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AND ATTITUDES DURING  
POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION  
CZECH REPUBLIC 1990-98**

Orla Doyle and Jan Fidrmuc

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**Orla Doyle**, Trinity College, Dublin  
**Jan Fidrmuc**, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles and CEPR

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Centre for Economic Policy Research  
90–98 Goswell Rd, London EC1V 7RR, UK  
Tel: (44 20) 7878 2900, Fax: (44 20) 7878 2999  
Email: [cepr@cepr.org](mailto:cepr@cepr.org), Website: [www.cepr.org](http://www.cepr.org)

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## ABSTRACT

### Anatomy of Voting Behaviour and Attitudes During Post-Communist Transition Czech Republic 1990-98\*

How does implementing harsh economic reforms influence voting behaviour? And how do the patterns of political support change over the course of transition? We analyse these issues using data from a sequence of 11 opinion surveys conducted in the Czech Republic between 1990-98. We find that, while voters' ideological position and some socio-economic characteristics, such as age and education tend to have a stable impact on voting behaviour over time, economic outcomes, such as employment status, income and unemployment, only affect political preferences in the later stages of the transition. This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature on political constraints during transition – as the uncertainty about reform's outcomes dissipates, constituencies of winners and losers emerge. The winners are the young, educated, high-wage earners and workers employed in *de novo* private firms. The losers, on the other hand, are the elderly, low-skilled and low-wage workers and the unemployed. The balance between these two constituencies then determines the support for reform-minded and left-wing parties at election time.

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Orla Doyle  
Department of Economics  
Trinity College Dublin  
Dublin 2  
IRELAND  
Email: [odoyle@tcd.ie](mailto:odoyle@tcd.ie)

Jan Fidrmuc  
ECARES  
Université Libre de Bruxelles  
CP 114  
1050 Bruxelles  
BELGIUM  
Tel: (32 2) 650 4462  
Fax: (32 2) 650 3369  
Email: [jfidrmuc@ulb.ac.be](mailto:jfidrmuc@ulb.ac.be)

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# 1 Introduction

The breakdown of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s gave rise to a period of political, economic and social transformation during which unprecedented liberties and rights were bestowed on their citizens. The right to cast their votes in free and democratic elections was the most notable of them. In this respect, the experiences of the post-communist countries are unique. While democratic elections are a routine and often mundane occurrence in developed countries, for most citizens of the former communist countries the opportunity to influence political outcomes through democratic and free elections was a brand new experience. Moreover, the stakes during post-communist elections are very high, as each election could potentially alter the course of transition from state socialism to a market economy and have other far-reaching economic and political implications. Indeed, the first decade after the fall of communism brought about not only dramatic and turbulent economic developments but also political instability, break-ups of countries, coup d'états, resurgence of authoritarian regimes and military conflicts. Many of these events were directly or indirectly shaped by the underlying political developments and outcomes of post-communist elections in particular.

The transition experience thus provides a rare opportunity to witness and analyze a new political equilibrium. An important question in this context is how economic events affect political attitudes and voting behavior, and how this relationship between economics and politics changes in the course of the transition. In this paper, we consider this question in the specific case of the Czech Republic. In particular, we analyze the economic background of voting behavior and political attitudes using a sequence of 11 opinion surveys conducted in the Czech Republic between 1990 and 1998. Each survey contains a battery of questions on respondents' economic and political attitudes, political preferences (vote intentions and actual voting behavior in the most recent election) as well as extensive information about their socio-economic background. Given that the surveys span the first eight years of the transition in the Czech Republic, we can utilize this data both to analyze the determinants of voting behavior in a static manner and also to observe changes in voting behavior and political preferences as the transition progresses.

There are several reasons why voting behavior in the transition countries is likely to differ from that in developed countries. Firstly, as already argued above, the stakes during elections are very high, especially during the first few years after the collapse of communism.

At a time of extraordinary economic turbulence, one may expect economic variables to factor highly in voting decisions. Secondly, *retrospective voting*, i.e. voting based on past economic performance and/or the parties' economic record while in office, does not offer a viable explanation of voting behavior when most competing political parties are newly established or have undergone dramatic transformations. Attributing responsibility for the transition-induced recession is complicated – rather than being caused by the lack of competence of the reformist government, it may have been caused by mismanagement under communist rule. In addition, economic reforms that are costly in the short term may be necessary for better economic performance in the future – rational voters aware of this inter-temporal trade-off should not punish the government for the interim hardship. Finally, the last reason for the differences between voting behavior in post-communist countries and developed economies is the uncertainty inherent to the transition process. At the outset of the transition, there was high aggregate and individual uncertainty about the eventual outcome of the reforms – the former referring to uncertainty about the overall outcome and the latter about individual distribution of costs and benefits of the transition. Both types of uncertainty diminish during the course of the transition and this gradual resolution of uncertainty is likely to affect voters' preferences and electoral choices.

In the following section, we outline the main hypotheses about voting behavior derived from previous empirical studies (however much of the existing literature on economic voting is concerned only with elections in Western democracies) and theoretical analyses of the political economy of transition. In Section 3, we describe the data used in our analysis and in Section 4 we outline our methodology. Section 5 then presents our results. In this analysis, we assess the role of individual socio-economic characteristics (such as age, gender and education), individual economic experiences (income and economic status), and regional economic performance (average wage and unemployment rate in the individual's district of residence) in determining respondents' support for the various political parties. Since our dataset spans an eight-year period, we can compare how patterns of political support evolve over time. We then discuss how these changes relate to the progress of transition and in particular to the gradual resolution of uncertainty about the aggregate and individual outcomes of the reforms. By analyzing both the relative importance of individual and aggregate outcomes, and the changing nature of political constraints, we take advantage of the cross-sectional and the time-series dimensions of our data. The final Section then summarizes our conclusions.

## 2 Economic Voting and Post-communist Transition

Economic analysis of voting behavior originates in the seminal study by Downs (1957), who applied rational choice theory to electoral choices. He postulated that voters, being rational, were motivated by their personal self-interest and thus supported parties (candidates) from whose policies they expected to derive the highest utility in the future. The formulation of voting choices as an outcome of utility maximization has led to a plethora of subsequent work, much of it empirical, in both economics and political science.<sup>1</sup> Yet the number of studies, which examine economic voting in post-communist countries, has been rather limited to date.<sup>2</sup>

Two basic dimensions of economic voting have been identified in the literature. Firstly, voting can be *prospective* (i.e. motivated by expectations of future outcomes) or *retrospective* (reflecting past economic conditions – a pattern referred to as the *responsibility hypothesis*, as the voters hold the government responsible for past economic performance). Secondly, voters can be either *egocentric* (concerned primarily with their own pocketbooks) or *sociotropic* (making their voting decisions based on aggregate rather than individual economic outcomes).

Voting in Western democracies is typically found to be retrospective, while the evidence on the second dimension is generally split (see Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).<sup>3</sup> The backward-looking nature of voting behavior, nonetheless, does not necessarily violate the Downsian rational-voter assumption. In the relatively stable economic and political environment of Western democracies, voters can use past information in order to formulate expectations about future outcomes and assess the competence of the current government. However, as argued in the Introduction, retrospective voting may not be the optimal strategy, or even a feasible one, in the specific conditions of the post-communist transition.<sup>4</sup> Following these arguments, we therefore expect post-communist voters to be prospective rather than retrospective (Fidrmuc, 2000a,b, and Doyle and Walsh, 2001, reach similar findings), without having a clear-cut expectation as to whether they should be egocentric or sociotropic.

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<sup>1</sup> See Nannestad and Paldam (1994), Miller (1997), and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) for surveys.

<sup>2</sup> Tucker (2002) in his survey identified 101 academic articles on post-communist elections and voting, of which 49 present quantitative (rather than descriptive) analysis. Furthermore, not all of those 49 deal with economic voting, and 24 of them are concerned with a single country – Russia.

<sup>3</sup> Note that the two dimensions are orthogonal, i.e. retrospective voters can be either egocentric or sociotropic, and the same holds for prospective voters.

<sup>4</sup> Again, this is so because of lack of a relevant track record for newly established parties, difficulties in attributing responsibility for the transition-induced recession, and because costly economic reforms may be needed in order to secure better economic performance in the future

The theoretical literature on political constraints during transition (see Roland, 2000, 2002, for an overview) suggests that voters' political preferences may change dramatically as transition progresses, reflecting the resolution of uncertainty and, in turn, the changing nature of expectations about the reforms' outcome. For example, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Rodrik (1995) show how individual uncertainty about the distribution of gains and losses from the reform can lead to conflicting preferences *ex ante* and *ex post*. Voters may support a radical reform at the outset of transition if their *expected* payoff from the reform is positive. *Ex post*, however, those voters whose *actual* payoff is negative can turn against the reform and even support its reversal.<sup>5</sup> Dewatripont and Roland (1995) similarly argue that in presence of aggregate uncertainty voters can update their expectations, and subsequently reconsider their support for the reform, when new information about the reform's outcomes becomes available.

Applying these theories to post-communist voting behavior, we should be able to observe changes in the pattern of political support for the reforms as transition progresses and as the payoffs to winners and losers become revealed. Indeed, post-communist elections often display dramatic swings in political support for the pro-reform parties and parties less enthusiastic about implementing and continuing the reforms. Therefore, the effect of (some) explanatory variables on political preferences may change over time in line with the gradual resolution of uncertainty about the reforms' outcome. In general, we expect the patterns of political support to become more clearly defined as the transition progresses. The effect of individual socio-demographic characteristics (age, marital status, education etc.) on political preferences should be relatively stable, as these variables have little relation to the reforms' outcome. On the other hand, the effect of past and/or contemporaneous economic experiences such as individual income and employment status can be dramatically different in the early stages of the transition and later on. In particular, economic experiences early on in the transition may not be informative about the eventual outcome of the reforms. Subsequently, once much of the transition-induced relocation of resources has unfolded and the individual gains or losses have been realized, economic experiences should become more important factors underlying political preferences and voting behavior.

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<sup>5</sup> The opposite case is possible as well (i.e. voters opposing the reform beforehand but accepting it once it has been implemented) although the former pattern corresponds better to the post-communist experience.



### 3 Data

The analysis is based on a sequence of 11 surveys entitled *Economic Expectations and Attitudes* (further on referred to as EEA) that were conducted semi-annually (1990-1992) and annually (1993-1998) by the Socio-economic team of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences. Table 1 briefly describes the individual surveys. The sampling methodology involved two steps: first, stratification by settlement size and region, and second, quota sampling by age, gender and education. This procedure ensures the sample is representative of the Czech population. The surveys contain between 1113 and 2084 observations (respondents) and approximately 130 questions per survey. The first six surveys were conducted in both parts of the former Czechoslovakia. Starting with EEA 7, however, the surveys cover only the Czech Republic. Therefore, we focus only on political developments in the Czech Republic and thus use only the Czech sub-sample of the first six surveys (approximately two thirds of observations).

**Insert Table 1 about here.**

The questions focus on attitudes towards economic transformation (speed of economic reforms, poverty, social justice, role of state in the economy, privatization, etc.) and political issues (voting preferences, political self-identification, trust in institutions, satisfaction with the political regime, and so on. Many, though not all, attitudinal and value questions appear in multiple surveys. The surveys also contain a battery of questions on the respondents' socio-economic background including identification of his or her district of residence. We use this information on residency to pool our individual data with regional data on average district wages and unemployment rates.

The EEA surveys have remained a largely untapped source of data, especially with respect to political preferences and voting behavior during transition. Earle and Gelbach (2000) use EEA 9 (conducted in 1996) to study how privatization policies in the Czech Republic affected support for economic reforms, markets and democratic institutions. Mateju and Reháková (1996) and Mateju and Vlachová (1998) utilize several of the early surveys to study voters' realignments alongside the left-right political spectrum, and impact of political values and respondents' political self-identification on their voting behavior, respectively.

## 4 Methodology

The dependent variable for most surveys is the stated intention to vote for a particular political party (the precise wording of the question is the following: *If the elections to the Chamber of deputies of the Czech parliament were organized now, which political party (movement) would you vote for?*). In four surveys (EEA02 – 05), the question on voting intentions was not actually asked (and for a similar question on *most preferred party*, a large fraction of respondents' answers were either *other* or *don't know* or *refuse to answer*). For these surveys, we have used the actual vote in the most recent election (1990 for EEA02-04 and 1992 for EEA05). Obviously, the results obtained with these four surveys are not directly comparable with those for the remaining surveys. In particular, the dependent variable refers to a past voting decision whereas the explanatory variables are contemporaneous. Changes in the respondents' socio-economic background since the election clearly may have caused changes in their political preferences. Nevertheless, for two of these surveys, the time lag between the election and the survey is relatively short (6 months for EEA02 and one month for EEA05).

Models of electoral choice are typically estimated using either ordinary least squares (OLS) or a binomial logit/probit technique. However, several recent studies (Whitten and Palmer, 1996, Alvarez and Nagler, 1998, Tomz, Tucker and Wittenburg, 2002) have suggested these techniques are inappropriate when estimating vote choices in multiparty systems, as statistical models should approximate the underlying causal process as closely as possible. Therefore as our dependent variable consists of choices over multiple parties, our regressions are estimated with multinomial logit (MNL), which accurately represent voters' decisions in multiparty election. In our MNL regressions, all parties are analyzed relative to voting for a base party, which is typically the largest (often incumbent) party.

Accordingly, the base category in the present paper is the Civic Forum (OF) for EEA01–04, and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) for EEA05–11. The OF and the ODS dominated Czech politics since 1990 and served in government until the Social Democrats (CSSD) took over in 1998.<sup>6</sup> This specific formulation of the dependent variable has to be taken into account

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<sup>6</sup> The OF, formed in November 1989 as a broad anti-communist movement with dissident roots, won the 1990 election and led the first post-communist government (in coalition with the KDU-CSL). In early 1991, the OF disintegrated into two right-wing parties, the ODS and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and a centrist Civic Movement (OH). The ODS subsequently won the 1992 and 1996 elections and formed the next two governments in coalition with ODA and KDU-CSL as junior partners. See Mansfeldova (1998) for more details.

when interpreting the results. The estimated coefficients capture effects of the explanatory variables on votes or support for the party in question, relative to the votes for the base party. For example, a positive regression coefficient obtained for variable  $i$  in regression equation pertaining to party  $j$  indicates that variable  $i$  increases the probability that respondents will support party  $j$  rather than the base party.

The regressions relate vote intention (or choice) to a number of socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. They include demographic variables: age and age squared, gender, marital status, the number of dependent children in the household and the education level. Other variables reflect economic outcomes: economic status (employed in a state firm, employed in a privatized state firm, employed in a private firm and economically inactive, i.e. student, housewife, unemployed or pensioner) and net personal income (in thousands of Czech Koruna). To capture aggregate economic conditions, we also include the unemployment rate and average wage in the respondent's district of residence (as we estimate a separate regression for each survey, we cannot include national economic variables). Finally, we also include the respondents' self-declared ideological identification (position alongside the left-right spectrum). The list of regressors varies somewhat across the regressions as not all the dependent variables are available for all surveys.

The analysis includes between two and five parties, in each survey, in addition to the base party (OF or the ODS) and an additional category which aggregates smaller parties, refusals to answer and don't know responses. The choice and number of parties is mandated by the support they receive in the surveys. In the early surveys, for example, Civic Forum (OF) enjoyed support of approximately 50% of respondents (either as voting intention or the actual past vote). Later, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) routinely secured support of some 30% of respondents. Typically, no party other than the Social Democrats in the later surveys received more than 10-12% support, as Table 2 illustrates by reporting actual election results for the four elections that occurred during the period covered by our study (the support enjoyed by the various parties in the individual surveys is reported in the last line of the Tables with regression results below). This high degree of fractionalization of the Czech political system creates problems. In particular, given that we can use around 1,000 observations per survey, the data often do not contain enough individual variation to make estimation feasible for parties with low support (for example, it may easily be the case that among the supporters of a small party, none has a university degree or is employed in a private firm).

**Insert Table 2 about here.**

## 5 Explaining Voting Behavior in the Czech Republic<sup>7</sup>

Estimation results are reported in Tables 5-13. As explained in the previous section, the estimated coefficients identify the effect of the various explanatory variables on support for a given party *relative* to their effect on support for the base party (the OF and subsequently the ODS). Overall, the results suggest that voters' socio-economic background is important in determining their voting behavior and political preferences. Nevertheless, information on voters' ideological position also carries considerable explanatory power. Omitting ideology does not alter the results obtained for the socio-economic characteristics much however, although the overall explanatory power of the regressions declines (these results are available upon request).

**Insert Tables 5-13 about here (and on the following pages).**

Overall, the determinants of voting behavior become more clearly defined over time. Ideology is the only characteristic that appears to affect political preferences significantly and consistently in all surveys. Its impact is straightforward. Not surprisingly, voters who consider themselves centrist or right-wing are significantly less likely to vote for the left-wing parties – the social democrats (CSSD) and the communists (KSCM or LB) – than for the ODS. Those who declare themselves as right wing are also less likely to vote for the KDU, although this effect is not always significant.

The effect of education and age is also significant and consistent throughout several surveys. Higher education is associated with lower support for the CSSD and KSCM, and thus, higher support for the ODS. Moreover, the size of the coefficients (in absolute value) increases with level of education. The left wing parties also derive significantly greater support from among the elderly. The impact of age appears non-linear though. Moreover, it levels off at a younger age for the social democrats than for the communists (for example, in EEA10, the support for the social democrats peaks at 33 years compared to 51 for the KSCM). On the other hand, the impact of education and age on the support for right wing parties (ODA, US, and KDU) does not seem to differ much from that for the ODS. In a few

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<sup>7</sup> An extensive description of the political developments during the transition process in the Czech Republic is beyond the scope of this paper. See Mansfeldova (1998) and Doyle and Walsh (2001) for more details.

surveys, nevertheless, education is inversely related to support for the KDU. In 1998, the newly founded Union of Freedom (US, a splinter party that broke away from the ODS) was more successful in attracting the support of middle aged voters (the effect of age levels off at 45 years), but the other variables do not have significant effects.

The inverse correlation between the level of education and the support for left-wing parties reflects the differentiated impact of economic reforms on high-skilled and low-skilled labor. The communist ideology favored the working class, which was reflected in relatively low premiums to education during the socialist period. This changed with the introduction of the market economy. Brainerd (1998) and Chase (1998) find that the returns to education increased dramatically in the course of transition. Moreover, educated individuals are generally in a better position to adjust to and benefit from change, such as the dramatic shocks brought about by the reform process. Similarly, older individuals are more likely to possess human capital that may have been valuable under central planning but not in a market environment (see Chase, 1998, and Campos and Dabusinskas, 2002).<sup>8</sup> In addition, inflation during the initial phase of transition eroded away the real value of savings and nominal entitlements such as pensions, which again imposes a greater burden on the elderly. Therefore, less educated and older voters quite naturally turn to the parties that they expect to slow down the pace of change and/or implement greater redistribution programs.

In contrast to ideology, education and age, the effect of economic outcomes (individual or aggregate) on voting behavior changes over time. In the early surveys, essentially none of the economic variables (economic status, income, district unemployment rate and district wage) is significant. Then, starting with EEA07 (pertaining to November 1993), being employed in a private firm significantly lowers the probability of voting for the social democrats. This pattern then remains significant in all subsequent surveys except EEA09. The impact on supporting the communists is similar but not significant. Consequentially, it is the de-novo private firms that are important, as the impact of being employed in a privatized formerly state owned firm is not different from that of being employed in a state-owned firm (this is also the finding of Jackson et al. (2001) in the case of Poland). A similar pattern over time

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<sup>8</sup> Older individuals also have spent a greater portion of their lives under the communist regime and thus may have become *indoctrinated* to a greater extent. Different patterns of *exposure* also may help account for the hump-shaped impact of age on support for left-wing parties –those born before the mid 1930s have experienced democracy during a part of their adult lives (in the interwar period and again between the end of the second World War and the communist takeover in 1948) and, hence, support for the left wing parties declines beyond certain age.

emerges for personal income, which is negatively correlated with the support for the social democrats in the last three surveys, and district unemployment rate, which increases their support in the last two surveys. The same pattern obtains for the communists in EEA10 but not in the other surveys.

This effect of personal income and regional unemployment may be consistent with the responsibility hypothesis – voters with low incomes and living in areas with high unemployment indeed tend to show greater support for the left-wing opposition parties. However, as only right-wing parties controlled the government during the analyzed period, we cannot unambiguously conclude that this suggests retrospective voting. Fidrmuc (2000a,b) finds that unemployment increases support for left-wing parties even when they are in government, which in turn suggests prospective voting. The evidence is also inconclusive with respect to the distinction between egocentric and sociotropic voting, as individual income and regional unemployment rate both affect voting behavior (regional wage is only significant in EEA10 and has opposite sign as individual income). Hence, there is no clear pattern of either individual or regional variables prevailing.

The changes in the determinants of political preferences over time offer empirical support to the literature on political constraints during transition. As discussed above, the theory suggests that uncertainty about the reforms' outcomes will be relatively high at the outset of the reforms and will gradually fall over time. Accordingly, contemporaneous individual realizations at the outset of reforms should have relatively little predictive power with respect to the final outcome – an individual who experienced low income or lived in a depressed region in 1991 may eventually benefit from the reforms by 1998. On the other hand, someone who is unemployed or has low income in 1998, when the bulk of reform-related shocks have already been realized, faces a rather low probability of a dramatic improvement. This is indeed the pattern that we observe in our results: economic variables do not appear to affect voting behavior during the early transition but become important in the later stages. Apparently, the time when the transition-related uncertainty becomes resolved is between late 1993 (EEA07) and early 1996 (EEA09). From this time on, the economic variables continue to play an important role in determining voting behavior.

These results thus identify the winners and losers of the transition process. The Civic Forum and subsequently the ODS and ODA (and, to a lesser extent, KDU) were associated with (and blamed for) the radical reforms initiated after 1989. The left-wing opposition, on

the other hand, largely built their electoral programs on criticizing (the social democrats) or opposing (the communists) the reform process. Therefore, one may expect that those who benefited from the reforms and who oppose their reversal will naturally support these parties. In contrast, those who were made worse off as a consequence of the reforms are more likely to support the social democrats or the communists. The latter category clearly includes the unemployed and those with low incomes. As argued above, older individuals and those with low education are also more likely to have been made worse off by the reforms. Hence, the constituency of winners comprises the young, educated and workers employed in private firms. On the other hand, the losers of reforms are the unemployed, low educated and the elderly.

The gradual resolution of uncertainty and emergence of the constituencies of winners and losers sheds light on the dramatic rise in support for the social democrats. The CSSD started as a marginal party in the 1990 and 1992 elections but nearly caught up with the ODS by the time of the 1996 election and eventually surpassed it in 1998 (see Table 2). With the transition progressing, the Czech political environment thus changed from unimodal, with the OF and subsequently the ODS being the only major party, to bimodal.

Finally, Table 14 goes beyond reporting only the statistical significance of the results and calculates the real quantities of interest i.e. the impact of selected explanatory variables on voting intentions, through the use of simulations.<sup>9</sup> In our MNL models, the probability of intending to vote for a particular party is  $E(Y_i) = \pi_i$ , an intuitive quantity of interest. Therefore we estimated this probability, and the uncertainty surrounding it, for different levels of income, age and regional unemployment, while holding the other variables at their means. In each case we repeated the expected value algorithm  $M=1000$  times to obtain approximately a 95%-confidence interval around the probability of intention to vote. For each survey, the first row reports the simulated probabilities that the mean voter (i.e. an individual with all variables set at their respective means) chooses each party. The subsequent rows then report the percentage-point change in these probabilities resulting from increasing the variable of interest (individual income, age, or regional unemployment) from the 40<sup>th</sup> to the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile, and from the 20<sup>th</sup> to the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile (while holding all other variables constant). The effect of age is sizeable. For example, in EEA11, moving from the 40<sup>th</sup> to the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile lowers the probability of voting for the ODS by 10 percentage points and, in turn, with the main benefactor being the Freedom Union (US). In EEA09, the impact on the ODS is

similar but the gains accrue to the social democrats, communists and the other/don't-know/refused-to-answer category. The effects of changes in individual income or regional unemployment are less dramatic but still not negligible in the later surveys.

**Insert Table 14 about here.**

## 6 Conclusions

During its post-communist transition, the Czech Republic went from being one of the few remaining hard-line communist countries to being a champion of free-market liberalism and then again reverting to social democratic ideals. We present empirical evidence based on analyzing a sequence of 11 opinion surveys carried out between 1990 and 1998 that helps us understand these pendulum-like swings in Czech voting behavior. We show that these changes were not accidental but rather that they reflected the evolution of voters' preferences, which in turn were shaped by the ongoing reform process. At the outset of the reforms, the pro-reform parties benefited from the widely-shared prospect of gains that would ensue from economic liberalization and restructuring. Accordingly, we find that economic outcomes such as individual income, economic status and regional economic variables do not affect voters' preferences during early stages of the transition. Over time, as the reform-induced shocks unfold, the identity of those who were going to gain or lose in the course of transition becomes revealed and, not surprisingly, political preferences change. The winners of reform continued to support the pro-reform parties. However, the rising constituency of the losers of reform turned to left-wing parties, thus propelling the political rebirth of the social democrats and their eventual accession to power in 1998. We thus find that economic variables become important as determinants of voting behavior approximately at a mid-point of the period covered by our survey data – between late 1993 and early 1996. Three economic variables consistently emerge significant during the later part of the transition. Being employed in a private firm and earning a high income reduces the probability of voting for the left-wing parties and increases the odds of being a pro-reform voter. Living in a district with high unemployment rate increases the probability of voting for left-wing rather than pro-reform parties.

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<sup>9</sup> All simulations were produced using Clarify, as described in King, Tomz and Wittenburg (2000).



By analyzing a sequence of surveys spread over the first eight years of transition in the Czech Republic, we offer, to our knowledge, the first time-series evidence supporting the predictions of theoretical models of political constraints during the post-communist transition (see Roland, 2000, 2002). Utilizing the time dimension entailed in our data, we obtain evidence not only on static patterns of political preferences but also their evolution in the course of transition.

Our results thus further our understanding of the dynamics of political attitudes and voting behavior during the turbulent transition period. The swings in political preferences reflect the balance of power between the constituencies of winners and losers of reform. Economic repercussions of the reforms therefore have important implications on sustaining the support for further continuation of the transition and preventing its reversal. Avoiding excessive unemployment and declines in real incomes, ensuring credible insurance against adverse outcomes of the reforms and encouraging the emergence of de novo private firms strengthens the pro-reform constituency and will thus make the reforms more acceptable both ex post and ex ante.

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**Table 1 Overview of Surveys**

Survey	Sample Size	Survey Date	Election Dates	Question Used
EEA01	1651	May, 1990	8-9 June 1990	Voting Intention
EEA02	1744	December, 1990		Previous Vote
EEA03	1689	June 1991		Previous Vote
EEA04	1718	December 1991		Previous Vote
EEA05	2084	July, 1992	15-16 June 1992	Previous Vote
EEA06	1972	January, 1993		Voting Intention
EEA07	1113	November, 1993		Voting Intention
EEA08	1307	November, 1994		Voting Intention
EEA09	1459	January, 1996		Voting Intention
EEA10	1421	January 1997	31 May – 1 June 1996	Voting Intention
EEA11	1380	April, 1998	19-20 June 1998	Voting Intention

**Notes:** Previous vote reports on actual vote choice in the latest national election. Voting intention is the answer to question “If the elections to the Chamber of deputies of the Czech parliament were organized now, which political party (movement) would you vote for?”.

**Table 2 Actual Election Results**

1990		1992	
Communist Party (KSCM) <sup>L</sup>	13.8	(Communist) Left Block (LB) <sup>L</sup>	14.05
Christian Democrats (KDU) <sup>R,W</sup>	8.8	Social Democrats (CSSD) <sup>L</sup>	6.53
Civic Forum (OF) <sup>R,W</sup>	49.5	Liberal Social Union (LSU) <sup>L</sup>	6.52
Moravian Movement (HSD-SMS) <sup>E</sup>	9.1	Civic Movement (OH) <sup>R,I</sup>	4.59
Other	18.4	Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) <sup>R,I,W</sup>	6.28
		Civic Democratic Party (ODS-KDS) <sup>R,I,W</sup>	29.73
		Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) <sup>R,I,W</sup>	5.93
		Republicans (SPR-RSC) <sup>N</sup>	5.98
		Moravian Movement (HSD-SMS) <sup>E</sup>	5.87
		Other	14.52
1996		1998	
Communist Party (KSCM) <sup>L</sup>	10.33	Communist Party (KSCM) <sup>L</sup>	11.03
Social Democrats (CSSD) <sup>L</sup>	26.44	Social Democrats (CSSD) <sup>L,W</sup>	32.31
Free Democrats (SD-LSNS) <sup>R</sup>	2.05	Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) <sup>R,I</sup>	9.00
Democratic Union (DEU) <sup>R</sup>	2.80	Civic Democratic Party (ODS) <sup>R,I</sup>	27.74
Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) <sup>R,I,W</sup>	8.08	Union of Freedom <sup>R,I</sup>	8.6
Civic Democratic Party (ODS) <sup>R,I,W</sup>	29.62	Republicans (SPR-RSC) <sup>N</sup>	3.9
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) <sup>R,I,W</sup>	6.36	Other	7.42
Republicans (SPR-RSC) <sup>N</sup>	8.01		
Moravian Movement (HSMS) <sup>E</sup>	0.42		
Other	5.89		

**Notes:** Parties are denoted with abbreviated names as well as commonly used acronyms. Election results for 1990 and 1992 are for the Czech National Council, those for 1996 and 1998 are for the Chamber of Deputies.

Superscripts denoting political orientation: *L* left wing, *R* pro-reform (right wing), *N* nationalist, *E* ethnic minority or regional party. Superscripts denoting incumbency: *I* member of government prior to the election; *W* member of government after the election

**Table 3 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Voting Intentions, EEA 01: May 1990**

EEA01	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.004	0.060	0.020	0.047	0.276**	0.097	-0.048	0.030
Age squared	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.003**	0.001	0.000	0.000
No. of children <sup>1</sup>	-0.060	0.246	-0.057	0.145	0.031	0.144	-0.047	0.066
Female	-0.172	0.318	-0.021	0.254	-0.368	0.305	-0.030	0.146
Vocational Education <sup>2</sup>	0.256	0.362	-0.253	0.278	-0.556	0.359	-0.168	0.180
Secondary Education <sup>2</sup>	-0.898	0.544	-0.427	0.342	-0.511	0.421	-0.187	0.206
University Education <sup>2</sup>	-0.463	0.746	0.030	0.473	-0.746	0.594	0.079	0.279
Centre <sup>3</sup>	-1.451**	0.352	-0.684	0.380	-3.284**	0.357	-0.622**	0.214
Right <sup>3</sup>	-2.395**	0.506	-0.193	0.371	-5.472**	1.020	-1.461**	0.238
Income [thousands] <sup>4</sup>	-0.069	0.081	-0.075	0.098	0.031	0.095	0.028	0.044
District UE Rate <sup>5</sup>	-0.314	0.435	0.049	0.330	0.345	0.386	0.396	0.209
District Wage [ths] <sup>5</sup>	1.602	0.847	-1.797*	0.870	0.711	0.946	-0.272	0.434
Constant	-5.706	3.038	4.346	2.910	-8.691*	3.914	2.161	1.564
Log likelihood	-1199.08							
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.1075							
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	212.8**							
Vote Intention [%]	4.60		7.90		6.89		34.38	

Notes: 1075 observations. The dependent variable is intention to vote for a specific party, with Civic Forum being the base party (% vote intention 46.23). The Civic Forum coefficients have been set to zero, so the first four columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>2</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>3</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>5</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined. Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 4 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Vote Choice, EEA 02: December 1990**

EEA02	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	CSL	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.035	0.076	0.137	0.078	0.070	0.055	0.095	0.061	-0.017	0.041
Age squared	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	0.483	0.825	-1.134	1.024	-0.608	0.571	-0.224	0.571	-0.608	0.312
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	1.218	0.982	-0.908	1.162	-1.081	0.737	-0.092	0.646	-0.465	0.399
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	0.078	0.182	0.167	0.239	0.235	0.178	-0.030	0.151	0.084	0.096
Female	-0.322	0.351	0.768	0.696	0.331	0.282	-0.494*	0.228	0.084	0.158
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.166	0.411	0.391	0.793	-0.293	0.297	0.097	0.266	-0.051	0.191
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.287	0.465	-0.743	1.161	-0.853*	0.424	-0.035	0.314	-0.113	0.220
University Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.549	0.678	0.370	1.314	-1.975	1.033	-0.121	0.430	-0.302	0.314
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.522	0.788	1.232	0.679	0.759*	0.376	0.205	0.338	0.327	0.274
Income [thousands] <sup>5</sup>	-0.015	0.064	0.049	0.041	-0.107	0.088	-0.044	0.054	0.022	0.033
District UE Rate <sup>6</sup>	0.284	0.438	-0.670	1.044	-0.192	0.367	0.403	0.265	0.428*	0.204
District Wage [ths] <sup>6</sup>	-0.117	0.773	0.690	1.788	-1.096	0.851	-0.345	0.735	-0.177	0.438
Constant	-3.286	2.709	-9.443	6.878	0.302	3.091	-3.368	2.772	-0.056	1.580
Log likelihood	-1260.66									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0411									
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	193.54**									
Reported 1990 vote [%]	4.00		1.07		6.23		9.97		22.60	

**Notes:** 1080 observations. The dependent variable is respondent's reported vote for a specific party in the 1990 election, with Civic Forum being the base party (56.32% of the past vote according to the survey). The Civic Forum coefficients have been set to zero, so the first five columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active is the omitted category. <sup>5</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>6</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 5 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Vote Choice, EEA 03: May 1991**

EEA03	CSSD	St. Error	CSL	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	-0.160	0.088	0.106	0.067	0.010	0.064	0.036	0.041
Age squared	0.002*	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	-0.474	0.908	-0.459	0.666	-1.310*	0.574	-1.002**	0.314
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	0.022	0.989	-0.155	0.739	-1.116	0.696	-0.673	0.395
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	-0.034	0.264	0.062	0.188	0.154	0.199	0.211*	0.097
Female	-0.167	0.426	0.130	0.342	-0.243	0.294	-0.463*	0.189
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	0.572	0.526	-0.536	0.394	0.188	0.345	0.123	0.206
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	0.132	0.639	-0.547	0.434	0.275	0.394	-0.090	0.241
University Education <sup>3</sup>	1.681*	0.690	-1.723	1.114	0.480	0.708	0.284	0.330
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.504	0.525	0.630	0.399	-0.132	0.400	-0.290	0.261
Centre <sup>5</sup>	-2.445**	0.494	0.628	0.763	-4.318**	0.385	-1.110**	0.253
Right <sup>5</sup>	-2.788**	0.529	0.605	0.779	-6.763**	1.039	-1.877**	0.271
Income [thousands] <sup>6</sup>	0.019	0.036	-0.024	0.075	0.047	0.035	-0.306**	0.092
District UE Rate <sup>7</sup>	-0.170	0.127	0.031	0.071	0.061	0.077	0.035	0.041
District Wage [ths] <sup>7</sup>	-1.186	0.832	-1.208	0.686	0.374	0.533	-0.204	0.307
Constant	7.234*	3.506	-0.890	3.171	-1.162	2.625	1.718	1.436
Log likelihood	-952.979							
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.207							
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	298.710**							
Reported 1990 Vote [%]	2.94		5.31		10.91		27.23	

**Notes:** 1012 observations. The dependent variable is respondent's reported vote for a specific party in the 1990 election, with Civic Forum being the base party (53.61% of the past vote according to the survey). The Civic Forum coefficients have been set to zero, so the first four columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active is the omitted category. <sup>5</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>6</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>7</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01



**Table 6 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Vote Choice, EEA 04: December 1991**

<b>EEA04</b>	<b>CSSD</b>	<b>St. Error</b>	<b>KSCM</b>	<b>St. Error</b>	<b>O/R/DK</b>	<b>St. Error</b>
<b>Age</b>	-0.080	0.085	0.001*	0.109	-0.092*	0.045
<b>Age squared</b>	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001*	0.001
<b>Married/remarried<sup>1</sup></b>	-0.315	0.709	0.618	0.942	-0.374	0.318
<b>Divorced/widowed<sup>1</sup></b>	-0.103	0.879	0.251	1.002	-0.397	0.400
<b>No. of children<sup>2</sup></b>	0.286	0.211	0.130	0.248	0.282*	0.111
<b>Female</b>	-0.216	0.468	-0.020	0.331	0.090	0.173
<b>Vocational Education<sup>3</sup></b>	0.141	0.498	0.213	0.429	0.163	0.227
<b>Secondary Education<sup>3</sup></b>	0.731	0.502	-0.835	0.568	0.364	0.246
<b>University Education<sup>3</sup></b>	0.808	0.743	0.578	0.559	-0.097	0.342
<b>Centre<sup>4</sup></b>	-2.016**	0.445	-3.765**	0.405	-0.927**	0.273
<b>Right<sup>4</sup></b>	-3.130**	0.602	-6.227**	1.058	-1.609**	0.282
<b>Income [thousands]<sup>5</sup></b>	-0.781*	0.309	0.018	0.035	-0.004	0.032
<b>District UE Rate<sup>6</sup></b>	-0.101	0.123	0.106	0.084	0.061	0.040
<b>District Wage [ths]<sup>6</sup></b>	0.280	0.702	0.421	0.770	0.179	0.353
<b>Constant</b>	1.169	3.182	-3.136	3.818	1.092	1.652
<b>Log likelihood</b>	-694.440					
<b>Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.177					
<b>c<sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model</b>	212.730**					
<b>Reported 1990 Vote [%]</b>	3.6		9.87		34.04	

**Notes:** 828 observations. The dependent variable is respondent's reported vote for a specific party in the 1990 election, with Civic Forum being the base party (52.49% of the actual vote according to the survey). The Civic Forum coefficients have been set to zero, so the first three columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>5</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>6</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 7 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Vote Choice, EEA 05: July 1992**

EEA05	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	IB	St. Error	ODA	St. Error	LSU	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.032	0.069	0.180*	0.073	0.161*	0.073	-0.011	0.055	-0.011	0.056	0.012	0.042
Age squared	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.002*	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	-0.625	0.693	-1.581**	0.527	0.170	0.883	0.086	0.456	-0.677	0.514	0.006	0.372
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	-0.565	0.851	-0.886	0.624	0.649	0.983	0.771	0.545	-0.509	0.616	0.641	0.433
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	-0.288	0.217	0.422*	0.202	-0.372	0.231	-0.031	0.162	0.114	0.194	-0.028	0.116
Female	-0.534	0.370	0.181	0.358	-0.539	0.375	-0.230	0.250	-0.311	0.309	-0.313	0.215
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	0.314	0.472	-0.265	0.424	0.587	0.437	0.527	0.416	-0.668	0.404	-0.155	0.281
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	0.361	0.484	-0.236	0.428	0.055	0.469	0.528	0.415	-0.312	0.414	-0.321	0.286
University Education <sup>3</sup>	0.464	0.690	-0.246	0.603	-0.486	0.628	0.842	0.473	-0.248	0.536	-0.051	0.364
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.220	0.531	0.321	0.522	0.167	0.481	0.284	0.409	-0.176	0.513	0.082	0.314
Centre <sup>5</sup>	-2.233**	0.551	0.759	1.141	-4.417**	0.560	1.021	1.125	-1.080	0.569	-0.543	0.534
Right <sup>5</sup>	-6.030**	0.730	-0.556	1.119	-43.350**	0.488	0.065	1.106	-3.863**	0.602	-2.434**	0.521
Income [thousands] <sup>6</sup>	-0.238	0.154	-0.010	0.049	-0.034	0.032	0.017	0.021	0.007	0.025	-0.061	0.049
District UE Rate <sup>7</sup>	-0.005	0.117	0.059	0.113	0.102	0.125	-0.212*	0.089	0.045	0.093	0.012	0.066
District Wage [ths] <sup>7</sup>	-0.149	0.421	-0.116	0.375	0.756	0.427	-0.246	0.267	-0.890*	0.395	-0.380	0.241
Constant	3.265	2.556	-5.724*	2.788	-4.524	2.609	0.080	1.957	5.931*	2.329	3.563*	1.530
Log likelihood	-1277.74											
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2328											
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	65058.8*											
Vote Intention [%]	6.15		4.88		11.32		9.95		7.22		24.78	

**Notes:** 976 observations. The dependent variable is reported vote for a specific party in the 1992 election, with the ODS being the base party (% vote intention 35.71). The ODS coefficients have been set to zero, so the first six columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active is the omitted category and the economically inactive category includes students, housewives and pensioners. <sup>5</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>6</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>7</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined. Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 8 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Voting Intentions, EEA06: January 1993**

EEA06	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	ODA	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	-0.084	0.108	-0.300**	0.117	0.008	0.080	0.057	0.151	-0.065	0.066
Age squared	0.001	0.001	0.004**	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	0.330	0.673	0.322	0.683	0.669	0.474	0.653	0.861	-0.082	0.355
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	-0.970	0.995	-0.674	1.003	0.008	0.623	0.390	0.983	0.159	0.463
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	0.325	0.203	0.071	0.266	-0.077	0.141	0.047	0.243	0.276*	0.130
Female	0.006	0.349	0.200	0.453	-0.291	0.248	-0.547	0.410	-0.239	0.227
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.194	0.522	-0.231	0.567	-0.086	0.398	-0.061	0.572	0.058	0.310
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.512	0.510	-0.314	0.589	-0.077	0.404	-0.414	0.579	-0.638	0.339
University Education <sup>3</sup>	0.276	0.589	0.046	0.781	0.867	0.448	-0.034	0.829	-0.167	0.405
Economically Active: private firm <sup>4</sup>	0.107	0.467	-0.789	0.565	0.047	0.274	0.052	0.533	0.260	0.247
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.870	0.765	-2.066*	0.875	0.542	0.428	-0.792	0.858	0.223	0.390
Centre <sup>5</sup>	-3.100**	0.646	-1.692	0.951	0.970	1.161	-4.852**	0.694	-1.522*	0.604
Right <sup>5</sup>	-6.576**	0.779	-1.936*	0.909	-0.042	1.155	-44.633**	0.602	-3.934**	0.595
Income [thousands] <sup>6</sup>	0.043	0.037	-0.326*	0.139	-0.030	0.033	0.041	0.055	-0.017	0.041
District UE Rate <sup>7</sup>	0.012	0.092	0.013	0.094	0.004	0.060	0.079	0.099	0.056	0.054
District Wage [ths] <sup>7</sup>	-0.073	0.302	0.031	0.345	0.184	0.202	0.053	0.329	-0.429*	0.205
Constant	3.128	2.897	5.828	3.024	-2.566	2.118	-0.445	3.738	6.255**	1.819
Log likelihood	-945.518									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2506									
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	56932.97**									
Vote Intention [%]	8.07		5.02		12.74		10.67		32.47	

**Notes:** 817 observations. The dependent variable is intention to vote for a specific party, with the ODS being the base party (% vote intention 31.03). The ODS coefficients have been set to zero, so the first five columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active in a state firm is the omitted category and the economically inactive category includes students, housewives and pensioners. <sup>5</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>6</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>7</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined. Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 9 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Voting Intentions, EEA 07: November 1993**

EEA07	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	ODA	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.052	0.052	0.149	0.082	0.030	0.056	0.000	0.073	0.036	0.045
Age squared	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.000
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	0.392	0.455	-0.861	0.676	0.530	0.464	1.090	0.751	0.012	0.353
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	0.669	0.560	-0.478	0.733	0.917	0.546	1.022	0.830	0.355	0.437
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	0.101	0.148	-0.007	0.230	0.079	0.142	-0.116	0.260	0.091	0.122
Female	-0.796**	0.247	0.208	0.379	-0.199	0.237	0.057	0.324	-0.550*	0.223
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	0.068	0.327	-0.247	0.395	0.173	0.383	-0.245	0.415	-0.590*	0.280
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.038	0.340	-0.484	0.428	0.552	0.368	-0.540	0.481	-0.904**	0.298
University Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.300	0.449	-2.422	1.048	0.804	0.413	-0.734	0.593	-0.962*	0.377
Economically Active: privatised state firm <sup>4</sup>	0.221	0.353	-0.301	0.712	0.518	0.311	0.659	0.496	0.336	0.308
Economically Active: private firm <sup>4</sup>	-0.919*	0.392	-0.014	0.616	0.074	0.306	-0.825	0.552	-0.190	0.304
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	0.163	0.383	1.054*	0.503	-0.105	0.386	-0.094	0.528	0.180	0.316
Centre <sup>5</sup>	-2.411**	0.499	-1.227*	0.629	-0.189	0.694	-4.800**	0.569	-1.396**	0.509
Right <sup>5</sup>	-5.567**	0.562	-2.472**	0.646	-1.344	0.689	-7.249**	0.781	-3.636**	0.519
Income [thousands] <sup>6</sup>	-0.013	0.047	-0.006	0.051	0.011	0.026	0.045	0.036	-0.064	0.041
District UE Rate <sup>7</sup>	0.057	0.057	-0.111	0.082	-0.032	0.055	0.116	0.079	-0.001	0.051
District Wage [ths] <sup>7</sup>	0.107	0.192	-0.933**	0.283	-0.119	0.189	0.347	0.274	0.054	0.171
Constant	0.823	1.663	2.704	2.729	-0.653	1.740	-0.640	2.384	2.247	1.495
Log likelihood	-1322.19									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2239									
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	520.16**									
Vote Intention [%]	17.03		5.04		12.45		9.62		22.89	

Notes: 1036 observations. The dependent variable is intention to vote for a specific party, with the ODS being the base party (% vote intention 32.97). The ODS coefficients have been set to zero, so the first five columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active in a state firm is the omitted category and the economically inactive category includes students, housewives and pensioners. <sup>5</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>6</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>7</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 10 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Voting Intentions, EEA 08: November 1994**

EEA08	CSSD	St. Error.	KDU	St. Error	ODA	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.092	0.055	0.073	0.069	0.065	0.050	0.071	0.078	0.071	0.044
Age squared	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.000
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	-0.543	0.430	-0.798	0.718	-0.167	0.375	0.051	0.713	-0.479	0.323
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	-0.271	0.502	-0.465	0.739	-0.289	0.468	0.194	0.763	-0.061	0.401
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	-0.046	0.138	0.141	0.210	0.020	0.132	-0.138	0.212	-0.033	0.110
Female	-1.012**	0.232	-0.144	0.285	-0.088	0.229	-0.682*	0.328	-0.508**	0.190
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.287	0.306	-0.432	0.345	-0.293	0.332	-0.488	0.383	-0.282	0.265
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.416	0.314	-0.539	0.386	-0.152	0.331	-0.657	0.430	-0.439	0.272
University Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.997*	0.397	-1.646**	0.619	-0.070	0.384	-1.486*	0.582	-1.105**	0.320
Economically Active: privatised state firm <sup>4</sup>	-0.071	0.288	0.552	0.457	0.332	0.311	-0.084	0.423	-0.422	0.264
Economically Active: private firm <sup>4</sup>	-1.018**	0.361	0.687	0.448	0.454	0.297	-0.919	0.564	-0.152	0.262
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.314	0.359	0.754	0.487	0.227	0.360	-0.198	0.515	0.448	0.293
Centre <sup>5</sup>	-2.171**	0.493	1.017	0.845	0.148	0.755	-4.979**	0.585	-1.648**	0.498
Right <sup>5</sup>	-5.013**	0.531	-1.150	0.859	-0.630	0.748	-7.472**	0.868	-3.232**	0.496
Income [thousands] <sup>6</sup>	-0.048	0.026	-0.026	0.036	-0.025	0.018	-0.047	0.056	0.003	0.016
District UE Rate <sup>7</sup>	0.067	0.058	0.138	0.074	0.093	0.059	0.076	0.079	0.014	0.051
District Wage [ths] <sup>7</sup>	-0.013	0.162	-0.324	0.219	0.136	0.156	-0.117	0.210	-0.155	0.139
Constant	2.351	1.597	-1.407	2.274	-2.556	1.690	2.841	2.227	3.112*	1.398
Log likelihood	-1605.09									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2097									
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	532.03**									
Vote Intention [%]	18.84		6.28		11.32		9.77		26.51	

Notes: 1211 observations. The dependent variable is intention to vote for a specific party, with the ODS being the base party (% vote intention 26.74). The ODS coefficients have been set to zero, so the first five columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active in a state firm is the omitted category and the economically inactive category includes students, housewives and pensioners. <sup>5</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>6</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>7</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 11 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Voting Intentions, EEA 09: January 1996**

EEA09	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	ODA	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.079	0.050	-0.013	0.054	0.079	0.062	0.086	0.077	0.065	0.044
Age squared	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	-0.261	0.353	0.303	0.512	-0.529	0.359	-0.994	0.600	-0.303	0.290
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	-0.121	0.421	0.480	0.594	-0.348	0.471	-1.117	0.684	0.171	0.364
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	0.130**	0.046	0.159**	0.047	0.109*	0.049	0.091	0.075	0.103*	0.043
Female	-0.313	0.202	0.088	0.261	0.169	0.239	0.200	0.319	-0.059	0.184
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.389	0.281	-0.818**	0.319	-0.328	0.405	-0.369	0.372	-0.510*	0.254
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.243	0.291	-1.209**	0.339	-0.005	0.396	-0.723	0.432	-0.821**	0.265
University Education <sup>3</sup>	0.187	0.356	-1.061*	0.444	0.283	0.429	-0.347	0.583	-0.908**	0.341
Economically Active: privatised state firm <sup>4</sup>	0.087	0.270	-0.832*	0.402	0.313	0.305	-0.750	0.535	-0.014	0.242
Economically Active: private firm <sup>4</sup>	-0.102	0.297	-0.467	0.423	0.028	0.334	0.132	0.535	0.229	0.252
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.006	0.331	0.009	0.380	-0.120	0.435	0.588	0.515	-0.087	0.306
Centre <sup>5</sup>	-2.092**	0.444	0.399	0.738	-0.519	0.637	-5.210**	0.579	-1.645**	0.450
Right <sup>5</sup>	-5.755**	0.517	-0.618	0.737	-1.585*	0.632	-8.189**	1.120	-3.305**	0.452
Income [thousands] <sup>6</sup>	-0.104**	0.029	-0.082	0.042	0.017	0.015	0.005	0.045	-0.045*	0.023
District UE Rate <sup>7</sup>	0.044	0.049	-0.120	0.068	0.022	0.060	0.009	0.076	-0.037	0.045
District Wage [ths] <sup>7</sup>	0.066	0.079	-0.161	0.108	0.164	0.093	-0.080	0.126	-0.021	0.071
Constant	1.382	1.314	1.993	1.749	-3.236	1.712	1.560	2.049	2.186	1.211
Log likelihood	-1734.53									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2192									
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	557.33**									
Vote Intention [%]	22.25		7.67		7.95		7.88		24.55	

Notes: 1350 observations. The dependent variable is intention to vote for a specific party, with the ODS being the base party (% vote intention 29.71). The ODS coefficients have been set to zero, so the first five columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active in a state firm is the omitted category and the economically inactive category includes students, housewives and pensioners. <sup>5</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>6</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>7</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 12 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Voting Intentions, EEA10: January 1997**

EEA10	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	ODA	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.065	0.054	0.088	0.074	0.007	0.052	0.236**	0.084	0.046	0.050
Age squared	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.002*	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	-0.318	0.448	-0.899*	0.439	-0.659	0.469	-1.173	0.763	-0.556	0.381
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	0.076	0.528	-0.763	0.570	-0.130	0.551	-0.209	0.824	0.139	0.460
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	0.080	0.148	0.061	0.159	0.298	0.161	0.150	0.245	0.159	0.135
Female	-0.186	0.253	0.287	0.276	-0.080	0.270	-0.818*	0.368	-0.564*	0.232
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.041	0.332	0.028	0.442	0.087	0.378	-0.392	0.426	-0.100	0.306
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.622	0.352	-0.052	0.439	0.055	0.381	-1.393**	0.501	-0.830*	0.326
University Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.612	0.465	0.433	0.483	-0.166	0.475	-0.833	0.681	-1.092*	0.431
Economically Active: privatised state firm <sup>4</sup>	-0.117	0.323	-0.176	0.341	-0.282	0.408	0.510	0.547	-0.475	0.320
Economically Active: private firm <sup>4</sup>	-0.624	0.353	-0.714*	0.359	0.103	0.388	0.277	0.607	-0.146	0.309
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.685	0.385	-0.517	0.454	0.613	0.404	0.422	0.610	0.015	0.353
Centre <sup>5</sup>	-2.713**	0.613	0.351	1.178	-1.039	0.681	-5.119**	0.712	-2.090**	0.625
Right <sup>5</sup>	-6.192**	0.673	-0.442	1.173	-2.834**	0.690	-8.186**	1.179	-3.910**	0.629
Income [thousands] <sup>6</sup>	-0.095**	0.034	-0.001	0.019	-0.031	0.026	-0.151*	0.071	-0.049*	0.023
District UE Rate <sup>7</sup>	0.132**	0.049	0.089	0.054	0.041	0.056	0.182**	0.066	0.050	0.047
District Wage [ths] <sup>7</sup>	0.220*	0.105	0.161	0.116	0.018	0.116	0.321*	0.148	0.164	0.097
Constant	0.398	1.698	-3.850	2.264	0.327	1.827	-4.401	2.581	1.279	1.602
Log likelihood	-1330.61									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.2317									
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	802.62**									
Vote Intention [%]	24.81		10.46		8.81		8.53		21.10	

Notes: 1026 observations. The dependent variable is intention to vote for a specific party, with the ODS being the base party (% vote intention 26.97). The ODS coefficients have been set to zero, so the first five columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active in a state firm is the omitted category and the economically inactive category includes students, housewives and pensioners. <sup>5</sup> Ideological identification, left wing is the omitted category. <sup>6</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>7</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01

**Table 13 Multinomial Logit Determinants of Voting Intentions, EEA 11: April 1998**

EEA11	CSSD	St. Error	KDU	St. Error	KSCM	St. Error	US	St. Error	O/R/DK	St. Error
Age	0.102*	0.052	0.005	0.061	0.058	0.062	0.178**	0.067	0.076	0.052
Age squared	-0.001*	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.002**	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Married/remarried <sup>1</sup>	0.414	0.368	-0.370	0.495	0.809	0.626	-0.812*	0.357	-0.548	0.349
Divorced/widowed <sup>1</sup>	0.977*	0.438	0.209	0.609	1.146	0.697	-0.591	0.489	0.230	0.418
No. of children <sup>2</sup>	-0.004	0.126	0.191	0.161	-0.333	0.177	0.043	0.136	0.048	0.129
Female	-0.160	0.205	0.143	0.278	0.033	0.281	-0.103	0.226	-0.206	0.208
Vocational Education <sup>3</sup>	-0.298	0.301	-0.616	0.367	-0.391	0.349	-0.308	0.394	-0.468	0.306
Secondary Education <sup>3</sup>	-1.024**	0.316	-0.649	0.374	-0.854*	0.392	0.214	0.382	-0.949**	0.320
University Education <sup>3</sup>	-1.062**	0.370	-1.181*	0.472	-1.972**	0.571	0.068	0.423	-1.245**	0.386
Economically Active: privatised state firm <sup>4</sup>	-0.398	0.294	-0.427	0.396	-0.110	0.409	-0.643	0.349	-0.383	0.306
Economically Active: private firm <sup>4</sup>	-0.698*	0.283	-0.696	0.388	-0.566	0.428	-0.319	0.305	-0.715*	0.299
Economically Inactive <sup>4</sup>	-0.276	0.352	-0.831	0.467	-0.339	0.488	0.037	0.403	-0.504	0.358
Income [thousands] <sup>5</sup>	-0.071**	0.026	-0.087**	0.032	-0.095	0.060	-0.017	0.015	-0.103**	0.026
District UE Rate <sup>6</sup>	0.085**	0.030	0.010	0.040	0.023	0.040	-0.011	0.035	0.037	0.032
District Wage [ths] <sup>6</sup>	0.018	0.061	-0.125	0.082	-0.002	0.079	-0.038	0.072	0.047	0.062
Constant	-1.252	1.349	1.892	1.640	-1.552	1.647	-2.132	1.761	-0.021	1.344
Log likelihood	-1959.049									
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0703									
c <sup>2</sup> statistic of overall model	255.870**									
Vote Intention [%]	27.68		8.45		10.86		13.80		23.15	

**Notes:** 1230 observations. The dependent variable is the intention to vote for a specific party, with the ODS being the base party (% vote intention 16.06%). The ODS coefficients have been set to zero, so the first five columns represent a complete set of MNL coefficients. <sup>1</sup> Marital status, single is the omitted category. <sup>2</sup> Number of children living in household. <sup>3</sup> Highest completed education, primary is the omitted category. <sup>4</sup> Economic status, economically active in a state firm is the omitted category and the economically inactive category includes students, housewives and pensioners. <sup>5</sup> Personal monthly income excluding benefits. <sup>6</sup> Unemployment rate and average wage in district of residence. O/R/DK stands for others, refused to answer, and don't know responses combined.

Significance level \*p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01



**Table 14 Simulated Impact of Changes in Selected Explanatory Variables**

Political Parties	KSCM		CSSD		ODS		ODA		KDU		US		O/R/DK	
Change in Percentile <sup>1</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> -60 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup> -80 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> -60 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup> -80 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> -60 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup> -80 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> -60 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup> -80 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> -60 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup> -80 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> -60 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup> -80 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> -60 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup> -80 <sup>th</sup>
EEA 11: Benchmark <sup>2</sup>	<b>9.30%*</b>		<b>29.72%*</b>		<b>15.47%*</b>				<b>9.18%*</b>		<b>11.38%*</b>		<b>24.95%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	-0.53%*	-1.62%*	-0.22%	-0.89%	1.88%*	5.92%*			-0.36%*	-1.13%*	1.06%*	3.25%*	-1.84%*	-5.55%*
Impact of Δ in Age	-1.42%*	-3.89%*	6.86%	17.25%	-10.44%*	-35.28%*			-5.72%*	-18.07%*	10.56%*	40.04%*	0.16%	-0.05%
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	-0.26%*	-0.68%*	3.12%*	7.96%*	-1.18%	-2.99%			-0.53%*	-1.36%*	-1.18%*	-2.98%*	0.03%	0.04%
EEA10: Benchmark	<b>2.2%*</b>		<b>23.7%*</b>		<b>20.8%*</b>		<b>6.9%*</b>		<b>14.5%*</b>				<b>31.9%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	-0.5%*	-1.5%*	-2.3%	-6.6%	1.8%*	5.3%*	0.6%*	1.8%*	0.5%	1.3%			-0.1%	-0.3%
Impact of Δ in Age	3.2%*	28.7%*	4.5%	8.6%	-7.4%	-26.7%	2.5%*	6.7%*	-4.0%*	-14.7%*			1.2%	-2.6%
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.5%*	1.0%*	2.8%*	6.5%	-2.3%*	-5.2%*	0.3%*	0.7%*	-0.6%*	-1.3%			-0.7%*	-1.7%
EEA 09: Benchmark	<b>1.60%*</b>		<b>19.96%*</b>		<b>26.05%*</b>		<b>8.99%*</b>		<b>7.26%*</b>				<b>36.15%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	0.11%*	0.39%*	-1.94%*	-6.72%*	1.61%*	5.68%*	0.75%*	2.71%*	-0.44%*	-1.57%*			-0.09%	-0.50%*
Impact of Δ in Age	0.49%*	1.80%*	5.11%*	18.07%*	-9.74%*	-34.57%*	2.20%	9.32%	-3.52%*	-12.93%*			5.45%*	18.30%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.03%*	0.11%*	1.02%*	3.95%*	0.27%	1.01%	0.28%	1.06%	-0.74%*	-2.82%*			-0.87%*	-3.31%*
EEA 08: Benchmark	<b>2.86%*</b>		<b>19.94%*</b>		<b>22.30%*</b>		<b>10.46%*</b>		<b>5.20%*</b>				<b>39.24%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	-0.15%*	-0.49%*	-1.04%*	-3.42%*	0.47%*	1.56%*	-0.17%	-0.58%	-0.10%*	-0.32%*			0.98%*	3.25%*
Impact of Δ in Age	0.32%*	1.15%*	5.36%*	20.29%*	-10.95%*	-40.37%*	0.49%	1.74%	0.64%*	2.30%*			4.14%*	14.89%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.11%*	0.37%*	0.57%*	1.99%*	-0.83%	-2.88%	0.57%	1.98%	0.52%*	1.82%*			-0.94%*	-3.28%*
EEA 07: Benchmark	<b>3.95%*</b>		<b>17.63%*</b>		<b>30.82%*</b>		<b>13.47%*</b>		<b>4.61%*</b>				<b>29.52%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	0.25%*	0.80%*	0.11%*	0.32%*	0.61%*	1.89%*	0.41%	1.28%	0.06%*	0.19%*			-1.44%*	-4.48%*
Impact of Δ in Age	-0.73%*	-3.78%*	2.37%*	8.48%*	-5.59%	-29.15%*	-0.13%	-1.83%*	2.90%*	25.36%*			1.17%	0.92%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.39%*	1.69%*	0.83%*	3.50%*	-0.14%	-0.63%	-0.45%	-1.88%	-0.49%*	-2.01%*			-0.15%*	-0.67%*
EEA 06: Benchmark	<b>3.95%*</b>		<b>17.63%*</b>		<b>30.82%*</b>		<b>13.47%*</b>		<b>4.61%*</b>				<b>29.52%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	0.25%*	0.80%*	0.11%*	0.32%*	0.61%*	1.89%*	0.41%	1.28%	0.06%*	0.19%*			-1.44%*	-4.48%*
Impact of Δ in Age	-0.73%*	-3.78%*	2.37%*	8.48%*	-5.59%	-29.15%*	-0.13%	-1.83%	2.90%*	25.36%*			1.17%	0.92%
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.39%*	1.69%*	0.83%*	3.50%*	-0.14%	-0.63%	-0.45%	-1.88%	-0.49%*	-2.01%*			-0.15%*	-0.67%*

**Table 14 Simulated Impact of Changes in Selected Explanatory Variables (continued)**

Political Parties	KSCM		CSSD		ODS(EEA05) OF(EEA04, 02, 01)		ODA		KDU		LSU(EEA05) CSP(EEA02-03)		O/R/DK	
<b>EEA 05: Benchmark</b>	<b>0.00%*</b>		<b>4.02%*</b>		<b>37.98%*</b>		<b>10.37%*</b>		<b>4.82%*</b>		<b>8.21%*</b>		<b>34.61%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	0.00%*	0.00%*	-0.68%*	-2.21%*	0.79%*	2.66%*	0.34%*	1.17%*	0.07%*	0.23%*	0.21%*	0.73%*	-0.74%*	-2.58%*
Impact of Δ in Age	0.00%*	0.00%*	0.64%*	0.89%	-3.46%	-21.13%	-1.95%	-9.91%	6.12%*	45.84%*	-1.46%*	-6.74%*	0.11%	-8.94%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.00%*	0.00%*	0.02%	0.07%	0.40%	1.17%	-1.81%*	-5.43%*	0.29%*	0.88%*	0.39%*	1.20%*	0.71%*	2.13%*
<b>EEA04: Benchmark</b>	<b>1.87%*</b>		<b>2.12%*</b>		<b>60.26%*</b>								<b>35.75%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	0.04%	0.15%	-0.91%*	-3.76%*	0.59%*	2.44%*							0.29%*	1.17%*
Impact of Δ in Age	0.25%	2.43%	-0.67%*	-2.08%*	14.92%*	44.50%*							-14.50%*	-44.85%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.16%	0.68%	-0.27%*	-1.01%*	-1.36%*	-5.35%*							1.47%*	5.68%*
<b>EEA 03: Benchmark</b>	<b>2.22%*</b>		<b>2.57%*</b>		<b>60.46%*</b>						<b>4.37%*</b>		<b>30.38%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	0.19%*	0.50%*	0.18%*	0.46%*	3.48%*	9.15%*					0.20%	0.53%	-4.04%*	-10.63%*
Impact of Δ in Age	0.02%	0.00%	-4.57%*	-26.47%*	-4.56%	-14.52%					2.87%	20.45%	6.25%*	20.54%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.09%*	0.43%*	-0.37%*	-1.68%*	-0.39%	-1.97%					0.06%	0.31%	0.61%*	2.91%*
<b>EEA02: Benchmark</b>	<b>8.46%*</b>		<b>3.59%*</b>		<b>59.16%*</b>				<b>0.72%*</b>		<b>4.60%*</b>		<b>23.47%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	-0.35%*	-1.03%*	-0.04%*	-0.12%*	0.24%	0.72%			0.04%*	0.11%*	-0.48%	-1.46%	0.59%*	1.78%*
Impact of Δ in Age	6.70%*	20.72%*	0.91%*	1.94%*	-4.95%	-17.42%			0.84%*	3.42%*	2.57%	8.26%	-6.07%*	-16.91%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.22%*	1.29%*	0.05%*	0.31%*	-0.72%*	-4.30%*			-0.06%*	-0.33%*	-0.15%	-0.86%	0.66%*	3.89%*
<b>EEA01: Benchmark</b>	<b>1.83%*</b>		<b>4.03%*</b>		<b>49.02%*</b>				<b>7.74%*</b>				<b>37.38%*</b>	
Impact of Δ in Income	0.04%	0.13%	-0.29%*	-0.86%*	-0.12%	-0.37%			-0.60%*	-1.80%*			0.96%*	2.89%*
Impact of Δ in Age	5.61%*	50.50%*	0.60%*	-0.35%	5.31%	-6.62%			2.29%*	1.79%			-13.81%*	-45.31%*
Impact of Δ in Regional UE	0.03%	0.23%	-0.15%*	-1.04%*	-0.57%*	-4.02%*			-0.06%*	-0.41%*			0.75%*	5.25%*

**Notes:** \* indicates that the sign of the change is significant at the 5% level.

<sup>1</sup> Change in percentiles: We examine the effect of increasing the variables of interest (Income, Age and Regional Unemployment) from their 40<sup>th</sup> to 60<sup>th</sup> percentile and from their 20<sup>th</sup> to 80<sup>th</sup> percentile when all other variables are held constant at their means.

<sup>2</sup> The benchmark figures are the simulated probabilities that an observation will take on any of the values of the dependent variable when all variables are set at their respective means.