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ABSTRACT

Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?*

We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by bondholders on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a rollover crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a trade-off between safer long-term debt and cheaper short-term debt. Second, we construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. We show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting towards shorter maturities. The evidence suggests that international investors' time-varying risk aversion is crucial to understand the debt structure in emerging economies.

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1 Introduction

During the last two decades, emerging economies have experienced recurring financial crises. A common factor across many of these crises has been a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, which has led to rollover problems.¹ When governments (or the private sector) have large stocks of short-term liabilities to repay and prospects deteriorate, it becomes very costly to renew their debt, sometimes triggering outright default. Even worse, excessive reliance on short-term debt can open the door to self-fulfilling liquidity crises, which may be simply triggered by a shift in expectations. The risks associated with short-term debt have prompted several authors to suggest that countries should decrease their vulnerability to capital inflow reversals by lengthening the maturity structure of their liabilities.² However, if it is so clear that short-term borrowing is risky, why do emerging economies borrow short term?

The conventional view is that emerging economies borrow short term to alleviate a moral hazard problem that exists on the demand (debtor) side.³ The early literature, such as Calvo (1988) and Blanchard and Missale (1994), focuses on the government incentive to lower the real value of public debt by creating inflation. These papers show that this incentive is lower when the debt is indexed, in foreign currency, and short-term. More recent work by Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Jeanne (2004) shows that, when they have to meet early debt repayments, opportunistic governments have ex-post a lower incentive to default on their debt and a higher incentive to carry out revenue-raising reforms. In this context, short-term debt serves as a commitment device for the debtor and increases its welfare ex-ante.⁴

In this paper, we propose an alternative view based on supply (lender) side factors. In particular, we argue that investor risk aversion makes short-term borrowing cheaper, thus providing incentives

¹For example, large amounts of short-term debt had been accumulated by governments prior to the crises of Mexico 1994-95, Russia 1998, and Brazil 1998-99, and by the private sector in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand before the 1997 East Asian crisis. According to central bank sources, the average maturity of outstanding government bonds in Brazil was 1.7 years in 1998. In the cases of South Korea and Thailand, short-term debt (maturing at most in five years) was, respectively, 97 and 60 percent of total corporate bonds outstanding in 1997.

²This view is presented, among others, by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Obstfeld (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999), Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), Feldstein (1999), and Cole and Kehoe (2000).

³Throughout the paper we refer to the supply and demand sides of the market for loanable funds. Thus, investors are on the supply side, while the government is on the demand side.

⁴The role of short-term debt as a commitment device in the context of international lending has also been emphasized by Diamond and Rajan (2001), Rochet and Vives (2004), and Tirole (2002, 2003). Dell'Arìccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2002) present some evidence consistent with the conventional view based on moral hazard.

for emerging economies to rely on short-term debt.⁵ What do we mean by short-term borrowing being cheaper than long-term borrowing? The cost of borrowing is given by the expected repayment for each borrowed dollar and it equals the difference between the spread a country pays and the probability of default.⁶ Since the cost of borrowing at a given maturity is captured by the risk premium on bonds of that maturity, the difference between long-term and short-term risk premia (i.e. the term premium) measures the extent to which borrowing short term is cheaper.⁷

Our main arguments are illustrated using a simple model, where the optimal debt maturity structure and borrowing cost at different maturities are determined as the result of a risk sharing problem between a debtor country and risk averse investors with a short horizon. On the one hand, since investors may need to liquidate long-term bonds before maturity and the price of these bonds fluctuates over time, investors are subject to more risk when holding long-term bonds. They thus require higher returns on long-term bonds to compensate for this “price risk.”⁸ On the other hand, long-term debt is safer for the government because it reduces the probability of a rollover crisis. As a result, emerging economies have to balance the rollover costs associated with short-term borrowing against the higher borrowing cost associated with long-term borrowing. This model allows us to clarify the difference between bond prices, bond spreads, and risk premia and illustrate the role of the supply side on the risk premium and the maturity of bond issuance.

The model has several implications. First, it shows that, when investors are risk averse, the term premium is positive on average and increases during crises. Moreover, the model explores the effects of different types of shocks on the optimal maturity choice and risk premia at different maturities. A negative shock to government resources leads to an increase in the risk premium on long-term bonds and an increase in the maturity of bond issues. This is analogous to a positive demand shock on the market for international loans, leading to higher risk premia and higher quantities of long-term bonds. A negative shock to investor wealth also leads to an increase in the

⁵The literature on emerging market borrowing has already stressed the importance of the supply side of international capital markets. See, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003), Chang and Velasco (2001), Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004), Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2005), and Pavlova and Rigobon (2005).

⁶In other words, the cost of borrowing equals the difference between actual spreads and “actuarially fair” spreads.

⁷A positive term premium should not be confused with spreads on long-term bonds being higher than spreads on short-term bonds. The latter may also be due to a higher probability of default at longer horizons. For example, this is the case in the model of Chang and Velasco (2000), in which long-term spreads are higher than short-term spreads even though bondholders are risk neutral and the term premium is thus zero.

⁸On the investor side, the model has the features of a model of liquidity provision in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).

risk premium on long-term bonds but, on the other hand, leads to a decrease in the maturity of bond issues. This is analogous to a negative shock to the supply of funds, leading to higher risk premia and lower quantities of long-term bonds.

We then study two questions related to the behavior of sovereign bond prices and issuance patterns. First, how big is the premium that investors require to hold long-term bonds instead of short-term bonds? Second, can this premium explain the maturity structure? To address these questions, we construct a new database on emerging market sovereign bonds. We then analyze the properties of conditional and unconditional risk and term premia for emerging countries. These are estimated by computing average ex-post excess returns on long-term and short-term bonds, held over the same horizon. Excess returns are computed relative to those of two “safe” countries, Germany and the United States. Finally, we study the behavior of bond issuance by emerging economies.

Our main results can be summarized in three stylized facts. First, when compared with Germany and the United States, the excess returns from holding emerging market long-term bonds are, on average, higher than those from holding emerging market short-term bonds. This implies that, on average, the term premium is positive. When comparing 3-year and 12-year maturities, the term premium is four percentage points per year.⁹ This positive term premium reflects the risk premium required by investors to be exposed to the price risk associated with long-term bonds. Second, the term premium increases significantly during crises. When comparing 3-year and 12-year maturities, the term premium is 30 percentage points during crises and close to zero during non-crisis periods. Furthermore, this increase cannot be accounted for by the observed changes in the volatility of returns, i.e. the Sharpe ratio increases during crises. Third, emerging economies issue relatively more short-term debt during periods of financial turmoil, and wait for tranquil times to issue long-term debt. Thus, there is a negative relation between the term premium and the maturity of debt issuance.

This evidence suggests that time-varying investor risk aversion plays an important role in the

⁹To be precise, the term premium is equal to the difference between the risk premium an emerging economy pays on long-term debt (relative to Germany and the U.S.) and the risk premium it pays on short-term debt (again, relative to Germany and the U.S.). This difference can be called “excess term premium,” due to the comparison with Germany and the U.S. To simplify, however, we will just use the expression term premium throughout the paper, with the understanding that we study the yields that emerging economies pay on top of those charged to Germany and the U.S.

debt markets of emerging economies. During crises, investors demand higher term premia, while they *reduce* their exposure to long-term debt. These two observations indicate the presence of a negative shift in the supply of funds and cannot be explained by models that focus only on the debtor side. If investors had constant risk aversion, they would require a lower term premium when they reduce their holdings of long-term debt and are less exposed to the associated price risk. In sum, while moral hazard considerations could still play a relevant role in determining the optimal maturity structure, the results in this paper show that supply side factors appear necessary to understand why emerging economies borrow short term.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 studies the behavior of risk and term premia. Section 5 provides more evidence studying long- and short-term bond issuance. Section 6 concludes.

2 The model

In this section, we present a model of the joint determination of the debt maturity structure and the risk premium at different maturities. The model describes the government of an emerging economy that borrows from a set of international investors.¹⁰ We assume that it is more costly for the government to raise fiscal revenues in the short run than in the long run. This assumption implies that short-term borrowing may result in a costly fiscal adjustment, or “rollover crisis.”¹¹ This happens if the government is forced to raise taxes to cover the shortfall between debt repayments and new debt issues. We also assume that international investors are risk averse and have short horizons. This makes investors sensitive to the price risk associated with long-term bonds.¹²

In this environment, the maturity structure of sovereign debt can be interpreted as the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the country lowers the expected cost of a rollover crisis but, at the same time, it transfers risk to

¹⁰In the model we refer to bondholders as “international investors.” It would be easy to extend the model to allow for local investors. The case of international investors is simpler because their utility does not enter the government’s objective function.

¹¹In Cole and Kehoe (2000), this difference in the cost of fiscal adjustment in the short run and long run plays a crucial role in generating self-fulfilling debt crises.

¹²Assuming short horizons is an easy way of having investors care about price risk. Liquidity shocks would lead to similar results. Since we abstract from coordination problems among investors, the assumption of short horizons is a useful simplification. For a discussion on the type of environment where price risk matters, see Holmström and Tirole (2001).

bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and lower bond prices, thereby increasing the cost of borrowing for the country. Thus, the model allows us to analyze the trade-off between safer long-term borrowing and cheaper short-term borrowing.

The model can be interpreted as a model of liquidity provision in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The government finances its debt by selling claims to its long-run fiscal revenues. However, long-run revenues are random and investors need to liquidate their claims before the final period. Investors are risk averse and the government can offer them partial insurance by issuing short-term debt with a fixed rate of return. Our model differs in two main respects from existing models that follow Diamond and Dybvig (e.g., Chang and Velasco, 2001). First, it features exogenous aggregate risk, due to the shocks to long-run fiscal revenue. While models following Diamond and Dybvig focus on arrangements that allow investors to share their idiosyncratic shocks, we focus on arrangements that allow the government and investors to share aggregate risk. This is reflected in the fact that in a model *a la* Diamond and Dybvig allowing for retrading of long-term liabilities (as we do in our model) completely eliminates the need of risky short-term liabilities.¹³ Second, our model abstracts from coordination problems and multiple equilibria.¹⁴

The model predicts that the term premium (i.e. the difference between the risk premium on long-term and short-term bonds) should be positive on average. Moreover, the term premium should be higher during financial crises. The model also predicts that debt issuance should shift towards shorter maturities when crises are due to an increase in investor risk aversion, and towards longer maturities when crises are due to a decrease in the country's expected repayment capacity.

2.1 Debtor country

There are three periods, dated 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, the government must borrow D_0 to finance old debt coming to maturity. The government can sell either short-term (one-period) or long-term (two-period) bonds. In period 1, the government pays off the short-term bonds issued in period 0 and issues new short-term bonds. The difference between the two is covered by a short-run fiscal adjustment. In period 2, which represents the long run, the government has access to a stochastic

¹³See Hellwig (1994) on the role of aggregate risk in models of liquidity provision.

¹⁴In this paper there can be no "runs" in the intermediate period since we assume that the ability to raise revenue in the future is not affected by what happens in that period. This is assumed for simplicity and is not important for our qualitative results. Allowing for runs would introduce an additional type of supply side "shock," which would increase the incentives to borrow long term.

and exogenous amount of fiscal revenue. This revenue is used to pay back maturing long- and short-term bonds, to reduce taxation, or for public spending. We abstract from strategic default by assuming that the government repays its debt whenever feasible.¹⁵

In period 0, the government's budget constraint is

$$D_0 = p_S D_S + p_L D_L,$$

where D_S and D_L are the amount of short- and long-term bonds issued in period 0, with p_S and p_L being their respective prices.

In period 1, the government has to roll over the stock D_S of short-term bonds. The government's budget constraint in period 1 is

$$D_S = x + p_{S,1} D_{S,1},$$

where $D_{S,1}$ is the amount of short-term bonds issued in period 1, $p_{S,1}$ is their price, and x is the government's primary surplus in period 1. Short-term bonds issued in period 1 are junior to existing long-term bonds.

In period 2, the government's potential revenue equals \tilde{Y} , which is a random variable that can take two values, Y in the good state and 0 in the bad state. The extreme case of zero realization in the bad state simplifies the analysis because it eliminates the possibility of partial default. As of period 0, the probability of being in the good state is π_0 . In period 1, there is a shock that affects the probability of being in the good state. The updated probability is denoted by π . As of period 0, π is a random variable distributed on $[\underline{\pi}, \bar{\pi}]$, with mean π_0 . As we show below, the volatility of π introduces uncertainty in the government's ability to borrow in period 1 and, thus, on the required fiscal adjustment. Issuing long-term bonds in period 0 is a way for the government to insure against this uncertainty.

The government's objective function is

$$W = E_0 \left[-C(x) + \max \left\{ \tilde{Y} - D_L - D_{S,1}, 0 \right\} \right],$$

where $C(x)$ is a strictly convex function that represents the cost of the short-term fiscal adjustment.

¹⁵We rule out the possibility of strategic default. This is done for simplicity and also because strategic default can be thought of as a form of moral hazard and we want to focus on the role of investor risk aversion.

We assume that $C(0) = 0$ and $C'(0) = 1$. Since C is strictly convex, $C'(x) > 1$ for $x > 0$.¹⁶ This assumption, together with the assumption that in the long run the government's marginal utility is always equal to 1, results in short-run fiscal adjustments being more costly than long-run fiscal adjustments. This difference can be explained by the fact that, in the long run, the government can spread the adjustment over a longer period of time and thus achieve better tax smoothing, or that by better preparing for the adjustment its associated cost can be reduced.

We assume that government resources satisfy $\pi_0 Y - D_0 > 0$, so that, at risk neutral prices, the government is solvent with no need of fiscal adjustment in period 1. We also assume that the government can carry out a fiscal adjustment large enough and faces a cost of default high enough, such that it never defaults in period 1.¹⁷ When $x > 0$, the country faces a rollover crisis.

2.2 Investors and bond prices

There are two overlapping generations of investors, period-0 and period-1 investors. Period- t investors invest in period t and consume in period $t + 1$. Both generations have mass 1. Period-0 investors have initial wealth w . They invest in three assets: an international risk-less asset with zero net returns (e.g. U.S. Treasury bills), and short- and long-term bonds issued by the government in period 0. Their preferences are represented by the utility function $E_0[u(c)]$, where $u(\cdot)$ is increasing, concave, and displays decreasing absolute risk aversion.¹⁸ Their budget constraint is

$$\begin{aligned} w &= b + p_S d_S + p_L d_L, \\ c &= b + d_S + p_{L,1} d_L, \end{aligned}$$

where b denotes holdings of the international risk-less bond, and d_S and d_L denote holdings of short- and long-term bonds issued by the country. Note that the period 1 budget constraint reflects the assumption that the government never defaults on short-term bonds issued in period 0.

¹⁶We are implicitly assuming that optimal smoothing of fiscal distortions between periods 1 and 2 is attained at $x = 0$. It is easy to generalize the model to the case where $C'(x) = 1$ is satisfied for $x \neq 0$.

¹⁷This is the simplest setup in which the trade-off emphasized in this paper can be studied. The fact that default never takes place in period 1 simplifies the pricing of bonds in period 0. However, even if default in period 1 was allowed, short-term bonds would remain less risky than long-term bonds from the point of view of investors, since the default would affect both short- and long-term bonds. In addition, the fact that the fiscal adjustment in period 1 does not affect fiscal resources in period 2 rules out multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling runs.

¹⁸This implies that lower levels of wealth are associated with higher levels of investor risk aversion. When referring to negative shocks to the supply of funds, we use the two indistinctly.

Period 1 investors can purchase the international risk-less asset, short-term bonds issued in period 1, and long-term bonds issued in period 0, with remaining maturity of one period. We make the simplifying assumption that period 1 investors are risk neutral. As a result, bond prices in period 1 are equal to the probability of the good state

$$p_{L,1} = p_{S,1} = \pi,$$

which does not depend on the debt maturity structure chosen by the government in period 0. This simplifies the government's problem in period 0.

This setup reflects an environment where the market for emerging market debt is segmented and investors are specialists, subject to liquidity shocks. Segmented markets result in bondholders being more affected by movements in the country's bond prices than would be suggested by the size of this market as a fraction of world assets. Therefore, the cost of borrowing is affected by the wealth and risk aversion of specialized investors.¹⁹ In addition, the existence of short investment horizons makes investors sensitive to the price risk of long-term bonds, since they need to liquidate their portfolios in period 1.

Using the market clearing conditions $d_S = D_S$, $d_L = D_L$, and bond prices in period 1, we obtain the consumption level of period 0 investors,

$$c = w + (1 - p_S) D_S + (\pi - p_L) D_L.$$

The period 0 first order conditions are $E[u'(w + (1 - p_S) D_S + (\pi - p_L) D_L)(\pi - p_L)] = 0$ and $1 - p_S = 0$. These conditions imply that bond prices satisfy $E[u'(w + (\pi - p_L) D_L)(\pi - p_L)] = 0$, what defines implicitly the price of long-term bonds as a function of D_L , $p(D_L)$. This leads us to the following lemma.

¹⁹How reasonable is the assumption of specialized investors? The assumption would probably be too strong if it required a separate pool of specialists for each emerging economy. However, we just need to assume that there is a subset of investors who specialize in emerging economies. The reason is that the returns of emerging economy assets are highly correlated across countries, so the degree to which investors can diversify away risk within this asset class is quite limited. This assumption can be justified given the existence of dedicated emerging market funds and dedicated emerging market departments within institutional investors. Also, the existence of home bias suggests that domestic bondholders are especially exposed to domestic bond returns. Finally, the assumption that emerging economies borrow from investors which are not equal to the "world representative investor" is common in the literature. This assumption is made, explicitly or implicitly, in all papers that highlight the role of financial channels in the transmission of crises across emerging economies.

Lemma 1. *The price of long-term bonds, $p(D_L)$, satisfies $p(D_L) \leq \pi_0$, where the condition holds as an equality if and only if $D_L = 0$. Furthermore, $p(D_L)$ is decreasing in D_L .*

Proof: See Appendix A.

The lemma implies that the risk premium on long-term bonds, which equals $\frac{E_0[p_{L,1}] - p_L}{p_L} = \frac{\pi_0 - p_L}{p_L}$, is generally positive. Since the risk premium on short-term bonds equals zero (they are risk-less), the lemma also implies the existence of a positive term premium. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Shocks to expected revenues make the price of long-term bonds in period 1 volatile. Since investors care about short-run returns, they require a positive risk premium to hold long-term bonds to compensate for this price risk. Since the degree of exposure to price risk increases with D_L , higher levels of D_L lead to a higher risk premium and a lower price $p(D_L)$.²⁰

It is useful to discuss the importance of different assumptions for the results. The two assumptions necessary for the existence of a positive term premium are: the presence of a shock to expected revenues in period 1 and the fact that investors have a short horizon. If the shock to expected revenues occurred after period 1, the price of long-term bonds would not change between periods 0 and 1, $p_{L,1} = p_L$, so investors would not require a positive risk premium to hold them. In addition, if investors did not care about short-run returns, they would require the same risk premium to hold long-term bonds (between periods 0 and 2) as they would to hold short-term bonds (between periods 0 and 1, and then between periods 1 and 2). The reason is that both strategies would pay out the same amount in all states of nature in period 2. On the other hand, the assumptions that no default takes place in period 1 and that investors are risk neutral between periods 1 and 2 substantially simplify the analysis of the model, but are not necessary for the results. In a more general setting where the country can default in the intermediate period, the risk premium on short-term bonds would also be positive. However, it would still be lower than the risk premium on long-term bonds, since the risk premium on long-term bonds would reflect not only the default risk in the intermediate period, but also the price risk.

²⁰The yield on long-term bonds, $\frac{1 - p_L}{p_L}$, equals the sum of their risk premium, $\frac{\pi_0 - p_L}{p_L}$, plus their default premium, $\frac{1 - \pi_0}{p_L}$.

2.3 Optimal maturity and risk sharing

We turn now to the choice of D_L by the government. Using the bond prices derived in the previous section, the government problem can be written as,²¹

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{D_L, D_S, D_{S,1}, x} && E_0 [-C(x) + \pi(Y - D_L - D_{S,1})], \\
& \text{s.t.} && D_0 = D_S + p_L D_L, \\
& && x = D_S - \pi D_{S,1}, \\
& && D_{S,1} \leq Y - D_L, \\
& && E[u'(w + (\pi - p_L) D_L)(\pi - p_L)] = 0.
\end{aligned}$$

We can solve this problem backward, solving first the optimization problem in period 1. The maximum amount of short-term debt that the government can issue in period 1 is given by $Y - D_L$, which is valued at $\pi(Y - D_L)$. If $\pi(Y - D_L) \geq D_S$, the government can raise enough funds to repay maturing short-term bonds without any fiscal adjustment. In this case, it sets $x = 0$ and issues an amount $D_{S,1} = D_S/\pi$ of short-term bonds in period 1. The value of short-term liabilities is constant over time and the government expected payoff is $\pi(Y - D_L) - \pi D_{S,1} = \pi(Y - D_L) - D_S$.

When $\pi(Y - D_L) < D_S$, a fiscal adjustment is needed to avoid default. Since $C'(x) > 0$ for $x > 0$, it is optimal to set $D_{S,1}$ to its maximum level to minimize the fiscal adjustment. The government then sets $x = D_S - \pi(Y - D_L)$ and the expected payoff is $-C(x)$.

The government's objective function as of period 1 depends only on the value of its net resources $\pi(Y - D_L) - D_S$. We thus define the government's indirect utility function, $V(\cdot)$, as

$$V(\pi(Y - D_L) - D_S) = \begin{cases} \pi(Y - D_L) - D_S & \text{if } \pi(Y - D_L) - D_S \geq 0 \\ -C(-(\pi(Y - D_L) - D_S)) & \text{if } \pi(Y - D_L) - D_S < 0 \end{cases}$$

The function $V(\cdot)$ is increasing and concave. Using the fact that $D_0 = D_S + p_L D_L$, we can rewrite

²¹The constraint on $D_{S,1}$ is due to the fact that short-term bonds issued in period 1 are junior to long-term bonds. Without this constraint, the government could pledge all period 2 output to short-term bond holders. As a result, in equilibrium the government would not be able to issue any long-term bonds in period 0.

the government's problem in period 0 as

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{D_L} \quad & E[V(\pi Y - D_0 - (\pi - p_L)D_L)] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & E[u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)] = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Written in this form, the government's maturity choice in period 0 has the features of a risk-sharing problem. The problem can be thought as one in which the government has a utility function $V(\cdot)$ over period 1 "consumption," needs to invest D_0 in period 0 to finance a risky project that pays πY in period 1, and borrows from risk averse investors by issuing bonds that pay 1 in every state (i.e. short-term bonds) and bonds that pay π (i.e. long-term bonds). The government's "consumption" level is given by

$$C_G = \pi Y - D_0 - (\pi - p_L)D_L.$$

If the government issued only short-term bonds, it would hold all the risk and C_G would be very sensitive to π . Given the concavity of $V(\cdot)$, this volatility of C_G would be costly, reflecting a higher likelihood and size of fiscal adjustment. Thus, the government has incentives to issue long-term bonds to transfer some of this risk to investors.²² However, investors require a risk premium to bear the price risk associated with long-term bonds. Since investors' period 1 consumption equals $w + (\pi - p_L)D_L$, their exposure to π is proportional to D_L . The higher D_L , the higher the risk premium required by investors and the lower the price p_L . This implies that the expected level of government consumption, which equals $E[C_G] = \pi_0 Y - D_0 - (\pi_0 - p_L)D_L$, is decreasing in D_L . As a result, the government trades-off the insurance benefits associated with long-term bonds against the lower borrowing cost associated with short-term bonds.

2.4 Comparative statics: Supply and demand factors

We now characterize how the optimal maturity structure and the risk premium on long-term bonds depend on the characteristics of investors and the borrower country. We refer to supply and demand as supply and demand of funds in international capital markets: international investors are on the

²²Note that $dC_G/d\pi = Y - D_L$ is decreasing in D_L . In particular, when $\pi(Y - D_L) - (D_0 - p_L D_L) \geq 0$ the government is fully insured since $C_G \geq 0$ for all realizations of π .

supply side and the debtor country is on the demand side. In particular, we consider the effect of investor risk aversion (captured in the model by their wealth w) and the effect of the country's expected repayment capacity (captured in the model by Y). We focus on four limit cases.

Case I: Risk neutral investors, high expected revenues

Assume that investors are risk neutral and government resources satisfy $\underline{\pi}Y - D_0 \geq 0$. Investor risk neutrality implies that $p_L = \pi_0$. In addition, the condition on government resources implies that

$$\underline{\pi}(Y - D_L) - (D_0 - p_L D_L) = \underline{\pi}(Y - D_L) - (D_0 - \pi_0 D_L) \geq (\pi_0 - \underline{\pi})D_L \geq 0,$$

with the last inequality following from $\pi_0 \geq \underline{\pi}$. As a result, independently of the maturity structure, the risk premium on long-term bonds is zero and the government never needs to carry out a fiscal adjustment in period 1. This case shows that when both investor wealth and the government's expected revenues are high, term premia are low and the maturity structure is undetermined. This result reflects the fact that when investors and the government are both risk neutral, it does not matter which one holds the risk.

Case II: Risk averse investors, high expected revenues

Assume that investors are risk averse, while government resources still satisfy $\underline{\pi}Y - D_0 \geq 0$. This condition guarantees that if the government issued no long-term bonds and financed D_0 solely with short-term bonds ($D_S = D_0$), it would never face a rollover crisis. Since investors would hold no country risk, the risk premium on long-term bonds would be zero ($p_L = \pi_0$).²³ If the government issued a positive amount of long-term bonds, it would still avoid a rollover crisis in period 1 but it would face a higher borrowing cost. Its payoff would be

$$\pi_0 Y - D_0 - (\pi_0 - p_L)D_L < \pi_0 Y - D_0.$$

As a result, any $D_L > 0$ is suboptimal. This case shows that when investor wealth is low and the government's expected resources are high, term premia are low and the maturity structure is

²³In this case, p_L is the price of long-term bonds in the limit when $D_L \rightarrow 0$.

short. This result reflects the fact that when investor risk aversion dominates, it is optimal for the government to hold all the risk by issuing only short-term bonds.

Case III: Risk neutral investors, low expected revenues

Assume that investors are risk neutral, while government resources are such that $\underline{\pi}Y - D_0 < 0$. Investor risk neutrality implies that $p_L = \pi_0$. Let $\hat{D}_L = \frac{D_0 - \underline{\pi}Y}{\pi_0 - \underline{\pi}}$. If the government issued an amount of long-term bonds $D_L \geq \hat{D}_L$, then

$$\underline{\pi}(Y - D_L) - (D_0 - p_L D_L) = \underline{\pi}(Y - D_L) - (D_0 - \pi_0 D_L) = \underline{\pi}Y - D_0 + (\pi_0 - \underline{\pi})D_L \geq 0.$$

In this case, the government would never face a rollover crisis.²⁴ Any amount of long-term bonds $D_L < \hat{D}_L$ would lead to a positive probability of rollover crisis and would thus be suboptimal. This case shows that when investor wealth is high and the government's expected resources are low, term premia are low and the maturity structure is long. This result reflects the fact that when government risk aversion dominates, it is optimal for the government to transfer all the risk to investors by issuing only long-term bonds.

Case IV: Risk averse investors, low expected revenues

Finally, assume that investors are risk averse, while government resources are such that $\underline{\pi}Y - D_0 < 0$. In this case, the government has to trade-off the cost of a rollover crisis associated with short-term borrowing against the high borrowing cost associated with long-term borrowing. This leads us to the following proposition.

Proposition 1. *When investors are risk averse and government resources satisfy $\underline{\pi}Y - D_0 < 0$, there is an optimal amount of long-term borrowing $D_L \in (0, \hat{D}_L)$, the risk premium on long-term bonds is positive ($p_L < \pi_0$), and the probability of a rollover crisis is positive.*

Proof: See Appendix A.

The proposition states that when investors are risk averse and expected government resources are low, the optimal maturity structure is an interior solution. By setting $D_L = 0$, the government

²⁴Note that $\hat{D}_L \geq 0$ since the government's expected revenue satisfies $\pi_0 Y > D_0$ and $\underline{\pi} < \pi_0$. In the case in which $\underline{\pi} = 0$, $\hat{D}_L = \frac{D_0}{\pi_0}$ and the unique optimum is to issue no short-term debt ($D_S = 0$).

would not have to pay the risk premium associated with long-term borrowing, but it would face a high expected fiscal adjustment cost in period 1 (when a large stock of short-term debt is to be rolled over). By setting $D_L = \hat{D}_L$, the government would completely avoid a rollover crisis in period 1, but it would face a high borrowing cost in period 0. It is easy to see why the solution is interior. At low levels of D_L , investors are not very exposed to the country risk, so it is not very expensive to increase D_L . At high levels of D_L , the country is well insured, so the cost of lowering D_L in terms of a higher cost from a rollover crisis is low. In addition, since investors are risk averse and $D_L > 0$, the risk premium on long-term bonds must be positive.

Supply and demand side crises

These four cases are summarized in Figure 1, where they are represented in the (w, Y) space. This figure is useful to discuss the effects of supply and demand side shocks on debt maturity and the term premium.

A shift to the left reflects a reduction in investor wealth (or an increase in investor risk aversion), which represents a deterioration of the supply side. The increase in investor risk aversion causes an increase in the term premium and a shift towards shorter maturities, as the government finds it optimal to transfer some of the risk from investors to itself. In the case of a shift from region I to region II, this shift does not result in a rollover crisis, since expected repayment capacity is high. In the case of a shift from region III to region IV, this shift does involve an increase in the cost of a rollover crisis, since expected repayment capacity is low. Still, it is optimal for the government to hold this risk because of the savings in borrowing cost associated with short-term debt. Intuitively, a negative supply shock leads to lower quantities (less long-term borrowing) and higher cost of borrowing (higher term premium).

A shift down reflects a reduction in the country's expected repayment capacity, which represents a deterioration of the demand side. The decrease in expected repayment capacity increases the cost of a rollover crisis. As a result, the government finds it optimal to transfer some of the increased risk to investors by shifting towards longer debt maturities, which results in a higher term premium. In the case of a shift from region I to region III, investors have low risk aversion and thus are willing to hold the additional risk without demanding a higher premium. In the case of a shift from region II to region IV, the shift towards longer maturities does increase the term premium since investors

are risk averse. Intuitively, a positive demand shock leads to higher quantities (more long-term borrowing) and higher cost of borrowing (higher term premium).

2.5 Implications of the model

In the rest of the paper, we empirically study the behavior of the term premium and bond issuance by emerging market sovereigns at different maturities. In particular, we focus on whether there exists a positive term premium, whether the term premium increases during crises, and whether the maturity of bond issuance shifts during crises.

The model predicts that the term premium should be positive on average. It also predicts that, during crises, the term premium should increase. This occurs either because of an increase in investor exposure to country risk in the case of a demand side shock, or because investors require a higher premium to hold the same amount of risk in the case of a supply side shock. The predictions on the optimal maturity structure depend on the type of shock. While a demand side shock causes the country to issue long-term bonds to shift risk towards investors, a supply side shock causes the country to issue short-term bonds to shift risk away from investors and save on borrowing costs. As a result, the correlation between the term premium and the maturity of bond issuance allows us to establish whether the predominant shocks are on the supply side (shifting the supply curve) or on the demand side (shifting the demand curve).²⁵

3 Bond data

We now turn to the empirical evidence and analyze bond price and quantity data. The price data are used to estimate risk premia on short- and long-term bonds, and to characterize the behavior of the implied term premium. The quantity data are used to analyze the comovement between the maturity structure of bond issuance and the observed term premium.

We conduct the empirical analysis by collecting data on sovereign bonds from the early 1990s

²⁵In a more general setting, we would expect a demand side shock to affect the wealth of investors through its effect on the price of bonds investors already hold. In this case, a demand shock would have the direct effect highlighted in the model, but also an indirect effect on the supply side. As we show in the empirical section, crises are typically associated with higher term premia and a shift towards shorter maturities. This comovement suggests that either the predominant shocks are on the supply side or that, if they are on the demand side, their direct effects are dominated by their indirect effect on the supply side. In either case, the results support the conclusion that supply side factors play an important role in emerging market crises.

up to 2003 for eight emerging economies. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. To calculate the term premium, we also collect data on sovereign bonds for Germany and the U.S., which are assumed to be free of default risk. The choice of emerging markets is constrained by data limitations. To estimate time series of the term premium, we need enough foreign currency denominated bonds of different maturities at each point in time. Therefore, our sample corresponds to those emerging economies that borrowed heavily in foreign currency, generating a rich enough pool of bonds. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to sovereign bonds because they constitute the most liquid debt instrument in most emerging markets, and because private debtors in emerging markets do not issue enough bonds to compute the term premium.

We collect weekly (end-of-week) time series of bond prices, using all available bonds for each country.²⁶ We also collect other information on these bonds, including currency denomination, coupon structure, and maturity. In addition, we compile time series of bond issuance in foreign currency. For each bond, we collect the amount issued, currency denomination, and maturity date. With this information, we construct weekly time series of amount issued valued in U.S. dollars. We exclude from the sample the bonds with collateral and special guarantees, such as collateralized Brady bonds and those issued by Argentina during the large pre-default swap. We also exclude bonds issued during forced restructurings, like those issued by Argentina and Russia post default and Uruguay post crisis.²⁷ We collect data from three different sources: Bloomberg, Datastream, and J.P. Morgan.

Regarding the currency choice, we restrict the sample to bonds denominated in foreign currency so we can abstract from the currency risk that would affect the term premium on domestic currency bonds. This reduces the sample significantly, given that many countries, especially Asian and Eastern European ones, mostly issue domestic currency bonds. With respect to the currency selection, we use bonds denominated in U.S. dollars, Deutsche marks, and euros for the estimation of bond spreads. This choice is not very restrictive as most foreign currency bonds are issued in these currencies. As benchmarks of risk-less bonds, we use those issued by Germany in both Deutsche marks and euros and by the U.S. in dollars. We use bonds in all foreign currencies for our estimations of bond issuance.

²⁶We eliminate the observations where bond prices do not change over time, as this typically reflects no trading.

²⁷See Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003) for more details on the Russian default.

Table 1 lists the countries in the sample, along with the time periods used for the price and quantity data. The price data start in April 1993 (with a different starting date for each country), ending in May 2003 for all countries. The quantity data cover a longer time span, starting in January 1990 and ending in December 2002. Table 1 also displays the number of bonds available to calculate bond prices and the number of bonds issued during the sample period. For the price data, the table shows the average minimum maturity, maximum maturity, and 75th percentile. Though most bonds have a maturity of less than 15 years, the countries in the sample have been able to issue longer-term bonds with maturity of 20 and 30 years. The bottom panel of Table 1 displays the average amount issued by maturity, showing that issuance is distributed across maturities. Appendix Table 1 lists all the bonds used in the paper, specifying for each bond its characteristics and whether it is used for the price and/or quantity analysis. The number of emerging market bonds used in the paper is 466, while the total number of bonds (including German and U.S. bonds) is 746.

4 Bond returns: The cost of borrowing

In this section, we show that, consistent with the model predictions, observed term premia on emerging market bonds are positive and increase during crisis times. In the model, the risk premium on short-term debt is set to zero for simplicity, so the risk premium on long-term bonds and the term premium are identical. In reality, the risk premium on short-term bonds is also positive. Thus, to obtain information on the term premium, we first need to estimate the risk premia on bonds of different maturities.

The risk premium for each maturity is estimated by using ex-post excess returns on emerging market bonds over comparable default-free (German and U.S.) bonds. To calculate the risk premium, we need to obtain first bond yields, spreads, and prices. We begin by estimating time series of German and U.S. yields curves and emerging market spread curves. The maturity- τ spread, $s_{t,\tau}$, is defined as the difference between the yield, $y_{t,\tau}$, on an emerging market zero-coupon bond of maturity τ and the yield, $y_{t,\tau}^*$, on a default-free zero-coupon bond of maturity τ , $s_{t,\tau} = y_{t,\tau} - y_{t,\tau}^*$. We use this information to obtain bond returns at different maturities and over time for every country. This enables us to make cross-country, cross-maturity, and over-time comparisons. Note

that it would be impossible to carry out the analysis using the raw data because each country has a different set of bonds at each point in time, with varying maturity and coupon structure. Appendix B describes the methodology used to estimate yields and spread curves.

Figure 2 displays the estimated spreads over time for each country. The figure shows spreads at two maturities to illustrate how short-term (3-year) and long-term (12-year) spreads move over time. The figure shows some interesting facts. First, spread curves are, on average, upward sloping. Second, spreads increase during periods of financial crises. For example, during the crises in Argentina, Russia, and Uruguay, spreads jump to more than 25 percent or 2,500 basis points. Third, short-term spreads are more volatile than long-term spreads. In fact, during periods of very high spreads there is an inversion of the spread curve, with short-term spreads becoming higher than long-term ones.

Using the estimated spread curves and U.S. yield curves, we compute the price $P_{t,\tau}$ of a representative emerging market bond of given maturity τ and coupon c . In Figure 3, we plot the price of short- and long-term bonds, with a semi-annual coupon of 7.5 percent.²⁸ To simplify the comparisons, the value at the beginning of the sample is normalized to 100 for each country. The figure shows that the prices of long-term emerging market bonds are more volatile than those of short-term bonds. In particular, at the onset of a crisis the prices of long-term bonds fall much more than those of short-term bonds, while during the recovery (if there is one), the prices of long-term bonds increase much more than those of short-term bonds. Next, we show how these price changes are reflected in the risk premium and the term premium.

After having obtained prices, we estimate the risk premium using excess returns or, more precisely, average ex-post excess returns over T periods.²⁹ The return of holding an emerging market bond, $r_{t+1,\tau}$, for one period (one week) is equal to $\frac{P_{t+1,\tau}-P_{t,\tau}}{P_{t,\tau}}$, in the case of no coupon payment at date $t + 1$. We compare this return to the return on a German or U.S. bond, $r_{t+1,\tau}^*$. Excess returns, er_τ , are then expressed as the returns of holding emerging market bonds of maturity

²⁸For prices and returns, we choose to use coupon-paying bonds because emerging markets almost never issue zero-coupon bonds. So the pricing errors for coupon-paying bonds are smaller than for zero-coupon bonds.

²⁹To calculate the means, we use holding periods of one week. We also experimented with holding periods of one month, obtaining similar results.

τ and coupon c over the returns of “comparable” risk-less bonds,

$$er_{\tau} = \frac{1}{T-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} er_{t+1,\tau} = \frac{1}{T-1} \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} (r_{t+1,\tau} - r_{t+1,\tau}^*).$$

Positive excess returns mean that emerging market bonds pay positive returns on top of what German or U.S. bonds do. Note that the computation of excess returns does not simply use risk-less bonds of the same maturity and coupon. In fact, we obtain excess returns by taking into account the payment profile of the emerging market bond, and comparing it to a portfolio of risk-less bonds that replicates its payment structure. (See Appendix B for more details.)

The term premium, tp_{τ_2,τ_1} , is given by the difference between the risk premium (average excess returns) on long-term bonds (of maturity τ_2) and that on short-term bonds (of maturity τ_1),

$$tp_{\tau_2,\tau_1} = er_{\tau_2} - er_{\tau_1}.$$

Before going to the empirical estimates, two points are worth noting about the term premium. First, a positive slope in the spread curve does not imply that the term premium is positive, since the term premium also depends on the evolution of spreads over time and on how defaults affect bonds of different maturities. Second, the difference in risk premium between long- and short-term emerging market bonds would typically reflect both the price risk associated with the probability of default and the term premium inherent in default-free bonds. Here we concentrate on the first component, because we define the term premium on emerging market bonds in excess of the term premium on default-free bonds.³⁰

4.1 Unconditional risk and term premia

Table 2 shows average annualized excess returns across all observations in the sample. The table displays values for bonds with maturities of 3, 6, 9, and 12 years and annual coupon payments of 5, 7.5, and 10 percent (paid semi-annually). These “theoretical” bonds are representative of emerging market sovereign bonds both in terms of maturity and coupons. Table 2 shows that, when considering all the countries in the sample, excess returns are positive for all coupon sizes

³⁰Since the term premium for U.S. and German bonds is positive, the total term premium would be larger if we added the two components.

and maturities. More relevant for our analysis, excess returns increase with maturity in all cases, so the term premium is also positive.³¹ Not surprisingly, there is heterogeneity in the results at the country level, reflecting the different performance of each emerging market. However, the results are not driven by any particular emerging market, since they survive when we exclude from the sample individual countries.

What do the results in Table 2 tell about how much emerging market bonds pay relative to comparable default-free bonds? To answer this question, consider the results for bonds with annual coupons of 7.5 percent (the one closest to actual coupons). The results in Table 2 say that, on average, investors receive an annualized return three percent higher when investing in a 3-year emerging market bond than when investing in a German or U.S. 3-year bond, and an annualized return seven percent higher when investing in a 12-year emerging market bond than when investing in a German or U.S. 12-year bond. In other words, emerging market bonds pay a positive risk premium and a positive term premium.

4.2 Conditional risk and term premia: Crises vs. tranquil times

We now study whether the term premium is different during crisis and tranquil times. To do so, we first need to define crises. The literature has used different definitions, with no definition being perfect as certain ad-hoc criteria need to be adopted. To partly overcome this problem, we use four different definitions of crises to gauge the robustness of our results. Since we are interested in studying conditional returns, we adopt definitions that use only ex-ante information. In other words, to determine whether there was a crisis at time t , we only use information that was available at time t . Crisis definition 1 is our benchmark definition; it sets the beginning of a crisis when 9-year spreads are greater than a threshold, which is defined as the average spread over the previous six months plus 300 basis points.³² The end of the crisis is at the end of the first four-week period in which spreads have remained below the threshold used to determine the beginning of the crisis. Crisis definition 2 is similar to crisis definition 1, but uses 400 basis points to define the threshold. Crisis definitions 3 and 4 are similar, but use a one-week period instead of a four-week period to

³¹Also note that excess returns decrease with coupon size. This is expected given that the term premia are positive and duration is a decreasing function of coupon size.

³²To classify the first observations of the sample for each country, we repeat the first price observed during the previous six months.

end the crisis.

Table 3 lists the crisis periods obtained with crisis definition 1. All major crises are captured by the crisis definition. For example, the Mexican 94-95 crisis affected Argentina and Brazil. (Note that our sample does not contain spreads for Mexico during that period.) The Russian crisis affected all countries in the sample except Uruguay, which had its own crisis after Argentina defaulted on its debt in early 2002. The Argentine crisis started when the government was forced to change its economic plan and the default became very likely. Brazil and Colombia were also hit by crises in 2002.

Then, we calculate excess returns at different maturities, splitting the sample between tranquil times and crises. The results are reported in Table 4 for all crisis definitions. We report results using bonds with coupons of size 7.5 percent, although the results are similar for bonds with coupons of five and ten percent. The results indicate that both excess returns and the term premium are very large during crises, and close to zero during tranquil times. For example, according to definition 1, the difference between the average 12- and 3-year annualized excess returns (our measure of the term premium) is around 28 percent. Table 5 displays excess returns by country according to crisis definition 1. The table shows that for most countries the risk premium and the term premium are large during crises and low during non-crisis periods. There are two exceptions, excess returns are negative during crises in Uruguay and, for short maturities, in Argentina. This is due to the fact that both countries have experienced actual defaults, namely, crises in which the situation continued to deteriorate rather than improve. In the case of Argentina, this is partly compensated by the Mexican crisis, when excess returns were very high.

In Table 6, we analyze more formally whether excess returns across maturities are predictable, namely whether they change during crisis times. The table presents least squares regressions with the long-short excess return as the dependent variable, defined as the difference for each observation between a long-term (9-year or 12-year) excess return and a short-term (3-year) or medium-term (6-year) excess return. The independent variable is a dummy that takes the value one during crises and zero otherwise. To make sure that the results are robust to our crisis definition, we also try log spreads, defined as $\log(1 + s_{t,\tau})$, at different maturities as the independent variable. The estimations pool all observations available across countries and over time. Results with and without country

and time effects are reported.³³

The results in Table 6 show that the crisis variable is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level for all regressions. The estimates also show that the effect of a crisis is very large. For example, the regression for the 12-3 term premium with no country or time dummies shows that the term premium increases by 0.449 percent per week during crisis times, which on an annualized basis corresponds to more than 26 percent. The coefficient of 0.045 on the 6-year spread in the regression of the 12-3 term premium states that when 6-year spreads increase by one percent, the annualized long-short excess return increases by 2.4 percent. Confirming the evidence presented in the previous tables, these regressions imply that the term premium is time-varying, increasing during periods of crises and high spreads.

We have already shown that the term premium increases during crises. To estimate to what degree this increase can be related to an increase in the volatility of returns during crises, we plot in Figure 4 the excess returns against the standard deviation of excess returns for crisis, non-crisis, and all periods. The figure shows that during non-crisis periods excess returns are close to zero, with the standard deviation increasing with maturity. During crisis periods, both excess returns and their standard deviations increase for all maturities. It is important to note that the increase in excess returns cannot be accounted for by the increase in volatility. The reason is that the Sharpe ratio (i.e. the ratio of excess returns over their standard deviation) increases substantially during crisis times. The average Sharpe ratio across maturities is 0.006 during non-crisis periods and larger than 0.06 during crisis periods.

In sum, the results above are consistent with the model presented in Section 2, which shows that crises can be due to shocks to the country's repayment capacity or to shocks to investor wealth (or other determinants of risk appetite). In both cases, the model predicts that the term premium should increase. In the case of debtor side shocks, or demand shocks, the country demands more long-term funds, driving up the cost of long-term borrowing. In the case of investor side shocks, or supply shocks, bondholders become more sensitive to the price risk of long-term bonds and demand

³³The regressions use robust estimates of the standard errors. To do so, we define clusters by the country and crisis indicators, thus, observations are assumed to be independent across clusters, but not necessarily independent within clusters. This allows for a general form of heteroskedasticity across observations and non-zero correlation within clusters. As further robustness tests, we also estimated regressions with crisis dummies constructed with crisis definitions 2, 3, and 4. Moreover, we redefined clusters using either country or crisis indicators. In all cases, we obtained similar results.

a higher term premium. To complement the price evidence presented so far, the next section studies bond issuance at different maturities, during crisis and tranquil times. This will allow us to shed more light on the relative role of debtor and investor side shocks during crises. But before doing so, we discuss three points related to the results presented in this section.

4.3 Interpreting the evidence

We end this section with a discussion of three issues that might help clarify the results related to the risk premium and the term premium. First, can our results be due to a peso problem? Second, does the fact that the term premium is close to zero during tranquil times imply that our explanation of why emerging economies borrow short term only applies to crisis times? Third, what is the relation between our results and the literature on the term structure of interest rates in developed countries?

4.3.1 Peso problem

As usual in studies that estimate ex-ante expected returns by computing average ex-post returns, it is natural to ask whether our results could be due to a peso-type problem. In particular, is it possible that ex-post returns be positive in our sample simply because defaults are underrepresented? This potential small sample problem could be important given that defaults are rare events.

We think that it is very unlikely that our results on either risk or term premia be due to a peso problem. To begin, our sample does include a number of default episodes and it is difficult to claim that the period 1993-2003 was particularly good for emerging markets. In addition, the behavior of short- and long-term bond prices during defaults also suggests that the results are not due to a peso problem. As explained next, this argument is based on two points.

First, the result that the term premium is positive would probably survive even if there were more defaults in our sample. Usually, long-term bonds trade at higher discounts (i.e. lower percentage of face value) than short-term bonds. This is especially true during crises when spreads and the probability of default are high. In addition, post-default workouts generally involve payments approximately proportional to face value. This implies that episodes of default are associated with larger losses on short-term bonds than on long-term bonds.³⁴ As a result, even if in reality defaults

³⁴This in fact was the case during the Argentine default. We studied the excess returns of buying Argentine bonds

were more frequent than in our sample the term premium would still be positive.

Second, if the term premium is positive, then risk premia are likely to be positive as well. The reason is that it is very difficult to think of an environment where long-term bonds have higher returns than short-term bonds, while at the same time either long- or short-term bonds have a negative risk premium. The returns on short- and long-term bonds are highly correlated and, thus, probably have similar correlations with the investors' stochastic discount factor or marginal utility. A negative risk premium at any maturity would imply a positive correlation between bond returns and the investors' stochastic discount factor and, as a result, a negative price of risk. Since the returns on long-term bonds are much more volatile than those on short-term bonds, a negative price of risk would imply a negative term premium, contradicting our findings. Therefore, the fact that the term premium is positive suggests that the price of emerging market risk and, thus, risk premia are also positive.³⁵

4.3.2 When is it cheaper to borrow short term?

Since the term premium is close to zero during tranquil times, one could think that borrowing short term is cheaper than borrowing long term only during crises. In fact, this is not the case. The reason is that there is a positive transition hazard rate from tranquil to crisis times. As a result, when a country issues long-term bonds during tranquil times, it has to compensate bondholders for the drop in bond prices that would take place if a crisis were to materialize. In other words, the spreads on long-term bonds issued during tranquil times reflect not only the expected losses from default, but also the expected risk premia that would need to be paid during the lifetime of the bond. This is true irrespective of whether a crisis actually materializes.

A caveat to this reasoning applies. This argument is valid only if there is some cost associated with repurchasing outstanding long-term bonds at the beginning of crises by issuing short-term

of different maturities before the default (which was declared on December 23, 2001) and holding them until after the default. For purchase dates between early November 2001 and one week before the default and selling dates between one week and one year after the default, the losses on short-term bonds were virtually always greater than those on long-term bonds, by around ten percent.

³⁵The idea that the observed term premia carry information on the underlying risk premium seems to be very useful since estimates of the risk premium are typically very sensitive to the sample under study. For example, Eichengreen and Portes (1988) find that the ex-post excess returns on sovereign bonds issued by foreign countries in the United States and Britain during the interwar years were close to zero. Klingen, Weder, and Zettelmeyer (2004) find that the ex-post excess returns on emerging market sovereign lending were negative during the 1970s and 1980s, but positive during the 1990s. In this paper, although excess returns are positive in the full sample, we find negative excess returns for Argentina and Uruguay.

bonds. The behavior of bond issuance during crises suggests that this may be the case. As shown in the next section, during crises emerging economies do not repurchase existing long-term bonds, while they very seldom issue new ones. It is difficult to explain this knife-edge result of no change in long-term indebtedness in the absence of some cost (signalling or otherwise) associated with retiring existing long-term bonds.³⁶

4.3.3 Related literature on the term structure of interest rates

There is a vast literature on the term structure of interest rates in developed countries related to our paper. A large part of this literature has focused on testing and rejecting the pure expectations hypothesis (according to which term and risk premia are zero) and the expectations hypothesis (according to which term and risk premia are constant over time). The more recent literature has tried to characterize and explain the dynamics of risk premia by allowing for a time-varying price of risk.³⁷

Our findings that risk and term premia are positive and increase during crises can be interpreted as a rejection of the pure expectations hypothesis and the expectations hypothesis, but for emerging economies and stated in terms of spreads instead of yields. These findings contradict the still widely held view in the literature on emerging market borrowing that spreads mostly reflect the market assessment of the probability of default.³⁸

5 Bond issuance: Supply vs. demand shocks

The model in Section 2 shows that the comovement between the term premium and the maturity structure of debt can shed light on the type of shocks characterizing the cyclical behavior of emerging market debt. On the one hand, demand side shocks such as an increase in current financing needs or a reduction in future expected government revenues are likely to lead to an increase in the maturity

³⁶The IMF (1999) reports that in fact there have been some attempts to buyback debt perceived to be “mispriced,” i.e. paying a high risk premium. An example is the buyback of Polish Brady bonds. However, these operations are rare, involve relatively small amounts, and tend to take place in tranquil times.

³⁷For a definition of the pure expectations and expectations hypotheses and for some references on these topics, see Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), Cochrane (1999), Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), and Dai and Singleton (2002).

³⁸Our model provides a simple equilibrium framework that is consistent with these observations. However, to provide a quantitative assessment of these facts more work remains to be done, both in the direction of no-arbitrage models and in the direction of equilibrium models. For no-arbitrage models see Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003).

structure of debt and a resulting increase in the term premium, generating a positive comovement. On the other hand, supply side shocks, such as a decrease in investor wealth, are likely to lead to an increase in the term premium and a resulting decrease in the maturity structure of debt, generating a negative comovement.

In this section, we study whether the behavior of the quantity data are consistent with supply or demand type of shocks. We concentrate on two sets of variables, the amount issued at different maturities and the average maturity of bond issuance. We study the behavior of these variables over time. In particular, we analyze how they are affected by crises, spreads, and the term premium.

To study the amount issued at different maturities, we run a separate regression of issuance at each maturity as a function of each conditioning variable. We use a Tobit model, estimated by maximum likelihood, pooling all observations. These estimations take into account the fact that observations are left censored at zero. The dependent variable is the amount issued at each maturity in any given week, normalized by the average weekly issues for each country. This normalization takes into consideration that the average amount issued varies across countries. We use four different bond maturities: up to 3-year maturity (short term), more than 3-year maturity and up to 6-year maturity (medium-short term), more than 6-year maturity and up to 9-year maturity (medium-long term), and more than 9-year maturity (long term). As explanatory variables we use, alternatively, the crisis dummy defined above, the 3-year spread, the 9-year spread, the emerging market bond index (EMBI) spread for each country, and the predicted term premium for each country. For spreads, we use log-spreads, defined as $\log(1 + s_{t,\tau})$. The EMBI spreads, calculated by J.P. Morgan, are well-known measures of long-term spreads in emerging markets. They not only provide an alternative estimate of long-term spreads, but also extend the sample for Mexico to cover the Mexican crisis (though they exclude Uruguay). We use the predicted term premium because it most directly captures the cost of issuing long-term debt relative to short-term debt. This variable is computed by regressing ex-post excess returns on 3-year and 9-year spreads and then obtaining the predicted value. As before, we compute robust standard errors using the country and crisis indicators as clusters.

The Tobit estimations are reported in Table 7. The estimations show that short-term issues are hardly affected by any of the conditioning variables; only the 3-year spread is statistically significant at the ten percent level. However, medium- and long-term issues do show clear cyclical patterns.

The conditioning variables become more statistically significant and the point estimates negative and large in magnitude. In the regressions for long-term issues, all the regressors are significant, at least at the five percent level. The coefficients reported, which are the marginal effects or the effects on the observed (not the latent) variable, also seem large. For example, an increase of 100 basis points in 9-year spreads leads to a decline in the weekly issues of 0.223, where the average value of the normalized weekly issue is 1. In sum, the estimations in Table 7 suggest that during crises and, more generally, in periods of high spreads, countries tend to issue less debt. In addition, the longer the maturity of debt, the larger the effect of crises and spreads on the amount issued. Interestingly, the estimated term premium has a big negative effect on long-term issues, but no statistically significant effect on shorter-term issues. The result that short-term issues are barely affected by the different variables reflects the fact that although countries tend to issue less when spreads are high, they mostly issue short-term bonds (if they issue at all). These two effects cancel out, leading to non-significant coefficients.

To study the average maturity of issues, we estimate a model that takes into account the incidental truncation of the data, since the average maturity is only available when countries issue bonds and, otherwise, there are missing observations. As noted initially by Heckman (1979), ignoring the missing values might lead to a sample selection bias. In our case, one would tend to miss observations when spreads are high and countries do not issue any bonds. To account for this selection, we estimate two equations simultaneously by maximum likelihood. One equation describes the probability of observing the average maturity of issues each week. The second equation estimates how the average maturity is correlated with the conditioning variables. In this type of estimations, it is usually difficult to select the variables that enter in each equation. We choose different specifications to see whether the results are robust to this choice.³⁹ The regressors included in the selection equation are similar to those used for the Tobit models. These variables help to predict whether countries issue at all. The regressors included are, alternatively, the crisis dummy, the short- and long-term spreads, and the country EMBI spread. For the main equation, we use the long-term spread and, alternatively, the estimated term premium, which captures the relative cost of issuing long term. As the variables are not scaled, we include country dummies. Again, we compute robust standard errors using the country and crisis indicators as clusters.

³⁹ As another robustness check, we also estimated the main equation without taking into account the selection bias and obtained similar results.

The results of the selection equations, displayed in Table 8, show that countries are less likely to issue bonds during crisis times and, more generally, when spreads are high. In addition, the results of the main equations show that the average maturity of issues shortens when long-term spreads or the predicted term premium increases. These results are consistent with the pattern displayed in Figure 5, which shows the average maturity and spreads over time for each country. The figure also shows that issuance is negatively correlated with crises and, more generally, with the level of spreads. Finally, another way to summarize the evidence is that countries try to extend the maturity structure of their debt whenever market conditions permit it, i.e. when markets require a low term premium.

Taken together, the results presented in the last two sections provide compelling evidence that supply side factors play an important role in emerging market borrowing, especially during crises. First, the fact that term premia are on average positive implies that borrowing long term is on average more expensive than borrowing short term. Second, the fact that during crises the term premium increases while borrowing shifts toward shorter maturities implies that crises are characterized by negative shifts in the supply of funds to the affected countries.

6 Final remarks

This paper proposes a new explanation to why emerging economies borrow short term, even though this type of debt increases their exposure to rollover crises. We argue that countries borrow short term because investors require a high risk premium to hold long-term debt, making short-term borrowing cheaper. We model the choice of debt maturity structure as the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the debtor country and risk averse investors. The model highlights the trade-off between cheaper short-term borrowing and safer long-term borrowing, and endogenously derives the maturity structure and the cost of borrowing at different maturities. We then show that emerging economies face a term premium that is positive on average and increases significantly during crises. We also show that there is a negative correlation between the term premium and the maturity of debt issuance. These results suggest that the higher cost of borrowing long-term can account for both why emerging economies tend to borrow short term and why they rely even more heavily on short-term debt during periods of financial turbulence.

The evidence presented in the paper shows that supply-side factors, in particular time-varying investor risk aversion, are important determinants of the borrowing cost and debt maturity of emerging economies. While the evidence does not rule out the importance of other factors, it does suggest that the conventional view overestimates the importance of debtor moral hazard.⁴⁰ This has important policy implications. One example is the question of how the international financial system should deal with financial crises in emerging economies. From a moral hazard perspective, the cost of crises is what makes these episodes a strong disciplining device. Efforts to limit the cost of crises through loans from the international financial community, or other liquidity providing mechanisms, would exacerbate the moral hazard problem, and could end up reducing welfare. If, on the other hand, countries borrow short term because of the high cost of long-term borrowing, those same crisis prevention mechanisms would improve welfare. The benefits would come not only from fewer and less severe crises, but also from cheaper long-term borrowing as a result of the reduction in the price risk of long-term debt.

An additional contribution of this paper is to construct time series of spreads and risk premia at different maturities. This is useful since the literature so far has mostly used plain spreads to measure the cost of borrowing. Simply looking at spreads can lead to the wrong conclusions. For example, during crises, long-term spreads increase less than short-term spreads, as illustrated in Figure 2. This does not mean that long-term debt becomes relatively less costly. Indeed, looking at risk premia, we show that long-term borrowing becomes more costly during crises. This happens not because long-term spreads increase disproportionately, but because short-term spreads tend to revert quickly to normal levels. Thus, the country would benefit by issuing short-term debt and renewing it at lower spreads after the crisis.

The distinction between risk premia and plain spreads is crucial for quantitative macroeconomic analysis. Although the literature stresses the relation between spreads (and interest rates) and the macroeconomic performance of emerging economies, existing studies need to make strong assumptions regarding the extent to which spreads reflect expected losses from default and risk premia. At one extreme, there is a growing literature that tries to account for the behavior of emerging economy spreads in an environment in which bondholders are risk neutral and spreads

⁴⁰The evidence does rule out models *solely* based on moral hazard since in such models risk and term premia are zero. Although in such models short-term borrowing can reduce spreads, this reduction only reflects lower expected losses from default. Furthermore, the evidence also rules out models with constant investor risk aversion because risk and term premia are close to zero during tranquil times.

solely reflect expected losses from default.⁴¹ These papers have so far been unable to account for the high volatility of spreads in emerging economies. This is not surprising given our evidence that an important fraction of the increase in spreads during crises reflects an increase in risk premia. In fact, our evidence implies that even if these models could account for the volatility of spreads while assuming zero risk premia, they would do so by overestimating the volatility of default probabilities. At the other extreme, a number of papers analyze the relation between interest rates and output volatility assuming that there are no defaults.⁴² These papers overestimate the increase in the cost of borrowing during crises, by attributing it entirely to changes in risk premia. Our paper has useful implications for this literature as it provides estimates on the magnitude and volatility of the cost of borrowing for emerging economies.

⁴¹See, for example, Oviedo (2003), Arellano (2005), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005), and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). A notable exception is a recent paper by Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2006), which integrates risk averse international investors into a quantitative model of the optimal maturity structure for emerging economies.

⁴²See, for example, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006).

7 References

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Appendix A: Model details

This appendix provides some details on the model.

Proof of Lemma 1.

The investors' first order condition is

$$E[u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)] = 0.$$

When $D_L = 0$, $u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)$ is a positive constant, and it easily follows that $p_L = E[\pi] = \pi_0$.

Next, we consider the case $D_L > 0$.

Let $F(\cdot)$ be the CDF of π . We can rewrite the first order condition as

$$\int_0^{p_L} u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)dF(\pi) + \int_{p_L}^1 u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)dF(\pi) = 0.$$

In the first region, $\pi - p_L < 0$ and $u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L) > u'(w)$. In the second region, $\pi - p_L > 0$ and $u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L) < u'(w)$. We thus have

$$u'(w) \int_0^{p_L} (\pi - p_L)dF(\pi) = \int_0^{p_L} u'(w)(\pi - p_L)dF(\pi) + \int_{p_L}^1 u'(w)(\pi - p_L)dF(\pi) > 0,$$

which implies $p_L < E[\pi] = \pi_0$.

We now show that $p'(D_L) < 0$. Differentiating investors' first order condition with respect to D_L and rearranging we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} p'(D_L) \{E[u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)] + E[u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)] D_L\} &= \\ &= E[u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)^2] \end{aligned}$$

Since $u'(\cdot) > 0$ and $u''(\cdot) < 0$, it easily follows that

$$E[u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)] > 0$$

and

$$E[u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)^2] < 0.$$

As a result, to show that $p'(D_L) < 0$ it suffices to show that

$$-E [u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)] < 0.$$

We can write

$$\begin{aligned} & -E [u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)] = \\ & = \int_0^{p_L} -\frac{u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)}{u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)} u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L) dF(\pi) + \\ & \quad + \int_{p_L}^1 -\frac{u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)}{u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)} u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L) dF(\pi). \end{aligned}$$

Since $u(\cdot)$ displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, in the first region $\pi - p_L < 0$ and

$$-\frac{u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)}{u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)} > -\frac{u''(w)}{u'(w)},$$

while in the second region $\pi - p_L > 0$ and

$$-\frac{u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)}{u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)} < -\frac{u''(w)}{u'(w)}.$$

Thus,

$$-E [u''(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)] < -\frac{u''(w)}{u'(w)} E [u'(w + (\pi - p_L)D_L)(\pi - p_L)] = 0,$$

where the last equality follows from the first order condition.

Proof of Proposition 1.

Let $F(\cdot)$ be the CDF of π , and let

$$x(\pi, D_L) = \max \{D_0 - \pi Y + (\pi - p_L)D_L, 0\}$$

be the fiscal adjustment in period 1. The government's objective function can be written as

$$W(D_L) = \pi_0 Y - D_0 - (\pi_0 - p_L)D_L + \int_{x(\pi, D_L) \geq 0} [x(\pi, D_L) - C(x(\pi, D_L))] dF(\pi).$$

Differentiating W with respect to D_L , we obtain

$$W'(D_L) = -\frac{d}{dD_L}(\pi_0 - p_L)D_L + \int_{x(\pi, D_L) \geq 0} \left[(1 - C'(x(\pi, D_L))) \frac{d}{dD_L}(\pi - p_L)D_L \right] dF(\pi).$$

When $D_L = 0$, the first term in $W'(D_L)$ is zero and we have

$$W'(0) = \int_{\underline{\pi}}^{\hat{\pi}} (1 - C'(x(\pi, 0))) (\pi - \pi_0) dF(\pi),$$

where we used the fact that $p(0) = \pi_0$, and $\hat{\pi} = \frac{D_0}{Y}$ is the minimum π such that $x(\pi, 0) = 0$. The fact that $C'(x) > 1$ for $x > 0$ implies that the first factor in the integrand is negative. The fact that $\pi_0 Y - D_0 > 0$ and $\underline{\pi} Y - D_0 < 0$ implies that $\hat{\pi} \in (\underline{\pi}, \pi_0)$ and, thus, the second factor in the integrand is also negative. This shows that

$$W'(0) > 0.$$

When $D_L = \hat{D}_L$, the second term in $W'(D_L)$ is zero and we have

$$W'(\hat{D}_L) = -(\pi_0 - p_L) + p'(\hat{D}_L)\hat{D}_L.$$

The fact that investors are risk averse implies that $p_L < \pi_0$ and $p'(\hat{D}_L) < 0$. This shows that

$$W'(\hat{D}_L) < 0.$$

Since $W'(0) > 0$ and $W'(\hat{D}_L) < 0$, the optimum D_L must be in $(0, \hat{D}_L)$.

Appendix B: Estimating spread curves

To estimate spread curves, we follow a modified version of the procedure developed by Nelson and Siegel (1987) to estimate yields. At date t we have a sample of J coupon bonds, with various coupon and maturity characteristics. Let $\hat{P}_{t,j}$ be the estimated price at time t of the emerging market bond j with coupons $\{c_{j,t+k}\}_{k=1}^{\tau_j}$ and maturity τ_j . Price $\hat{P}_{t,j}$ can be written as

$$\hat{P}_{t,j}(\bar{a}_t) = \sum_{k=1}^{\tau_j} e^{-ky_{t,k}(\bar{a}_t)} c_{j,t+k} + e^{-\tau_j y_{t,\tau_j}(\bar{a}_t)}, \quad (1)$$

where $y_{t,k}(\bar{a}_t)$ is the yield on a zero-coupon bond of maturity k ; $\bar{a}_t \equiv (a_{t,0}, \dots, a_{t,3})$ is a vector of time-varying parameters.

We decompose the yield $y_{t,k}(\bar{a}_t)$ as

$$y_{t,k}(\bar{a}_t) = y_{t,k}^*(\bar{a}_t^*) + s_{t,k}(\bar{a}_t),$$

where $y_{t,k}^*$ is the zero-coupon yield on a default-free German or U.S. bond (depending on the currency denomination of the original bond) and $s_{t,k}$ is the zero-coupon spread. We express the spread $s_{t,k}$ as

$$s_{t,k}(\bar{a}_t) = a_{t,0} + a_{t,1} \left(\frac{1 - e^{-ka_{t,3}}}{ka_{t,3}} \right) + a_{t,2} \left(\frac{1 - e^{-ka_{t,3}}}{ka_{t,3}} - e^{-ka_{t,3}} \right). \quad (2)$$

We proceed with the estimation in two steps. First, we compute the yields on default-free German and U.S. bonds, $y_{t,k}^*$. To do that, we use German and U.S. bond prices and estimate the parameters \bar{a}_t^* using an expression analogous to (2). In the second step, we use the yields $y_{t,k}^*$ derived in the first step and expression (2) to estimate the parameters \bar{a}_t . In both steps, we use non-linear least squares (NLLS) period by period. For example, in the second step, we take the J bonds available for a given emerging country at each date t and find the \bar{a}_t that minimizes

$$\sum_{j=1}^J \left(P_{t,j} - \hat{P}_{t,j}(\bar{a}_t) \right)^2,$$

where $P_{t,j}$ is the price of bond j at time t .

The approximation is parsimonious and gives a good fit of the data. This type of approximation has other advantages. It allows us to include bonds denominated in different currencies, using most of the available information to obtain a better fit of the curve.⁴³ Finally, expression (2) has a simple interpretation. Spreads can be viewed as having three components. The constant is a long-term, level component. The second term is a short-term component as it starts at one and decays monotonically and quickly to zero. The third term can be interpreted as a “hump” or medium-term component, which starts at zero, increases, and then goes to zero. Small values of $a_{t,3}$ generate a slow decay and can better fit the curve at long maturities. We adopt this specific parametrization of the yield curve and fix $a_{t,3} = 0.005$ following Diebold and Li (2006); this helps in the convergence of the NLLS estimation described above.⁴⁴

Once we have computed yields and spreads, we calculate prices and excess returns. The price of any coupon bond can simply be obtained using (1). But to compute excess returns, one needs to compare the returns of an emerging market bond to those of a comparable risk-less bond. Using bonds with the same maturity and coupon structure can be misleading because the yields on emerging market bonds tend to be much higher than those on risk-less bonds, affecting significantly the payments profile and duration. In particular, the high yield on an emerging market bond means that its short-run payments carry more weight in the bond valuation. Therefore, its duration will be much shorter than that of a similar U.S. bond.

In this paper, we deal with this problem using two different approaches. The two approaches lead to similar expressions for excess returns and to very similar results. The first approach consists in calculating separately the returns on an emerging market bond and on a comparable German or U.S. bond. Then, one subtracts the returns on the risk-less bonds from those on the risky bonds. The difficulty lies in constructing the comparable risk-less bond. We proceed in the following way. We take a given coupon bond for the emerging economy, and construct a portfolio of risk-less bonds with the same time profile of payments. For a given emerging market bond with coupons $\{c_{t+k}\}$ and maturity τ , we derive the weights $\omega_{t,k} = \frac{e^{-ky_{t,k}}}{P_t} c_{t+k}$ for $k = 1, \dots, n-1$, and $\omega_{t,n} = \frac{e^{-\tau y_{t,\tau}}}{P_t} (c_{t+\tau} + 1)$. Then we construct a portfolio of risk-less zero-coupon bonds $\{\theta_{t,k}\}$, such that $\frac{e^{-ky_{t,k}^*}}{P_t^*} \theta_{t,k} = \omega_{t,k}$ for

⁴³For the countries and periods in which a comparison is feasible, we found similar results when estimating spreads by calculating first the yield curve for each country (using only bonds in one currency) and then subtracting the corresponding yield curve for Germany or the U.S. In addition, we compared our results with EMBI spreads on long-term bonds, which are compiled by J.P. Morgan, obtaining similar values.

⁴⁴We chose this value of $a_{t,3}$ after experimenting with different alternatives, which generated similar results.

each k . The price of this portfolio will be

$$P_t^* = \sum_{k=1}^n e^{-ky_{t,k}^*} \theta_{t,k}.$$

In this way the emerging market bond and the U.S. portfolio have an identical time profile of payments and an identical duration, equal to $\sum_{k=1}^n k\omega_{t,k}$.

The realized excess returns in period t take the form⁴⁵

$$\begin{aligned} er_{t,\tau} &= \frac{P_{t+1,\tau-1}}{P_{t,\tau}} - \frac{P_{t+1}^*}{P_t^*} = \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^n \omega_{t,k} \left[e^{-[(k-1)(y_{t+1,k-1} + s_{t+1,k-1}) - k(y_{t,k} + s_{t,k})]} - e^{-[(k-1)y_{t+1,k-1} - ky_{t,k}]} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Notice that the expression in brackets represents the excess returns on a zero-coupon bond. Therefore, the expression for excess returns is a weighted average of excess returns on zero-coupon bonds.

The second approach is to use only spreads $s_{t,k}$. We compute the “spread-based” prices

$$P_{t,\tau}^s = \sum_{k=1}^{\tau} e^{-ks_{t,k}(\bar{a}_t)} c_{t+k} + e^{-\tau s_{t,\tau}(\bar{a}_t)},$$

and obtain the excess returns

$$\hat{e}r_{t,\tau} = \frac{P_{t+1,\tau-1}^s}{P_{t,\tau}^s} - 1.$$

The spread-based excess returns $\hat{e}r_{t,\tau}$ can also be interpreted as a weighted average of returns on zero-coupon bonds, but the weights $\omega_{t,k}$ are slightly different from those in (3). Both approaches are valid, in the sense that both approaches give us excess returns that can be obtained with the appropriate portfolio of emerging market and risk-free bonds. Their interpretation are slightly different: while the first approach is easier to interpret in terms of the financial strategy involved, the second one is easier to interpret in terms of the behavior of spreads.

Using prices derived from spreads to calculate excess returns has an important practical advantage. Since we work with bonds denominated in different currencies, we avoid the need to report every result for both dollar and deutsche mark/euro bonds. The reason is that while $P_{t,\tau}$ depends

⁴⁵This expression holds for a bond that pays no coupon in period $t + 1$. If the bond pays a coupon in period $t + 1$ the expression is easily adjusted.

on the currency of choice, $P_{t,\tau}^s$ can be computed only from spreads. All the results reported in the paper are based on spread-based prices. We have also computed excess returns using the first method and obtained very similar results.⁴⁶

⁴⁶If we restricted ourselves to zero-coupon bonds, the excess returns obtained using the two approaches would be identical. However, almost all the emerging market bonds used in the estimation of the yield curve are coupon bonds, so we prefer to derive returns for coupon bonds.

Figure 1
Comparative Statics






Figure 2
Short- and Long-Term Spreads




The figures show spreads of 3-year and 12-year maturities over time by country.

Figure 3
Short- and Long-Term Prices




The figures show indices of prices of 3-year and 12-year maturities over time by country. Prices are estimated assuming a coupon rate of 7.5 percent and using U.S. yields as a benchmark. The indices are constructed by fixing the first observation in each country equal to 100.

Figure 4
Sharpe Ratio During Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods



The figure shows the Sharpe ratio corresponding to maturities of 3, 6, 9, and 12 years during crisis periods, non-crisis periods, and all periods. Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and assuming a coupon rate of 7.5 percent. Crisis and non-crisis periods are determined according to definition 1.

Figure 5
Average Maturity and Spreads



The figures show the average maturity of bonds issued in each semester and the estimated spread of maturity of 9 years by country. In the case of Mexico, the EMBI spread is used instead of the estimated spread.

Table 1
Data Description

| Price Data | | | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|----------------|------------------------|
| Country | Sample Period | Number of Bonds | Maturities | | |
| | | | Minimum | Maximum | 75th Percentile |
| Argentina | Apr 1994 - May 2003 | 63 | 1.0 | 23.6 | 8.3 |
| Brazil | Nov 1994 - May 2003 | 38 | 1.5 | 29.5 | 13.4 |
| Colombia | Apr 1996 - May 2003 | 21 | 1.3 | 25.7 | 9.7 |
| Mexico | Oct 1995 - May 2003 | 26 | 1.5 | 27.5 | 12.7 |
| Russia | Nov 1996 - May 2003 | 21 | 2.2 | 24.2 | 10.7 |
| Turkey | Apr 1996 - May 2003 | 49 | 0.8 | 17.9 | 5.3 |
| Uruguay | Nov 1998 - May 2003 | 10 | 1.8 | 26.4 | 9.2 |
| Venezuela | Apr 1993 - May 2003 | 22 | 1.4 | 26.2 | 15.7 |
| Germany | Apr 1993 - May 2003 | 229 | 0.6 | 20.0 | 5.9 |
| U.S. | Apr 1993 - May 2003 | 51 | 1.5 | 29.4 | 23.2 |

| Quantity Data | | | | | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|--|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Country | Sample Period | Number of Bonds | Average Amount Issued by Maturity (USD Thousands) | | | |
| | | | Up to 3 Years | From 3 to 6 Years | From 6 to 9 Years | Over 9 Years |
| Argentina | Jul 1993 - Dec 2002 | 146 | 17,731 | 59,388 | 29,898 | 60,008 |
| Brazil | Jul 1994 - Dec 2002 | 45 | 7,557 | 29,273 | 9,246 | 57,959 |
| Colombia | Jan 1993 - Dec 2002 | 41 | 1,087 | 9,080 | 3,797 | 13,567 |
| Mexico | Jan 1991 - Dec 2002 | 54 | 5,941 | 14,798 | 7,887 | 39,836 |
| Russia | Jan 1993 - Dec 2002 | 27 | 3,513 | 10,010 | 12,839 | 49,757 |
| Turkey | Jan 1990 - Dec 2002 | 77 | 4,944 | 22,436 | 8,294 | 17,415 |
| Uruguay | Jan 1993 - Dec 2002 | 18 | 195 | 1,811 | 970 | 3,899 |
| Venezuela | Jul 1991 - Dec 2002 | 24 | 2,406 | 1,524 | 2,239 | 9,305 |

The tables describe the price and quantity data used in the paper. The top table shows the sample periods, number of bonds, and maturities covered by the price data. Maturities are expressed in years. Minimum, maximum, and 75th percentile correspond to the average minimum, maximum, and 75th percentile maturity over time within the sample period. The bottom table shows the sample periods, number of bonds, and average amount issued by maturity covered by the quantity data. Maturity up to 3 years includes bonds of 3-year maturity, maturity from 3 to 6 years includes bonds of 6-year maturity, and maturity from 6 to 9 years includes bonds of 9-year maturity. USD stands for U.S. dollars.

Table 2
Excess Returns

Annualized Means Over Comparable German and U.S. Bonds, In Percent

| | Coupon = 5% | | | | Coupon = 7.5% | | | | Coupon = 10% | | | |
|-----------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|---------------|-------|-------|-------|--------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | er3 | er6 | er9 | er12 | er3 | er6 | er9 | er12 | er3 | er6 | er9 | er12 |
| Average | 2.90 | 3.49 | 6.74 | 8.26 | 3.08 | 3.45 | 5.93 | 6.95 | 3.23 | 3.44 | 5.46 | 6.27 |
| Argentina | -7.08 | -4.21 | 0.55 | 0.48 | -6.34 | -4.02 | -0.31 | -0.98 | -5.71 | -3.85 | -0.81 | -1.63 |
| Brazil | 6.02 | 6.34 | 9.28 | 12.69 | 6.04 | 6.21 | 8.60 | 11.34 | 6.06 | 6.12 | 8.16 | 10.52 |
| Colombia | 4.67 | 4.41 | 4.11 | 4.50 | 4.61 | 4.34 | 4.03 | 4.28 | 4.57 | 4.30 | 3.99 | 4.15 |
| Mexico | 3.56 | 5.25 | 6.72 | 7.89 | 3.52 | 5.08 | 6.40 | 7.43 | 3.49 | 4.95 | 6.17 | 7.11 |
| Russia | 14.84 | 18.73 | 39.72 | 45.96 | 15.09 | 18.03 | 33.43 | 37.57 | 15.31 | 17.54 | 30.01 | 33.53 |
| Turkey | 4.09 | 3.78 | 4.52 | 6.92 | 4.09 | 3.77 | 4.32 | 6.11 | 4.09 | 3.77 | 4.21 | 5.63 |
| Uruguay | -2.72 | -5.21 | -5.33 | -5.74 | -2.51 | -4.93 | -5.22 | -5.69 | -2.32 | -4.70 | -5.11 | -5.61 |
| Venezuela | 2.50 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.74 | 2.63 | 1.21 | 1.18 | 1.59 | 2.74 | 1.35 | 1.25 | 1.53 |

The table shows the annualized means of excess returns over comparable German and U.S. bonds, by country and across countries. Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and for coupon rates of 5, 7.5, and 10 percent. er3, er6, er9, and er12 stand for 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-year excess returns.

Table 3
Crisis Periods

| Crisis Definition 1 | | |
|----------------------------|------------|----------|
| | Start date | End date |
| Argentina | | |
| Crisis 1 | 12/30/94 | 01/12/96 |
| Crisis 2 | 09/04/98 | 11/06/98 |
| Crisis 3 | 07/13/01 | - |
| Brazil | | |
| Crisis 1 | 01/20/95 | 10/06/95 |
| Crisis 2 | 08/21/98 | 04/23/99 |
| Crisis 3 | 06/14/02 | 04/06/03 |
| Colombia | | |
| Crisis 1 | 08/28/98 | 02/26/99 |
| Crisis 2 | 05/05/00 | 06/23/00 |
| Crisis 3 | 07/26/02 | 11/15/02 |
| Mexico | | |
| Crisis 1 | 08/28/98 | 11/06/98 |
| Russia | | |
| Crisis 1 | 07/10/98 | 06/29/01 |
| Turkey | | |
| Crisis 1 | 08/28/98 | 11/13/98 |
| Uruguay | | |
| Crisis 1 | 04/19/02 | - |
| Venezuela | | |
| Crisis 1 | 08/14/98 | 03/03/00 |

We use four different crisis definitions. Crisis definition 1 sets the beginning of a crisis when 9-year spreads are greater than a threshold, which is defined as the average spread over the previous six months plus 300 basis points. The end of the crisis is at the end of the first four-week period in which spreads have remained below the threshold used to determine the beginning of the crisis. Crisis definition 2 is similar to crisis definition 1, but uses 400 basis points to define the threshold. Crisis definitions 3 and 4 are similar, but use a period of one week instead of a period of four weeks to end the crisis.

Table 4
Excess Returns During Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods
Annualized Means Over Comparable German and U.S. Bonds, In Percent

| | er3 | er6 | er9 | er12 |
|--|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| All Periods | 3.08 | 3.45 | 5.93 | 6.95 |
| Crisis Definition 1 | | | | |
| <i>Threshold + 300 basis points, ending crisis after four weeks of low spreads</i> | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 11.43 | 15.03 | 30.88 | 39.06 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 1.02 | 0.65 | 0.26 | -0.11 |
| Crisis Definition 2 | | | | |
| <i>Threshold + 400 basis points, ending crisis after four weeks of low spreads</i> | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 11.47 | 16.85 | 42.50 | 55.70 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 1.85 | 1.54 | 1.20 | 0.94 |
| Crisis Definition 3 | | | | |
| <i>Threshold + 300 basis points, ending crisis after one week of low spreads</i> | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 10.31 | 13.39 | 33.38 | 42.67 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 1.86 | 1.80 | 1.73 | 1.66 |
| Crisis Definition 4 | | | | |
| <i>Threshold + 400 basis points, ending crisis after one week of low spreads</i> | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 11.67 | 20.32 | 52.03 | 66.03 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 2.05 | 1.52 | 1.24 | 1.20 |

The table shows the annualized means of excess returns over comparable German and U.S. bonds during crisis and non-crisis periods across countries. Results are presented for the four crisis definitions. Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and assuming a coupon rate of 7.5 percent. er3, er6, er9, and er12 stand for 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-year excess returns.

Table 5
Excess Returns During Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods by Country
Annualized Means Over Comparable German and U.S. Bonds, In Percent

| | Crisis Definition 1 | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| | er3 | er6 | er9 | er12 |
| Average | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 11.43 | 15.03 | 30.88 | 39.06 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 1.02 | 0.65 | 0.26 | -0.11 |
| Argentina | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | -10.03 | -3.47 | 11.81 | 15.87 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | -4.36 | -4.30 | -6.10 | -8.78 |
| Brazil | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 18.36 | 25.98 | 41.73 | 58.11 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 1.95 | -0.10 | -1.30 | -1.85 |
| Colombia | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 22.96 | 33.98 | 39.79 | 42.73 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 1.85 | 0.10 | -0.95 | -1.02 |
| Mexico | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 81.03 | 82.56 | 90.33 | 113.92 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 1.88 | 3.43 | 4.64 | 5.32 |
| Russia | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 35.06 | 31.06 | 62.37 | 70.75 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 0.38 | 7.93 | 12.80 | 14.35 |
| Turkey | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 21.66 | 61.44 | 109.15 | 162.47 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 3.55 | 2.24 | 1.90 | 2.91 |
| Uruguay | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | -6.03 | -9.76 | -6.61 | -4.78 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | -1.35 | -3.34 | -4.78 | -5.98 |
| Venezuela | | | | |
| Crisis Periods | 5.61 | 6.89 | 13.61 | 23.21 |
| Non-Crisis Periods | 2.09 | 0.20 | -0.95 | -1.95 |

The table shows the annualized means of excess returns over comparable German and U.S. bonds during crisis and non-crisis periods by country. Crisis and non-crisis periods are determined according to definition 1. Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and assuming a coupon rate of 7.5 percent. er3, er6, er9, and er12 stand for 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-year excess returns.

Table 6
Explaining Long-Short Excess Returns

| | Dependent Variable: er9-er3 | | | | Dependent Variable: er12-er3 | | | | | Dependent Variable: er12-er6 | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Crisis Dummy | 0.325 *** [5.809] | | | | 0.449 *** [7.151] | | | | | 0.381 *** [6.868] | | | |
| 3-Year Spread | 0.015 *** [4.816] | | | | 0.016 *** [5.539] | | | | | | | | |
| 6-Year Spread | 0.040 *** [10.219] | | | | 0.045 *** [9.576] | | | | | 0.035 *** [6.052] | | | |
| 9-Year Spread | 0.062 *** [8.229] | | | | 0.069 *** [10.587] | | | | | 0.072 *** [3.753] | | | |
| 12-Year Spread | | | | | 0.060 *** [10.562] | | | | | 0.075 *** [3.498] | | | |
| Country Dummies | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no |
| Time Dummies | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no | no |
| Observations | 3153 | 3153 | 3153 | 3153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 |
| R-squared | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.01 | 0.013 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.013 | 0.022 |
| Number of Countries | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |

| | Dependent Variable: er9-er3 | | | | Dependent Variable: er12-er3 | | | | | Dependent Variable: er12-er6 | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Crisis Dummy | 0.290 *** [4.441] | | | | 0.407 *** [6.985] | | | | | 0.295 *** [5.188] | | | |
| 3-Year Spread | 0.013 *** [6.096] | | | | 0.012 *** [4.766] | | | | | | | | |
| 6-Year Spread | 0.040 *** [6.317] | | | | 0.039 *** [6.353] | | | | | 0.029 *** [7.855] | | | |
| 9-Year Spread | 0.072 *** [5.714] | | | | 0.073 *** [6.436] | | | | | 0.083 *** [3.243] | | | |
| 12-Year Spread | | | | | 0.062 *** [8.442] | | | | | 0.087 *** [3.569] | | | |
| Country Dummies | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Time Dummies | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Observations | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 | 3,153 |
| R-squared | 0.265 | 0.265 | 0.267 | 0.273 | 0.286 | 0.285 | 0.287 | 0.291 | 0.293 | 0.225 | 0.226 | 0.234 | 0.243 |
| Number of Countries | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |

The tables report ordinary least squares regressions of weekly long-short excess returns on a crisis dummy and on spreads of different maturities. The long-short excess returns are the differences between the 9-year excess return and the 3-year excess return (er9-er3), between the 12-year excess return and the 3-year excess return (er12-er3), and between the 12-year excess return and the 6-year excess return (er12-er6). Excess returns are estimated using a holding period of one week and assuming a coupon rate of 7.5 percent. The crisis dummy corresponds to crisis definition 1. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Observations are assumed to be independent across clusters but not within clusters. Clusters are defined by country and crisis periods. Regressions in the bottom table include country and time dummies. Robust t statistics are in brackets. *, **, and ***: significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.

Table 7
Amount Issued

| | Dependent Variable: Issues of Maturity Up to 3 Years | | | | | Dependent Variable: Issues of Maturity Between 3 and 6 Years | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Crisis Dummy | -0.528 [1.087] | | | | | -2.947 *** [2.662] | | | | |
| 3-Year Spread | -0.066 * [1.729] | | | | | -0.189 ** [2.311] | | | | |
| 9-Year Spread | -0.043 [1.097] | | | | | -0.133 ** [2.321] | | | | |
| EMBI | -0.027 [1.007] | | | | | -0.121 [1.619] | | | | |
| Predicted Term Premium (er9-er3) | 0.087 [0.183] | | | | | -0.455 [0.816] | | | | |
| Observations | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,647 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,647 | 2,996 |
| Uncensored Observations | 46 | 46 | 46 | 48 | 46 | 109 | 109 | 109 | 86 | 109 |

| | Dependent Variable: Issues of Maturity Between 6 and 9 Years | | | | | Dependent Variable: Issues of Maturity Over 9 Years | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Crisis Dummy | -1.973 *** [3.008] | | | | | -2.180 *** [4.500] | | | | |
| 3-Year Spread | -0.145 * [1.940] | | | | | -0.257 ** [2.227] | | | | |
| 9-Year Spread | -0.141 *** [2.729] | | | | | -0.223 *** [4.501] | | | | |
| EMBI | -0.148 * [1.933] | | | | | -0.223 ** [2.172] | | | | |
| Predicted Term Premium (er9-er3) | -0.692 [1.434] | | | | | -1.230 *** [3.975] | | | | |
| Observations | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,647 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,647 | 2,996 |
| Uncensored Observations | 56 | 56 | 56 | 48 | 56 | 103 | 103 | 103 | 87 | 103 |

The tables report the marginal coefficients of Tobit regressions of the amount issued at different maturities on a crisis dummy, short-term and long-term spreads, the EMBI, and the predicted term premium. Regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood. The dependent variables are normalized by the average weekly amount issued, short-term or long-term respectively, for each country. Maturity up to 3 years includes bonds of 3-year maturity, maturity from 3 to 6 years includes bonds of 6-year maturity, and maturity from 6 to 9 years includes bonds of 9-year maturity. The independent variables are in logs. The crisis dummy corresponds to crisis definition 1. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Observations are assumed to be independent across clusters but not within clusters. Clusters are defined by country and crisis periods. Regressions using the EMBI do not include Uruguay due to data availability. Robust z statistics are in brackets. *, **, and ***: significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.

Table 8
Average Maturity

| Dependent Variable: Average Maturity of Issues | | | | |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Main Equation | | | | |
| 9-Year Spread | -0.476 ** [2.287] | -0.590 *** [4.730] | -0.332 ** [2.116] | -0.399 ** [2.000] |
| Selection Equation | | | | |
| Crisis Dummy | -0.149 ** [2.033] | | | |
| 3-Year Spread | | -0.032 *** [2.985] | | |
| 9-Year Spread | | | -0.089 *** [4.550] | |
| EMBI | | | | -0.066 *** [3.704] |
| Country Dummies | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Observations | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,338 |
| Dependent Variable: Average Maturity of Issues | | | | |
| Main Equation | | | | |
| Predicted Term Premium (er9-er3) | -2.724 ** [2.316] | -2.696 *** [3.238] | -5.554 *** [4.904] | -2.103 *** [3.029] |
| Selection Equation | | | | |
| Crisis Dummy | -0.191 ** [2.212] | | | |
| 3-Year Spread | | -0.031 *** [3.005] | | |
| 9-Year Spread | | | -0.065 *** [3.352] | |
| EMBI | | | | -0.066 *** [3.764] |
| Country Dummies | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Observations | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,996 | 2,338 |

The tables report selection bias regressions of the average maturity of issues on long-term spreads and the predicted term premium. In the selection equation, the decision to issue is explained by a crisis dummy, short- and long-term spreads, and the EMBI. Regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood. The independent variables are in logs. The crisis dummy corresponds to crisis definition 1. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Observations are assumed to be independent across clusters but not within clusters. Clusters are defined by country and crisis periods. All regressions include country dummies. Regressions using the EMBI do not include Uruguay due to data availability. Robust z statistics are in brackets. *, **, and ***: significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.

Appendix Table 1
Description of Emerging Market Bonds Included in the Sample

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------------------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|------------|----------|------------------|------------------|
| Argentina | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 10/15/92 | 10/15/97 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 2 | 08/02/93 | 08/02/96 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 6.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 3 | 08/02/93 | 08/02/00 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 4 | 10/05/93 | 10/05/98 | 608,580 | DM | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 5 | 11/05/93 | 03/29/05 | 8,466,548 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |
| 6 | 12/20/93 | 12/20/03 | 2,050,000 | USD | Global | 8.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 7 | 03/04/94 | 03/06/95 | 350,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | N.A. | Quantity |
| 8 | 04/01/94 | 04/01/04 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.9 | A | Quantity |
| 9 | 07/11/94 | 07/11/97 | 312,538 | DM | Eurobond | 8 | A | Quantity |
| 10 | 08/22/94 | 08/27/97 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Price / Quantity |
| 11 | 08/26/94 | 08/26/97 | 67,688 | ATS | Eurobond | 8 | A | Quantity |
| 12 | 10/14/94 | 10/14/97 | 73,562 | CAD | Eurobond | 10.5 | A | Quantity |
| 13 | 10/21/94 | 10/21/97 | 288,453 | ITL | Eurobond | 13.45 | A | Quantity |
| 14 | 11/01/94 | 11/01/99 | 500,000 | USD | Global | 10.95 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 15 | 11/01/94 | 11/01/01 | 52,000 | USD | Domestic | Floating | A | Quantity |
| 16 | 12/09/94 | 12/09/97 | 75,720 | ESP | Eurobond | 12.8 | A | Quantity |
| 17 | 12/15/94 | 12/15/99 | 149,815 | JPY | Eurobond | 7.1 | A | Quantity |
| 18 | 12/19/94 | 12/19/97 | 199,753 | JPY | Eurobond | 6 | A | Quantity |
| 19 | 12/28/94 | 12/28/10 | 23,674 | USD | Domestic | Floating | M | Quantity |
| 20 | 01/06/95 | 01/06/98 | 187,463 | FRF | Eurobond | 9.875 | A | Quantity |
| 21 | 08/29/95 | 08/29/00 | 795,153 | DM | Eurobond | 9.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 22 | 11/09/95 | 11/09/98 | 130,905 | CHF | Eurobond | 7.125 | A | Quantity |
| 23 | 11/14/95 | 11/14/02 | 704,460 | EUR | Eurobond | 10.5 | A | Quantity |
| 24 | 11/23/95 | 11/14/02 | 177,493 | DM | Eurobond | 10.5 | A | Quantity |
| 25 | 11/29/95 | 03/25/99 | 441,534 | JPY | Eurobond | 5 | A | Quantity |
| 26 | 12/06/95 | 12/28/98 | 49,297 | ATS | Eurobond | 8.5 | A | Quantity |
| 27 | 12/27/95 | 06/27/97 | 137,504 | JPY | Eurobond | 3.25 | S | Quantity |
| 28 | 02/06/96 | 02/06/03 | 676,200 | EUR | Eurobond | 10.25 | A | Quantity |
| 29 | 02/20/96 | 02/23/01 | 1,100,000 | USD | Global | 9.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 30 | 03/06/96 | 03/06/01 | 321,473 | ITL | Eurobond | 13.25 | A | Quantity |
| 31 | 04/04/96 | 04/04/06 | 74,993 | JPY | Eurobond | 7.4 | A | Quantity |
| 32 | 04/10/96 | 04/10/06 | 676,652 | DM | Eurobond | 11.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 33 | 04/15/96 | 09/01/02 | 99,341 | EUR | Eurobond | 12.625 | A | Quantity |
| 34 | 04/18/96 | 04/18/01 | 95,200 | ATS | Eurobond | 9 | A | Quantity |
| 35 | 04/25/96 | 04/25/06 | 74,444 | JPY | Eurobond | 7.4 | A | Quantity |
| 36 | 05/07/96 | 03/27/01 | 845,499 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.5 | A | Quantity |
| 37 | 05/15/96 | 05/15/06 | 65,761 | JPY | Eurobond | 7.4 | A | Quantity |
| 38 | 05/20/96 | 05/20/99 | 326,146 | DM | Eurobond | 7 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 39 | 05/20/96 | 05/20/11 | 645,360 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.75 | A | Quantity |
| 40 | 06/25/96 | 06/25/99 | 227,505 | ITL | Eurobond | 11 | A | Quantity |
| 41 | 07/05/96 | 07/05/99 | 147,589 | NLG | Eurobond | 7.625 | A | Quantity |
| 42 | 08/14/96 | 08/14/01 | 155,302 | GBP | Eurobond | 11.5 | A | Quantity |
| 43 | 08/15/96 | 08/19/99 | 500,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Price / Quantity |
| 44 | 09/19/96 | 09/19/03 | 248,363 | DM | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 45 | 09/19/96 | 09/19/16 | 248,363 | DM | Eurobond | 12 | A | Quantity |
| 46 | 10/09/96 | 10/09/06 | 1,300,000 | USD | Global | 11 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 47 | 11/05/96 | 11/05/03 | 329,903 | ITL | Eurobond | 11 | A | Quantity |
| 48 | 11/12/96 | 03/24/05 | 445,407 | JPY | Eurobond | 6 | A | Quantity |
| 49 | 11/13/96 | 11/13/26 | 329,078 | DM | Eurobond | 11.75 | A | Quantity |
| 50 | 12/04/96 | 12/04/03 | 230,357 | CHF | Eurobond | 7 | A | Quantity |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|
| 51 | 12/05/96 | 12/20/02 | 444,286 | JPY | Eurobond | 5 | S | Quantity |
| 52 | 12/13/96 | 12/13/98 | 500,000 | USD | Domestic | 8 | S | Quantity |
| 53 | 12/20/96 | 12/20/02 | 439,504 | JPY | Eurobond | 5 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 54 | 12/23/96 | 02/23/05 | 643,561 | DM | Eurobond | 8.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 55 | 01/03/97 | 01/03/07 | 385,990 | ITL | Eurobond | 10 | A | Quantity |
| 56 | 01/30/97 | 01/30/17 | 3,287,500 | USD | Global | 11.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 57 | 03/18/97 | 03/18/04 | 898,382 | DM | Eurobond | 7 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 58 | 04/09/97 | 03/18/04 | 83,852 | ATS | Eurobond | 7 | A | Quantity |
| 59 | 05/08/97 | 05/27/04 | 449,785 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.4 | S | Quantity |
| 60 | 05/09/97 | 05/09/02 | 2,292,000 | USD | Domestic | 8.75 | S | Quantity |
| 61 | 05/23/97 | 05/23/02 | 138,569 | ESP | Eurobond | 7.5 | A | Quantity |
| 62 | 05/27/97 | 05/27/04 | 295,869 | ITL | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 63 | 05/27/97 | 05/27/04 | 420,198 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.4 | S | Quantity |
| 64 | 06/25/97 | 06/25/07 | 330,785 | GBP | Eurobond | 10 | A | Quantity |
| 65 | 08/11/97 | 08/11/07 | 416,948 | ITL | Eurobond | 7.625 | A | Quantity |
| 66 | 09/19/97 | 09/19/27 | 2,500,000 | USD | Global | 9.75 | S | Quantity |
| 67 | 10/17/97 | 10/16/98 | 500,000 | USD | Domestic | 0 | Z | Price |
| 68 | 10/21/97 | 03/18/04 | 435,325 | ITL | Eurobond | 7 | A | Quantity |
| 69 | 10/24/97 | 03/18/04 | 217,845 | ITL | Eurobond | 7 | A | Quantity |
| 70 | 10/30/97 | 10/30/09 | 570,169 | DM | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 71 | 12/16/97 | 11/30/02 | 500,000 | USD | Yankee | 9.5 | S | Quantity |
| 72 | 12/22/97 | 12/22/00 | 158,580 | ITL | Eurobond | 8 | A | Quantity |
| 73 | 01/14/98 | 01/20/01 | 1,563,000 | USD | Domestic | Floating | N.A. | Quantity |
| 74 | 02/04/98 | 02/04/03 | 663,790 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.75 | A | Quantity |
| 75 | 02/26/98 | 02/26/08 | 822,684 | EUR | Eurobond | Step Down | A | Price / Quantity |
| 76 | 03/12/98 | 10/30/09 | 416,914 | ITL | Eurobond | 8 | A | Quantity |
| 77 | 04/03/98 | 02/26/08 | 244,577 | EUR | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 78 | 04/03/98 | 02/26/08 | 249,335 | EUR | Eurobond | 8 | A | Quantity |
| 79 | 04/13/98 | 04/10/05 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 80 | 04/21/98 | 04/21/08 | 820,829 | EUR | Global | 8.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 81 | 07/06/98 | 07/06/10 | 556,615 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 82 | 07/08/98 | 07/08/05 | 565,384 | ITL | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 83 | 07/21/98 | 07/21/03 | 1,000,000 | USD | Domestic | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 84 | 07/29/98 | 07/29/05 | 414,863 | DM | Eurobond | 7.875 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 85 | 07/30/98 | 07/30/10 | 554,485 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 86 | 10/16/98 | 09/19/27 | 293,450 | USD | Domestic | 9.9375 | S | Quantity |
| 87 | 11/19/98 | 11/19/08 | 299,618 | DM | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 88 | 11/19/98 | 12/04/05 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 11 | S | Quantity |
| 89 | 12/04/98 | 12/04/05 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 11 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 90 | 01/15/99 | 04/15/07 | 48,918 | USD | Domestic | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 91 | 02/04/99 | 02/04/03 | 214,198 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.75 | A | Quantity |
| 92 | 02/25/99 | 02/25/02 | 112,061 | EUR | Domestic | 8 | A | Quantity |
| 93 | 02/25/99 | 02/25/19 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 12.125 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 94 | 02/25/99 | 02/25/19 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 12.125 | S | Quantity |
| 95 | 02/26/99 | 02/26/08 | 393,623 | EUR | Eurobond | Step Down | A | Price / Quantity |
| 96 | 03/01/99 | 03/01/29 | 125,000 | USD | Yankee | 8.875 | S | Quantity |
| 97 | 03/04/99 | 03/04/04 | 433,182 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 98 | 03/15/99 | 04/06/04 | 300,000 | USD | Private Placement | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 99 | 03/19/99 | 03/17/00 | 1,168,544 | USD | Domestic | 0 | Z | Price |
| 100 | 04/06/99 | 04/10/04 | 300,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Price / Quantity |
| 101 | 04/06/99 | 02/26/08 | 270,304 | EUR | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 102 | 04/07/99 | 04/07/09 | 1,226,354 | USD | Global | 11.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 103 | 04/26/99 | 04/26/06 | 483,316 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 104 | 05/10/99 | 03/18/04 | 439,464 | EUR | Eurobond | 7 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 105 | 05/24/99 | 05/24/01 | 1,270,080 | USD | Domestic | 9.5 | S | Quantity |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|------------------|------------------|
| 106 | 05/24/99 | 05/24/04 | 2,640,292 | USD | Domestic | 11.25 | S | Quantity |
| 107 | 05/26/99 | 05/26/09 | 694,155 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 108 | 06/10/99 | 06/10/02 | 208,677 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.125 | A | Quantity |
| 109 | 07/01/99 | 07/01/04 | 681,842 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 110 | 07/22/99 | 07/22/03 | 103,489 | EUR | Eurobond | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 111 | 08/11/99 | 08/11/09 | 158,724 | JPY | Eurobond | 3.5 | A | Quantity |
| 112 | 09/03/99 | 09/03/01 | 585,504 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 113 | 10/14/99 | 05/14/01 | 321,199 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.3 | Z | Quantity |
| 114 | 10/15/99 | 10/16/00 | 250,000 | USD | Global | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 115 | 10/15/99 | 04/15/01 | 250,000 | USD | Global | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 116 | 10/15/99 | 10/15/01 | 250,000 | USD | Global | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 117 | 10/15/99 | 10/15/02 | 250,000 | USD | Global | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 118 | 10/15/99 | 10/15/03 | 250,000 | USD | Global | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 119 | 10/15/99 | 10/15/04 | 250,000 | USD | Global | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 120 | 10/21/99 | 10/21/02 | 523,341 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.25 | A | Quantity |
| 121 | 11/12/99 | 11/10/00 | 1,141,458 | USD | Domestic | 0 | Z | Price |
| 122 | 11/19/99 | 02/26/08 | 1,488,544 | EUR | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 123 | 11/26/99 | 11/26/03 | 260,308 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 124 | 12/07/99 | 12/07/04 | 412,672 | EUR | Eurobond | 10 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 125 | 12/09/99 | 12/07/04 | 101,792 | EUR | Eurobond | 10 | A | Quantity |
| 126 | 12/11/99 | 01/07/05 | 254,091 | EUR | Eurobond | 10 | A | Quantity |
| 127 | 12/17/99 | 12/17/03 | 183,135 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.4 | S | Quantity |
| 128 | 12/22/99 | 12/22/04 | 202,196 | EUR | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 129 | 01/07/00 | 01/07/05 | 657,455 | EUR | Eurobond | 10 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 130 | 01/07/00 | 01/07/05 | 253,362 | EUR | Eurobond | N.A. | N.A. | Quantity |
| 131 | 01/26/00 | 01/26/07 | 776,156 | EUR | Eurobond | 10.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 132 | 02/03/00 | 02/01/20 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 12 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 133 | 02/21/00 | 05/21/03 | 1,684,938 | USD | Domestic | 11.75 | S | Quantity |
| 134 | 02/21/00 | 05/21/05 | 1,763,641 | USD | Domestic | 12.125 | S | Quantity |
| 135 | 03/15/00 | 03/15/10 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 11.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 136 | 03/17/00 | 03/16/01 | 1,109,683 | USD | Domestic | 0 | Z | Price |
| 137 | 04/04/00 | 10/04/04 | 479,039 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 138 | 05/24/00 | 05/24/05 | 674,068 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 139 | 06/14/00 | 06/14/04 | 561,979 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.125 | S | Quantity |
| 140 | 06/15/00 | 06/15/15 | 2,402,700 | USD | Global | 11.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 141 | 06/20/00 | 06/20/03 | 940,083 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 142 | 07/14/00 | 07/13/01 | 1,251,560 | USD | Domestic | 0 | Z | Price |
| 143 | 07/20/00 | 07/20/04 | 949,065 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 144 | 07/21/00 | 07/21/30 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 10.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 145 | 09/07/00 | 09/07/07 | 435,722 | EUR | Eurobond | 10 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 146 | 09/26/00 | 09/26/05 | 575,595 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.85 | S | Quantity |
| 147 | 11/10/00 | 11/09/01 | 1,000,979 | USD | Domestic | 0 | Z | Price |
| 148 | 02/21/01 | 02/21/12 | 1,593,951 | USD | Global | 12.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 149 | 02/22/01 | 02/22/07 | 300,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 150 | 06/19/01 | 06/19/31 | 8,935,311 | USD | Global | 12 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 151 | 06/19/01 | 06/19/31 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Quantity |
| 152 | 06/19/01 | 06/19/18 | 7,691,791 | USD | Global | 12.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 153 | 06/19/01 | 06/19/18 | 463,729 | EUR | Eurobond | 10 | A | Quantity |

Brazil

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|-----------|-----|-------------------|----------|---|-------|
| 1 | 10/15/88 | 10/15/99 | 670,000 | USD | Restructured Debt | Floating | S | Price |
| 2 | 08/31/89 | 09/15/13 | 1,000,000 | USD | Restructured Debt | 6 | S | Price |
| 3 | 11/26/92 | 01/01/01 | 7,104,960 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |
| 4 | 04/15/94 | 04/15/06 | 4,799,521 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |
| 5 | 04/15/94 | 04/15/09 | 1,737,355 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|
| 6 | 04/15/94 | 04/15/09 | 2,174,663 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |
| 7 | 04/15/94 | 04/15/14 | 7,387,519 | USD | Brady Bond | 8 | S | Price |
| 8 | 04/15/94 | 04/15/24 | 3,593,064 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |
| 9 | 04/15/94 | 04/15/24 | 10,631,926 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |
| 10 | 10/15/94 | 04/15/12 | 8,489,909 | USD | Brady Bond | Floating | S | Price |
| 11 | 06/19/95 | 06/19/97 | 946,415 | JPY | Eurobond | 6 | A | Quantity |
| 12 | 06/21/95 | 07/20/98 | 719,756 | DM | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 13 | 10/19/95 | 01/06/01 | 70,715 | DM | Eurobond | 10 | A | Price |
| 14 | 03/22/96 | 03/22/01 | 283,509 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.5 | S | Quantity |
| 15 | 05/08/96 | 04/15/05 | 164,668 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 16 | 06/11/96 | 06/11/99 | 154,223 | GBP | Eurobond | 9.75 | A | Quantity |
| 17 | 10/09/96 | 09/15/07 | 1,281,699 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 18 | 11/05/96 | 11/05/01 | 750,000 | USD | Global | 8.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 19 | 02/05/97 | 02/26/07 | 601,900 | EUR | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 20 | 02/26/97 | 02/26/07 | 590,338 | EUR | Eurobond | 8 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 21 | 04/25/97 | 05/21/02 | 174,124 | EUR | Eurobond | 6.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 22 | 04/30/97 | 05/21/02 | 208,699 | EUR | Eurobond | 6.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 23 | 05/07/97 | 05/21/02 | 166,905 | EUR | Eurobond | 6.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 24 | 06/03/97 | 06/26/17 | 442,219 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 25 | 06/09/97 | 05/15/27 | 3,500,000 | USD | Global | 10.125 | S | Quantity |
| 26 | 07/30/97 | 07/30/07 | 253,245 | GBP | Eurobond | 10 | A | Quantity |
| 27 | 03/03/98 | 03/03/03 | 538,100 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 28 | 04/06/98 | 04/07/08 | 1,000,000 | USD | Eurobond | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 29 | 04/07/98 | 04/07/08 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 9.375 | S | Quantity |
| 30 | 04/23/98 | 04/23/08 | 413,289 | DM | Eurobond | Step Down | A | Quantity |
| 31 | 04/30/99 | 04/15/04 | 3,046,172 | USD | Global | 11.625 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 32 | 07/29/99 | 07/29/02 | 750,778 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Quantity |
| 33 | 09/10/99 | 09/30/04 | 523,596 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 34 | 10/25/99 | 10/15/09 | 4,000,000 | USD | Global | 14.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 35 | 10/29/99 | 11/17/06 | 735,812 | EUR | Eurobond | 12 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 36 | 11/13/99 | 11/26/01 | 606,366 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 37 | 01/15/00 | 02/04/10 | 741,988 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 38 | 01/26/00 | 01/15/20 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 12.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 39 | 03/06/00 | 03/06/30 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 12.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 40 | 06/21/00 | 07/05/05 | 709,622 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Quantity |
| 41 | 06/23/00 | 07/05/05 | 1,170,631 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 42 | 07/26/00 | 07/26/07 | 1,500,000 | USD | Global | 11.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 43 | 08/17/00 | 08/17/40 | 5,157,311 | USD | Global | 11 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 44 | 09/20/00 | 10/05/07 | 423,765 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 45 | 11/29/00 | 03/22/06 | 600,646 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.75 | S | Quantity |
| 46 | 01/10/01 | 01/24/11 | 937,124 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 47 | 01/11/01 | 01/11/06 | 1,500,000 | USD | Global | 10.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 48 | 03/17/01 | 04/10/07 | 651,090 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.75 | S | Quantity |
| 49 | 03/22/01 | 04/15/24 | 2,150,000 | USD | Global | 8.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 50 | 05/09/01 | 07/05/05 | 424,012 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Quantity |
| 51 | 05/17/01 | 07/15/05 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 9.625 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 52 | 08/02/01 | 08/28/03 | 177,576 | JPY | Eurobond | 3.75 | S | Quantity |
| 53 | 01/11/02 | 01/11/12 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 11 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 54 | 03/12/02 | 03/12/08 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 11.5 | S | Quantity |
| 55 | 04/02/02 | 04/02/09 | 445,859 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 56 | 04/16/02 | 04/15/10 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 12 | S | Quantity |

Colombia

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|---------|-----|----------|-------|---|------------------|
| 1 | 05/11/93 | 05/11/98 | 125,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.125 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 2 | 01/14/94 | 01/14/99 | 89,678 | JPY | Eurobond | 3.55 | S | Quantity |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------------------|------------------|
| 3 | 02/23/94 | 02/23/04 | 250,000 | USD | Yankee | 7.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 4 | 10/06/94 | 10/06/99 | 175,000 | USD | Yankee | 8.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 5 | 02/15/95 | 02/15/00 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.25 | A | Quantity |
| 6 | 08/02/95 | 08/02/02 | 126,920 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.1 | S | Quantity |
| 7 | 11/28/95 | 12/21/00 | 104,113 | DM | Eurobond | 7.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 8 | 12/21/95 | 12/22/00 | 147,326 | JPY | Eurobond | 3 | S | Quantity |
| 9 | 02/15/96 | 02/15/03 | 200,000 | USD | Global | 7.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 10 | 02/15/96 | 02/15/16 | 200,000 | USD | Global | 8.7 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 11 | 06/13/96 | 06/14/01 | 400,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 12 | 10/07/96 | 10/07/16 | 125,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.66 | S | Quantity |
| 13 | 11/21/96 | 11/21/01 | 181,916 | DM | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 14 | 02/24/97 | 02/15/07 | 750,000 | USD | Global | 7.625 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 15 | 02/24/97 | 02/15/27 | 250,000 | USD | Global | 8.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 16 | 02/11/98 | 02/11/08 | 164,830 | GBP | Eurobond | 9.75 | A | Quantity |
| 17 | 03/06/98 | 03/06/02 | 222,433 | ITL | Eurobond | 7 | A | Quantity |
| 18 | 04/02/98 | 04/01/08 | 500,000 | USD | Global | 8.625 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 19 | 06/15/98 | 06/15/03 | 150,000 | USD | Private Placement | 7.27 | S | Quantity |
| 20 | 06/25/98 | 06/15/03 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.27 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 21 | 07/14/98 | 07/14/03 | 135,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.7 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 22 | 08/13/98 | 08/13/05 | 500,000 | USD | Yankee | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 23 | 03/09/99 | 03/09/04 | 500,000 | USD | Global | 10.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 24 | 04/23/99 | 04/23/09 | 500,000 | USD | Global | 9.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 25 | 11/30/99 | 04/25/05 | 500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.75 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 26 | 11/30/99 | 04/23/09 | 500,000 | USD | Global | 9.75 | S | Quantity |
| 27 | 02/25/00 | 02/25/20 | 1,075,000 | USD | Global | 11.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 28 | 03/17/00 | 03/09/28 | 22,285 | USD | Global | 11.85 | S | Quantity |
| 29 | 06/09/00 | 06/30/03 | 427,948 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 30 | 07/28/00 | 06/30/03 | 139,210 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Quantity |
| 31 | 10/05/00 | 10/20/05 | 513,629 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 32 | 10/13/00 | 10/17/05 | 300,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 33 | 10/20/00 | 10/20/05 | 252,786 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.25 | A | Quantity |
| 34 | 01/25/01 | 01/31/08 | 648,145 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.375 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 35 | 04/09/01 | 04/09/11 | 875,000 | USD | Global | 9.75 | S | Quantity |
| 36 | 04/12/01 | 04/27/05 | 243,041 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.5 | S | Quantity |
| 37 | 05/12/01 | 05/31/11 | 344,828 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 38 | 06/13/01 | 06/13/06 | 450,000 | USD | Global | 10.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 39 | 11/21/01 | 01/23/12 | 900,000 | USD | Global | 10 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 40 | 07/09/02 | 07/09/10 | 507,029 | USD | Global | 10.5 | S | Quantity |
| 41 | 12/09/02 | 01/15/13 | 625,000 | USD | Global | 10.75 | S | Quantity |

Mexico

| | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|----------|-----------|-----|------------|-----------|---|------------------|
| 1 | 03/28/90 | 12/31/19 | 1,516,473 | EUR | Brady Bond | 5.01 | S | Price |
| 2 | 03/13/91 | 03/13/96 | 187,243 | DM | Eurobond | 10.5 | A | Quantity |
| 3 | 07/16/91 | 07/16/01 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.5 | S | Quantity |
| 4 | 08/21/91 | 08/21/96 | 91,747 | ESP | Eurobond | 14.25 | A | Quantity |
| 5 | 09/29/91 | 09/01/08 | 96,500 | GBP | Eurobond | 16.5 | S | Quantity |
| 6 | 12/03/91 | 12/03/98 | 182,252 | GBP | Eurobond | 12.25 | A | Quantity |
| 7 | 09/24/92 | 09/15/02 | 250,000 | USD | Yankee | 8.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 8 | 03/16/93 | 03/16/98 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 9 | 04/02/93 | 08/12/00 | 58,895 | USD | Eurobond | 6.97 | S | Price |
| 10 | 07/23/93 | 07/23/96 | 92,825 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.9 | S | Quantity |
| 11 | 01/25/95 | 01/29/03 | 846,891 | EUR | Eurobond | 10.375 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 12 | 07/20/95 | 07/21/97 | 1,000,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | S | Price |
| 13 | 07/21/95 | 07/21/97 | 418,403 | USD | Eurobond | Step Down | A | Quantity |
| 14 | 08/17/95 | 08/17/98 | 1,057,666 | JPY | Eurobond | 5 | A | Quantity |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|------------------|------------------|
| 15 | 10/05/95 | 11/02/00 | 705,975 | DM | Eurobond | 9.375 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 16 | 12/05/95 | 11/27/96 | 1,500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 0 | Z | Quantity |
| 17 | 12/12/95 | 03/12/97 | 294,652 | JPY | Eurobond | 2.85 | A | Quantity |
| 18 | 12/12/95 | 12/12/97 | 127,683 | JPY | Eurobond | 3 | A | Quantity |
| 19 | 01/29/96 | 01/29/03 | 684,158 | DM | Eurobond | 10.375 | A | Quantity |
| 20 | 02/06/96 | 02/06/01 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 9.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 21 | 05/07/96 | 05/15/26 | 1,750,000 | USD | Global | 11.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 22 | 06/06/96 | 06/06/06 | 918,628 | JPY | Eurobond | 6.75 | S | Quantity |
| 23 | 09/10/96 | 09/10/04 | 1,002,904 | DM | Eurobond | Step Up | A | Quantity |
| 24 | 09/24/96 | 09/15/16 | 1,200,000 | USD | Global | 11.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 25 | 09/30/96 | 09/30/02 | 637,841 | JPY | Eurobond | 5 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 26 | 11/21/96 | 11/21/01 | 330,447 | ITL | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 27 | 01/14/97 | 01/15/07 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 9.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 28 | 01/14/97 | 01/15/07 | 500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.875 | S | Quantity |
| 29 | 02/05/97 | 02/24/09 | 902,850 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 30 | 02/20/97 | 02/20/07 | 302,076 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 31 | 02/24/97 | 02/24/09 | 885,506 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.25 | A | Quantity |
| 32 | 03/11/97 | 03/11/04 | 407,692 | JPY | Eurobond | 4 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 33 | 04/24/97 | 04/24/02 | 796,761 | JPY | Eurobond | 3.1 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 34 | 05/08/97 | 05/08/17 | 297,195 | ITL | Eurobond | 11 | A | Quantity |
| 35 | 05/30/97 | 05/30/02 | 489,966 | GBP | Eurobond | 8.75 | A | Quantity |
| 36 | 06/27/97 | 06/27/02 | 1,000,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 37 | 07/16/97 | 07/16/04 | 286,671 | ITL | Eurobond | 8.375 | A | Quantity |
| 38 | 07/23/97 | 07/23/08 | 418,543 | DM | Eurobond | 8 | A | Quantity |
| 39 | 09/10/97 | 10/01/04 | 446,235 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 40 | 10/29/97 | 06/02/03 | 360,573 | CAD | Global | 7 | S | Quantity |
| 41 | 03/12/98 | 03/12/08 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 8.625 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 42 | 06/08/98 | 06/08/03 | 100,867 | PTE | Eurobond | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 43 | 02/19/99 | 02/17/09 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 10.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 44 | 04/06/99 | 04/06/05 | 1,000,000 | USD | Global | 9.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 45 | 04/07/99 | 04/07/00 | 227,952 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 46 | 04/07/99 | 04/07/04 | 500,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Price |
| 47 | 04/07/99 | 04/07/04 | 394,926 | EUR | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 48 | 06/23/99 | 07/06/06 | 420,643 | EUR | Global | 7.375 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 49 | 01/28/00 | 02/01/10 | 1,500,000 | USD | Global | 9.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 50 | 03/02/00 | 03/08/10 | 966,277 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 51 | 08/01/00 | 02/01/06 | 1,500,000 | USD | Global | 8.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 52 | 09/20/00 | 09/29/04 | 467,158 | JPY | Eurobond | 2.25 | S | Quantity |
| 53 | 01/16/01 | 01/14/11 | 1,500,000 | USD | Global | 8.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 54 | 03/13/01 | 03/13/08 | 659,805 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.375 | A | Quantity |
| 55 | 03/30/01 | 12/30/19 | 3,300,000 | USD | Global | 8.125 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 56 | 08/13/01 | 08/15/31 | 3,250,000 | USD | Global | 8.3 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 57 | 01/14/02 | 01/14/12 | 1,250,000 | USD | Global | 7.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 58 | 09/24/02 | 09/24/22 | 1,750,000 | USD | Global | 8 | S | Quantity |

Russia

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|-----------|-----|----------|------|---|------------------|
| 1 | 05/14/93 | 05/14/94 | 266,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | A | Quantity |
| 2 | 05/14/93 | 05/14/96 | 1,518,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | A | Quantity |
| 3 | 05/14/93 | 05/14/99 | 1,307,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | A | Quantity |
| 4 | 05/14/93 | 05/14/03 | 2,627,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 5 | 05/14/93 | 05/14/08 | 2,502,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 6 | 05/14/96 | 05/14/06 | 1,750,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 7 | 05/14/96 | 05/14/11 | 1,750,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 8 | 11/27/96 | 11/27/01 | 1,000,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 9 | 03/13/97 | 03/25/04 | 1,177,126 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|
| 10 | 03/19/97 | 03/19/15 | 58,932 | DM | Eurobond | Floating | A | Quantity |
| 11 | 03/25/97 | 03/25/04 | 1,187,936 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Quantity |
| 12 | 06/26/97 | 06/26/07 | 2,400,000 | USD | Private Placement | 10 | S | Price |
| 13 | 06/26/97 | 06/26/07 | 2,400,000 | USD | Eurobond | 10 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 14 | 12/06/97 | 12/06/99 | 50,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | N.A. | Quantity |
| 15 | 03/12/98 | 03/12/18 | 54,744 | DM | Eurobond | Step Down | A | Quantity |
| 16 | 03/31/98 | 03/31/05 | 680,108 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.375 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 17 | 03/31/98 | 03/31/05 | 687,815 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.375 | A | Quantity |
| 18 | 04/24/98 | 04/30/03 | 418,403 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 19 | 06/10/98 | 06/10/03 | 1,250,000 | USD | Private Placement | 11.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 20 | 06/10/98 | 06/10/03 | 1,250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 21 | 06/24/98 | 06/24/08 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 12.75 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 22 | 06/24/98 | 06/24/28 | 2,500,000 | USD | Private Placement | 12.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 23 | 06/24/98 | 06/24/28 | 2,500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 12.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 24 | 07/24/98 | 07/24/05 | 2,968,968 | USD | Private Placement | 8.75 | S | Price |
| 25 | 07/24/98 | 07/24/05 | 2,968,967 | USD | Eurobond | 8.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 26 | 07/24/98 | 07/24/18 | 3,466,671 | USD | Private Placement | 11 | S | Price |
| 27 | 07/24/98 | 07/24/18 | 3,466,671 | USD | Eurobond | 11 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 28 | 02/01/00 | 11/14/07 | 1,322,000 | USD | Domestic | 3 | S | Price |
| 29 | 03/31/00 | 03/31/30 | 1,840,000 | USD | Private Placement | Step Up | S | Quantity |
| 30 | 03/31/00 | 03/31/30 | 1,840,000 | USD | Eurobond | Step Up | S | Quantity |
| 31 | 08/25/00 | 03/31/10 | 2,534,000 | USD | Private Placement | 8.25 | S | Price |
| 32 | 08/25/00 | 03/31/10 | 2,534,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.25 | S | Price / Quantity |

Turkey

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|----|----------|----------|-----------|-----|----------|--------|------|------------------|
| 1 | 01/01/50 | 02/06/03 | 1,000,000 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.25 | A | Price |
| 2 | 12/22/88 | 12/22/98 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 3 | 04/27/89 | 04/27/99 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 4 | 06/07/89 | 06/07/99 | 280,000 | USD | Eurobond | 5.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 5 | 09/14/89 | 09/14/99 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 10.25 | S | Quantity |
| 6 | 11/22/89 | 11/22/95 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.75 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 7 | 02/21/90 | 03/15/97 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 10.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 8 | 04/04/90 | 04/24/97 | 147,001 | DM | Eurobond | 10 | A | Price |
| 9 | 08/16/90 | 08/16/95 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 10.375 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 10 | 10/28/91 | 10/28/96 | 328,235 | DM | Eurobond | 10.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 11 | 03/03/92 | 03/20/97 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 12 | 06/25/92 | 06/15/99 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 13 | 07/06/92 | 07/27/99 | 268,294 | DM | Eurobond | 10.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 14 | 07/16/92 | 08/06/97 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 15 | 09/24/92 | 09/24/99 | 407,432 | JPY | Eurobond | 6.8 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 16 | 01/19/93 | 02/18/00 | 243,665 | DM | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 17 | 02/25/93 | 02/25/00 | 826,720 | JPY | Eurobond | 6.3 | S | Quantity |
| 18 | 06/10/93 | 06/10/03 | 326,067 | JPY | Eurobond | 7 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 19 | 06/28/93 | 07/09/03 | 585,783 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 20 | 10/19/93 | 10/29/98 | 610,493 | DM | Eurobond | 7.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 21 | 10/27/93 | 10/27/03 | 187,481 | GBP | Eurobond | 9 | A | Quantity |
| 22 | 11/30/93 | 11/30/98 | 278,287 | JPY | Eurobond | 4 | S | Quantity |
| 23 | 11/30/93 | 11/30/01 | 463,811 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.1 | S | Quantity |
| 24 | 03/01/94 | 03/01/02 | 428,006 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.45 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 25 | 03/01/94 | 03/01/04 | 286,766 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.75 | S | Quantity |
| 26 | 07/25/95 | 08/21/98 | 345,994 | DM | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 27 | 07/27/95 | 07/27/98 | 573,254 | JPY | Eurobond | 4.5 | S | Quantity |
| 28 | 09/19/95 | 10/05/98 | 300,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 29 | 11/06/95 | 05/06/05 | 263,350 | USD | Eurobond | 3 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 30 | 01/16/96 | 02/16/06 | 94,793 | JPY | Eurobond | 7.2 | A | Quantity |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------|-----------|------------------|------------------|
| 31 | 02/05/96 | 02/14/01 | 341,041 | DM | Eurobond | 7.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 32 | 04/23/96 | 04/23/01 | 697,913 | JPY | Eurobond | 5.7 | S | Quantity |
| 33 | 05/22/96 | 06/11/99 | 500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 34 | 05/30/96 | 05/30/02 | 281,833 | JPY | Eurobond | 6 | A | Quantity |
| 35 | 08/13/96 | 09/04/00 | 431,656 | DM | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 36 | 12/05/96 | 12/05/01 | 483,406 | DM | Eurobond | 7.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 37 | 01/29/97 | 02/17/04 | 301,397 | DM | Eurobond | 7.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 38 | 02/24/97 | 03/18/02 | 177,144 | EUR | Eurobond | 9 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 39 | 03/14/97 | 06/26/03 | 57,626 | DM | Eurobond | 8.5 | A | Quantity |
| 40 | 05/20/97 | 05/23/02 | 400,000 | USD | Eurobond | 10 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 41 | 06/03/97 | 06/24/02 | 578,935 | DM | Eurobond | 7.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 42 | 08/18/97 | 08/18/00 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 43 | 09/17/97 | 09/19/07 | 600,000 | USD | Eurobond | 10 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 44 | 09/19/97 | 09/19/07 | 600,000 | USD | Private Placement | 10 | S | Quantity |
| 45 | 10/10/97 | 10/22/07 | 1,285,709 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 46 | 02/06/98 | 02/06/03 | 551,222 | DM | Eurobond | 7.25 | A | Quantity |
| 47 | 02/13/98 | 02/23/05 | 400,000 | USD | Private Placement | 9.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 48 | 02/13/98 | 02/23/05 | 450,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 49 | 04/20/98 | 04/20/06 | 552,154 | DM | Eurobond | Step Down | A | Quantity |
| 50 | 05/12/98 | 05/12/03 | 300,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 51 | 11/20/98 | 11/30/01 | 475,737 | DM | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 52 | 12/11/98 | 12/15/08 | 600,000 | USD | Eurobond | 12 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 53 | 12/15/98 | 12/15/03 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 12 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 54 | 02/06/99 | 02/17/03 | 449,102 | DM | Eurobond | 9.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 55 | 02/25/99 | 03/15/04 | 1,105,154 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 56 | 06/19/99 | 06/15/09 | 1,250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 12.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 57 | 08/05/99 | 08/25/05 | 427,656 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 58 | 10/30/99 | 11/05/04 | 500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 59 | 11/13/99 | 11/30/06 | 773,914 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.625 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 60 | 12/03/99 | 12/17/02 | 404,000 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 61 | 01/11/00 | 01/15/30 | 1,500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 62 | 01/27/00 | 02/09/10 | 977,359 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 63 | 03/31/00 | 04/14/05 | 561,209 | EUR | Eurobond | 7.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 64 | 06/09/00 | 06/15/10 | 1,500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 65 | 06/13/00 | 06/13/03 | 474,809 | EUR | Eurobond | Floating | Q | Quantity |
| 66 | 06/15/00 | 06/15/10 | 750,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.75 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 67 | 06/17/00 | 07/14/04 | 516,674 | JPY | Eurobond | 3.25 | S | Quantity |
| 68 | 08/07/00 | 08/07/03 | 177,949 | EUR | Eurobond | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 69 | 11/07/00 | 11/27/03 | 467,022 | JPY | Eurobond | 3 | S | Quantity |
| 70 | 01/31/01 | 02/16/04 | 697,492 | EUR | Eurobond | 8.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 71 | 10/24/01 | 02/07/05 | 713,349 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 72 | 11/21/01 | 11/27/06 | 1,000,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 73 | 01/17/02 | 01/23/12 | 1,000,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.5 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 74 | 03/13/02 | 03/19/08 | 600,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 75 | 04/19/02 | 05/08/07 | 614,058 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 76 | 05/14/02 | 05/14/07 | 200,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11.5 | S | Quantity |
| 77 | 11/13/02 | 01/13/08 | 1,100,000 | USD | Eurobond | 10.5 | S | Quantity |
| 78 | 01/14/03 | 01/14/13 | 1,500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 11 | S | Quantity |
| 79 | 01/24/03 | 01/24/08 | 535,720 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.875 | A | Quantity |

Uruguay

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|---------|-----|----------|------|---|------------------|
| 1 | 04/23/93 | 04/23/98 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.5 | S | Quantity |
| 2 | 03/07/94 | 03/07/01 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.25 | S | Quantity |
| 3 | 10/24/94 | 04/24/97 | 101,604 | JPY | Eurobond | 5 | S | Quantity |
| 4 | 08/08/95 | 09/08/00 | 136,774 | DM | Eurobond | 8 | A | Price / Quantity |

| Bond | Issue Date | Maturity Date | Amount Issued (USD Thousands) | Currency | Market | Coupon | Coupon Frequency | Data Available |
|------|------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------------------|------------------|
| 5 | 09/19/96 | 09/26/06 | 100,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.375 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 6 | 09/20/96 | 09/26/06 | 100,000 | USD | Private Placement | 8.375 | S | Quantity |
| 7 | 04/24/97 | 04/24/02 | 79,676 | JPY | Eurobond | 2.5 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 8 | 07/09/97 | 07/15/27 | 510,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 9 | 04/06/98 | 04/07/08 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 10 | 11/14/98 | 11/18/03 | 175,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.875 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 11 | 04/30/99 | 05/04/09 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 12 | 06/20/00 | 06/22/10 | 300,000 | USD | Eurobond | 8.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 13 | 09/13/00 | 09/26/05 | 196,824 | EUR | Eurobond | 7 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 14 | 11/23/00 | 05/29/07 | 156,149 | CLP | Eurobond | Floating | S | Quantity |
| 15 | 02/27/01 | 03/14/06 | 257,023 | JPY | Eurobond | Step Up | S | Quantity |
| 16 | 06/08/01 | 06/28/11 | 170,032 | EUR | Eurobond | 7 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 17 | 11/20/01 | 01/20/12 | 355,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.625 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 18 | 03/25/02 | 03/25/09 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 7.875 | S | Quantity |

Venezuela

| | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------|----------|-----------|-----|-------------------|----------|------|------------------|
| 1 | 11/14/88 | 11/14/93 | 60,606 | DM | Eurobond | 8.25 | A | Price |
| 2 | 12/22/88 | 12/22/98 | 167,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | S | Price |
| 3 | 12/22/88 | 12/30/03 | 167,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | S | Price |
| 4 | 12/18/90 | 03/30/20 | 329,059 | EUR | Brady Bond | 6.66 | S | Price |
| 5 | 12/18/90 | 03/31/20 | 719,600 | USD | Brady Bond | 6.75 | S | Price |
| 6 | 08/21/91 | 09/11/96 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 7 | 09/18/91 | 12/18/07 | 100,000 | USD | Restructured Debt | 9 | S | Quantity |
| 8 | 11/18/91 | 12/02/96 | 127,429 | DM | Eurobond | 10.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 9 | 12/18/92 | 12/18/07 | 30,000 | USD | Private Placement | 8.75 | S | Quantity |
| 10 | 03/08/93 | 03/11/96 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9.125 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 11 | 05/05/93 | 05/05/98 | 155,661 | DM | Eurobond | 10.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 12 | 05/11/93 | 05/27/96 | 150,000 | USD | Eurobond | 9 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 13 | 09/13/93 | 09/20/95 | 250,000 | USD | Eurobond | 6.75 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 14 | 09/16/93 | 10/15/00 | 183,148 | DM | Eurobond | 8.75 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 15 | 09/20/93 | 09/20/95 | 50,000 | USD | Eurobond | Floating | N.A. | Quantity |
| 16 | 12/07/93 | 12/07/95 | 83,155 | ATS | Eurobond | 8 | N.A. | Quantity |
| 17 | 12/14/95 | 12/14/98 | 347,044 | DM | Eurobond | 10 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 18 | 09/12/96 | 10/04/03 | 427,590 | EUR | Eurobond | 10.25 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 19 | 06/10/97 | 06/18/07 | 315,000 | USD | Global | 9.125 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 20 | 06/10/97 | 06/18/07 | 315,000 | USD | Private Placement | 9.125 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 21 | 09/11/97 | 09/15/27 | 4,000,000 | USD | Global | 9.25 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 22 | 07/31/98 | 08/15/18 | 500,000 | USD | Eurobond | 13.625 | S | Price / Quantity |
| 23 | 10/29/98 | 10/29/08 | 109,532 | DM | Eurobond | Step Up | A | Quantity |
| 24 | 12/23/99 | 12/23/02 | 190,762 | EUR | Eurobond | 9.875 | A | Quantity |
| 25 | 03/03/00 | 03/23/05 | 481,554 | EUR | Eurobond | 10.5 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 26 | 02/09/01 | 03/05/08 | 550,785 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 27 | 03/05/01 | 03/05/08 | 181,830 | EUR | Eurobond | 11 | A | Quantity |
| 28 | 06/28/01 | 07/25/11 | 213,613 | EUR | Eurobond | 11.125 | A | Price / Quantity |
| 29 | 12/07/01 | 06/30/03 | 222,892 | EUR | Eurobond | 10.5 | A | Price / Quantity |

The table describes the emerging market bonds used in the paper by country. For the currency, ATS stands for Austrian schilling, CAD for Canadian dollar, CHF for Swiss franc, CLP for Chilean peso, DM for Deutsche mark, ESP for Spanish peseta, EUR for Euro, FRF for French franc, GBP for British pound, ITL for Italian lira, JPY for Japanese yen, NLG for Dutch guilder, PTE for Portuguese escudo, and USD for U.S. dollar. For the coupon frequency, A stands for annual, M for monthly, Q for quarterly, S for semi-annual, Z for zero-coupon bond, and N.A. for not available. The last column of the table reports whether the bond is used in the price section, in the quantity section, or in both sections of the paper.