as high a value as possible of some objective  $W(x)$ . In the application below, this objective will

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<sup>10</sup>In section 2.3 we discuss a particular approach to the parameterization of belief distortions, but our general remarks here do not rely on it.

correspond to the expected utility of the representative household. In the presence of a concern for robustness, we instead assume, following Hansen and Sargent (2005) and Woodford (2010), that alternative policies are evaluated according to the value of

$$\min_{m \in M} [W(x) + \theta V(m)], \quad (2)$$

where the minimization is over the set of all possible belief distortions  $M$ ;  $V(m) \geq 0$  is a measure of the size of the belief distortions, equal to zero only in the case of beliefs that agree precisely with those of the policymaker;  $\theta > 0$  is a coefficient that indexes the policymaker's degree of concern about potential belief distortions; and (2) is evaluated taking into account the way in which belief distortions affect the determination of  $x$ . Here a small value of  $\theta$  implies a great degree of concern for robustness, while a large value of  $\theta$  implies that only modest departures from model-consistent expectations are considered plausible. In the limit as  $\theta \rightarrow \infty$ , criterion (2) reduces to  $W(x)$ , and the rational expectations analysis is recovered.<sup>11</sup>

More specifically, let us suppose that the policymaker must choose a policy commitment  $c$  from some set  $C$  of feasible policy commitments. Our goal is to show that we can obtain results about robustly optimal policy that do not depend on the precise specification of the set  $C$ ; for now, we assume that there exists such a set, but we make no specific assumption about what its boundaries may be. We only make two general assumptions about the nature of the set  $C$ . First, we assume that each of the commitments in the set  $C$  can be defined independently of what the belief distortions may be.<sup>12</sup> And second, we shall require that for any  $c \in C$ , there exists an equilibrium outcome for any choice of  $m \in M$ .

We thus rule out policy commitments that would imply non-existence of equilibrium for some  $m \in M$ , and thereby situations in which one might be tempted to conclude that belief distortions must be of a particular type under a given policy commitment, simply because no other beliefs would be consistent with existence of

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<sup>11</sup>Adam (2004) shows that the modified objective function (2) assumed for the case with a concern for robustness can be interpreted as inducing infinite risk aversion over a subset of the possible belief distortions. Again, the size of this subset depends inversely on the robustness parameter  $\theta$ .

<sup>12</sup>As is made more specific in the application below, we specify policy commitments by equations involving the endogenous and exogenous variables  $x$ , and not explicitly involving the belief distortions  $m$ . But of course the endogenous variables referred to in the rule will typically also be linked by structural equations that involve the belief distortions.

equilibrium. Instead of assuming that private-sector beliefs will necessarily be consistent with some equilibrium that allows the intended policy to be carried out, we assume that it is the responsibility of the policymaker to choose a policy commitment that can be executed (so that an equilibrium exists in which it is fulfilled), regardless of the beliefs that turn out to be held by the private sector. Thus, if under certain beliefs, the policy would have to be modified on ground of infeasibility, then a credible description of the policy commitment should specify that the outcome will be different in the case of those beliefs.<sup>13</sup>

Note that the set  $C$  may involve many different types of policy commitments. For example, it may include policy commitments that depend on the history of exogenous shocks; commitments that depend on the history of endogenous variables, as is the case with Taylor rules; and commitments regarding relationships between endogenous variables, as is the case with so-called targeting rules. Also, the endogenous variables in terms of which the policy commitment is expressed may include asset prices (futures prices, forward prices, etc.) that are often treated by central banks as indicators of private-sector expectations, as long as the requirement is satisfied that the policy commitment must be consistent with belief distortions of an arbitrary form.

In order to define the robustly optimal decision problem of the policymaker, we further specify an *outcome function* that identifies the equilibrium outcome  $x$  associated with a given policy commitment and a given belief distortion  $m$ .

**Definition 1** *The economic outcomes associated with belief distortions  $m$  and commitments  $c$  are given by an outcome function*

$$O : M \times C \rightarrow X$$

*with the property that for all  $m \in M$  and  $c \in C$ , the outcome  $O(m, c)$  and  $m$  jointly constitute an equilibrium of the model. In particular, the outcome function must satisfy*

$$F(O(m, c), m) = 0$$

*for all  $m \in M$  and  $c \in C$ .*

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<sup>13</sup>Alternatively, instead of ruling out commitments that give rise to non-existence of equilibrium under some belief distortions, it is equivalent to allow for such commitments and to assign a value of  $-\infty$  to the policymaker's objective when an equilibrium does not exist.

Here we have not been specific about what we mean by an “equilibrium,” apart from the fact that (1) must be satisfied. In the context of the specific model presented in the next section, equilibrium has a precise meaning. For purposes of the present discussion, it does not actually matter how we define equilibrium; only the definition of the outcome function matters for our subsequent discussion.<sup>14</sup>

Note also that we do not assume that there is necessarily a *unique* equilibrium associated with each policy commitment  $c$  and belief distortion  $m$ . We simply suppose that the policymaker’s robust policy problem can be defined relative to some assumption about which equilibrium should be selected in order to evaluate a given policy. For example, consistent with the desire for robustness, one might specify that the outcome function  $O(c, m)$  selects the *worst* of the equilibria, in the sense of yielding the lowest value for  $W(x)$  consistent with the pair  $(c, m)$ . Our approach to the characterization of robustly optimal policy, however, does not depend on such a specification; it can also be used to determine the robustly optimal policy for a policymaker who is willing to assume that the *best* equilibrium will occur, among those consistent with the given belief distortion.

We are now in a position to define *the robustly optimal policy problem* as the choice of a policy commitment to solve

$$\max_{c \in C} \min_{m \in M} \Lambda(m, c) \tag{3}$$

where

$$\Lambda(m, c) \equiv W(O(m, c)) + \theta V(m).$$

## 2.2 An Upper Bound on What Policy Can Robustly Achieve

We shall now determine an upper bound for the economic outcomes that robustly optimal policy can achieve in the decision problem (3), that does not depend on the choice of the set  $C$  of feasible commitments or the outcome function  $O(\cdot, \cdot)$ . We proceed in three incremental steps.

First, we use the min-max inequality (see appendix A.1 for a proof) to obtain

$$\max_{c \in C} \min_{m \in M} \Lambda(m, c) \leq \min_{m \in M} \max_{c \in C} \Lambda(m, c). \tag{4}$$

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<sup>14</sup>If the set of equations (1) is not a complete set of requirements for  $x$  to be an equilibrium, this only has the consequence that the upper-bound outcome defined below might not be a tight enough upper bound; it does not affect the validity of the assertion that it provides an upper bound.

This inequality captures the intuitively obvious fact that it is no disadvantage to be the second mover in the “game”.

Second, using the right-hand side in (4), we free the policymaker from the restriction to choose commitments from the strategy space  $C$  and from the restrictions imposed by the outcome function  $O(\cdot, \cdot)$ . Instead, we allow the policymaker to choose directly the preferred economic outcomes  $x$  consistent with an equilibrium. This yields

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{m \in M} \max_{c \in C} \Lambda(m, c) \\ & \leq \min_{m \in M} \max_{x \in X} [W(x) + \theta V(m)] \\ & \text{s.t. : } F(x, m) = 0, \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where the constraint  $F(x, m) = 0$  captures the restrictions required for  $x$  to be an equilibrium.<sup>15</sup>

In a third step, we define a *Lagrangian optimization problem* associated with problem (5):

$$\min_{m \in M} \max_{x \in X} L(m, x, \gamma), \tag{6}$$

where  $L$  is the Lagrange function

$$L(m, x, \gamma) \equiv W(x) + \theta V(m) + \gamma F(x, m),$$

and  $\gamma$  is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. We will now state conditions under which the outcome of the Lagrangian problem (6) generates weakly higher utility to the policymaker than problem (5). Under these conditions it will also be the case that the solution of the Lagrangian problem represents an upper bound on what policy can achieve in the robustly optimal policy problem (3).

Suppose we have found a point  $(m^*, x^*, \gamma^*)$  and the Lagrange function has a saddle at this point, i.e., satisfies

$$L(m^*, x, \gamma^*) < L(m^*, x^*, \gamma^*) \quad \forall x \neq x^* \tag{7a}$$

$$L(m, x^*, \gamma^*) > L(m^*, x^*, \gamma^*) \quad \forall m \neq m^* \tag{7b}$$

$$L(m^*, x^*, \gamma) \geq L(m^*, x^*, \gamma^*) \quad \forall \gamma. \tag{7c}$$

Appendix (A.1) then proves the following result:

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<sup>15</sup>The constraint represents a restriction on the choice of the second mover, i.e., the policymaker choosing  $x$ .

**Proposition 1** *Suppose  $(m^*, x^*, \gamma^*)$  satisfies the saddle point conditions (7) and let  $(x^R, m^R)$  denote the solution of the robustly optimal policy problem (3), then  $(x^*, m^*)$  is an equilibrium and*

$$W(x^R) + \theta V(m^R) \leq W(x^*) + \theta V(m^*).$$

The solution to the Lagrangian optimization problem thus delivers an upper bound on what policy can achieve in the robustly optimal policy problem, provided the saddle-point conditions hold.

Assuming differentiability, it follows from conditions (7a) and (7b) that the solution to the Lagrangian problem necessarily satisfies the first order conditions

$$W_x(x^*) + \gamma^* F_x(x^*, m^*) = 0 \tag{8}$$

$$\theta V_m(m^*) + \gamma^* F_m(x^*, m^*) = 0. \tag{9}$$

Moreover, condition (7c) holds if and only if

$$F(x^*, m^*) = 0. \tag{10}$$

Conditions (8)-(10) represent necessary conditions that allow us to generate candidate solutions for the Lagrangian optimization problem. If a candidate solution satisfies (7a)-(7b), then Proposition 1 implies that one has found an upper bound to the value of the robustly optimal policy problem (3).<sup>16</sup> For simplicity we refer to the solution of the Lagrangian problem as the “upper-bound solution” in the remainder of the paper.

### 2.3 Distorted Private Sector Expectations

We next discuss our approach to the parameterization of belief distortions, and the cost function  $V(m)$ . At this point it becomes necessary to specify that our analysis concerns dynamic models in which information is progressively revealed over time, at a countably infinite sequence of successive decision points.

Let  $(\Omega, \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{P})$  denote a standard probability space with  $\Omega$  denoting the set of possible realizations of an exogenous stochastic disturbance process  $\{\xi_0, \xi_1, \xi_2, \dots\}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  the

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<sup>16</sup>Condition (7c) is implied by the necessary condition (10).

$\sigma$ -algebra of Borel subsets of  $\Omega$ , and  $\mathcal{P}$  a probability measure assigning probabilities to any set  $B \in \mathcal{B}$ . We consider a situation in which the policy analyst assigns probabilities to events using the probability measure  $\mathcal{P}$  but fears that the private sector may make decisions on the basis of a potentially different probability measure denoted by  $\widehat{\mathcal{P}}$ .

We let  $E$  denote the policy analyst's expectations induced by  $\mathcal{P}$  and  $\widehat{E}$  the corresponding private sector expectations associated with  $\widehat{\mathcal{P}}$ . A first restriction on the class of possible distorted measures that the policy analyst is assumed to consider — part of what we mean by the restriction to “near-rational expectations” — is the assumption that the distorted measure  $\widehat{\mathcal{P}}$ , when restricted to events over any finite horizon, is absolutely continuous with respect to the correspondingly restricted version of the policy analyst's measure  $\mathcal{P}$ .

The Radon-Nikodym theorem then allows us to express the distorted private sector expectations of some  $t + j$  measurable random variable  $X_{t+j}$  as

$$\widehat{E}[X_{t+j}|\xi^t] = E\left[\frac{\mathcal{M}_{t+j}}{\mathcal{M}_t}X_{t+j}|\xi^t\right]$$

for all  $j \geq 0$  where  $\xi^t$  denotes the partial history of exogenous disturbances up to period  $t$ . The random variable  $\mathcal{M}_{t+j}$  is the Radon-Nikodym derivative, and completely summarizes belief distortions.<sup>17</sup> The variable  $\mathcal{M}_{t+j}$  is measurable with respect to the history of shocks  $\xi^{t+j}$ , non-negative and is a martingale, i.e., satisfies

$$E[\mathcal{M}_{t+j}|\omega^t] = \mathcal{M}_t$$

for all  $j \geq 0$ . Defining

$$m_{t+1} = \frac{\mathcal{M}_{t+1}}{\mathcal{M}_t}$$

one step ahead expectations based on the measure  $\widehat{\mathcal{P}}$  can be expressed as

$$\widehat{E}[X_{t+1}|\xi^t] = E[m_{t+1}X_{t+1}|\xi^t],$$

where  $m_{t+1}$  satisfies

$$E[m_{t+1}|\xi^t] = 1 \text{ and } m_{t+1} \geq 0. \tag{11}$$

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<sup>17</sup>See Hansen and Sargent (2005) for further discussion.

This representation of the distorted beliefs of the private sector is useful in defining a measure of the distance of the private-sector beliefs from those of the policy analyst. As discussed in Hansen and Sargent (2005), the relative entropy

$$R_t = E_t[m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1}]$$

is a measure of the distance of (one-period-ahead) private-sector beliefs from the policymaker's beliefs with a number of appealing properties.

We wish to extend this measure of the size of belief distortions to an infinite-horizon economy with a stationary structure. In the kind of model with which we are concerned, the policy objective in the absence of a concern for robustness is of the form

$$W(x) \equiv E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(x_t) \right], \quad (12)$$

for some discount factor  $0 < \beta < 1$ , where  $U(\cdot)$  is a time-invariant function, and  $x_t$  is a vector describing the real allocation of resources in period  $t$ . Correspondingly, we propose to measure the overall degree of distortion of private-sector beliefs by a discounted criterion of the form

$$V(m) \equiv E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t+1} m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1} \right], \quad (13)$$

as in Woodford (2010). This is a discounted sum of the one-period-ahead distortion measures  $\{R_t\}$ . We assign relative weights to the one-period-ahead measures  $R_t$  for different dates and different states of the world in this criterion that match those of the other part of the policy objective (12). Use of this cost function implies that the policymaker's degree of concern for robustness (relative to other stabilization objectives) remains constant over time, regardless of past history.

Hansen and Sargent (2005) appear to use a different cost function, but this is because they consider a problem in which a decisionmaker is concerned about the possible inaccuracy of *her own* probability beliefs. In their problem, the decisionmaker's basic objective is of the form

$$W^{HS}(x) \equiv \hat{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(x_t) \right], \quad (14)$$

instead of (12), as she wishes to maximize expected utility under the *correct* probabilities, which may be different from those implied by her baseline model. They



correspondingly define a discounted measure of belief distortions

$$V^{HS}(m) \equiv \widehat{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t+1} m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1} \right] = E_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t+1} M_{t+1} \log m_{t+1} \right] \quad (15)$$

instead of (13). As in their analysis, our worst-case belief distortions minimize a discounted sum of terms of the form  $U(x_t) + \beta\theta R_t$ , with a relative weight  $\theta$  that is time-invariant.<sup>18</sup> This allows us to obtain a characterization of robustly optimal policy with a stationary form, which simplifies the presentation of our results below.

It may be asked why we do not assume an objective of the form (14) in our case, in which case it would also be appropriate to assume a cost function (15) for belief distortions. This would imply a desire to maximize the expected utility of the representative household *as evaluated by that household* when forecasting the consequences of its actions, whether the policymaker agrees with those beliefs or not. We instead assume a paternalistic objective: the policymaker wishes to maximize people's *true welfare*, whether they understand it correctly or not.

There are arguments to be made for either objective in a normative analysis. Here we focus on the paternalistic case, because our results are less trivial in that case. The policymaker's problem in the non-paternalistic case would be equivalent to the choice of a policy under the assumption that a rational-expectations equilibrium must result, but with uncertainty about the true probabilities of the stochastic disturbances (assumed to be correctly understood by the private sector). Since the rational-expectations analysis of Giannoni and Woodford (2010) has already shown that there exists a form of policy commitment (commitment to an optimal target criterion) that achieves a welfare-optimal equilibrium *regardless* of the stochastic process assumed for the exogenous disturbances, this would also be a robustly optimal policy commitment under the non-paternalistic objective. The case considered here is instead more complex.<sup>19</sup>

We now apply these results to a specific New Keynesian DSGE model of the options for monetary stabilization policy.

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<sup>18</sup>The point of the discount factor in (15) is clearly to make this relative weight time-invariant.

<sup>19</sup>See Hansen and Sargent (2011) for additional discussion of alternative possible robustly optimal policy problems in the context of a dynamic New Keynesian model.

### 3 A New Keynesian Model with Distorted Private Sector Expectations

We shall begin by deriving the exact structural relations of a New Keynesian model that is completely standard, except that the private sector holds potentially distorted expectations. The exposition here follows and extends Woodford (2011), who writes the exact structural relations in a recursive form for the case with model-consistent expectations.

#### 3.1 Private Sector

The economy is made up of identical infinite-lived households, each of which seeks to maximize

$$U \equiv \widehat{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \tilde{u}(C_t; \xi_t) - \int_0^1 \tilde{v}(H_t(j); \xi_t) dj \right], \quad (16)$$

subject to a sequence of flow budget constraints<sup>20</sup>

$$P_t C_t + B_t \leq \int_0^1 w_t(j) P_t H_t(j) dj + B_{t-1}(1 + i_{t-1}) + \Sigma_t + T_t,$$

where  $\widehat{E}_0$  is the common distorted expectations held by consumers conditional on the state of the world in period  $t_0$ ,  $C_t$  an aggregate consumption good which can be bought at nominal price  $P_t$ ,  $H_t(j)$  is the quantity supplied of labor of type  $j$  and  $w_t(j)$  the associated real wage,  $B_t$  nominal bond holdings,  $i_t$  the nominal interest rate, and  $\xi_t$  is a vector of exogenous disturbances, which may include random shifts of either of the functions  $\tilde{u}$  or  $\tilde{v}$ . The variable  $T_t$  denotes lump sum taxes levied by the government and  $\Sigma_t$  profits accruing to households from the ownership of firms.

The aggregate consumption good is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of each of a continuum of differentiated goods,

$$C_t \equiv \left[ \int_0^1 c_t(i)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} di \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}, \quad (17)$$

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<sup>20</sup>We abstract from state contingent assets in the household budget constraint because the representative agent assumption implies that in equilibrium there will be no trade in these assets. We consider the prices of state contingent assets in section 7.2 below.

with an elasticity of substitution equal to  $\eta > 1$ . Each differentiated good is supplied by a single monopolistically competitive producer. There are assumed to be many goods in each of an infinite number of “industries”; the goods in each industry  $j$  are produced using a type of labor that is specific to that industry, and suppliers in the same industry also change their prices at the same time, but are subject to frictions in price adjustment as described below.<sup>21</sup> The representative household supplies all types of labor as well as consuming all types of goods. To simplify the algebraic form of the results, it is convenient to assume isoelastic functional forms

$$\tilde{u}(C_t; \xi_t) \equiv \frac{C_t^{1-\tilde{\sigma}^{-1}} \bar{C}_t^{\tilde{\sigma}^{-1}}}{1 - \tilde{\sigma}^{-1}}, \quad (18)$$

$$\tilde{v}(H_t; \xi_t) \equiv \frac{\lambda}{1 + \nu} H_t^{1+\nu} \bar{H}_t^{-\nu}, \quad (19)$$

where  $\tilde{\sigma}, \nu > 0$ , and  $\{\bar{C}_t, \bar{H}_t\}$  are bounded exogenous disturbance processes which are both among the exogenous disturbances included in the vector  $\xi_t$ .

There is a common technology for the production of all goods, in which (industry-specific) labor is the only variable input,

$$y_t(i) = A_t f(h_t(i)) = A_t h_t(i)^{1/\phi}, \quad (20)$$

where  $A_t$  is an exogenously varying technology factor, and  $\phi > 1$ . The Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (17) imply that the quantity demanded of each individual good  $i$  will equal<sup>22</sup>

$$y_t(i) = Y_t \left( \frac{p_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta}, \quad (21)$$

where  $Y_t$  is the total demand for the composite good defined in (17),  $p_t(i)$  is the (money) price of the individual good, and  $P_t$  is the price index,

$$P_t \equiv \left[ \int_0^1 p_t(i)^{1-\eta} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}, \quad (22)$$

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<sup>21</sup>The assumption of segmented factor markets for different “industries” is inessential to the results obtained here, but allows a numerical calibration of the model that implies a speed of adjustment of the general price level more in line with aggregate time series evidence. For further discussion, see chapter 3 in Woodford (2003).

<sup>22</sup>In addition to assuming that household utility depends only on the quantity obtained of  $C_t$ , we assume that the government also cares only about the quantity obtained of the composite good defined by (17), and that it seeks to obtain this good through a minimum-cost combination of purchases of individual goods.

corresponding to the minimum cost for which a unit of the composite good can be purchased in period  $t$ . Total demand is given by

$$Y_t = C_t + g_t Y_t, \tag{23}$$

where  $g_t$  is the share of the total amount of composite good purchased by the government, treated here as an exogenous disturbance process.

### 3.2 Government Sector

We assume that the central bank can control the riskless short-term nominal interest rate  $i_t$ ,<sup>23</sup> and that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates never binds.<sup>24</sup> We equally assume that the fiscal authority ensures intertemporal government solvency regardless of what monetary policy may be chosen by the monetary authority. This allows us to abstract from the fiscal consequences of alternative monetary policies and to ignore the bond versus lump sum tax financing decision of the fiscal authority in our consideration of optimal monetary policy, as is implicitly done in Clarida et al.(1999), and much of the literature on monetary policy rules. Finally, we assume that the fiscal authority implements a bounded path for the real value of outstanding government debt, so that the transversality conditions associated with optimal private sector behavior are automatically satisfied.

### 3.3 Household Optimality Conditions

Each household maximizes utility by choosing state contingent sequences  $\{C_t, H_t(j), B_t\}$  taking as given the process for  $\{P_t, w_t(j), i_t, \Sigma_t, T_t\}$ . The first order conditions give rise to an optimal labor supply relation

$$w_t(j) = \frac{\tilde{v}_h(H_t(j); \xi_t)}{\tilde{u}_c(C_t; \xi_t)}, \tag{24}$$

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<sup>23</sup>This is possible even though we abstract from monetary frictions that would account for a demand for central-bank liabilities that earn a substandard rate of return, as explained in chapter 2 in Woodford (2003).

<sup>24</sup>This can be shown to be true in the case of small enough disturbances, given that the nominal interest rate is equal to  $\bar{r} = \beta^{-1} - 1 > 0$  under the optimal policy in the absence of disturbances. Consequences of a binding zero lower bound for the case with non-distorted private sector expectations are explored in Eggertson and Woodford (2003) and Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), for example.

and a consumption Euler equation

$$\tilde{u}_C(C_t; \xi_t) = \beta \widehat{E}_t \left[ \tilde{u}_C(C_t; \xi_t) \frac{1 + i_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right], \quad (25)$$

which characterize optimal household behavior.

### 3.4 Optimal Price Setting by Firms

The producers in each industry fix the prices of their goods in monetary units for a random interval of time, as in the model of staggered pricing introduced by Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Let  $0 \leq \alpha < 1$  be the fraction of prices that remain unchanged in any period. A supplier that changes its price in period  $t$  chooses its new price  $p_t(i)$  to maximize

$$\widehat{E}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \alpha^{T-t} Q_{t,T} \Pi(p_t(i), p_T^j, P_T; Y_T, \xi_T), \quad (26)$$

where  $\widehat{E}_t$  is the distorted expectations of price setters conditional on time  $t$  information, which are assumed identical to the expectations held by consumers,  $Q_{t,T}$  is the stochastic discount factor by which financial markets discount random nominal income in period  $T$  to determine the nominal value of a claim to such income in period  $t$ , and  $\alpha^{T-t}$  is the probability that a price chosen in period  $t$  will not have been revised by period  $T$ . In equilibrium, this discount factor is given by

$$Q_{t,T} = \beta^{T-t} \frac{\tilde{u}_C(C_T; \xi_T) P_t}{\tilde{u}_C(C_t; \xi_t) P_T}. \quad (27)$$

Profits are equal to after-tax sales revenues net of the wage bill. Sales revenues are determined by the demand function (21), so that (nominal) after-tax revenue equals

$$(1 - \tau_t) p_t(i) Y_t \left( \frac{p_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta}.$$

Here  $\tau_t$  is a proportional tax on sales revenues in period  $t$ ;  $\{\tau_t\}$  is treated as an exogenous disturbance process, taken as given by the monetary policymaker. We assume that  $\tau_t$  fluctuates over a small interval around a non-zero steady-state level  $\bar{\tau}$ . We allow for exogenous variations in the tax rate in order to include the possibility of “pure cost-push shocks” that affect equilibrium pricing behavior while implying no change in the efficient allocation of resources.

The real wage demanded for labor of type  $j$  is given by equation (24) and firms are assumed to be wage-takers. Substituting the assumed functional forms for preferences and technology, the function

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(p, p^j, P; Y, \xi) \equiv & (1 - \tau)pY(p/P)^{-\eta} \\ & - \lambda P \left(\frac{p}{P}\right)^{-\eta\phi} \left(\frac{p^j}{P}\right)^{-\eta\phi\nu} \bar{H}^{-\nu} \left(\frac{Y}{A}\right)^{1+\omega} \left(\frac{(1-g)Y}{\bar{C}}\right)^{1/\bar{\sigma}} \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

then describes the after-tax nominal profits of a supplier with price  $p$ , in an industry with common price  $p^j$ , when the aggregate price index is equal to  $P$  and aggregate demand is equal to  $Y$ . Here  $\omega \equiv \phi(1 + \nu) - 1 > 0$  is the elasticity of real marginal cost in an industry with respect to industry output. The vector of exogenous disturbances  $\xi_t$  now includes  $A_t, g_t$  and  $\tau_t$ , in addition to the preference shocks  $\bar{C}_t$  and  $\bar{H}_t$ .

Each of the suppliers that revise their prices in period  $t$  chooses the same new price  $p_t^*$ , that maximizes (26). Note that supplier  $i$ 's profits are a concave function of the quantity sold  $y_t(i)$ , since revenues are proportional to  $y_t(i)^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}}$  and hence concave in  $y_t(i)$ , while costs are convex in  $y_t(i)$ . Moreover, since  $y_t(i)$  is proportional to  $p_t(i)^{-\eta}$ , the profit function is also concave in  $p_t(i)^{-\eta}$ . The first-order condition for the optimal choice of the price  $p_t(i)$  is the same as the one with respect to  $p_t(i)^{-\eta}$ ; hence the first-order condition with respect to  $p_t(i)$ ,

$$\hat{E}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} \alpha^{T-t} Q_{t,T} \Pi_1(p_t(i), p_T^j, P_T; Y_T, \xi_T) = 0,$$

is both necessary and sufficient for an optimum. The equilibrium choice  $p_t^*$  (which is the same for each firm in industry  $j$ ) is the solution to the equation obtained by substituting  $p_t(i) = p_t^j = p_t^*$  into the above first-order condition.

Under the assumed isoelastic functional forms, the optimal choice has a closed-form solution

$$\frac{p_t^*}{P_t} = \left(\frac{K_t}{F_t}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\omega\eta}}, \quad (29)$$

where  $F_t$  and  $K_t$  are functions of current aggregate output  $Y_t$ , the current exogenous state  $\xi_t$ , and the expected future evolution of inflation, output, and disturbances, defined by

$$F_t \equiv \hat{E}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\alpha\beta)^{T-t} f(Y_T; \xi_T) \left(\frac{P_T}{P_t}\right)^{\eta-1}, \quad (30)$$

$$K_t \equiv \widehat{E}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\alpha\beta)^{T-t} k(Y_T; \xi_T) \left( \frac{P_T}{P_t} \right)^{\eta(1+\omega)}, \quad (31)$$

where

$$f(Y; \xi) \equiv (1 - \tau) \bar{C}^{\bar{\sigma}^{-1}} (Y(1 - g))^{-\bar{\sigma}^{-1}} Y, \quad (32)$$

$$k(Y; \xi) \equiv \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \lambda \phi \frac{1}{A^{1+\omega} \bar{H}^\nu} Y^{1+\omega}. \quad (33)$$

Relations (30)–(31) can instead be written in the recursive form

$$F_t = f(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha\beta \widehat{E}_t [\Pi_{t+1}^{\eta-1} F_{t+1}] \quad (34)$$

$$K_t = k(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha\beta \widehat{E}_t [\Pi_{t+1}^{\eta(1+\omega)} K_{t+1}], \quad (35)$$

where  $\Pi_t \equiv P_t/P_{t-1}$ .<sup>25</sup>

The price index then evolves according to a law of motion

$$P_t = [(1 - \alpha)p_t^{*1-\eta} + \alpha P_{t-1}^{1-\eta}]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}, \quad (36)$$

as a consequence of (22). Substitution of (29) into (36) implies that equilibrium inflation in any period is given by

$$\frac{1 - \alpha \Pi_t^{\eta-1}}{1 - \alpha} = \left( \frac{F_t}{K_t} \right)^{\frac{\eta-1}{1+\omega\eta}}. \quad (37)$$

Equations (34), (35) and (37) jointly define a short-run aggregate supply relation between inflation and output, given the current disturbances  $\xi_t$ , and expectations regarding future inflation, output, and disturbances.

### 3.5 Summary of the Model Equations and Equilibrium Definition

For the subsequent analysis it will be helpful to express the model in terms of the endogenous variables  $(K_t, F_t, Y_t, i_t, \Delta_t, m_t)$  only, where  $m_t$  is the belief distortions of

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<sup>25</sup>It is evident that (30) implies (34); but one can also show that processes that satisfy (34) each period, together with certain bounds, must satisfy (30). Since we are interested below only in the characterization of bounded equilibria, we can omit the statement of the bounds that are implied by the existence of well-behaved expressions on the right-hand sides of (30) and (31), and treat (34)–(35) as necessary and sufficient for processes  $\{F_t, K_t\}$  to measure the relevant marginal conditions for optimal price-setting.

the private sector and

$$\Delta_t \equiv \int_0^1 \left( \frac{p_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\eta(1+\omega)} di \geq 1 \quad (38)$$

a measure of price dispersion at time  $t$ . The vector of exogenous disturbances is given by  $\xi_t = (A_t, g_t, \tau_t, \bar{C}_t, \bar{H}_t)'$ .

We begin by expressing expected household utility (evaluated under the objective measure  $\mathcal{P}$ ) in terms of these variables. Inverting the production function (20) to write the demand for each type of labor as a function of the quantities produced of the various differentiated goods, and using the identity (23) to substitute for  $C_t$ , where  $g_t$  is treated as exogenous, it is possible to write the utility of the representative household as a function of the expected production plan  $\{y_t(i)\}$ . One thereby obtains

$$U \equiv E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ u(Y_t; \xi_t) - \int_0^1 v(y_t^j; \xi_t) dj \right], \quad (39)$$

where

$$u(Y_t; \xi_t) \equiv \tilde{u}(Y_t(1 - g_t); \xi_t)$$

and

$$v(y_t^j; \xi_t) \equiv \tilde{v}(f^{-1}(y_t^j/A_t); \xi_t).$$

In this last expression we make use of the fact that the quantity produced of each good in industry  $j$  will be the same, and hence can be denoted  $y_t^j$ ; and that the quantity of labor hired by each of these firms will also be the same, so that the total demand for labor of type  $j$  is proportional to the demand of any one of these firms.

One can furthermore express the relative quantities demanded of the differentiated goods each period as a function of their relative prices, using (21). This allows us to write the utility flow to the representative household in the form

$$U(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t) \equiv u(Y_t; \xi_t) - v(Y_t; \xi_t)\Delta_t.$$

Hence we can express the household objective (39) as

$$U = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t). \quad (40)$$

Here  $U(Y, \Delta; \xi)$  is a strictly concave function of  $Y$  for given  $\Delta$  and  $\xi$ , and a monotonically decreasing function of  $\Delta$  given  $Y$  and  $\xi$ .



Using this notation, the consumption Euler equation (25) can be expressed as

$$u_Y(Y_t; \xi_t) = \beta E_t \left[ m_{t+1} u_Y(Y_{t+1}; \xi_{t+1}) \frac{1+i_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \frac{1-g_t}{1-g_{t+1}} \right]. \quad (41)$$

Using (37) to substitute for the variable  $\Pi_t$  equations (34) and (35) can be expressed as

$$F_t = f(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha \beta E_t [m_{t+1} \phi_F(K_{t+1}, F_{t+1})] \quad (42)$$

$$K_t = k(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha \beta E_t [m_{t+1} \phi_K(K_{t+1}, F_{t+1})], \quad (43)$$

where the functions  $\phi_F, \phi_K$  are both homogeneous degree 1 functions of  $K$  and  $F$ .

Because the relative prices of the industries that do not change their prices in period  $t$  remain the same, one can use (36) to derive a law of motion for the price dispersion term  $\Delta_t$  of the form

$$\Delta_t = h(\Delta_{t-1}, \Pi_t),$$

where

$$h(\Delta, \Pi) \equiv \alpha \Delta \Pi^{\eta(1+\omega)} + (1-\alpha) \left( \frac{1-\alpha \Pi^{\eta-1}}{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{\eta(1+\omega)}{\eta-1}}.$$

This is the source of welfare losses from inflation or deflation. Using once more (37) to substitute for the variable  $\Pi_t$  one obtains

$$\Delta_t = \tilde{h}(\Delta_{t-1}, K_t/F_t). \quad (44)$$

Equation (41)-(44) represent four constraints on the equilibrium paths of the six endogenous variables  $(Y_t, F_t, K_t, \Delta_t, i_t, m_t)$ . For a given sequence of belief distortions  $m_t$  satisfying restriction (11) there is thus one degree of freedom left, which can be determined by monetary policy. We are now in a position to define the equilibrium with distorted private sector expectations:

**Definition 2 (DEE)** *A distorted expectations equilibrium (DEE) is a stochastic process for  $\{Y_t, F_t, K_t, \Delta_t, i_t, m_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  satisfying equations (11) and (41)-(44).*

## 4 Upper Bound in the New Keynesian Model

We shall now formulate the Lagrangian optimization problem (6) for the nonlinear New Keynesian model with distorted private sector expectations, and derive the nonlinear form of the necessary conditions (8)-(10).

The Lagrangian game (6) for the New Keynesian model is given by

$$E_0 \min_{\{m_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \max_{\{Y_t, F_t, K_t, \Delta_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \left[ \begin{array}{l} U(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t) + \theta \beta m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1} \\ + \gamma_t \left( \tilde{h}(\Delta_{t-1}, K_t/F_t) - \Delta_t \right) \\ \Gamma'_t [z(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha \beta m_{t+1} \Phi(Z_{t+1}) - Z_t] \\ + \beta \psi_t (m_{t+1} - 1) \end{array} \right] + \alpha \Gamma'_{-1} \Phi(Z_0), \quad (45)$$

where  $\gamma_t, \Gamma_t, \psi_t$  denote Lagrange multipliers and we used the shorthand notation

$$Z_t \equiv \begin{bmatrix} F_t \\ K_t \end{bmatrix}, \quad z(Y; \xi) \equiv \begin{bmatrix} f(Y; \xi) \\ k(Y; \xi) \end{bmatrix}, \quad \Phi(Z) \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \phi_F(K, F) \\ \phi_K(K, F) \end{bmatrix}, \quad (46)$$

and added the initial pre-commitment  $\alpha \Gamma'_{-1} \Phi(Z_0)$  to obtain a time-invariant solution. The Lagrange multiplier vector  $\Gamma_t$  is associated with constraints (42) and (43) and given by  $\Gamma'_t = (\Gamma_{1t}, \Gamma_{2t})$ . The multiplier  $\gamma_t$  relates to equation (44) and the multiplier  $\psi_t$  to constraint (11). We also eliminated the interest rate and the constraint (41) from the problem. Under the assumption that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is not binding, constraint (41) imposes no restrictions on the path of the other variables. The path for the nominal interest rates can thus be computed ex-post using the solution for the remaining variables and equation (41).

The nonlinear FOCs for the policymaker (8) are then given by

$$U_Y(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t) + \Gamma'_t z_Y(Y_t; \xi_t) = 0 \quad (47)$$

$$-\gamma_t \tilde{h}_2(\Delta_{t-1}, K_t/F_t) \frac{K_t}{F_t^2} - \Gamma_{1t} + \alpha m_t \Gamma'_{t-1} D_1(K_t/F_t) = 0 \quad (48)$$

$$\gamma_t \tilde{h}_2(\Delta_{t-1}, K_t/F_t) \frac{1}{F_t} - \Gamma_{2t} + \alpha m_t \Gamma'_{t-1} D_2(K_t/F_t) = 0 \quad (49)$$

$$U_{\Delta}(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t) - \gamma_t + \beta E_t[\gamma_{t+1} \tilde{h}_1(\Delta_t, K_{t+1}/F_{t+1})] = 0 \quad (50)$$

for all  $t \geq 0$ . The nonlinear FOC (9) defining the worst-case belief distortions takes the form

$$\theta(\log m_t + 1) + \alpha \Gamma'_{t-1} \Phi(Z_t) + \psi_{t-1} = 0 \quad (51)$$

for all  $t \geq 1$ . Above,  $\tilde{h}_i(\Delta, K/F)$  denotes the partial derivative of  $\tilde{h}(\Delta, K/F)$  with respect to its  $i$ -th argument, and  $D_i(K/F)$  is the  $i$ -th column of the matrix

$$D(Z) \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \partial_F \phi_F(Z) & \partial_K \phi_F(Z) \\ \partial_F \phi_K(Z) & \partial_K \phi_K(Z) \end{bmatrix}. \quad (52)$$

Since the elements of  $\Phi(Z)$  are homogeneous degree 1 functions of  $Z$ , the elements of  $D(Z)$  are all homogenous degree 0 functions of  $Z$ , and hence functions of  $K/F$  only. Thus we can alternatively write  $D(K/F)$ . Finally, the structural equations (10) are given by equations (42)-(44). This completes the description of the necessary conditions equations (8)-(10) for the New Keynesian model.

## 5 Locally Optimal Dynamics under the Upper Bound Policy

We shall be concerned solely with optimal outcomes that involve small fluctuations around a deterministic optimal steady state. An *optimal steady state* is a set of constant values  $(\bar{Y}, \bar{Z}, \bar{\Delta}, \bar{\gamma}, \bar{\Gamma}, \bar{\psi}, \bar{m})$  that solve the structural equations (42)-(44) and the FOCs (47)-(51) in the case that  $\xi_t = \bar{\xi}$  at all times and initial conditions consistent with the steady state are assumed. We now compute the steady-state, then derive the local dynamics implied by these FOCs and show that the saddle point conditions (7) are locally satisfied.

### 5.1 Optimal Steady State

In a deterministic steady state, restriction (11) implies  $\bar{m} = 1$ , so that the optimal steady state is the same as derived in Benigno and Woodford (2005) for the case with non-distorted private sector expectations. Specifically, it satisfies  $\bar{F} = \bar{K} = (1 - \alpha\beta)^{-1}k(\bar{Y}; \bar{\xi})$ , which implies  $\bar{\Pi} = 1$  (no inflation) and  $\bar{\Delta} = 1$  (zero price dispersion), and the value of  $\bar{Y}$  is implicitly defined by

$$f(\bar{Y}, \bar{\xi}) = k(\bar{Y}, \bar{\xi}).$$

Because  $\tilde{h}_2(1, 1) = 0$  (the effects of a small non-zero inflation rate on the measure of price dispersion are of second order), conditions (48)-(49) reduce in the steady state

to the eigenvector condition

$$\bar{\Gamma}' = \alpha \bar{\Gamma}' D(1). \quad (53)$$

Moreover, since when evaluated at a point where  $F = K$ ,

$$\frac{\partial \log(\phi_K/\phi_F)}{\partial \log K} = -\frac{\partial \log(\phi_K/\phi_F)}{\partial \log F} = \frac{1}{\alpha},$$

and we observe that  $D(1)$  has a left eigenvector  $[1 \ -1]$ , with eigenvalue  $1/\alpha$ ; hence (53) is satisfied if and only if  $\bar{\Gamma}_2 = -\bar{\Gamma}_1$ . Condition (47) provides then one additional condition to determine the magnitude of the elements of  $\bar{\Gamma}_1$ . It implies

$$U_Y(\bar{Y}, 1; \bar{\xi}) + \bar{\Gamma}_1(f_Y(\bar{Y}; \bar{\xi}) - k_Y(\bar{Y}; \bar{\xi})) = 0. \quad (54)$$

Since  $k_y - f_y = \omega + \tilde{\sigma}^{-1} > 0$  we have that

$$\bar{\Gamma}_1 > 0,$$

whenever  $U_Y > 0$ , i.e., whenever steady state output  $\bar{Y}$  falls short of the first best or efficient steady state level  $\bar{Y}^e$  defined as

$$U_Y(\bar{Y}^e, 1; \bar{\xi}) = 0.$$

In the limiting case  $\bar{Y} \rightarrow \bar{Y}^e$  we have  $\bar{\Gamma}_1 = 0$ . Finally, condition (50) provides a restriction allowing to determine the steady state value of  $\bar{\gamma}$ :

$$U_\Delta(\bar{Y}, 1; \bar{\xi}) - \bar{\gamma} + \beta \bar{\gamma} \tilde{h}_1(1, 1) = 0.$$

Since  $U_\Delta < 0$  and  $\tilde{h}_1(1, 1) = \alpha$ , we have

$$\bar{\gamma} = \frac{U_\Delta(\bar{Y}, 1; \bar{\xi})}{(1 - \beta\alpha)} < 0.$$

## 5.2 Optimal Dynamics

Let us define the endogenous variables

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &\equiv \log \Pi_t \\ \hat{m}_t &\equiv \log m_t \\ x_t &\equiv \hat{Y}_t - \hat{Y}_t^*, \end{aligned} \quad (55)$$

where  $x_t$  denotes the ‘output gap’ with  $\widehat{Y}_t = \log Y_t/\bar{Y}$ ,  $\widehat{Y}_t^* = \log Y_t^*/\bar{Y}$  and  $Y_t^*$  being the ‘target level of output’, which is a function of the exogenous disturbances only and implicitly defined as

$$U_Y(Y_t^*, 1; \xi_t) + \bar{\Gamma}' z_Y(Y_t^*; \xi_t) = 0. \quad (56)$$

The following proposition characterizes the log-linear local approximation to the dynamics implied by the nonlinear structural equations (42)-(44) and the nonlinear first-order conditions (47)-(51):

**Proposition 2** *If initial price dispersion  $\Delta_{-1}$  is small (of order  $\mathcal{O}(\|\xi\|^2)$ ) and the initial precommitments such that  $\Gamma_{1,0} = -\Gamma_{2,0} > 0$ , then equations (42)-(44) and (47)-(51) imply up to first order that*

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + u_t \quad (57)$$

$$0 = \xi_\pi \pi_t + \lambda_x (x_t - x_{t-1}) + \xi_m \hat{m}_t \quad (58)$$

$$\hat{m}_t = \lambda_m (\pi_t - E_{t-1}[\pi_t]). \quad (59)$$

The constants  $(\kappa > 0, \xi_\pi, \xi_m, \lambda_x, \lambda_m)$  are functions of the deep model parameters (explicit expressions are provided in Appendix A.2). In the empirically relevant case in which steady state output falls short of its efficient level ( $\bar{Y} < \bar{Y}^e$ ) we have  $\xi_\pi > 0, \xi_m > 0, \lambda_m > 0$ ; and if the steady-state output distortion is sufficiently small,  $\lambda_x > 0$  as well.

The proof of the proposition is given in appendix A.2. The disturbance  $u_t$  above denotes a ‘cost-push’ term and is defined as

$$u_t \equiv \kappa [\widehat{Y}_t^* + u_\xi' \tilde{\xi}_t], \quad (60)$$

where  $u_\xi$  is defined in equation (81) in Appendix A.2. It is straightforward to generalize the above proposition to the case with larger degrees of initial price dispersion ( $\Delta_{-1}$  of order  $\mathcal{O}(\|\xi\|)$ ). As becomes clear from Appendix A.2, this would add additional deterministic dynamics to the optimal path. Also, in the case that the initial precommitments fail to imply the condition stated in the proposition, the results of the proposition would still become valid asymptotically, as the effects of the initial conditions vanishes with time.

The following proposition shows that the economic outcomes characterized by Proposition 2 indeed constitute a local solution to the upper-bound problem (5).

**Proposition 3** *If steady state output falls short of its efficient level ( $\bar{Y} < \bar{Y}^e$ ) and the steady state output distortions are sufficiently small, then the Lagrangian (45) locally satisfies the saddle point properties (7a)-(7b) at the solution implied by equations (57)-(59).*

The proof of the proposition can be found in appendix A.2.

### 5.3 The Optimal Inflation Response to Cost-Push Disturbances

In this section we derive a closed form solution for the optimal inflation response to a cost push disturbance, as implied by equations (57)-(59). For simplicity, we assume that the evolution of the cost-push disturbances is described by

$$u_t = \rho u_{t-1} + \omega_t, \quad (61)$$

where  $\rho \in [0, 1)$  captures the persistence of the disturbance and  $\omega_t$  is an *iid* innovation. We then use the relationship (59) to substitute for  $\hat{m}_t$  in (58), and equation (57) to substitute for  $x_t$ . This delivers a second order expectational difference equation describing the worst-case inflation evolution under a robustly optimal policy commitment:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 = & \xi_\pi \pi_t + \frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa} (\pi_t - \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - u_t - \pi_{t-1} + \beta E_{t-1} \pi_t + u_{t-1}) \\ & + \xi_m \lambda_m (\pi_t - E_{t-1} \pi_t). \end{aligned}$$

We now consider the impulse response dynamics to an unexpected cost push shock  $\omega_{t_0}$  in some period  $t_0$  that are implied by this equation. Because of the linearity of our system, we can calculate the dynamic response to an individual shock independently of any assumptions about the shocks that occur in other periods, so let us consider the case in which no shocks have occurred in the past and none will occur in any later periods either; in this case we need only solve for the perfect-foresight dynamics after the occurrence of the one-time shock. We suppose, then, that we start from the deterministic steady state, so that the initial conditions are given by  $\pi_{t_0-1} =$

$E_{t_0-1}\pi_{t_0} = u_{t_0-1} = 0$ . The previous equation then implies

$$0 = \left(\xi_\pi + \xi_m \lambda_m + \frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa}\right)\pi_{t_0} - \frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa}(\beta\pi_{t_0+1} + u_{t_0}), \quad (62)$$

$$0 = \left(\xi_\pi + \frac{\lambda_x(1+\beta)}{\kappa}\right)\pi_t - \frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa}(\beta\pi_{t+1} + \pi_{t-1} + u_t - u_{t-1}) \quad \text{for } t > t_0, \quad (63)$$

where the second equation applies for all  $t > t_0$ . (All variables in these equations refer to the expected values of the variables after the shock is realized in period  $t_0$ .)

The eigenvalues of the characteristic equation imply that equation (63) has a unique non-explosive solution for  $\pi_t$  ( $t > t_0$ ) for a given initial value  $\pi_{t_0}$  and a given bounded exogenous sequence for  $u_t$ . In the case that (as implied by (61))  $u_{t+j} = \rho^j u_t$  for all  $j \geq 0$ , so that at each date  $u_t$  is a sufficient statistic for the entire anticipated future evolution of the disturbance term, this solution takes the simple form

$$\pi_t = a\pi_{t-1} + bu_{t-1}, \quad (64)$$

where  $0 < a < 1$  is the smaller of the two real roots of

$$\beta\mu^2 - (1 + \beta + \xi_\pi \kappa / \lambda_x)\mu + 1 = 0,$$

and

$$b = -(1 - \rho)a < 0.$$

Note that the coefficients  $a$  and  $b$  are independent of the policymaker's concern for robustness  $\theta$ . Thus the optimal dynamics for  $t > t_0$  depend in the same way on the lagged inflation rate and the path of the exogenous disturbance as in a pure RE analysis of the model. The result is different, though, for the initial period  $t_0$  when inflation jumps unexpectedly in response to the shock.

Combining equation (62) with equation (64) for  $t = t_0 + 1$  delivers a solution of the form  $\pi_{t_0} = b_0 u_{t_0}$  for the initial impact of the shock, where

$$b_0 \equiv \frac{b + \beta^{-1}}{\frac{\kappa}{\lambda_x \beta} \left(\xi_\pi + \xi_m \lambda_m + \frac{\lambda_x}{\kappa}\right) - a}.$$

Note that the numerator and denominator of this fraction are both positive for all  $\xi_m \lambda_m \geq 0$ , so that  $b_0 > 0$ . With robustness concerns we have  $\xi_m \lambda_m > 0$ , so that the optimal immediate impact effect of the shock on inflation is smaller than under the RE analysis. And in the limiting case where robustness concerns increase without

bound ( $\theta \rightarrow 0$ ), we have  $\xi_m \lambda_m \rightarrow \infty$ , so that it becomes optimal to prevent any unexpected jump in inflation at all in response to a shock. (Under an optimal policy, inflation will be completely forecastable one period in advance.)

It follows that the cumulative price level response to a shock is given by

$$\sum_{t=t_0}^{\infty} \pi_t = \frac{b_0 u_{t_0}}{1-a} + \sum_{t=t_0+1}^{\infty} \frac{b u_t}{1-a} = \left[ b_0 + \left( \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \right) b \right] \frac{u_{t_0}}{1-a}.$$

In the absence of robustness concerns, this implies that  $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \pi_t = 0$ , so that cost-push shocks have no effect on the long-run price level under an optimal commitment. (This results in the familiar conclusion from the RE literature that price-level targeting is optimal.) Since  $a$  and  $b$  are independent of robustness concerns, but the initial response  $b_0$  is dampened under robustness concerns, the term in square brackets is negative when robustness is taken into account. Hence robustness concerns make it optimal to plan to decrease (increase) the price level in the long run following a positive (negative) cost-push shock.

Because of certainty-equivalence, the above results translate directly to the case with a random shock each period, as specified in (61). Under the upper-bound dynamics, in any period  $t_0$ , the conditional expectation  $E_{t_0} \pi_t$  (for any  $t \geq t_0$ ) depends linearly on  $u_{t_0}$  through precisely the coefficient obtained in the perfect-foresight calculation, so that the sequence of coefficients describes the impulse response function of inflation to a cost-push shock. The law of motion for inflation in the general case is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= E_{t-1} \pi_t + (\pi_t - E_{t-1} \pi_t) \\ &= (a\pi_{t-1} + b u_{t-1}) + b_0(u_t - \rho u_{t-1}) \\ &= a\pi_{t-1} + b_0 u_t + b_1 u_{t-1}, \end{aligned} \tag{65}$$

where  $b_1 \equiv b - \rho b_0 < 0$ . Thus inflation evolves according to the stationary ARMA(2,1) process

$$(1 - aL)(1 - \rho L)\pi_t = b_0 \omega_t + b_1 \omega_{t-1}.$$



## 5.4 Comparison with Results in Woodford (2010)

As noted in the introduction, Woodford (2010) considers a similar problem, but assuming a quadratic loss function

$$\min E_0 \sum_{t=t_0}^{\infty} \beta^t [\pi_t^2 + \lambda(x_t - x^*)^2] \quad (66)$$

with coefficients  $\lambda, x^* > 0$  for the policy objective, and a New Keynesian Phillips curve that depends on subjective private-sector expectations,

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \hat{E}_t \pi_{t+1} + u_t. \quad (67)$$

The structural relation (67) is assumed to be linear in the (potentially) distorted expectations, but when written in terms of the policymaker's expectation operator,

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + E_t[m_{t+1}\pi_{t+1}] + u_t, \quad (68)$$

the structural relation includes a quadratic term.

It is known from the results in Benigno and Woodford (2005) that the characterization of the optimal policy commitment obtained from such a linear-quadratic analysis coincides with the linear approximation to the dynamics under an optimal policy commitment that can be derived (as in the present paper) by log-linearizing the exact equations that characterize an optimal commitment in a microfounded New Keynesian model.<sup>26</sup> Here we comment on the extent to which a similar justification for the linear-quadratic analysis is valid when policy is required to be robust to departures from model-consistent expectations.

In Woodford (2010), worst-case dynamics under the robustly optimal policy commitment are described by linear equations, as they are here, but the linearity is obtained not from a local linear approximation to the exact optimal dynamics, but rather as a consequence of only optimizing over a class of linear policy rules. The analysis in Woodford (2010) therefore leaves open the question of the extent to which nonlinear policy rules could improve upon the constrained-optimal policy characterized in that paper, while our present analysis leaves open the question of the extent to which the optimal policy commitment should be different in the case of larger shocks than those assumed in our local analysis. Hence we should not expect the results of

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<sup>26</sup>See Woodford (2011), section 2, for further discussion of the relation between the two approaches.

the two analyses to coincide, except in the case to which both are intended to give a solution, which is the case of small enough shocks for terms other than those of first order in the amplitude of the shocks to be neglected.<sup>27</sup> Woodford (2010) also presents an explicit solution for the dynamics under robustly optimal policy only in the case of i.i.d. cost-push disturbances, corresponding to the special case  $\rho = 0$  of the process (61) considered in the previous section.

We can, however, compare the results obtained here to those obtained in Woodford (2010) for the case  $\rho = 0$  in the small-shock limit (i.e., the limiting values of the coefficients that describe the robustly optimal dynamics as  $\sigma_u \rightarrow 0$ ). In that limiting case, the results presented in (2010) coincide with those derived here, with a suitable interpretation of the coefficients  $\lambda, x^*$  of the policy objective (66) in terms of the parameters of our microfounded model.

In Woodford (2010), as here, the dynamics of inflation under the robustly optimal policy commitment<sup>28</sup> are given by a law of motion of the form (65); in the earlier paper, the coefficient  $a$  is referred to as  $\mu$ , the coefficient  $b_0$  is referred to as  $\bar{p}_1/\sigma_u$ , and the coefficient  $b_1$  (which is equal to  $-a$  in the case that  $\rho = 0$ ) is written as  $-\mu$ . The characteristic equation defining  $a$  in the present solution is furthermore seen to coincide with the quadratic equation defining  $\mu$  in Woodford (2010) if the coefficient  $\lambda$  in that paper is defined as

$$\lambda \equiv \frac{\lambda_x \kappa}{\xi_\pi}$$

in terms of our current notation.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the nonlinear equation that implicitly defines  $\bar{p}_1$  in Woodford (2010) implies that  $\bar{p}_1 \rightarrow 0$  as  $\sigma_u \rightarrow 0$ , but that the ratio  $\bar{p}_1/\sigma_u$  converges to a non-zero limit. That limiting value is given by an equation identical

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<sup>27</sup>In fact, the results obviously do not coincide more generally, since the coefficients of the robustly optimal linear dynamics derived in Woodford (2010) are functions of the parameter  $\sigma_u$ , indicating the standard deviation of the “cost-push shocks,” whereas they are independent of all shock variances in the local linear approximation calculated in this paper.

<sup>28</sup>Under the kind of policy assumed in Woodford (2010), the dynamics of inflation are determined solely by the policy commitment and are independent of private-sector belief distortions. As discussed in the next section, this is also one possible way of implementing the upper-bound dynamics in our model as well, though not the only one.

<sup>29</sup>Note that as long as steady-state distortions are not too large, the value of  $\lambda$  implied by this formula is positive, as assumed in the earlier paper.

to the one given above for  $b_0$ , if  $x^*$  is the positive quantity<sup>30</sup> such that

$$\left(\frac{\beta\lambda}{\kappa}x^*\right)^2 = \frac{\xi_m}{\xi_\pi}\lambda_m\theta > 0.$$

Hence with these identifications of the parameter values, the linear dynamics for inflation derived in Woodford (2010) are identical to those obtained here as a linear approximation to the upper-bound dynamics.

A local linear approximation to the implied dynamics of the output gap under the robustly optimal policy commitment can be derived from the dynamics of inflation, by substituting the predicted evolution of inflation into the aggregate-supply relation and solving for the implied path of the output gap. In the method employed here, the solution (65) for inflation is substituted into the linearized structural relation (57), whereas in Woodford (2010) the path of inflation is substituted into the relation (68), which involves the expectation distortion factor. It might seem, then, that our current method should not predict the same upper-bound dynamics of output, even if the dynamics of inflation are the same; indeed, in the earlier paper it was shown that under the kind of linear policy rule that is considered there, the implied fluctuations in the output gap are amplified (divided by a constant factor  $\bar{\Delta} < 1$ ) as a result of the worst-case belief distortions, relative to the prediction of the log-linear New Keynesian Phillips curve in the absence of distorted beliefs. But in the limit as  $\sigma_u \rightarrow 0$ , the optimal value of the coefficient  $\bar{p}_1 \rightarrow 0$ , as just noted, and this implies that  $\bar{\Delta} \rightarrow 1$ . Hence in the small-noise linear approximation, the predicted output dynamics are the same using both methods. This is just what one should expect, given that in the small-noise linear approximation,

$$E_t[m_{t+1}\pi_{t+1}] = E_t\tilde{m}_{t+1} + E_t\pi_{t+1} = E_t\pi_{t+1},$$

so that (57) and (68) are equivalent, to that order of approximation.

Hence the problem considered in Woodford (2010) has the same solution as the robustly optimal dynamics of our microfounded model, up to a linear approximation of these respective characterizations in the limiting case of small-enough exogenous disturbances. We have no reason, however, to expect that the characterization in Woodford (2010) of the way in which robustly optimal policy changes as  $\sigma_u$  is increased should also be correct for the microfounded model. There is no reason to

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<sup>30</sup>Here we assume, as in our discussion above, that steady-state output is inefficiently low, so that  $\bar{\Gamma}_1 > 0$ .

expect even that the calculations in the earlier paper describe robustly optimal policy within the class of linear policy rules; for in this sort of calculation for the large-shock case, nonlinearities of the various structural equations become relevant, and we have no reason to suppose that the particular nonlinearity that is considered in Woodford (2010) — the effect of the distorted expectations in (68) — is the only that is quantitatively significant. But we leave the quantitative investigation of this issue for future work.

## 6 Implementing the Upper Bound

We now study whether a monetary policymaker can achieve the upper-bound solution characterized in the previous section, so that it represents the solution to the robustly optimal monetary policy problem (3). Since we have only characterized the upper-bound dynamics to a linear approximation, we similarly only show that certain policies result in dynamics that coincide with the upper-bound dynamics in this local linear approximation. We do show that local implementation is feasible, and present a variety of policy commitments, each of which would suffice for this purpose.

The result that we rely upon applies to policy commitments of the following form.

**Assumption 1** *Under policy commitment  $c$ , the policymaker commits to ensure that some relationship  $c_t(\cdot) = 0$  holds every period, where for each  $t$ ,  $c_t(\cdot)$  is a function of the paths of the variables  $\{\Pi_\tau, Y_\tau, i_\tau, \xi_\tau\}$  for  $\tau \leq t$ , and there exists some neighborhood of the steady-state values of these variables such that the functions  $c_t(\cdot)$  are all defined and twice continuously differentiable for all paths that remain forever within that neighborhood.*

We shall furthermore seek a robustly optimal member of a class of rules of the following form.

**Definition 3** *In the case of any neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}$  of the steady-state values of the endogenous variables  $(\Pi_t, Y_t, i_t)$ ; any bound  $\|\xi\| > 0$  on the amplitude of the exogenous disturbances; and any class  $\mathcal{M}$  of belief distortions, including all processes  $\{m_{t+1}\}$  in which  $m_{t+1}$  remains forever within a certain neighborhood of 1; we define the class  $\mathcal{C}$  of policy commitments as the set of all commitments  $c$  such that*

1. Assumption 1 is satisfied, in the case of exogenous disturbances satisfying the bound  $\|\xi\|$  and paths of the endogenous variables remaining forever within neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}$ ; and
2. for any belief distortions in the class  $\mathcal{M}$ , and any disturbance process satisfying the bound  $\|\xi\|$ , there exists at least one DEE in which the endogenous variables remain forever in the neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}$ .

Suppose furthermore that there exists a policy commitment with the following additional properties.

**Assumption 2** *The policy commitment  $c$  is consistent with the steady state in the case that all disturbance processes are at all times equal to their steady-state values. Moreover, a log-linear approximation of the sequence of policy commitments around the steady state is such that*

1. *the linearized policy commitments are consistent with the log-linear approximation to the upper-bound solution (defined by equations (57)-(59)), and*
2. *the linearized policy commitments imply a locally determinate equilibrium under rational expectations (i.e., there exist a bound on the amplitude of the exogenous disturbances and a neighborhood of the steady-state values of the endogenous variables, such that for any disturbance process satisfying the bound there exists a unique REE in which the endogenous variables remain always within the neighborhood).*

If there exists a policy commitment  $\bar{c}$  satisfying these assumptions, then we can show that, up to a log-linear approximation,  $\bar{c}$  represents a robustly optimal policy commitment that implements the upper-bound solution defined above.

More precisely, our key result can be stated as follows.

**Proposition 4** *Suppose there exists a policy commitment  $\bar{c}$  that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Then it is possible to define the bound  $\|\xi\| > 0$ , the neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}$ ; the class of belief distortions  $\mathcal{M}$ ; and a particular policy commitment  $c^* \in \mathcal{C}$ , where  $\mathcal{C}$  is the class of rules specified in Definition (3), under which the policymaker commits to ensure that certain relations  $c_t^*(\cdot) = 0$  hold for all  $t$ ; such that*

1. for each  $t$ , the function  $c_t^*(\cdot)$  is equal to the function  $\bar{c}_t(\cdot)$ , to a log-linear approximation (i.e., the log-linearizations of policies  $\bar{c}$  and  $c^*$  are identical);
2. in the case of any disturbance process satisfying the bound, and any outcome function  $O(m, c)$ , defined for all belief distortions  $m \in \mathcal{M}$  and all policy commitments  $c \in \mathcal{C}$ , and associating to any pair  $(m, c)$  a DEE in which the endogenous variables remain forever in the neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}$ , the policy commitment  $c^*$  solves the robustly optimal policy problem

$$\max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} W(O(m, c)) + \theta V(m); \quad (69)$$

and

3. the belief distortions  $m^*$  that solve the inner problem in (69) are identical to the worst-case belief distortions  $m^*$  associated with the upper-bound solution; and the dynamics of the endogenous variables given by the outcome function  $O(m^*, c^*)$  are identical to the dynamics under the upper-bound solution.

Hence by choosing a policy commitment that (to a log-linear approximation) corresponds to a policy  $\bar{c}$  that satisfies the conditions stated in the proposition, monetary policy can implement the upper-bound outcome regardless of the assumed outcome function  $O(\cdot, \cdot)$ , as long as the outcome function selects only equilibria in the neighborhood of the optimal steady state. The proof of Proposition 4 is given in Appendix A.3.

Note that our assumption that the policy commitment  $\bar{c}$  (and hence similarly the robustly optimal policy commitment  $c^*$ ) is expressed by a sequence of backward-looking functions of the path of the particular variables mentioned in Assumption 1 is not intended to imply that this is the *only* coherent formulation of a policy commitment, nor that *only* rules of this form can possibly be robustly optimal policies. We simply have established that it is not *necessary* for the policy commitment to be of some more complex form — for example, it is not necessary either for the policy commitment to refer explicitly to the evolution of the belief distortions  $\{m_{t+1}\}$  or to private-sector forecasts of any variables — in order for a robustly optimal policy commitment to exist. In fact, we show below that there are several ways in which one can find robustly optimal policy commitments that have the form assumed in the proposition. Commitments from this simple class have the advantage that the

policymaker does not have to commit to a specific empirical measure of private-sector belief distortions when stating its policy commitment.

The corollaries below present a number of specific policy commitments that satisfy the conditions stated in Proposition 4. Among other things, these examples verify that there do exist policy rules satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.

**Corollary 1** *If monetary policy commits to implement the state-contingent inflation sequence of the upper-bound solution (as implied by the solution to equations (57)-(59)), then the upper bound is the locally unique outcome of the robust monetary policy problem (69).*

For the commitment considered in the previous corollary, condition 1 of Assumption 2 holds by assumption; and as is easily shown, the commitment also implies a locally determinate outcome under rational expectations, so that the second condition of Assumption 2 holds as well.

The following result shows that monetary policy can alternatively implement the upper bound outcome by committing to a Taylor rule.<sup>31</sup>

**Corollary 2** *Suppose monetary policy commits to follow a Taylor rule of the form*

$$1 + i_t = (1 + i_t^*) \left( \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_t^*} \right)^{\phi_\Pi} \left( \frac{Y_t}{Y_t^*} \right)^{\phi_Y}, \quad (70)$$

where  $(i_t^*, \Pi_t^*, Y_t^*)$  denotes the evolution of the interest rate, inflation and output in the upper-bound solution. If the coefficients  $(\phi_\Pi, \phi_Y)$  satisfy the local determinacy conditions under private-sector rational expectations, then the upper-bound solution is the locally unique outcome of the robust monetary policy problem (69).

Finally, monetary policy could implement the upper-bound outcome instead by committing to a targeting rule. In this case somewhat more stringent conditions apply.

**Corollary 3** *Suppose steady-state output falls short of its efficient level ( $\bar{Y} < \bar{Y}^e$ ), and the steady state output distortions are sufficiently small. If monetary policy commits to insure that the target criterion*

$$\xi_\pi \pi_t + \lambda_x (x_t - x_{t-1}) + \xi_m \lambda_m (\pi_t - E_{t-1}[\pi_t]) = 0 \quad (71)$$

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<sup>31</sup>Note that conditions 1 and 2 of Assumption 2 are guaranteed to hold by the hypotheses of corollary 2.

*holds each period, then the upper-bound solution is the locally unique outcome of the robust monetary policy problem (69).*

Condition 1 of Assumption 2 holds because the targeting rule (71) is implied by the log-linearized upper-bound dynamics (58) and (59). Appendix A.3 shows that condition 2 of Assumption 2 also holds, provided that the additional conditions stated in the corollary are satisfied.

To sum up, this section has shown that monetary policy can implement the upper-bound solution as the locally unique outcome of the robustly optimal policy problem by making an appropriate policy commitment. Importantly, the required policy commitments do not need to make explicit reference to private-sector belief distortions, and thus are not fundamentally more difficult to explain to the public than policy commitments that would be desirable under the assumption of private-sector rational expectations.

## 7 Extensions of the Basic Analysis

Here we address two possible extensions of the analysis above. The first considers a possible strengthening of our definition of robustly optimal policy, under which the policies just described would no longer suffice. The second considers the consequences of additional restrictions on the class of feasible policies, as a result of which the policies just described would not necessarily be available.

### 7.1 Maximally Robust Optimal Policy

The previous sections were concerned with monetary policy rules that implement the best possible level of policymaker objective under worst-case private sector beliefs. We now ask whether one can find monetary policy rules that improve robustness in the sense that they perform better than the robust policy considered thus far in the case of some possible private sector beliefs other than the worst-case beliefs,<sup>32</sup> while

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<sup>32</sup>For example, Benigno and Paciello (2010) hypothesize a particular kind of private-sector belief distortions, resulting from a concern for robustness on the part of the public, and suppose that the policymaker should be able to predict this kind of concern on the part of the public. The maximally robust optimal policy characterized in this section would also represent an optimal policy under that hypothesis.



doing equally well in the case of the worst-case beliefs.

The best that monetary policy can do in response to general belief distortions is to bring about the highest-welfare equilibrium consistent with the given belief distortions, regardless of what those belief distortions may be. This is the outcome that would result if, purely hypothetically, the private sector had to commit to particular belief distortions *before* the policymaker's choice of its policy commitment, and the policymaker could observe those distortions before making its decision. Again, this defines a problem that can be formulated and solved without reference to any particular class of policy commitments — it is simply necessary to optimize over the set of paths for the endogenous variables that constitute a DEE under the given belief distortions — and again this provides an upper bound for what can conceivably be achieved by any policy. If a policy commitment can then be found that achieves this upper bound, it would necessarily be a maximally robust optimal policy.

Under the present, stronger criterion for robustness, it is less obvious that we should expect that the upper bound can be attained; certainly a much more complex type of policy commitment will have to be contemplated if this is to be possible. Nonetheless, here we restrict our discussion to a derivation of the state-contingent evolution corresponding to this upper bound. The following proposition locally characterizes the best response dynamics for output and inflation for a general belief distortion process:<sup>33</sup>

**Proposition 5** *If initial price dispersion  $\Delta_{-1}$  is small (of order  $\mathcal{O}(\|\xi\|^2)$ ) and the initial precommitments such that  $\Gamma_{1,0} = -\Gamma_{2,0} > 0$ , then equations (42)-(44) and (47)-(51) imply up to first order that the best response dynamics of output and inflation for any given process of belief distortions satisfy*

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + u_t \tag{72}$$

$$0 = \xi_\pi \pi_t + \lambda_x (x_t - x_{t-1}) + \xi_m \hat{m}_t, \tag{73}$$

where again  $\hat{m}_t \equiv \log m_t$ , and the constants  $(\kappa > 0, \xi_\pi, \xi_m, \lambda_x, \lambda_m)$  satisfy the conditions stated in Proposition 2.

For the particular case that private sector belief distortions are given by worst-case belief distortions, the previous result reduces to the one given in Proposition 2.

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<sup>33</sup>The proof of Proposition 5 follows directly from the steps of the proof of Proposition 2 up to equation (91).

For a general process of belief distortions and if the evolution of mark-up shocks is of the autoregressive form (61), Proposition 5 implies that the best response dynamics are given (to first order) by the following recursion

$$\begin{pmatrix} x_t \\ \pi_t \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} e_2 \\ \frac{\lambda_x(1-e_2)}{\xi_\pi} \end{pmatrix} x_{t-1} + \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{\xi_\pi}{\beta\lambda_x(e_1-\rho)} \\ \frac{1}{\beta(e_1-\rho)} \end{pmatrix} u_t + \begin{pmatrix} -1\frac{\xi_m}{e_1\beta\lambda_x} \\ \frac{1-e_1\beta}{e_1\beta}\frac{\xi_m}{\xi_\pi} \end{pmatrix} \hat{m}_t, \quad (74)$$

where  $e_1 > \beta^{-1}$  and  $e_2 \in (0, 1)$ . This is shown in Appendix A.4. Since  $e_1\beta > 1$ , the best response dynamics imply that monetary policy optimally reduces inflation in states to which private agents assign higher than objective likelihood ( $\hat{m}_t > 0$ ) and increases it in states whose likelihood private agents underpredict ( $\hat{m}_t < 0$ ).

We also have the following result, which is proven in Appendix A.4:

**Proposition 6** *Suppose that monetary policy commits to implement the state-contingent best-response dynamics for inflation, defined in (74). Then the worst-case belief distortions are the distortions  $m^*$  defined in our derivation of the upper-bound dynamics, and the associated worst-case value of the augmented objective (2) is the same as under the upper-bound solution.*

This shows that committing to the best-response dynamics for inflation, instead of to the upper-bound process for inflation, as a monetary policy commitment comes at no cost, if the criterion used to evaluate alternative policy commitments is simply the value of the augmented objective under worst-case beliefs. However, under other types of belief distortions than the ones that would be *worst* for the policymaker, the best-response commitment will in general deliver a higher value for the policymaker's objective than that guaranteed by the upper-bound dynamics for inflation. Hence the fact that a policy commitment is robustly optimal in the weaker sense defined earlier does not imply that it cannot be dominated by other types of policy commitments.

The example of a maximally robust policy commitment just given requires the policy commitment to make explicit reference to the magnitude of private-sector belief distortions. While we have no proof, it seems likely that a strongly robust policy must necessarily refer to a larger set of state variables than the ones allowed by the class  $\mathcal{C}$  of policy commitments defined earlier.

## 7.2 Implications of Central Bank Information Constraints

In the previous sections we assumed that the policymaker has perfect information about the state of the economy at time  $t$ . One implication of this - clearly unrealistic - assumption is that monetary policy can contemporaneously and costlessly undo any distortion in private sector *output* expectations by appropriately adjusting the nominal interest rate.<sup>34</sup> As a result, someone seeking to choose the private-sector belief distortions that will most embarrass the policymaker has no incentives to distort output expectations, and focuses instead on distorting inflation expectations. One may wonder whether this exclusive concern with distorted inflation expectations in the worst-case scenario is itself robust to assuming a more realistic information set for the monetary policymaker. If monetary policy cannot react contemporaneously to distortions in output expectations, because of information lags for example, then perhaps the worst-case belief distortions should also distort expectations about states in which there are unexpected movements in output. This would in turn provide incentives for the policymaker to stabilize output movements, thereby potentially overturning our previous results, which require policy to dampen unexpected movements in inflation.

In order to investigate this possibility, we consider now a setting where at time  $t$  the policymaker has only information available up to time  $t - 1$ , and study the resulting upper bound outcome under this information setting. As we show below, our baseline results turn out to be robust. Worst case belief distortions continue to be associated - to a first order approximation - exclusively with unexpected movements in inflation.

Under the assumed lagged information set, the Lagrangian game determining the

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<sup>34</sup>This assumes that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is not binding.

upper bound outcome is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
& \min_{\{m_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \max_{\{Y_t, F_t, K_t, \Delta_t, i_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \tag{75} \\
& E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \begin{aligned}
& U(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t) + \theta \beta m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1} \\
& + \gamma_t \left( \tilde{h}(\Delta_{t-1}, K_t/F_t) - \Delta_t \right) \\
& \Gamma'_t [z(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha \beta m_{t+1} \Phi(Z_{t+1}) - Z_t] \\
& + \beta \psi_t (m_{t+1} - 1) \\
& + \Omega_t \left( u_Y(Y_t; \xi_t) - \beta m_{t+1} u_Y(Y_{t+1}; \xi_{t+1}) \frac{1+i_{t-1}}{\Pi_{t+1}} \frac{1+g_t}{1+g_{t+1}} \right)
\end{aligned} \right] \\
& + \alpha \Gamma'_{-1} \Phi(Z_0) + \Omega_{-1} u_Y(Y_0; \xi_0) \frac{1+i_{-2}}{\Pi_0} \frac{1+g_{-1}}{1+g_0},
\end{aligned}$$

where unlike in problem (45) we can no longer drop the constraint (41), because the interest rate now has to be determined based on one period lagged information.<sup>35</sup> We also added the last term, which is an initial commitment useful for obtaining a time-invariant solution.

The following proposition summarizes the main finding:

**Proposition 7** *Suppose in period  $t$  the policymaker has access to information up to period  $t - 1$  only. The worst case belief distortions associated with the upper bound outcome then continues to be given up to first order by equation (59).*

The proof of the proposition can be found in appendix A.5. It shows that the effects of unexpected movements in output have at most second order effects on the worst case belief distortions. This finding is ultimately due to the fact that the Lagrange multiplier  $\Omega_t$  associated with constraint (41) is zero in steady state, which results from the fact that the deterministic steady-state information set of the policymaker is unbiased.

## 8 Conclusions

We have shown how it is possible to analyze optimal monetary stabilization policy, taking into account the possibility that private-sector expectations may not be precisely model-consistent. Our approach shows how one can choose a policy that is

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<sup>35</sup>The timing convention is that  $i_t$  denotes the interest rate between period  $t + 1$  and  $t + 2$ , as chosen in period  $t$ .

intended to be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs close enough to model-consistency. Moreover, we have shown how to characterize robustly optimal policy without restricting consideration a priori to a particular parametric family of candidate policy rules.

One of our key goals in this reconsideration of the results of Woodford (2010) has been to consider whether policy rules that allow direct dependence of the central bank’s policy targets on measures of private-sector expectations may have superior robustness properties relative to policy rules of the kind shown to be optimal in the literature that assumes rational-expectations equilibrium. We have found that even if we were to consider rules involving arbitrary dependence of that kind on private-sector forecasts, it would not be possible to choose a policy commitment that could ensure a higher lower bound for welfare (across the set of belief distortions that satisfy our criterion for “near-rationality”) than the one that can be achieved by a policy of the kind considered by Woodford (2010), in which the central bank’s state-contingent inflation target is expressed as a function of the history of exogenous disturbances.

Among the policy commitments that we have shown should suffice to achieve this greatest lower bound is a commitment to a particular target criterion, that maintains a linear relationship between the paths of inflation and of a suitably defined output gap. This particular characterization of the robustly optimal policy commitment has the advantage that it can be stated without any reference to any exogenous disturbances, and the coefficients of the optimal target criterion are independent (in the linear approximation used here) of all parameters describing the properties of the exogenous disturbance processes as well, just as in the optimal target criteria derived by Giannoni and Woodford (2010) under the assumption of rational expectations.

The form of the optimal target criterion is similar to the one derived by Giannoni and Woodford in the RE case, except that it no longer refers solely to variations in inflation, regardless of the extent to which these may be anticipated in advance. Instead, under the robustly optimal target criterion, “objective” inflation surprises (by which we mean the component of inflation that is understood by the policy analyst to differ from what should have been predicted the period before) receive a greater weight — and so require a greater output reduction in order to be justifiable — than do variations in inflation that are predicted in advance by the central bank. As a consequence, shocks will not be allowed to cause unexpected movements in inflation as large in magnitude as those that would be considered optimal if the central bank could

be certain that the private sector would share its expectations about the economy's future evolution.

Among the further implications of this change in the target criterion are the fact that an optimal policy commitment no longer implies complete stationarity of the long-run price level, as is true of the optimal policy prescription under rational expectations. However, we do not feel that this result does much to weaken the case for the desirability of a (suitably flexible) price-level target. By comparison with the type of forward-looking inflation targets actually adopted by inflation-targeting central banks — under which temporary departures of the inflation rate from its long-run target are allowed to persist for a time and are certainly never reversed — a price-level target, which would require temporary departures from the price-level target path to eventually be reversed, would still be closer to the policy recommended by our analysis. For while we show that the robustly optimal policy commitment implies that there should be a unit root in the price level, the central bank's forecasted change in the long-run price level in response to a shock should have the *opposite* sign to the short-run effect on prices, rather than allowing a further cumulative change in prices that is in the same direction as (and larger than) the initial effect on prices. A commitment to maintain a fixed target path for the price level — so that at least short-run departures from the path would eventually be reversed — would represent a change to something much closer to the robustly optimal policy, and would most likely raise the welfare lower bound (even if not quite to its theoretical maximum level), though we do not provide any explicit calculation of this gain here.

Our specific conclusions depend, of course, on a specific conception of which kinds of departures from model-consistent expectations should be regarded as most plausible. We have proposed a non-parametric specification of the possible belief distortions that is intended to be fairly flexible. Nonetheless, we are well aware that in some ways our specification remains fairly restrictive. In particular, our assumption that the only belief distortions that are contemplated in the robust policy analysis are ones that are absolutely continuous with respect to the policy analyst's own probability measure — a restriction that was necessary in order for our relative entropy measure of the “size” of belief distortions to be defined — is hardly an innocuous one. We are concerned that this assumption may have an important effect on our results. It implies that a determination on the part of the central bank to ensure that a certain relation among variables will hold in all states of the world is sufficient to ensure

that the private sector cannot doubt that it will hold in all states of the world; and such an assumption may well still exaggerate the extent to which central bank policy commitments can shape private-sector expectations, even if not to the extent that an assumption of fully model-consistent expectations would. This may lead us to exaggerate the value of a policy commitment to inflation stabilization. An extension of our analysis to allow for alternative definitions of “near-rational expectations” would accordingly be of great value in further clarifying the nature of a robust approach to the conduct of monetary policy.

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# A Appendix

## A.1 Proofs for Section 2.2

**Proof of the minmax inequality.** Let us define

$$\begin{aligned} m^*(c) &\equiv \arg \min_m \Lambda(m, c) \\ c^*(m) &\equiv \arg \max_c \Lambda(m, c) \\ \bar{m} &\equiv \arg \min_m \Lambda(m, c^*(m)), \end{aligned}$$

then

$$\begin{aligned} \max_c \min_m \Lambda(m, c) &\leq \max_c \Lambda(\bar{m}, c) \\ &= \Lambda(\bar{m}, c^*(\bar{m})) \\ &= \min_m \Lambda(m, c^*(m)) \\ &= \min_m \max_c \Lambda(m, c). \end{aligned}$$

■

**Proof of Proposition 1.** We first note that  $(x^*, m^*)$  is an equilibrium. This follows directly from (7c), which only holds if  $F(x^*, m^*) = 0$ . Next, we show that a triple  $(x^*, m^*, \gamma^*)$  satisfying (7) delivers a weakly higher value than problem (5). Let  $(x^U, m^U)$  denote the solution to (5), then

$$\begin{aligned} W(x^U) + \theta V(m^U) &= \min_m \max_x W(x) + \theta V(m) \text{ s.t. } F(x, m) = 0 \\ &\leq \max_x W(x) + \theta V(m^*) \text{ s.t. } F(x, m^*) = 0 \\ &= W(x^*) + \theta V(m^*). \end{aligned} \tag{76}$$

The last equality follows from the fact that any alternative solution  $\tilde{x}$  with  $\tilde{x} \neq x^*$  achieves a strictly lower value than  $x^*$ ; using  $F(\tilde{x}, m^*) = 0$  and (7a), we have

$$\begin{aligned} W(\tilde{x}) + \theta V(m^*) &= W(\tilde{x}) + \theta V(m^*) + \gamma^* F(\tilde{x}, m^*) \\ &= L(m^*, \tilde{x}, \gamma^*) \\ &< L(m^*, x^*, \gamma^*) \\ &= W(x^*) + \theta V(m^*). \end{aligned}$$

It then follows from (5) and (4) that  $(x^*, m^*)$  also delivers a weakly higher value than the the robustly optimal policy problem (3). ■

## A.2 Proofs for Section 5

**Proof of Proposition 2.** We start by log-linearizing the constraints (42)-(44) around the deterministic steady state. Using  $E_t \hat{m}_{t+1} = 0$  this delivers

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{F}_t &= (1 - \alpha\beta)[f_y \hat{Y}_t + f'_\xi \tilde{\xi}_t] + \alpha\beta E_t[(\eta - 1)\pi_{t+1} + \hat{F}_{t+1}] \\ \hat{K}_t &= (1 - \alpha\beta)[k_y \hat{Y}_t + k'_\xi \tilde{\xi}_t] + \alpha\beta E_t[\eta(1 + \omega)\pi_{t+1} + \hat{K}_{t+1}] \\ \hat{\Delta}_t &= \alpha \hat{\Delta}_{t-1},\end{aligned}\tag{77}$$

using the notation

$$\hat{F}_t \equiv \log(F_t/\bar{F}), \quad f_y \equiv \frac{\partial \log f}{\partial \log Y}, \quad f'_\xi \equiv \frac{\partial \log f}{\partial \xi},$$

and corresponding definitions when  $K$  replaces  $F$  and  $\tilde{\xi}_t$  for  $\xi_t - \bar{\xi}$ . Subtracting the first of these equations from the second, one obtains an equation that involves only the variables  $\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $\hat{Y}_t$ , and the vector of disturbances  $\xi_t$ . Log-linearization of (37) yields

$$\pi_t = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \frac{1}{1 + \omega\eta} (\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t); \tag{78}$$

and using this to substitute for  $\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t$  in the relation just mentioned, we obtain

$$\pi_t = \kappa[\hat{Y}_t + u'_\xi \tilde{\xi}_t] + \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} \tag{79}$$

as an implication of the log-linearized structural equations, where

$$\kappa \equiv \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \alpha\beta)}{\alpha} \frac{\omega + \tilde{\sigma}^{-1}}{1 + \omega\eta} > 0, \tag{80}$$

and

$$u'_\xi \equiv \frac{k'_\xi - f'_\xi}{k_y - f_y}. \tag{81}$$

This last expression is well-defined, since  $k_y - f_y = \omega + \tilde{\sigma}^{-1} > 0$ . Finally, using the definition of the output gap (55) and of the mark-up disturbance (60), one can rewrite equation (79) as

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + u_t. \tag{82}$$

Next, we log-linearize the FOCs (47)-(50) around the steady-state values. Log-linearizing (48)-(49) yields the vector equation

$$\begin{aligned}-\frac{\bar{\gamma}}{\bar{K}} \frac{1 - \alpha\eta(1 + \omega)}{\alpha} \frac{1}{1 + \omega\eta} [(\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t) + \alpha \hat{\Delta}_{t-1}] \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ -1 \end{bmatrix} \\ -\tilde{\Gamma}_t + \alpha D(1)' \tilde{\Gamma}_{t-1} + \alpha C \hat{Z}_t + \alpha D(1)' \bar{\Gamma} \hat{m}_t = 0,\end{aligned}\tag{83}$$

where  $\tilde{\Gamma}_t \equiv \Gamma_t - \bar{\Gamma}$ ,  $\hat{Z}'_t \equiv [\hat{F}_t \hat{K}_t]'$ ,  $\hat{m}_t = \log m_t$ , and  $C$  is  $\bar{K}$  times the Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives of the function  $\bar{\Phi}(Z) \equiv \bar{\Gamma}'\Phi(Z)$ . The fact that  $\bar{\Phi}(Z)$  is homogeneous of degree 1 implies that its derivatives are homogeneous of degree 0, and hence functions only of  $K/F$ ; it follows that the matrix  $C$  is of the form

$$C = c \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (84)$$

where  $c$  is a scalar given by

$$c = \bar{\Gamma}_1 \frac{\bar{F}}{\bar{K}} \left( -\frac{(1-\alpha)\eta(1+\omega)}{\alpha} \frac{1}{1+\omega\eta} - \left( \frac{(1-\alpha)}{\alpha} \right)^2 \frac{\eta(1+\omega)}{1+\omega\eta} \right) \quad (85)$$

and satisfies  $c < 0$  whenever steady state output falls short of its first best level, as then  $\bar{\Gamma}_1 > 0$ . Similarly, the fact that each element of  $\Phi(Z)$  is homogeneous of degree 1 implies that

$$D(1)e = e,$$

where  $e' \equiv [1 \ 1]$ .

Pre-multiplying (83) by  $e'$  therefore yields

$$e'_t \tilde{\Gamma} = \alpha e'_{t-1} \tilde{\Gamma}_{t-1} \quad (86)$$

for all  $t \geq 0$ , which implies that  $e'_t \tilde{\Gamma}_t$  converges to zero with probability 1, regardless of the realizations of the disturbances; hence under the optimal dynamics, the asymptotic fluctuations in the endogenous variables are such that

$$\tilde{\Gamma}_{2,t} = -\tilde{\Gamma}_{1,t} \quad (87)$$

at all times. And if we assume an initial commitment of the kind that (87) is satisfied also  $t = 0$ , as we do, then (87) will hold for all  $t \geq 0$ .

There must also exist a vector  $v$  such that  $v_2 \neq v_1$  and such that  $D(1)v = \alpha^{-1}v$ , since  $1/\alpha$  is one of the eigenvalues of the matrix  $D(1)$ . (The vector  $v$  must also not be a multiple of  $e$ , as  $e$  is the other right eigenvector, with associated eigenvalue 1.) Pre-multiplying (83) by  $v'$  then yields

$$-\frac{\bar{\gamma}}{\bar{K}} \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\eta(1+\omega)}{1+\omega\eta} [(\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t) + \alpha \hat{\Delta}_{t-1}] - \tilde{\Gamma}_{1,t} + \tilde{\Gamma}_{1,t-1} - \alpha c (\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t) + \bar{\Gamma}_1 \hat{m}_t = 0. \quad (88)$$

Here the common factor  $v_1 - v_2 \neq 0$  has been divided out from all terms, and  $\tilde{\Gamma}_{2,t}$  has been eliminated using (87). Note that conditions (86) and (88) exhaust the implications of (83), and hence of conditions (48)–(49).

We now use the FOC (47) to eliminate  $\tilde{\Gamma}_1$  in equation (88). Log-linearizing this FOC yields

$$\bar{Y}[U_{YY} + \bar{\Gamma}' z_{YY}]\hat{Y}_t + [U'_{Y\xi} + \bar{\Gamma}' z_{Y\xi}]\tilde{\xi}_t + U_{Y\Delta}\hat{\Delta}_t - \frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{Y}}(k_y - f_y)\tilde{\Gamma}_{1,t} = 0.$$

Again using (87) to eliminate  $\tilde{\Gamma}_{2,t}$  and a log-linear approximation to (56) to eliminate  $\tilde{\xi}_t$  we can equivalently write this as

$$\bar{Y}[U_{YY} + \bar{\Gamma}' z_{YY}](\hat{Y}_t - \hat{Y}_t^*) + U_{Y\Delta}\hat{\Delta}_t - \frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{Y}}(k_y - f_y)\tilde{\Gamma}_{1,t} = 0. \quad (89)$$

Using (89) to eliminate  $\tilde{\Gamma}_1$  in (88), (78) to express  $\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t$  in terms of  $\pi_t$ , and (55) one obtains

$$\xi_\pi \pi_t + \lambda_x(x_t - x_{t-1}) + \xi_m \hat{m}_t + \xi_\Delta \hat{\Delta}_{t-1} + \lambda_\Delta (\hat{\Delta}_t - \hat{\Delta}_{t-1}) = 0 \quad (90)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \xi_\pi &\equiv - \left( \frac{\bar{\gamma}}{\bar{K}} \frac{1 - \alpha \eta(1 + \omega)}{\alpha} + \alpha c \right) \frac{\alpha(1 + \omega \eta)}{1 - \alpha} \\ \xi_\Delta &\equiv - \frac{\bar{\gamma}}{\bar{K}} \frac{1 - \alpha \eta(1 + \omega)}{\alpha} \alpha \\ \lambda_x &\equiv - \frac{\bar{Y}[U_{YY} + \bar{\Gamma}' z_{YY}]}{\frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{Y}}(k_y - f_y)} \\ \lambda_\Delta &\equiv - \frac{U_{Y\Delta}}{\frac{\bar{K}}{\bar{Y}}(k_y - f_y)} \\ \xi_m &\equiv \bar{\Gamma}_1. \end{aligned}$$

Since  $\bar{\gamma} < 0$  and  $c < 0$  when steady state output falls short of its first best level ( $\bar{Y} < \bar{Y}^e$ ), we have  $\xi_\pi > 0$ . In this case we also have  $\bar{\Gamma}_1 > 0$ , so that  $\xi_m > 0$ . Moreover, in the case with sufficiently small steady state distortions,  $U_{YY} + \bar{\Gamma}' z_{YY} < 0$ . Since  $k_y - f_y = \omega + \tilde{\sigma}^{-1} > 0$ , it then follows that  $\lambda_x > 0$ .

Since the initial degree of price dispersion  $\hat{\Delta}_{-1}$  is assumed to be of second order and since equation (77) implies that price dispersion remains of second order independently of the realization of the stochastic disturbances, the first order accurate

optimal relationship (90) simplifies to

$$\xi_\pi \pi_t + \lambda_x (x_t - x_{t-1}) + \xi_m \hat{m}_t = 0. \quad (91)$$

For the sake of brevity, we skip the log-linearization of the FOC (50), which only serves to determine the value of the Lagrange multiplier  $\gamma_t$ .

Finally, it remains to log-linearize the FOC (51)

$$\alpha \Phi(\bar{Z})' \tilde{\Gamma}_{t-1} + \bar{K} \alpha \bar{\Gamma}' D(1) \hat{Z}_t + \theta \hat{m}_t + \tilde{\psi}_{t-1} = 0.$$

Applying the expectations operator  $E_{t-1}$  to the previous equation, subtracting the result from it, and using  $\alpha \bar{\Gamma}' D(1) = \bar{\Gamma}'$  and  $\bar{\Gamma}_1 = \bar{\Gamma}_2$  yields

$$\hat{m}_t = \frac{\bar{K} \bar{\Gamma}_1}{\theta} \left( (\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t) - E_{t-1}[\hat{K}_t - \hat{F}_t] \right).$$

Using once more (78) gives

$$\hat{m}_t = \lambda_m (\pi_t - E_{t-1}[\pi_t]), \quad (92)$$

with

$$\lambda_m = \frac{\bar{K} \bar{\Gamma}_1 \alpha (1 + \omega \eta)}{\theta (1 - \alpha)}.$$

Again in with  $\bar{Y} < \bar{Y}^e$  it follows from  $\bar{\Gamma}_1 > 0$  that  $\lambda_m > 0$ . Equations (91), (92), and (82) are those stated in the proposition. ■

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We prove that the saddle point properties (7a) and (7b) hold at the steady state. Continuity then insures that the same applies in a small enough neighborhood around the steady state.

Since  $m_t = 1$  in steady state, inequality in (7a) follows from results derived in Benigno and Woodford (2005) who show that the Lagrangian (45) is locally concave (on the set of paths consistent with the model structural relations) near the optimal steady state if the difference between steady state output and the efficient output level is sufficiently small.

Since the Lagrangian (45) is locally convex in  $m_{t+1}$  (it contains only terms linear in  $m_{t+1}$  and the convex term  $m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1}$ ) the first order conditions for the optimal choice (92) indeed determine a minimum for the Lagrangian, so that inequality (7b) also holds. ■

### A.3 Proofs for Section 6

To prove proposition 4, we use two auxiliary results, that we prove below:

**Lemma 1** *Let  $\bar{c}$  be a policy commitment that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Then under this policy commitment, the equilibrium dynamics of  $\{\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Pi}_t, \tilde{F}_t, \tilde{K}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t\}$  are unaffected to first order by the belief distortions. Moreover, to second order, the equilibrium dynamics depend at most linearly on the belief distortions  $\{m_t\}$ , but are otherwise independent of them.*

**Lemma 2** *Let  $\bar{c}$  be a policy commitment that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Then there exists a neighborhood of 1 such that the function  $\Lambda(m, \bar{c})$  is a strictly convex function of  $m$  on the domain  $\mathcal{M}$ , defined as the set of all belief distortions such that  $m_{t+1}$  remains forever within that neighborhood.*

Given these results, we are able to prove the proposition.

**Proof of Proposition 4:** For some neighborhood of 1, let  $\mathcal{M}$  be the set of belief distortions such that  $m_{t+1}$  remains in this neighborhood at all times; and for some neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}$  of the steady-state values of the endogenous variables, let  $\mathcal{X}$  be the set of all paths  $x$  for the endogenous variables along which the period- $t$  variables remain within  $\mathcal{N}$  at all times. Then our local characterization of the upper-bound solution implies that there exist neighborhoods for which the upper-bound dynamics  $x^*$  and the associated worst-case belief distortions  $m^*$  solve the problem

$$\min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} [W(x) + \theta V(m)] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad F(x, m) = 0. \quad (93)$$

Here  $x^*$  and  $m^*$  refer to the *exact* solutions to the nonlinear FOCs characterizing the upper-bound dynamics (rather than to the log-linear approximation to these dynamics that we have computed); our local analysis above implies that such solutions exist, at least in the case of a tight enough bound  $\|\xi\|$  on the exogenous disturbances, though it cannot tell us whether these dynamics would also represent a global minmax solution if we were to relax the bounds on  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{X}$ .

Our goal is to show that for an appropriate choice of the bounds that define the class of policy commitments  $\mathcal{C}$ , and any outcome function with the property assumed

in the proposition,

$$\max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} [W(O(m, c)) + \theta V(m)] = \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} [W(x) + \theta V(m)] \text{ s.t. } F(x, m) = 0. \quad (94)$$

so that the commitment  $c^*$  that solves this local version of the robustly optimal policy problem (the problem on the left-hand side of (94)) implements the upper-bound dynamics. We have already established in section 2.2 the upper bounds

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \Lambda(m, c) &\leq \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Lambda(m, c) & (95) \\ &\leq \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} [W(x) + \theta V(m)] \text{ s.t. } F(x, m) = 0, & (96) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\Lambda(m, c)$  is again shorthand for the objective function in the robustly optimal policy problem. It therefore suffices for this step of the proof that we establish that both inequalities hold with equality, under the conditions assumed in the proposition. This will establish the existence of a  $c^*$  that attains the upper bound; the construction used to show it will also imply that  $\bar{c}$  coincides with  $c^*$  to a log-linear approximation. The proof proceeds in stages.

(1) We first establish that (96) holds with equality. We begin by noting that (93) implies that for suitable bounds  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{X}$ , it must be the case that for any  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , there exists an allocation  $x_m \in \mathcal{X}$  such that  $F(x_m, m) = 0$ , and

$$W(x_m) + \theta V(m) \geq W(x^*) + \theta V(m^*). \quad (97)$$

Moreover, there must exist a commitment  $c_m \in \mathcal{C}$  that implements the outcome  $x_m$  in the case of belief distortions  $m$ . Fixing  $m$ , for each possible date and state of the world, let  $\hat{c}_t \equiv \bar{c}_t(x_m)$ , where  $\bar{c}_t(\cdot)$  is the function that specifies commitment  $\bar{c}$  at that date and in that state of the world. Then we can define a policy commitment  $c_m$  by a sequence of functions  $\{c_{mt}(\cdot)\}$ , where  $c_{mt}(x) \equiv \bar{c}_t(x) - \hat{c}_t$  for each date and each possible state of the world. The policy commitment  $c_m$  is, by construction, consistent with the DEE outcome  $x_m$  in the case of belief distortions  $m$ . We wish to show that policy  $c_m$  is also consistent with the existence of a nearby DEE outcome in the case of any belief distortions that are close enough to  $m$ , so that  $c_m$  is an element of the class  $\mathcal{C}$ .

Consider the set of (exact, nonlinear) structural equations that define a DEE, in the case of arbitrary belief distortions  $m$  and an arbitrary policy commitment of the form

$$\bar{c}_t(x) = \hat{c}_t, \quad (98)$$



for some process  $\{\hat{c}_t\}$  (not necessarily the one that defines the commitment  $c_m$ ). When there are no belief distortions and  $\hat{c}_t = 0$  at all times, this system of equations has a locally unique solution, by condition 2 of Assumption 2, which is equal to the steady-state values of the endogenous variables if the exogenous disturbances take their steady-state values. Hence log-linearization of the system around the steady state (and this policy commitment) must yield a log-linear system with a unique bounded solution for the endogenous variables in the case of any bounded disturbance processes, under the assumption of rational expectations. It follows (since the conditions for a unique bounded solution are exactly the same when additional additive disturbance terms are added to the structural equations) that the log-linear system also has a unique bounded solution for the endogenous variables in the case of any bounded processes  $\{\xi_t, \hat{m}_t, \hat{c}_t\}$ . This then implies that the original (exact, nonlinear) structural equations have a locally unique solution for the endogenous variables in the case of any small enough perturbations of the exogenous disturbance process, the belief distortions, or the process  $\{\hat{c}_t\}$  that defines the policy commitment.

It is therefore possible to choose the bounds  $\|\xi\|, \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{M}$  tight enough so that (i) condition (93) holds, and (ii) for any disturbance process satisfying the bound and any  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , there is a unique DEE consistent with the policy commitment  $c_m$  in which the endogenous variables remain forever within the neighborhood  $\mathcal{N}$ , and the allocation associated with this DEE is  $x_m$ . It follows that for any  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ , the policy commitment  $c_m$  defined above belongs to the class  $\mathcal{C}$ . Moreover, for any outcome function  $O(m, c)$  with the property assumed in the proposition, we must have

$$O(m, c_m) = x_m$$

for any  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ .

It then follows from (97) that

$$\max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Lambda(m, c) \geq \Lambda(m, c_m) = W(O(m, c_m)) + \theta V(m) \geq W(x^*) + \theta V(m^*)$$

for any  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ . Hence the minimum value of the left-hand expression (minimizing over  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ ) must also be at least as large as the right-hand expression. Since (96) asserts that it is also no greater, the two expressions must be equal. This establishes that (96) holds as an equality.

(2) Before completing the demonstration of (94), we define a policy commitment  $c^*$  that can be shown to solve the problem on the left-hand side of (94). Let  $c^*$  be

the commitment  $c_m$  (defined above) in the case that  $m = m^*$ . It follows from the discussion above that  $O(m^*, c^*) = x^*$ , so that  $\Lambda(m^*, c^*) = W(x^*) + \theta V(m^*)$ . the minmax value of the problem on right-hand side of (96).

By the definition of the upper-bound solution,  $x^*$  is (at least locally) the best DEE consistent with belief distortions  $m^*$ ; then since  $c^*$  achieves this level of the policymaker's objective,  $c^*$  must also be a best-response policy commitment within the class of policies  $\mathcal{C}$ , so that

$$\max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Lambda(m^*, c) = \Lambda(m^*, c^*). \quad (99)$$

And it is similarly evident that  $m^*$  must be a solution to the outer problem on the right-hand side of (95).

We further note that, to a log-linear approximation,  $c^*$  is identical to  $\bar{c}$ . Each is a commitment of the form (98); they differ only to the extent that the process  $\{\hat{c}_t\}$  is different in the two cases. In the case of policy  $c^*$ , the process  $\{\hat{c}_t\}$  is obtained as

$$\hat{c}_t = \bar{c}_t(x^*).$$

But, by condition 1 of Assumption 2, the functions  $\bar{c}_t(\cdot)$  are all consistent with the upper-bound solution, at least to a log-linear approximation. This implies that in that log-linear approximation,  $\hat{c}_t = 0$  at all times. Hence in the log-linear approximation,  $\bar{c}$  and  $c^*$  are identical policies.

(3) Finally, we establish that (95) holds with equality as well, and that  $c^*$  is a policy commitment that achieves the upper bound. Given the results of step (2) of the proof, we can alternatively write the proposition that we wish to establish as

$$\max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \Lambda(m, c) = \Lambda(m^*, c^*). \quad (100)$$

Moreover, it will suffice to prove that

$$\min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \Lambda(m, c^*) = \Lambda(m^*, c^*). \quad (101)$$

For we already know from (95) that there exists no commitment  $c$  for which  $\min_m \Lambda(m, c)$  is larger than  $\Lambda(m^*, c^*)$ ; since (101) suffices to ensure that the bound can be obtained, it will imply (100). Furthermore, it implies that  $c^*$  is a policy commitment that achieves the bound.

Let us define the function

$$\Omega(m) \equiv \max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Lambda(m, c)$$

for arbitrary  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ . It follows from the discussion in step (2) that

$$\min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} \Omega(m) = \Omega(m^*) = \Lambda(m^*, c^*),$$

and hence that

$$\Omega_m(m^*) = 0.$$

But by the envelope theorem,  $\Omega_m(m^*) = \Lambda_m(m^*, c^*)$ , so that we must have

$$\Lambda_m(m^*, c^*) = 0. \tag{102}$$

Finally, let us consider the function  $\Lambda^*(m) \equiv \Lambda(m, c^*)$ , also defined for arbitrary  $m \in \mathcal{M}$ . We wish to show that  $m^*$  minimizes this function (at least locally). By (102),  $m^*$  is a critical point of the function, so it suffices to show that  $\Lambda^*(m)$  is a strictly convex function of  $m$ , at least for  $m$  in a neighborhood of  $m^*$ . By Lemma 2,  $\Lambda(m, \bar{c})$  is (at least locally) a strictly convex function, for any commitment  $\bar{c}$  satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. But we have shown that  $c^*$  is an example of a commitment satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, and so the lemma can be applied. It follows that  $\Lambda^*(m)$  is a strictly convex function of  $m$ , for  $m$  in some neighborhood of the undistorted beliefs. By choosing tight enough bounds  $\|\xi\|$ , we can ensure that  $m^*$  is in the neighborhood on which the function is strictly convex, and hence it is strictly convex in a neighborhood of  $m^*$ .

This establishes that we can define the bounds so that (101) holds, from which (100) follows. It then follows directly that (95) holds with equality, and that the commitment  $c^*$  defined in step (2) is an example of a policy that solves the local robust policy problem. Hence  $\bar{c}$  is equivalent, to a log-linear approximation, to the solution to the local robust policy problem, and the value of the objective achieved by the locally robustly optimal policy is the one achieved by the upper-bound solution.

■

We now prove Lemmas 1 and 2, required for the above proof. (The proof of Proposition 4 relies upon Lemma 2, which in turn relies upon Lemma 1.) We first note that a DEE consistent with a policy commitment  $\bar{c}$  of the kind assumed in

the lemmas, and with given belief distortions  $m$ , corresponds to a set of processes  $\{Y_t, F_t, K_t, i_t, \Delta_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  satisfying the conditions

$$u_Y(Y_t; \xi_t) = \beta E_t \left[ m_{t+1} u_Y(Y_{t+1}; \xi_{t+1}) \frac{1 + i_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \frac{1 - g_t}{1 - g_{t+1}} \right] \quad (103)$$

$$F_t = f(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha \beta E_t [m_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\eta-1} F_{t+1}] \quad (104)$$

$$K_t = k(Y_t; \xi_t) + \alpha \beta E_t [m_{t+1} \Pi_{t+1}^{\eta(1+\omega)} K_{t+1}] \quad (105)$$

$$\Delta_t = \tilde{h}(\Delta_{t-1}, K_t/F_t) \quad (106)$$

$$E_t m_{t+1} = 1$$

$$\bar{c}_t(\cdot) = 0 \quad (107)$$

for all  $t$ .

The problem defining worst-case belief distortions in the case of the policy  $\bar{c}$  is then

$$\min_{\{m_{t+1}, Y_t, F_t, K_t, i_t, \Delta_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [U(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t) + \theta \beta m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1}] \quad (108)$$

$$+ \alpha \Gamma'_{-1} \Phi(Z_0) \quad (109)$$

subject to constraints (103)–(107), where  $\alpha \Gamma'_{-1} \Phi(Z_0)$  captures an initial precommitment to achieve a time-invariant solution, as in problem (45). In the case of a policy commitment  $\bar{c}$  satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, there will be a locally unique DEE (solution to equations (103)–(106) and (107)) in the case of any given small enough belief distortions  $m$ , and this will have to be the allocation given by the outcome function. The value of the objective function in (109) for those belief distortions will then define the objective  $\Lambda(m, \bar{c})$  in our reduced-form statement of the robustly optimal policy problem. Lemmas 1 and 2 state some properties of local approximations to the solutions to these equations.

**Proof of Lemma 1:** We first prove that the solution for the endogenous variables  $\{\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Pi}_t, \tilde{F}_t, \tilde{K}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t\}$ , in the case of arbitrary (small) belief distortions, is unaffected by the belief distortions up to first order. To do so, we linearize the system of nonlinear equations listed above.

Defining the exogenous process  $\bar{Y}_t = \frac{\bar{C}_t}{1-g_t}$  and noting that  $u_Y(Y_t; \xi_t) = (Y_t/\bar{Y}_t)^{-1/\bar{\sigma}} (1 - g_t)$ , we can rewrite equation (103) as

$$\left(\frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}_t}\right)^{-1/\bar{\sigma}} = \beta E_t \left[ m_{t+1} \left(\frac{Y_{t+1}}{\bar{Y}_{t+1}}\right)^{-1/\bar{\sigma}} \frac{1+i_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right].$$

Denoting exogenous terms by e.t., using  $E_t \hat{m}_{t+1} = 0$  and  $(1 + \bar{i})\beta = 1$ , a linear approximation to this equation is given by

$$-\frac{\bar{\sigma}^{-1}}{\bar{Y}} \tilde{Y}_t = E_t \left[ -\frac{\bar{\sigma}^{-1}}{\bar{Y}} \tilde{Y}_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{u}_t - \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1} \right] + e.t. + O(\|\xi\|^2). \quad (110)$$

Next, we linearize (104) and (105):

$$\tilde{F}_t = f_Y \tilde{Y}_t + \alpha \beta E_t \left[ (\eta - 1) \bar{F} \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1} + \tilde{F}_{t+1} \right] + e.t. + O(\|\xi\|^2) \quad (111)$$

$$\tilde{K}_t = k_Y \tilde{Y}_t + \alpha \beta E_t \left[ (\eta(1 + \omega)) \bar{K} \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1} + \tilde{K}_{t+1} \right] + e.t. + O(\|\xi\|^2). \quad (112)$$

Subtracting the first from the second equation and using  $\bar{K} = \bar{F}$

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{K}_t - \tilde{F}_t &= (k_Y - f_Y) \tilde{Y}_t + \alpha \beta E_t \left[ (1 + \eta\omega) \bar{K} \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1} + (\tilde{K}_{t+1} - \tilde{F}_{t+1}) \right] \\ &\quad + e.t. + O(\|\xi\|^2). \end{aligned}$$

A linear approximation to (106) delivers

$$\tilde{\Pi}_t = \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{\alpha} \frac{1}{1 + \omega\eta} \frac{1}{\bar{K}} (\tilde{K}_t - \tilde{F}_t) + O(\|\xi\|^2),$$

so that

$$\tilde{\Pi}_t = (k_Y - f_Y) \frac{1 - \alpha}{\bar{K} (1 + \omega\eta) \alpha} \tilde{Y}_t + \beta E_t [\tilde{\Pi}_{t+1}] + e.t. + O(\|\xi\|^2). \quad (113)$$

Note that equations (110)-(113) are independent of the belief distortions up to first order, and thus identical as in the case with rational private sector expectations. Since the policy commitment  $c$  is also assumed independent of the belief distortions and because  $c$  insures a locally determinate outcome under rational expectations, equations (110)-(113) have a locally unique solution that — to first-order accuracy — is independent of the belief distortions.

We now show that to second order, the solution for  $\{\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Pi}_t, \tilde{F}_t, \tilde{K}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t\}$  depends only linearly on  $\{\tilde{m}_t\}$ . Since up to first order the solution  $\{\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Pi}_t, \tilde{F}_t, \tilde{K}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t\}$  evolves

independently of the belief distortions, a quadratic approximation to equation (103) is given by

$$-\frac{\tilde{\sigma}^{-1}}{\bar{Y}}\tilde{Y}_t = E_t\left[-\frac{\tilde{\sigma}^{-1}}{\bar{Y}}\tilde{Y}_{t+1} + \beta\tilde{y}_t - \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1} - \frac{\tilde{\sigma}^{-1}}{\bar{Y}}\tilde{Y}_{t+1}\tilde{m}_{t+1} - \tilde{\Pi}_{t+1}\tilde{m}_{t+1} + \frac{\tilde{\sigma}^{-1}}{\bar{Y}}\tilde{Y}_{t+1}\tilde{m}_{t+1}\right] + t.i.m + e.t. + O(\|\xi\|^3).$$

The only new terms appearing in a quadratic approximation are thus either independent of the belief distortions (as they involve squares of the variables  $\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Pi}_t, \tilde{F}_t, \tilde{K}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t$  and exogenous terms) or of the form  $E_t\tilde{X}_{t+1}\tilde{m}_{t+1}$ , where  $\tilde{X}_{t+1}$  is a variable independent of the belief distortions. The same can be noted when quadratically approximating (104), (105) and (106). Moreover, a quadratic approximation to the policy commitment involves no terms in  $\tilde{m}$ . We can thus perform the same steps as in the linearization above and solve for a unique non-explosive solution for  $\{\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Pi}_t, \tilde{F}_t, \tilde{K}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t\}$ , which is accurate to second order. The only newly appearing terms will be *t.i.m* and terms linear in  $\tilde{m}$ , which completes the proof. ■

**Proof of Lemma 2:.** Let  $\bar{c}$  be a policy commitment satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. The problem defining worst-case belief distortions is then given by (109). When the exogenous disturbances take their steady-state values at all times, the locally unique DEE consistent with zero belief distortions is given by the steady state. We wish to consider the value  $\Lambda(m, \bar{c})$  of the objective in (109) in the case that both belief distortions and the exogenous disturbances are small; in such a case, the DEE allocation will be correspondingly close to the steady state. We locally approximate  $\Lambda(m, \bar{c})$  through Taylor series expansions around the steady-state values of all variables.

From Lemma 1 we know that the variables  $(\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Pi}_t, \tilde{F}_t, \tilde{K}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t)$  are to first order independent of the belief distortions. A second-order accurate approximation of the objective function in problem (109) is thus given by

$$\begin{aligned} & E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [U(Y_t, \Delta_t; \xi_t) + \theta\beta m_{t+1} \log m_{t+1} + \alpha\Gamma'_{-1}\Phi(Z_0)] \\ &= E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ U_Y \tilde{Y}_t + U_{\Delta} \tilde{\Delta}_t + \frac{1}{2}\theta\beta (\tilde{m}_{t+1})^2 + \alpha\Gamma'_{-1}D(1) \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{F}_0 \\ \tilde{K}_0 \end{pmatrix} \right] \\ &+ t.i.m + O(\|\xi\|^3), \end{aligned} \tag{114}$$

where *t.i.m* refers to (first- and higher-order) terms that are independent of the belief distortion process  $m$ . Lemma 1 also implies that the endogenous variables  $\{\tilde{Y}_t, \tilde{\Delta}_t, \tilde{F}_0, \tilde{K}_0\}$  showing up in (114) depend up to second-order accuracy only linearly on the chosen process for the belief distortions  $\{\tilde{m}_{t+1}\}$ , but are otherwise independent of the choices of the belief distortions (to second-order accuracy). Strict convexity of (114) is thus implied by the quadratic term in  $\tilde{m}$ , so that second-order conditions for the worst-case belief distortions problem necessarily hold at the solution to the first-order conditions. ■

**Proof of corollary 3:** Suppose policy commits to the targeting rule (71) from date  $t$  onwards. To establish determinacy of the solution under rational expectations with such a commitment, we have to analyze the system of equations

$$\xi_\pi \pi_{t+j} + \lambda_x (x_{t+j} - x_{t+j-1}) + \xi_m \lambda_m (\pi_{t+j} - E_{t+j-1}[\pi_{t+j}]) = 0 \quad (115)$$

$$\pi_{t+j} - \kappa x_{t+j} - \beta E_{t+j} \pi_{t+j+1} - u_{t+j} = 0, \quad (116)$$

which holds for all  $j \geq 0$ . Taking the expectation  $E_{t-1}[\cdot]$  and rearranging terms delivers a system describing the dynamics of the  $t-1$  dated expectations of the endogenous variables

$$\begin{pmatrix} E_{t-1} \pi_{t+j} \\ E_{t-1} x_{t+j} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \beta^{-1} \left( 1 + \kappa \frac{\xi_\pi}{\lambda_x} \right) & -\frac{\kappa}{\beta} \\ -\frac{\xi_\pi}{\lambda_x} & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} E_{t-1} \pi_{t+j} \\ E_{t-1} x_{t+j-1} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} -\beta^{-1} \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} E_{t-1} u_{t+j}.$$

Under the additional assumptions stated in the corollary, we have  $\lambda_x > 0$ ,  $\lambda_\pi > 0$ , and  $\kappa > 0$ , so that the characteristic polynomial of the autoregressive matrix in the preceding equation implies that both roots are positive with one root being explosive and one being stable. Since  $E_{t-1} x_{t-1}$  is predetermined at date  $t$ , the previous equation system has a unique non-explosive solution for the dynamics of  $E_{t-1} \pi_{t+j}$  and  $E_{t-1} x_{t+j}$  for all  $j \geq 0$ , given any bounded path for  $E_{t-1} u_{t+j}$  for all  $j \geq 0$ . Repeating this procedure for any date  $h \geq t-1$  determines also unique non-explosive values for  $E_h \pi_{t+j}$  and  $E_h x_{t+j}$  for all  $j > h-t$ . Taking the expectation  $E_{t-1}[\cdot]$  of equations (115) and (116) and subtracting the corresponding results from equations (115) and (116), respectively, delivers for  $j = 0$

$$\begin{aligned} (\xi_\pi + \xi_m \lambda_m) (\pi_t - E_{t-1}[\pi_t]) + \lambda_x (x_t - E_{t-1} x_t) &= 0 \\ \pi_t - E_{t-1}[\pi_t] - \kappa (x_t - E_{t-1} x_t) - \beta (E_t \pi_{t+1} - E_{t-1} \pi_{t+1}) - (u_t - E_{t-1} u_t) &= 0, \end{aligned}$$

which uniquely determines  $\pi_t$  and  $x_t$  as a linear function of the already determined expectations ( $E_{t-1}\pi_t, E_{t-1}\pi_{t+1}, E_t\pi_{t+1}, E_{t-1}x_t$ ) and the exogenous terms ( $u_{t+j} - E_{t-1}u_{t+j}$ ). Repeating this last step for each  $j > 0$  determines the locally unique state contingent path for  $\{\pi_{t+j}, x_{t+j}\}$  and completes the proof of local determinacy of the outcome under rational expectations. ■

## A.4 Proofs for Section 7.1

**Derivation of the best response dynamics (74).** Equation (73) implies

$$\xi_\pi \pi_t = -\lambda_x(x_t - x_{t-1}) - \xi_m \hat{m}_t \quad (117)$$

and substituting into (72) delivers

$$E_t \left( \beta x_{t+1} - (1 + \beta + \frac{\xi_\pi \kappa}{\lambda_x}) x_t + x_{t-1} \right) = \frac{\xi_\pi}{\lambda_x} u_t + \frac{\xi_m}{\lambda_x} \hat{m}_t. \quad (118)$$

The lag polynomial on the l.h.s. can be expressed as

$$L \left( \beta L^{-2} - (1 + \beta + \frac{\xi_\pi \kappa}{\lambda_x}) L^{-1} + 1 \right) = -\beta e_1 (1 - (e_1 L)^{-1}) (1 - e_2 L),$$

where  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  solve  $\beta e^2 - (1 + \beta + \frac{\xi_\pi \kappa}{\lambda_x}) e + 1$  and satisfy  $e_1 > \beta^{-1}$  and  $e_2 \in (0, 1)$ . Using the lag polynomial, we can write (118) as

$$\begin{aligned} -\beta e_1 E_t [(1 - (e_1 L)^{-1})(1 - e_2 L)x_t] &= \frac{\xi_\pi}{\lambda_x} u_t + \frac{\xi_m}{\lambda_x} \hat{m}_t \\ -\beta e_1 (1 - e_2 L)x_t &= \frac{\xi_\pi}{\lambda_x} E_t [(1 - (e_1 L)^{-1})^{-1} u_t] + \frac{\xi_m}{\lambda_x} E_t [(1 - (e_1 L)^{-1})^{-1} \hat{m}_t]. \end{aligned}$$

Assuming that  $u_t$  evolves according to (61) and using  $E_t[\hat{m}_{t+j}] = 0$  for all  $j \geq 1$  we have

$$-\beta e_1 (1 - e_2 L)x_t = \frac{\xi_\pi}{\lambda_x} \frac{1}{1 - \rho/e_1} u_t + \frac{\xi_m}{\lambda_x} \hat{m}_t.$$

Solving for  $x_t$  gives

$$x_t = e_2 x_{t-1} - \frac{\xi_\pi}{\beta \lambda_x} \frac{1}{e_1 - \rho} u_t - \frac{1}{e_1} \frac{\xi_m}{\beta \lambda_x} \hat{m}_t,$$

which is the upper row in (74). Substituting this into (117) delivers the lower row in (74). ■



**Proof of Proposition 6.** Let  $m$  denote a state contingent belief distortion and  $\pi$  a state contingent inflation commitment. Similarly, let  $(m^*, \pi^*)$  the corresponding contingent sequences of the the upper bound solution. Letting  $BR$  denote the best response function for inflation, we have that  $\pi^* = BR(m^*)$ . Furthermore, letting  $O(\pi, m)$  denote the objective function of the policymaker, we know from corollary 1 that

$$O(\pi^*, m^*) < O(\pi^*, m),$$

for all  $m \neq m^*$ . Since

$$O(\pi^*, m) \leq \max_{\pi} O(\pi, m) = O(BR(m), m),$$

this implies that

$$O(\pi^*, m^*) < O(BR(m), m)$$

for all  $m \neq m^*$ . This shows that the worst-case belief distortions are given by  $m^*$  whenever the policymaker has committed to the best-response function  $BR(\cdot)$ . ■

## A.5 Proofs for Section 7.2

**Proof of Proposition 7.** Consider problem (75). The first-order condition for  $i_{t-1}$  is given by

$$E_{t-1}[\Omega_t m_{t+1} u_Y(Y_{t+1}; \xi_{t+1}) \frac{1}{\Pi_{t+1}} \frac{1+g_t}{1+g_{t+1}}] = 0$$

and linearizing this around the optimal steady state where  $\bar{\Omega} = 0$  delivers

$$E_{t-1}[\tilde{\Omega}_t] = 0. \tag{119}$$

The first order condition for  $m_t$  is given by

$$\theta(1 + \log m_t) + \alpha \Gamma'_{t-1} \Phi(Z_t) + \psi_{t-1} + \Omega_{t-1} u_Y(Y_t; \xi_t) \frac{1+i_{t-2}}{\Pi_t} \frac{1+g_{t-1}}{1+g_t} = 0$$

and its linearization by

$$\theta \hat{m}_t + \alpha \bar{K} \bar{\Gamma}' D(1) \hat{Z}_t + \alpha \Phi(\bar{Z})' \tilde{\Gamma}_{t-1} + \tilde{\psi}_{t-1} + \beta^{-1} \tilde{\Omega}_{t-1} = 0.$$

Applying the operator  $E_{t-1}[\cdot]$  to this equation, subtracting the result from it and using (119) gives

$$\theta \hat{m}_t + \alpha \bar{K} \bar{\Gamma}' D(1) (\hat{Z}_t - E_{t-1} \hat{Z}_t) = 0.$$

Using a log-linearization of (37) then delivers (59). ■