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False Narratives and Political Mobilization*

Kfir Eliaz, Simone Galperti, and Ran Spiegler[†]

January 3, 2023

Abstract

We present an equilibrium model of politics in which political platforms compete over public opinion. A platform consists of a policy, a coalition of social groups with diverse intrinsic attitudes to policies, and a narrative. We conceptualize narratives as subjective models that attribute a commonly valued outcome to (potentially spurious) postulated causes. When quantified against empirical observations, these models generate a shared belief among coalition members over the outcome as a function of its postulated causes. The intensity of this belief and the members' intrinsic attitudes to the platform's policy determine the extent to which the coalition is mobilized. Only platforms that generate maximal mobilization prevail in equilibrium. Our equilibrium characterization demonstrates how false narratives can be detrimental to the commonly valued outcome, and how political fragmentation leads to their proliferation. The false narratives that emerge in equilibrium attribute good outcomes to the exclusion of social groups from ruling coalitions.

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1 Introduction

Success in democratic politics requires the mobilization of public opinion, which takes various forms: rallies, petitions, social media activism, and ultimately voter turnout. Public opinion shifts can explain which policies get implemented and which coalitions of social groups form around them (Burstein (2003)). In turn, opinion makers (politicians, news outlets, pundits) use past performance of policies and coalitions as raw material for shaping public opinion. This paper is an attempt to shed light on this interplay.

Our starting point is the idea that *narratives* are a powerful tool for mobilizing public opinion. This is a familiar idea with numerous expressions in academic and popular discourse. After Senator John Kerry lost the 2004 presidential elections, his political strategist Stanley Greenberg said that “a narrative is the key to everything” and that Republicans had “a narrative that motivated their voters”.¹ Shanahan et al. (2011) write: “Policy narratives are the lifeblood of politics. These strategically constructed ‘stories’ contain predictable elements and strategies whose aim is to influence public opinion toward support for a particular policy preference”. And Stone (1989) writes: “... political actors use narrative story lines ... to manipulate so-called issue characteristics ... As one side in a political battle seeks to push a problem into the realm of human purpose, the other side seeks to push it away from intent toward the realm of nature or to show that the problem was intentionally caused by someone else.”

We build on the approach of Eliaz and Spiegler (2020), who proposed to view political narratives as *causal models* that attribute public outcomes (national security, economic growth, the climate) to other factors (such as policies or external variables). A narrative generates a probabilistic belief by being “estimated” against the observed correlation between the outcome and its postulated causes. The stronger this correlation, the stronger the belief that the narrative generates, and hence the extent to which the narrative mobilizes agents behind a political platform. This means that competition for political power is to some extent a battle between conflicting narratives over what drives public outcomes. Under this modeling approach, a *false narrative* corresponds to a *misspecified* causal model. It can produce wrong beliefs because it imposes an incorrect causal meaning on the correlation it highlights.

¹See William Safire’s New York Times article titled “Narrative” (<https://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/05/magazine/narrative.html>).

While Eliaz and Spiegler (2020) assumed a representative agent, this paper considers a heterogenous society consisting of multiple social groups. We think of a social group as a collection of agents having shared ideological, socioeconomic or ethnic/religious characteristics, as well as a distinct political representation. For example, society can be divided into left and right wings, possibly with finer subdivisions. Other examples include the Flemish and French parties in Belgium, or the various religious parties in Israel. The departure from a representative-agent environment means that narratives can now also attribute outcomes to *which social groups are in power*. This generates new insights into the role of various kinds of false narratives in determining the structure of ruling coalitions and ultimately the implemented policies.

Our model makes the stark, simplifying assumption that policies are the *only true cause* of public outcomes. However, ideological differences between social groups will naturally give rise to correlations between the structure of ruling coalitions, the policies they implement, and these policies' resulting outcomes. A false narrative can exploit this correlation and causally attribute the outcome *solely* to social groups' power status (i.e., whether they belong to the ruling coalition), even though in reality this correlation is due to confounding by the implemented policies.

For illustration, suppose that a certain coalition C usually refrains from taxing wealth. As a result, social inequality tends to rise when C is in power. A rival coalition C' may exploit this correlation and spin a false narrative that, in order to reduce inequality, we only need to keep the social groups in C out of power. Because this narrative does not attribute the outcome to its true cause (namely, tax policy), it enables C' to gain support: On the one hand, C' can act exactly like C by not proposing an unpopular wealth tax; on the other hand, it can claim that by elbowing out C it is doing something to lower inequality, which *is* popular. Thus, in a sense, C' uses C as a “scapegoat” that enables it to hide the link between an attractive policy and its unattractive consequences. Our main objective in this paper is to understand how such false narratives can gain ascendancy, what form they take, and how they shape public policies and ruling coalitions.

In our setting, a *political platform* consists of a policy, a coalition of social groups, and a narrative. Given a long-run joint empirical distribution over prevailing platforms and public outcomes, different narratives may induce conflicting beliefs regarding the consequences of policies and coalitions. Moreover, changes in long-run frequencies of plat-

forms and outcomes may change the beliefs induced by a narrative, and therefore the extent to which it can mobilize a social group. We define an *equilibrium* as a probability distribution over prevailing platforms, such that every platform in its support maximizes the total mobilization of the social groups belonging to the platform’s coalition.

This definition captures in reduced form the idea that a platform’s success depends on the strength of its popular support (in terms of the number and size of participating social groups, and the intensity of their participation). It does so in the spirit of competitive equilibrium, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The backstory is that there is “free entry” of office-motivated political entrepreneurs who propose policy-narrative combinations. If a particular combination attracts stronger support than the current combination, it will overthrow it, such that the platform that eventually prevails is the one that maximizes total support.

Using this formalism, we obtain several qualitative insights. First, in addition to the true narrative that attributes outcomes to policies, two types of false narratives emerge in equilibrium. The first type is a “denial” narrative that does not attribute outcomes to any endogenous variable (thus implicitly attributing it to external forces). The other type is a “tribal” narrative that attributes a good public outcome to the *exclusion* of some social groups from the ruling coalition. In a political speech or a social-media post, such a narrative could appear as “national security is in good shape when the left is out of power.”

Recent public debates over rising inflation are suggestive of such narratives, as they involve competing claims over the causes of high inflation. Some narratives attribute it to government actions (fiscal expansion), others to external factors (global supply-chain disruptions), and yet others assign credit or blame for the level of inflation solely to the party in power, without attempting to link this to the party’s policy decisions. A selection of press quotes demonstrates the form that these conflicting narratives take:

“As prices have increased ... some Democrats have landed on a new culprit: price gouging ... For Democrats, it is a convenient explanation as inflation turns voters against President Biden. It lets Democrats deflect blame from their pandemic relief bill, the American Rescue Plan, which experts say helped increase prices.”²

²<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/14/briefing/inflation-supply-chain-greedflation.html>

“Democrats have blamed supply chain deficiencies due to COVID-19, as well as large corporations and monopolies.”³

“As the midterm elections draw nearer, a central conservative narrative is coming into sharp focus: President Biden and the Democratic-controlled Congress have made a mess of the American economy.”⁴

The distinction between a false narrative that attributes outcomes to whoever is in power and a more accurate narrative that attributes outcomes to policies is also alluded to by Paul Krugman in a recent article about the politics of inflation:

“... voters aren’t saying, ‘Trimmed mean P.C.E. inflation is too high because fiscal policy was too expansionary’. They’re saying, ‘Gas and food were cheap, and now they’re expensive...’. So when people say — as they do — that gas and food were cheaper when Donald Trump was president, what do they imagine he could or would be doing to keep them low if he were still in office?”⁵

We wish to emphasize that we do not argue that our specific model matches the inflation scenario. Nevertheless, we believe it offers insights into the interplay between the popularity of certain types of false narratives and objective statistical reality, which both feeds the narratives and gets shaped by them through the policy choices that different narratives promote.

Our second qualitative insight is that the false narratives that are employed in equilibrium sustain a policy that would not be taken if the only prevailing narrative were a true one (which correctly attributes outcomes to policies). The function of false narratives is to resolve the cognitive dissonance between the intrinsic appeal of a policy and its objective inadequacy for an outcome of interest. This is achieved by deflecting responsibility for the outcome from its true cause to spurious causes.

Moreover, when society becomes more politically fragmented (in the sense that finer social groups have distinct political representation), tribal narratives proliferate and

³<https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-democrats-and-republicans-get-wrong-about-inflation/>

⁴<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/11/opinion/fed-federal-reserve-inflation-democrats.html>

⁵<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/02/opinion/inflation-biden.html>. See also Weaver (2013) and Sanders et al. (2017).

can lead to further crowding out of the true narrative and the policy it justifies. Greater polarization of attitudes toward policies has a similar equilibrium effect.

Finally, we characterize the structure of coalitions that form in equilibrium. False narratives give rise to coalitions that would not form if only the true narrative prevailed. In particular, when a political platform employs a tribal narrative, it “scapegoats” social groups that support that platform’s policy (indeed, they implement the same policy when they are in power), yet their exclusion from the platform’s coalition is necessary for the narrative’s effectiveness. Thus, our results suggest that the mobilizing power of false tribal narratives has substantial implications for implemented policies and prevailing social coalitions.

2 A Model

We begin by describing the model’s primitives. Let $y \in \{B, G\}$ be a *public outcome*. There is a social consensus that $y = G$ is a “good” outcome. Let $a \in A = \{b, g\}$ be a *policy*. Policies cause outcomes according to the objective conditional probability distribution

$$\Pr(y = G \mid a) = \begin{cases} q & \text{if } a = g \\ 0 & \text{if } a = b \end{cases}, \quad (1)$$

where $q \in (0, 1]$.

Let $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ be a set of *social groups*, where $n \geq 2$. A *coalition* is a non-empty subset C of N . Define a function $f : N \times A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$. We refer to $f(i, a)$ as group i ’s *mobilization propensity* given policy a . This captures group i ’s intrinsic attitudes toward a . For all i , $f(i, a) > 0$ for at least one a .

Using these primitives, we now present the key definitions of the model.

Narratives

To formulate our notion of narratives, we introduce a language that encodes policies and coalitions. Let $x = (x_0, \dots, x_n)$ be a profile of binary variables, where $x_0 \in \{b, g\}$ and $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for every $i > 0$. Define the following function that assigns values of x to every policy-coalition pair (a, C) : $x_0(a, C) = a$, and for $i > 0$, $x_i(a, C) = 1$ if and only if $i \in C$. For instance, if $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $(a, C) = (g, \{2, 3\})$, then $x = (g, 0, 1, 1)$. If C is interpreted as a ruling coalition, the variable $x_i(a, C)$ encodes the “*power status*”

of group i —i.e., whether it is part of the ruling coalition.

A *narrative* is a set $S \subseteq \{0, 1, \dots, n\}$, namely a subset of the components of x . The set S defines the variables to which the outcome y is attributed. For example, $S = \{0, 2\}$ means that the postulated causes of y are the policy and group 2’s power status. Given a probability distribution p over (x, y) , a narrative S generates a belief over the outcome conditional on its postulated causes. We denote this belief by $(p(y \mid x_S))$, where $x_S = (x_i)_{i \in S}$.⁶ Thus, a narrative S draws attention to the correlation between y and x_S and gives this correlation a causal meaning.

We refer to $S = \{0\}$ as the “*true*” narrative, because it attributes y to its sole true cause a . Every narrative that fails to include 0 is false because it attributes y to wrong causes. We refer to $S = \emptyset$ as a “*denial*” narrative because it does not attribute y to any of the endogenous variables. Implicitly, the denial narrative attributes the outcome to external factors. Finally, we refer to non-empty narratives $S \subseteq N$ as “*tribal*” because they attribute y to the power status of social groups, without mentioning policies.

We assume that there is some domain of feasible narratives, which includes the true and denial narratives. We will later consider various domain restrictions.

Platforms and Mobilization

A *platform* is a policy-coalition-narrative triple (a, C, S) with the restriction (to be explained below) that, if $i \in C$, then $f(i, a) > 0$. Let σ denote an objective long-run probability distribution over prevailing platforms (we will clarify below what it means for a platform to prevail). The induced joint distribution over (a, C, S, y) is

$$p_\sigma(a, C, S, y) = \sigma(a, C, S) \cdot \Pr(y \mid a),$$

where $\Pr(y \mid a)$ is given by (1). We denote the support of σ by $Supp(\sigma)$.

We assume that the extent to which a platform mobilizes a group is proportional to the promise of a good outcome it offers, where the proportionality constant is the group’s mobilization propensity.

⁶We use the abbreviated notation $(p(y \mid x_S))$ for $(p(y \mid x_S))_{x_S, y}$.

Definition 1 (Mobilization). *Fix a distribution σ over platforms. The extent to which platform (a, C, S) mobilizes group i is*

$$m_{i,\sigma}(a, C, S) = p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(a, C)) \cdot f(i, a). \quad (2)$$

The term $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(a, C))$ represents a narrative-based probability of a good outcome conditional on the platform—specifically those aspects of the platform that its narrative highlights as relevant causes. It is the empirical frequency of a good outcome (according to the long-run distribution p_σ) conditional on $x_S = x_S(a, C)$. We elaborate on this term below.

Equilibrium

We are now ready to define equilibrium in our model, which pours content into the notion of prevailing platforms.

Definition 2 (Equilibrium). *A distribution σ over platforms with full support over (a, C) is an ε -equilibrium if whenever $\sigma(a, C, S) > \varepsilon$, platform (a, C, S) maximizes the total mobilization*

$$M_\sigma(a, C, S) = \sum_{i \in C} m_{i,\sigma}(a, C, S). \quad (3)$$

A distribution σ (not necessarily with full support) is an equilibrium if it is the limit of ε -equilibria as $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$.

We start from the notion of ε -equilibrium to ensure that $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S)$ is well-defined. This “trembling hand” aspect plays a very limited role in our analysis.

2.1 Discussion and Interpretation

Mobilization Propensity

The function $f(i, a)$ represents in reduced form several aspects of group i : a value judgment of policy a , the policy’s specific costs or benefits for the group (independently of its implications for the public outcome), the group’s political participation costs and its size. In particular, we can think of an individual social group i as consisting of a mass of agents with distinct attitudes to policies, such that each agent supports exactly one of them; $f(i, a)$ is the mass of agents in group i who can be mobilized in support of a .

We view $f(i, a) > 0$ and $f(i, a) = 0$ as being qualitatively distinct. This is the reason why our definition of platforms requires that $f(i, a) > 0$ if $i \in C$. Suppose group i is intrinsically *opposed* to policy a . Then, it is natural to assume that this group will not be part of a coalition that advocates a : Either the coalition’s gatekeepers will oust what it perceives as a “fifth column”, or the group itself would not want to join the coalition in the first place. By assumption, this group satisfies $f(i, a') > 0$ for $a' \neq a$, so it could join coalitions that advocate a' . In this case, rallying in favor of a' is akin to rallying against a .

Group Mobilization

The function M_σ is a measure of the total support that platform (a, C, S) generates, given distribution σ . Our notion of support takes a broad view of political mobilization to include not only voting, but also other kinds of political participation: rallies, petitions, or social media activism. Expression (3) means that the mobilization of a coalition is proportional to its aggregate mobilization propensity given the platform’s policy, as well as to the belief—shaped by the platform’s narrative—that the outcome will be good conditional on the event that the platform prevails. The stronger the belief, the stronger the support for the platform.

We adopt the multiplicative form of (2) mainly for tractability. However, this form can be “microfounded” in various ways. For example, we can assume that group mobilization around a platform is proportional to the group’s subjective indirect utility from the platform. Specifically, suppose that the policy a determines not only the probability of a good outcome but also *when* the outcome is realized (think of the decision whether to make an investment that produces future rewards); group i ’s utility is $\delta_i(a) \cdot y$, where $\delta_i(a)$ is a discount factor associated with policy a . Then, the group’s subjective indirect expected utility from the platform will be given by (2).

We index M_σ by σ because the conditional belief $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S)$ may vary with the long-run distribution over prevailing platforms. To see why, recall that y is a fixed (probabilistic) function of only a , so it is independent of C conditional on a . This property can be represented by the directed acyclic graph (DAG) $C \leftarrow a \rightarrow y$.⁷ However, if narrative S does not attribute y to a —i.e., $0 \notin S$ —it amounts to interpreting a long-run correlation between C and y as if it is causal, namely as if the DAG were $C \rightarrow y$.

⁷The link $a \rightarrow y$ represents a true causal relation, whereas the direction of the link between C and a is arbitrary.

In reality, this correlation is due to confounding because both y and C are correlated with a . The latter correlation depends on σ as shown by the following expression:

$$p_\sigma(y | x_S) = \sum_a p_\sigma(a | x_S) \Pr(y | a), \quad (4)$$

where $p_\sigma(a | x_S)$ is determined by σ .

We now illustrate how false narratives can induce wrong beliefs about the outcome. Suppose $n = 3$ and σ is as follows:

σ	a	C	S
α	g	$\{1\}$	$\{0\}$
β	b	$\{2, 3\}$	\emptyset
γ	b	$\{1, 3\}$	$\{2\}$

Then, using (4), we obtain the subjective conditional probability of a good outcome associated with each of the three platforms in $Supp(\sigma)$:

$$\begin{aligned} p_\sigma(y = G | x_{\{0\}}(g, \{1\})) &= p_\sigma(y = G | a = g) = q \\ p_\sigma(y = G | x_{\emptyset}(b, \{2, 3\})) &= p_\sigma(y = G) = q \cdot \alpha \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} p_\sigma(y = G | x_{\{2\}}(b, \{1, 3\})) &= p_\sigma(y = G | x_2 = 0) = \\ p_\sigma(y = G | 2 \notin C) &= q \cdot \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \gamma} \end{aligned}$$

For a general distribution σ , the last term would be

$$p_\sigma(y = G | x_2 = 0) = \frac{q \sum_{C, S | 2 \notin C} \sigma(g, C, S)}{\sum_{a, C, S | 2 \notin C} \sigma(a, C, S)}.$$

We can see that false narratives can generate positive mobilization for platforms that involve the policy b , even though it objectively leads to $y = B$ with certainty.

Equilibrium Concept

Our definition of equilibrium captures the idea that a platform’s political power depends on how strongly it mobilizes its coalition groups. We view narrative-fueled political competition as a battle over public opinion. A platform prevails given σ if it generates the largest total mobilization—if it didn’t, another platform would arise in the political arena and replace it. When (a, C, S) prevails, C is a *ruling coalition*. The distribution σ describes the long-run frequencies with which different platforms prevail.

Note that if only the true narrative $S = \{0\}$ existed, any platform with $a = b$ would generate $M_\sigma = 0$ by (1). Instead, a platform with $a = g$ always generates $M_\sigma > 0$. In this case, policy g would occur with probability one in equilibrium. We therefore refer to g as the “*rational*” policy.

3 Two-Group Societies

We begin our analysis with the simple case of $n = 2$. To avoid trivial cases, we assume that mobilization propensities satisfy $f(1, g) > f(2, g)$ and $f(1, b) < f(2, b)$. The following are some examples of policies and outcomes to have in mind. First, the issue is climate change and policy g represents carbon taxation, which produces a common environmental benefit but induces differential costs among social groups (captured by f). Second, the issue is economic growth, where g represents structural reforms that foster growth but inflict differential adjustment costs across society. Third, the issue is inflation, where g represents fiscal restraint. Finally, the issue is national security, where g represents an aggressive military strategy that mitigates security threats but involves sacrifices and moral judgments that vary across groups.

In this section, we rule out the grand coalition: C can only be $\{1\}$ or $\{2\}$. This specification is akin to a two-party system, in which exactly one party can be in power at any point in time. In this case, our equilibrium concept can be interpreted in terms of a two-party voting model: Supporters of each party vote non-strategically for it, to the extent that the party’s policy-narrative combination mobilizes them to do so—otherwise, they abstain (somewhat as in Levy et al. (2022)).

This setting allows us to reduce the set of relevant narratives. Since $x_1 = 1$ if and only if $x_2 = 0$, all tribal narratives $S \subseteq N$ are equivalent: When they accompany the coalition $\{i\}$, they effectively say that “*things are good when group i is in power / group*

j is not in power”. In addition, all S that contain $\{0\}$ are equivalent, because $\Pr(y = G \mid a, C) = \Pr(y = G \mid a)$ for all a, C . Every feasible narrative is then equivalent to one of the following: the true narrative $\{0\}$, the denial narrative \emptyset , or the tribal narrative $\{1\}$.

Therefore, in this section, we assume that only these three narratives are feasible—and we denote them by *true*, *denial*, and *tribal* for expositional clarity. This assumption is without loss of generality as far as the equilibrium distribution over (a, C) is concerned.

This de-facto reduction to a two-party model with few relevant narratives is an expositional device to present some of our main ideas in a simple form, while deferring others to the next section.

Proposition 1. *There is a unique equilibrium σ^* . The only platforms that can be in $\text{Supp}(\sigma^*)$ are $(g, \{1\}, \text{true})$, $(b, \{2\}, \text{denial})$, and $(b, \{1\}, \text{tribal})$. Furthermore,*

$$(i) \ \sigma^*(g, \{1\}, \text{true}) = \min \{1, f(1, g)/f(2, b)\};$$

$$(ii) \ \sigma^*(b, \{1\}, \text{tribal}) > 0 \text{ only if } \sigma^*(b, \{2\}, \text{denial}) > 0.$$

We present the proof of this result here, as it illustrates the basic forces at the core of our model. All other proofs are in the Appendix.

Proof of Proposition 1. We begin by writing down the total mobilization of platforms carried by the three relevant narratives:

$$\begin{aligned} M_\sigma(a, \{i\}, \text{true}) &= p_\sigma(y = G \mid a) \cdot f(i, a) = q \cdot \mathbf{1}[a = g] \cdot f(i, a) \\ M_\sigma(a, \{i\}, \text{denial}) &= p_\sigma(y = G) \cdot f(i, a) = q \cdot p_\sigma(a = g) \cdot f(i, a) \\ M_\sigma(a, \{i\}, \text{tribal}) &= p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_i = 1) \cdot f(i, a) \end{aligned}$$

The proof proceeds in steps. As a preliminary observation, we note that there must exist $(a, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$ such that $a = g$. A formal argument for this appears in the proof of our main result (Theorem 1) in the Appendix. Intuitively, the trembles of ε -equilibria ensure that the total mobilization generated by the platform $(g, \{1\}, \{0\})$ is $q \cdot f(1, g) > 0$. Therefore, the equilibrium platforms have to generate positive mobilization, which is impossible if policy g is never taken and, hence, the outcome is never G .

Step 1 (platform carried by true narrative). (i) If $\sigma(a, \{i\}, true) > 0$, then $a = g$ and $i = 1$. (ii) If $\sigma(g, \{i\}, S) > 0$, then $S = true$.

Proof. Consider an ε -equilibrium σ . Note that $p_\sigma(y = G \mid a = b) = 0$ and $p_\sigma(y = G \mid a = g) = q$. It follows that if $\sigma(a, \{i\}, true) > \varepsilon$ and hence $(a, \{i\}, true)$ maximizes M_σ , then $a = g$ and $i = 1$ because $f(1, g) > f(2, g)$. Now suppose $\sigma(g, \{i\}, S) > \varepsilon$. Since σ has full-support, $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_{S'}) < q$ whenever $0 \notin S'$. This means that $M_\sigma(g, \{i\}, true) > M_\sigma(g, \{i\}, S')$ for every such S' ; hence, $S = true$. We have thus established that claims (i) and (ii) hold for any ε -equilibrium and, hence, in any limit of ε -equilibria. \square

Step 1 implies that $(g, \{1\}, \{0\}) \in Supp(\sigma)$, and that if $(a, \{i\}, denial)$ or $(a, \{i\}, tribal)$ are in $Supp(\sigma)$, then $a = b$.

Step 2 (platforms carried by denial and tribal narratives). (i) If $\sigma(b, \{i\}, denial) > 0$, then $i = 2$. (ii) If $\sigma(b, \{i\}, tribal) > 0$, then $i = 1$.

Proof. Claim (i) follows immediately from $f(2, b) > f(1, b)$. As to claim (ii), Step 1(i) and $Pr(y = 1 \mid a = b) = 0$ imply that $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_i = 1) > 0$ only if $i = 1$. Therefore, if $(b, \{i\}, tribal)$ is in $Supp(\sigma)$, then $i = 1$. \square

The previous steps pin down the three platforms that can be in $Supp(\sigma)$ for any equilibrium σ , namely $(g, \{1\}, true)$, $(b, \{2\}, denial)$, and $(b, \{1\}, tribal)$. Since they all have distinct narratives, it will be convenient hereafter to *denote each platform by its narrative*. The total mobilization they generate is

$$\begin{aligned} M_\sigma(true) &= q \cdot f(1, g) \\ M_\sigma(denial) &= q \cdot \sigma(true) \cdot f(2, b) \\ M_\sigma(tribal) &= q \cdot \frac{\sigma(true)}{\sigma(true) + \sigma(tribal)} \cdot f(1, b). \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Step 3 (narratives' hierarchy). In any equilibrium, $\sigma(tribal) > 0$ only if $\sigma(denial) > 0$.

Proof. Suppose $\sigma(tribal) > 0 = \sigma(denial)$. Then,

$$\sigma(true) + \sigma(tribal) = 1,$$

so that

$$M_\sigma(\textit{tribal}) = q \cdot \sigma(\textit{true}) \cdot f(1, b).$$

But $f(2, b) > f(1, b)$ then implies that $M_\sigma(\textit{tribal}) < M_\sigma(\textit{denial})$, which contradicts $\sigma(\textit{tribal}) > 0$. \square

Steps 1-3 enable us to establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Since $\sigma(\textit{true}) > 0$, every platform in the support of σ generates a total mobilization of $q \cdot f(1, g)$. This requirement reduces the task of deriving σ to solving systems of linear equations under various configurations of f . Suppose

$$f(2, b) > f(1, b) > f(1, g) > f(2, g) \tag{6}$$

(the Appendix solves the other cases). Then, $M_\sigma(\textit{true}) < M_\sigma(\textit{denial})$ if $\sigma(\textit{true}) = 1$. Therefore, $\sigma(\textit{true}) < 1$. It follows from Step 3 that $\sigma(\textit{denial}) > 0$. Moreover, $\sigma(\textit{tribal}) > 0$ because otherwise $M_\sigma(\textit{tribal}) > M_\sigma(\textit{true})$. Therefore, σ must satisfy

$$M_\sigma(\textit{denial}) = M_\sigma(\textit{true}) = M_\sigma(\textit{tribal}),$$

which has the unique solution

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma(\textit{true}) &= \frac{f(1, g)}{f(2, b)} \\ \sigma(\textit{denial}) &= \frac{f(2, b) - f(1, b)}{f(2, b)} \\ \sigma(\textit{tribal}) &= \frac{f(1, b) - f(1, g)}{f(2, b)}. \end{aligned}$$

This completes the argument. \blacksquare

To interpret the equilibrium, assume (6), so that all three platforms mentioned in Proposition 1 are in $\textit{Supp}(\sigma)$. When *true* prevails, this means that group 1 is in power, implements policy g , and employs the true narrative attributing outcomes to policies. When *denial* prevails, this means that group 2 is in power, implements policy b , and employs the denial narrative that implicitly attributes outcomes to external factors. Finally, when *tribal* prevails, this means that group 1 is in power, implements b , and employs the tribal narrative.

In the context of the inflation story mentioned in the Introduction and at the beginning of this section, we can think of the true narrative as a claim that low inflation is brought about by fiscal restraint; the denial narrative attributes inflation to external factors such as “corporate greed” or supply shocks; and the tribal narrative credits the contending party for low inflation (without being specific about policies).

In equilibrium, the rational policy g must be played with positive probability. The reason is that any platform carried by a false narrative free-rides on episodes with $a = g$. Also, note that a platform advocating g will generate its largest total mobilization if it employs the true narrative, which highlights the correlation between a and y (this correlation is stronger than the correlation between y and any other variable).

However, when $f(2, b) > f(1, g)$, policy b is more strongly mobilizing than policy g . In this case, false narratives allow b to gain dominance at the expense of g . They enable supporters to “eat their cake and have it:” On the one hand, they are intrinsically attracted to policy b ; on the other hand, the narrative distracts them from the adverse consequences of b . The equilibrium probability of $a = g$ is determined by the ratio $f(1, g)/f(2, b)$. What makes policy b not only popular but also “populist” is that it necessitates a false narrative to mobilize public opinion.

The distinction between the two false narratives—denial and tribal—is irrelevant for the equilibrium probability of $a = g$. However, it matters for the identity of the group in power. When $f(1, b) > f(1, g)$, the tribal narrative enables group 1 to displace group 2, even though it adopts the same “populist” policy b . The reason is that group 1 can milk its reputation for achieving a good outcome—thanks to its historical tendency to actually implement g . It does so by highlighting the historical correlation between $y = G$ and being in power (or, equivalently, group 2 being out of power).

A dynamic interpretation

For a deeper intuition behind the equilibrium, it is useful to have a dynamic process in mind. At every time period, the M -value of platforms is calculated according to the historical frequencies of prevailing platforms; the platform with the highest M -value is the one that prevails at that period. Imagine that initially there are some random fluctuations over (a, C) and that only the true narrative is considered. This narrative can only justify policy g because $\Pr(y = G \mid a) = q \cdot \mathbf{1}[a = g]$. This policy mobilizes group 1 more strongly. Therefore, the prevailing platform is $(g, \{1\}, true)$.

Suppose this status quo persists for a while, and at some point platform $(b, \{2\}, denial)$

arises. By then, the historical frequency $a = g$ is close to one. Therefore, the denial narrative induces the belief $\Pr(y = G) \approx q$. Since $f(2, b) > f(1, g)$, the new platform is more strongly mobilizing than the “incumbent” platform $(g, \{1\}, true)$. As a result, the new platform displaces the old one and becomes dominant. Since the new platform involves policy b , the historical frequency of policy g declines, lowering $\Pr(y = G)$.

As this process continues, the denial platform’s mobilization will drop below $q \cdot f(1, b)$. At that same time, the platform $(b, \{1\}, tribal)$ gains traction. In the path described so far, $a = g$ is strongly associated with $x_1 = 1$. This implies the historical conditional probability $\Pr(y = G \mid x_1 = 1) \approx q$. Consequently, a narrative arguing that things are good when group 1 is in power (or, equivalently, when group 2 is out of power) can mobilize group 1 behind policy b . The total mobilization of $(b, \{1\}, tribal)$ is approximately $q \cdot f(1, b)$. Since $f(1, b) > f(1, g)$, this exceeds the total mobilization of the two previous platforms, and $(b, \{1\}, tribal)$ becomes dominant. As this phase continues, it gradually weakens the correlation between x_1 and y and therefore lowers the total mobilization that the platform generates. By lowering the frequency of $y = G$, it also weakens the appeal of the denial narrative. This brings the platform carried by the true narrative back in vogue.

The subsequent dynamic repeats this cycle, albeit with smaller swings in total mobilization because marginal and conditional frequencies are calculated over longer histories. In the long run, all three platforms generate the same total mobilization $q \cdot f(1, g)$. Any deviation that increases the long-run frequency of one platform will trigger an off-setting dynamic response. That is, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is dynamically stable.⁸

4 Fragmented Societies

This section considers societies with more than two social groups ($n > 2$). Relative to the case in Section 3, three key differences will emerge. First, “*exclusionary*” narratives of the form “things are good when these groups are *out* of power” are no longer equivalent to “*inclusionary*” narratives of the form “things are good when these groups are *in* power”. We will see that only the former arise in equilibrium. Second, the proliferation of exclusionary narratives can depress the equilibrium probability of the good

⁸We prove this dynamic stability in a supplementary document to this paper (Eliaz et al. (2022)).

outcome. Finally, new coalition structures can arise that would not be sustainable if only the true narrative was feasible.

To show this, we need to introduce some notation and terminology. Let $N^a = \{i \in N \mid f(i, a) > 0\}$ be the set of social groups that do not oppose policy a . For convenience, we will refer to $N \setminus N^b$ as the “Right”, $N \setminus N^g$ as the “Left,” and $N^g \cap N^b$ as the “Center”.⁹ For every feasible narrative S , let $L(S)$ be the components of S that belong to the Left:

$$L(S) \equiv S \cap (N \setminus N^g)$$

For every $J \subseteq N$, let $F(J, a)$ be the aggregate mobilization propensity given a of the groups in J :

$$F(J, a) \equiv \sum_{i \in J} f(i, a).$$

Remark 1. *If $F(N, g) > F(N, b)$, then (2)-(3) immediately imply that $M_\sigma(g, N^g, \{0\}) > M_\sigma(b, C, S)$ for every C, S . In this case, $\Pr(a = g) = 1$ in any equilibrium. Moreover, $M_\sigma(g, N^g, \{0\}) \geq M_\sigma(g, C, S)$ for every C, S , and thus there is an equilibrium σ in which $\sigma(g, N^g, \{0\}) = 1$.*

The next result provides a general equilibrium characterization for the more interesting case, in which $F(N, g) \leq F(N, b)$. The proof develops an algorithm to compute the unique equilibrium distribution over (a, C) . In the supplementary document Eliaz et al. (2022), we also prove a convergence result that provides a dynamic foundation for the equilibrium, using the same kind of dynamic process described informally in Section 3.

Theorem 1. *Let $F(N, g) \leq F(N, b)$. An equilibrium σ^* exists. Furthermore, any equilibrium induces the same unique distribution over policy-coalition pairs (a, C) and has the following additional properties:*

- (i) *The policy g is played with positive probability which is at most $F(N, g)/F(N, b)$.*
- (ii) *If $(g, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma^*)$, then $C = N^g$ and $0 \in S$.*
- (iii) *Every platform $(b, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma^*)$ satisfies $S \subseteq N^b$ and $C = N^b \setminus L(S)$.*

⁹Obviously, these labels are arbitrary; the appropriateness of the labeling will depend on the context. For example, when the issue is homeland security, the Right may be viewed as more supportive of aggressive counter-terrorism policies. Conversely, when the issue is climate change, the Left may be viewed as more supportive of emission regulation.

The first part of this result establishes an upper bound on $\Pr(a = g)$, which is implied by the denial narrative. To see why, note that the total mobilization generated by $(g, N^g, \{0\})$ is $q \cdot F(N, g)$, which in equilibrium has to be weakly larger than the total mobilization generated by (b, N^b, \emptyset) , namely $q \cdot p_{\sigma^*}(a = g) \cdot F(N, b)$.

The theorem only partially pins down equilibrium narratives. The reason is that multiple narratives can induce the same promise of a good outcome, and therefore the same total mobilization. In particular, if $0 \in S$, then $p_{\sigma}(y \mid x_S(a, C)) = p_{\sigma}(y \mid a)$ because y is independent of C conditional on a (as we saw in Section 2.1).

Therefore, it is convenient to focus on equilibria in which narratives do not have any redundant component.

Definition 3 (Essential equilibria). *An equilibrium σ is essential if whenever $(a, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$, then: (i) if $p_{\sigma}(y \mid a) = p_{\sigma}(y \mid x_S(a, C))$ for all a, C , then $S = \{0\}$; and (ii) there is no $T \subset S$ such that $p_{\sigma}(y \mid x_T(a, C)) = p_{\sigma}(y \mid x_S(a, C))$ for all a, C .*

This refinement applies two “tie-breaking rules” that favor the true narrative over false ones, and small narratives over large ones. This enables us to obtain a sharper characterization of equilibrium narratives, under a mild restriction of the domain of feasible narratives.

Corollary 1. *Suppose that if S is a feasible narrative, then $S \setminus (N^g \cap N^b)$ is feasible, too. Then, there exists a unique essential equilibrium σ^* . Furthermore, (i) if $(g, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma^*)$, then $S = \{0\}$ and $C = N^g$; and (ii) if $(b, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma^*)$, then $S \subseteq N \setminus N^g$ and $C = N^g \setminus S$.*

Thus, in the unique essential equilibrium, the rational policy g is accompanied by the true narrative, whereas the false narratives that accompany policy b take the exclusionary tribal form. They identify a collection S of groups that oppose g but are not in the coalition supporting b . By attributing the outcome to the power status of S , the narrative essentially argues that “things are good when S is out of power”. The denial narrative is a special case in which $S = \emptyset$.

Corollary 1 shows that exclusionary and inclusionary tribal narratives are no longer equivalent when $n > 2$. What makes exclusionary narratives effective in this context? When a group opposes g , there is positive correlation between that group being out of power and the good outcome. The exclusionary narrative exploits this correlation to

generate a false belief that the very exclusion of specific groups from power will lead to a good outcome, while advocating policy b . This enables groups to “*have their cake and eat it:*” They reap the mobilization benefits of the intrinsically more attractive b , while deflecting responsibility for a bad outcome and “scapegoating” the excluded groups for it.

By contrast, platforms advocating b refrain from using “inclusionary” narratives S that attribute the outcome to the power status of coalition members. The reason is that to generate a positive belief, such an S must be contained in the only coalition that advocates g in equilibrium (i.e., N^g). In other words, the outcome is good only when S is in power. Therefore, no platform can generate positive mobilization by scapegoating S . This ultimately means that in equilibrium, S must be part of *every* coalition advocating b , hence it is *always* in power. As a result, its power status is uncorrelated with y , so that adding S to any narrative is redundant. Essential equilibrium rules out narratives that contain such redundancies.

Both inclusionary and exclusionary tribal narratives S are “simple” in the sense that they point to social groups with identical power status — i.e., either all of them are in the coalition C or none of them is. In principle, one could have tribal narratives S that are “hybrid” with respect to C — e.g. $S = \{1, 2\}$, $1 \in C$ and $2 \notin C$. The characterization in Theorem 1 allows for such narratives, whereas Corollary 1 rules them out.

Exclusionary tribal narratives trade off breadth and intensity of induced support. Excluding groups from a coalition is costly because it forgoes their mobilization propensity. However, if this exclusion is not too frequent, its correlation with $a = g$ (and hence $y = G$) remains strong, thus generating intense support from the coalition members. At one extreme, the denial narrative garners the largest coalition by not excluding any group, but induces a weaker belief of $y = G$ by not exploiting any correlation in the data.

The following result characterizes when *non-empty* exclusionary narratives are part of the unique essential equilibrium.

Proposition 2. *There exists (b, C, S) with non-empty $S \subset N$ in the support of the essential equilibrium if and only if $0 < F(T) < F(N, b) - F(N, g)$ for some feasible narrative $T \subseteq N \setminus N^g$.*

The condition is that the domain of feasible narratives induces a set whose aggregate

mobilization propensity is sufficiently weak. When the condition is violated, the only false narrative that can be part of essential equilibrium is the denial narrative.

The next example illustrates the characterization of essential equilibria.

An example with a fragmented Left

Let $n = 4$ and the domain of feasible narratives be $\{\{1\}, \{2\}, \{3\}, \{4\}, \{3, 4\}\}$. The Right is $\{1\}$, the Center is $\{2\}$, and the Left is $\{3, 4\}$; the Left can be further sub-divided into $\{3\}$ and $\{4\}$ (e.g., moderates and progressives). Let $f(3, a) \equiv f(4, a)$. Assume that $f(2, b) > f(1, g) + f(2, g)$, namely the Center's mobilization propensity given b is stronger than that given g among the Center-Right. The following distribution is the unique essential equilibrium:

σ	<i>policy</i>	<i>coalition</i>	<i>narrative</i>
$\frac{f(1,g)+f(2,g)}{f(2,b)+f(3,b)+f(4,b)}$	g	$\{1, 2\}$	<i>true</i>
$\frac{f(2,b)-f(1,g)-f(2,g)}{f(2,b)+f(3,b)+f(4,b)}$	b	$\{2\}$	$\{3, 4\}$
$\frac{f(3,b)+f(4,b)}{2[f(2,b)+f(3,b)+f(4,b)]}$	b	$\{2, 3\}$	$\{4\}$
<i>ditto</i>	b	$\{2, 4\}$	$\{3\}$

As in two-group societies, policy b occurs with positive probability sustained by false narratives. Here, however, all false narratives are non-empty exclusionary tribal ones. For example, in platform $(b, \{2\}, \{3, 4\})$, the Center attributes a good outcome to keeping the Left out of power. Furthermore, the equilibrium exhibits *endogenous fragmentation*: Each faction of the Left sometimes joins the Center to form a coalition, using a false narrative that attributes the good outcome to keeping the remaining left-wing group out of power. Finally, the equilibrium probability of policy g is equal to the ratio of the total mobilization propensity for g and for b , as in two-group societies. The next section shows that this is not a general feature.

A pattern similar to that in the example is exhibited by Israeli politics, where a salient issue is the relation between military aggression and national security. For the sake of argument, suppose that a more aggressive military strategy benefits border security, yet at the same time it is intrinsically less popular because of moral considerations and the sacrifices it requires. For several decades, the ruling coalition typically consisted of the largest party (Likud) and satellite parties on its relative left or right. The coalition

with the parties on the left of the Likud tended to be less aggressive than what the parties on its right advocated. Amid periods of unrest, the Likud often changed allies on its relative left (e.g., the left-wing Labor party or the center-left party Yesh Atid) and blamed the outcome on the others, without fundamentally changing its military strategy. In our terminology, the scapegoating narrative was not accompanied by a change in policy.

5 Specific Domains of Feasible Narratives

Section 4 allowed for any domain of feasible narratives that includes the true and denial narratives. In this section, we consider various restricted domains. We use \mathcal{S} to denote the domain of feasible *tribal* narratives (i.e., $S \subseteq N$ for every $S \in \mathcal{S}$). There are several reasons for considering such restricted domains. First, we interpret each $S \in \mathcal{S}$ as a collection of social groups that can be *clearly identified* by a common label or defining attribute (“fundamentalists”, “progressive left”, “unionized workers” or “the economic elite”). Second, \mathcal{S} reflects the extent to which different groups are represented in government, which can render them accountable for outcomes. In some political systems (e.g., Israel), there are political parties that directly represent specific ethno-religious groups. Consequently, there is data about their power status and how it correlates with outcomes, which makes narratives that exploit this correlation quantifiable. In other systems (e.g., the US), the mapping between specific social groups and political representation is more blurred, thus restricting the supply of similar narratives.

This section is structured as follows. In Section 5.1, we consider a particular restricted domain and show that it leads to a simple characterization of $\Pr(a = g)$ and equilibrium narratives. Section 5.2 characterizes the narrative domains for which $\Pr(a = g)$ hits the upper bound provided by Theorem 1. Section 5.3 applies this characterization to other specific domains.

Throughout the section, we assume that policy b is intrinsically more appealing than policy g , even among the groups that intrinsically support g . That is, mobilization propensity satisfies

$$F(N^g, b) > F(N^g, g). \tag{7}$$

This condition fits situations in which g is a more costly policy (carbon tax, fiscal

restraint) and therefore, *ceteris paribus*, it is less popular than b . For expositional convenience, this section focuses on *essential equilibria* (as defined and characterized in Section 4).

5.1 A Multi-Attribute Model

Suppose that each social group is characterized by multiple attributes that represent ideological, ethno-religious, or socioeconomic identities. That is, let $N = \{0, 1\}^K$, where $K > 1$.¹⁰ Use $i_k \in \{0, 1\}$ to denote the value of group i 's k -th attribute, and denote $i_B = (i_k)_{k \in B}$. Let $m \in \{0, \dots, K - 1\}$ and assume that $N \setminus N^g = \{i \in N \mid i_k = 1 \text{ for all } k > m\}$. That is, the attributes $m + 1, \dots, K$ identify the Left category. The parameter m indicates the degree of *internal fragmentation* on the Left.

Suppose \mathcal{S} contains all sets $S \subset N$ that take the form $S = \{i \in N \mid i_B = v\}$ for some $B \subseteq \{1, \dots, K\}$ and $v \in \{0, 1\}^B$. That is, a feasible tribal narrative focuses on some subset of attributes B and fixes their values; the narrative is defined as the set of groups that share these values. For example, $S = \{i \in N \mid i_1 = 1, i_2 = 0\}$ is a feasible narrative (for example, in the context of Israeli politics, this combination could represent the category of secular Muslims), whereas $S = \{i \in N \mid i_1 = i_2\}$ is not.

Proposition 3. *In the unique essential equilibrium σ^* of the multi-attribute model,*

$$p_{\sigma^*}(a = g) = \frac{F(N, g)}{F(N^g, b) + \max\{m, 1\} \cdot F(N \setminus N^g, b)} \quad (8)$$

Furthermore, the narratives that accompany $a = b$ in the support of σ^ are $S = N \setminus N^g$ and all sets of the form*

$$S = (N \setminus N^g) \cap \{i \in N \mid i_k = v\} \quad (9)$$

*for some $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ and $v \in \{0, 1\}$.*¹¹

This result has two noteworthy features. First, the exclusionary tribal narratives that sustain policy b in equilibrium take a simple form. One such narrative is $S = N \setminus N^g$.

¹⁰The restriction to *binary* attributes is for expositional simplicity; the analysis easily extends to an arbitrary finite alphabet.

¹¹We will prove this result by applying the general characterization theorem presented in the next sub-section.

The coalition that accompanies this combination of a and S is the Center $C = N^g \cap N^b$ —i.e., in this platform the Center scapegoats the entire Left. The other narratives that accompany policy b scapegoat all Left groups having a particular value $v \in \{0, 1\}$ in one of the attributes $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ that distinguish among them. For example, suppose attribute $k \leq m$ indicates a social group’s education status. Then, one of the equilibrium narratives that accompany policy b can be phrased as “the outcome is good when the highly educated Left is out of power”.

Second, expression (8) gives an explicit formula for the equilibrium probability of policy g . This probability decreases with m (strictly so when $m > 1$). Thus, political fragmentation on the Left creates more room for false tribal narratives that crowd out the true narrative and the rational policy g .

The formula suggests an additional comparative-statics exercise. Consider changes in mobilization propensities that reflect *more polarized attitudes* toward policy b . Specifically, suppose $F'(N^g, b) = F(N^g, b) - \varepsilon$ and $F'(N \setminus N^g, b) = F(N \setminus N^g, b) + \varepsilon$, where $\varepsilon > 0$ is small enough that condition (7) continues to hold. This change from F to F' captures a shift of intrinsic support for b from the center to the left, resulting in a more polarized society. When $m > 1$, this shift lowers $p_{\sigma^*}(a = g)$. In this sense, higher polarization is detrimental to the rational policy.

5.2 When do Tribal Narratives Crowd out Rational Policies?

We now characterize the tribal-narrative domains \mathcal{S} for which the equilibrium probability of policy g achieves the upper bound $F(N, g)/F(N, b)$. Recall that this bound is attained when denial is the only feasible false narrative. Therefore, when the equilibrium probability of $a = g$ hits the upper bound, it means that tribal narratives are policy-irrelevant.

We say that $S \subset N \setminus N^g$ is a *coarse subcategory* of the Left if there is no S' such that $S \subset S' \subset N \setminus N^g$. We also introduce the following two properties of \mathcal{S} :

- (i) $S \cup \hat{S} = N \setminus N^g$ for all coarse subcategories S and \hat{S} of the Left.
- (ii) For every $S \in \mathcal{S}$, $S \subset N \setminus N^g$, that is not a coarse subcategory of the Left,

$$S = \bigcap_{S \subset S'} S'.$$

Property (i) says that coarse subcategories are sufficiently broad so that every pair of them covers the Left. Property (ii) says that every finer category is equal to the intersection of its coarser categories.

Theorem 2. *Fix $F(N^g, b)$ and $F(N, g)$ (and recall that $F(N^g, b) > F(N, g)$). Then in any equilibrium σ^* , $p_{\sigma^*}(a = g) = F(N, g)/F(N, b)$ for all values of $F(N \setminus N^g, b)$ if and only if \mathcal{S} satisfies properties (i) and (ii).*

This result says that exclusionary tribal narratives cannot crowd out the rational policy—no matter how strongly the Left supports b —if and only if properties (i) and (ii) hold. To illustrate the result, reconsider the multi-attribute model. Coarse subcategories in this model are obtained by fixing the value of one attribute $k \leq m$. For example, suppose S and S' correspond to fixing $i_m = 1$ and $i_{m-1} = 1$. Then, $S \cup S' = \{i \in N | i_m = 1 \text{ or } i_{m-1} = 1\}$, which is a strict subset of $N \setminus N^g$. It follows that property (i) fails, which is why $p_{\sigma^*}(a = g) < F(N, g)/F(N, b)$.

It is easy to verify that the multi-attribute model does satisfy property (ii). Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 2 establishes that property (ii) is necessary and sufficient for the feature that coarse subcategories of the Left are the smallest tribal narratives that are employed in every essential equilibrium. This is indeed the case in the equilibrium given by Proposition 3. The next sub-section further illustrates the role that properties (i) and (ii) play in the characterization of essential equilibrium.

5.3 Additional Examples of Narrative Domains

A hierarchical multi-attribute model

The multi-attribute model assumes that a feasible narrative is defined by setting the values of some collection of attributes B . However, in some applications we may wish to impose additional structure. For example, the attributes may be *hierarchically ordered*, such that the distinction between values of attribute k is nonsensical unless the value of attribute $k + 1$ has been pinned down. For example, attribute $k + 1$ may indicate social groups' broad religious identity (e.g., Jewish), while attribute k indicates their finer religious affiliation (e.g., Orthodox). Therefore, a narrative that specifies the value of attribute k must also specify the value of attribute $k + 1$.

To capture this idea, let $D \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ be a constant, and define \mathcal{S} as the collection of all $S \subset N$ that take the form $S = \{i \in N \mid i_{\{k, \dots, K\}} = v\}$ for some $k \in \{m - D + 1, \dots, K\}$ and $v \in \{0, 1\}^{\{k, \dots, K\}}$. This specification represents a “social taxonomy”: the narrative defined by v_k, \dots, v_K is a direct subcategory of the coarser category defined by v_{k+1}, \dots, v_K . The parameter D represents the depth of the social taxonomy.

Proposition 4. *In the hierarchical multi-attribute model, the unique essential equilibrium σ^* satisfies*

$$p_{\sigma^*}(a = g) = \frac{F(N, g)}{F(N^g, b) + D \cdot F(N \setminus N^g, b)}. \quad (10)$$

This formula is similar to (8), except that D replaces m . Note that $p_{\sigma^*}(a = g) < F(N, g)/F(N, b)$ if and only if $D > 1$. In fact, the hierarchical multi-attribute model violates property (ii)—unless $D = 1$ —because the intersection of narratives coarser than S is the smallest S' that strictly contains S . However, property (i) holds because coarse subcategories of the Left partition $N \setminus N^g$ into two subsets pinned down by the value of attribute $m - 1$.

The structure of equilibrium narratives is qualitatively different between the hierarchical and the non-hierarchical (original) multi-attribute model. In the latter, only a fraction of the feasible tribal narratives are employed in equilibrium. By contrast, in the hierarchical model, *every* feasible narrative $S \subseteq N \setminus N^g$ is realized with positive probability in the essential equilibrium. To see why, suppose an exclusionary tribal narrative invokes some category S' in the social taxonomy, and yet one of its direct subcategories S is never invoked. The hierarchical structure of \mathcal{S} implies that the equilibrium narratives that weakly contain S' and S are the same. This means that narratives S and S' generate the same beliefs. However, the smaller S is coupled with a larger coalition and therefore generates higher total mobilization than does S' , so we cannot be in an equilibrium.

A rich domain of tribal narratives

Finally, consider the extreme case in which \mathcal{S} is the set of *all* subsets $S \subseteq N$. We refer to such \mathcal{S} as the “rich” narrative domain. The multi-attribute structure of N is redundant in this case, so we ignore it here.

Proposition 5. *In the unique essential equilibrium σ^* under a rich narrative domain,*

$$p_{\sigma^*}(a = g) = \frac{F(N, g)}{F(N, b)}.$$

Furthermore, the narratives that accompany policy b in the support of the equilibrium are $S = N \setminus N^g$ and all sets of the form

$$S = N \setminus (N^g \cup \{i\})$$

for some $i \in N \setminus N^g$.

The proof of this result is a simple application of Theorem 2. The rich domain satisfies both properties (i) and (ii). Property (i) holds because coarse subcategories of the Left correspond to $N \setminus (N^g \cup \{i\})$ for any $i \in N \setminus N^g$. Property (ii) holds because any intersection of subsets of $N \setminus N^g$ is by definition in \mathcal{S} . Therefore, the equilibrium probability of $a = g$ attains the upper bound in Theorem 1. Turning to the structure of equilibrium false narratives, $N \setminus N^g$ and its coarse subcategories are employed as exclusionary tribal narratives; the proof is exactly as in the case of Proposition 3. Since the rich domain satisfies property (ii), Lemma 1 implies that these are the only false narratives that are employed in equilibrium. Thus, the narratives that accompany policy b take the following form: Either the entire Left $N \setminus N^g$ is scapegoated, or the Left minus exactly one group is scapegoated (this group joins the Center to form a Center-Left ruling coalition).

Proposition 5 demonstrates that the effect of political fragmentation on $p_{\sigma^*}(a = g)$ is non-monotonic. The rich domain represents a larger scope for tribal narratives than the multi-attribute domain. Nevertheless, $p_{\sigma^*}(a = g)$ is higher whenever $m > 1$. The reason is that apart from narrative $N \setminus N^g$, which belongs to both domains, the largest narratives in the rich domain are larger than the largest narratives in the multi-attribute domain. This means that the coalitions that employ false narratives tend to be smaller in the rich domain case, which is compensated for by a more optimistic belief, namely a larger $p_{\sigma^*}(a = g)$.

To summarize our findings for the three domain restrictions we considered, the rich domain and multi-attribute domain are similar in the equilibrium structure of false narratives, but differ in terms of the equilibrium probability of policy g . By contrast, the

social-taxonomy and multi-attribute domains are similar in the equilibrium probability of g (in terms of the mobilization propensity function and the measure of political fragmentation), but differ in the structure of equilibrium narratives.

6 Related Literature

Eliaz and Spiegler (2020) presented the basic idea of formalizing political narratives as causal models whose adoption by agents is driven by motivated reasoning. The present paper borrows these ingredients. The key difference is that Eliaz and Spiegler (2020) considered a representative-agent model, whereas the present paper assumes a heterogeneous society and focuses on the role of false narratives as the “glue” of social coalitions. Indeed, the existence of multiple social groups in the present model enables the new class of “tribal” narratives, which are moot in the single-agent model.

More broadly, this paper is related to a strand in the political-economics literature that studies voters’ belief formation according to misspecified subjective models or wrong causal attribution rules (e.g., Spiegler (2013), Esponda and Pouzo (2017), Izzo et al. (2021), and Levy et al. (2022)). In particular, the latter paper studies dynamic electoral competition between two candidates, each associated with a different subjective model of how two policy variables map into outcomes. One model is complete and correct; the other is a “simplistic” model that omits one of the policy variables. Voter participation is costly; stronger beliefs lead to larger voter turnout. The long-run behavior of this system involves ebbs and flows in the relative popularity of the two models, not unlike the dynamics of platform popularity that underlie equilibrium in our model.¹²

The general program of studying the behavioral implications of misspecified causal models is due to Spiegler (2016; 2020). In their general form, causal models are formalized as directed acyclic graphs, following the Statistics/AI literature on graphical probabilistic models (Cowell et al. (1999), Pearl (2009)). The causal models in this paper fit into the graphical formalism (as we saw in Section 2), but do not require its heavy use because they take a relatively simple form (related to the misspecified models in otherwise very different works, such as Jehiel (2005), Eyster and Piccione (2013) or Mailath and Samuelson (2020)). Therefore, in this paper, graphical representations

¹²For a survey on the broader field of behavioral political economy, see Schnellenbach and Schubert (2015).

of causal models remained mostly in the background.

Given the fluidity of the notion of narratives, it naturally invites diverse formalizations. Bénabou et al. (2018) focus on moral decision-making and formalize narratives as messages or signals that can affect decision-makers’ beliefs regarding the externality of their policies. Levy and Razin (2021) use the term to describe information structures in game-theoretic settings that people postulate in order to explain observed behavior. Schwartzstein and Sunderam (2021a; 2021b) propose an alternative approach to “persuasion by models”, where models are formalized as likelihood functions and the criterion for selecting models is their success in accounting for historical observations. Shiller (2017) focuses on the spread of economic narratives in society, using an epidemiological analogy.

The political science literature has long acknowledged the power of narratives in garnering public support for policies and in mobilizing people to protests or rallies (see Polletta (2008)). In particular, the so-called “narrative policy framework” was developed as a systematic empirical framework for studying the role of stories or narratives in public policy. Studies employing this framework have argued that narratives have a greater influence on the opinions of policymakers and citizens than does scientific information (see the papers mentioned in the Introduction, or Jones et al. (2014)).

Finally, there are a few recent attempts to study political and economic narratives empirically, using textual analysis. Mobilizing public opinion often takes the form of texts (speeches, op-eds, tweets). What we observe in these texts are qualitative stories more than bare quantitative beliefs. Ash et al. (2021), Andre et al. (2022) and Macaulay (2022) have performed manual and machine analysis of these texts in order to elicit prevailing narratives in various contexts.

7 Conclusion

This paper has explored the role of false narratives in the mobilization of public opinion in heterogeneous societies. Our main insight is that false narratives enable social groups to dissociate the link between the intrinsic private appeal of certain policies and their unattractive public outcome. They achieve this by attributing outcomes to spurious causes, exploiting historical correlations, and misrepresenting them as causal. This takes the form of exclusionary tribal narratives, which argue that keeping certain

social groups out of power leads to good outcomes. Such narratives are reminiscent of “scapegoating,” a type of narrative that is often used in the political arena.

This insight suggests a novel perspective into the idea of *retrospective voting* (see Healy and Malhotra (2013) for a review article, and Plescia and Kritzing (2017) for an example that extends the concept to multi-party systems). This is the notion that voters punish or reward parties according to their performance (measured by certain outcomes) when they were in office. This view puts less emphasis on the policies that ruling parties take and more emphasis on outcomes. The conventional view is that retrospective voting is a “healthy” feature of democratic politics because it improves government accountability and helps select competent candidates. By comparison, our perspective is that attributing public outcomes to who is (or is not) in power rather than to the implemented policies can be a demagogic false narrative that is detrimental to public outcomes. This offers a new and more critical view of retrospective voting.

Appendix: Proofs

Remaining derivation of the unique equilibrium in Section 3

By Steps 1-3 in the proof of Proposition 1, there are three possible cases for $Supp(\sigma)$: all three platforms, $\{true, denial\}$, or $\{true\}$. We already covered the first case and now complete the other two. By the definition of equilibrium, each member of $Supp(\sigma)$ has to maximize M_σ .

Case I: $f(1, g) \geq f(2, b)$. In this case, $M_\sigma(true) > M_\sigma(denial)$ whenever $\sigma(true) < 1$. It follows that $Supp(\sigma) = \{true\}$. Indeed, when $\sigma(true) = 1$,

$$M_\sigma(true) \geq M_\sigma(denial), M_\sigma(tribal)$$

Thus, $\sigma(true) = 1$ is the unique equilibrium.

Case II: $f(2, b) > f(1, g) \geq f(1, b)$. In this case, $M_\sigma(true) < M_\sigma(denial)$ if $\sigma(true) = 1$. Therefore, $\sigma(true) < 1$. It follows from Step 3 that $\sigma(denial) > 0$. Since $f(1, g) \geq f(1, b)$, then $M_\sigma(tribal) < M_\sigma(true)$ whenever $\sigma(tribal) > 0$. Therefore,

$$\sigma(true) = \frac{f(1, g)}{f(2, b)} \quad \sigma(denial) = \frac{f(2, b) - f(1, g)}{f(2, b)}$$

is the unique solution of

$$M_\sigma(\text{denial}) = M_\sigma(\text{true}) \geq M_\sigma(\text{tribal}).$$

This completes the proof.

Proof of Theorem 1

We organize the proof in steps. We will posit the existence of an equilibrium, characterize its properties, and then confirm that we indeed have an equilibrium. Hereafter, let σ be any candidate equilibrium. Note that by definition, $F(N, a) = F(N^a, a)$. We use the two notations interchangeably. For convenience, let

$$d = F(N, b) - F(N, g) \tag{11}$$

Step 1. *There exists $(a, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$ such that $a = g$.*

Proof. Assume the contrary—i.e., $a = b$ for every $(a, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$. Then $p_\sigma(y = G) = 0$. Therefore,

$$M_\sigma(a, C, S) = p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(a, C)) = 0$$

for every $(a, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$. By the definition of equilibrium, σ is the limit of a sequence of ε -equilibria for some $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$. Since $\sigma(a, C, S) > 0$, $\sigma_\varepsilon(a, C, S)$ is bounded away from zero, and therefore $M_{\sigma_\varepsilon}(a, C, S) \approx p_{\sigma_\varepsilon}(y = G \mid x_S(a, C)) \approx 0$, for some point along the sequence $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$. By contrast, $M_{\sigma_\varepsilon}(g, N^g, \{0\}) = q \cdot F(N, g)$, which is bounded away from zero and therefore higher than $M_{\sigma_\varepsilon}(a, C, S)$. This contradicts $(g, N^g, \{0\}) \notin \text{Supp}(\sigma)$. \square

Step 2. *If $(g, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$, then $C = N^g$ and $S = \{0\}$.*

Proof. Since $F(N^g, g) > F(C', g)$ for every $C' \subset N^g$, it follows that $C = N^g$ for every $(g, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$. Moreover, note that

$$p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(g, C)) = q \cdot p_\sigma(x_0 = g \mid x_S(g, C)) \leq q = p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_0 = g).$$

In particular, the inequality is strict if σ has full support, which is the case in ε -equilibrium. Therefore, for every ε -equilibrium $\sigma_\varepsilon(g, N^g, S) \leq \varepsilon$ for all $S \neq \{0\}$. We conclude that $(g, N^g, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$ implies $S = \{0\}$. \square

The last step establishes part (ii) in the statement of the theorem. Steps 1-2 are the only place in the proof where we use the trembles of ε -equilibria. From now on, we focus on the $\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$ limit itself.

Corollary 2. *Total equilibrium mobilization is equal to*

$$M^* \equiv q \cdot F(N^g, g). \quad (12)$$

This follows immediately from Steps 1 and 2. Note that M^* is independent of σ . Denote

$$\alpha = \sigma(g, N^g, \{0\}) \quad (13)$$

Step 3. *If $x_S(b, C) = x_S(g, N^g)$, then*

$$p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) = \frac{q\alpha}{\alpha + \sum_{C', S' \mid x_S(b, C') = x_S(b, C)} \sigma(b, C', S')} \quad (14)$$

Otherwise, $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) = 0$.

Proof. Suppose $0 \notin S$. By definition,

$$p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) = \frac{q \cdot \sum_{C', S' \mid x_S(g, C') = x_S(b, C)} \sigma(g, C', S')}{\sum_{a', C', S' \mid x_S(a', C') = x_S(b, C)} \sigma(a', C', S')}$$

By Step 2, the numerator can be rewritten as

$$q \cdot \alpha \cdot \mathbf{1}[x_S(b, C) = x_S(g, N^g)]$$

which delivers (14). (Note that when $0 \notin S$, $x_S(b, C) = x_S(g, C')$ if and only if $S \cap C = S \cap C'$.) Now suppose $0 \in S$. Then,

$$p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) = p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_0 = b) = 0 \quad (15)$$

□

Corollary 3. *For every $(b, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$, $0 \notin S$.*

Proof. Suppose $0 \in S$. By (15), $M_\sigma(b, C, S) = 0 < M^*$, hence $(b, C, S) \notin \text{Supp}(\sigma)$. \square

Step 4. If $F(N, b) \leq F(N, g)$, then $\alpha = 1$. If $F(N, b) > F(N, g)$, then

$$\alpha \leq \frac{F(N, g)}{F(N, b)}$$

Proof. Suppose $F(N, b) \leq F(N, g)$, but $\alpha < 1$. Then there exists $(b, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$, such that the denominator of (14) is greater than α and hence $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) < q$. It follows that

$$M_\sigma(b, C, S) = p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) \cdot F(C, b) < q \cdot F(N, b) \leq q \cdot F(N, g) = M^*$$

which is a contradiction. Thus, in this case $\alpha = 1$. Suppose $F(N, b) > F(N, g)$. If $\alpha = 1$, then

$$M_\sigma(b, N^b, \emptyset) = p_\sigma(y = G)F(N, b) = qF(N, b) > M^*$$

which is a contradiction. Thus, in this case $\alpha < 1$. Recall that the denial narrative $S = \emptyset$ is feasible. Furthermore, we must have $M_\sigma(b, N^b, \emptyset) \leq M^*$ in any equilibrium. Since $p_\sigma(y = G) = q\alpha$, it follows that $q\alpha \cdot F(N, b) \leq q \cdot F(N, g)$. This implies the upper bound on α when $\alpha < 1$. \square

Steps 1 and 4 establish part (i) in the statement of the theorem. The next step proves part (iii).

Step 5. If $(b, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$, then $L(S) \subseteq N \setminus N^g$ and $C = N^b \setminus L(S)$.

Proof. We first show that $N^g \cap N^b \subseteq C$ for every $(a, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$, and then use this observation to establish the claim. Assume there is a platform $(a, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$ such that $j \notin C$ for some $j \in (N^g \cap N^b)$. By Step 2, $a = b$. There are two cases to consider: *Case 1:* $j \notin S$. Then $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C \cup \{j\})) = p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C))$. But since $F(C \cup \{j\}, b) > F(C, b)$, it follows that $M_\sigma(b, C \cup \{j\}, S) > M_\sigma(b, C, S)$, a contradiction. *Case 2:* $j \in S$. Since $x_j(a, C) = 0$ and every platform with $a = g$ includes j in its coalition, we have that $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(a, C)) = 0$. But then $(b, C, S) \notin \text{Supp}(\sigma)$, a contradiction. We have thus shown that the Center is always in every ruling coalition. Consider some platform $(b, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$. By assumption, no $j \in N \setminus N^b$ is in C . From the argument above, $(N^g \cap N^b) \subseteq C$. In addition, $0 \notin S$ and $S \cap (N \setminus N^b) = \emptyset$

as otherwise, $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) = 0$. It follows that $S \setminus (N^g \cap N^b) \subseteq N \setminus N^g$ (this includes the case where $S \setminus (N^g \cap N^b) = \emptyset$). It remains to show that $C = N^b \setminus L(S)$. First, suppose there is $j \in L(S)$ such that $j \in C$. Then $x_j(b, C) = 1$ and hence, $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C)) = 0$ (since j is not in any coalition that is part of a platform with $a = g$), a contradiction. Second, suppose there is $j \in N \setminus N^g$ such that $j \notin S$ and $j \notin C$. Then since $p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C \cup \{j\})) = p_\sigma(y = G \mid x_S(b, C))$ and $F(C \cup \{j\}, b) > F(C, b)$, it follows that $M_\sigma(b, C \cup \{j\}, S) > M_\sigma(b, C, S)$, a contradiction. \square

The rest of the proof establishes uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution over (a, C) , and provides an algorithm for computing it (which will be put to use in subsequent results).

The last step implies that the equilibrium probability of a pair (b, C) is entirely pinned down by C . In particular, any platform $(b, C, S) \in \text{Supp}(\sigma)$ satisfies $C = N^b \setminus L(S)$. We use this observation to introduce the following notation, which we will use for the remainder of the proof. Let \mathcal{S} denote the domain of feasible tribal narratives, and let $\mathcal{T} \equiv \{L(S) \mid S \in \mathcal{S}\}$. For every $T \in \mathcal{T}$, define

$$\bar{\sigma}(T) \equiv \sum_{C, S \mid L(S)=T} \sigma(b, C, S). \quad (16)$$

Step 6. *There is an equilibrium σ that induces the distribution $(\alpha, \bar{\sigma})$ if and only if, for all $T \in \mathcal{T}$ that satisfy $T \subseteq N \setminus N^g$,*

$$\alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(T, b)}{F(N, g)} \leq \sum_{T' \in \mathcal{T} \mid T' \supseteq T} \bar{\sigma}(T') \quad (17)$$

with equality if $\bar{\sigma}(T) > 0$. (Recall that d is defined by (11).)

Proof. By Definition 2, σ is an equilibrium if and only if $M_\sigma(b, C, S) \leq M^*$ for all (b, C, S) , with equality if $\sigma(b, C, S) > 0$. By Corollary 2 and Step 3, this inequality can be written as follows:

$$\frac{\alpha \cdot F(C, b)}{\alpha + \sum_{C', S' \mid x_S(b, C')=x_S(b, C)} \sigma(b, C', S')} \leq F(N, g). \quad (18)$$

By Step 5, $C = N^b \setminus L(S)$. Therefore, the above inequality reduces to a linear inequality

in σ :

$$\alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(L(S), b)}{F(N, g)} \leq \sum_{C', S' | x_S(b, C') = x_S(b, C)} \sigma(b, C', S'). \quad (19)$$

Again, by Step 5, if $\sigma(b, C', S') > 0$, then $C' = N^b \setminus L(S')$, such that $x_S(b, C') = x_S(b, C)$ if and only if $L(S') \supseteq L(S)$. This means that we can replace the R.H.S. of the last inequality with the R.H.S. of (17). \square

Inequalities (17) enable us to construct the following algorithm that associates with every equilibrium σ a unique distribution over $\bar{\sigma}(T)$ for every $T \in \mathcal{T}$ satisfying $T \in N \setminus N^g$.

The algorithm:

Let

$$\bar{\mathcal{T}} = \{T \in \mathcal{T} \mid T \subseteq N \setminus N^g \text{ and } F(T, b) < d\}.$$

Define

$$\bar{\mathcal{T}}_1 = \{T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}} \mid \text{there is no } T' \in \bar{\mathcal{T}} \text{ such that } T \subset T'\}$$

Now, for every $k > 1$, define $\bar{\mathcal{T}}_k$ recursively as follows:

$$\bar{\mathcal{T}}_k = \{T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}} \mid \text{there is no } T' \in \bar{\mathcal{T}} \setminus \cup_{j < k} \bar{\mathcal{T}}_j \text{ such that } T \subset T'\}$$

Since $\bar{\mathcal{T}}$ is finite, in this way we obtain a finite sequence $\{\bar{\mathcal{T}}_k\}_{k=1}^K$. This sequence identifies all the “exclusionary” components of feasible narratives (i.e., those that scapegoat groups in $N \setminus N^g$) that can accompany platforms with a policy of b .

The algorithm starts from the “top layer” of $\bar{\mathcal{T}}$ (i.e., $\bar{\mathcal{T}}_1$) and then proceeds to the other layers in order. For every $T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}_1$, (17) can be written as

$$\bar{\sigma}(T) \geq \alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(T, b)}{F(N, g)}.$$

By the definition of $\bar{\mathcal{T}}$, the R.H.S. is strictly positive for every $T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}_1$, which implies that T is in the equilibrium support and therefore the inequality must hold with equality. This pins down $\bar{\sigma}(T)$.

For every $T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}$, denote $\mathcal{H}(T) \equiv \{T' \in \bar{\mathcal{T}} \mid T \subset T'\}$. By definition, if $T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}_k$, then $\mathcal{H}(T) \subseteq \cup_{j < k} \bar{\mathcal{T}}_j$. We proceed by induction. Suppose that for all $j < k$ and every

$T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}_j$, there exists $w(T) \geq 0$ such that

$$\bar{\sigma}(T) = \alpha w(T).$$

For $T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}_1$, we have already established that $w(T) = (d - F(T, b))/F(N, g)$. For every $T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}_k$, (17) becomes

$$\bar{\sigma}(T) = \max \left\{ 0, \alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(T, b)}{F(N, g)} - \alpha \sum_{T' \in \mathcal{H}(T)} w(T') \right\} \quad (20)$$

where $w(T')$ is well-defined for all $T' \in \mathcal{H}(T)$, by the inductive step. This confirms that $\bar{\sigma}(T) = \alpha w(T)$, where

$$w(T) = \max \left\{ 0, \frac{d - F(T, b)}{F(N, g)} - \sum_{T' \in \mathcal{H}(T)} w(T') \right\} \quad (21)$$

completing the inductive argument, and thus the definition of the algorithm for computing $\bar{\sigma}(T)$.

Step 7. *The algorithm establishes existence of an equilibrium σ and uniqueness of the induced distribution $(\alpha, \bar{\sigma})$.*

Proof. Since $(\alpha, \bar{\sigma})$ must define a probability distribution, we must have

$$\alpha + \sum_{T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}} \bar{\sigma}(T) = 1.$$

Moreover, the algorithm produced unique expressions for each $\bar{\sigma}(T)$ that depend multiplicatively on α (see (20) and (21)). This pins down the value of α ,

$$\alpha = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{T \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}} w(T)}.$$

Thus, we have pinned down $(\alpha, \bar{\sigma})$. Since this pair satisfies all the inequalities (17), it implies that the following distribution over platforms is an equilibrium: $\alpha = \sigma(g, N^g, 0)$ and $\bar{\sigma}(T) = \sigma(b, N^b \setminus T, T)$ for every $T \in \mathcal{T}$ such that $T \in N \setminus N^g$. \square

Proof of Proposition 2

This result is a corollary of Step 6 in the proof of Theorem 1. Suppose $0 < F(T) < F(N, b) - F(N, g)$ for some $T \subseteq N \setminus N^g$. Then, the L.H.S. of (17) is strictly positive. Therefore, we must have $\bar{\sigma}(T') > 0$ for some such $T' \supseteq T$. Conversely, suppose $F(T) \geq F(N, b) - F(N, g)$ for all $T \subseteq N \setminus N^g$. In this case, the L.H.S of (17) is non-positive for every such T . By Step 6, this implies $\bar{\sigma}(T) = 0$ for every such T .

Proof of Theorem 2

Let \mathcal{S}^* be the collection of coarse subcategories of the Left — i.e., a feasible tribal narrative $S \subset N \setminus N^g$ is in \mathcal{S}^* if there is no $S' \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $S \subset S' \subset N \setminus N^g$. Let

$$\mathcal{S}^{\neg*} = \{S \in \mathcal{S} \mid S \subset N \setminus N^g \text{ and } S \notin \mathcal{S}^*\}.$$

For every $S \in \mathcal{S}$, let $B(S) = N \setminus (N^g \cup S)$ — i.e., $B(S)$ is the set of Left groups that do not belong to S . Finally, recall that we are focusing on essential equilibria.

We use the notation $\bar{\sigma}$ as in the proof of Theorem 1. By (17) and (7),

$$\bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) = \alpha \cdot \frac{F(N^g, b) - F(N, g)}{F(N, g)} > 0. \quad (22)$$

Also, for $S \in \mathcal{S}^*$, we have

$$\bar{\sigma}(S) = \alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(S, b)}{F(N, g)} - \bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) = \alpha \cdot \frac{F(N \setminus N^g, b) - F(S, b)}{F(N, g)} > 0. \quad (23)$$

These expressions establish that the Left and its coarse sub-categories are employed with positive probability as tribal narratives in every essential equilibrium. The following lemma establishes that under property (ii), these are the only non-empty tribal narratives that are employed.

Lemma 1. *If property (ii) holds, then $\bar{\sigma}(S) = 0$ for every non-empty $S \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$.*

Proof. Assume the contrary — i.e., property (ii) holds and yet there is $S \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$ such that $\bar{\sigma}(S) > 0$. Select S such that there is no $S' \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$ for which $S \subset S'$ and $\bar{\sigma}(S') > 0$.

We have

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{\sigma}(S) &\geq \alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(S, b)}{F(N, g)} - \bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) - \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* | S \subset S'} \bar{\sigma}(S') \\
&= \alpha \cdot \left(\frac{d - F(S, b)}{F(N, g)} - \frac{F(N^g, b) - F(N, g)}{F(N, g)} \right. \\
&\quad \left. - \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* | S \subset S'} \frac{F(N \setminus N^g, b) - F(S', b)}{F(N, g)} \right) \\
&= \frac{\alpha}{F(N, g)} \cdot \left(F(B(S), b) - \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* | S \subset S'} F(B(S'), b) \right). \tag{24}
\end{aligned}$$

where the inequality follows from (17), and the subsequent equations result from using (22) and (23). If \mathcal{S} satisfies property (ii), then

$$B(S) \subseteq \bigcup_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* | S \subset S'} B(S'),$$

which implies that the difference in (24) is weakly negative. Hence, $\bar{\sigma}(S) = 0$, a contradiction. \square

Part I (“if”): Suppose properties (i) and (ii) hold. Taken together, Lemma 1 and equations (22) and (23) state that $N \setminus N^g$ and all $S \in \mathcal{S}^*$ are in $\text{Supp}(\bar{\sigma})$, and that $\text{Supp}(\bar{\sigma})$ includes no other non-empty $S \subset N \setminus N^g$.

If $\bar{\sigma}(\emptyset) > 0$, then (17) becomes

$$\alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(\emptyset, b)}{F(N, g)} = \sum_{S \supseteq \emptyset} \bar{\sigma}(S) = 1 - \alpha$$

which implies $\alpha = F(N, g)/F(N, b)$.

Now suppose $\bar{\sigma}(\emptyset) = 0$. Then,

$$1 = \alpha + \bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) + \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^*} \bar{\sigma}(S') \tag{25}$$

By the same calculation as in (24),

$$\bar{\sigma}(\emptyset) \geq \frac{\alpha}{F(N, g)} \cdot \left(F(N \setminus N^g, b) - \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^*} F(B(S'), b) \right).$$

Since \mathcal{S} satisfies property (i), $B(S') \cap B(S'') = \emptyset$ for every $S', S'' \in \mathcal{S}^*$. This implies that the R.H.S. of the last inequality is non-negative. And since $\bar{\sigma}(\emptyset) = 0$, the R.H.S. must be exactly zero. Using this observation and plugging (22) and (23) into (25), we obtain

$$1 = \alpha \left(\frac{F(N^g, b)}{F(N, g)} + \frac{F(N \setminus N^g, b)}{F(N, g)} \right) = \alpha \frac{F(N, b)}{F(N, g)},$$

which again implies $\alpha = F(N, g)/F(N, b)$. Note that we reach this conclusion for any f and, hence, for f such that $F(N^g \cap N^b, b) > F(N, g)$.

Part II (“only if”): Suppose property (i) does not hold. Equations (22) and (23) continue to hold. In particular, $N \setminus N^g$ and every $S \in \mathcal{S}^*$ are in $\text{Supp}(\bar{\sigma})$. Note that

$$1 \geq \alpha + \bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) + \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} \bar{\sigma}(S)$$

Plugging (22) and (23) in the R.H.S. yields

$$1 \geq \frac{\alpha}{F(N, g)} \left(F(N^g, b) + \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} F(B(S), b) \right).$$

Therefore, $\alpha < F(N, g)/F(N, b)$ if

$$F(N^g, b) + \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} F(B(S), b) > F(N, b) \tag{26}$$

We claim that there exist values of $F(N \setminus N^g, b)$ for which this happens, while holding $F(N, g)$ and $F(N^g \cap N^b, b)$ fixed. Since property (i) fails, there exist $S, S' \in \mathcal{S}^*$ such that $B(S) \cap B(S') \neq \emptyset$. Thus, every i in this intersection is counted more than once on the L.H.S. of (26). We can then choose f such that, for any $i \in B(S) \cap B(S')$,

$$f(i, b) > F(N \setminus N^g, b) - F(B(\mathcal{S}^*), b) = F\left(N \setminus (N^g \cup B(\mathcal{S}^*)), b\right),$$

where $B(\mathcal{S}^*) \equiv \cup_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} B(S)$.

Now, suppose property (i) holds but property (ii) fails. This failure implies that

there exists a non-empty $S \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$ such that¹³

$$B(S) \supset \bigcup_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* | S \subset S'} B(S'). \quad (27)$$

Moreover, we claim that there exists a non-empty $S \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$ that satisfies (27) and $\bar{\sigma}(S) > 0$. Suppose not. From Part I of this proof, we know that $\bar{\sigma}(S') = 0$ if $S' \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$ satisfies property (ii). Therefore, for any non-empty $S \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$ that satisfies (27), we can write

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\sigma}(S) &\geq \alpha \cdot \frac{d - F(S, b)}{F(N, g)} - \bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) - \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* : S \subset S'} \bar{\sigma}(S') \\ &= \alpha \cdot \left(\frac{d - F(S, b)}{F(N, g)} - \frac{F(N^g, b) - F(N, g)}{F(N, g)} - \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* | S \subset S'} \frac{F(B(S'), b)}{F(N, g)} \right) \\ &= \alpha \cdot \left(\frac{F(B(S), b)}{F(N, g)} - \sum_{S' \in \mathcal{S}^* | S \subset S'} \frac{F(B(S'), b)}{F(N, g)} \right) > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the strict inequality follows using (27) and property (i) (which means that $B(S') \cap B(S'') = \emptyset$ for all distinct $S', S'' \in \mathcal{S}^*$ such that $S \subset S', S''$). This contradicts the premise that $\bar{\sigma}(S) = 0$, proving our claim.

Now take any $S' \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$ such that $\bar{\sigma}(S') > 0$. Note that

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &\geq \alpha + \bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) + \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} \bar{\sigma}(S) + \bar{\sigma}(S') \\ &= \frac{\alpha}{F(N, g)} \left(F(N^g, b) + \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} F(B(S), b) + F(B(S'), b) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\alpha < F(N, g)/F(N, b)$ if

$$F(N^g, b) + \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} F(B(S), b) + F(B(S'), b) > F(N, b) \quad (28)$$

We again claim that there exist values of $F(N \setminus N^g, b)$ for which this inequality holds, while keeping $F(N, g)$ and $F(N^g \cap N^b, b)$ fixed. The reason is that since S' satisfies (27),

¹³Note that if there is no non-empty $S \in \mathcal{S}^{\neg*}$, then property (ii) cannot fail. In this case, the proof is complete.

there exists

$$i \in B(S') \cap \bigcup_{S \in \mathcal{S}^* | S' \subset S} B(S)$$

that is counted more than once on the L.H.S. of (28). Therefore, we can choose such i and set $f(i, b)$ such that

$$f(i, b) > F\left(N \setminus (N^g \cup B(S^*)), b\right).$$

This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3

Let σ be the unique essential equilibrium. Since $F(N, b) > F(N^g, b) > F(N, g)$, Theorem 1 implies that $\sigma(g, N^g, \{0\}) = \alpha \in (0, 1)$. Let us now activate the algorithm described in the proof of Proposition 1. The restriction to essential equilibria allows us to identify any equilibrium platform with its narrative. Therefore, we will use the abbreviated notation $\bar{\sigma}(S) = \sigma(b, C, S)$. Also, for every $S \subset N \setminus N^g$, denote $S^c = (N \setminus N^g) \setminus S$.

As in the proof of Theorem 2, $\bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g)$ is given by (22). Now consider the largest feasible tribal narratives $S \subset N \setminus N^g$. By definition, these take the form

$$S = (N \setminus N^g) \cap \{i \in N \mid i_k = w\} \tag{29}$$

where $k \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ and $w \in \{0, 1\}$. Denote this set of $2m$ narratives by \mathcal{S}^* . By definition, $S \not\subseteq S'$ for any $S' \neq S$ such that $S' \subset N \setminus N^g$. Therefore, if $\bar{\sigma}(S) = 0$ for some $S \in \mathcal{S}^*$ then the following inequality must hold:

$$\alpha \cdot \frac{F(N^g \cup S^c, b) - F(N, g)}{F(N, g)} \leq \bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g),$$

which is a contradiction since $F(N^g \cup S^c, b) > F(N^g, b)$. It follows that for every $S \in \mathcal{S}^*$,

$$\bar{\sigma}(S) = \alpha \cdot \frac{F(S^c, b)}{F(N, g)} > 0. \tag{30}$$

The support of $\bar{\sigma}$ contains no other narratives. To see why, recall that in Section 5.2, we explained why the multi-attribute model satisfies property (ii). Therefore, applying Lemma 1, we conclude that the support of $\bar{\sigma}$ consists of the true narrative (whose

equilibrium probability is α), $N \setminus N^g$ and all the narratives in \mathcal{S}^* . By (22) and (30),

$$\alpha + \alpha \cdot \frac{F(N^g, b) - F(N, g)}{F(N, g)} + \alpha \cdot \frac{1}{F(N, g)} \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} F(S^c, b) = 1. \quad (31)$$

By definition,

$$F(S, b) + F(S^c, b) = F(N \setminus N^g, b)$$

for every $S \in \mathcal{S}^*$. Therefore,

$$\sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}^*} F(S^c, b) = m \cdot F(N \setminus N^g, b),$$

so that (31) implies (8).

Proof of Proposition 4

As explained in Section 5.3, every feasible $S \subseteq N \setminus N^g$ is employed as an exclusionary tribal narrative in the essential equilibrium. We will take this feature for granted, and use the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 1 to derive the equilibrium probabilities of all such narratives.

It will be convenient to translate the hierarchical multi-attribute model into a system Π of nested partitions of the set $N \setminus N^g$. Let $\pi_0 = \{N \setminus N^g\} = \{\{i \in N \mid i_k = 1 \text{ for all } k > m\}\}$. For every $\ell = 1, \dots, D$, let π_ℓ consist of all sets of the form $S \cap \{i \in N \mid i_{m-\ell+1} = v\}$, where $S \in \pi_{\ell-1}$ and $v \in \{0, 1\}$. Thus, for instance, π_1 consists of the two cells $N \setminus N^g \cap \{i \in N \mid i_m = 1\}$ and $N \setminus N^g \cap \{i \in N \mid i_m = 0\}$.

We make use of the same abbreviated notation $\bar{\sigma}$ as in the proof of Proposition 3. As in that case,

$$\bar{\sigma}(N \setminus N^g) = \alpha \cdot \frac{F(N^g, b) - F(N, g)}{F(N, g)}.$$

This characterizes the equilibrium probability of the single cell that comprises π_0 . Now consider $\ell > 1$. Given $S_\ell \in \pi_\ell$, the collection of sets $\mathcal{H}(S_\ell) = \{S' \in \bar{\mathcal{S}} \mid S_\ell \subset S'\}$ in the algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 1 takes the form of a chain $\{S_j\}_{j=1}^{\ell-1}$ that satisfies $S_j \in \pi_j$ and $S_{j+1} \subset S_j$ for all $j < \ell$. For $S_1 \in \pi_1$, we must have

$$\bar{\sigma}(S_1) = \frac{\alpha(d - F(S_1, b)) - \alpha(d - F(N, g))}{F(N, g)} = \alpha \frac{F(S_1 \setminus S_2, b)}{F(N, g)}.$$

Thus, the coefficient $w(S_2)$ in the proof of Theorem 1 is takes the form $F(S_1 \setminus S_2, b)/F(N, g)$. By induction,

$$\bar{\sigma}(S_\ell) = \alpha \frac{F(S_{\ell-1} \setminus S_\ell, b)}{F(N, g)} \quad (32)$$

for every $S_\ell \in \pi_\ell$, $\ell = 1, \dots, D$. This completes the characterization of the $\bar{\sigma}(S)$ for every cell S in one of the nested partitions in Π .

Before the final step of the proof, it also needs to be shown that $\bar{\sigma}(\emptyset) = 0$. The calculation that establishes this is straightforward but somewhat tedious, and we omit it for brevity. The intuition is that while every cell in one of the nested partitions is contained by a relatively small number of other cells, \emptyset is contained by *all* of these cells. As a result, the R.H.S. of (17) is too large for this inequality to be binding for $S = \emptyset$, which means that $\bar{\sigma}(\emptyset) = 0$.

It remains to calculate α . For every $S_\ell \in \pi_\ell$, let $S_{\ell-1}$ be again the antecedent of S_ℓ in the chain $\{S_j\}_{j=1}^{\ell-1}$ that we used above. For every $S \in \pi_\ell$, let $P(S)$ be the unique cell $S' \in \pi_{\ell-1}$ such that $S \subset S'$. Given this, and plugging (32), we have

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &= \alpha + \sum_{S \subseteq N \setminus N^g} \bar{\sigma}(S) \\ &= \frac{\alpha}{F(N, g)} \left\{ F(N, g) + d - F(N \setminus N^g, b) + \sum_{\ell=1}^D \sum_{S \in \pi_\ell} F(P(S) \setminus S, b) \right\} \\ &= \frac{\alpha}{F(N, g)} \left\{ F(N^g, b) + \sum_{\ell=1}^D \sum_{S \in \pi_\ell} F(P(S) \setminus S, b) \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

To further simplify this expression, we now use the assumption that each cell in $\pi_{\ell-1}$ has exactly two subsets in π_ℓ . Using this, we can rewrite the last condition as

$$1 = \frac{\alpha}{F(N, g)} \{F(N^g, b) + D \cdot F(N \setminus N^g, b)\},$$

which implies (10).

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