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ABSTRACT

Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures*

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures, involving 'contractibility' of sovereign debtor's payoffs, suspension of convertibility in a 'discovery' phase and penalties in case of malfeasance. In relation to the current debate, this is more akin to the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism than the Collective Action Clauses which some promote as an alternative.

JEL Classification: F02, F30, F33 and F34

Keywords: creditor coordination, international financial architecture, moral hazard and sovereign debt restructuring

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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY

In criticising the conventional wisdom ? the Washington Consensus ? Guillermo Calvo of Inter-American Development Bank argues that emerging market finance is subject to market failures with potentially disastrous consequences. At the UTDT summer workshop in Buenos Aires in August 2002 he proposed that whether or not a theory of sovereign debt crisis includes 'sudden stops' should be a crucial test of its empirical relevance for emerging market finance (see Calvo *et al* (2002)). In his recent book on the international monetary system, Tirole (2002, p. ix-x) evidently takes the same perspective: he begins by referring to the wide consensus that has emerged among economists that 'capital account liberalization...was unambiguously good. Good for the debtor countries, good for the world economy' but goes on to note 'that consensus has been shattered lately. A number of capital account liberalizations have been followed by spectacular foreign exchange and banking crises'.

Following Russia's partial foreign debt repudiation in August 1998, for example, generous inflows to Latin America came to a standstill; and sovereign interest rate spreads rose to over 1600 basis points on the Emerging Market Bond index (EMBI+). These developments ? together with the collapsing currencies and soaring sovereign spreads facing many Latin American countries in 2001/2 ? have put in question traditional explanations for financial crises, based on current account and fiscal deficits. They suggest the need to focus on the intrinsic behaviour of capital markets.

The focus of this Paper is on how problems of creditor coordination interact with debtors' incentives to generate excessive crises. In the academic literature, these issues are typically treated separately. In explaining 'bank runs', for example, the classic paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrates the possibility of multiple equilibria in financial markets, but takes as given the structure of demand deposit contracts (i.e. the right of depositors to withdraw on demand) and the choice of investments by the bank. To help select the 'good' equilibrium, three institutional mechanisms were discussed ? provision of liquidity, suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance. Analogous coordination problems arise in connection with emerging-market bonds and similar proposals have recently been made with respect to sovereign debt. Stanley Fischer (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Truman (2001), for example, have emphasized official provision of liquidity; while Krugman (1998) called for capital outflow controls to protect East Asian currencies (i.e. a suspension of convertibility). There has not been much talk of explicit insurance, Soros (1998) and Jeanne (2001) being exceptions; but an additional possibility has been widely discussed, that of *revising the nature of sovereign debt contracts themselves*. Eichengreen and

Portes (1995), Buchheit and Gulati (2000) and Taylor (2002) have advocated the insertion of collective action clauses to assist creditor coordination.

Proposals like these, designed to solve creditor coordination problems, have been criticised for failing to take into account their effect on sovereign debtors' incentives. Barro (1998, p.18), for example, suggested that bailouts can increase the probability of sovereign default, stating that 'bailouts increase "moral hazard" by rewarding and encouraging bad policies by governments and excessive risk-taking by banks'. With reference to \$42 billion support package for Brazil in 1998, for example, Barro asked: 'How did the Brazilians qualify for this support? They did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies. If their policies had been better, they would not be in their current difficulties and would not qualify for IMF money'. After further discussion of the bailouts for Mexico and Russia, he concluded 'the IMF might consider changing its name to the IMH ? the Institute for Moral Hazard'. Typically, debtor's moral hazard has been considered in a separate strand of the literature that focuses on the use of punishment strategies in models of repeated interaction. In Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), for example, *trade sanctions* are the punishment mechanism to prevent strategic default. But since their bargaining mode assumes a single creditor lending to a single debtor, creditor coordination problems are not discussed. Nor are they addressed in Kletzer and Wright (2000), who use a repeated game model to study how restricting access to capital markets can check moral hazard.

A convincing treatment of sovereign debt crises and their resolution needs to combine creditor coordination and debtor incentives in a consistent framework. This Paper develops such a framework. It is structured as follows:

To set the scene, we first describe the two principal proposals for improving the international financial architecture currently under active consideration, the *Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism* (SDRM) advocated by the IMF and the *Collective Action Clauses* recommended by the US Treasury.

The analysis follows in section 3 with a canonical two-player game of *creditor coordination* where neither creditor can make a credible commitment not to quit where there is a default, even when shocks are temporary. This coordination game has three Nash equilibria: two in pure strategies (stay, stay) and (quit, quit), and a third in mixed strategies. Solving creditor coordination problems in sovereign bond markets is, however, subject to a moral hazard constraint: that debtors must retain the incentive to service their debts. In this model of sovereign illiquidity with three Nash equilibria facing creditors, it is quite likely that this incentive constraint rules out the no-crisis equilibrium, and either the mixed strategy equilibrium or the pure strategy where all creditors quit will be selected, depending on how severe the incentive problem is. In general, however, the termination probability is higher than necessary for incentive purposes, i.e. *there are too many crises*.

Though, in general, interest rates are treated as given, we discuss briefly how they may be determined endogenously, depending on equilibrium selected. In particular, we indicate how the model might be calibrated to the data, with parameter chosen so as to generate sovereign spreads that vary over a range running from 300 to 7000 basis points (see Table 5). The possible perverse effects of unregulated financial liberalization are also discussed using this framework.

Our analysis implies that bailouts alone will not solve the underlying causes of sovereign debt crises; and that the market equilibrium needed to provide the right incentives is excessively prone to financial crisis (i.e. to sudden stops in capital flows). How can bond markets be made more efficient? We consider a bankruptcy procedure involving temporary stay on creditor litigation and discovery process for determining the underlying causes of default. A key element of the procedure is that when the sovereign debtor in default is found to have made little or no effort, its private payoffs will be reduced *ex post*. To provide the right incentives, it is crucial that the mechanism for doing this should have been agreed *ex ante*, as would be true if a ruled-governed public agency is involved. Moreover, we argue that privately issued bond contracts are unlikely to achieve the same result.

The mechanism we describe incorporates features of the bankruptcy procedures advocated by the IMF (Krueger, 2002) ? though, unlike the IMF's proposal, it is not restricted to cases of 'insolvency'. We conclude, therefore, that the institutional approach to sovereign debt restructuring proposed by the IMF is, in principle, capable of increasing bond market efficiency. What the rules should be ? and whether the IMF as currently constituted is the appropriate public agency to implement them ? are policy issues that remain to be discussed.

In related work, Tirole (2002) has recently emphasised the 'common agency problems' affecting sovereign borrowing: the contracting externalities, which may lead to over-borrowing and excessive short-term debt, and the collective action problems that prevent efficient rollover and restructuring. Though our focus is somewhat different ? we take both the amount and maturity structure of sovereign debt as given ? the analytical approach we use has many features in common, including the assumption that there are debtor payoffs which cannot be secured by creditors (i.e. are not 'contractible') and the links that are established between *ex-post* resolution procedures and *ex-ante* debtor incentives. Our institutional recommendation for increasing the contractibility of the debtor payoffs is not unlike Tirole's proposal to increase the 'pledgable income' of the sovereign debtor. Like Tirole, we have focused on the problems that can arise from contracts that pose problems of creditor coordination. For simplicity we have assumed that creditors all share the same

information: but the information asymmetries stressed by Calvo would (as the Appendix suggests) greatly enrich the analysis.

The framework developed here could be used to look at contagion in capital markets. Masson (1999, p.267), for instance, argues, 'pure contagion involves changes in expectations that is not related to country's macroeconomic fundamentals'. To include contagion on this definition, we need only relax the assumption that the market selects the most efficient incentive compatible equilibrium between creditors: a move from a mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure strategy of quitting unconnected with any change in fundamentals would count as contagion on Masson's definition (and, as Table 5 indicates, could double sovereign spreads). In future research, we intend to include the determination of sovereign spreads within the analysis; and to combine creditor heterogeneity and insolvency shocks with debtor moral hazard. Another useful extension would be to take account of the politics of decision-making within a debtor country and how it interacts with the debt crises.

Introduction

Following Mexico's moratorium on its external debt payments in 1982, virtually all voluntary lending to emerging markets by commercial banks ceased (Buchheit, 1999); and the eighties came to be known as the 'lost decade' in Latin America. When lending to these markets restarted in the 1990s, as a result of the Brady Plan, lenders sought to avoid any repeat of the write-downs imposed on commercial banks by swapping loans for sovereign bonds. Unlike bank lending, however, Brady bonds issued under New York law cannot be restructured without unanimous consent. While this may be a useful check on debtor's 'moral hazard', it means that emerging markets are exposed to financial crisis due to creditor panic or extraneous shocks to their debt service capacity. Nevertheless, for some years, capital kept flowing to emerging markets at modest rates of interest – underwritten in part by an IMF policy of (ever increasing) bail-outs. Following Russia's partial foreign debt repudiation in August 1998, however, generous inflows to Latin America once again came to a standstill; and sovereign interest rate spreads rose to over 1600 basis points on the EMBI index, remaining above 700 basis points for the next two years.

These developments – together with the collapsing currencies and soaring sovereign spreads facing many Latin American countries in 2001/2 – have put in question traditional explanations for financial crises, based on current account and fiscal deficits. They suggest the need to focus on the intrinsic behaviour of capital markets (Calvo et al, 2002). Why do sudden stops to the flows of finance occur? What are the economic consequences, and the implications for institutional design?

In this paper, we focus on how problems of creditor co-ordination interact with debtor's incentives to generate excessive crises. In the literature, however, these issues are typically treated separately. In explaining bank runs, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrated the possibility of multiple equilibria in financial markets, taking as given the structure of demand deposit contracts (i.e. the right of depositors to withdraw on demand) and the choice of investments by the bank. To help select the "good" equilibrium, three institutional mechanisms were discussed – provision of liquidity, suspension of convertibility and deposit insurance. Analogous co-ordination problems arise in connection with emerging-market bonds footnote and similar proposals have recently been made. Stanley Fischer (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Truman (2001), for example, have emphasised official provision of liquidity; while Krugman (1998) called for capital outflow controls to protect East Asian currencies (i.e. a suspension of convertibility). There has not been much talk of explicit insurance, Soros (1998) and Jeanne (2001) being exceptions: but an additional possibility has been widely discussed, that of revising the nature of sovereign debt contracts themselves. Eichengreen and Portes (1995), Buchheit and Gulati (2000) and Taylor (2002) have advocated the insertion of collective action clauses to assist creditor co-ordination.

Such proposals to solve creditor coordination problems have been criticised for failing to take into account their effect on sovereign debtors' incentives. Barro (1998, p.18), for example, suggested that bail-outs can increase the probability of sovereign default, stating that "bailouts increase 'moral hazard' by rewarding and encouraging bad policies by governments and excessive risk-taking by banks". With reference to \$42 billion package for Brazil in 1998, for example, Barro asked: "How did the Brazilians qualify for this support? They did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies. If their policies had been better, they would not be in their current difficulties and would not qualify for IMF money". After further discussion of the bailouts for Mexico and Russia, he concluded "the

IMF might consider changing its name to the IMH– the Institute for Moral Hazard”.

Typically, however, debtor’s moral hazard has been considered in a separate strand of the literature which focuses on the use of punishment strategies in models of repeated interaction. In Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), for example, trade sanctions are the punishment mechanism to prevent strategic default. But since their bargaining model assumes a single creditor lending to a single debtor, creditor coordination problems are not discussed. Nor are they addressed in Kletzer and Wright (2000), who use a repeated game model to study how restricting access to capital markets can check moral hazard. footnote

A convincing treatment of sovereign debt crises and their resolution needs to combine creditor co-ordination and debtor incentives in a consistent framework. In this paper, we develop such a framework. It implies that bail-outs do not solve the underlying causes of a sovereign debt crisis; and that the market equilibrium needed to provide the right incentives is excessively prone to financial crisis (i.e. to sudden stops in capital flows). To improve on the equilibrium market outcome, we analyse an international bankruptcy procedure as ex-ante commitment device that involves (a) ensuring partial contractibility of sovereign debtor’s payoffs, (b) temporary suspension of convertibility in a ‘discovery’ phase and (c) ex-post transfers. The mechanism we describe incorporates features of the bankruptcy procedures advocated by the IMF (Krueger, 2002) – though, unlike the IMF’s proposal, it is not restricted to cases of ‘insolvency’. On the other hand, it differs sharply from the ‘crisis insurance fund’ footnote recommended by Jeanne (2001) who assumes that solving the creditor coordination problem has no impact on the debtor’s incentives.

In related work, Tirole (2002) has recently emphasised the ‘common agency problems’ affecting sovereign borrowing: the contracting externalities which may lead to over-borrowing and excessive short-term debt, and the collective action problems that prevent efficient roll-over and restructuring. Though our focus is somewhat different – we take both the amount and maturity structure of sovereign debt as given – the analytical approach we use has many features in common, including the assumption that there are debtor payoffs which cannot be secured by creditors (i.e. are not ‘contractible’) and the links that are established between ex-post resolution procedures and ex-ante debtor incentives. Our institutional recommendation for increasing the contractibility of the debtor payoffs is not unlike Tirole’s proposal to increase the ‘pledgable income’ of the sovereign debtor.

While in the main body of the paper, we have, for simplicity, assumed that shocks are temporary and creditors have symmetric (but incomplete) information about these shocks and the actions chosen by the debtor, the appendix discusses the issues that arise when creditors are unsure and disagree whether the shock is temporary or permanent footnote . The model and results in the Appendix share with Calvo (1999) the focus on asymmetric information and heterogenous creditors as causes of excessive crises.

The paper is structured as follows. To set the scene, we first describe the two principal proposals for improving the international financial architecture currently under active consideration, the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) advocated by the IMF and the Collective Action Clauses recommended by the US Treasury. The analysis begins in section 3 with a canonical two-player game of *creditor coordination* where neither creditor can make a credible commitment not to play a grab race, even when shocks are temporary. To select between the multiple equilibria of the creditor game, we use debtor’s incentives – rather than sunspots or risk dominance. To this end, we present a generic model of *debtor moral hazard*, where the sovereign debtor cannot credibly (or verifiably) commit to putting in effort ex-ante, due to either sovereign immunity or non-contractibility of debtor payoffs; nor can he commit to ex-post bargaining in the event of default. Then we examine how the equilibrium selection in the creditor coordination

problem interacts with the sovereign debtor's incentives and show that solving the sovereign debtor's incentive problems requires excessive 'project termination' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. Though, in general, we treat interest rates as given, we discuss briefly how they may be determined endogenously, depending on equilibrium selected. Lastly, we consider potential improvements involving either SDRM or changes to contracts. The Appendix contains a model of asymmetric information and excessive crisis.

Sovereign debt restructuring: Two mechanisms

Collective action clauses in bond contracts

After the Mexican crisis of 1994/5, the Deputies of the G-10 made a number of recommendations to facilitate crisis management (Group of Ten Report, 1996). As regards liquidity provision, for example, they suggested that the IMF should 'lend into arrears' for countries whose domestic policies were deemed acceptable. For the private sector, they commended **changes to contractual provisions** covering sovereign debt (so as to allow for the collective representation of bondholders; for supermajority voting on changing the terms and conditions of the debt contract; and for sharing of proceeds among creditors). Such ideas had found academic support in the work of Eichengreen and Portes (1995) who also recommended the creation of a Bondholders Council to help negotiate debt reconstruction. But markets have proved very slow to respond. To date, only two sovereign debtors have incorporated such clauses in their foreign currency liabilities, but these are the UK and Canada and not the emerging market debtors for whom the recommendation was intended – probably because of a signalling problem (Eichengreen, 1999).

The increasingly desperate case of Argentina has re-opened the debate on sovereign debt restructuring. footnote Thus in April 2002, John Taylor (2002), on behalf of the US Treasury, argued forcefully for the inclusion of collective action clauses in the emerging market debt. To help overcome the problem of transition, the US Treasury proposed adding substantial "carrots and sticks" as incentives to change. (Positive incentives could include lower interest rate charges when borrowing from the IMF; and further financial inducements to carry out bond swaps on the existing stock: as a punishment, the insertion of such clauses could be made a precondition of seeking an IMF program.) To tackle problems of asset diversity, it was proposed that such clauses could be included in bank debt as well. For problems of aggregation across creditor classes, it was proposed that disputes between creditors could be handled in an arbitration process provided for in the contracts themselves. An alternative suggestion from Morgan Chase and Co. is that of a two-step bond swap where the first step is designed to achieve uniformity of claim, and the second step is the actual restructuring, Bartholomew, Stern, and Liuzzi (2002).

A sovereign debt restructuring mechanism

Jeffrey Sachs's response to the Mexican crisis of 1994/5 was that sovereigns needed the basic protections available to corporate borrowers and he proposed an **international bankruptcy court** for sovereign debt restructuring. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) provide an account of this and other proposals for revising an international financial architecture to incorporate bankruptcy-style procedures.

The new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism first outlined by Anne Krueger in November 2001 was clearly inspired by the analogy of the US corporate bankruptcy procedures (Chapter 11, in particular). While collective action clauses also embody similar provisions for supermajority voting, the IMF claims that SDRM is necessary to solve the problems of aggregation and of transition discussed above (Anne Krueger, 2002, p.14).

The evolution of corporate debt restructuring and its implications

Buchheit and Gulati (2002) contrast the different paths taken by Britain and United States in respect of corporate debt restructuring. As indicated in Column 1 of the table below, UK creditors inserted collective action clauses into their bonds in the nineteenth century; but – because these clauses were not acceptable under New York law – the US adopted court-ordered bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Buchheit and Gulati argue that the global economy should now follow the lead of the London bond market by adopting collective action clauses, implemented if necessary by ‘exit consent swaps’, i.e. bond exchanges where creditors accepting the new contract agree to changes which render the old contracts less attractive. These links between corporate history and the current debate on sovereign debt are summarised in Table 1.

[Table 1. *Debt restructuring: Two approaches*]

This historical summary may suggest that collective action clauses and court-ordered procedures are substitutes. But the London capital market has subsequently gone on to develop court-ordered bankruptcy procedures analogous to those in the US, so they may well be complementary (Miller, 2002). It may be easier in the short run to solve the transition problem of modifying bond contracts than it is to revise the IMF Articles of Agreement; there may nevertheless be advantages in having an explicit sovereign debt restructuring mechanism. The simple model of sovereign debt that follows abstracts from the aggregation and transition problems which play such an important role in the current debate: it does suggest, however, that sovereign bankruptcy procedures combined with IMF-style conditionality can better achieve the commitment needed than would collective action clauses inserted into bond contracts.

Creditor co-ordination without moral hazard

Take the case of a sovereign embarking on a bond-financed investment project, costing K , which lasts only two periods. All the finance is supplied by two investors, investing b each, who are promised returns of r in the first period and $1 - r$ in the second period. So long as resources available cover these payments (i.e. cash flow in period 1 is greater than $2rb$ and cash flow in period 2 is greater than $1 - r - 2b$), all is well and the project will run to completion.

[Fig.1. *Timeline of events: Liquidity shocks*]

Consider what happens if an unanticipated, exogenous shock (‘bad luck’) lowers the capacity to pay in period one below the amount that is due to bond holders under their contract. If it is strictly a shock to liquidity, which is what we assume here, then project net worth will be unchanged. One example might be a country hit by contagion where the funds earmarked for debt service are suddenly withdrawn (as for Korea in 1998); another would be a sovereign debtor in a ‘credit chain’ forced into default by delays in payment by its creditors. Since failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract constitutes technical default, each creditor is entitled to accelerate its claim, demanding the capital sum

as well as the current coupon owed in period 1, i.e. technical default makes the debt 'callable' in period 1 and exposes the sovereign to the risk of a *liquidity crisis*. (Acceleration of the claim in this way normally requires a minimum percentage of creditors to act, usually 25%: but in our two-creditor model, one is enough.)

The co-ordination game facing the two creditors is shown in Table 2 below where the actions of Creditor 1 (Quit, Stay) are indicated by rows 1 and 2 respectively; likewise for Creditor 2 by the columns. In the cells showing the resulting payoffs, those for Creditor 1 are given first.

[Table 2. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]

Symbols used and key assumptions made in determining the payoffs are as follows. First, if either creditor accelerates its claim, the project will end (i.e. there is a minimum level of resources $K_1 = K$ required for continuation, and $1 - r - b = K - K_1$ where $\bar{Q} = K$ is the recovery amount if the project is terminated in period 1. Second, the creditor who accelerates when the other does not, reckons to recover either his initial investment b plus interest rb or the full quit value *minus* the privately borne legal costs of quitting L – leaving the other creditor with the residual, if any, as in a grab race for a firm's assets where liquidation allows the first mover to exit without much loss of value but liquidation is costly for other creditors. Third, if both quit, they each pay legal fees, L , and split the expected recovery amount equally between themselves. (Most bargaining solutions support the latter assumption, including those of Nash and Kalai - Smorodinsky.) Last of all, we assume that unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so there is no loss of value to the bondholders if the project continues. Thus, if both creditors decide to stay, the payoffs are as shown in the bottom right cell.

As is evident after normalising the payoffs footnote (see Table 3, where $1 - r - b = 0$), this coordination game has three Nash equilibria, two in pure strategies (Stay, Stay) – with unit payoffs and (Quit, Quit) with zero payoff – and a third in mixed strategies where each creditor quits with probability $q = \frac{1-r-b}{1-r}$. The payoffs of the normalised game are shown in Fig.2 together with three equilibria indicated at A, B and C. Pure strategy equilibrium A represents a total coordination failure among creditors; and the mixed strategy equilibrium B represents a partial coordination failure.

[Table 3. Normalised expected, discounted payoffs for the co-ordination game]

What quit rates might one expect in the mixed strategy equilibrium? In their discussion of sovereign spreads, Cline and Barnes (1997) use a recovery rate of 0.5. If, correspondingly, one was to assume that the recovery value if the project is liquidated in the first period is sufficient to repay only one of the two creditors i.e. $\bar{Q} = 1 - r - b$, and that the legal fee faced by any creditor accelerating his claim is equal to 10% i.e. $L = 0.1(1 - r - b)$, we find that, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the individual quit rate is 0.2 and the continuation probability is 0.64. In the case, the pay-offs and equilibria will appear as in Fig.2.

[Fig. 2. Discounted expected payoff in period 1: The creditor co-ordination game (with normalised payoffs)]

How is one to select between these equilibria? One possible answer is that the equilibrium is selected by *sunspots*. Sunspots are random, payoff-irrelevant states of nature which are publicly observed and are used by creditors to coordinate their expectations and actions (see, for instance, Jeanne, 2001, Peck and Shell, forthcoming). This approach implies that sovereign debt crisis occur with positive probability: but the probability is entirely independent of the underlying economic fundamentals – an aspect which Morris and Shin (1998) criticise.

A second approach might be to focus on equilibria in pure strategies and use *risk dominance* as the selection criterion used by creditors. Note that, in this context, quitting is

risk dominant when the gain to being the first mover is the creditor grab race is relatively large. footnote (Let α and $1 - \alpha$ be the probabilities that player 1 attaches to the other player quitting and staying, respectively. Then expected payoffs to quitting and staying for player 1 are $\alpha(1 - \alpha)$ and $1 - \alpha(1 - \alpha)$. The condition for quitting to be strictly risk dominant (i.e. $\alpha(1 - \alpha) > 1 - \alpha(1 - \alpha)$) is that $\alpha > 1 - \alpha$.)

A more satisfactory theory of which equilibrium will be chosen lies, we believe, in the need to provide appropriate *incentives for the debtor*, which is what we examine in the next section. While the main body of the paper deals only with the case of two creditors, the Appendix examines the general case and shows that the key features – the existence of two pure strategy Nash equilibria and an other mixed strategy equilibrium – continue to hold with n identical creditors. Second issue discussed in the Appendix is the extension of the creditor coordination game to the case where the shock on the country's fundamentals is not temporary. Where, conditional on default, there is incomplete information and disagreement within creditors about whether the shock is temporary or permanent, it is possible to show that, at equilibrium, there is inefficient termination of the project as well. footnote

Sovereign borrowing with moral hazard

Selecting equilibrium without taking account of debtor's behaviour is inappropriate if different solutions to the creditor coordination problem alter incentives of the sovereign debtor. If the probability of project termination were reduce to zero, for instance, this could have the perverse consequence of actually increasing the possibility of sovereign debt crises, as the sovereign debtor uses the money borrowed from creditors unwisely, Barro (1998). It is possible, therefore, that a positive probability of termination may be needed to solve the moral hazard problem.

The model of debtors moral hazard developed here is of a small open economy where, as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), the interest rate at which the sovereign can borrow in world markets is fixed. (For simplicity, dynamic interactions between creditors and sovereign debtors such as those involved in models of reputation are ignored footnote .) Assume as before that the sovereign issues debt in period 0 which promises an interest coupon in period 1 and repayment the capital sum together with a second interest coupon in period 2. But before the first coupon becomes due, there are two events that may lead to default. First the debtor has to choose a level of effort, either good and bad; and second an independently-determined negative shock arrives with probability p . Since we are still looking at *liquidity crises*, bad effort in this context involves condoning (or causing) cash flows to be temporarily reduced so that debt interest due cannot be paid on time. (It might involve those in power shipping cash overseas in a flight of capital which leads to default, for example.) We assume that either bad effort or a negative exogenous shock is sufficient to cause default – but which of these is not immediately evident. If the cause of the technical default is revealed fairly soon ('early') i.e. before creditors decide to stay or withdraw, the delay is not significant. But the problem of debtor's moral hazard arises when creditors have to decide whether to stay or withdraw before revelation takes place, see Fig.3.

[Fig.3. Timeline of events]

There are four possible out-turns in period 1, as shown in Fig.4 below, where it is assumed that with good effort *plus* good luck the coupon can be paid, but not otherwise. If

coupon is paid on time, of course, creditors have no option to terminate the loan, and the project continues to completion. But when the coupon is not paid, creditors can accelerate.

[Fig.4. Events prior to default or no default in period 1]

It is assumed that creditors are able to distinguish between a default caused by bad luck *plus* bad effort and defaults due to only *one* of these factors; but that they are unable to distinguish between cases of the latter. So, as the circle in Fig. 3 indicates, they are unable to distinguish between default due to a bad shock (for example, a delay in receipt of payments due to the sovereign in period 1) combined with good effort, and one due to just bad effort - with no shock (capital flight, for example).

In the subgame following default, the co-ordination game facing the two creditors is shown in Table 4 below.

[Table 4. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]

The only new elements are the continuation values if both creditors choose to stay. As before, we assume that unpaid interest is rolled-up and added to the coupon in period 2, so there is no loss of value to the bondholders from a temporary exogenous shock if the project continues. But creditors will not be paid in full if the sovereign does not put in good effort. Let p be the probability of an exogenous shock drawn by nature and h denote the hair-cut taken by creditors (due to bad effort by the debtor) footnote . With probability p , each debtor obtains $1 - r - b$ at $t = 2$ while with probability $1 - p$, each creditor suffers a hair cut, h , at $t = 2$; therefore, conditional on the default at $t = 1$, the expected payoff to each creditor at $t = 2$ is $1 - r - bp - (1 - r - b - h)(1 - p) = 1 - r - b - h(1 - p)$.

After normalisation, the payoff matrix will have the same structure as before; and therefore the set of equilibria remains unchanged. In this section, we will focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium where either creditor quits with probability q . Since either one leaving triggers disorderly default, the continuation probability is $1 - c = 1 - q^2$ where c is the probability of disorderly default.

What if the need to provide incentives for the debtor to put in good effort is used as a principle for selecting equilibrium? Assume that the continuation outcome, where neither quits, cannot be the part of a sub-game perfect equilibrium where the debtor chooses to put in effort (i.e. assume that a debtor, whose funding is guaranteed, will inevitably be tempted to put in bad effort). By contrast, the outcome where creditors quit for sure will certainly give debtor an incentive to put in effort: but it is socially inefficient as any temporary exogenous shock will trigger a liquidity crisis. The mixed strategy equilibrium should provide some incentives the debtor: but will this be socially efficient?

Debtor moral hazard and incentive compatible randomisation

The source of moral hazard in our model is that the sovereign debtor has incentives that are not aligned with those of the creditors. Funded by resources borrowed in the international bond markets, we assume that the sovereign debtor receives 'private payoffs' when the project terminates at $t = 1$ or at $t = 2$. To begin with, we assume that these payoffs are essentially 'non-contractible', i.e. cannot be attached by the creditors in settlement of their claims nor can the sovereign debtor make a credible commitment to transfer these payoffs to the creditors. If funds are used to subsidise a public corporation, for example, the assets of the corporation are not attachable even though the sovereign has waived immunity: so these assets would count as private payoffs. Funds transferred to private citizens fall in the same category: the added popularity of the government is not something that creditors can attach either.

We further assume that the value of these debtor payoffs depends on whether ‘effort’ is good or bad, where good effort implies that default only occurs with the bad exogenous shock but bad effort implies that default is inevitable. Good effort could correspond to a situation where, for instance, money is borrowed and used to promote R&D in the export sector to help the country remain internationally competitive. Bad effort might correspond to transferring borrowed money to rich people who are free to put it in tax havens overseas, exposing the country to currency risk and the budget to a loss of tax revenue. (An alternative interpretation, suggested by James Tobin, would be that good effort corresponds to properly regulated liberalisation of domestic financial markets and bad effort corresponds to un-regulated financial liberalisation. footnote)

Let u_t^G and u_t^B denote the expected, discounted payoffs (measured at $t - 1$) for the sovereign debtor when the project is terminated at period t , $t = 1, 2$. We assume, for simplicity, that there is no residual value of the project after paying for debt service and repayment, so u_t^G and u_t^B consist of the non-contractible benefits to the sovereign. Suppose $u_t^G > u_t^B$ for all t . In that event, there is no solution to the debtor moral hazard problem without a bankruptcy procedure because, ex ante, the sovereign debtor will always choose the bad effort even if the project is terminated in period 1. The intermediary case, which we study below, is when $u_1^G > u_1^B$ but $u_2^G < u_2^B$. This is shown in Fig. 5 where BB, the schedule showing expected payoff to bad effort, is steeper than GG which gives the expected payoff to good effort. If the probability of continuation $1 - \delta$, was equal to 0, second-period payoff would of course be irrelevant. As $1 - \delta$ increases to one, however, the prospect of continuation with high private benefits makes bad effort (‘shirking’) more attractive.

[Fig.5. Debtor moral hazard: The no-shirking constraint]

To ensure that the sovereign chooses good effort, the probability of continuation must not exceed $1 - \delta_m$ where the two schedules intersect in Fig. 5. It follows that the equilibrium selected in the creditor coordination game must satisfy a ‘no shirking’ constraint associated with debtor’s moral hazard. Conditional on default, if creditors always choose to stay, the debtor’s ex-ante incentives to choose good effort will never be satisfied. The other extreme situation is when creditors always quit after default. This will solve the debtors incentive problem but is obviously socially inefficient as a debtor applying his best efforts would nevertheless face certain default in the presence of a unfavourable temporary shock. An intermediate solution is that creditors coordinate on the mixed strategy equilibrium. As the continuation probability at the mixed strategy equilibrium, $1 - \delta_c$, is derived independently of debtor incentives, there is no reason why it should coincide with the continuation probability $1 - \delta_m$ associated with the no-shirking constraint. Of course, the creditors could panic and choose the pure strategy of quitting: by assuming that, where it is incentive compatible, creditors coordinate on the mixed strategy equilibrium in the event of default biases, our analysis is biased in favour of the market solution.

These results are summarised in Fig. 6. On the vertical axis is plotted $1 - \delta_c$, the probability of continuation given the mixed strategy equilibrium of the creditor co-ordination game, while on the horizontal is plotted $1 - \delta_m$, the continuation probability required for time-consistency or ‘subgame perfection’ on the part of the debtor. The shaded part of the figure shows the excess default probabilities relative to second best. footnote

[Fig.6. Excessive probability of disorderly default]

Let NEC denote the Nash equilibrium continuation probability, where $NEC = 1 - \delta_c$ if $1 - q^2 > 1 - \delta_m$ and $NEC = 0$ otherwise; and let ICC denote the incentive compatibility continuation probability, $1 - \delta_m$. Then the above discussion can be summarised as:

Proposition *Almost always, NEC = ICC.*

How providing the right incentives for the debtor almost always leads to excessive crises is shown graphically in Fig. 7. Creditor payoffs and the three Nash equilibria of the co-ordination game are shown in top left panel. The non-contractible payoffs to the debtor are shown in the top right panel and ICC, the maximum probability of continuation compatible with good effort, is shown as $1 - m$ on the horizontal axis (below the intersection of GG and BB at I). How does this incentive compatibility constraint affect the selection of equilibrium for creditors? Clearly it rules out equilibrium at C (Stay, Stay). It is, however, consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium at B. This can be seen (in the bottom right panel) by comparing the incentive compatibility constraint, $1 - m$, with the continuation probability associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium, $1 - c$. The latter is the square of the individual continuation probability $1 - q$ (see lower left panel) where this, in turn, is derived footnote from the mixed strategy equilibrium B (as shown in the top right panel).

[Fig.7. Creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard]

Although the level of randomisation in the mixed strategy equilibrium is consistent with the debtor putting in effort (as $1 - m = 1 - c$), there is ‘too much’ randomisation (measured by distance xx’ in the figure) as a higher continuation probability among creditors would also be incentive compatible. It is in this sense that the mixed strategy equilibrium is inefficient and the excess randomisation is indicated by the shaded triangle in the diagram.

This inefficiency would greatly increase, however, if the continuation probability from the co-ordination game were to rise above $1 - m$ (i.e. if point B were to approach sufficiently close to C). In that case, the only credible equilibrium consistent with debtor incentive is where both creditor quit as soon as default occurs. The excess randomisation in this case, $1 - m$, is shown by the shaded box in the lower right panel.

Only at the point E is the Nash Equilibrium randomisation equal to the incentive compatible randomisation. *This is what leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of bankruptcy style procedures, there will almost always be excessive disorderly default in sovereign bond markets.* This is true even when we make the favourable assumption that creditors choose the most efficient incentive compatible equilibrium.

Implications for sovereign spreads

To simplify the analysis, we have treated the interest rate as predetermined. In reality, however, sovereign spreads would be endogenous, varying with the equilibrium selected. Ideally footnote , we would extend the theory to explain how interest rates are determined and test the predictions of the extended model on relevant data. For present purposes, we restrict ourselves to indicating briefly how our model might be calibrated to fit recent data. As discussed in the introduction, emerging market sovereign spreads over US Treasuries responded sharply to the Russian default. From a level of between 400 and 500 basis points earlier in 1998, they peaked at over 1600 after the Russian default in August and then fell to somewhere between 700 and 800 in 2000. In 2001, Argentine debt suffered spreads of 2000 basis points and above, as did Brazilian debt in the summer of 2002. (After leaving the currency peg, Argentina has recorded even higher spreads of around 7000 basis points.) In Table 5, illustrative parameters are chosen so as to generate sovereign spreads that vary over a range running from 300 to 7000 bps. Case 1 with low quit probability and high risk of bad shock, quitting is risk dominant and the mixed strategy is consistent with spread of 800 basis points. In case 2 with high quit probability and low risk of bad shock, neither

quitting nor staying are risk dominant (see discussion in Section 3 above) and sovereign spreads can rise to 7000 basis points.

The sovereign spread, S , is calculated using the formula:

$$S = p(1 - R) \text{ and } 1 - \beta = 1 - q^2, \text{ so } S = 1 - 1 - q^2 p(1 - R)$$

where p is a probability of a bad shock, β is a conditional probability of termination given default, q is the individual quit probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium and R is the recovery rate on debt. In Eichengreen and Bordo (2001), it is reported that, from 1973-1997, a randomly-selected country (from a sample of 56 countries including OECD numbers) had probability of experiencing crisis of 12 % per annum. Given the higher incidence of crises in emerging market countries, we choose a figure of 0.16 to characterise the probability of crisis in the mixed strategy equilibrium for emerging markets. Setting p at 0.16 and combining this with a value of 0.5 for $1 - R$, Cline and Barnes (1997), this implies a sovereign spread of 800 basis points, or 8 percentage points at the *mixed strategy equilibrium*, see line 2 of Table 5, Case 1. Note that, in this case, the continuation probability conditional on default is set at 0.6 (in line with the earlier discussion in Section 3 above): this implies a value of 0.4 for β and a quit probability, q , of 0.23 as shown in bold in line 2. In Case 2, where the recovery rate is cut to 30 %, and q is set at 0.5, the continuation probability falls by more than half to 0.25, as shown in bold in the lower half of the table.

The sovereign spreads associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium will fall on the application of a '*second-best*' strategy of *Constructive Ambiguity*. Assume, for example, that the lowest rate of termination consistent with good effort is $\beta_m = 0.2$. This policy would reduce sovereign spreads to 400 bps or about 300 bps, depending on the value of p , see the first row of each case. If, on the other hand, moral hazard problems were sufficiently severe to shift the market equilibrium to the *pure strategy of quitting* whenever technical default occurred, sovereign spreads could rise sharply. In Case 1 where the increase in termination probability more than doubles, spreads widen to 2000 basis points: in Case 2 where termination is quite likely in any case, sovereign spreads rise to around 1500 basis points.

Given the moral hazard constraint, selecting the *pure equilibrium of stay/stay* would remove the incentive to put in effort and increase the probability of termination to 1 unconditionally. In this case, sovereign spreads rise to 5000 or 7000 as shown in the bottom line of each case.

[Table 5. *Sovereign Risk: Illustrative examples*]

Note that changes in interest rates as between the mixed strategy and the pure strategy of quitting are, in fact, likely to change the default probability. Taking into account of this could lead to models of self-fulfilling crises such as those of Aghion et al. (2000) and Sachs et al. (1996).

Possible perverse effects of un-regulated financial liberalisation

Financial liberalisation in the absence of appropriate regulation can increase the risk of financial crisis (Goldstein, 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In the framework developed here, this can come about through a fall in $1 - \beta_m$, together with an increase in $1 - \beta_c$. The former, the tightening of the 'no-shirking constraint', could occur if liberalisation makes it more attractive to pursue the bad effort strategy – if it makes it easier to ship money out of the country to evade taxes, for example footnote . This

increases the pay-offs to low effort and, as shown by the upward shift from BB to B'B' in Fig. 8, shifts the intersection with GG to the left, which reduces the incentive compatible continuation probability (to $1 - m$). If the mixed strategy equilibrium of the co-ordination game remains at $1 - c$, however, it may still satisfy the incentive compatibility condition and there will be no effect on equilibrium, see figure. But what if liberalisation also cuts the cost of exit in the co-ordination game? (A fall in legal costs makes quitting more attractive: so, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability of staying must be increased to balance the expected pay-offs of quitting and staying – and this increases the continuation probability of the game.) The new mixed strategy equilibrium could then fall afoul of the no-shirking constraint, as shown by $1 - c$ in the figure: hence, in the face of default for any reason, only the threat of certain withdrawal will be sufficient to check debtor's moral hazard. The results could be dramatic: as shown in Line 2 and 3 of the table above, a shift from the mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure strategy equilibrium could raise the sovereign spread from 800 to 2000 bps.

[Fig.8. Possible effects of badly-designed liberalisation]

Is this more than a theoretical curiosity? As Tobin (1999, p.73) notes: “In the ‘bailout’ packages for East Asian economies, further cross-border financial liberalization was one of the conditions imposed by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury for official loans. This was a surprising requirement, given the evident facts that excessive private external short-term debt was, if not a cause of the crisis, a serious aggravation of it, and that banking and financial institutions seemed to need more regulations in several respects as well as fewer in other respects.” Pressure to increase competition in financial markets may also be counter-productive in the absence of appropriate financial regulation (Hellman et al., 2000).

Sovereign bankruptcy procedures as a commitment device

We have seen that, in the absence of institutional innovation, there will be excessive disorderly default in equilibrium. Can this be reduced by institutional change?

Where creditors can, in event of default, exercise some legal claim over the assets of the sovereign state or its citizens, there is a good case for a bankruptcy procedure. This might involve the following elements. Ex ante, the sovereign agrees to bargaining in good faith after default, and to this end, *establishes some ‘contractibility’ on assets in favour of the creditors*. This might involve waiving sovereign immunity and agreeing that some foreign interest payments and loans footnote could be diverted in favour of creditors as part of the bargaining process. Note that this enhanced ‘contractibility’ must also have the effect of reducing private payoffs to the sovereign; otherwise it will not have the desired incentive effects.

When a default occurs, however, the sovereign debtor is afforded *protection by a temporary stay on creditor litigation*. This legitimises the suspension of payments and also prevents litigation (by ‘vultures’) from inhibiting negotiations, Miller and Zhang (2000). Furthermore, it provides a breathing space for a *‘discovery’ process* where efforts are made to establish the underlying causes of default (and to determine whether it was due to a bad shock or poor effort). If this reveals the debtor to have made appropriate effort and to be suffering from an exogenous shock, bargaining would involve *debt restructuring* – the lengthening of debt maturities for temporary shock, and some write-down for a permanent shock known to be outside the control of the debtor. But if the debtor is revealed to have

made little or no effort to arrange its financial and fiscal affairs, then *it will be penalised with payoffs changed ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante*. (It is to make this possible that the debtor must have agreed to make some private payoffs contractible.)

Along similar lines, Eaton (2002, p.5) observes: “One role that an international bankruptcy court could play is in clarifying the extent of the sovereign’s malfeasance in a default, and applying penalties appropriately.” He goes on to note that: “Tougher sanctions in response to malfeasance that leads to default is ultimately in the interest of sovereign countries, as it enhances their access to credit”. This can be shown in Fig. 9 where an ex ante agreement to transfer funds to the creditors in period 2 in event that default is discovered to be attributable to low effort reduces the private benefits, swivels the BB schedule clockwise and so increases the maximum continuation probability. If ex ante contracting ensures that u_2^B is less than or equal to u_2^G , as shown by the lower dotted line in the figure, then the maximum incentive-compatible continuation probability shifts to one and the creditors can safely roll over their lending without fear of moral hazard. Even if the moral hazard constraint does not rise to one, but only to $1 - m$ as shown in the figure, bankruptcy procedures can reduce the termination probability without completely eliminating them.

[Fig.9. *Shifting the no-shirking constraint by ex ante contract*]

Before turning to the institutional implications, consider two special cases. First is where the reasons for default are known as soon as it occurs, i.e. *without* a discovery phase. Here, there is no need for an extended bankruptcy procedure. If the default is due to an exogenous shock, liquidity can be provided right away. If the default is due to lack of effort, then the debtor’s payoffs are changed ex post in ways that have been agreed ex ante. This is perspective taken by Olivier Jeanne (2001) who argues that “the institution that brings the economy the closest to the first-best is a ‘crisis insurance fund’ that bails out all governments with a rollover crisis *conditional on the fiscal adjustment*”, (p.19, italics in the original). Under his proposed scheme, moral hazard is neutralized by denying bailouts to countries that have not implemented the fiscal adjustment. Jeanne notes, however, the crisis fund would probably have to be a rule-based public agency, first because of ‘time to verify’ footnote and second because private insurance contract for sovereigns cannot be made contingent on fiscal effort which is under their control.

At the other end of the spectrum is the special case where the discovery phase is completely unrevealing, so the indeterminacy as to the causes of default can never be resolved. In these circumstances, the contractibility over private benefits cannot be exploited, and ‘constructive ambiguity’ appears to be the only solution – where all defaulting debtors are bailed out with probability $1 - m$, and the expected costs to creditors are reflected in sovereign spreads as discussed earlier.

Institutional implications

If financing development by issuing bonds exposes emerging markets to excessive crisis, one response is to limit the use of such debt instruments, Rodrik (1998). Some economists (e.g. Stiglitz, 1998; Williamson 1995, 1999) have discussed the use of explicit *inflow controls* such as those used in Chile intended to change the composition of flows in favour of longer term investment rather than hot money. footnote As Cordella (1998) points out, inflow controls which succeed in shifting the structure of external financing may increase rather than decrease the total volume of finance available for development: “taxes on short-term capital flows by avoiding rational panics, can improve the expected returns of investments in emerging markets, and thus increase the total volume of funds

entering the country”, (p.6). In time of crisis, however, the use of *outflow controls* may well be considered, both as a way of conserving scarce foreign currency and of lowering domestic interest rates, Krugman (1998).

Rogoff (1999, p.37-8) too has concluded that “the main problem with the present system is that it contains strong biases towards debt finance”. To mitigate this bias, he argues for a reversal of legal trends which have enabled creditors to enforce emerging markets debt contracts in industrialised country courts – an argument for the restoration of sovereign immunity. footnote It is acknowledged that this recommendation would lead to a contraction in the issuance of sovereign market bonds; and he observes that “instituting an international bankruptcy court might be an alternative means to the same end”.

The debate between John Taylor and Anne Krueger is, of course, premised on the widespread continuation of bond finance for emerging markets countries *without* sovereign immunity, as is our own discussion of the bankruptcy procedure – where we see an important role for a rule-governed public agency to supply a commitment mechanism which makes private payoffs accessible to the creditors *ex post*. It may be that the required control over the *ex post* behaviour of the debtor could be achieved by official “IMF conditionality” which governs the actions of the sovereign whose debt is being restructured. (Applicants for debt restructuring in the Paris Club are required as a matter of course to agree a programme with the IMF before negotiation with creditors begin.) Thus IMF programmes could play an important role in the international bankruptcy procedure described above. footnote To check moral hazard, of course, it would have to be known in advance that ‘conditionality’ would be used to achieve the contractibility of private payoffs, i.e. the ‘rules’ need to be clear.

As an alternative to an SDRM, Collective Action Clauses have the attraction that they are voluntary and market driven. As discussed earlier, however, there are two problems of implementation, first the need to replace outstanding contracts, by swaps for example, and second the need to aggregate across different instruments, possibly by two-stage debt swaps, see Table 6. Even supposing both can be solved, we believe that private bond contracts, which are typically incomplete and involve creditors deciding what to do *ex post*, are unable to deliver the required degree of protection and pre-commitment. Contracts incorporating Collective Action Clauses do not prevent creditors from suing provided a sufficient majority in favour, Thomas (2002). Moreover, contracts with majority action clauses may fail to be renegotiation proof after a discovery phase in which the debtor is effort level is confirmed to be ‘bad’, as the debtor may renege on commitments to make *ex-post* transfers. In other words, a hold-up problem may ensue as now the sovereign debtor has all the bargaining power. footnote Anticipating this, even with majority action clauses, creditors may choose to terminate the project.

[Table 6. CACs and SDRM: Some key issues]

An SDRM backed by an international organisation, acting on behalf of the international community, can solve such a hold-up problem by making the sovereign’s payoffs attachable *ex-post*. In other words, our analysis of the reason for excessive crisis leads us to choose an SDRM mechanism rather than private contracts. The implementation of the SDRM will, however, require a super-majority vote to change the Articles in the IMF, something that United States can block. Even assuming that the Articles can be changed, two delicate issues need to be considered: whose private payoffs should be attached *ex post*; and to whom should responsibility for overseeing such attachment be delegated?

The former is the matter of political economy. What if, in a crisis, those responsible can exit, leaving debt for others to pay? In extreme cases, sovereign debtors may appeal to the principle of ‘odious debt’ where a state may justifiably repudiate obligations incurred by tyrants no longer in power (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002, and Kremer and Jayachandran,

2001). But assuming that this does not apply, is it efficient or fair to punish those who could not exit? It appears that in Argentina, for example, rich and well-informed citizens were able to take their capital out of the country, thus avoiding the precipitate depreciation of the peso. footnote If rich private residents have made enormous capital gains in local currency by exporting dollars from the country – now in default for lack of dollars to service its debt – should they not participate in the cost of clearing up the ensuing chaos? Could the state not demand payment of capital gains tax on the assets “marked to market”, for example; or *in extremis* enforce repatriation in order to ensure the realisation of capital gains (and a massive inflow of dollars)?

Even if one could think of such devices for making private payoffs contractible, what public agency should implement them? Stiglitz (2002b) argues that, being dominated by creditors’ interests and having adopted the ‘free market mantra of 1980s’, the IMF is not well suited to devise and implement strategies for remedying capital market failures. In response to financial crises in East Asia and Latin America, the organisation has nevertheless shown itself willing to contemplate inflow controls and standstills as part of an SDRM – though recommending outflow controls (and enforced repatriation) would not be consistent with its normal practices and procedures.

Conclusion

Calvo’s critique of the conventional wisdom – the Washington Consensus – is that market failures in emerging market finance are far too important to be ignored. footnote Tirole (2002, p. ix-x) evidently shares the same perspective: his recent book on financial crises begins by referring to the wide consensus that has emerged among economists that “capital account liberalisation ... was unambiguously good. Good for the debtor countries, good for the world economy” but goes on to note “that consensus have been shattered lately. A number of capital account liberalizations have been followed by spectacular foreign exchange and banking crises.” Like Tirole, we have focussed on the problems that can arise from contracts which pose problems of creditor coordination. For simplicity we have assumed that creditors all share the same information: but the information asymmetries stressed by Calvo would (as the Appendix suggests) greatly enrich the analysis.

Solving creditor co-ordination problems in sovereign bond markets is, however, subject to a moral hazard constraint: that debtors must retain the incentive to service their debts. In a model of sovereign illiquidity with three Nash equilibria facing creditors, it is quite likely that this incentive constraint rules out the no-crisis equilibrium, and either the mixed strategy equilibrium or the pure strategy where all creditors quit will be selected, depending on how severe the incentive problem is. In general, however, the termination probability is higher than necessary for incentive purposes, i.e. there are too many crises.

How can bond markets be made more efficient? We consider a bankruptcy procedure involving temporary stay on creditor litigation and discovery process for determining the underlying causes of default. A key element of the procedure is that when the sovereign debtor in default is found to have made little or no effort, its private payoffs will be reduced *ex post*. To provide the right incentives, it is crucial that the mechanism for doing this should have been agreed *ex ante*, as would be true if a ruled-governed public agency is involved. Moreover, as we have argued, privately issued bond contracts are unlikely to achieve the same result. We believe that the institutional approach to sovereign debt restructuring proposed by the IMF is, in principle, capable of increasing bond market efficiency. What the rules should be – and whether the IMF as currently constituted is the

appropriate public agency to implement them – are policy issues that remain to be discussed.

The framework developed here could be used to look at contagion in capital markets. footnote Masson (1999, p. 267), for instance, argues that “pure contagion involves changes in expectations that is not related to country’s macroeconomic fundamentals” and suggests that “by analogy to the literature on bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), attacks on countries which involve a simultaneous move from a non-run to a run equilibrium seem to be relevant for recent experience in emerging market countries”. To include contagion on this definition, we need only relax the assumption that the market selects the most efficient incentive compatible equilibrium between creditors: a move from a mixed strategy equilibrium to the pure strategy of quitting unconnected with any change in fundamentals would count as contagion on Masson’s definition; and, as Table 5 indicates, could double sovereign spreads. In future research, we intend to include the determination of sovereign spreads within the analysis; and to combine creditor heterogeneity and insolvency shocks with debtor moral hazard. Another useful extension would be to take account of the politics of decision-making within a debtor country and how it interacts with the debt crises.

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Appendix: Extensions to the model

Robustness: The case of n creditors

In this section, we show that with n identical creditors, the equilibrium analysis of the creditor coordination game is robust i.e. there continue to exist only two pure strategy equilibria where all creditors either choose to quit or stay; and, in addition there is at least one other mixed strategy equilibrium where each creditor quits with some probability q , $0 < q < 1$.

The time line of events is as in Section 3. A sovereign is embarking on a bond-financed investment project, costing K , which lasts only two periods. All finance is now supplied by n identical creditors each of whom has invested b , and is promised a return of r in the first period and $1 - r$ in the second period. So long as resources available cover these payments (i.e. cash flow in period 1 is greater than nrb and cash flow in period 2 is greater than $(1 - r)nb$), all is well and the project will run to completion.

As before, there is an unanticipated, exogenous temporary shock ('bad luck') that lowers the sovereign's capacity to pay in period one the amount that is due to bond holders under their contract. This is a liquidity shock so that the project net worth is unchanged, but, as the failure to comply with the terms of the debt contract constitutes technical default, the sovereign is exposed to the risk of a *liquidity crisis* if sufficient creditors seek to accelerate their claims. Here, we assume that acceleration requires a minimum of 25% of the creditors to act.

The co-ordination game facing the n creditors can then be specified as follows. Label an individual creditor by i , $i = 1, \dots, n$. Each creditor chooses an action $a^i \in \{Quit, Stay\}$. For an action profile $a = (a^1, \dots, a^n)$, let $N_{a,Q} = \{i : a^i = Q\}$ and $N_{a,S} = \{i : a^i = S\}$. Let N be the set of integers between $\frac{n}{4}$ and n . Consider the function $g : N \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $g(x) = \min\{1 - r b, \bar{Q}/x - L, x/n\}$ and $g(n) = \bar{Q}/n - L$. Consider also the function $l : N \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $l(n-x) = \max\{\frac{\bar{Q} - 1 - r b x}{n-x}, 0\}$, $x < n$. Remark that $l(n-x)$ is well-defined for all $x \in N$ as we must have $1 - r b n > \bar{Q}$: otherwise, the sovereign debtor would have had enough resources to service her debt i.e. would not have defaulted in the first place. Then the payoffs to creditors can be specified as follows. Suppose a is such that $x = \#N_{a,Q} > \frac{n}{4}$. Then, if $a^i = Q$, the payoff to creditor i is $g(x)$, while if $a^i = S$, the payoff to creditor i is $l(x)$. Now suppose a is such that $\#N_{a,Q} \leq \frac{n}{4}$. Then, if $a^i = Q$, the payoff to creditor i is $1 - r b - L$, while if $a^i = S$, the payoff to creditor i is $1 - r b$, where $L > 0$ and $L < L$. The legal costs, L , reflect the fact that an individual creditor, who unsuccessfully tries to accelerate the project, pays a small legal fee for doing so but as the project is not terminated obtains his continuation payoff $1 - r b$.

As before, we find it convenient to work with normalized payoffs. Define the function $g : N \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $g(x)$ is decreasing in x , $g(x) = 0$ for $x = n$ and $g(n) = 0$. Consider also the function $l : N \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $l(n-x)$ is decreasing in x and $l(n-x) = 0$ for all $x \in N$. Suppose a is such that $x = \#N_{a,Q} > \frac{n}{4}$. Then, if $a^i = Q$, the payoff to creditor i is $g(x)$ while if $a^i = S$, the payoff to creditor i is $l(n-x)$. Now suppose a is such that $\#N_{a,Q} \leq \frac{n}{4}$. Then, if $a^i = Q$, the payoff to creditor i is $1 - r b - L$ while if $a^i = S$, the payoff to creditor i is $1 - r b$ where $L > 0$. As explained above, g captures the fact that an individual creditor who unsuccessfully tries to accelerate the project, pays a small but strictly positive cost and therefore receives a continuation payoff of $1 - r b$ net of this cost.

As before, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where all creditors choose to quit and another where all creditors choose to stay. There are no other pure strategy Nash equilibria.

Next, we show that there is at least one other mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where all n creditors randomly choose to quit with probability q , $0 < q < 1$. Fix an individual creditor i . Then, from the perspective of this creditor, there are $n - 1$ creditors choosing to quit with probability q and stay with probability $1 - q$. It follows that her payoff from quitting will be given by the expression

$$q^{x-1} \binom{n-1}{x} q^x (1-q)^{n-1-x} g + (1-q)^{n-1-x} (1-q) - \left(q^{x-1} \binom{n-1}{x} q^x (1-q)^{n-1-x} \right) (1-q)$$

while her payoff from staying would be given by the expression

$$q^{x-1} \binom{n-1}{x} q^x (1-q)^{n-1-x} l + (1-q)^{n-1-x} (1-q) - \left(q^{x-1} \binom{n-1}{x} q^x (1-q)^{n-1-x} \right) (1-q)$$

At a mixed strategy equilibrium, the payoff from quitting must be equal to the payoff from staying. By computing, it follows that this condition is equivalent to requiring that the following polynomial $f(q)$ has a zero in the open interval $(0, 1)$ where $f(q)$ is given by the expression

$$f(q) = \left(q^{x-1} \binom{n-1}{x} q^x (1-q)^{n-1-x} \right) (r - q) - \left(q^{x-1} \binom{n-1}{x} q^x (1-q)^{n-1-x} \right) (l - q) - g q^{x-1}$$

where $r - q = 0$ if n isn't exactly divisible by 4 and is given by the expression

$$\left(\frac{n-1}{\frac{n}{4}-1} \right) q^{\frac{n}{4}} (1-q)^{\frac{3}{4}n-1}$$

when n is exactly divisible by 4. Again, by computation, it follows that $f(0) < 0$ while $f(1) = l - g > 0$. As $f(q)$ is a polynomial in q and therefore continuous in q , it follows that there is a solution to $f(q) = 0$ at some $q \in (0, 1)$. Therefore, there is at least one mixed strategy equilibrium where all creditors randomly choose quit with some probability q , $0 < q < 1$.

Asymmetric information between creditors

Assume that after a sovereign default, there is incomplete information about whether the adverse shock is temporary or permanent i.e. whether the underlying problem is one of liquidity or insolvency. There are two states of the world P, T where P denotes a permanent shock which has an irreversible effect on the debtors net worth and on the continuation payoff of the creditors and T denotes a temporary shock which only has a no effect on debtors net worth and nor on the continuation payoff of the creditors. Nature selects one of these two states of the world according to the prior probability distribution

$\frac{1}{2}, 1 - \frac{1}{2}$. Once the state of world nature is chosen, each player receives a signal $i \in \{P, T\}$ which is privately observed by each individual creditor and independently distributed across creditors with $p = \Pr(i = P) = \frac{1}{2}$, for $i = 1, 2$ and $i \in \{P, T\}$. Payoffs depend upon state of nature and on creditor's action as shown in the table below.

[Table 7. State dependent payoffs]

A strategy for a creditor is a map from his signals to actions. We focus on Bayesian equilibrium strategy profiles.

We remark that the strategy profile where both creditors quit whatever their signal is always a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium: given that the other creditor always quits, quitting is a dominant action for each individual creditor.

However, under certain restrictions on parameters, another pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium exists, namely one where each creditor chooses to quit if $i = P$ and stays if $i = T$. Although at first sight this Bayesian equilibrium is appealing, as we show later in this subsection, it is also ex-ante inefficient. Conditional on a individual creditor observing some signal, let s denote the probability that the other creditor observes the same signal. Note that $s = p^2 = 1 - p^2$. footnote For any individual creditor, conditional on $i = P$, the expected payoff from quitting is $0 = 1 - s = 0$ which is always greater than the expected payoff from staying, $s - 1 - sK = 1 - 2p = 0$ as $p = \frac{1}{2}$. For any individual creditor, conditional on $i = T$, the expected payoff from quitting is s while the expected payoff from staying is $1 - s = sK = 2p - 1$. For staying to be a best response, we need the condition that $s > 1 - s = sK = 2p - 1$, or equivalently $\frac{|i|}{|i|K} > 2p - 1$. Remark that s is a measure of the correlation of the signals privately observed by individual creditors and $|i|$ is a measure of the disadvantage of being the second mover in the creditor grab race. The inequality $\frac{|i|}{|i|K} > 2p - 1$ can be now be interpreted as saying that the more costly it is to be the second mover in the creditor grab race, the more correlated the privately observed signals have to be across creditors for the above strategy profile to be a Bayesian equilibrium.

In a first best situation, where the state of the world is common knowledge, termination should occur only when the shock is permanent, hence the project is terminated with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. In the Bayesian equilibrium where both creditors withdraw irrespective of their signal, however, the probability of project termination is one. In the Bayesian equilibrium where each creditor chooses to quit if $i = P$ and to stay if $i = T$, the probability of termination is $1 - p^2 = 2p = 1 - p = 2p = 1 - \frac{1}{2}$. Remark that if $p = 1$, this expression is equal to $\frac{1}{2}$. By computation, it can be confirmed that the derivative of this expression is $2 = -p$. When, $p = \frac{1}{2}$, there is excessive project termination relative to the first best, while if $p = 1$ there is too little project termination relative to first-best. It follows that the Bayesian equilibrium randomisation is almost always inefficient relative to first best.

Now, consider a direct revelation mechanism where the creditors announce their signals to the mechanism designer and the mechanism designer terminates the project with probability one if both creditors announce bad signal; terminates the project with some exogenous probability x if one creditor announces a good signal and another creditor announces the bad signal; and continues the project with probability one if both creditors announce the good signal. The associated probability of termination is $1 - p^2 - 2xp = 1 - p - 2p = 1 - \frac{1}{2}$. It follows that by choosing x appropriately, a direct revelation mechanism can always do at least as well as a Bayesian equilibrium and in some cases i.e. $p = \frac{1}{2}$, it can do strictly better. Observe that this mechanism is incentive-compatible as truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy for each creditor. We summarize this discussion by the following proposition.

Proposition *The Bayesian equilibrium project termination is almost always inefficient relative to first best. Moreover, a direct revelation mechanism does better.*

	Corporations	Sovereign states	
[B] [approaches]	Self-organizing creditors	19th century Britain: Majority Action Clauses	London debt: Collective Action Clauses. New York Debt: Exit Consent/ Swaps [E]
	Court-ordered restructuring	20th century USA: Chapter 11 Bankruptcy	Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)

[Table 1. Debt restructuring: Two approaches]

	Actions	2 QUILTS	2 STAYS	
[B] [payoffs1]	1 QUILTS	$\bar{Q}/2 - L$ $\bar{Q}/2 - L$	$\min 1 - r b, \bar{Q} - L$ $\max \bar{Q} - 1 - r b, 0$	[E]
	1 STAYS	$\max \bar{Q} - 1 - r b, 0$ $\min 1 - r b, \bar{Q} - L$	$1 - r b$ $1 - r b$	

[Table 2. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]

	Actions	2 QUILTS	2 STAYS	
[B] [payoffs2]	1 QUILTS	0 0	0	[E]
	1 STAYS	0	1 1	

[Table 3. Normalised expected, discounted payoffs for the co-ordination game]

	Actions	2 QUILTS	2 STAYS	
[B] [payoffs3]	1 QUILTS	$\bar{Q}/2 - L$ $\bar{Q}/2 - L$	$\min 1 - r b, \bar{Q} - L$ $\max \bar{Q} - 1 - r b, 0$	[E]
	1 STAYS	$\max \bar{Q} - 1 - r b, 0$ $\min 1 - r b, \bar{Q} - L$	$1 - r b - 1 - p h$ $1 - r b - 1 - p h$	

[Table 4. How Payoffs depend on Creditor Co-ordination]

	q	$1 - q$	$1 -$		p	$1 - R$	Spread in bps	Spread in %
<i>Case 1: Low quit probability/high risk of bad shock</i>								
Second Best CA	na	na	0.8	0.2	0.4	0.5	400	4
Mixed strategy	0.23	0.77	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.5	800	8
Quit/Quit	1	0	0	1	0.4	0.5	2000	20
Stay/Stay	0	1	1	0	na	0.5	5000	50
<i>Case 2: High quit probability/low risk of bad shock</i>								
Second Best CA	na	na	0.8	0.2	0.213	0.7	298	3
Mixed strategy	0.5	0.5	0.25	0.75	0.213	0.7	1280	13
Quit/Quit	1	0	0	1	0.213	0.7	1491	15
Stay/Stay	0	1	1	0	na	0.7	7000	70

[B] [example] [E] [Table 5. Sovereign Risk: Illustrative examples]

		Problems of Implementation	Problems of Operation
[B] [issues]	Collective Action Clauses (voluntary, market driven)	1. 'Transition' 2. 'Aggregation'	Not litigation proof Not renegotiation proof
	SDRM (involuntary, statutory)	Change of IMF Articles needed	Subject to geo-political & ideological pressures

[Table 6. CACs and SDRM: Some key issues]

a) When P the payoff matrix is	
Actions	2 QUILTS 2 STAYS
1 QUILTS	0 0
1 STAYS	- K - K

[B] [payoffs4] [E]

b) When T the payoff matrix is	
Actions	2 QUILTS 2 STAYS
1 QUILTS	0 0
1 STAYS	K K

[Table 7. State dependent payoffs]




figure 1




figure 2




figure 3




figure 4




figure 5




figure 6




figure 7

Payoff to debtor




figure 8




figure 9