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## OUTSOURCING AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **Outsourcing and Technological Change\***

In this paper we argue that an important source of the recent increase in outsourcing is the computer and information technology revolution, characterized by increased rates of technological change. Our model shows that an increase in the pace of technological change increases outsourcing because it allows firms to use services based on leading edge technologies without incurring the sunk costs of adopting these new technologies. In addition, firms using more IT-intensive technologies face lower outsourcing costs of IT-based services generating a positive correlation between the IT level of the user and its outsourcing share of IT-based services. This implication is verified in the data.

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# 1 Introduction

During the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in labor outsourcing among U.S. manufacturing firms.<sup>1</sup> Firms are increasingly purchasing the services of outside providers to perform tasks that were previously performed by in-house employees or to perform new tasks. The outside service providers are used to carry out administrative duties or to provide business support such as security, engineering, maintenance, sales, legal services, accounting services, food services, data processing, and software development. Another manifestation of the trend towards outsourcing is the increased use of temporary workers.<sup>2</sup>

“Make-or-buy” decisions are fundamental to the degree of vertical integration of the firm and ultimately to the industrial organization of production. The transactions costs literature emphasizes the role played by asset specificity in defining the boundaries of the firm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986). Specific assets create “quasi-rents” which tempt firms to behave opportunistically in order to appropriate as much of these rents as possible. These costs of transacting through the market can be mitigated through in-house production (and by the use of long-term contracts and reputation). It is the balancing of these costs against its benefits that defines the boundaries of the firm.

While there is empirical evidence in support of different explanations for the existence of labor outsourcing (e.g. Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Houseman, 2001), little is known about why it has increased so dramatically in recent years. One exception is Autor (2002) who presents evidence that 20% of the 1973-1995 growth in temporary employment can be attributed to exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine in the U.S., which has raised the costs of terminating workers.

In this paper we propose that an important source of the recent increase in out-

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<sup>1</sup>According to the Census of Manufacturers, the ratio of purchased services to value added more than doubled, rising from 4.25% in 1992 to 10.68% in 1997.

<sup>2</sup>Between 1979 and 1995, the Temporary Help Supply industry in the U.S. grew at 11 percent annually – over five times more rapidly than U.S. non-farm employment. See Autor (2002) and Esteveo and Lach (1999a).

sourcing is the computer and information technology revolution, characterized by increased rates of technological change. We present a model that examines the different channels by which technological change can affect the firm's decision to outsource. According to our model, a firm decides to outsource a service or to produce it in-house depending on which organizational mode minimizes production costs. The cost of outsourcing is the price of the service plus an adjustment cost specific to the firm. Since there is a fixed cost in the production of the service, the economies of scale generated by this fixed cost are exploited by setting up a firm that sells the service to several users. The service provider can then offer the service at a price below the average cost of in-house production. At this lower price, some firms (those with adjustment costs below a threshold) will outsource.

Given this general framework, we show that the level of technology in the production of the service cannot predict an increase in outsourcing without making additional assumptions. An increase in the *speed* of technological change, however, will increase outsourcing because it allows firms to use services based on leading edge technologies without incurring the ever more frequent sunk costs of adopting these new technologies. In addition, we argue that the generality and portability of the skills associated with the wave of information technology (IT) innovations in recent years reduce the costs of outsourcing IT-based services and, therefore, lead to increases in the outsourcing of these services. For the same reasons, firms using more IT-intensive technologies face lower outsourcing costs of IT-based services generating a positive correlation between the IT level of the user and its outsourcing share of IT-based services.

Section 2 reviews prior research that explores various explanations for labor outsourcing. Section 3 presents our basic model of outsourcing which is then expanded in Section 4 to incorporate technological change in the production of services. In Section 5 the model considers the impact of investments in IT by final good firms and industry-level data is used to test the model's predictions. Consistent with our model, we find that as final good producers increase their reliance on IT, they are more likely to purchase outside services. Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Prior Research on Labor Outsourcing

Prior research has proposed and tested several reasons for labor outsourcing. Abraham and Taylor (1996) used a special addendum to thirteen manufacturing Industry Wage Surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics between June 1986 and September 1987 to test whether firms' use of outside contractors was induced by (1) the desire to cut costs by contracting out to firms that offer less generous wage and benefit packages, (2) the demand for greater flexibility in response to a volatile economic environment, and (3) economies of scale in the provision of specialized services. They found support for the first hypothesis in the case of janitorial services, for the second hypothesis in the case of accounting services, and for the third hypothesis in the cases of machine maintenance services, engineering and drafting services, accounting services and computer services. They concluded that the main reason for the growth of outsourcing was the increase in the comparative advantage enjoyed by specialized service-providing establishments as compared to in-house providers of the same services. Using an establishment survey conducted in 1996, Houseman (2001) found that the most commonly cited reason for using flexible staffing arrangements was the need to accommodate fluctuations in workload or staff absences.

A different hypothesis was proposed and tested by Autor (2001, 2002): Temporary help firms gather and sell information about worker quality to the market, and skills training plays a key role in the brokering of such information. The temporary help firms offer prospective employees a package of training and initially lower wages that induces self-selection. Workers of high-perceived ability choose training in anticipation of a steeper wage profile while low ability workers are deterred by limited expected gains. According to Autor (2002), the escalating use of temporary help workers in the U.S. labor market reflects an increase in employer demand for worker screening in response to the growth of unjust dismissal doctrine that has raised employer costs of terminating workers.

Magnani (2002) considers whether technological diffusion is responsible for the growth of labor outsourcing. She presents a theoretical framework that shows that as the technologies of the firm and the economy converge, outsourcing becomes more

attractive.<sup>3</sup> Using data on 18 two-digit industries in the U.S. for the time period 1949-1999, she finds empirical evidence in support of her hypothesis. In the next section we present a fully articulated model that more clearly explains the relationship between technological change and outsourcing. Unlike Magnani (2002), we differentiate between users' and producers' technologies and between levels and rates of technological change. The model shows why the outsourcing decision for different types of services will respond differently to technological change and hence why an empirical analysis cannot rely on an aggregate measure of purchased services but must look at different categories of services.

### 3 A Model of Outsourcing

#### 3.1 The Demand for Outsourcing

Consider a firm using conventional factors of production jointly with an amount  $s$  of a service to produce an amount  $q$  of a final good. We assume that the production technology is of fixed proportions so that input quantities—including the service—are proportional to output, i.e.,

$$s = \alpha q \tag{1}$$

The firm hires the conventional factors in the market but has the option to produce the service in-house. For simplicity, we constrain the firm to make an all-or-nothing decision regarding the service: it either produces  $s$  in-house or outsources it. As in Ono (2000), the firm will choose the option that minimizes the cost of obtaining the service.

The unit cost of *producing* in-house an amount  $s$  of the service is  $c(s)$ . The unit cost of *outsourcing* the service is composed of  $p$ , the price of the service in the market, and a firm-specific cost  $u \geq 0$ , per unit of service, reflecting other internal costs related to outsourcing (see below). For a given service, the price  $p$  is the same to all firms but  $u$  varies across firms: there is heterogeneity in the cost of outsourcing.<sup>4</sup> The distribution of

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<sup>3</sup>Another study that considers the relationship between technological change and outsourcing is Baker and Hubbard (2003) who show that, in the trucking industry, information technology that improves coordination leads to less vertical integration while information technology that improves monitoring leads to an increase in vertical integration.

<sup>4</sup>Alternatively, and with identical results, we could have allowed for heterogeneity in the in-house



$u$  across firms is given by  $G(u)$ . Thus, the unit cost of the service in the market is  $p + u$ . If a firm decides to buy the service in the market we say that the firm is *outsourcing* the service.

The term  $u$  could be interpreted as an *adjustment cost* related to outsourcing. These costs may be caused by the less than perfect match between the in-house workers and the external workers resulting in misunderstandings, frictions, delivery lags, quality differences, etc.<sup>5</sup> The more “specific” or idiosyncratic the firm’s technology and mode of production, the higher these costs would be, making outsourcing more costly. Put differently, the more “global” the firm’s operation is, the lower will  $u$  be and outsourcing will be less costly. The cost  $u$  may also represent something more abstract as the disutilities associated with losing control over the production process.<sup>6</sup>

In this simple model, a firm will outsource the service, indicated by  $Y = 1$ , when the unit cost of outsourcing is less than the unit cost of in-house production,  $p + u < c(s)$ . The probability that a firm using an amount  $s$  of the service will outsource is

$$P(Y = 1) = G(c(s) - p) \tag{2}$$

The term  $c(s) - p$  is the threshold level of the adjustment cost  $u$ . Firms with  $u$  above this threshold choose not to outsource the service. Suppose the price of the service  $p$  is less than  $c(s)$  for some  $s$ . If we do not allow for heterogeneity in the cost of outsourcing then *all* firms of size  $q = \frac{s}{\alpha}$  would be either outsourcing or producing in-house which is in general contrary to the facts. It is the presence of heterogeneity in the service-specific costs  $u$  that makes some firms prefer in-house production of some services even though it is “cheaper” to outsource.

The model implies that if  $c$  decreases with  $s$  so does the probability of outsourcing. In other words, if larger firms have a cost advantage in producing in-house services

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cost function  $c(s)$ .

<sup>5</sup> According to the W.E. Upjohn Institute’s Employer Survey on Flexible Staffing Policies (Houseman, 1997), 31% of the businesses that brought work previously contracted out back in house did so because of their inability to maintain product or service quality using outside contractors.

<sup>6</sup> Information leakage appears to play an important role in organizational structure. In firms where confidentiality is important outsourcing is likely to be more costly (Baccara, 2003).

then they are less likely to outsource them. To isolate the factors relating size to the probability of outsourcing we assume that total costs of producing  $s$  are composed of a fixed cost  $\zeta$  and a variable cost which is proportional to  $s$ . Thus, the unit cost of producing  $s$  units of the service is

$$c(s) = \frac{\zeta}{s} + c \quad (3)$$

We now introduce technical change in the *production of the service*. This form of technical change reduces  $c$ , the unit (variable) cost of producing the service. These cost-reducing innovations arrive every  $T$  periods. After  $\tau$  innovations arrived, the unit cost of producing the service is

$$\frac{\zeta}{s} + c_\tau$$

where  $\{c_\tau\}_{\tau=1}^\infty$  is a sequence of decreasing numbers.

To avoid unnecessary complexities, we make two simplifying assumptions. First, every time an innovation arrives the firm makes an “in-house/outourcing” decision for the next  $T$  periods, until the next innovation arrives. Thus, the decision on the 1<sup>st</sup> innovation is made at time  $T$ , the decision on the 2<sup>nd</sup> one at time  $2T$  and so on. The model is static because the outsourcing decisions today do not affect future states.<sup>7</sup> The second simplifying assumption is that old innovations are retired from the market when a new innovation arrives. In other words, at any point in time only the “leading edge” technology is used (as in Aghion et al. (2000)). The duration of new technologies is  $T$ . Thus, if a firm wishes to produce the service in-house it *must* adopt the latest innovation.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Dynamics can be introduced by allowing the production costs to depend on previous decisions.

<sup>8</sup>Suppose we do not assume full depreciation of the old technology. Take a firm that has been producing the service in-house. When a new innovation arrives the firm has three options: it can continue producing in-house with the old technology, it can adopt the innovation and produce in-house or it can outsource the service (using the leading edge technology). Suppose the cost reduction embedded in the new technology is large enough for the firm to always prefer adopting the new innovation than to continue using the old technology. Then the firm faces essentially two choices: outsource or in-house production with the new technology. Thus, the assumption that only the leading edge technology is used is an assumption about the size of the innovation steps.

Suppose that the cost reduction is not large enough. Then using the old technology in-house may be the most profitable option. Since cost reductions cumulate over time, at some point adopting the new technology will be preferred to continue using the old one. At this point we are back to the model analyzed in the paper. So outsourcing may be delayed when old technologies are not retired. Also cycles

Adopting the latest innovation costs  $A$ , so that the per-period cost is  $\frac{A}{T}$  (a zero discount rate is assumed) bringing the total cost of producing one unit of the service in-house using the latest technology  $\tau$  to

$$\frac{\frac{A}{T}}{\alpha q} + \frac{\zeta}{\alpha q} + c_\tau \quad (4)$$

The final good producer decides at time  $\tau T$  whether to adopt the  $\tau^{th}$  innovation and produce in-house at a unit cost (4) per period for the next  $T$  periods, or outsource the service at a per-period cost  $p + u$ . The (conditional) probability of outsourcing when technology is at level  $\tau$  and the price of outsourcing the service is  $p$  is therefore

$$P(Y = 1) = G \left( \frac{\frac{A}{T}}{\alpha q} + \frac{\zeta}{\alpha q} + c_\tau - p \right)$$

There are  $N$  final producers in an industry differing only with respect to the value of the adjustment cost  $u$ . The demand for outsourcing the service at a price  $p$  equals the number of final good producers outsourcing satisfying  $u < \frac{A}{T} + \frac{\zeta}{\alpha q} + c_\tau - p$ , multiplied by  $\alpha q$ , the amount of the service desired by each firm,

$$D(p) = \alpha q N G \left( \frac{\frac{A}{T}}{\alpha q} + \frac{\zeta}{\alpha q} + c_\tau - p \right) \quad (5)$$

This formulation captures two contrasting effects of technological change on the demand for outsourcing. First, as the level of technology  $\tau$  increases, the cost of producing in-house decreases making outsourcing less desirable. Second, as the pace at which technology changes increases (a decrease in  $T$ ) the costs of adopting the latest technology and producing in-house go up, making outsourcing more attractive. We will show later on that only this second effect is relevant in equilibrium.

Notice that shifts in  $G$  can potentially explain changes over time in the demand for outsourcing. Autor's (2001) argument that employment agencies are increasingly being used as a screening device to screen high-ability workers can be interpreted as a likely decline in the non-pecuniary costs of outsourcing labor  $u$ . This means an upward shift

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between in-house production (with the old and new technologies) and outsourcing may be possible in this case, unnecessarily complicating the model.

of the  $G$  distribution over time.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, demand for labor outsourcing through employment agencies increases. Thus, over-time variations in  $G$  can potentially explain variations in outsourcing rates over time.

### 3.2 The Supply of Outsourced Services

We assume that a single firm provides the service.<sup>10</sup> This supplier does not enjoy a technological advantage in the production of the service relative to the final good producer, nor does it benefit differently from technological change. In fact, we assume that the production cost of the supplying firm is the *same* as the cost of producing in-house, equation (4).<sup>11</sup>

The service provider takes the demand function (5) as given and chooses the price that maximizes per-period profits. These profits, net of the per-period innovation adoption costs, are

$$\pi(p) = (p - c_\tau) N\alpha q G \left( \frac{A}{\alpha q} + \frac{\zeta}{\alpha q} + c_\tau - p \right) - \frac{A}{T} - \zeta \quad (6)$$

In the Appendix we prove

**Proposition 1** *Assume  $G$  is continuous and twice differentiable with density  $g$  satisfying*

$$-2g(a + c_\tau - p) + (p - c_\tau) g'(a + c_\tau - p) < 0 \quad \text{for } p \in (c_\tau, a + c_\tau) \quad (7)$$

*Then the unique profit maximizing price is given by the solution to*

$$p_\tau - c_\tau = \frac{G(a + c_\tau - p_\tau)}{g(a + c_\tau - p_\tau)} \quad (8)$$

<sup>9</sup>We later show that certain types of technological change can have similar effects.

<sup>10</sup>We use monopoly to simplify the analysis. Competition among suppliers reduces the price margin,  $p - c$ , increasing the demand for outsourcing. Ono (2000) analyzes the entry of service providers into a market and finds that larger markets induce more entry of suppliers leading to a lower price  $p$  and more outsourcing.

<sup>11</sup>The assumption that final good producers and service supplier have the same production technology is not a serious restriction. If anything, the provider of the service should be more efficient because it enjoys other types of cost advantages due, for example, to specialization and learning. Autor (2001), for example, emphasizes the general training provided by THS agencies to their employees. Introducing such differences in production technologies will magnify the incentives for outsourcing. Although the driving force of the model is the ability to exploit increasing returns in the production of services due to the presence of fixed costs of production, the model can also accommodate efficiency gains due to other size-related sources.

where  $a = \frac{A+\zeta}{\alpha q}$  is the average fixed cost.

The optimal price balances the incentives to raise prices and increase profits from the services provided to the inframarginal final producers,  $\Delta p \times N\alpha q G(a + c_\tau - p)$ , and the lost profits from the decision of  $N \times \Delta p \times g(a + c_\tau - p)$  to switch to in-house production,  $(p - c_\tau)N\alpha q [\Delta p \times g(a + c_\tau - p)]$ .

The second order condition (7) ensures concavity of the profit function and therefore uniqueness of the solution. The second order condition is always satisfied by all non-increasing densities (e.g., uniform and exponential) but also by some parametrization of the Pareto and other distributions.

By selling the service to more than one final good producer, the monopoly realizes the economies of scale resulting from the presence of a fixed cost in the production of the service. This lowers the average unit cost of production which enables the monopoly to set a price low enough to induce some final good producers to outsource and still high enough to make a positive net profit. From (6) it is clear that  $p_\tau$  must satisfy

$$\frac{a}{NG(a + c_\tau - p_\tau)} + c_\tau < p_\tau < a + c_\tau$$

In other words, the size of the market  $N$  has to be large enough for the cost saving due to scale economies to be substantial. Although the price that exists in the outsourcing market is independent of  $N$  (but not of  $q$ ), the viability of such a market depends on whether at the best possible price, net positive profits can be made.

The following example is helpful for motivating the model. Suppose the service in question is a clerical job that requires one computer-skilled person. The final good firm needs to hire one instructor to train this worker. The hiring and firing processes involve a fixed cost. The same instructor, however, can possibly train more than one person *simultaneously* without incurring additional costs. In this example, it is the combination of a fixed cost and excess capacity (of the instructor) that gives rise to returns to scale. This is precisely the feature being exploited by temporary employment agencies: they train their workers in basic computer skills and offer them to firms at a cost lower than it would have cost the firm to train the workers itself.

More generally, and in a temporal setting, some tasks are performed infrequently by firms (training, repairs, maintenance, bookkeeping, etc.). If such tasks are performed by dedicated employees of the firm, these workers will be idle substantial amounts of time. If such tasks are performed at different times in different firms, the outsourcing firm can perform all of these tasks and charge a lower price than the in-house cost because it uses the *same* workers *continuously*, thereby lowering the average fixed cost of production.

Technological diffusion provides another example of the economies to scale that can arise in this context. Suppose now that not all firms adopt the new technologies at the same time. Some firms adopt the  $\tau^{th}$  innovation at  $\tau T$  and the rest adopt  $T$  periods later, at  $(\tau + 1)T$  (we assume that the supplier can keep the innovation for  $2T$  periods). Thus, we have early and late adopters: diffusion of the  $\tau$  technology. In this situation, the service provider spreads the same fixed costs over a longer period of time than the individual firm,  $2T$  instead of  $T$ .

In an industry with  $N$  identical producers, the amount of service outsourced as a share of final good output is

$$\frac{D(a, c_\tau)}{Nq} \equiv \sigma(a, c_\tau) = \alpha G(a + c_\tau - p(a, c_\tau)) \quad (9)$$

where  $p(a, c_\tau)$  is the the equilibrium price.

The effect of a change in the unit fixed cost  $a = \frac{A+\zeta}{\alpha q}$  on the share of outsourcing is straightforward. In the Appendix we prove the following proposition

**Proposition 2** *Under the conditions of Proposition 1 we have*

$$\frac{d\sigma(a, c_\tau)}{da} \geq 0$$

An increase in the unit fixed cost  $a$  makes in-house production less attractive. Thus, demand for outsourcing increases. Since the marginal cost of the provider is constant, the quantity outsourced increases.<sup>12</sup> This result generates two predictions. First, the production scale  $q$  of the final good producers affects the level of outsourcing

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<sup>12</sup>Without additional restrictions on  $G$  we do not know what happens to price. We do know, however, that if it increases it increases by less than the change in  $a$ . See the appendix.

(through  $a$ ). Larger final good producers have lower unit fixed costs in the production of the service and this makes outsourcing less attractive. This means that industries with larger firms should exhibit lower outsourcing shares.<sup>13</sup> This prediction is verified by the Abraham and Taylor (1996) study on firms' use of outside contractors: in four out of the five services analyzed (machine maintenance services, engineering and drafting services, accounting services and computer services) economies of scale are an important factor in the decision to contract out.<sup>14</sup>

Second, an increase in the fixed production cost  $\zeta$  makes outsourcing more attractive. As a result quantity outsourced increases. Autor (2002) argues that part of the trend towards outsourcing of labor services by hiring workers through employment agencies can be explained by the increasingly higher costs of firing in-house workers. This argument is captured in our model by increases in  $\zeta$  over time.

## 4 Technological Change and Outsourcing

How does technological change in the production of the service affect outsourcing? Uniqueness of the solution to (8) in Proposition 1 implies that any change in the marginal cost of production  $c$  is matched by a corresponding change in price. This keeps the price margin  $p_\tau - c_\tau$  constant. This observation implies that the level of technology  $\tau$  and the share of outsourcing are independent.

Because of a constant price margin, the set of outsourcing firms, i.e., those satisfying  $u \leq a + c_\tau - p_\tau$ , does not change as technology improves over time. Demand for outsourcing is constant over technology states (and time). Even though the final good producers produce the service at a lower cost due to the improvement in technology and, consequently, their demand for outsourcing declines with  $\tau$ , the service supplier also re-

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<sup>13</sup>The total quantity of services outsourced, however, may be larger in industries with larger firms because, even though less firms are outsourcing, those that do outsource, outsource a larger amount of the service.

<sup>14</sup>However, Ono (2000) finds that larger plants are more likely to outsource. She points out that this may indicate the possible existence of economies of scale arising from the fixed costs in service transactions, such as contract costs. Or it may indicate that larger plants may have more power in negotiating prices with service providers.

duces its production cost. The new equilibrium price declines by the same amount as the decline in the marginal cost of producing the service and therefore the incentives to outsource do not change. This means that the level of technology has no effect on the quantity of service outsourced.<sup>15</sup>

Even though the *level* of technology has no intrinsic implications for outsourcing, the *pace* at which technology evolves does. As the pace of technological change is accelerated,  $T$  decreases and  $a$  increases. Thus, the per-period unit cost of producing in-house increases and this shifts the demand for outsourcing outwards at any price. Shortening the time horizon of the new technology increases its per-period fixed costs making them more expensive to use. The final good firm is faced with an increase in the marginal cost of a make-or-buy decision. The supplier of the service, on the other hand, does not face any change in its marginal cost of producing the service. Thus the equilibrium quantity of outsourcing increases.

Thus it is not the level of the technology per-se but the frequency of its arrival that matters. This is the channel through which technological change affects outsourcing. The incentives to outsource are magnified the faster technologies change because, through outsourcing, the firm can use the latest technologies without incurring the fixed costs of adopting them.

We summarize the two results in

**Proposition 3** *The level of technology in the production of the service does not affect outsourcing, but a faster pace of technological change increases outsourcing.*

If technological improvements are more frequent in bookkeeping than in janitorial services then, ceteris paribus, the share of bookkeeping outsourcing will be larger. If improvements arrive at the same speed, and all other parameters are equal, the outsourcing shares of both services should also be the same even though the technological level in bookkeeping may be higher than in janitorial services. Because different services rely on

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<sup>15</sup>This is because both sides of the market face the same cost reductions. Of course, this not need be the case. If, as Porter (1998) puts it: “Outside specialists are often more cost effective and responsive than in-house units...”, then they may be more likely to adopt the latest technologies and outsourcing will be more attractive.



different technologies, and these may have been diffusing at different speeds, the model can potentially explain different time patterns in outsourcing.

The Censuses of Manufactures provide information on eight Selected Purchased Services: repair of buildings and other structures, repair of machinery, communication services, legal services, accounting and bookkeeping services, advertising, software and data processing services, and refuse removal. The data are available at the four-digit SIC level in 1992 and at the seven-digit NAICS level in 1997.<sup>16</sup> Table 1 shows the ratio of purchased services to total value added in 1992 and 1997 averaged across industries while the third column reports the change in the outsourcing shares between 1992 and 1997. The manufacturing sector’s spending on outsourced services as a percentage of value-added more than doubled during that five-year period. Spending on some services increased at an even faster rate, notably accounting and bookkeeping services and communication services where the increases are 14 and 8 times, respectively, in just five years! Our model predicts that we should observe a positive correlation between the pace of technological change in service production and expenditures on the outsourcing of those services. Unfortunately, we are unable to test this prediction because time-series data on changes in the IT-intensity of the various services listed in Table 1 are not available.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>1992 is the earliest year for which detailed data on purchased services are provided. 1992 data were classified based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system rather than the new North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) used in 1997. We aggregated both datasets to four-digit SIC, following the Census guidelines to “bridge” between the NAICS and SIC codes. Weights for aggregation were based on value of shipments.

<sup>17</sup>The only available data on IT investments by service producers for both 1992 and 1997 are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s report “Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods 1925-2001”. But the service categories from the Census of Manufacturers are much more detailed than the categories used by the BEA making it impossible to identify changes in IT-intensity for the detailed services shown in Table 1 (the exceptions are legal services and telephone services). For example, in the BEA, the category “Business Services” includes advertising services and computer programming services, but it also includes consumer credit reporting agencies, mailing, reproduction, commercial art, photography and stenographic services, services to dwellings, miscellaneous equipment rental and leasing, and personnel supply services. The category “Other Services” includes accounting and bookkeeping services, museums, botanical and zoological gardens, membership organizations, engineering and management services, and private households. “Miscellaneous Repair Services” includes machinery services, TV and radio repairs, electric equipment repairs, watch repairs, and furniture services.

## 5 Users' Technology and Outsourcing

Another channel through which technological change can affect outsourcing is through improvements in the technologies used by final good firms. One of the distinguishing features of modern economies during the past two decades is the development and adoption of innovations in the area of information technology (IT). Here we analyze whether investment in IT by final good firms is conducive to more outsourcing.

The use of computer technology is pervasive across all sectors of the modern economy. Many aspects of the technology are essentially similar across firms and industries and this is changing the nature and numbers of jobs within economic organizations.<sup>18</sup> Thus, an important feature of the new information technologies of the 1990s is that they are relatively intensive in their requirement of *general* skills; skills that can be easily transferred across firms and sectors (e.g., database programmers). The IT content of both the services and of the production technology at the firms using the services generates a *technological compatibility* between the firm's use of its *own* technology and the ability to use *others'* technologies.

For our purposes, we interpret the effects of IT as inducing changes in the distribution of the adjustment costs,  $u$ . We denote the technology used by the final good firm in production by an index  $\omega$  such that the higher  $\omega$ , the higher the IT content of the firm's production technology.<sup>19</sup> The distribution of adjustment cost  $u$  is now parameterized by  $\omega$ ,

$$G(u; \omega)$$

The notion of technological compatibility leads to the hypothesis that *more IT-intensive firms face (stochastically) lower adjustment costs of outsourcing*,

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<sup>18</sup>This should be contrasted to past innovations which affected specific occupations and industries. Machine tool automation, for example, affected production jobs in manufacturing only (McConnell, 1996).

<sup>19</sup>Thus, we differentiate between the technology used in the production of the service, previously denoted by  $\tau$ , and the technology level of the final good producer,  $\omega$ . The level of the service technology may also be assumed to have an effect on the distribution of adjustment costs but we abstract from this here since we do not have technology data at the service level and, therefore, cannot test these assumptions. Recall, however, that the implications of changes in  $\tau$  were analyzed through the induced changes in  $c$ .

$$\frac{\partial G(u; \omega)}{\partial \omega} \geq 0 \quad (10)$$

Inequality (10) implies that demand for outsourcing a given service increases with the IT content of final good producers. For some services, i.e., janitorial services, technological advances may not confer any cost advantages, i.e.,

$$\frac{\partial G(u; \omega)}{\partial \omega} = 0$$

For these type of services, there should not be significant variations in the share of outsourcing across firms differing in their technological level (after controlling for all other factors affecting demand). Nor should there be any significant variation over time as the firm invests in IT. On the other hand, the demand for services such as labor outsourcing via employment agencies that provide workers with computing and other general skills should increase over time as these workers are bundled with more IT and the final producers themselves rely on more IT-based technologies. In other words, the plausible complementarity between the IT-level of the service and the IT-level of the user implies that the reduction in user costs is larger for more IT-intensive services.

Let  $\theta = (a, c, \omega)$  be the vector of parameters and  $p(\theta)$  the equilibrium price of the service. Obviously, the equilibrium analysis is the same as in the previous Section. We are now interested in examining the change in the outsourced share when the users' technology changes. In general, the effect of the technology parameters cannot be signed because (10) imposes no restrictions on the change in the slope of the demand function. We therefore assume that the proportional increase in  $G$  due to an increase in  $\omega$  increases with  $u$  or, equivalently, decreases with  $p$ . More precisely, we assume that for  $\omega' > \omega$  and  $u' > u$ ,  $G$  satisfies the *Monotone Probability Ratio*

$$\frac{G(u'; \omega')}{G(u'; \omega)} \geq \frac{G(u; \omega')}{G(u; \omega)} \quad \text{for all } u \in [0, a] \quad (11)$$

That is, the proportional change in  $G$  caused by an increase in  $\omega$  is non-decreasing in  $u$ , at least for  $u \in [0, a]$ . This is a plausible assumption because all cumulative density

functions pass through 0 at  $u = 0$  irrespective of the value of the parameter  $\omega$ . As  $u$  increases, the difference between the cumulative density functions must increase in the neighborhood of 0. We require that the increase is large enough so as to guarantee a *proportional* increase. This property has to hold only in a part of the support of  $u$ , namely  $[0, a]$ . Because the difference between the cumulative density functions tends to disappear as  $u$  approaches infinity we need to think of  $a$  as being well below that point.

The outsourcing share is

$$\sigma(\theta) = \alpha G(a + c_\tau - p(\theta); \tau, \omega) \quad (12)$$

**Proposition 4** *Under assumption (11), price decreases with  $\omega$  and outsourcing increases with  $\omega$ .*

See the Appendix for a proof. Intuitively, when  $\omega$  changes the only effect is an increase in demand; the marginal cost curve of the service provider does not change. Thus, the outsourced share increases. Because the increase in  $\omega$  “brings in” more firms in the higher range of adjustment cost it pays the service provider to lower prices and service these firms.

Notice that (11) is a sufficient condition. In the Appendix we present an example where the weak inequality in (11) is not satisfied but nevertheless the price decreases and outsourcing increases.

Is there any empirical evidence that more IT-intensive final goods producers are more likely to purchase outside services? We examine this issue using the industry-level data from the 1992 and 1997 Censuses of Manufactures. Our basic estimating equation is:

$$(\textit{Purchased Service})_{ijt} = X_{ijt}\beta + \delta IT_{it} + \mu_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (13)$$

where  $IT_{it}$  is a measure of the information technology intensity in industry  $i$  at time period  $t$ , subscript  $j$  is a service index,  $X_{ijt}$  is a vector of control variables, and  $\mu_{ij}$  is an industry-service fixed effect.

Although in our theoretical model the firm makes an all-or-nothing decision concerning the outsourcing of any given service, our data only report industry level spending on various services. We therefore use as our dependent variable the log of average dollars per firm spent in industry  $i$  on service  $j$  at time  $t$  and account for scale effects by including the log of value added in the industry as an independent variable. We recognize that a preferred empirical measure of outsourcing would be the industry's expenditures on the outsourcing of a given service as a percentage of total expenditures on that service (in-house and outsourced combined). Unfortunately, such data are not available and our dependent variable may reflect inter-industry heterogeneity that is unrelated to heterogeneity in outsourcing. Hence, we may be less likely to find a significant relationship between outsourcing expenditures and technological change. In order to account for industry fixed effects that may be correlated with the regressors, we also estimate the model in first differences.

Our main independent variable is the IT-intensity of the industry. We measure IT-intensity by using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) detailed data on capital investment and calculate the ratio of IT investment to total capital investment.<sup>20</sup> IT investment includes computer hardware (mainframes, personal computers, storage devices, printers, terminals, tape drives and integrated systems) and computer software (prepackaged, custom, and own-account). These data are available on a two-digit SIC level only. Because the dependent variable is at the four-digit SIC level, we allow for arbitrary correlation in  $\varepsilon_{ijt}$  (or  $\mu_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$ ) within groups of industries belonging to the same two-digit SIC classification by computing standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC classification. In our cross-sectional analysis for 1992, we are also able to use an alternative measure of IT-intensity available at the four-digit SIC level. This variable, the ratio of investments in computers divided by total investments in new machinery and equipment, can be calculated from the 1992 Census of Manufacturers but was not available in 1997.

The vector  $X$  contains a variety of variables that are likely to affect spending on

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<sup>20</sup>Stiroh (2002) used these data to compare the productivity effects of IT capital and non-IT capital.

outsourcing. The variables, discussed in detail in the Data Appendix, are: (1) value-added; (2) the share of wage payments in total value added; (3) a proxy for the seasonality of the industry’s workload; (4) annual payroll divided by the number of employees in the four-digit industry, calculated from the Census of Manufacturers; (5) average years of schooling in the three-digit industry; (6) percentage of workers in the industry who are unionized; (7) the Herfindahl–Hirshman index; and (8) the average number of employees per establishment, calculated from the Census of Manufacturers.

Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients of the IT-intensity variable in equation (13) estimated separately for each of the eight purchased services in each year (1992 and 1997) and in first differences.<sup>21</sup> Two sets of results are reported for 1992: column (1) uses the data from the Census of Manufacturers to calculate the industry’s IT-intensity while column (2) uses the data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the cross-sectional regressions, we do observe positive effects (although not always significant) for those services where we would expect that an increased use of IT by final goods producers will reduce the adjustment costs of outsourcing business services such as communications, legal services, accounting and bookkeeping, advertising and software. The adjustment costs of outsourcing services such as buildings repair, machine repair and refuse services are unlikely to be affected by the final goods producer’s use of IT and we should not observe any IT effect there. In fact, for these services we observe negative and significant IT effects which are not consistent with the model’s predictions.

The latter cross-sectional finding may be due to the fact that more traditional industries have relatively large shares of these services but lower investments in IT. Estimating equation (13) in first differences controls for this and other types of unobserved industry effects. The results are now in line with the model’s predictions: the outsourcing of communications, accounting and bookkeeping, and software services are positively and significantly related to the IT-intensity of the using firm. These are precisely the services where one would expect (10) to hold in a strict sense. The number of negative IT coefficients is greatly reduced and none is significantly different from zero. Specifically,

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<sup>21</sup>The coefficients on the other variables in equation (13) are shown in Appendix Tables 2-a through 2-c.

and as expected, the outsourcing of buildings repair, machine repair and refuse services are unrelated to the IT-intensity of the final goods producer.

To gain an idea of the magnitude of the effects, consider the following thought experiment using the coefficients from the first-difference specification in Table 2 (see Appendix Table 1 for means and standard deviations). A one standard deviation increase in the first-difference value of IT-intensity (or 3.84 percentage points) leads to an increase in first-difference log expenditures on outsourced communication services of .1044 (measured in thousands of dollars), or 13 percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Similar calculations for the outsourcing of accounting/bookkeeping services and software services result in impacts that each equal 8 percent of the standard deviations of the dependent variable.

The coefficients on the other variables in equation (13) are shown in the Appendix Tables 2a – 2c. Focusing on the first difference results in Table 2c, we see that the only variables that are significant are “Seasonality” and the “Wage Share”. The latter variable was used to control for the fact that industries that are more labor-intensive will be more likely to outsource labor; it is positive and significant in seven of the nine regressions. Seasonality is positive and significant for five services (building repair, machine repair, legal services, advertising and refuse services). These are the services for which IT-intensity did not have a significant effect; the decision to outsource these services appears to be driven by the seasonality of demand for the industry’s product.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper we propose that an important source of the recent increase in labor outsourcing among manufacturing firms is technological change. We develop a model that shows that the level of technology in the service industry alone (i.e., the introduction of lower cost technology) cannot predict an increase in outsourcing without making additional assumptions. We show, however, that an increase in the *pace* of technological change will increase outsourcing. The lack of data on the pace of technological change across services prevents us from testing directly this prediction.

Technological change in the using firms, however, can have an effect on outsourcing if it can reduce the adjustment costs of outsourcing. This is particularly important because the recent wave of technological change based on new information technologies of the 1990s is relatively intensive in its requirement of *general* skills; skills that can be easily transferred across firms and sectors. We posit that the IT content of both the services and of the production technology at the firms using the services generates a *technological compatibility* between the firm's use of its *own* technology and the ability to use *others'* technologies. This compatibility tends to reduce the adjustment costs of outsourcing, thereby increasing the demand for outsourced services. We test this prediction using data from the 1992 and 1997 Censuses of Manufacturers. Consistent with our model, we find that as final good producers increase their reliance on IT, they are more likely to purchase outside services.

These findings are potentially important because they imply that labor outsourcing will increase over time as information technology becomes more pervasive in the economy. Our empirical analysis is based on the available industry-level data which are not ideal for our purposes. We view our empirical findings as suggestive evidence which needs to be refined once better data on outsourcing and technological change become available.



**Table 1. Industry Average Spending on Outsourcing\***

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<b>Type of Service</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1997</b>	$\frac{1997}{1992}$
<i>All Purchased Services</i>	4.25%	10.68%	2.51
<i>Accounting &amp; Bookkeeping</i>	0.14%	1.95%	13.93
<i>Communications</i>	0.35%	2.82%	8.06
<i>Advertising</i>	0.87%	2.41%	2.77
<i>Refuse Services</i>	0.33%	0.43%	1.30
<i>Software Services</i>	0.28%	0.35%	1.25
<i>Machine Repair</i>	1.69%	2.09%	1.24
<i>Legal Services</i>	0.28%	0.32%	1.14
<i>Buildings Repair</i>	0.40%	0.32%	0.80

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\*As percentage of total value added

**Table 2. The Effects of IT Intensity on Different Purchased Services**

Type of Service	Industry level regressions (equation (13))			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1992 (4-digit IT measure)	1992	1997	Differenced Data (1997 - 1992)
<i>All Purchased Services</i>	-.589 (.365)	-.951* (.538)	-.912* (.494)	.482 (.932)
<i>Buildings Repair</i>	-1.34** (.594)	-1.52*** (.636)	-1.26*** (.504)	-.021 (1.18)
<i>Machine Repair</i>	-4.09*** (.725)	-3.78*** (1.08)	-2.88*** (.927)	-.972 (834)
<i>Communications</i>	1.25*** (.391)	.718** (.356)	1.37*** (.428)	2.72*** (1.02)
<i>Legal Services</i>	1.15* (.621)	.687 (.731)	.520 (.544)	.891 (1.33)
<i>Accounting &amp; Bookkeeping</i>	.958** (.476)	.164 (.305)	.616 (.426)	2.08* (1.28)
<i>Advertising</i>	3.54*** (.952)	4.08*** (.744)	2.49*** (.776)	.311 (1.21)
<i>Software Services</i>	2.36*** (.523)	1.727*** (.536)	1.47*** (.566)	2.16* (1.19)
<i>Refuse Services</i>	-4.44*** (.737)	-4.69*** (.765)	-2.46*** (.819)	1.08 (2.56)

Notes: Data source for IT-intensity in col. (1) is 1992 Census of Manufacturers. In all other columns, the data source is the BEA. IT intensity is measured as the ratio of IT investment to total capital investment. The dependent variable is in logs. Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parentheses.

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

## Appendix

### A Data Appendix

The main data sources for our empirical analysis are the 1992 and 1997 Annual Surveys of Manufactures. The 1992 data were classified based on the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system rather than the new North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) used in 1997. We aggregated both data sets into 4-digit SIC, following the Census guidelines to “bridge” between the NAICS and SIC codes. Weights for aggregations were based on value of shipment.

The original 1997 file is extracted from a CD produced by the Census Bureau (E9731I3) “Manufacturing: Detailed Statistics by Industry, 1997”. The universe of this file is “all operating establishments with one or more paid employees primarily engaged in manufacturing”. This universe includes all establishments classified in the manufacturing North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS), Codes 311111 through 339999. The data are shown at the 6-digit NAICS code level, and for selected industries at the 7-digit (sub-industry) level. The file E97b1.dta (obtained from the census web site) was used to collapse this data into 4-digit SIC code. A weight was computed using the variable "value".

The data contains detailed industry statistics, including data on the number of establishments, employment, payroll, materials, value of shipments, value added, inventories, assets, and capital expenditures. The statistics on Purchased Services were collected on a sampled basis, and are therefore subject to sampling errors.

The original 1992 file is extracted from several files produced by the Census Bureau. The data files were: Supplemental Statistics, ASM, Assets, and Industry Statistics from Manufacturing Industries. The 1992 data is aggregated at a 4-digit SIC code.

Once the 1992 and the 1997 data were merged by 4-digit SIC codes, they were further collapsed into 3-digit and 2-digit formats, using values of shipments as weights in order to allow matching with variables that were available at different levels of aggre-

gations. Our main data set is, however, at 4-digit SIC level of aggregation.

In 1997 we exclude NAICS 323110 (Commercial lithographic printing), which is linked to the following SIC codes: 2752, 2771, and 3999. The values for most services in this industry seem to be in error. The census bureau confirmed our observation.

### **Definition of Purchased Services**

Establishments responding to the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) were asked to provide information on the cost of purchased services for: (1) the repair of buildings and other structures, (2) the repair of machinery, (3) communication services, (4) legal services, (5) accounting and bookkeeping services, (6) advertising, (7) software and other data processing services, and (8) refuse removal. Each of these items reflects the costs paid directly by the establishment and excludes salaries paid to employees of the establishment for these services. The data on purchased services, as well as other variables that are reported in dollar terms are in units of thousands of dollars. In the regression analyses a log transformation was used.

Included in the cost of purchased services for the repair of buildings and machinery are payments made for all maintenance and repair work on buildings and equipment. Payments made to other establishments of the same company and for repair and maintenance of any leased property also are included. Extensive repairs or reconstruction that was capitalized is considered capital expenditures and is, therefore, excluded from this item.

Repair and maintenance costs provided by an owner as part of a rental contract or incurred directly by an establishment in using its own work force also are excluded.

Included in the cost of purchased advertising services are payments for printing, media coverage, and other advertising services and materials. Included in the cost of purchased software and other data processing services are all purchases by the establishment from other companies.

Excluded are services provided by other establishments of the same company (such as by a separate data processing unit). Included in the cost of purchased refuse removal services are all costs of refuse removal services paid by the establishment, including costs for hazardous waste removal or treatment. Excluded are all costs included in rental

payments or as capital expenditures.

### Measuring IT-intensity

We use the US bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) report on “Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods 1925-2001”. This publication reports, among other things, “fixed investment” which denote any addition to fixed reproducible tangible wealth. We calculate the ratio of investment in IT related items to total investment, excluding investment in buildings and structure. The table below lists all the items that are included in this calculation. This variable is aggregated at the 2 digit SIC level (We have 20 manufacturing industries at this level of aggregation).

<b>IT related</b>	<b>Other</b>	
Mainframe computers	Communication equipment	Aircraft
Personal computers	Instruments	Ships and boats
Direct access storage devices	Photocopy and related equipment	Railroad equipment
Computer printers	Office and accounting equipment	Household furniture
Computer terminals	Nuclear fuel rods	Other furniture
Computer tape drives	Other fabricated metal products	Farm tractors
Computer storage devices	Steam engines	Construction tractors
Integrated systems	Internal combustion engines	Agricultural machinery, except tractors
Prepackaged software	Metalworking machinery	Construction machinery, except tractors
Custom software	Special industry machinery, n.e.c.	Mining and oilfield machinery
Own-account software	General industrial machinery	Service industry machinery
	Electrical transmission & distribution	Household appliances
	Trucks, buses, and truck trailers	Other electrical equipment, n.e.c.
	Autos	Other nonresidential equipment

In 1992, we also have an alternative measure of IT-intensity available from the Census of Manufacturers, namely, the ratio of investments in computers divided by total investment in new machinery and equipment.

### Additional Variables and Data Sources

Other variables that were obtained from the 1992 and 1997 censuses of manufacturers include:

1. Log of value added: This measure of manufacturing activity is derived by subtracting the cost of materials, supplies, containers, fuel, purchased electricity, and

contract work from the value of shipment (products manufactured plus receipts of service rendered).

2. Employees Per Establishment: Calculated as the average number of production workers obtained at four specific pay periods during the year plus all other workers at one given pay period.
3. Pay per Employee: Annual payroll (excluding fringe benefits) divided by number of employees.
4. Pay per Value Added: Annual payroll divided by value added.
5. Seasonality: We constructed a measure of industry level seasonality following Abraham and Taylor (1996). The data source is BLS, the Current Employment Statistics (CES) database. We first run a regression of log change in employment by industry (using monthly data) on monthly dummies, over ten years period (83-92 for the 92 survey and 83-97 for the 97 data). Then we took the standard deviation of the monthly coefficients by industry, which gives us our measure of seasonality. Using a five years period, instead of ten, didn't alter our results. This variable is computed at 4 digit SIC level for 183 industries and at 3 digit SIC for 260 industries. (We have a total of 458 categories at 4 digit SIC level).
6. Union Membership: Percentage of people unionized in the industry. This variable is aggregated at the 3 digit SIC level for a total of 116 different manufacturing sectors. Source: Union & Earnings Data book (Hirsch and Macpherson, 1997), Compilations from the CPS.
7. Schooling: Average years of schooling. Source: Union & Earnings Data book (Hirsch and Macpherson, 1997), Compilations from the CPS. This variable is aggregated at the 3 digit SIC level for a total of 116 different manufacturing sectors.
8. HHI Index: The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. We use the Census Bureau 1992 and 1997 Census CD's, where the following procedure is used to calculate the index: Summing the squares

of individual company percentages (value of shipments) for the 50 largest companies or the universe, whichever is lower. For 1992 the index is reported at a 4 digit SIC level and for 1997 it is reported at the 6 digit NAICS level. We converted it to SIC by using the bridge procedure outlined by the Census Bureau.

## B Appendix

### B.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Let  $H(p) = (p - c)G(a + c - p)$ . The profit-maximizing price should maximize  $H(p)$  subject to non-negative profits. Let  $z = p - c$  be the price margin. It is easier to analyze the equivalent problem of maximizing  $H(z) = zG(a - z)$ .  $z$  cannot be lower than 0 and cannot be larger than  $a$ —otherwise demand for the service will be zero. Thus, optimal  $z$  should be between 0 and  $a$ . Note that  $H(z)$  increases at  $z = 0$  because  $H'(0) = G(a) > 0$  and is non-increasing at  $z = a$  because  $H'(a) = -ag(0) \leq 0$  using  $G(0) = 0$ . Since  $H(z)$  is continuous in  $[0, a]$  an interior solution exists. This solution satisfies

$$H'(z) = G(a - z) - zg(a - z) = 0 \quad (14)$$

implying

$$z = \frac{G(a - z)}{g(a - z)} \quad (15)$$

Uniqueness of the solution is ensured if  $H(z)$  is strictly concave in  $(0, a)$ , i.e., if

$$H''(z) \equiv \Delta = -2g(a - z) + zg'(a - z) < 0 \quad (16)$$

A sufficient condition for strict concavity is that  $zg(a - z)$  be increasing in  $(0, a)$ .

### B.2 Proof of Proposition 2

$$\frac{d\sigma(a, c)}{da} = \alpha g(a + c - p) \left( 1 - \frac{dp(a, c)}{da} \right)$$

Totally differentiating the first order condition results in

$$\frac{dp(a, c)}{da} = - \frac{g(a + c - p) - (p - c)g'(a + c - p)}{\Delta}$$

where  $\Delta < 0$  from (16).

Moreover

$$1 - \frac{dp(a, c)}{da} = -\frac{g(a + c - p)}{\Delta} \geq 0$$

Combining these results we obtain

$$\frac{d\sigma(a, c)}{da} = -\alpha \frac{g^2(a + c - p)}{\Delta} \geq 0$$

### B.3 Proof of Proposition 4

Let  $p'$  be optimal for  $\omega'$  and  $p$  optimal for  $\omega$ . Assume  $\omega' > \omega$ . Profit maximization implies

$$(p' - c_\tau) G(a + c_\tau - p'; \omega') \geq (p - c_\tau) G(a + c_\tau - p; \omega')$$

$$(p - c_\tau) G(a + c_\tau - p; \tau, \omega) \geq (p' - c_\tau) G(a + c_\tau - p'; \omega)$$

Dividing appropriately we get

$$\frac{G(a + c_\tau - p'; \tau, \omega')}{G(a + c_\tau - p'; \tau, \omega)} \geq \frac{G(a + c_\tau - p; \tau, \omega')}{G(a + c_\tau - p; \tau, \omega)}$$

Suppose  $p' > p$ . Then,  $a + c_\tau - p' < a + c_\tau - p$  and this violates the Monotone Probability Ratio assumption (11). Thus, we must have  $p' \leq p$ .

Because the outsourcing share is proportional to  $G(a + c_\tau - p'; \tau, \omega')$  and  $\omega' > \omega$  and  $p' \leq p$  we get

$$G(a + c_\tau - p'; \tau, \omega') \geq G(a + c_\tau - p'; \tau, \omega) \geq G(a + c_\tau - p; \tau, \omega)$$

That is,  $\sigma(\theta)$  is nondecreasing in  $\omega$ .

## B.4 Two Parametric Examples

### B.4.1 Uniform Distribution

Let  $u$  be uniformly distributed in  $[0, \frac{\bar{u}}{\omega^{\kappa_1} \tau^{\kappa_2}}]$ ,  $\kappa_1, \kappa_2 \geq 0$ . Then  $G(u|\tau, \omega) = \omega^{\kappa_1} \tau^{\kappa_2} \frac{u}{\bar{u}}$  and  $g(u) = \omega^{\kappa_1} \tau^{\kappa_2} \frac{1}{\bar{u}}$  for  $0 \leq u \leq \frac{\bar{u}}{\omega^{\kappa_1} \tau^{\kappa_2}}$ . When  $\kappa_1 = \kappa_2 = 0$  there is no technological effect on



G. Demand is

$$D(\theta) = N\alpha q \omega^{\kappa_1} \tau^{\kappa_2} \frac{1}{\bar{u}} (a + c_\tau - p)$$

and the pricing decision is given by

$$p - c_\tau = a - \left( p - \frac{c}{(1 + \lambda)^\tau} \right) \quad (17)$$

which implies

$$p = c_\tau + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\frac{A}{T} + \zeta}{\alpha q}$$

and the equilibrium level of outsourcing is

$$D(\theta) = N\omega^{\kappa_1} \tau^{\kappa_2} \frac{1}{\bar{u}} \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{A}{T} + \zeta \right)$$

$$\implies \sigma(\theta) = \frac{\omega^{\kappa_1} \tau^{\kappa_2} \frac{1}{\bar{u}} \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{A}{T} + \zeta \right)}{q}$$

Note the following features of this parametrization:

1. The output level of the individual firm  $q$  does not affect *absolute* demand for outsourcing. Although a higher  $q$  decreases the probability of outsourcing it also increases the quantity actually outsourced and both effects cancel each other. Therefore, outsourcing in the industry as a *share* of final output decreases with  $q$ .
2. When there is no technological effect on  $G$  ( $\kappa_1 = \kappa_2 = 0$ ), outsourcing is not affected by  $\tau$  but increases with  $T$ , the speed of technological change (Proposition 3).
3. When  $\kappa_1 > 0$ , outsourcing is higher in industries with a high level of IT (Proposition 4).
4. When  $\kappa_2 > 0$ , outsourcing is higher in services with a high level of IT.
5. There are complementarities between the final producer's and the service's level of IT in the sense that

$$\frac{\partial^2 \sigma(\theta)}{\partial \omega \partial \tau} = \frac{\sigma(\theta)}{\kappa_1 \kappa_2 \omega \tau} \geq 0$$

### B.4.2 A More Flexible Distribution

Let  $G(u) = b(ku - \underline{u})^\gamma$  where all parameters  $\underline{u}$ ,  $k$ ,  $b$ , and  $\gamma$  are non-negative and  $\frac{\underline{u}}{k} \leq u \leq \left(\frac{\underline{u}}{k} + \frac{b^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{k}\right)^\frac{1}{\gamma}$ .<sup>22</sup> The equilibrium price satisfies

$$p - c_\tau = \frac{1}{\gamma} \left( \frac{\frac{A}{T} + \zeta}{\alpha q} + c_\tau - p - \frac{\underline{u}}{k} \right)$$

implying

$$p(\theta) = c_\tau + \frac{1}{1 + \gamma} \left( \frac{\frac{A}{T} + \zeta}{\alpha q} - \frac{\underline{u}}{k} \right)$$

$$\sigma(\theta) = \alpha b \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma} \right)^\gamma \left( k \frac{\frac{A}{T} + \zeta}{\alpha q} - \underline{u} \right)^\gamma$$

The effect of changes in technology is introduced by letting the parameter  $k$  be an increasing functions of  $\omega$  and  $\tau$ . After a suitable parametrization of  $k$ , outsourcing in this more general example has the same properties as in the previous case. Alternatively, we can let  $b$  be an increasing function of  $\omega$  and  $\tau$ . Interestingly,  $G$  does not satisfy the monotone probability ratio with respect to changes in  $k$ . Nevertheless, price declines with  $k$  while outsourced quantity increases.

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<sup>22</sup>The density function  $g(u) = bk\gamma(ku - \underline{u})^{\gamma-1}$  is quite flexible. When  $\gamma = 1$ , the uniform distribution results. When  $\gamma < 1$ , the density is declining in  $u$  and when  $\gamma > 1$  it is increasing in  $u$ .

## C Additional Tables

**Appendix Table 1. Selected Means**

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	<b>1992</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1997-1992</b>
IT Intensity	.153 (.0095)	.237 (.132)	.0839 (.0384)
<b>Ln Expenditures (in thousands of \$)</b>			
<i>Buildings Repair</i>	8.4597 (1.347)	8.63 (1.42)	.2196 (.753)
<i>Machine Repair</i>	9.86 (1.41)	10.02 (1.53)	.165 (.655)
<i>Communications</i>	8.59 (1.187)	8.67 (1.51)	.123 (.809)
<i>Legal Services</i>	8.149 (1.357)	8.08 (1.55)	-.0028 (.915)
<i>Accounting &amp; Bookkeeping</i>	7.674 (1.228)	7.659 (1.546)	.0059 (.995)
<i>Advertising</i>	8.795 (1.709)	8.75 (1.948)	.0696 (1.06)
<i>Software Services</i>	7.828 (1.449)	7.94 (1.728)	.209 (.995)
<i>Refuse Services</i>	8.044 (1.46)	8.038 (1.568)	.024 (.91)

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Notes:

IT intensity is measured as the ratio of IT investment to total capital investment

**Appendix Table 2-a: Estimated Coefficients of Additional Regressors**

	1992 - OLS Regression Results							
	Union	AvgSal	Educ	Seas	Hhind	Firm Size	Wage Share	Obs. (R <sup>2</sup> )
All Purchased Services	.007** (.0036)	.016** (.008)	.044 (.078)	.031 (1.28)	-.0003** (.00005)	.00005 (.0002)	-.087 (.575)	357 (.865)
Buildings Repair	.0044 (.005)	.022*** (.008)	.030 (.96)	-1.56 (1.97)	.00002 (.00006)	.00012 (.0002)	1.49*** (.498)	350 (.831)
Machine Repair	.0099 (.007)	.040*** (.014)	-.104 (.190)	-.858 (2.70)	-.00012 (.0001)	-.0004 (.0003)	-.237 (1.10)	351 (.749)
Commun.	-.0035 (.0025)	.0017 (.0057)	.157*** (.044)	-2.89*** (1.16)	-.0003*** (.00006)	-.0001 (.0002)	1.54*** (.580)	347 (.881)
Legal Services	.0097 (.0062)	.0022 (.0124)	.222*** (.106)	-.872 (2.05)	-.00054*** (.00007)	.00008 (.0001)	1.71*** (.640)	351 (.773)
Accounting & Bookkeeping	-.0003 (.006)	-.009 (.010)	.091 (.064)	.329 (1.70)	-.0005*** (.00009)	-.0006* (.0003)	2.21*** (.374)	345 (.678)
Advertising	.0129 (.010)	-.071*** (.016)	.290** (.132)	4.98 (3.81)	-.0006*** (.00017)	-.0004 (.0003)	-2.54*** (.881)	344 (.583)
Software Services	.0045 (.0048)	.029*** (.0097)	.061 (.066)	-4.16*** (1.72)	-.00018* (.0001)	.0008*** (.0002)	2.182*** (.770)	343 (.785)
Refuse Services	.009 (.008)	.029 (.018)	.078 (.103)	-2.25 (1.79)	.0001 (.00008)	-.0007*** (.0002)	2.047* (1.11)	348 (.746)

Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis.

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.

Not reported are the coefficients of IT intensity, value added, and the constant term

**Appendix Table 2-b: Estimated Coefficients of Additional Regressors**

	1997 - OLS Regression Results							
	Union	AvgSal	Educ	Seas	Hhind	Firm Size	Wage Share	Obs. (R <sup>2</sup> )
All Purchased Services	.002 (.004)	.019*** (.005)	.079 (.084)	1.55 (1.18)	-.0002*** (.00007)	.00002 (.0004)	.885 (.537)	350 (.862)
Buildings Repair	.0007 (.005)	.027*** (.007)	.0145 (.070)	-1.08 (1.96)	-.00013 (.00009)	.0002 (.0004)	1.61*** (.414)	348 (.832)
Machine Repair	.0075 (.008)	.037*** (.011)	-.150 (.189)	-1.28 (3.93)	-.0002 (.00013)	.0003 (.0006)	.630 (.854)	347 (.751)
Commun.	.0027 (.0049)	.0028 (.0049)	.123*** (.055)	-1.17 (1.18)	-.0002*** (.00008)	-.0013*** (.0003)	2.289*** (.573)	350 (.829)
Legal Services	-.0002 (.0046)	.0028 (.007)	.255*** (.101)	.982 (1.80)	-.0003*** (.00013)	-.0003 (.0006)	2.856*** (.874)	347 (.748)
Accounting & Bookkeeping	-.001 (.005)	-.010 (.007)	.185** (.089)	2.27 (1.96)	-.00047*** (.0001)	-.0019*** (.0008)	3.016*** (.435)	349 (.736)
Advertising	.0066 (.101)	-.058*** (.017)	.448*** (.180)	6.75 (5.53)	-.0004*** (.00014)	-.0033*** (.0008)	-1.11 (1.31)	350 (.614)
Software Services	.0034 (.004)	.024*** (.005)	.181* (.094)	-.036 (1.64)	-.0002* (.00011)	-.0002 (.0006)	3.53*** (.918)	349 (.784)
Refuse Services	.005 (.005)	.0306*** (.0089)	.0259 (.118)	.412 (2.65)	-.00019 (.00014)	.00012 (.0006)	1.803** (.898)	349 (.768)

Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis.

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.

Not reported are the coefficients of IT intensity, value added, and the constant term

**Appendix Table 2-c: Estimated Coefficients of Various Variables**

	1997-1992, First Differences Regression Results							
	Union	AvgSal	Educ	Seas	Hhind	Firm Size	Wage Share	Obs. (R <sup>2</sup> )
All Purchased Services	.0025 (.0055)	.0021 (.012)	.054 (.078)	34.1*** (11.98)	-.00016 (.00016)	-.00014 (.0005)	2.87*** (.587)	336 (.349)
Buildings Repair	.006 (.013)	-.0026 (.020)	.265*** (.105)	18.55* (10.95)	.00016 (.00013)	-.00017 (.0006)	3.86*** (.958)	330 (.289)
Machine Repair	-.013** (.006)	-.005 (.013)	.147* (.083)	28.8** (14.7)	-.00001 (.0001)	.00065* (.00037)	2.34*** (.499)	329 (.337)
Commun.	.0043 (.006)	-.0064 (.013)	-.041 (.103)	17.4 (22.1)	-.00004 (.0001)	.0002 (.0006)	2.59*** (1.03)	326 (.276)
Legal Services	.0012 (.008)	-.0046 (.016)	-.145 (.130)	39.6** (18.8)	-.00016* (.00009)	.0009 (.00068)	2.84*** (.819)	328 (.173)
Accounting & Bookkeeping	-.004 (.009)	.006 (.025)	-.110 (.196)	49.55 (35.97)	.00005 (.0001)	-.00014 (.0005)	1.42 (.956)	324 (.076)
Advertising	.003 (.007)	.010 (.031)	-.012 (.23)	58.8** (27.5)	-.0003 (.00026)	.001 (.001)	1.44 (1.05)	324 (.158)
Software Services	-.009 (.010)	.008 (.031)	-.436** (.209)	30.7 (30.4)	-.0000 (.0001)	-.001 (.0008)	4.78*** (.719)	322 (.248)
Refuse Services	-.002 (.011)	-.015 (.018)	-.001 (.217)	44.97** (20.25)	-.0002 (.00015)	.00023 (.0008)	2.70*** (.547)	328 (.230)

Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis.

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.

Not reported are the coefficients of IT intensity, value added, and the constant term

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