UNEMPLOYMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, INFLATION AND NORDIC EFTA COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

Exchange Rate Policy, Inflation and Unemployment: The Experience of the Nordic EFTA Countries*

viability of existing exchange rate policies in the Nordic EFTA countries and other implications of current developments in the EC as 1992 approaches for the average in recent years. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the to a lesser extent, a weaker external position than other industrial countries on of current policies. In particular, the Nordic EFTA countries have experienced special emphasis on their devaluation record during 1976-82 and the credibility the exchange rate policies and other policies that have been tollowed, with considerably less unemployment (as intended) at the cost ot more inflation and, macroeconomic performance in these countries since the early 1970s in view of arrangements from the Nordic point of view. The paper also tries to evaluate then attempts to weigh the principal pros and cons of these and alternative countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) since the early 1970s, and This paper reviews the exchange rate policy experience ot the Nordic EFTA

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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

primarily in an endeavour to preserve the ultimate independence of their participation in the EMS or other international exchange rate arrangements, destabilizing effects of excessive volatility of exchange rates on trade, investment which they are so heavily dependent, and more recently, to restrain inflation. exchange rates. Their declared purpose has been to stabilize toreign trade, on (Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) have tollowed a policy of essentially fixed Since the early 1970s, the governments of the Nordic member countries of EFTA objectives. monetary and fiscal policies and their freedom of choice of macroeconomic and employment, as well as on inflation. Thus tar, they have also decided against They have decided against tree floating mainly out of fear tor the potentially

devalue (or revalue) their currencies unilaterally, usually in order to enhance or Instead, they have chosen to peg the exchange rates of their currencies individually to different trade-weighted or payments-weighted baskets of foreign other industrial countries on average in recent years. the cost of more inflation and, to a lesser extent, a weaker external position than Nordic EFTA countries have experienced considerably less unemployment at Sweden. Partly as a result of this common strategy, it is argued in this paper, the which, however, has recently been significantly relaxed in Finland, Norway and a tairly restrictive regime of foreign exchange control of capital transactions jeopardized their market shares abroad. At the same time, they have maintained restore external competitiveness when domestic wage increases have currencies. Indeed, they have reserved and periodically exercised the right to

perspective and their exchange rate arrangements in particular. The numbers of the national economies of the Nordic EFTA countries in an international countries since the early 1970s. The paper briefly describes the main features outcome may substantially be the intended result of judicious monetary, fiscal, misery index and without inflation or external debt getting out of hand. countries over a period of almost two decades without much effect on Okun's more inflation and larger current account deficits than other OECD member suggest that the Nordic group has been able to combine less unemployment with This paper reviews the exchange rate policy experience of the Nordic EFTA particular areas remain unresolved. insufficient domestic policy coordination as well as structural maladjustment in exchange rate and incomes policies, even though some serious problems of

rate arrangements from the Nordic standpoint. In view of the persistent inflation problem in the Nordic EFTA countries, fixed exchange rates have several The paper then attempts to weigh the principal pros and cons of current exchange

ever since the late 1960s at least. to some extent in Norway and Sweden during 1977-82, and especially in Iceland important element of the wage/exchange rate spiral observed in Finland and also increases tends to be particularly strong and difficult to resist. This has been an circumstances the pressure on the government to accommodate the wage one group of workers to threaten the jobs of other groups as well. Under such tor example, in Switzerland and Japan) permits wage increases negotiated by unions along occupational as well as industry lines rather than firm by firm (as, especially difficult in the Nordic countries, where the organization of labour costs by insisting that devaluation is out of the question, should they execute the threat if wages rise excessively nevertheless? That is an old problem. It is as soon as wage costs outpace the ability of firms to pay, given the government's commitment to fixed exchange rates. If the authorities strive to contain labour exports, so as not to endanger employment at home. Problems arise, however, keeping with the development of labour productivity and world market prices of actions is meant to ensure moderate wage and price inflation domestically, in and employer associations. Their realization of their own responsibility for their the macroeconomic consequences of wage negotiations among labour unions containing import prices and indirectly by necessitating strict monetary and fiscal discipline. They also partially absolve the government of direct responsibility for desirable properties. They contribute to overall price stability, both directly by

macroeconomic effects of devaluation. results of numerical simulations of simple analytical models exports and imports in all three countries, and also in Iceland, as well as by the is supported by econometric evidence ot substantial relative price elasticities of monetary expansion or wage inflation, at least not immediately. This impression the devaluations on the current account were not eroded by accommodative responded favourably to relative price changes and that the intended effects of Finland, Norway and Sweden during 1976-82. This suggests that trade flows general strengthening of the current account in the short to medium term, without simulation studies of the effects of devaluation in these countries. There was a general pattern is confirmed tor the short to medium term by econometric significant improvement of the current account position, for a time at least. This countries. In each country, each round of devaluation was followed by a devaluation strategy appears to have met with some success in all that have been tollowed, with special emphasis on their devaluation record during since the early 1970s in view of the exchange rate policies and other policies 1976-82 and the credibility of current policies. It is argued that, by and large, the The paper also tries to evaluate macroeconomic performance in these countries substantial increase in unemployment, in the wake of the devaluations in of the

to have worked reasonably well so tar, its very success in the past may carry the But while the exchange rate policy strategy of the Nordic EFTA countries seems

devalue again if pressed. Under these circumstances, a government profitability, export revenues or employment because the government will wage earners that excessive wage increases are unlikely to jeopardize credibility. Repeated devaluation of the currency may signal to employers and seeds of its own destruction. The problem has to do with reputation and driving force behind the Finnish devaluation cycle. triggering new demands tor devaluation after a while, and so on. This is the devaluation may prove increasingly difficult to resist with the resulting inflation commitment to a fixed exchange rate may not be credible. Demands tor

developments in the EC as 1992 approaches for the viability of existing exchange rate policies in the Nordic EFTA countries and other options. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of current

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, INPLATION, AND UNEMPLOYMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NORDIC EFTA COUNTRIES

I. Introduction

sustantial degree in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. right to devalue (or revalue) their currencies unilaterally, usually in to different trade-weighted or payments-weighted baskets of foreign international exchange destabilizing effects of excessive volatility of exchange rates on decided against free floating mainly out of fear for the potentially dependent and also, more recently, of restraining inflation. They have purpose of stabilizing foreign trade on which they are so heavily followed a policy of essentially fixed exchange rates for the declared subsequent Smithsonian agreement in 1973, countries have experienced considerably less unemployment at the cost increases have order have chosen to peg the exchange rates of their currencies individually they have also decided against participation in the EMS or their freedom of choice of macroeconomic objectives. common strategy, maintaining a to enhance or restore external competitiveness when domestic investment, and employment as well as on inflation. countries of the ultimate the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the transactions which, however, Indeed, they have reserved and periodically exercised the jeopardized their market shares abroad, fairly restrictive EPTA (Pinland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) have it is argued in this paper, the Nordic EFTA independence of their monetary and fiscal policies rate arrangements primarily regime of has recently been relaxed to the governments of the Nordic foreign exchange control Partly as a result of in an endeavor while Instead, they Thus far at the wage

other more inflation and, to a lesser extent, industrial countries on average in recent years cu weaker external position than

ĭn ΨЭξΨ V.L.s. credibility of current policies special emphasis on their devaiuation record during 1976-82 and the exchange performance in these countries since the early 1970s in view of the and cons of these and alternative arrangements from the Nordic point particular 5 brief an the Nordic EFTA countries and other options (Section V). 1992 approaches for the viability of unchanged exchange rate This (Section countries since the early 1970s.² features international perspective and their exchange rate arrangements discussion of the implications of current developments in the EC paper reviews the exchange rate policy experience rate policies and other policies that have been followed, with (Section II), and then attempts to weigh the principal pros III). of the national economies of The paper also tries to evaluate macroeconomic (Section IV). The paper briefly The paper the Nordic EFTA countries concludes describes of the Nordic policies with the 'n Ö,

II. The Nordic EFTA economies in a nutshell

and small entity. thus are In the world Denmark countries 88 less are community of nations, the Nordic EFTA countries are but well as Their total population is less than 18 million. populous than California or inhabited by the Parce fewer Islands and Greenland) included, than 23 million people Romania. in total, Even the

a. Overview

Sweden amounted to The combined gross domestic less than 3 per cent of the total for the industrial product of Finland, Iceland, Norway, and

Switzerland, is a Genberg, whereas The experience of the other two members of EFTA, is reviewed Denmark in the paper prepared for dealt with in the paper paper the the seminar by Paul de Austria Grauwe by Hans and

Nordic On the <u>ن</u> OECD consideraby Nordic compared countries in Nordic accounted for public 5 per growth of capita was also cent Ç head region ςı, 9 85 46 of, The countries force group other year countries cent EFTA exports sector GNP Ø average: per greater ш. СО With dependence in 1970, whole GDP especially 27 high 33 on average in Finland, Norway, cent higher on average for countries in hand, recent than per -3 53 15 per Ċ the Nordic and imports of 25 per than (column the rad total government expenditures and current whole (column 9). have been more in the OECD countries as a by international standards: larger Ę D capita indicating a slightly higher than average cent above open unemployment relative cent times, of OECD whole the cent that 9 'n during the Nordic 8). and the OECD area in general, BS on average average Norway in the OF. and 54 EFTA countries Ī with consumer 8 8 while 1987 the the OECD average whole 1970-88 goods and services CNP prone to and Sweden, tax burden Nordic 5 per industriai EFTA current (Table Ħ (columns 1987 in the Ħ has been considerably cent, the Nordic compared with needs dno.13 countries prices inflation than other OECD on average <u>---</u> compared with account OECD countries (column 7).3 and Sweden during 9 respectively, than elsewhere whole (column 4). countries column 1). ÇŢ ţ their average GDP since heavier in in 1987 compared with ç and 6). ጄ rising by countries accounted for ŝ 2 deficits 1970 stressed, 6 in 1987 international in per per cent 41 Finally, (columns But the ç general. 8 per cent than have lower tax receipts in the OECD CNP ç rate compared their however Nordic 1970-88 cent and for of, ø 62 per Also, ij been Ė in the the ю O.F per trade income the the the The and 112

averages period, Iceland With annual is an outlier average inflation <u>"</u> the sample, of 35 and rad Ġ cent during excluded from this these

Were that because government; occupied through various public employment schemes. open unemployment in Sweden in particular has been artificially οf the relatively large number recently, about 4 per cent of. workers of the Swedish employed directly labor force

TABLE 1 HERE

domestic policy coordination as well as structural maladjustment in some incomes policies, intended result of judicious monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, suggested without inflation or external debt getting out of hand. Ċ, current account deficits than other OECD member countries over a period been able to combine less unemployment with more inflation and larger almost In sum, remain unresolved. below that this outcome may two decades without these numbers appear even though some serious problems of insufficient much effect on Okun's misery to indicate to an important extent that the Nordic It will index be group has ьe and

Exchange rate practices

1973, currencies overriding objective of high employment in Norway and Sweden, prompting elsewhere monetary dominant narrow Norway and Sweden joined the European snake arrangement in 1972 Nordic EFTA countries adopted similar exchange rate policy strategies Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system they to leave the snake respectively, margins policy aimed at restraining inflation in Germany and perhaps role. have followed since. as well came to be regarded as incompatible with the instead to their own baskets of foreign currencies, to those As time passed, thus effectively tying their in 1978 of the EEC where and 1977, respectively, The Bank of Finiand made internal use of however, the the restrictiveness of German German currencies nark ä and to played 1971, within D peg their policy

wake 1972, export currency basket with respect to which the krona has been devalued many was officially tied to gold until 1977 as required by law, but in the other times reference the currency basket, foreign currency basket already of a and subsequently entered the EMS at its inception in 1979 since primarily in order countries is currently classified by the industries from being unduly eroded by inflation. hand, change in the currency law that year the mark was pegged to 6 determined the left EFTA to join the EEC US dollar from 1973 to 1978, the and still is. exchange to prevent the rate of ın 1972. Iceland, and hence also the Icelandic krona However, which unlike profitability of the and then adopted a foreign MY. under the the snake Pinnish Denmark, managed the with other on ===

Currently, Finland began publishing the composition of the basket daily. geometric Moreover, Soviet ruble in particular, foreign trade. reflecting all currencies accounting for more their baskets The Nordic EFTA countries have composed their foreign currency and production.4 shared of. in roughly the same way, a fixed base year was replaced by a sliding reference period, averages were substituted for arithmetic ones, Ġ the exchange per goal Since 1984, cent of stabilizing real exchange rates and 2 rate Finland has used bilateral trade weights the however, nonconvertible currencies, have been excluded from the Finnish basket. of the Finnish basket which is not index mark than 1 surprising Bust per cent of her be kept and thus external in view the within of. Bank of

weights Norway initially adopted except the US dollar was assigned a heavier weight (25 a similar system of bilateral export trade per cent)

optimai Α See "geg" John ohn Williamson (1982), Journal of Development Economics "A survey <u>--</u> of the literature August, pp.

as the four Nordic notwithstanding, the Danish krona has been about as stable in 1980-88, with a standard deviation of 6.4. EFTA currencies would have sterling and 15.4 for the US dollar during 1978-88, for example. fluctuations of the real effective exchange rates of all the Danish kronn remained within 9 per cent of its average during things being equal. say, the US dollar EFTA currencies on average in the 1980s. For comparison, the real effective been considerably larger had they been or the German mark during this period, Hence, EMS membership four Nordic real terms MERM rate The

FIGURE 1 HERE

inflation spiral for various reasons, with consumer prices rising developing roughly in parallel with their currencies since the late unchanged for more than a century despite quite different economic exchange rates among the three currencies have thus remained essentially well as under the reinstated gold standard of the late 1920s. case under the Scandinavian Currency Union before the first world war as followed a tightly connected with the European continent through EC membership the second world war, conditions cent a Danish It is interesting to note that the three Scandinavian currencies: I celandic 1972. Iceland, similar path as the Scandinavian countries with the mark in many respects -- Sweden being neutral and unoccupied during 9 per year on average during 1970-88 compared with an annual krona, Following substantial devaluation the same value vis-a-vis other currencies as was also the krona in the late 1950s on the other hand, has failed to break the persistent cent the Norwegian krona, Norway being an oil exporter, in the other four Nordic and mid-1960s, Finland has and the 였 countries. Swedish krona, the Finnish mark and and Denmark being The nominal Mou The by 35

strongest 1av0 cent, Norwegian, effective t)e and 20 per cent, 1970-88, last MERM exchange of. Swedish, these decade, whereas currencies and Finnish currencies fell however, respectively, rate the corresponding nominai οf the Finnish mark has been the Icelandic during the krona same by 12 rates fell period per of, bу γď cent, the (Figure far 98 per 23 cent per <u>ಬ</u> .

FIGURE 2 HERE

III. The pros and cons of the Nordic strategy

original Mundell-Fleming model and both wayopen economy should depend to some extent at least--and in a optimal choice between fixed and floating exchange rates assumptions systems have proved to the disturbances flexibility as well as including the degree of financial capital mobility According relative efficacy of monetary and fiscal policies relative -on various structural characteristics of the the policy actions. insulation properties of than was political to which the economy is G the conventional view thought initially, ç the nature be less robust with respect to underlying This administrative feasibility <u>ب</u> not or origin of the exogenous different exchange its more ω primarily exposed and possibly also that simple matter, as demonstrated by Argy among **53** recent largely derived economy extensions, and real wage of monetary rate however, within different Tor 'n systems ω question complicated Ç because from small and and

Holland, Staff Papers 9, November, pp. 369-379; "Stabilization policies in open econom policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates". Canadian Journal of Economics 29, November, pp. 475-485; John Flewing (1962), "Domestic financial policies under fixed and under floating exchange rates", II Kenen (eds.), pp. See Robert Mundell (1963), 859-916. Handbook of International Economics, in open economies", in Ronald Jones and Description of the conomies of the control of the contro "Capital mobility and stabilization Vol.

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þ rather system parameter, the indexation bargaining the Europe 100 shocks can 9 9 arrangement ç others direct controi. rather than the other way around, think the basis of, say, the prevailing extent of degree years bе generally has tended to be made on pragmatic grounds in than on the basis where incomes policies have and other determined simultaneously by the government in view æ In Ď, in an attempt to More importantly, of wage among labor unions and employer associations and where further has occasionally been written into View and the the optimal choice Of truly exogenous phenomena over which the complicating flexibility 211 Moreover, exchange this of explicit optimality considerations stem the escalation of wages in centralized perhaps, complexity, control in the Nordic countries is also of an exchange rate the been resorted to time and again over optimal choice of an exchange regime because ; ដ is not necessarily the choice of an exchange rate Some are both the law or extent capital mobility policy regime as being made abolished by a policy and elsewhere exchange parameters government very useful of external practice rate and wage iaw, rate that 15 has

How others choose

exchange analysis floating fixed it can the Nordic which one But and 90 even rates have typically been favored by (a) small countries (i.e. to study the determinants of exchange rate over flexible useful can judge once ones should determine though there the to ascertain how other nations years. rates and among alternative ways of fixing and for all how small open economies exists no generally valid According the exchange to Heller, rates who used discriminant have of practices, principle based on chosen their between currencies such fixed 25

economy" Studies, O. -1 University Seminar Paper Victor Argy of Stockholm No. (1986), 369, Institute "Exchange October for rate International policy for æ Economi small open

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partners.7 have basket, including the SDR.8 pure and managed floating and the fixed exchange rate group aiso almost roughly 150 member countries of the IMF operates a floating exchange of fixed and floating exchange rates. Ö, There is no evidence, however, of a link between the revealed preference this classification, whereas the US and Japan are typical floaters. Nordic capital mobility; countries with relatively low inflation; (d) countries with limited capita); (b) countries that are heavily dependent on foreign trade; countries with low incomes, albeit not necessarily low incomes per evenly divided between pegging to a single currency and to a currency rate policy makers for an exchange rate regime and the nature or origin exogenous shocks that impinge on the economy in question as might floating exchange rate group approximately evenly divided between been expected based on the somewhat different insulation properties system, countries Thus, while are with and (e) countries with relatively few trading two thirds have opted for fixed exchange typical fixed exchange rate countries according the exception of the low inflation criterion, For the record, one third of the rates, with <u>c</u> t the Ç

black market trade, exchange rates in close consultation with the IMP in an attempt to developing countries have moved in recent years from fixed to flexible reduce balance of payments deficits, foreign debt accumulation, In this connection, it is interesting put then it needs to be to note kept in mind that that severai inflation

practices", 321. See Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 10, August, Robert Heller (1978), "Determinants of exchange rate .dd 308-

See the Annual Report of the IMP, 1987.

adjustment. has responsible aggregate exchange rate appropriate and credible fairly well, thus far seems to indicate that flexible rates can suit these countries financial markets not been a serious problem in most of these countries. 9 moderation and adequate provided that the floating rate policy is accompanied by regime are underdeveloped in most of them, the experience cannot, demand management or necessary fiscal and monetary restraint as well as of course, efficency in be viewed as production. D) structural > substitute floating Even though λq

b. The Nordic strategy

ellminating substantial inflation without a fixed exchange rate. 10 has been a major consideration in the Nordic scope for very substantial monetary, and Sweden--a fixed exchange rate regime is generally a prerequisite countries iasting success in the battle against depend on made in a vaccuum or once and for all, but must almost by definition the exchange rates of their currencies. for pragmatic choice between fixed and floating exchange rates cannot example, and elsewhere. prevailing circumstances to 'n Iceland and aiso When inflation fiscal, and wage restraint. the inflation unless there đ some extent, 15 some extent 23 No nation has succeeded EFTA countries' decision serious in the Wordic in Finland, concern--as EFTA بسر 23 Norway, This ; for ۱ S 6

foreign the But ii. trade case say. ř <u>...</u> Iceiand after ß the radical structural change toward liberalization government's main objective of 1960, then a floating exchange rate or economic policy. of. ø 28

Мау Occasional Paper 1987. See "Floating exchange rates per No. 53, International International Monetary in developing countries" Fund, Washington, BC.

See Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Pischer hyperinflations past and present", Weltwirtschaftlig ЪĎ. 10 1-47. H particular, see table 17. . Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 122, 쁑. 41-42 (1986), "Stopping hiv 122, No.

more clauses contradicted by the view that justification to apply to some or all of the Nordic EFTA countries authorities consider it desirable or necessary for some American countries (but not in the Nordic countries!), or if the considered adjustment inflation would be a prerequisite for the adoption of a the public particular, order be accompanied by necessary macroeconomic inflation inflation currently sufficient domestic increased inflation for a while at least if stage, even though such a liberalization strategy generally entails government to revert contribution to the success of the strategy by reducing pressures on substantial devaluation, inflation at home than abroad, as may be said with some ö liberalization of domestic are rate Ç keep inflation under control. In the Nordic EFTA countries This line of argument, and severe macroeconomic imbalance must inevitably bring the into confronting of fixed rates) may be deemed necessary if inflation is sector in order to remove an important underlying source strengthen the balance of payments position at a needed to substantial fiscal reform including increased efficiency be beyond controi. regime. the open. economic demand restraint. to import controls and multiple currency practices prevent some of the economies of Eastern Europe where Indeed, policy once In either case, successful liberalization excessive fixed rules, or more often, floating exchange rates (or repeated instruments it should be added, is not necessarily as is the case presently in some Latin markets under conditions of suppressed This problem and ultimately and structural reforms laus, and not accompanied by can make ç 9 restrain inflation is even D harmful akin reason to accept more significant constitutional flexible 20 11 ĺ'n

the economy's long run, nominal anchor because the money supply can in principle under a floating exchange rate regime serve as

c. Benefits and costs

attributed cent of. the labor supposition, been conclusively something intended. price exchange between different the the fixed and floating exchange D) in 1988, stability and steady growth in the world economy during peak SEES Ö, major industriai countries view of 2 rates force in 1973-74 ö nations ĺ'n Ħ On the other hand, changed e, of course, 6 part 1979. while 1 the various and well known advantages under with the increase per established and 1979-81, even though such a relationship have G these countries. from one unemployment rose Thereafter, the Bretton Woods the cent on average SBA chosen one existence an system γď flexible important rates, statisticai inflation in in world inflation following the oil since 1973 seem likely system or đ D, These from in 1980 the other over it is not the exchange rates system probably catalyst O developments EMS by many observers the raď research. 12 6 EMS countries surprising other an average cent to ť and the the of 9 contributed have years, 11 10 establishment disadvantages to have the something This that per of declined currencies 1945-71 N has not cent rad had 6 Fixed ä of.

December, exchange rates: ٠đď Jacques Artus and John Young (1979), 654~698. > renewal of the debate", IMP Staff "Fixed and flexible Papers

See Morris Goldstein (1980), "Have handicapped macroeconomic policy?", Special Economics No. 14, International Finance Sec y?", Special Papers in International Finance Section, Princeton University "Have flexible exchange

point. al though 13 econometric studies thus far have been inconclusive 9 this

resist. Under one occupational as well the nevertheless? wage also example, question, contain commitment costs endanger iabor their Buoue responsibility indirectly overall ra tes wage From group Nordic and price βĢ such outpace productivity GW0 have labor being labor price This S the increases employment of. should responsibility circumstances countries ç Ьy the Switzerland and Japan) permits wage increases unions workers point has costs the necessitating fixed exchange partially stability both directly That for inflation desirable property they been ability and tends of and employer associations. the ļ. 2 ρy as ő where execute View an ä home. World macroeconomic insisting that threaten industry intended for ť the domestically old of important the organization of of, рē strict pressure market prices their rates firms the the problem Problems particularly the lines ç threat Nordic that ő actions monetary element absolve jobs of consequences ₩ ₩ ä and an especially pay devaluation by containing in keeping with rather arise, they the the EFTA if wages given 30 ا of the strong not and authorities the other government meant countries, than firm however exports labor Their the only government fiscal discipline, οf s rise and wage/exchange groups ť government's import out unions realization wage contribute 80 the excessively difficult 25 ensure ő by firm (as, difficult strive of fixed 88 25 negotiated 8001 development negotiations accommodate oř, along prices the not well moderate direct 25 exchange đ rate 2 wage one and 3 ng Š for 'n of

Press, European Monetary Policy Research, J Marcus ដ 1988 Miller (eds.), Paul de aul de Grauwe (19 ry System", Discu , July, and also The European Monetary 9e (1989), "The cost of disinflation and the Discussion Paper No. 326, Center for Econom (1989), Prancesco Giavazzi, System, Cambridge University S. Micossi, and Economic

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dur ing least spiral observed in 1977-82 and especially Finland and also in Iceland ever to some extent since in Norway the late 1960s and Sweden Ċ,

affairs exchange hypothesis rigidities, economy price and individual flexible depreciation raises cause currency appreciation to lower prices less he1d may harm would probably not independent flexible main concern here D trade The View statistically and and wage rigidities in the markets for likely as a and in wage negotiations, and may thus induce the government above rates clearly require the exchange rates and the resulting uncertainty about is mixed. 14 that uncertainty generally (b) that exchange rate flexibility of inherent inflationary bias. 15 however, source of inflation. whole. 6 efficiency of production, investment, considerations e e is two-sided: the suit the Nordic EFTA countries well presently significant exchange rate countries as well as to the world prices, there is not much empirical support Despite strong evidence The second point rests in part on the notion that case, thus also al though less discipline link between exchange rate variablilty (a) that imparting an inflationary bias explain why The inhibits economic the available first point reflects the widely the general volatility 9 of wage goods, in itself may floating in monetary the in general than and international services, and labor other econometric and price exchange activity. 101 hand, and fiscal be an the the future of rates evidence flexible This The ç

and Paper No. foreign trade"; er No. 28, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, Eric Perée and Alfred Steinherr (1989), "Exchange rate See "Exchange rate European Economic Review 33, July, volatility and world trade" "Exchange rate uncertainty PP. Occasional 1241-1264. July 1984,

flexible Some empirical tests", IME_Staff_Papers_24, Andrew Crockett and Morris Goldstein (1976), ratchet effects, exchange rates" See Morris and the Goldstein (1977), inflationary IHF Papers impact of import price "Downward price 24, November, 23, "Inflation under fixed November, рp. inflexibility, pp. 569-612 changes: and

indirectly inflation unsatisfactory monetary, under market organizations to feel less restrained at the bargaining table adopt a more expansionary or accommodative policy stance and the labor fixed than under floating exchange rates, but then rather than the flexibile exchange rate per se except perhaps fiscal, and wage policies are ő blame for

IV. Macroeconomic performance

arena since 1970 with special emphasis their inflation record, economic reviews the experience of the Nordic EPTA countries in the macroeconomic contribution to macroeconomic performance. policies and policy regimes must ultimately rest on their actual A reasonable judgement of the success or fallure of macroeconomic and unemployment rate policy and the current account and their relationship to the conduct of This section selectively

a. Inflation

significant (0.43, 0.37, and in Finland, Norway, Norway and Sweden, 0.59. Finland and Norway during 1970-88 movements in Finland, Norway, year since 1980. each of the Nordic EFTA countries than in the OECD area on average every not markedly different from that in the OECD area in general (Figures 3 inflation front: remarkable. Until the late the 1970s, inflation in the Nordic EFTA countries On the other hand, consumer prices have risen more rapidly The simple correlation between the rates of the correlations between the inflation rates in The close relationship among general price and Sweden are generally lower and less and 0.59, respectively). Iceland, however, and Sweden during this period is also is 0.50; Finland and Sweden, 0.71; and is an outlier on the inflation in

FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE

of, economic activity in Finiand. shocks arrangement with the Soviet Union reduced the adverse effects of the oil Norway's total export revenues doubled in nominal terms between 1978 and one half of her total merchandise export earnings and one sixth of GNP. exports of petroleum and natural gas from Norway accounted for more than exports comprised only about 2 per cent of Norwegian merchandise earnings. inflationary in Norway primarily through an upswing in oil export through Pinland contributed to increased inflation in Norway in much the same way as oil all along. since the mid-1970s, and that of Sweden and Finland which have imported resemblance between the experience of Norway, a significant oil exporter devaluation of all three the first oil price increase. inflation has gradually characterized by two separate bulges, The inflation record of Finland, Norway, and Sweden in this period again interesting to note while of exchange rate adjustments. of the 1970s on the current account and also, presumably, on and Sweden and many other oil importing countries, that is, inflated oil import prices and production costs and induced wage as well as accommodative aggregate demand management by Ten years later, shortly after the second oil price hike In 1972, just before the first oil price increase, petroleum during 1980-82 private On the other The first oil price hike in world markets in 1973-74 consumption rose by less than 1n currencies hand, the second oil shock in 1979-81 was following the second oil shock and another subsided this context that substantial wage increases everywhere, ÀS elsewhere ä (as well as the Danish krona), It is interesting to note the a11 first during 1974-78 three 'n Finland's bilateral trade the OECD area, countries since 60 per cent. the following ij

freely combination of lax financial policies, variety of reasons of domestic origin, including the unfortunate and unprecedented heights in the aftermath of the second oil shock for following the first oil shock and saw the rate of inflation reach new the other hand, experienced a early with wages outpacing prices by a substantial margin. floating exchange especially in Finland and Sweden, whereas Norway rebound of did not manage to reverse the inflationary upsurge rate high single digit inflation over the last of, the krona until full indexation of wages, 1983 Iceiand.

over hourly paving the way for the repeated devaiuation of all three currencies production substantial overcompensation for the oil price increases at a time when Norway and Sweden and consumer coinciding earnings impulse can be traced primarily to a given event. identify involved Nordic hikes, monetary expansion, and currency devaluation to inflation in the depreciation, during real wages should have been allowed to fall to preserve domestic EFTA countries in recent years wages 1976-82. Sweden, and Finiand during 1973-75 with any degree of accuracy. prices rose much less rapidly, or by just over 20 per cent in certain episodes where increased by more than 40 percent during this two year t WO and jobs, real wage costs rose with and immediately year rose easy to monetary expansion, Iceland had a similar experience during 1976-78 period, by 117 distinguish the independent contributions by 37 per cent in Finiand. per cent triggering a following the origin of an extended inflationary and and consumer rapid Nonetheless, it is and the relevant leads and lags new the to unsustainable levels, thus burst is a case in point. inflation first oil shock, while prices As a result of this of, The wage explosion currency ρy which culminated 88 per possible to of. cent period Hourty wage

unions. 17 also tightness or slack in labor markets as well as expected inflation, determines monetary and fiscal policy. 16 instrument which the labor market organizations wield centralized bargaining causes nominal wages to become employer associations play an important macroeconomic markets in 8 this context, 86 for move own economic objectives per cent other not only atomistically along Phillips curves in response the Nordic countries where nation-wide labor unions and it must be kept in mind that the organization of labor reasons, including rivalry among different labor in 1983 when wages were in much the temporarily frozen by Viewed in this way, nominal same way as the government a kind in order role through law. of policy to reach ij

segments ensuring positive interest rates to adjust closer contribution to increased price stability in this decade by financial obligations in Iceland since 1979, has made a substantial countries, including the adoption of fairly widespread indexation of deregulation and internationalization of credit markets Nordic EFTA countries in recent years. expansion has not been a primary source of demand inflation in the exchange rates, played a largely accommodative role In the inflationary episodes reviewed above, monetary policy) o the financial markets at least real interest in the medium rates (before to their equilibrium values, in the as is to term. On the contrary, a gradual 1980s be expected tax, Exogenous monetary in contradistinction at least) in all four under permitting thus = fixed wide has ť

Review 30, <u>بر</u> See Thorvaldur Gylfason and Assar Lindbeck (1986), governments: A game-theoretic approach", European governments: A February, pp. 5 5-26. European Economic "Endogenous

Economic Review 24, wage claims, cost inflation, 17 See Thorvaldur Gylfason and Assar Lindbeck (1964), s. cost inflation, and capacity utilization", Euro February, рp. 1-21 European "Competing

fallen substantially in Finland and Iceiand in the 1980s, and also generally expenditure by stimulating financial saving, and thus has had 1960s and 1970s. negative real interest rates generally prevalent throughout but not in Sweden. stabilizing influence on prices. the income velocity of money, broadly defined, This development has tended per se to restrain private With declining rates has also i

. Economic growth and unemployment

record of the Icelandic economy during most of the period since 1970 mounting inefficiency in the public sector. substantial government budget deficit inherited from earlier years as hampered, however, The growth performance of the Swedish economy in the 1980s may have been stimulated output growth in all three countries, at least temporarily. and Sweden as well as Norway after a while as intended and consequently competitiveness and thus increased the foreign market shares of Finland Moreover, the devaluations during 1976-82 restored external oil production for export in Norway fostered more rapid growth there wake of the than Finland and especially Sweden experienced after the mid-1970s (Figure 5). capita has increased by 2 per cent a year on average over this period been favorable in general compared with the experience of the rest of the OECD countries, with the exception of Sweden where real GDP The growth performance increasing fish catches -- and, by declining work incentives due to high marginal tax rates large extent on favorable external conditions, two oil shocks, but recovered before long. All four countries suffered significant backlashes by the gradual and successful elimination of the of the Nordic EFTA countries since indeed, extensive overfishing--The impressive growth The advent of including 1970 has Ξ

and productive resources with macroeconomic consequences that recently despite continuing favorable external conditions. deliberate and extended overheating of the economy also contributed the growth rate of GNP in Iceiand during 1970-88 is this outcome at the cost of increasingly distorting the use of financial except 1.6, and 1.7 begun to volatile for a dramatic downturn in more than that of the other three: the standard deviation of be felt in a significant deceleration of economic the rate of growth of the Icelandic economy has been much for Finland, Norway, and Sweden. than one half of total export earnings fisheries during 1981-83, Also, 3.8 compared with and about one with fisheries but activity

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pressure Therefore, labor mobility Switzerland, were subsequently exacerbated by increasing structural rigidities in persistent unemployment following the supply shocks of the 1970s that least single year since 1980, even though they have all experienced or at average over the period under review as a whole, and unemployment has unemployment standards similar picture of relatively brisk economic activity by Nordic Figures on unemployment been below the OECD average in each of the four countries every felt the general international tendency toward higher and more markets. from local interest groups, (Figure 6). EFTA countries the political has been for example, In addition, much lower in general than in the OECD In all four countries agenda in all four is relatively costly. is not well diversified geographically. the structure of employment and industry in the Nordic EFTA countries convey regional policy the Nordic governments have countries. considerations weigh registered open Under strong political Compared international

indirect subsidies rather than by encouraging interregional labor frequently met. economic difficulties in individual areas with direct

steadily increasing payroll taxes since unemployment. currency devaluation during 1976-82) in order to prevent adverse been the government's reliance on expansionary fiscal policy (as well as of the public sector in Sweden and also in Norway over the years Ξ running large budget deficits and accumulating substantial external debt public following keep unemployment in check than otherwise easier equivalent sluggish rate of growth of labor supply in Sweden over this period (and 1989). cent in either country except in Norway in 1983-84 and again the process. in Sweden since 1960, but by almost 50 per cent in Norway. Swedish government has fought incipient unemployment by expanding labor force on average since the early 1970s, In Norway and Sweden unemployment has hovered around 1960, in view of the additional stagflationary impetus brought about employment as well as expenditure and gradually also taxes and excessive domestic wage increases from increasing for employers in the private sector as well as the government in that Ħ the two oil shocks and the wage explosions of the 1970s, to about 0.7 per cent per year on average, presumably made has also been accommodated Norway, equivalent The situation g Indeed, one major reason for the persistent expansion the supply of labor has grown by about 20 per cent the other hand, of the ť the in Sweden in this period. two countries is quite about rapid rate 6 1.6 per cent per B would have been the case large extent of growth of never exceeding 3 Ŋ year by the quickly different, per cent Moreover in 1988 2 the average supply supply not δĢ

ם expanding oil least until very recently. sector without the emergence of increasing unemployment,

FIGURE 6 HERE

without order to stimulate employment: partly despite unemployed by a wide margin 1978 when the trend was turned around temporarily. Norway this ratio rose outlier then recuperation of the general government financial position. and 1982 when the trend was reversed, with a corresponding weakening and government's rose that following closely the average for the OECD area as a whole. rapidly as in Sweden and Norway for accommodative or other purposes (Figure increase Sweden every GDP in Sweden increased from 43 per cent to 67 per cent between 1970 Icelandic government has felt no need to expand the public from the In Finland, unemployment has period. slowly than in Norway over the years. due ĭ 8 20 in this field, with job vacancies as a " public sector there has not been expanded nearly as much or in unemployment in Finland during this period appears to be detectable tendency to increase over Iceland has remained 30 increase risen at about the same rate as per year general financial position weakened correspondingly during The ratio of total government expenditure to GDP in the increased labor force participation of women. For comparison, the ratio of total government expenditure cent to 42 per since ä labor from 41 per cent to 52 per cent between 1970 the mid-1970s, even though labor supply in in a supply of almost 70 per cent since close the ratio of total government expenditure cent between grossly overheated been much higher to one third since the early 1970s One reason for the relative in Sweden and hence much 1970 and 1987, rule time. than in Norway labor outnumbering Iceland market, ĕ thus The sector 1960 Ħ and Finland Finnish <u>.</u>

PIGURE 7 HERE

countries under review remain to be seen. consequences of the different strategies of accommodation of the four rad added, registered unemployment doubled in Norway (from 2 per cent expansion, conclude that while Finiand (like Denmark and most other European comparable early, insustainability of the policies of previous years. cent) and also At the risk of oversimplification, Norway. through however, to interpret these developments as an indication of devaluation, and inflation. increase in Joblessness thus far--Norway and Sweden has accepted a substantial increase in unemployment in recent Sweden, and Iceland have largely managed to avoid a public sector expansion and Iceland mainly via monetary in Iceland (from 0.5 per cent to 1 per cent). <u>...</u> During 1987-89, it should thus seems reasonable The long ç to 4 It is

c. Exchange rate policy and the current account

Sweden increasing during 1970-88 was 1 per cent in Sweden, 2 per cent in Finland, almost On average, the ratio of the current account deficit to GNP or GDP exception of Sweden during 1971-73 and Norway during 1980-85 (Figure 8). cent in Norway, and nearly 4 per cent in Iceland compared with 0.3 Ħ cent in the OECD area as a whole. review has been consistently in deficit since 1970 with the and the ratios about 40 per cent of GNP neighborhood ratio of external debt to output as well as increasing of. in all account of the balance of payments output. four of Ą 20 countries during this the end of per cent ij These figures imply a gradually of GNP Iceland 1987, net foreign 117 Finland, period despite fairly of the iong Norway, four countries term debt debt

FIGURE 8 HERE

shares beyond the levels prevailing before the oil shocks. 18 γď 2). intended to improve competitiveness and raise Swedish krona account following restoring Norway, and Sweden devalued their currencies several times each (Table option revaluation) has facilitating macroeconomic Norway again during and after the second oil shock in 1979-81 in all except account position of all four countries deteriorated considerably, and about a quarter during this period was aimed primarily option Following the While Was, which had become an oil exporter in the meantime. strategy of the Nordic external competitiveness and thus strengthening e, the devaluation of the Finnish mark and the Norwegian krona indeed, exercised repeatedly during 1976-82 when Finiand, by more a unilateral been an essential ingredient the first oil price than one half over two oil shocks, currency devaluation for, occasionally, adjustment EFTA countries in recent years. increase in 1973-74 the current the cumulative to such disturbances, the same period was apparently international market of the exchange rate devaluation of the at gradually With a view keeping open current This ç

TABLE 2 HERE

Finland, current account position, devaluation was followed by a significant improvement of the current success in all three countries. during By and large, account deficit was reduced the improvement of the current account between these 1974-82 the devaluation strategy appears 101 6 0.6 a time at least. per cent of In each country, each round of from GDP In Sweden, an average on average to have met with some for of. Ħ example. 2.1 per cent of 1983-88.

^{1985,} Chapter See Johan > Lybeck, Devalveringar, Liber Förlag, Stockholm,

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structural reform of strongly that these two objectives are persistent accumulation of foreign debt in recent years indicates restrain inflation. general, exchange until led ٥f the current account over this period is more difficult other necessary to ensure a similar improvement in the external position bigger confirmed for the short to medium term by econometric periods was concurrent slowdown of economic ensure the ç the things being equal. ø effects of devaiuation in these downturn of activity and less inflation would no doubt strengthening of the current account. of its rate policy has been defensive substantial strengthening of the collapse of oil prices in 1986. satisfactory profitability in the fisheries sector the advent less marked than in Sweden. main 21**8** the fisheries. The inflation record of Iceland as well as has of oil production for export in the interia which been In Norway, ď strike activity the link between devaluation and incompatible without countries, 19 rather ы This general pattern external accounts of Norway balance between the need (a) and imports also contributed In Iceland, Without devaiuation, than offensive: Ħ simulation studies the to both countries, deal with stance a major and (b) have 5 15 her of. a been ď

monetary exports and imports to relative price successful devaluation requires not only sufficient responsiveness discipline as well as moderation changes, in wage settlements. but also fiscal and

Financial discipline ŝ required ţ ensure that devaluation moves the

of Economics 1, pp. 35-51. See also flexibility and macroeconomic policy Basil Blackwell, Ecnomic Adjustment: and adjustment policies in Finland", Helsinki, and H. Haltunen and Sixten See Johan A. Lybeck et ai (1984), properties of five Nordic macroeconometric 19 Oxford. Small Countries and H. Haltunen (1980), "Exchange in Finland", B:35, Bank of Finland, in Finland", B:35, External shocks E , "A comparison of the dynamic models", Scandinavian Journal Eurpoean Monetary , <u>Scandinavian Journai</u> 1980), "Exchange rate International

indexed current devaiuation with given money these elasticities and other estimates indicate ō, necessary for relative effects independently term elasticities of aggregate exports numerical simulations of three countries, and also in Iceiand, substantial accommodative monetary expansion or wage effects responded favorably Sweden during 1976-82 provides an indication (a) that trade immediately. unemployment occurred stagflation. restraint is necessary to prevent devaluation from resulting in ω about two to per easily exchange rate and hence trade and expenditure **---**-account đ of. Çţ, money cent of GNP over a prices 'n the devaluation. consumer satisfying relative price elasticities of exports and imports the in the wake of the devaluations in Finland, Norway, of the response devaiuation to improve the current account over This impression is supported by econometric The general strengthening of the wages devaluations 5 in three years. short the Finiand, prices 6 are held fixed, to medium term without a substantial increase the four relative simple analytical models of the macroeconomic Specifically, typical estimates (Table simple CHO CHO Iceland, and Sweden by the equivalent countries 9 supply of wages, Moreover, numerical calibrations the to three price changes 3) 20 10 current and flexible prices improves the but extended Marshall-Lerner as well as by the generally and imports with respect and (b) that real year horizon almost falls Ħ inflation, account were not the and (b) that <u>...</u> current account that long run, (a) that lie between 0.8 Wages flows, whereas at least not are results W ņ GNP however evidence the ten per fully the medium eroded Flows ø conditions generally based on in all intended period and and 엾 Wage cent â of 2 3 in ы

thus do Norway. not These lend models themselves are designed without for oil importing countries, modification to an applicati application and

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profitability, investment, devaiuation per se بسر (2) neutrai and potential output. ä these models unless 21 raises

TABLE 3 HERE

average growth rate of GNP per capita in Finland having exceeded the OECD especially in the 1970s when the inflation differential between Finland and the OECD average was considerably larger. least than was feared by some economists critical of the strategy. consequences of the Finnish strategy have been less serious thus far points, exceeding the OECD average since Korkman. 22 behind the for difficult may these circumstances, employment because the government will devalue again if pressed. increases are unlikely to jeopardize profitability, export revenues, or currency countries seems to have worked reasonably well so far. in the past may carry the seeds of its own destruction. do with reputation and credibility. not devaiuation after a while, But while the exchange rate by one be credible. may to resist with the resulting inflation triggering new demands Finnish devaluation cycle as has been emphasized seems safe to conclude, however, With the average annual rate signal percentage point during 1970-88 without ť a government commitment to a fixed exchange Demands for devaiuation may prove employers and so on. policy strategy 1970 by less than two percentage and wage earners that excessive Repeated of inflation in Finland This is the driving force that the inflationary Moreover, of, devaluation of the Nordic EFTA the benefit its very success increasingly with the The problem the rate wage annua] Under 0 급 has ø

properties of See Ole Risager (1988), investment", Scandinavian Journal and Johan A. Lybeck et al (1984), Economics 1, five Nordic Pp. 35 - 51macroeconometric Journal of Economics 90, no. 2, pp. (1984), "A comparison of the dynamic of Economics 90, "Devaiuation, models" profitability, Scandinavian Journal 125-140,

cycle", Oxford See, Economic Papers 30, for example. Sixten Korkman (1978), November, pp. 3 357-366 "The devaluation

growth does not seem likely that the devaluation cycle has been detrimental natural resource boom (compare Norwegian oil and Icelandic in the Finnish economy over this period. fish), đ

direction more difficult delaying necessary structural reforms in the export industries and thus policy of monetary accommodation aimed explicitly at maintaining full which is not surprising in view of the Icelandic government's deliberate cycle credible, depletion of fish stocks) over time. in reducing properly measured economic growth (i.e., growth without in Western Europe, but also raising serious questions about its roie been taken retrospect, in the (or overfull) employment at the cost of high inflation. ī are has has the for in good years and face Iceland. the attempt to bring inflation down by maintaining a fixed exchange an exception) the pressure been more taken place more too far, monetary <u>...</u> of substantial real appreciation resulting from ongoing Icelandic krona during 1985-87 was abandoned in early 1988 fixed exchange rate must not always be adjusted in purpose of reducing the swings in export earnings and by the government's unwillingness either seems clear 9 the other hand, where 9 ö resulting not only in the highest rate of inflation expansion as well as excessive pronounced and more persistent than in Finland, the exchange rate 30 restrain inflation (two small devaluations to establish export that the Iceiandic than twenty times since This problem has been rendered in bad years. æ formal devaluation revenue devaluation strategy has Hage 1970, stabilization In order 6 increases. the devaluation Indeed, revalue 9 the ç

V. Conclusion

Nordic countries European **most** into 'n exchange particular, contemplate Αs the important fixed countries then have 1992 approaches and the Monetary rate policy stance EC down after 1992 with increasing seriousness, exchange rate policy and, gradually questions here System (EMS) to EC the to rise must also be reconsidered. 23 S benefits and costs of potential entry Nordic EFTA countries, levels by enhancing help bring inflation this: to EC lart. Prij would participation so, would unemployment levels 'n the the = their Norway and Sweden process? credibility the Nordic One current Ħ the Эo 1 of.

the developments. effect including considered countries devaiued unilaterally. credible margins commitment accompanying Nordic question in an emergency despite the considerable The certain. of second only with the approval of other EMS participants should be answer than the current regime EMS participation on unempioyment and growth performance discontinued access were countries would depend ç đ part ë D The Ιf ö to the fiscal and monetary policies fixed irreversible an exit from the EMS were enter existence of the above question, exchange first the 9 the other EMS, part ō, for to credit to support the currency, rate an emergency exit would probably in which the of. their Ç all time. that can be changed beyond accepted the question an important hand. entry would probably not be about unemployment, **...**; not considered to as well For that reason, one Nordic currencies seems fairly clear: extent 2 as more costs involved, 9 ao e, wage the the ë s the answer stance can out much tend to the Nordic 5 Bore ьe 20 ρ

23

Langtidsutredningen 1990 resursfördeining och penningpolitik: Avveckiad vaiutaregiering och medlemskap i EMS", in Svensk ekonomi och Europa-integrationen, Lars [17] .0 Svensson (Bilaga <u>5</u>). (1989), pp. 229-280. "Financiell integration,

excessive wage increases in defiance of EMS membership. associations as well as, indeed, on the Nordic governments themseives it could repeat itself. European snake arrangement in the 1970s and their subsequent exit from settlements. reduce the perceived need for financial discipline and prudence in wage an open question, and so is the likely reaction of government policy to influence of EMS participation on labor unions and employers' The history of Norwegian and Swedish entry into the In view of this, the potential restraining

TABLE 1
The Nordic EFTA Countries: Overview


	(1) GDP	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	19871)	GDP Per capita 1987 ²⁾	Growth of GDP Per capita 1970-88 ³)	Trade/GNP ratio 1987 ³)	Government spending/GNP 1987 ³)	Taxes/GNP 1987 ³⁾	Inflation 1970-88 ³)		Current eficit/GNP 1970-88 ³)
Finland	89.5	18,200	3.2	50.2	42.0	39.6	9.0	4.1	2.0
Iceland	5.3	21,800	3,8	74.3	33.3	32.2	35.2	0 , 6	3.5
Norway	82.7	19,800	3.5	73.9	51.6	54.2	8.6	2.1	2.6
Sweden	158.5	18,900	2.0	63.5	59.9	62.7	8.4	1.9	0.9
Total/ Weighted average	336.0	18,900	2.7	63.5	52.7	53.9	9.0	2.5	1.6
Total OECI Weighted	9/								
average 2	2,530.0	14,900	2.3	46.3	40.9	37.2	7.3	6.1	0.3

¹⁾ In billions of US dollars.


Sources: OECD and IMF.

²⁾ In US dollars.


³⁾ In per cent.




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
INFLATION 1970-88




INFLATION 1970-88



ECONOMIC GROWTH 1970-88




UNEMPLOYMENT 1970-88



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SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 1970-88 TOTAL GOVERNMENT OUTLAYS AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP



CURRENT ACCOUNT 1970-88 IN PER CENT OF GNP/GDP

