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Welfare and Output with Income Effects and Taste Shocks

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Abstract

We characterize how welfare responds to changes in budget set and technology when preferences are non-homothetic or subject to shocks, in both partial and general equilibrium. We generalize Hulten's theorem, the basis for constructing aggregate quantity indices, to this context. We show that calculating changes in welfare in response to a shock only requires knowledge of expenditure shares and elasticities of substitution, and given these statistics does not require knowledge of income elasticities or taste shocks. We also characterize the gap between changes in welfare and changes in chained indices. We apply our results to long-run and short-run phenomena. In the long-run, we show that structural transformation, if caused by income effects, is roughly twice as important for welfare than what is implied by standard measures of Baumol's cost disease. In the short-run, we show that when firms' demand shocks are correlated with their supply shocks, industry-level price and output indices are biased, and this bias does not disappear in the aggregate. Finally, using the Covid-19 crisis we illustrate the differences between partial and general equilibrium notions of welfare, and we show that real consumption and real GDP are unreliable metrics for measuring welfare or production.

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Welfare and Output with Income Effects and Taste Shocks

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Abstract

We characterize how welfare responds to changes in budget set and technology when preferences are non-homothetic or subject to shocks, in both partial and general equilibrium. We generalize Hulten's theorem, the basis for constructing aggregate quantity indices, to this context. We show that calculating changes in welfare in response to a shock only requires knowledge of expenditure shares and elasticities of substitution, and given these statistics does not require knowledge of income elasticities or taste shocks. We also characterize the gap between changes in welfare and changes in chained indices. We apply our results to long-run and short-run phenomena. In the long-run, we show that structural transformation, if caused by income effects, is roughly twice as important for welfare than what is implied by standard measures of Baumol's cost disease. In the short-run, we show that when firms' demand shocks are correlated with their supply shocks, industry-level price and output indices are biased, and this bias does not disappear in the aggregate. Finally, using the Covid-19 crisis we illustrate the differences between partial and general equilibrium notions of welfare, and we show that real consumption and real GDP are unreliable metrics for measuring welfare or production.

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1 Introduction

In this paper, we study how a change in the economic environment affects welfare. For example, how does the welfare of an individual consumer change when the budget constraint changes, or how does the welfare of a nation change when the production possibility frontier of the economy changes? The first question is a microeconomic question and the second is a macroeconomic question. Under some strong assumptions, chain-weighted real consumption, as measured by statistical agencies, correctly answers both of these questions at the same time. Two important assumptions required for this serendipity are homotheticity and stability of preferences, which are highly convenient but counterfactual assumptions. Homotheticity requires that the income elasticity of demand must equal one for every good. Stability requires that consumers only change spending in response to changes in incomes and relative prices. In this paper, we relax these assumptions and characterize welfare changes, chained-weighted consumption, and the gap between the two in terms of sufficient statistics.¹

Our baseline welfare measure is the equivalent variation at fixed final preferences, which answers the question: “*holding fixed preferences, how much must the consumers’ initial endowment change to make them indifferent between their choice sets at t_0 and t_1 ?*” Although we focus on equivalent variation, our results can easily be modified to also characterize compensating variation.

We study this problem in both partial equilibrium, where choice sets are defined in terms of budget sets (prices and income are exogenous), and in general equilibrium, where choice sets are defined in terms of production possibility frontiers (prices and income are endogenous).² We provide exact and approximate characterizations of the change in welfare and the change in chained-weighted real consumption. By comparing the two, we clarify the conditions under which real consumption captures welfare-relevant quantities even when preferences are non-homothetic and unstable.

Our partial equilibrium welfare measure answers a microeconomic question for an infinitesimal agent who cannot alter market-level prices through her choices. Our general equilibrium welfare measure answers a macroeconomic question for a collection of agents whose collective decisions alter market-level prices. When preferences are homothetic and stable, macroeconomic changes in welfare are equal to microeconomic changes

¹As we discuss in detail in Section 2, preference instability is driven by any factor that changes preference rankings over bundles of goods at fixed prices and income, e.g. age, health, advertising, fads. In the literature, preference instability and non-homotheticities are typically studied independently. We analyze them jointly in this paper because both generate the same type of biases in measures of real consumption. Our results are relevant when either of these forces is active.

²For the macro problem, we consider neoclassical economies with representative agents.

in welfare. However, we show that these two measures are not equal when household preferences are non-homothetic or unstable. Intuitively, some points on a budget constraint, which may be feasible for an individual agent, are not feasible for society as a whole due to curvature in the production possibility frontier.

We provide a generalization of Divisia (chain-weighted) indices that can be used to measure both microeconomic and macroeconomic changes in welfare. The latter extends Hulten (1978) to environments with non-homotheticities and taste shocks. In contrast to a standard Divisia index, which weights changes in prices or technologies using actual expenditure shares, the welfare-relevant index uses counterfactual “welfare-relevant” expenditure shares calculated under the final indifference curve. We show that this means that real consumption *undercounts* expenditure-switching caused by either income effects or taste shocks. We show that this undercounting is larger if changes in expenditures caused by income effects or taste shocks are correlated with changes in prices in partial equilibrium or changes in technologies in general equilibrium. If taste shocks are orthogonal to price changes or technology shocks, then real consumption will correctly measure changes in welfare.

To understand the intuition for this result, suppose healthcare services grew relative to manufacturing during the post-war era due to aging or income effects. In this case, measured real consumption does not correctly account for changes in expenditure shares. Intuitively, if expenditure shares change due to changes in demand, then when we compare the past to the present, we must use demand curves that are relevant for choices today, not the ones that were relevant in the past. If richer or older households prefer to spend their income on healthcare, and households in 2021 are richer and older than they were in 1950, then when we compare the economy’s productive capacity in 1950 to 2021, we must account for the fact that the richer and older households of today demand a different set of goods than the younger and poorer households of 1950. The gap between real consumption and welfare is large if spending on healthcare increases due to aging or income effects and the relative price of healthcare changes relative to that of other sectors.

Our results for welfare and the gap between welfare and real consumption are expressed in terms of measurable sufficient statistics. In both partial and general equilibrium, we show that computing the change in welfare does not require direct knowledge of the taste shocks or income elasticities. Instead, what we must know are the expenditure shares and the elasticities of substitution at the final allocation. For the micro problem, these are the household expenditure shares and the elasticities of substitution in consumption. For the macro problem, these are the input-output table and the elasticities of substitution in both production and consumption. These results can be used both for

ex-post accounting and ex-ante counterfactuals.

For very simple economies with one factor, constant returns to scale, and no intermediates, the difference between welfare and real consumption is approximately half the covariance of supply and demand shocks. This formula can be generalized to more complex economies. We show how the details of the production structure, like input-output linkages, complementarities in production, and decreasing returns to scale, interact with non-homotheticities and preference shocks to magnify the gap between welfare and real consumption. We show that the discrepancies between welfare and real consumption that we emphasize do not get “aggregated” away. In fact, the more we disaggregate, the more important these discrepancies are likely to become. In this sense, our results are related to the literature studying the macroeconomic implications of production networks and disaggregation (e.g. Gabaix, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Baqaee and Farhi, 2019b).

We illustrate the relevance of our results for understanding short-run and long-run phenomena by means of three applications. In our first application, we analyze the importance of non-homotheticity or preference instability for measures of long-run productivity growth. Since Baumol (1967), an enduring stylized fact about economic growth has been the observation that industries with slow productivity growth tend to become larger as a share of the economy over time. This phenomenon, known as Baumol’s cost disease, implies that aggregate growth is increasingly determined by productivity growth in slow-growth industries since, over time, the industrial mix of the economy shifts to favor these industries. To be specific, from 1947 to 2014, aggregate TFP in the US grew by 60%. If the US economy had kept its original 1947 industrial structure, then aggregate TFP would have grown by 78% instead. We show that if structural transformation is caused solely by income effects and demand instability, then welfare-relevant TFP grew by only 47%. This is because measured aggregate TFP does not fully account for substitution caused by changes in demand, and hence the increase in the welfare-relevant measure of aggregate TFP is much lower than what is measured. We also find a similar pattern in consumption data.

In our second application, we consider a firm-level specification of our model. We show that when firms’ demand shocks are correlated with their supply shocks, there is a gap between welfare-relevant and measured changes in industry-level output and prices. We show that these biases, which can be sizable even at annual frequency, do not disappear as we aggregate up to the level of real GDP even if firms and industries are infinitesimal. At annual frequency, the gap between welfare and real GDP due only to firm-level supply and demand shocks could be as high as 1%, and this gap gets larger at lower frequencies if firm-level supply and demand shocks are persistent, becoming unbound-

edly large in the limit when the shocks are random walks. If we start with industry-level (rather than firm-level) data, we are ruling out the existence of these biases by construction.³

In our final application, we demonstrate the difference between macroeconomic and microeconomic notions of welfare using the Covid-19 recession. During this recession, household expenditures switched to favor certain sectors and those same sectors displayed higher price increases. We show that this implies that microeconomic welfare, taking changes in prices as given, fell by more than macroeconomic welfare, taking into account the fact that that changes in prices are themselves caused by demand shocks.

Furthermore, in episodes in which household spending patterns are driven by taste shocks, as in Covid-19, changes in real consumption generically depend on irrelevant details like the order in which supply and demand shocks hit the economy. In these circumstances, the change in real consumption between two time periods is not a function of only prices and quantities in those two periods. The same logic applies to real GDP, which means that real GDP or TFP are unreliable metrics for measuring changes in productive capacity.

Of course, there are other reasons, besides instability and non-homotheticity, why Divisia indices fail to accurately measure welfare. Many of the well-known reasons can be thought of as being due to missing prices and quantities. For example, it is well-known that real consumption fails to properly account for the creation and destruction of goods if we cannot measure the quantity of goods continuously as their price falls from or goes to their choke price (Hicks, 1940; Feenstra, 1994; Hausman, 1996; Aghion et al., 2019); real consumption also fails to properly account for changes in the quality of goods (see Syverson, 2017); finally, real consumption fails to properly account for changes in non-market components of welfare, like changes in leisure and mortality (see Jones and Klenow, 2016), or changes in the user cost of durables. In all of these cases, the problem is that some of the relevant prices or quantities in the consumption bundle are missing or mismeasured, and correcting the index involves imputing a value for these missing prices or quantities. In this paper, we abstract from these issues and assume that prices and quantities have been correctly measured. If prices and quantities are mismeasured or missing, then our results would apply to the quality-adjusted, corrected, version of prices instead of observed prices. That is, the corrections we derive are different to the ones that are equivalent to adjustments in prices.⁴

³These aggregation biases are not unique to firm-level data, a similar logic also applies to the use of sectoral aggregates in place of more disaggregated industry-level data, whereby sectoral measures of TFP are contaminated by substitution bias caused by demand instability and income effects.

⁴Our approach to calculate ex-post welfare changes requires well-measured price changes and elastic-

Relatedly, taste shocks and mismeasured prices (i.e. unobserved quality change) are sometimes viewed as alternative means to the same end. This is because they can both be used to justify why demand curves shift over time, even holding prices and incomes fixed. However, while they have similar implications for changes in observed prices and quantities, they have very different implications for welfare. When there are unobserved changes in quality, the gap between welfare and real consumption is caused by a difference between measured and welfare-relevant *prices*. We show that in the case of non-homotheticities and taste shocks, the gap between welfare and real consumption is caused by a difference between measured and welfare-relevant *expenditure shares*.

Other related literature. This paper contributes to the literatures on growth and productivity accounting, multi-sectoral and disaggregated macroeconomics, as well as the literature on structural transformation. We discuss the way our paper complements and relates to these literatures in turn.

A key assumption in growth accounting is the existence of a stable and homothetic final aggregator. As shown by, for example Hulten (1973) among others, chain-linked indices are meaningful if, and only if, a homothetic and stable final aggregator exists. Therefore, this assumption is ubiquitous in growth accounting, and also appears in almost all papers that study aggregate outcomes using disaggregated input-output models.⁵ We provide a generalization of growth accounting to environments where preferences are neither homothetic nor stable.

Measuring changes in welfare using a money metric when there are income effects is standard in microeconomic theory. Our results extend these insights to a general equilibrium context, and we relate them to welfare-relevant growth accounting. We provide a generalization of Domar (1961) and Hulten (1978) that measures changes in welfare in general equilibrium allowing for preferences to be unstable or non-homothetic. Using this, we can construct exact and approximate characterizations of how welfare responds to shocks in general equilibrium, a question which is of central importance in the literature on disaggregated and production network models.⁶

ities of substitution in the final period. For ex-post welfare measurement, when information on prices is missing or mismeasured, if preferences are non-homothetic an alternative approach is to infer changes in welfare by relying on changes in prices, expenditures, price elasticities, and Engel curve slopes for only a subset of goods, given assumptions on separability and stability in preferences (see e.g. Hamilton, 2001 and, more recently, Atkin et al., 2020). In addition to ex-post measurement with non-homotheticities, in this paper we study the implications of instability of preferences (that generate shifts in expenditures correlated with price changes) and we also consider counterfactuals.

⁵See, for example, the review paper by Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi (2018) and the references therein.

⁶The biases we identify, and the failure of Hulten's theorem, are not caused by inefficiencies (e.g. markups, wedges, taxes). Baqaee and Farhi (2019a) analyze how growth accounting must be adjusted in

A recent and related paper is Redding and Weinstein (2020), who show that variations in sales are difficult to explain via shifts in supply curves alone, and shifts in demand curves (i.e. taste shocks) are an important source of variation in the data. Their approach to evaluate welfare changes in the presence of taste shocks contrasts with ours because, unlike us, they treat changes in tastes as being equivalent to changes in price. Operationally, this makes the taste shocks behave like quality shocks. They estimate changes in taste/quality necessary to explain variations in product-level data. However, this only determines changes in the *relative* size of demand shocks across goods, and it does not pin down changes in the overall level of these shocks. Redding and Weinstein (2020) pin down the overall level of the shocks by assuming they are mean zero (see Martin, 2020 for a discussion of this assumption). Our approach is different in that we do not compare utils before and after the taste shocks. Instead we compute changes in equivalent variation keeping preferences over goods constant for the variation, as advocated by Fisher and Shell (1968) and Samuelson and Swamy (1974). This approach does not require any assumptions about the overall level of the taste shocks in terms of utils. Moreover, as mentioned above, in practical terms the adjustments we derive require the use of counterfactual expenditure shares and not counterfactual *taste-adjusted* prices.⁷

Our paper is also related to the literature on structural transformation and Baumol's cost disease. As explained by Buera and Kaboski (2009) and Herrendorf et al. (2013), this literature advances two microfoundations for structural transformation. The first explanation is all about relative prices differences: if demand curves are not unit-price-elastic, then changes in relative prices change expenditure shares (e.g. Ngai and Pissarides, 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008; Buera et al., 2015). The second explanation emphasizes non-homotheticities, or income effects, whereby households spend more of their income on some goods as they become richer (e.g. Kongsamut et al., 2001; Boppart, 2014; Comin

inefficient economies. Whereas incorporating inefficiencies in production does not affect our micro welfare results, how they interact with demand instability and non-homotheticity in general equilibrium is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁷Given CES preferences, Martin (2020) estimates using scanner level data large differences in annual price changes between price indices based on fixed initial tastes and final tastes. Other papers studying the relationship between conventional index numbers and welfare in the presence of preference instability include Balk (1989) who discusses various ways one can define changes in the cost of living, Feenstra and Reinsdorf (2007) who show that the Sato-Vartia index is equal to the CES price index evaluated at some intermediate level of taste shifters, and Caves et al. (1982) who show that when preferences are homothetic, translog, but unstable, Tornqvist-based indices correspond to a geometric average of welfare changes under initial and final preferences. We characterize welfare (in partial and general equilibrium) at either initial or final preferences and using either EV or CV. In contrast to Tornqvist and Sato-Vartia, Divisia indices cannot generically be interpreted as corresponding to any mixture of well-defined preferences. This is because, as we discuss in Section 5, Divisia (or chained) indices are path-dependent, so they can violate basic properties like assigning a higher value to a strictly larger budget set.

et al., 2015; Alder et al., 2019). Our results suggest that settling this question has important implications for welfare. From a welfare perspective, structural transformation driven by relative price changes should be treated differently to structural transformation driven by non-homotheticity or demand instability. In particular, measures of real production or consumption must be adjusted for substitution bias in the latter case, but no adjustment is necessary in the former case.⁸

The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we set up the microeconomic problem and provide exact and approximate characterizations of the difference between welfare and measured real consumption. In Section 3, we set up the macroeconomic general equilibrium model and provide exact and approximate characterizations of the difference between welfare and measured real output changes. Whereas in section 3 we present our macro results in terms of endogenous sufficient statistics, in Section 4 we solve for these endogenous sufficient statistics in terms of microeconomic primitives and consider some simple but instructive analytical examples. Our applications are in Section 5. We discuss some extensions in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. Proofs are in the appendix.

2 Microeconomic Changes in Welfare and Consumption

In this section, we consider changes in budget constraints in partial equilibrium. We ask how consumers value these changes, and compare these measures of welfare with measures of real consumption. We provide exact and approximate results. This section helps build intuition for Section 3, where we model the equilibrium determination of prices.

2.1 Definition of Welfare and Real Consumption

In this subsection we define welfare and real consumption. Measuring changes in welfare using equivalent variation is standard when preferences are stable. However, measuring welfare changes in the presence of unstable preferences is less common and therefore we discuss this issue in some detail.

Consider a set of preference relations, $\{\succeq_x\}$, over bundles of goods. These preferences are indexed by x , which represents anything that affects preference rankings over bundles

⁸For welfare analysis with non-homothetic preferences in other contexts such as cross-country real income comparisons and gains from trade, see Feenstra et al. (2009) and Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016).

of goods. For example, x could be calendar time, age, exposure to advertising, or state of nature. For every x , we represent the preference relation \succeq_x by a utility function $u(c; x)$, where $c \in \mathbb{R}^N$ and N is the number of goods in the consumption bundle. Since the consumer makes no choices over x , we do not need to specify how $u(c; x)$ varies with x . Moreover, preferences over x , if they exist, are not revealed by choices.⁹

There are two properties of preferences that are analytically convenient benchmarks throughout the rest of the analysis.

Definition 1 (Homotheticity). Preferences over goods c are *homothetic* if, for every positive scalar $a > 0$ and every feasible c and x , we can write

$$u(ac; x) = au(c; x).$$

Definition 2 (Stability). Preferences over goods c are *stable* if there exists a time-invariant function $\Phi(\cdot)$ such that the utility function can be written as $u(c; x) = U(\Phi(c); x)$ for every feasible c and x .

If preferences are stable, x can change over time (e.g. households get higher or lower utility from all goods) but, since x is separable from c , these changes do not impact preferences over bundles of goods c . If preferences are not stable, we say that they are unstable.

Given preferences encapsulated in u , the indirect utility function of the consumer, for any value of x , is

$$v(p, I; x) = \max_c \{u(c; x) : p \cdot c = I\}.$$

where p is a price vector over goods and I is expenditures (which we interchangeably refer to as income). The vector p includes all relevant prices in the preference relation. If the preference relation is intertemporal, then p includes the path of current and future prices.¹⁰

Consider shifts in the budget set as prices and income change from p_{t_0} and I_{t_0} to p_{t_1} and I_{t_1} . Here, t_0 and t_1 simply index the vector of prices and income being compared. Motivated by our applications, we refer to this index as time, but it could equally refer to space. This change in the budget set is accompanied by changes in x from x_{t_0} to x_{t_1} .

Since utility is only defined up to monotone transformations, changes in utility do not have meaningful units. When prices are exogenous, we measure changes in utility using

⁹In Section 6, we discuss situations in which x is endogenously chosen and valued by the consumer, such as leisure, but its price and quantity are not being measured. We also discuss situations in which x is endogenously chosen by firms, such as advertising.

¹⁰We discuss how to apply our results in dynamic economies in Section 4.3.

corresponding changes in income. Our baseline measure of microeconomic welfare is defined as follows.

Definition 3 (Micro Welfare). The change in welfare measured using the *micro equivalent variation with final preferences* is $EV^m(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}, p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) = \phi$ where ϕ solves

$$v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) = v(p_{t_0}, e^\phi I_{t_0}; x_{t_1}). \quad (1)$$

In words, EV^m is the change in income (in logs), under initial prices p_{t_0} , that a consumer with preferences $\succeq_{x_{t_1}}$ would need to be indifferent between the budget set defined by initial prices $(p_{t_0}, e^\phi I_{t_0})$ and the new budget set defined by new prices and income (p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}) .¹¹ The new budget set is preferred to the initial one, if and only if, EV^m is positive. The superscript m represents the fact that this is the *micro* equivalent variation, since we take prices as given.

Discussion of our welfare criterion. Following Fisher and Shell (1968), the welfare criterion in Definition 3 measures the change in welfare by presenting the consumer with a hypothetical choice holding fixed their preferences. To be concrete, suppose that x represents the age of the consumer. Clearly, we cannot meaningfully compare the amount of utils an individual derives from watching cartoons as a child to the amount of utils that individual derives from drinking coffee as an adult. Since consumers never make choices about how old they are, their preferences across consumption goods consumed at different ages are not revealed by their choices. In the words of Heraclitus: “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man.” However, if we fix the consumer’s age x , we can meaningfully compare the consumer’s choices about budget sets they faced at different points in their life or that they may face in the future.

This approach, of holding x constant, is different to the one taken when x represents some form of quality change. Intuitively, quality adjustments are more applicable to situations where the consumer can conceivably make choices between the good at differing levels of quality. For example, if a box of chocolates undergoes quality change so that each box now contains twice as many chocolates, the consumer can conceivably make choices

¹¹In principle, we could also measure changes in welfare using compensating (instead of equivalent) variation, or by using initial (rather than final) preferences. Combining EV with final preferences (CV with initial preferences) is natural since this requires preserving the shape of the indifference curve at the final (initial) allocation. In the body of the paper, we focus on EV using final preferences since equivalent variation is more commonly used and final preferences are more relevant than initial preferences, but we characterize these other welfare measures in Appendix B. See also Remark 2.

between the old and new boxes that reveal how much they value the quality change. Taste changes, on the other hand, do not involve meaningful choices from the consumer’s perspective. Our approach of holding x constant allows us to study welfare in situations where, either for practical or philosophical reasons, it is not possible to model preferences over x itself.

Real Consumption. Having defined changes in welfare, we now define changes in real consumption. The change in real consumption corresponds to what national income accountants and statistical agencies do when given data on the evolution of prices p and consumption bundles c . We assume that this data is *perfect* — completely accurate, comprehensive, adjusted for any necessary quality changes, and available in continuous time. This is because the biases associated with imperfections in the data, like the lack of quality adjustment, missing prices, or infrequent measurement, are different to the biases we study.

Definition 4 (Real consumption). For some path of prices that unfold as a function of time t , the change in *real consumption* from t_0 to t_1 is defined to be

$$\Delta \log Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} b_i(t) \frac{d \log c_i}{dt} dt = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} b_i d \log c_i, \quad (2)$$

where $b_i(t)$ is the budget share of good i given prices, income, and preferences at time t .¹²

Equation (2) is called a *Divisia* quantity index. In practice, since perfect data is not available in continuous time, statistical agencies approximate this integral via a (Riemann) sum using chained indices. We abstract from the imperfections of these approximations in this paper.

Using the budget constraint, we can express changes in real consumption in terms of changes in income deflated by price changes,

$$\Delta \log Y = \Delta \log I - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} b_i d \log p_i. \quad (3)$$

In other words, changes in real consumption are equal to changes in income minus changes in the consumption price deflator. Notice that changes in real consumption (or the consumption price deflator) potentially depend on the entire path of prices and quantities between t_0 and t_1 and not just the initial and final values. This is unlike welfare changes,

¹²For any variable z , we denote by dz its change over infinitesimal time intervals, so that $\Delta z = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} dz$.

EV^m , which depend only on initial and final prices and incomes and not on their entire path.

2.2 Relating Welfare and Consumption

We consider how real consumption and welfare change in response to changes in the budget set and the indifference curves of the consumer. We first consider globally exact results and then local approximations. The results are stated in terms of changes in prices and income, which we endogenize in Sections 3 and 4.

Global results. When preferences are unstable or non-homothetic, the following lemma shows that changes in welfare can be expressed as changes in income deflated by a shock-dependent price index. Changes in this price index are equal to budget-share weighted price changes, as in expression (3) for real consumption. However, whereas the price deflator for real consumption is based on observed budget shares (given prices, income, and preferences over time), the price deflator for welfare is based on hypothetical budget shares (at fixed utility level and fixed preferences).

To state this, define the expenditure function for any value of x by

$$e(p, u; x) = \min_c \{p \cdot c : u(c; x) = u\}.$$

The budget share of good i (given prices, preferences, and a level of utility) is

$$b_i(p, u; x) \equiv \frac{p_i c_i(p, u; x)}{e(p, u; x)} = \frac{\partial \log e(p, u; x)}{\partial \log p_i}, \quad (4)$$

where the second equality, Shephard's lemma, establishes a connection between budget shares and elasticities of the expenditure function. Note that when preferences are homothetic, then the expenditure function can be written as $e(p, u; x) = e(p; x)u$ and, hence, budget shares do not depend on u .

The following lemma characterizes changes in microeconomic welfare.

Lemma 1 (Micro Welfare). *Given any change in prices, income, and preferences, micro welfare changes are given by*

$$EV^m = \Delta \log I - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} b_i^{ev} d \log p_i, \quad (5)$$

where $b_i^{ev}(p) \equiv b_i(p, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})$ denotes budget shares at prices p , but fixing final preferences x_{t_1} and final utility $v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1})$.

Lemma 1 follows from the observation that EV^m can be re-expressed, using the expenditure function, as

$$EV^m = \log \frac{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})} = \Delta \log I - \log \frac{e(p_{t_1}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})},$$

and recognizing that the second term can be written as the integral in (5).¹³

Compared to real consumption (3), which weights price changes by observed budget shares, EV^m weights price changes by hypothetical budget shares evaluated at current prices but for fixed final preferences, x_{t_1} , and final utility, $v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1})$. Welfare depends on budget shares at x_{t_1} since only these preferences matter for EV^m . Welfare depends on budget shares evaluated at final utility, $v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1})$, since EV^m adjusts the level of income in t_0 to make consumers as well off as they are in t_1 . If welfare increases from t_0 to t_1 , consumers must be given more income in t_0 to make them indifferent between t_0 and t_1 . As we give consumers more income in t_0 , the shape of their indifference curve changes until it mirrors the one in t_1 . This means that the shape of the indifference curve relevant for the comparison is the one at t_1 .¹⁴

We can reinterpret the hypothetical budget shares $b^{ev}(p)$ as corresponding to those of a fictional consumer with homothetic and stable preferences with expenditure function $e^{ev}(p, u) = e(p, v_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) \frac{u}{v_{t_1}}$, where $v_{t_1} = v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1})$. This implies that we can calculate changes in welfare given changes in prices based on budget shares $b^{ev}(p)$, *without* needing to know income elasticities or the nature of demand shocks. This is because the fictional consumer has homothetic and stable preferences, which means that all income elasticities are equal to one and there are no demand shocks. To compute $b^{ev}(p)$, we need to know the terminal budget shares and the terminal elasticities of substitution, as discussed in the following remark.

¹³By definition, EV^m only depends on initial and final prices and income, given t_1 preferences. By the gradient theorem, the integral in (5) is path independent and can be computed under any continuously differentiable path of prices that go from p_{t_0} to p_{t_1} . When comparing EV^m and real consumption, we consider the integral under the realized set of prices over time.

¹⁴When preferences are stable, real consumption, defined by (2), is a multi-good version of the change in consumer surplus, which is the area under the Marshallian demand curve. Similarly, by equation (5), welfare is the area under the Hicksian demand curve. Hence, in a partial equilibrium context with stable preferences, the gap between real consumption and welfare is the same as the gap between consumer surplus and welfare, studied by Hausman (1981) and McKenzie and Pearce (1982) amongst others. This equivalence does not hold when preferences are unstable (since Marshallian consumer surplus is not the same as chained real consumption) or in general equilibrium (since micro and macro welfare are not the same, as we discuss in Section 4).

Remark 1 (Non-homothetic CES preferences). To illustrate how Lemma 1 can be used to calculate EV^m with only knowledge of the elasticities of substitution, we consider a non-homothetic CES example as in Comin et al. (2015) or Fally (2020).¹⁵ In this case, the following differential equation pins down observed changes in actual budget shares:

$$d \log b_i = (1 - \theta_0) (d \log p_i - \mathbb{E}_b[d \log p]) + (\varepsilon_i - 1) (d \log I - \mathbb{E}_b[d \log p]) + d \log x_i, \quad (6)$$

where $\mathbb{E}_b(\cdot)$ is the expectation using budget shares as probability weights. The elasticity ε_i is the income elasticity of good i , and θ_0 is the (constant utility) elasticity of substitution across goods. The term $d \log x_i$ is a demand shifter (i.e. a taste shock), a residual that captures changes in expenditure shares not attributable to changes in income or prices. Note that when ε_i is equal to 1 for every i , final demand is homothetic, and when x_i is constant for all i , final demand is stable.¹⁶

For ex-post welfare questions, where $b(t_1)$ is observable, we can construct the unobserved $b^{ev}(p)$ between t_0 and t_1 by iterating on

$$d \log b_i^{ev} = (1 - \theta_0) (d \log p_i - \mathbb{E}_{b^{ev}}[d \log p]), \quad (7)$$

starting at t_1 and going back to t_0 . These are changes in budget shares which are only due to substitution effects. Given b^{ev} , we can apply Lemma 1. Hence, demand shocks and income elasticities are not required to calculate EV^m .¹⁷

For ex-ante counterfactuals, where $b(t_1)$ is not known, we must first iterate on equation (6) from t_0 to t_1 to obtain $b(t_1)$. This first step requires knowledge of demand shocks and income elasticities. Once we calculate b_{t_1} , we repeat the procedure above and apply (7) to get the path of welfare-relevant budget shares b^{ev} .

Remark 2 (Compensating Variation under Initial Preferences). Our baseline measure of welfare changes is equivalent variation under final preferences. An alternative would be to use compensating variation under initial preferences. Every result in the paper can be translated into compensating variation under initial preferences simply by reversing the

¹⁵The result that only elasticities of substitution are necessary to calculate EV^m can be generalized to arbitrary non-CES functional forms, but since the intuition for the more general case is very similar to the CES case, we leave the more general non-parametric results in Appendix E.

¹⁶Since b_i are expenditure shares that always add up to one, it must necessarily be the case that $\mathbb{E}_b[d \log x] = 0$, and $\mathbb{E}_b[\varepsilon] = 1$. See Appendix C for a derivation of this log-linearization of Marshallian demand.

¹⁷In practice, estimating the elasticity of substitution θ_0 may require knowing the income elasticities. However, if the expenditure share of each good is sufficiently small, then θ_0 can be estimated without knowledge of income elasticities. Auer et al. (2021) estimate the relevant elasticities and apply Lemma 1 to measure the heterogeneous welfare effects of changes in foreign prices in the presence of demand non-homotheticities.

flow of time. In particular, whereas Lemma 1 preserves the shape of the indifference curve at the final allocation, the compensating variation counterpart to Lemma 1 preserves the shape of the indifference curve at the initial allocation. Hence, calculating compensating variation requires knowledge of initial budget shares and elasticities of substitution, whereas equivalent variation requires knowledge of final budget shares and elasticities of substitution. This means that EV^m is more convenient for ex-post comparisons and CV^m (at initial preferences) is more convenient for ex-ante comparisons or counterfactuals. This is because in these cases, we use “today’s” indifference curves to undertake the welfare comparisons. See Appendix B for more details.¹⁸

We now contrast changes in real consumption and welfare.

Proposition 1 (Consumption vs. Welfare). *Given any continuously differentiable change in prices, income, and preferences, the difference between welfare changes and real consumption is*

$$EV^m - \Delta \log Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} (b_i - b_i^{ev}) d \log p_i = (t_1 - t_0) \mathbb{E}_t \text{Cov}(b - b^{ev}, d \log p),$$

where the covariance is calculated across goods at a point in time, and the expectation is calculated across time between t_0 and t_1 .

An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is the well-known result that real consumption is equal to changes in equivalent variation if, and only if, preferences are homothetic and stable. This is because when preferences are stable and homothetic, budget shares do not depend on x or changes in utility u over time. Hence, whenever preferences are homothetic and stable, $b_i^{ev}(t) = b_i(t)$ for every path of shocks and every t .

When preferences are non-homothetic or unstable, observed budget shares not only reflect price changes but also non-price changes (that is, changes in x and changes in u). This generates discrepancies between observed and hypothetical budget shares, and hence between real consumption and welfare. To gain more intuition for this, we characterize changes in real consumption and welfare using a second-order approximation around initial choices.

Local results. Consider local approximations of the objects of interest as the time period goes to zero, $t_1 - t_0 = \Delta t \rightarrow 0$.¹⁹ Throughout the rest of the paper, a second-order approx-

¹⁸In Appendix B we show that, up to a second-order approximation (but not globally), changes in real consumption equal a simple average of equivalent variation under final preferences and compensating variation under initial preferences.

¹⁹For our local approximations, we assume that the exogenous parameters (prices, income, and taste shifters) are smooth functions of t and that the expenditure function is a smooth function of the exogenous

imation means that the remainder term is of order Δt^3 . We focus on second-order approximations to capture the interaction between price changes and expenditure-switching, which is the source of the gaps between real consumption and welfare changes.

We begin by stating the results in terms of Hicksian budget shares, and then we re-express them in terms of Marshallian (observable) budget shares.

Proposition 2 (Approximate Micro using Hicksian Demand). *To a second-order approximation, the change in real consumption is*

$$\Delta \log Y \approx \Delta \log I - b' \Delta \log p - \sum_{i \in N} \left[\frac{1}{2} \Delta \log p' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log p} + \frac{1}{2} \Delta \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} + \frac{1}{2} \Delta \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} \right] \Delta \log p,$$

and the change in welfare is

$$EV^m \approx \Delta \log I - b' \Delta \log p - \sum_{i \in N} \left[\frac{1}{2} \Delta \log p' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log p} + \Delta \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} \right] \Delta \log p.$$

Comparing the expression for real consumption $\Delta \log Y$ and welfare EV^m shows that to a first order, they are the same. Discrepancies between the two arise starting at the second-order and involve how expenditure-switching is treated. Real consumption accounts for changes in budget shares in the same way regardless of their cause. The first term in the square brackets reflects changes in budget shares due to changes in relative prices (substitution effects) and the next two terms correspond to changes in budget share due to non-price factors (taste shocks and income effects).²⁰

The second line shows that welfare treats changes in budget shares due to substitution effects differently to changes in budget shares due to taste shocks or income effects. To understand the gap between welfare and real consumption changes, consider first the case of homothetic but unstable preferences. Whereas changes in real consumption only take into consideration changes in budget shares in response to changes in utility parameters as the shock unfolds over time, changes in welfare must account for these changes from the start. Therefore, changes in budget shares due to non-price factors are multiplied by 1/2 in real consumption, but they are multiplied by 1 in welfare. In other words, real consumption does not sufficiently account for substitution caused by preference instability. For example, the additional reduction in welfare (at new preferences) from a

parameters.

²⁰The terms $\Delta \log x$ and $\Delta \log u$ need only be first-order approximations since they are multiplied by $\Delta \log p$ (and we only need to keep terms that are of order Δt^2). However, for the first term $-b' \Delta \log p$, the primitive shock in prices must be approximated up to the second order, that is, $\Delta \log p \approx (\partial \log p / \partial t) \Delta t + 1/2 (\partial^2 \log p / \partial t^2) \Delta t^2$.

price increase in a good i with increasing demand ($d \log x \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} d \log p_i > 0$) is not fully reflected in real consumption, implying $EV^m < \Delta \log Y$.²¹

Similar reasoning applies in the case of stable but non-homothetic preferences, since changes in budget shares due to non-homotheticities should be incorporated in welfare immediately but are reflected in real consumption only gradually. For example, a reduction in the price of a good for which income effects are relatively weak ($d \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log v} d \log p_i > 0$) implies a smaller increase in welfare than in real consumption ($EV^m < \Delta \log Y$).

Proposition 2 is expressed in terms of Hicksian elasticities. We now re-express these results in terms of Marshallian elasticities using the non-homothetic CES aggregator introduced in Remark 1.

Proposition 3 (Approximate Micro using Marshallian Demand). *Consider some perturbation in demand $\Delta \log x$, prices $\Delta \log p$, and income $\Delta \log I$. Then, to a second-order approximation, the change in real consumption is*

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log Y \approx & \Delta \log I - \mathbb{E}_b [\Delta \log p] - \frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta_0) \text{Var}_b (\Delta \log p) \\ & - \frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}_b (\Delta \log x, \Delta \log p) - \frac{1}{2} (\Delta \log I - \mathbb{E}_b [\Delta \log p]) \text{Cov}_b (\varepsilon, \Delta \log p), \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

and the change in welfare is

$$EV^m \approx \Delta \log Y - \frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}_b (\Delta \log x, \Delta \log p) - \frac{1}{2} (\Delta \log I - \mathbb{E}_b [\Delta \log p]) \text{Cov}_b (\varepsilon, \Delta \log p), \quad (9)$$

where $\text{Cov}_b(\cdot)$ is the covariance using the initial budget shares as the probability weights.

We begin by considering the change in real consumption in (8). To a first order, the change in real consumption is just the change in income deflated by prices: $\Delta \log I - \mathbb{E}_b[\Delta \log p]$. The remaining terms capture nonlinearities associated with expenditure-switching. Since these are second-order, they are multiplied by 1/2. We discuss these terms one-by-one. If goods are substitutes, $\theta_0 > 1$, then variance in relative prices boosts expenditure shares of cheaper goods and this increases measured real consumption. The second line captures the changes due to changes in demand. Intuitively, if the composition of demand shifts in favor of goods that happen to become relatively cheap, either due to non-homotheticity $\text{Cov}_b (\varepsilon, \Delta \log p) (\Delta \log I - \mathbb{E}_b [\Delta \log p]) < 0$ or demand shocks $\text{Cov}_b(\Delta \log x, \Delta \log p) < 0$, then real consumption increases.

²¹A non-zero correlation between prices and demand shifters may emerge endogenously if firms have non-constant returns to scale or if firms invest in advertisement in response to productivity shocks. We consider the first possibility in Example 4 in Section 4 and discuss the second in Section 6.

Now consider changes in welfare in (9). As expected, the first-order terms are identical. The remaining terms capture the nonlinear response of welfare to price shocks. Note that if preferences are stable and homothetic, then welfare changes coincide with changes in real consumption. However, if preferences are unstable or non-homothetic, real consumption strays from welfare whenever price changes covary with non-price changes in demand. This happens because real consumption “undercounts” expenditure-switching due to the changes in demand.

3 Macroeconomic Changes in Welfare and Consumption

In the previous section we showed how changes in budget sets affect welfare when preferences are unstable and non-homothetic. For these problems, the frontier of the consumer’s choice set is linear, since prices are assumed to be exogenous. At the level of a whole society however, choice sets need not be linear. The production possibility set associated with an economy may have a nonlinear frontier. In this case, relative prices respond endogenously to choices made by consumers. In this section, we extend our analysis to allow for nonlinear production possibility frontiers (PPFs). The analysis in this section collapses to the one in Section 2 when the PPF of the economy is the same as the budget constraint (as happens in very simple general equilibrium models).

We first update our definitions of welfare, now at the macroeconomic level, and we introduce some basic structure and notation. We then present expressions for real GDP and welfare at the macroeconomic level, first globally and then locally in terms of endogenous sufficient statistics. In the next section, Section 4, we solve for these endogenous objects in terms of observable primitives.

3.1 Definition of Welfare and Real GDP

Consider a perfectly competitive neoclassical closed economy with a representative agent. Each good $i \in N$ has a production function

$$y_i = A_i G_i \left(\{m_{ij}\}_{j \in N}, \{l_{if}\}_{f \in F} \right),$$

where G_i is a neoclassical production function, m_{ij} are intermediate inputs used by i and produced by j , and l_{if} denotes primary factor inputs used by i for each factor $f \in F$. The exogenous scalar A_i is a Hicks-neutral productivity shifter. Without loss of generality, we assume that G_i has constant returns to scale since decreasing returns to scale can be

captured by adding producer-specific factors. Furthermore A_i is Hicks-neutral without loss of generality. This is because we can capture non-neutral (biased) productivity shocks to input j for producer i by introducing a fictitious producer that buys from j and sells to i with a linear technology. A Hicks-neutral shock to this fictitious producer is equivalent to a non-neutral technology shock to i .

Let A be the $N \times 1$ vector of technology shifters and L be the $F \times 1$ vector of primary (exogenously given) factor endowments. The production possibility set (and its associated frontier) is the set of feasible consumption bundles that can be attained given A and L . Given our assumption that production functions have constant returns to scale, the PPF is linear if there is only one factor of production.

For each A, L , and x , we denote equilibrium prices and aggregate income by $p(A, L, x)$ and $I(A, L, x)$. These equilibrium prices and incomes are unique up to the choice of a numeraire.

Define the *macro indirect utility* function as the maximum amount of utility the economy can deliver

$$V(A, L; x) = \max_c \{u(c; x) : c \text{ is feasible}\}.$$

Whereas the micro indirect utility takes prices as given and lets consumers pick any point in their budget set (even if such a point is not feasible at the economy-wide level), the macro indirect utility function takes the PPF as the primitive and lets society pick feasible points in the production possibility set. The first welfare theorem implies that the competitive equilibrium decentralizes the planning problem above with prices determined in equilibrium.²²

We generalize our macroeconomic measure of welfare in the following way.

Definition 5 (Macro Welfare). The change in welfare measured using the *macro equivalent variation* with *final preferences* is $EV^M(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}, A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) = \phi$ where ϕ solves

$$V(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) = V(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0}; x_{t_1}).$$

In words, EV^M is the proportional change in initial factor endowments required to make a planner with preferences $\succeq_{x_{t_1}}$ indifferent between the PPF defined by $(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0})$ and the new PPF, defined by (A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}) . Intuitively, EV^M expresses utility changes in terms of factor endowments. This is convenient in general equilibrium since it can be stated without reference to (endogenous) prices. In this sense, EV^M is similar to consumption-

²²When the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient or preferences are non-aggregable, we can still rely on the micro welfare change defined in Section 2, which requires neither assumption. We discuss non-aggregable preferences in Section 6.

equivalents commonly used to measure welfare in macroeconomics.²³

Discussion of our macroeconomic welfare criterion. To see the difference between macro and micro notions of welfare, consider a situation where preferences change between t_0 and t_1 but technologies and factor endowments do not. Since the PPF is unchanged, the change in macro welfare is zero. However, if the PPF is nonlinear, the relative of price of goods would change between t_0 and t_1 . Typically, the price rises for those goods that became more desirable. Hence, microeconomic welfare, at final preferences, would fall even though the PPF is unchanged. Hence, microeconomic changes in welfare are a poor guide for measuring technological change for a society.

Similarly, suppose we are interested in measuring technological progress in an economy with growth and aging. Households are richer and older in t_1 than in t_0 , so they prefer to spend more of their income on healthcare. Microeconomic welfare is measured by the endowment a single consumer, living in t_1 , would have to be given to make her willing to go back to the economy with t_0 prices. However, since in t_0 households were poor and young, healthcare services are relatively cheap in t_0 . This makes t_0 prices seem very attractive to the consumer in t_1 . But this is not because technologies in t_0 are any better. If the older and wealthy consumers were transported to the initial economy, the fact that they demand more healthcare would raise healthcare prices, and this would mean that they would not be able to consume as much healthcare services.

The issue is that using the initial budget set to represent the initial PPF is deceptive, since the initial budget set reflects both the PPF and demand in t_0 . Our macroeconomic notion of welfare accounts for the endogenous changes in prices by comparing the initial and final PPFs rather than the initial and final budget sets. To compare initial and final PPFs, we scale factor endowments instead of nominal income, since a proportional shift in factor quantities results in a proportional shift in the PPF and is interpretable without reference to base prices.

When relative prices do not respond to consumers' choices (i.e. the PPF is linear), then macro and micro welfare are always the same. Similarly, if preferences are homothetic and stable, then macro and micro welfare are the same. Proposition 11 in Appendix A formalizes this result. For a quantitative illustration of the difference between micro and macro welfare see the Covid-19 case study in Section 5.

²³When preferences are stable and homothetic, EV^M is the same as consumption equivalents, but we do not define welfare changes in terms of consumption equivalents because when preferences are non-homothetic or unstable, households' desired consumption bundle is not stable.

3.2 Relating Welfare and Real GDP

We now characterize changes in real GDP and welfare, first globally and then locally. The results in this subsection are the general equilibrium counterparts to those in Section 2. They are “reduced-form” in the sense that they are not expressed in terms of primitives. In Section 4, we explicitly solve for these sufficient statistics in terms of observable primitives.

As in Section 2, to study this problem we index the path of technologies, factor inputs, and preferences $A(t)$, $L(t)$ and $x(t)$, by time t . The definition of ΔY is the same as before: $\Delta Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} p_i d c_i$. In the general equilibrium model and (its applications), we refer to ΔY as real GDP.

Define the sales shares relative to GDP of each good or factor i to be

$$\lambda_i = \frac{p_i y_i}{I} \mathbf{1}(i \in N) + \frac{w_i L_i}{I} \mathbf{1}(i \in F),$$

where w_i and L_i are the price and quantity of factor i . The sales share λ_i is often referred to as a *Domar* weight. Note that referring λ_i as a “share” is an abuse of language since $\sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i > 1$ whenever there are intermediate inputs. On the other hand $\sum_{i \in F} \lambda_i = 1$.

Global Results. The following results show that changes in real GDP and welfare can both be represented as sales-weighted averages of technology changes. Real GDP uses actual sales shares over time, while welfare uses sales shares in an artificial economy in which budget shares only respond to price changes.

Lemma 2 (Real GDP). *Given a change in technologies, factor quantities, and preferences, the change in real GDP is*

$$\Delta \log Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i d \log A_i + \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in F} \lambda_i d \log L_i, \quad (10)$$

where λ are sales shares which are functions of A , L , and x .

In (10), the first N summands are equal to measured TFP, and the last F summands are the growth in real GDP caused by changes in factor inputs. Lemma 2 shows that changes in real GDP are equal to sales-weighted changes in technology and factor inputs. This is a slight generalization of Hulten (1978) to environments with unstable and non-homothetic final demand.

Next, we show that a Hulten-style result also exists for changes in welfare. Define $\lambda^{ev}(A, L)$ to be sales shares in a fictional economy with the PPF (A, L) but where con-

sumers have stable homothetic preferences represented by the expenditure function $e^{ev}(p, u) = e(p, v_{t_1}, x_{t_1}) \frac{u}{v_{t_1}}$ where $v_{t_1} = v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1})$, similar to Section 2.

Proposition 4 (Macro Welfare). *Changes in macro welfare are*

$$EV^M = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i^{ev} d \log A_i + \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in F} \lambda_i^{ev} d \log L_i. \quad (11)$$

According to Proposition 4, growth accounting for welfare should be based on hypothetical sales shares evaluated at current technology but for fixed final preferences and final utility. This should be contrasted with real GDP in (10), which uses sales shares evaluated at current technology and current preferences. As with real GDP, the first N summands of (11) are changes in *welfare-relevant TFP* and the last F summands are changes in welfare due to changes in factor inputs. We discuss some salient implications of this proposition below.

The first implication is that for welfare questions, the only information we need about preferences are expenditure shares and elasticities of substitution at the final allocation, since the fictional consumer in Proposition 4 has stable preferences with income elasticities all equal to one.²⁴

Second, Proposition 4 implies that if the path of technologies and factor quantities is continuously differentiable, then real GDP is equal to the change in welfare if, and only if, preferences are homothetic and stable (in which case $\lambda(A, L, x) = \lambda^{ev}(A, L)$ for every A, L , and x).

Third, as stated in the following corollary, movements on the surface of a PPF driven by changes in preferences have no effect on macroeconomic welfare or real GDP.

Corollary 1 (Demand Shocks Only). *In response to changes in preferences, x , that keep the PPF unchanged, $A(t) = A(t_0)$ and $L(t) = L(t_0)$ for $t \in [t_0, t_1]$,*

$$\Delta \log Y = EV^M = 0.$$

However, micro welfare changes, EV^m , may be nonzero.

Since the production possibility set is not changing, macro welfare (defined for fixed preferences) does not change. Quantities and prices do, however, change between t_0 and t_1 in response to changes in preferences over these goods. Micro welfare changes are typically non-zero when prices change, as shown in Section 2. These results are not

²⁴Following the observation made in Remark 2, for compensating variation at initial preferences, we need to know elasticities of substitution at the initial allocation instead of the final one.

contradictory: the micro welfare metric assumes that consumers can choose any bundle in their budget set at given prices (hence welfare changes as prices change). On the other hand, the macro welfare metric takes into account the fact that such choices may not be feasible for society as a whole. Finally, movements along the surface of a PPF have no effect on real GDP because demand-driven changes in output raise some quantities and reduce others, and these effects exactly cancel out.

While real GDP and macroeconomic welfare changes are the same so long as we stay on the surface of a given PPF, the two are not equal when the PPF shifts. This is because real GDP is based on a path of sales shares λ that take into consideration technology shocks as well as changes in preferences and non-homotheticities in final demand. However, changes in welfare are based on a path of sales shares λ^{ev} that only take into consideration technology shocks. Therefore, if productivity rises for goods for which sales shares fall due to non-technological factors, then $EV^M < \Delta \log Y$.

To get more intuition for Proposition 4, in the following section, we use a second-order approximation to characterize changes in real GDP and welfare.

Local Results. We characterize, up to a second order approximation (as $t_1 - t_0 = \Delta t \rightarrow 0$), the response of real GDP and welfare to technology and preference shocks, now taking into account the endogenous evolution of sales shares. To make the formulas more compact and without loss of generality, when we write local approximations we abstract from shocks to factor endowments.²⁵

Proposition 5 (Approximate Macro Welfare and Real GDP). *Up to to a second order approximation, the change in real GDP is*

$$\Delta \log Y \approx \lambda' \Delta \log A + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log A' \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log A} \right] \Delta \log A_i, \quad (12)$$

and the change in welfare is

$$EV^M \approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log A' \frac{\partial \log v}{\partial \log A} \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log v} \right] \Delta \log A_i. \quad (13)$$

Equation (12) resembles the one in Proposition 2, but it is based on sales shares and technology shocks rather than budget shares and price changes. The first term in (12)

²⁵Shocks to factor endowments are a special case of TFP shocks. To represent a factor endowment shock as a TFP shock, we add fictitious producers that buy the factor endowments on behalf of the other producers and shock their productivity.

corresponds to the Hulten-Domar formula. The terms in square brackets reflect nonlinearities due to changes in sales shares. Intuitively, if sales shares decrease for those goods with higher productivity growth, then real GDP growth slows down due to substitution effects. This type of effect, known as Baumol’s cost disease, is an important driver of the slow-down in aggregate productivity growth.

The intuition underlying the gap between macro welfare and real GDP in Proposition 5 is similar to that in Proposition 2 for our micro results (the signs are flipped because a positive productivity shock reduces prices). Specifically, real GDP takes into consideration changes in sales shares *along* the equilibrium path. These changes in sales shares could be induced by technology shocks but they could also be due to changes in preferences and non-homotheticities. However, welfare measures treat changes in shares due to technology shocks differently than changes in shares due to demand shocks or non-homotheticities. In both cases, real GDP “undercorrects” for changes in shares caused by non-homotheticities or changes in preferences. In particular, welfare is lower than real GDP if technology growth is lower in goods where sales shares rise due to preference changes or non-homotheticities.

Note that there can be a gap between real GDP and welfare even if all productivity shocks are the same. Specifically, suppose that productivity growth is common across all goods $\Delta \log A_i = \Delta \log A$ and denote the gross output to GDP ratio by $\lambda^{sum} = \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i \geq 1$. Then Proposition 5 implies that the gap between real GDP and welfare is

$$EV^M - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} \Delta \log A \left[\Delta \lambda^{sum} - \frac{\partial \lambda^{sum}}{\partial \log A} \Delta \log A \right], \quad (14)$$

where the term in square brackets is the change in the gross output to GDP ratio due to demand-side forces only. In particular, if demand shifts towards sectors with higher value-added as a share of sales, then $EV^M < \Delta \log Y$ when technology shocks are positive. Intuitively, this happens because welfare is less reliant on intermediates than real GDP, and hence real GDP is more sensitive to productivity shocks. Of course, in the absence of intermediate inputs, this effect disappears because λ^{sum} will always equal one.

4 Structural Macro Results and Analytic Examples

The results in Section 3 are reduced-form in the sense that they take changes in observed and welfare-relevant sales shares as given. In this section, we solve for changes in these endogenous objects in terms of observable sufficient statistics. For clarity, we restrict attention to nested-CES economies. The general case is in Appendix E, and the intuition

is very similar. After providing a characterization to solve for changes in prices and shares in general equilibrium, we go over some analytical examples to provide more intuition. We also discuss how our results can be applied in dynamics economies.

Nested-CES economies. Household preferences are represented by a non-homothetic CES aggregator, which imply that budget shares vary according to (6). Recall that θ_0 is the elasticity of substitution across consumption goods and ε is the vector of income-elasticities. Production also uses nested-CES aggregators. Nested-CES economies can be written in many different equivalent ways, since they may have arbitrary patterns of nests. We adopt the following representation. We assume that each good $i \in N$ is produced with the production function

$$y_i = A_i G_i \left(\{m_{ij}\}_{j \in N}, \{l_{if}\}_{f \in F} \right) = A_i \left(\sum_{j \in N} \omega_{ij} m_{ij}^{\frac{\theta_i-1}{\theta_i}} + \sum_{f \in F} \omega_{if} l_{if}^{\frac{\theta_i-1}{\theta_i}} \right)^{\frac{\theta_i}{\theta_i-1}},$$

where the parameters ω_{ij} and ω_{if} are constants. Any nested-CES production network can be represented in this way if we treat each CES aggregator as a separate producer (see Baqaee and Farhi, 2019b).

Input-output matrix. We stack the expenditure shares of the representative household, all producers, and all factors into the $(1 + N + F) \times (1 + N + F)$ input-output matrix Ω . The first row corresponds to the household. To highlight the special role played by the representative agent, we index the household by 0, which means that the first row of Ω is equal to the household's budget shares introduced above ($\Omega_0 = b'$, with $b_i = 0$ for $i \notin N$).²⁶ The next N rows correspond to the expenditure shares of each producer on every other producer and factor. The last F rows correspond to the expenditure shares of the primary factors (which are all zeros, since primary factors do not require any inputs).

Leontief inverse matrix. The Leontief inverse matrix is the $(1 + N + F) \times (1 + N + F)$ matrix defined as

$$\Psi \equiv (I - \Omega)^{-1} = I + \Omega + \Omega^2 + \dots,$$

where I is the identity matrix. The Leontief inverse matrix $\Psi \geq I$ records the *direct and indirect* exposures through the supply chains in the production network. We partition Ψ

²⁶We expand the vector of demand-shifters $\Delta \log x$ and income elasticities ε to be $(1 + N + F) \times 1$, where $\Delta \log x_i = \varepsilon_i = 0$ if $i \notin N$.

in the following way:

$$\Psi = \left[\begin{array}{c|ccc|ccc} 1 & \lambda_1 & \cdots & \lambda_N & \Lambda_1 & \cdots & \Lambda_F \\ \hline 0 & \Psi_{11} & \cdots & \Psi_{1N} & \Psi_{1N+1} & \cdots & \Psi_{1N+F} \\ 0 & & \ddots & & & & \\ 0 & \Psi_{N1} & & \Psi_{NN} & \Psi_{NN+1} & \cdots & \Psi_{NN+F} \\ \hline 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 1 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \cdots & \vdots & \vdots & 1 & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 1 \end{array} \right].$$

The first row and column correspond to final demand (good 0). The first row is equal to the vector of sales shares for goods and factors λ' . To highlight the special role played by factors, we interchangeably denote their sales share by the $F \times 1$ vector Λ . The next N rows and columns correspond to goods, and the last F rows and columns correspond to the factors. Define the $(1 + N + F) \times F$ matrix Ψ^F as the submatrix consisting of the right F columns of Ψ , representing the network-adjusted factor intensities of each good. The sum of network-adjusted factor intensities for every good i is equal to one, $\sum_{f \in F} \Psi_{if} = 1$ because the factor content of every good is equal to one. In our results below we will use the identities $\lambda' = b'\Psi$ and $\Lambda' = b'\Psi^F$.

4.1 General characterization for nested-CES economies

Changes in real GDP and welfare can be computed by weighing technology shocks by observed and welfare-relevant sales shares (λ and λ^{ev} , respectively) and cumulating the results (see Lemma 2 and Proposition 5). The following proposition pins down λ and λ^{ev} along the transition path. This proposition can then be used in combination with Lemma 2 and Proposition 5 to calculate (globally) changes in real GDP and welfare.

To simplify notation, we again assume away shocks to factor endowments and consider some path of taste and technology shocks $\{x(t), A(t)\}_{t \in [t_0, t_1]}$.

Proposition 6 (Characterization for nested-CES economies). *Change in observed variables are pinned down by the following coupled system of differential equations:*

$$d \log p_i = - \sum_j \Psi_{ij} d \log A_j + \sum_{f \in F} \Psi_{if} d \log \lambda_f,$$

$$d\Psi_{il} = \sum_j \Psi_{ij}(\theta_j - 1) \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(j)}} \left(-d \log p, \Psi_{(l)} \right) + \mathbf{1}_{\{i=0\}} \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(d \log x + \varepsilon d \log Y, \Psi_{(l)} \right),$$

where changes in observed sales shares are given by $d\lambda_i = d\Psi_{0i}$ for every i and changes in real GDP are given by $d \log Y = \sum_i \lambda_i d \log A_i$.

On the other hand, the change in welfare-relevant variables are pinned down by the following system of differential equations

$$\begin{aligned} d \log p_i^{ev} &= - \sum_j \Psi_{ij}^{ev} d \log A_j + \sum_{f \in F} \Psi_{if}^{ev} d \log \lambda_f^{ev}, \\ d\Psi_{il}^{ev} &= \sum_j \Psi_{ij}^{ev} (\theta_j - 1) \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{ev,(j)}} \left(-d \log p^{ev}, \Psi_{(l)}^{ev} \right), \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

where changes in welfare-relevant sales shares are given by $d\lambda_i^{ev} = d\Psi_{0i}^{ev}$ for every i and changes in welfare are given by (4).

For all of these expressions, the summations are evaluated over all goods and factors, so that i and $j \in \{0\} + N + F$, $\text{Cov}_{\Omega^{ev,(j)}}(\cdot)$ is the covariance using the j th row of Ω as the probability weights, and $\Psi_{(i)}$ is the i th column of the Leontief inverse.

Iterating on the equations in Proposition 6 allows us to compute the path of λ^{ev} and λ . Once in possession of these paths, the change in real GDP and welfare are straightforward to calculate by cumulating the λ and λ^{ev} -weighted sum of technology shocks. For this iterative procedure, the boundary conditions are that at the end point, prices satisfy $p(t_1) = p^{ev}(t_1) = \mathbf{1}$ and the Leontief inverse matches $\Psi^{ev}(t_1) = \Psi(t_1)$.

For ex-post welfare questions, where the Leontief inverse Ψ is observed at t_1 , we can calculate Ψ^{ev} between t_0 and t_1 by starting at t_1 and going backwards to t_0 . This process does not require knowledge of either the income elasticities ε nor the taste shocks $\Delta \log x$ since they do not appear in either the equation for $d \log p^{ev}$ nor the equation for $d\Psi^{ev}$.

Each term in Proposition 6 has a clear interpretation. We start by discussing the equation determining prices $d \log p$. This equation captures the fact that the price of each good $d \log p_i$ is determined by its (direct and indirect) exposure to the price of inputs j and factors f . The equation for $d \log \Psi_{il}$, in turn, shows that changes in the Leontief inverse are determined by substitutions by j , if j is an intermediary between i and l , as well as income and substitution effects if i is the household ($i = 0$). Finally, the welfare-relevant versions of these equations, $d \log p^{ev}$ and $d\Psi^{ev}$ are identical except that they do not account for expenditure-switching due to income effects or taste shocks.

Remark 3 (Micro Welfare). Proposition 6 can also be used to compute changes in microeconomic welfare EV^m . To this, we compute the path of prices using Proposition 6 and then plug these price changes into equation (7) to get the welfare-relevant budget shares b^{ev} . These can then be used in conjunction with Proposition 2 to get EV^m . Note that,

unlike macroeconomic welfare EV^M , this calculation requires knowledge of both income elasticities and taste shocks, unless there is a single factor of production as discussed below.

Remark 4 (Compensating Variation). Proposition 6 can also be used to compute changes in compensating variation at initial preferences (instead of equivalent variation at final preferences). To do this, we would still solve the differential equations for $d \log p^{ev}$ and $d\Psi^{ev}$, however, we would use different boundary conditions. The boundary conditions for compensating variation at initial preferences would match the data at t_0 instead of t_1 , setting $p^{ev}(t_0) = 1$ and $\Psi^{ev} = \Psi(t_0)$. We would then solve the differential equations forward from t_0 to t_1 and use the resulting welfare-relevant shares to weight the technology shocks. This procedure effectively makes use of the fact that compensating variation at initial preferences going from t_0 to t_1 is equal to equivalent variation at final preferences if we go from t_1 to t_0 . As with EV^M , conditional on the boundary conditions, we do not need to know the income elasticities or the taste shocks.

To build more intuition, we focus on the economies with only a single factor of production. In this case, the differential equations for $d \log p$ and $d \log p^{ev}$ are decoupled from the ones for $d\Psi$ and $d\Psi^{ev}$. This follows from the fact that the economy's single primary factor must have a sales share of unity. In other words, the following set of equations always hold: $\lambda_f = \lambda_f^{ev} = \Psi_{0f} = \Psi_{0f}^{ev} = 1$. This allows for a simple closed-form characterization of both welfare and real GDP up to a second-order approximation.

Proposition 7 (Approximate Macro Welfare vs GDP: Single Factor). *Consider some perturbation in technology, $\Delta \log A$, and final demand, $\Delta \log x$. When the economy has one factor of production, the change in real GDP is*

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log Y \approx & \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i \Delta \log A_i + \frac{1}{2} \sum_j \lambda_j (\theta_j - 1) \text{Var}_{\Omega^{(j)}} \left(\sum_{i \in N} \Psi_{(i)} \Delta \log A_i \right) \\ & + \frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(\Delta \log x + \left(\sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i \Delta \log A_i \right) \varepsilon, \sum_{i \in N} \Psi_{(i)} \Delta \log A_i \right), \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

The difference between welfare and GDP is

$$EV^M - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(\Delta \log x + \left(\sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i \Delta \log A_i \right) \varepsilon, \sum_{i \in N} \Psi_{(i)} \Delta \log A_i \right). \quad (17)$$

Proposition 7 is a general equilibrium counterpart to Proposition 3. We discuss (16) and (17) in turn, starting with (16). The first term in Equation (16) is the Hulten-Domar

term. The other terms are second-order terms resulting from the fact that sales shares change in response to shocks. The first one of these terms captures nonlinearities due to the fact that sales shares can respond to changes in relative prices caused by technology shocks (these effects were emphasized by Baqaee and Farhi, 2019b). The terms on the second line of (16), which are the ones we focus on in this paper, capture changes in sales shares due to changes in preferences or non-homotheticities.

Equation (17) shows that while real GDP correctly accounts for substitution due to supply shocks, it needs to be corrected for expenditure-switching due to changes in final demand caused by taste shocks or non-homotheticities. Whereas in partial equilibrium, the gap between welfare and real GDP is proportional to the covariance of supply and demand shocks (see Proposition 3), equation (17) shows that in general equilibrium, the relevant statistic is the covariance of demand shocks with a network-adjusted notion of supply shocks not supply shocks per se. Furthermore, Proposition 7 shows that the elasticities of substitution are irrelevant for the gap between welfare and real GDP in one-factor models. This is because, in response to demand-driven forces, relative prices do not change as the equilibrium moves along a linear PPF. Therefore, demand shocks do not trigger expenditure switching due to the endogenous response of relative prices. When we relax the linearity of the PPF, we see that the elasticities of substitution in production do, in general, affect the gap between welfare and GDP.

4.2 Analytical Examples

We now work through some simple examples to illustrate the forces that drive a gap between λ and λ^{ev} and, by extension, real GDP and welfare.

Example 1 (Correlated Supply and Demand Shocks). We start with the simplest possible example, a one sector model without any intermediates. In this case, sales shares are just budget shares $\lambda_i = b_i = \Omega_{0i}$ and $\Psi_{(i)}$ is the i th column of the $1 + N + F$ identity matrix $I_{(i)}$. Therefore, Proposition 7 implies

$$EV^M - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} (Cov_b(\Delta \log x, \Delta \log A) + Cov_b(\varepsilon, \Delta \log A) \mathbb{E}_b[\Delta \log A]).$$

Hence, welfare changes are greater than the change in real GDP if productivity and demand shocks are positively correlated. This could happen either because preferences exogenously change to favor high productivity goods, $Cov_b(\Delta \log x, \Delta \log A) > 0$, or preferences endogenously change to favor high productivity growth goods due to non-homotheticities, $Cov_b(\varepsilon, \Delta \log A) \Delta \log Y > 0$. When shifts in demand are orthogonal to

shifts in supply, to a second-order approximation, real GDP measures welfare correctly.

Example 2 (Input-Output Connections). For models with linear PPFs, input-output connections affect the gap between real GDP and welfare in two ways: (1) the impact of technology shocks is bigger when there are input-output linkages because $\Psi_{(i)} \geq I_{(i)}$ and $\lambda_i \geq b_i$; (2) the production network “mixes” the shocks, and this may reduce the correlation of supply and demand shocks by making the technology shocks more uniform. However, since it is the covariance (not the correlation) of the shocks that matters, this means the effects are, at least theoretically ambiguous.

To see these two forces, consider the three economies depicted in Figure 1. Each of these economies has a roundabout structure. Panel 1a depicts a situation where each producer uses only its own output as an input, Panel 1b a situation where all producers use the same basket of goods (denoted by M) as an intermediate input, and Panel 1c a situation where each producer uses the output of the other producer as an input. We compute the correction to GDP necessary to arrive at welfare for each of these cases using Proposition 7. For clarity, we focus on demand shocks caused by instability rather than non-homotheticity, though it should be clear that this does not affect any of the intuitions.




Figure 1: Three different kinds of round-about economy. The arrows represent the flow of goods. The only factor is labor which is not depicted in the diagram.

For Panel 1a, we get

$$EV^M - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} Cov_b(\Delta \log x_i, \Omega_{iL}^{-1} \Delta \log A_i),$$

where the covariance is computed across goods $i \in N$ and Ω_{iL} is the labor share for i . Hence, as intermediate inputs become more important, the necessary adjustment becomes larger. This is because, for a given vector of preference shocks, the movement in sales shares is now larger due to the roundabout nature of production.²⁷

²⁷As discussed after Equation (14), if all productivity shocks are the same, there may still be an adjustment

On the other hand, for Panel 1b, we get²⁸

$$EV^M - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} \left(Cov_b(\Delta \log x_i, \Delta \log A_i) - Cov_b(\Delta \log x_i, \Omega_{iL}) \frac{\sum_{i \in N} \Delta \log A_i}{\sum_{i \in N} \Omega_{iL}} \right).$$

Hence, in this case, if the labor share Ω_{iL} is the same for all $i \in N$, then the intermediate input share is irrelevant. Intuitively, in this case, all producers buy the same share of materials, so a shock to the composition of household demand does not alter the sales of any producer through the supply chain, and hence only the first-round non-network component of the shocks matters.²⁹

Finally, consider Panel 1c. For clarity, focus on the case where only producer 1 gets a productivity shock ($\Delta \log A_2 = 0$). In this case, the difference between real GDP and welfare is

$$EV^M - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{1 - \Omega_{12}\Omega_{21}} Cov_b \left(\Delta \log x, \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \Omega_{21} \end{bmatrix} \right) \Delta \log A_1.$$

As the intermediate input share Ω_{21} approaches one, the adjustment goes to zero (since the covariance term goes to zero). Intuitively, as Ω_{21} goes to one, the increase in demand for the first producer from a change in preferences is exactly offset by a reduction in demand from the second producer who buys inputs from the first producer. In this limiting case, changes in consumer preferences have no effect on the overall sales share of the first producer.

These three examples serve to illustrate that the effect of input-output networks on the adjustment are theoretically ambiguous but potent.

We now work through some simple examples with multiple factors of production to illustrate how nonlinear PPFs affect the previous results.

Example 3 (Decreasing Returns to Scale). Consider the one-sector model without intermediate inputs in Example 1 but now suppose that production functions are non-constant-returns-to-scale. Specifically, the production for good i is

$$y_i = A_i L_i^\gamma,$$

due to heterogeneity in labor shares. In particular, if demand shocks are higher for sectors with higher labor shares, then $EV^M < \Delta \log Y$ when technology shocks are positive.

²⁸For this example, we assume that there are no productivity shocks to the intermediate bundle $\Delta \log A_M = 0$ and we assume that $\Omega_{iM} = 1/N$ for each $i \in N$.

²⁹As in Footnote 27, if the labor share is heterogeneous across producers, there is an additional adjustment which depends on the covariance between demand shocks and labor shares. If the demand shocks reallocate expenditures towards sectors with high labor shares, then welfare becomes less sensitive to productivity shocks than real GDP.

where L_i is labor and γ need not equal 1. Furthermore, suppose that preferences are homothetic ($\varepsilon_i = 1$ for every i), but potentially unstable ($\Delta \log x \neq 0$). To apply our theorems to this economy, where producers have non-constant-returns production functions, we introduce a set of producer-specific factors in inelastic supply, and suppose that each producer has a Cobb-Douglas production function that combines a common factor with elasticity γ and a producer-specific factor with elasticity $1 - \gamma$. This means that our economy has $1 + N$ factors.

We apply Proposition 5 to compute the difference between welfare and real GDP. To do this, we first use Proposition 6 to compute changes in sales shares due to demand shocks:

$$\frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} \cdot d \log x = Cov_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(d \log x, \Psi_{(i)} \right) + (\theta_0 - 1) Cov_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(-\frac{d \log p}{d \log x} d \log x, \Psi_{(i)} \right).$$

The factor content of every good $i \in N$ is given by $\Psi_{if}^F = \gamma$ when f is the common factor and $\Psi_{if}^F = 1 - \gamma$ when f is the producer-specific factor. Since the factor shares of each producer are constant, the log change in the producer-specific factor share is the same as the log change in the sales share of that producer. Therefore, we can replace $d \log p_i / d \log x$ in the covariance with $(\gamma - 1) (\partial \log \lambda_i / \partial \log x) d \log x$ (the other components of price changes are common to all producers and drop out of the covariance). Plugging this into the expression above and solving yields a closed-form expression for $\partial \lambda_i / \partial \log x$. This allows us to apply Proposition 5 to get the difference between welfare and real GDP up to a second order approximation:

$$EV^M - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} \frac{Cov_{\Omega^{(0)}}(\Delta \log x, \Delta \log A)}{1 + (\theta_0 - 1)(1 - \gamma)}.$$

Note that the denominator disappears when we have constant-returns to scale ($\gamma = 1$) or the elasticity of substitution across goods is one ($\theta_0 = 1$). Outside of these cases, complementarities ($\theta_0 < 1$) amplify the impact of preference shocks under decreasing returns to scale ($\gamma < 1$). Intuitively, if preferences shift in favor of some good, the price of that good rises due to decreasing returns to scale. The fact that the price of the good increases raises the sales share of that good due to complementarities, which creates a feedback loop, raising prices of the good further, and causing additional substitution. In other words, in the decreasing returns to scale model with complementarities, sales shares respond more strongly to demand shocks. Given that sales shares respond more strongly to demand shocks, the necessary adjustment to correct real GDP is larger.

Example 4 (Macro vs. Micro Welfare Change). Finally, we demonstrate the difference

between macro and micro welfare changes using the previous example. The economy in the previous example has multiple factors and unstable preferences. Therefore, macro and micro notions of welfare are different since the PPF is no longer linear.

To illustrate this difference, suppose that only preference shocks are active (there are no supply shocks $\Delta \log A = 0$ and $\Delta \log L = 0$). By Corollary 1, real GDP changes are zero. Since the PPF is being held constant, macro-welfare changes are also zero. Micro-welfare changes, on the other hand, are not equal to zero. Specifically, by Proposition 2, micro welfare improves $EV^m > 0$ if preference shocks negatively covary with price changes. By equation (37), changes in prices are

$$d \log p_i = \sum_{f \in F} \Psi_{if}^F \frac{\partial \log \Lambda_f}{\partial \log x} d \log x.$$

Using the derivations above, for each $i \in N$, we obtain

$$d \log p_i = \frac{(1 - \gamma)}{(1 + (\theta_0 - 1)(1 - \gamma))} \frac{1}{\lambda_i} \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(d \log x, I_{(i)} \right),$$

where $I_{(i)}$ is the i th column of the identity matrix. If there are decreasing returns, $\gamma < 1$, then a positive demand shock for i raises the price of i . The change in the price is amplified if goods are complements and mitigated if goods are substitutes. We can now apply Proposition 3 to obtain the change in micro welfare, up to a second order,

$$EV^m \approx -\frac{1}{2} \frac{(1 - \gamma)}{(1 + (\theta_0 - 1)(1 - \gamma))} \text{Var}_{\Omega^{(0)}}(\Delta \log x) \neq 0 = EV^M.$$

With decreasing returns to scale ($\gamma < 1$), micro welfare decreases since the demand shock increases the prices of goods the consumer now values more. From a micro perspective, where the agent takes the budget sets as given, the agent is worse off.

On the other hand, when the economy has increasing returns to scale ($\gamma > 1$), micro welfare increases in response to demand shocks. Intuitively, in this case, increased demand for a good lowers the price of that good, which makes the consumer better off.³⁰ Of course, from a societal perspective, welfare has not changed, since the production possibility set of the economy has not changed.

³⁰If the economy has increasing returns to scale, then the decentralized equilibrium is potentially inefficient. However, the propositions regarding micro welfare changes, which take changes in prices as given, do not require that the decentralized equilibrium be efficient.

4.3 Dynamic Economies

As mentioned earlier, at an abstract level, all of our results can be applied to dynamic economies by using the Arrow-Debreu formalism. In particular, we can index goods by period of time and state of nature and apply our results to these economies (see e.g. Basu et al., 2012). In a dynamic economy the utility function is intertemporal and capital accumulation is an intertemporal intermediate good. Proposition 4 implies that, in such a model, macro welfare can be computed using the final (intertemporal) indifference curve of the representative agent.

In this subsection, we instead show how Proposition 4 can be used to make steady-state to steady-state welfare comparisons in models with unstable and non-homothetic preferences without requiring us to solve a dynamic model. For simplicity, we restrict our discussion to non-homothetic CES preferences, though this logic can be extended.

To this end, consider a perfectly competitive dynamic economy indexed by the initial period t with a representative agent whose intertemporal preferences are given by

$$U_t = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(C_s), \quad \sum_i \omega_{i0} x_{it} \left(\frac{C_{is}}{C_s^{\bar{c}_i}} \right)^{\frac{\theta_0-1}{\theta_0}} = 1,$$

where C_s is a non-homothetic (and potentially unstable) CES aggregator. The economy has the same set of goods every period, and every good i in period s is produced according to constant returns production technology

$$y_{is} = A_{is} G_i \left(\{m_{ijs}\}_{j \in N}, H(l_{is}, k_{is}) \right),$$

where A_{is} is a productivity shifter, l_{is} are capital and labor inputs, and H is constant returns to scale.

Labor L_s in each period is inelastically supplied, and capital is accumulated according to a capital accumulation technology

$$K_{s+1} = (1 - \delta) (K_s + I_s),$$

where I_s is aggregate investment. Investment goods are produced according to a constant returns technology

$$I_s = A_{Is} I \left(\{m_{Ijs}\}_{j \in N}, H(l_{Is}, k_{Is}) \right).$$

The intertemporal PPF of economy t is defined by an initial capital stock inherited from the past, a path of future labor endowments, and a path of vectors of productivi-

ties: $(K_t, \{L_s\}_{s=t}^\infty, \{A_s\}_{s=t}^\infty)$. This economy has infinitely many factors: the path of labor endowments as well as the initial capital stock $(K_t, \{L_s\}_{s=t}^\infty)$. The welfare change between t_0 and t_1 is the proportional change in factor endowments of the t_0 economy required to make the household indifferent between that and the t_1 economy. We say that economy t is in *steady-state* if the vector of productivities A_s , labor endowments L_s , per-period utility $u(C_s)$, and capital stocks K_s are constant over time.

The following proposition shows that computing the welfare change between t_0 and t_1 is straightforward if the economy is in steady-state in both t_0 and t_1 .

Proposition 8 (Dynamic Welfare Change). *Consider two dynamic economies, denoted t_0 and t_1 , that are in steady-state. The change in macro welfare is given by*

$$EV^M = \log \left(\frac{\sum_i p_{it_1} c_{it_1}}{\sum_i p_{it_0} c_{it_0}} \right) - \log \left(\sum_i b_{it_1} \left(\frac{p_{it_1}}{p_{it_0}} \right)^{1-\theta_0} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta_0}}.$$

In words, the change in nominal consumption deflated by the ideal price index associated with the t_1 indifference curve is equal to the macroeconomic change in welfare. If preferences are stable and homothetic in both t_0 and t_1 , then the change in welfare is equivalent to the change in real consumption. In the next section, we use Proposition 8 to compute welfare changes for the US under alternative assumptions about substitution and income elasticities.

5 Applications

In this section, we consider three applications of our results. The first application is to the problem of long-run growth and the difference between welfare-relevant and measured aggregate productivity growth as well as the difference between welfare and measured real consumption, in the presence of income effects and demand instability. The second application shows that correlated firm-level supply and demand shocks drive a wedge between measured real GDP and welfare even in the short-run. Our last application considers how demand instability can make measured real GDP an unreliable metric for changes in production, and we illustrate this point for the Covid-19 crisis.

5.1 Long-Run Growth and Structural Transformation

Baumol (1967) showed that, as economies grow, sectors with lower relative productivity growth rates expand (in terms of sales and value-added) relative to sectors with faster

productivity growth. This means that over time, aggregate productivity growth is increasingly determined by those sectors whose productivity growth is slowest. This phenomenon is oftentimes called Baumol’s cost disease.

Following Nordhaus et al. (2008), aggregate productivity growth can be decomposed into two terms:

$$\Delta \log TFP = \sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{i,t_0} \Delta \log A_{i,t} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} (\lambda_{i,t} - \lambda_{i,t_0}) \Delta \log A_{i,t}}_{\text{Baumol Adjustment}}$$

where $\lambda_{i,t}$ is the sales shares of industry i in period t and $\Delta \log A_{i,t}$ is the growth in gross-output productivity over that time period.³¹ The first term captures changes in aggregate TFP if industry-structure had remained fixed, and the second term is the adjustment attributed to the fact that sales shares change over time. The second-term captures the importance of Baumol’s cost disease.

Proposition 4 implies that, for the purposes of welfare, changes in sales shares due to income effects or demand instability must be treated differently to changes in sales shares due to substitution effects. In particular, the welfare-relevant measure of the change in TFP is

$$\Delta \log TFP^w = \sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{i,t_0} \Delta \log A_{i,t} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} (\lambda_{i,t} - \lambda_{i,t_0}) \Delta \log A_{i,t}}_{\text{Baumol Adjustment}} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} (\lambda_{i,t}^{ev} - \lambda_{i,t}) \Delta \log A_{i,t}}_{\text{Welfare Adjustment}}$$

where λ^{ev} is the hypothetical sales-shares of each industry holding fixed final preferences and income-level — that is, sales shares after they have been purged from changes due to factors other than changes in relative prices.

Two polar extremes. Computing these terms requires an explicit structural model of the economy. However, there are two polar cases in which the TFP adjustment term can be calculated without specifying the detailed model. On the one hand, demand is stable and homothetic, and changes in sales shares are due only to relative price changes (substitution effects). On the other hand, there are no substitution effects (as in a Cobb-Douglas

³¹Technically, this is an approximation, since we define aggregate TFP in continuous time but the data is measured in discrete time (at annual frequency). However, this approximation error, resulting from the fact that the Riemann sum is not exactly equal to the integral is likely to be negligible in practice. At our level of disaggregation, long run TFP growth is very similar if we weight sectors using sales shares at time t or time $t + 1$ averages.

economy) and changes in sales shares are only due to income effects or demand instability. If structural transformation is driven by a combination of substitution effects and non-homotheticities or demand instability, then the change in welfare TFP will be somewhere in between these two cases. The following corollary of Proposition 4 summarizes the change in welfare-TFP in these two polar cases.

Corollary 2. *If changes in sales shares are due only due only to substitution effects, then*

$$\Delta \log TFP^w = \Delta \log TFP = \sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{i,t} \Delta \log A_{i,t}.$$

If changes in sales shares are due only to non-homotheticity or instability of demand, then

$$\Delta \log TFP^w = \Delta \log TFP + \sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} (\lambda_{i,t_1} - \lambda_{i,t}) \Delta \log A_{i,t} = \sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{i,t_1} \Delta \log A_{i,t}.$$

In the first case, since preferences are homothetic and stable, welfare-TFP is equal to TFP in the data. In the second case, since there are no substitution effects in production or demand, sales shares do not respond to productivity changes. In order to hold utility and preferences fixed at their final value, we must compute welfare-TFP using terminal sales shares.

To quantify Corollary 2, we use US-KLEMS data on sales shares and TFP growth for 61 private-sector industries between 1947 and 2014. We calculate changes in industry-level gross-output TFP following the methodology of Jorgenson et al. (2005) and Carvalho and Gabaix (2013).³²

Figure 2 plots EV^M comparing 2014 to previous years under alternative assumptions about substitution and income elasticities. For comparisons that are relatively close to 2014, the change in welfare is not very sensitive to our assumptions about elasticities. This is because at high frequency, the shocks are small and the sales shares are reasonably stable. However, the assumptions about substitution and income elasticities do start to play a role as we roll the comparison back farther in time. Comparing 1947 to 2014, the

³²We calculate TFP by industry in the data allowing for cross-industry variation in capital and labor shares, and then feed these shocks as a primitive into our one-factor model (alternatively, in order to allow for industry variation in capital intensity while keeping the one-factor simplicity, we must assume that labor and capital are perfect substitutes). Moreover, we abstract from investment and apply our formulas statically. This means that we assume a reduced form representation whereby preference relations are defined over all final goods in a given period (including government spending, net exports, and investment) and calculate welfare changes between two time periods taking technologies and factor quantities as given. When calculating welfare using consumption data below, we apply the steady-state results of a dynamic economy implied by Proposition 8.




Figure 2: Growth in welfare-relevant TFP (in logs) from 1947 to 2014 using US-KLEMS. The blue line uses initial shares (in each year t between 1947 and 2014) to calculate TFP changes. The red and yellow line measure the increase in welfare-relevant TFP between t and 2014 under alternative assumptions about income and substitution elasticities. The red line assumes that sales shares change only due to substitution effects (welfare-relevant TFP is equal to measured chained-aggregate TFP). The yellow line assumes that sales shares change only due to income effects (or demand instability).

constant-initial-sales-share term grows by around 58 log points (or 78%), whereas the chain-linked change in aggregate TFP grew by around 47 log points (or 60%). Hence, Baumol’s cost-disease caused aggregate TFP to fall by -10 log points, reducing aggregate productivity growth by around 23 percent (from 78% to 60%).

If we assume that structural transformation is due solely to non-homotheticities or demand instability, then by Corollary 2 the growth in welfare-relevant TFP from 1947-2014 has been 37 log points (or 46%) instead of the measured 47 log points (or 60%) — that is, to say, a 23 percent additional reduction in the growth rate.³³

Intuitively, welfare-based productivity increases less than TFP because, relative to

³³The gap between constant-initial-sales shares TFP and (chained-linked) aggregate TFP growth and the gap between aggregate TFP and welfare-relevant TFP growth are driven by two forces. First, reallocation of sales towards sectors with lower relative productivity growth rates (the standard Baumol’s cost-disease mechanism). Second, reallocation in sales towards sectors with lower intermediate input use (see equation 14). In our quantitative results, the second force accounts for roughly 18% of the gap between constant-initial-sales shares TFP and aggregate TFP growth, and 35% of the gap between aggregate TFP growth and welfare-relevant TFP growth.

1947, preferences in 2014 favor low productivity growth sectors such as services (due to either income effects or demand instability). This means that, at 1947 prices, households require less income growth to be indifferent between their budget constraint in 1947 and the one in 2014. This is because sectors with high income elasticities or that consumers prefer in 2014, like services, were cheaper compared to manufacturing in 1947 than in 2014.³⁴

To sum up, structural transformation between caused by income effects or demand instability reduced welfare, EV^M , by roughly twice as much as structural transformation caused by substitution effects. To understand why the necessary adjustment is roughly twice as big using the second-order approximation in Proposition 4, see Appendix D. In this appendix, we also provide some quantitative illustrations away from the two polar extremes we discussed above. In Appendix D, we compute welfare changes for different values of elasticities of substitution in consumption and production using Proposition 6. Recall that this does not require taking a stance on the income elasticities. We show that welfare-relevant TFP is closer to measured TFP if the elasticity of substitution across disaggregated industries (in consumption or production) is lower than one.

The Baumol effect in real consumption. So far in this application we have examined aggregate productivity. We now show that similar conclusions apply if we measure welfare changes using data on consumer prices and budget shares across goods in the US between 1947 and 2019.

Specifically, we measure the change in microeconomic welfare using Lemma 1 under alternative assumptions about income and substitution elasticities. We apply this formula statically and calculate welfare changes between two time periods taking as given changes in prices and nominal expenditures. Under the assumptions of Proposition 8, these static numbers also represent the change in macroeconomic welfare in a dynamic model between two steady-states.

If changes in budget shares are driven by substitution effects only, then welfare changes are equal to growth in real consumption per capita. If changes in budget shares are driven by income effects and demand instability only, then welfare changes between any year and 2019 are given by changes in nominal expenditures deflated by a price index using

³⁴This intuition is flipped for compensating variation. As households become poorer in 2014 to be made equally well-off as under their budget constraint in 1947, they favor goods which are relatively cheap in 2014 such as manufacturing, so their income must be reduced by more. More generally, if structural transformation is purely due to income effects or preference instability, then welfare-based productivity growth using CV at initial preferences is given by initial sale-share weighted productivity growth, $\sum_{t=t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{i,t_0} \Delta \log A_{i,t}$ (which corresponds to the Initial Shares line in Figure 2), so in this case the Baumol adjustment is not welfare-relevant.

2019 budget shares.

Figure 3 shows that for comparisons that are close to 2019, the change in welfare is not very sensitive to the assumptions on demand instability and income effects versus substitution effects because, at high frequency, the shocks are small and the sales shares at our level of aggregation (66 goods and services) are stable. On the other hand, for longer time periods, welfare growth is smaller if changes in budget shares took place due to income effects (or demand instability) rather than substitution effects. That is, comparing 1947 and 2019, the change in welfare per capita is 145 log points if preferences are homothetic and stable, but it is only 126 log points if changes in budget shares were entirely due to demand shocks and income effects. As before, structural transformation in consumption caused by demand shocks and income effects is roughly twice as important for welfare as structural transformation caused by substitution effects.




Figure 3: Change in welfare per capita from 1947 to 2019 using Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) prices and expenditures for 66 goods and services from the BEA. The blue line uses initial shares (in each year t between 1947 and 2019) to calculate the deflator. The red and yellow line measure the increase in welfare between t and 2019 under alternative assumptions about income and substitution elasticities. The red line assumes that budget shares change only due to substitution effects (welfare is equal to measured chained-real consumption). The yellow line assumes that budget shares change only due to income effects (or demand instability).

5.2 Aggregation Bias with Firm-Level Shocks

In the previous application, we considered a long-run industry-level application. Since industry-level sales shares are relatively stable over short-horizons, given industry-level data, biases in real GDP and consumption are likely to be modest at high frequency. However, this does not mean that these biases are necessarily absent from short-run data.

Whereas industry sales shares are stable at high frequency, firm or product-level sales shares are highly volatile even over the very short-run. If firms' or products' supply and demand shocks are correlated, then measured industry-level output is biased relative to what is relevant for welfare, even if all firms are infinitesimal within their industry. Furthermore, these biases in industry-level data are not diversified away as we aggregate, even if all industries are infinitesimal in the aggregate economy. If these firm-level supply and demand shocks are persistent, then this bias becomes even larger as we lengthen the horizon. Finally, if we start with industry-level (rather than firm-level) data, we are ruling out the existence of these biases by construction.

To make these points formally, we rely on a specification of our model with an explicit industrial structure.

Definition 6 (Industrial Structure). An economy has an *industry structure* if the following conditions hold:

- i. Each firm i belongs to one, and only one, industry I . Firms in the same industry share the same constant-returns-to-scale production function up to a firm-specific Hicks-neutral productivity shifter A_i .
- ii. The representative household has homothetic preferences over industry-level goods, where the I th industry-level consumption aggregator is

$$c_I = \left(\sum_{i \in I} \bar{b}_{iI} x_i c_i^{\frac{\zeta_I - 1}{\zeta_I}} \right)^{\frac{\zeta_I}{\zeta_I - 1}},$$

where c_i are consumption goods purchased by the household from firm i in industry I and x_i are firm-level demand shocks.

- iii. Inputs purchased by any firm j from firms i in industry I are aggregated according to

$$m_{jI} = \left(\sum_{i \in I} \bar{s}_{iI} m_{ji}^{\frac{\sigma_I - 1}{\sigma_I}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_I}{\sigma_I - 1}},$$

where m_{ji} are inputs purchased by firm j from firm i , and \bar{s}_{iI} is a constant.

Input-output and production network models that are disciplined by industry-level data typically have an industry structure of the form defined above. For such economies, we can characterize the bias in real GDP relative to welfare easily.

Proposition 9 (Aggregation Bias). *For models with an industry structure, in response to firm-level supply shocks $\Delta \log A$ and demand shocks $\Delta \log x$, we have*

$$\Delta \log EV^M \approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in I} b_I \text{Cov}_{b_{(I)}}(\Delta \log x_{(i)}, \Delta \log A_{(i)}) + \Theta,$$

where b_I is industry I 's share of final demand and $b_{(I)}$ is a vector whose i th element is b_i/b_I if i belongs to industry I and zero otherwise. The scalar Θ is the gap between real GDP and welfare in a version of the model with only industry-level shocks.³⁵

In words, Proposition 9 implies that if firms' productivity and demand shocks are correlated with each other (but not necessarily across firms), then there is a gap between real GDP and welfare that does not appear in an industry-level specification of the model. Furthermore, this bias is, to a second-order, additive. That is, the overall bias is the sum of the industry-level bias (that we studied in the previous section) plus the additional bias driven by within-industry covariance of supply and demand shocks.

Identifying supply and demand shocks at the firm-level is notoriously difficult, and many papers impose that these shocks must be orthogonal in order to estimate them (or to estimate demand elasticities). However, a correlation between firm-level supply and demand shocks is a natural prediction in models with endogenous customer acquisition (Arkolakis, 2016; Foster et al., 2016; Fitzgerald et al.; 2016), as we discuss in Section 6. A detailed quantitative investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but Proposition 9 can be used for a back-of-the-envelope calculation.

As a numerical illustration, suppose that firm- or product-level demand shocks and TFP shocks at annual frequency have a standard deviation of 0.5 and 0.2 log points, and suppose that they have a correlation of 0.2. Proposition 9 implies that, up to a second-order approximation and at annual frequency, the gap between welfare-relevant industry

³⁵More specifically,

$$\Theta = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in I} \sum_{j \in J} \left[\mathbb{E}_{b_I}(\Delta \log A_{iI}) \left(\frac{\partial b_I}{\partial \log x_j} \right) + \mathbb{E}_{s_I}(\Delta \log A_{iI}) \left(\frac{\partial \lambda_I^f}{\partial \log x_j} \right) \right] \Delta \log x_j,$$

where $\lambda_I^f = \lambda_I - b_I$ is the sales share of industry I excluding sales to the household. In words, Θ is proportional to the product of changes in industry-level sales shares caused by demand shocks times the industry-level (sales-weighted) productivity shocks.

output and measured industry output is around $\frac{1}{2} \times 0.2 \times 0.5 \times 0.2 = 1\%$.³⁶ If these industry-level covariances are the same across all industries, then the gap between real GDP and welfare induced by firm-level shocks is also 1% at annual frequency. This is a one-off steady-state adjustment that does not compound over time (every year, the change in welfare would be 1% higher than real GDP) if the shocks are independent over time.

To continue this thought experiment, note that if supply and demand shocks at the firm level are persistent, then the bias grows over time. For example, suppose that firm-level supply and demand shocks are both AR(1) processes with persistence parameters $\rho^A \in [0, 1]$ and $\rho^x \in [0, 1]$. Then the gap between welfare and real GDP in period T relative to some period 0 due to firm-level shocks is (suppressing industry sub-indices)

$$Cov_b(\Delta \log x_T, \Delta \log A_T) = \frac{1 - (\rho_x \rho_A)^T}{1 - (\rho_x \rho_A)} Cov_b(\Delta \log x_1, \Delta \log A_1).$$

Hence, as we expand the horizon, the gap between real GDP and welfare becomes larger. In the limit where supply and demand shocks are correlated random walks, the gap expands without bound as we lengthen the horizon. If the persistence parameters are both equal to 0.9, then the asymptotic gap between welfare and real GDP is around 5 times larger than the one-period gap.

5.3 Case Study: the Covid-19 Recession

Our final application concerns the Covid-19 recession, and asks how real GDP, microeconomic welfare, and macroeconomic welfare were affected. The Covid-19 recession is a good case study since sectoral expenditure shares changed dramatically during this time, these changes were not explainable via changes in observed prices alone, and the movements in demand curves were correlated with movements in supply curves. These are exactly the conditions under which micro welfare, macro welfare, and real GDP can diverge from each other.

Cavallo (2020) argues that, during this episode, the fact that price indices were not being chained at high enough frequency led to “biases” in official measures of inflation. However, since final demand was unstable during this period, chaining is not theoretically justified. As we have argued, chaining is only theoretically valid if expenditure-switching is caused by substitution effects, and not if expenditure-switching is caused by

³⁶The gap would be around 2% based on statistics for TFPQ and demand shocks reported in Table 2 of Eslava and Haltiwanger (2021) using Colombian data. We obtain very similar numbers if we compute the gap exactly (numerically) or if we use the second-order approximation in Proposition 9

shocks to demand. Furthermore, if changes in prices are themselves caused by changes in demand (due to decreasing returns to scale), then microeconomic welfare and macroeconomic welfare changes are different.

In this section, we do not attempt to measure the welfare costs of Covid-19 itself. This is because households do not make choices over whether or not they live in a world with Covid-19. Therefore, their preferences about Covid-19 itself are not revealed by their choices. Instead, we ask a more modest question: how does the household value changes in prices (micro welfare) and changes in production (macro welfare), holding *fixed* the presence of Covid-19.

To study this episode, we use a modified version of the quantitative model introduced in Section 4. Since we are interested in a short-run application, we assume that factor markets are segmented by industry, so that labor and capital in each industry is inelastically supplied. We calibrate share parameters to match the 71 industry input-output table in 2018, and consider a range of elasticities of substitution. Following Baqaee and Farhi (2020), we model the Covid-19 recession as a combination of negative sectoral employment shocks and sectoral taste shifters. We hit the economy with a vector of primitive supply and demand shocks calibrated to match the reductions in employment and personal consumption expenditures by industry.³⁷ The reductions in sectoral employment are calibrated to match peak-to-trough reductions in hours worked by sector from January, 2020 to May, 2020. The primitive demand shifters are calibrated to match the observed peak-to-trough reductions in personal consumption expenditures by sector from January, 2020 to May, 2020 (conditional on the supply shocks and the elasticities of substitution).

We consider three different calibrations informed by empirical estimates from Atalay (2017) and Boehm et al. (2015): high complementarities, medium complementarities, and no complementarities (Cobb-Douglas). The high complementarity scenario sets the elasticity of substitution across consumption goods to be 0.7, the one across intermediates to be 0.01, across value-added and materials to be 0.3, and the one between labor and capital to be 0.2. The medium complementarities case sets the elasticity of substitution across consumption goods to be 0.95, the one across intermediates to be 0.01, across value-added and materials to be 0.5, and the one between labor and capital to be 0.5. The Cobb-Douglas calibration sets all elasticities of substitution equal to unity.

Table 1 displays welfare changes between January 2020 and May 2020 in the calibrated model. We report separately micro and macro welfare based on pre-Covid (initial) and

³⁷Changes in labor by sector and personal consumption expenditures, used to calibrate supply and demand shocks, are taken from Baqaee and Farhi (2020). For related analysis of Covid-19 induced supply shocks, see e.g. Bonadio et al. (2020) and Barrot et al. (2020). For related analysis of Covid-19 induced demand shocks, see Cakmakli et al. (2020).

post-Covid (final) preferences. Recall that micro and macro welfare are not equal in this economy because the PPF is nonlinear. For comparison, we also report the change in real consumption assuming supply and demand shocks arrive simultaneously.

Table 1: The change in micro and macro welfare with pre-Covid and post-Covid preferences given the supply and demand shocks between February 2020 to May 2020. Chained real consumption is computed assuming supply and demand shocks arrive simultaneously.

Elasticities	High compl.	Medium compl.	Cobb-Douglas
Micro pre-Covid preferences	-11.7%	-9.1%	-8.7%
Micro post-Covid preferences	-13.2%	-12.3%	-10.9%
Macro pre-Covid preferences	-16.2%	-12.5%	-10.8%
Macro post-Covid preferences	-10.1%	-9.4%	-9.0%
Chained real consumption	-12.1%	-10.6%	-9.8%

Table 1 shows that the drop in micro welfare is larger under post-Covid preferences than under pre-Covid preferences. This is because, as shown in our analytic example 4, demand shocks reduce welfare in the presence of decreasing returns to scale. Intuitively, demand shocks increase the price of goods that consumers value more over time and this causes micro welfare to drop since whatever households value becomes more expensive relative to the past.

This pattern is exactly reversed for macro welfare. Macro welfare is higher at post-Covid preferences than at pre-Covid preferences. This is because the negative supply shocks were biggest in those sectors where demand also fell more drastically (e.g. transportation and energy). Hence, the reduction in welfare is smaller with post-Covid preferences because those goods that the economy is less capable of producing are less desirable. This illustrates that micro and macro welfare answer different questions, and the answers to these questions can be quantitatively very different. Furthermore, comparing columns of Table 1 shows that the magnitude of these differences depend on the details of the production structure like the extent of complementarities in production. As we raise the elasticities of substitution in production closer to unity (Cobb-Douglas), the differences between macro and micro notions become less dramatic. This is because the PPF is become less curves.

In Table 1, we also compute real consumption assuming supply and demand shocks arrive simultaneously and linearly over time. Interestingly, chained real consumption in Table 1 does not exactly measure any of the different welfare notions. This is because sup-

ply and demand shocks are not orthogonal along the path. In fact, if we change the order or path of supply and demand shocks, real consumption changes value (even though the initial and final allocation are not changing). For example, if the supply shocks arrive before the demand shocks, then real consumption equals macro welfare changes at pre-Covid preferences. On the other hand, if demand shocks arrive before the supply shocks, then real consumption equals macro welfare changes at post-Covid preferences.

Hence, if the supply and demand shocks do not disappear in exactly the same way as they arrived, measured real consumption (or GDP) after the recovery can be higher or lower than it was before the crisis, even if the economy returns exactly to its pre-Covid allocation. For example, if in the downturn, demand shocks arrive before supply shocks and, in the recovery, demand shocks disappear before the supply shocks, then real consumption can be as much as 6% higher when comparing pre-shock real consumption to post-recovery real consumption. This is despite the fact that every price and quantity is the same when comparing the pre-shock allocation to the post-recovery allocation. Hence, during episodes where final demand is unstable, real GDP and consumption are unreliable guides for measuring output or welfare, even if we chain in continuous time.³⁸

6 Extensions

In this section, we briefly summarize how our theoretical results can be extended in different ways.

Extensive margin. If preference instability or non-homotheticity causes a consumer to begin purchasing a good in t_1 that she did not consume in t_0 (or to stop consuming a good that she was previously consuming), then our global and local formulas apply to that consumer without change.

To make this more explicit, consider a consumer whose preferences are represented by the utility function

$$u(c; x^*) = \left(\int_0^{x^*} c(z)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dz \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}, \quad (18)$$

³⁸This is related to a problem known as “*chain drift*” bias in national accounting. Chain drift occurs when a chained index registers an overall change between t_0 and t_1 even though all prices and quantities in t_0 and t_1 are identical. This is a specific manifestation of path dependence and, by the gradient theorem for line integrals, it must be driven by either demand instability, income effects, or approximation errors due to discreteness. Chain drift bias can thus appear when movements in prices and quantities are oscillatory, where changes that take place over some periods are reversed in subsequent periods. Welfare changes do not exhibit chain drift since, by definition, they depend only on t_0 and t_1 variables.

where goods are indexed by $z \in [0, 1]$ but the consumer only values goods $z \in [0, x^*]$. In this situation, x^* is a preference parameter, where goods $z \in (x^*, 1]$ are available at a finite price, but the consumer chooses not to consume them.

Consider how the welfare of the consumer changes accounting for the fact that x^* can change between t_0 and t_1 . The following is an application of Lemma 1.

Proposition 10 (New Goods Due to Taste Shocks). *Consider a household with preferences defined by (18). Up to a second-order approximation,*

$$\Delta \log EV^m \approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} b(x^*) \Delta x^* [\mathbb{E}_b [\Delta \log p] - \Delta \log p(x^*)].$$

In words, the gap between welfare and real GDP depends on product of sales shares at the cut-off $b(x^*)$, the change in the cut-off Δx^* , and the difference between inflation at the cut-off versus average inflation. If new goods are added $\Delta x^* > 0$, and the new goods experienced lower than average inflation, then welfare is higher than what is detected by real GDP. However, this adjustment is second-order (since it involves products of Δ), and to a first-order, real GDP is equal to the true change in the cost of living.

It is interesting to contrast Proposition 10 to the well-known new-goods adjustment due to Feenstra (1994), which, to a first-order approximation, is

$$\Delta \log EV^m = \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{1 - \sigma} \Delta \log \left[\int_{\mathcal{C}} b(z) dz \right], \quad (19)$$

where \mathcal{C} is the set of continuing goods and the integral is their share in expenditures. The difference in these results is due to a difference in interpretation. Under the interpretation in Proposition 10, the change in the extensive margin is caused by a change in tastes — that is, the goods were previously available to the consumer in the initial period but the consumer chose not to consume them (or goods are available in the final period, but the consumer chose to stop consuming them). Therefore, when we calculate welfare changes, we simply need to adjust the price index so that it accounts for the price of goods that the consumer is choosing to consume in the final period. On the other hand, under (19), when we compute the change in welfare, we assume that the consumer is unable to consume the new goods in the past or can no longer consume the disappearing goods in the present. That is, under (19), when goods are not consumed they are valued by the consumer but the implicit price is infinity.

Therefore, if a good is available in t_0 and t_1 , but the consumer does not consume the good in period t_0 and does consume the good in t_1 (due to, for example, advertising), an application of (19) is not innocuous. If the change in consumer behavior is due to a

change in tastes, as opposed to a change in availability, then no adjustment is necessary to a first-order, and to a second-order, the relevant adjustment is the one in Proposition 10.

Endogenous separable arguments in the utility function (e.g. leisure or home-production).

If there are goods in the utility function that are endogenously chosen but not measured, then an all-encompassing welfare measure must impute shadow prices for these goods (see Jones and Klenow, 2016). For example, suppose that leisure is the non-measured argument in the utility function. If these are separable from market goods, so that preferences over c are stable when the quantity of leisure changes, then our baseline results apply to the market-good component of welfare, even if leisure changes.

Endogenous non-separable arguments in the utility function (e.g. advertising). If the parameters of the utility function x are not separable from goods c , then our welfare questions ask how changes in constraints over c affect welfare holding fixed x . That is, we do not attempt to answer how a change in x itself affects welfare, which may or may not be a question that can be answered. A salient example of x can be advertising, which can change households ranking over different consumption bundles, and is obviously non-separable from market goods. In principle, advertising may have value to the consumer — that is, the consumer can have preferences over the amount of advertising they wish to be exposed to. If advertising is informative, the consumer’s utility may be increasing in advertising, and equally plausibly, if advertising is manipulative, then utility may be decreasing in advertising. We do not attempt to answer the question of how much the household values advertising, instead, we hold fixed the amount of advertising³⁹ (or indeed the weather, chemicals in the brain, and whatever else that affects valuations over consumption bundles), and measure how changes in the availability of market goods affects welfare.

Interestingly, unlike random fluctuations in tastes, advertising is a purposeful economic activity, and therefore, models of advertising and consumer acquisition, for example Arkolakis (2016), explicitly predict that changes in tastes induced by advertising will be correlated with changes in physical productivity, whereby more productive firms will expend more resources on advertising. This positive correlation means that we should expect real GDP or real consumption measures to be systematically biased in situations where advertising plays a large role in consumption choices.

³⁹In this sense, our approach is related to Dixit and Norman (1978), who study the welfare implications of advertising at either pre- or post-advertising preferences. As argued by Fisher and McGowan (1979), this does not answer the question of what is the value of advertisement taking into account the change in tastes.

Beyond CES. Our results in Section 4 can be generalized beyond CES functional forms relatively easily. In Appendix E, we discuss how Proposition 6 must be adjusted to allow for non-CES production and utility functions.

Heterogeneous agents. Our microeconomic welfare results can be applied to individual households in economies without representative agents. Furthermore, if one commits to a particular social welfare function (SWF), we can extend the results to calculate the change in social welfare and to characterize the gap between social welfare and real GDP. With heterogeneous preferences, there are other reasons why social welfare and real GDP do not coincide in addition to the ones that we have focused on. For example, in Appendix F we consider a utilitarian SWF and show that there is a gap between social welfare and changes in real GDP even if preferences at the individual level are stable and homothetic.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we characterize welfare and the gap between standard measures of consumption and welfare that appear when preferences are non-homothetic or unstable. We do this in both partial and general equilibrium. We show that the gap between welfare and real consumption can be large over long horizons relevant for long-run growth as well as for short-horizons, if expenditure shares at the firm and product-level change rapidly, and if demand-driven changes in expenditures covary with prices.

Although our motivation and applications have focused on shocks across time, our results can also be applied to compare welfare across locations in space (see e.g. Deaton, 2003, and Argente et al., 2020). Variation in tastes and income effects are likely to be even more significant across space than across time. When calculating how income per person would have to increase in Mexico for a consumer with Mexican tastes facing Mexican prices to be as well-off as they would be at US income and prices, the price deflator must use budget shares based on US demand. Moreover, the distinction between macroeconomic and microeconomic notions of welfare are also relevant in a spatial context. Comparing budget constraints in one location to another may be misleading as a way to compare two economies. This is because, even if PPFs in both locations are exactly the same, the relative price of goods households value more in one location will be lower in the other location. This would mean that, even when both locations have the same PPF, each country appears richer from the perspective of the other country. Applying our results in a spatial context is an interesting avenue for future work.

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Appendix A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. By definition,

$$\begin{aligned}
 EV^m &= \log \frac{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})} \\
 &= \log \frac{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})} \frac{e(p_{t_1}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{e(p_{t_1}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})} \\
 &= \log \frac{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{I_{t_0}} \frac{I_{t_1}}{e(p_{t_1}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}.
 \end{aligned}$$

To finish, rewrite

$$\log \frac{e(p_{t_0}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{e(p_{t_1}, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})} = - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \frac{\partial \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}); x_{t_1})}{\partial \log p} \frac{d \log p}{dt} dt,$$

and use the Shephard's lemma to express the price elasticity of the expenditure function in terms of budget shares. If the path of prices between t_0 and t_1 is not differentiable, then construct a new a modified path of prices that is differentiable, and apply the integral to this modified path. Since the integral is path independent, it only depends on p_{t_0} and p_{t_1} . Therefore any path that connects p_{t_0} and p_{t_1} gives the same integral. \square

Proof of Proposition 1. If the path of prices is continuously differentiable, we can combine Lemma 1 with the definition of real consumption. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. For real consumption, differentiate real consumption

$$\Delta \log Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} d \log I(t) - \sum_{i \in N} b_i(p(t), u(t); x(t)) \frac{d \log p_i}{dt} dt$$

twice with respect to t_1 and evaluate the derivative at $t_1 = t_0$. This yields the desired expression.

By Lemma 1:

$$EV = \Delta \log I - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \frac{\partial \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, x_{t_1}), x_{t_1})}{\partial \log p} \frac{d \log p}{d \log t} d \log t$$

Differentiate EV twice with respect to t_1 and evaluate the derivative at $t_1 = t_0$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dEV}{dt_1} &= \frac{d \log I}{dt} - \sum_{i \in N} \frac{\partial \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, x_{t_1}), x_{t_1})}{\partial \log p_i} \frac{d \log p_i}{d \log t} - \\
&\quad - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} d \log v \frac{\partial^2 \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, x_{t_1}), x_{t_1})}{\partial \log u \partial \log p_i} d \log p_i \\
&\quad - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} d \log x \frac{\partial^2 \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, x_{t_1}), x_{t_1})}{\partial \log x \partial \log p_i} d \log p_i \\
\frac{d^2 EV}{dt_1^2} &= - \sum_{i \in N} b_i \frac{d^2 \log p}{d \log t^2} - \sum_{i \in N} \sum_{j \in N} \frac{\partial^2 \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, x_{t_1}), x_{t_1})}{\partial \log p_i \partial \log p_j} d \log p_i d \log p_j \\
&\quad - 2 \sum_{i \in N} d \log v \frac{\partial^2 \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, x_{t_1}), x_{t_1})}{\partial \log p_i \partial \log u} d \log p_i - 2 \sum_{i \in N} d \log x' \frac{\partial \log e(p, v(p_{t_1}, x_{t_1}), x_{t_1})}{\partial \log p_i \partial \log x} d \log p_i \\
&= - \sum_{i \in N} \sum_{j \in N} \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log p_j} d \log p_i d \log p_j - \sum_{i \in N} b_i \frac{d^2 \log p}{d \log t^2} \\
&\quad - 2 \sum_{i \in N} d \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} d \log p_i - 2 \sum_{i \in N} d \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} d \log p_i \\
&= - \sum_{i \in N} \left[\sum_{j \in N} \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log p_j} d \log p_j + d \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} + d \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} \right] d \log p_i - \sum_{i \in N} b_i \frac{d^2 \log p}{d \log t^2} \\
&\quad - \sum_{i \in N} d \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} d \log p_i - \sum_{i \in N} d \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} d \log p_i \\
&= - \sum_{i \in N} db_i d \log p_i - \sum_{i \in N} b_i \frac{d^2 \log p}{d \log t^2} - \sum_{i \in N} d \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} d \log p_i - \sum_{i \in N} d \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} d \log p_i
\end{aligned}$$

The first two terms are equal to the second-order expansion of $\Delta \log Y$, and the remaining terms are the bias. \square

Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 2, we have

$$\Delta \log Y \approx \Delta \log I - \sum_i b_i \Delta \log p_i - \frac{1}{2} \sum_i \Delta b_i \Delta \log p_i.$$

Substitute (6) in place of Δb to get the desired expression. For the bias, note that Proposition 1 implies that

$$EV - \Delta \log Y \approx -\frac{1}{2} \sum_i \left[\Delta b_i - \sum_j \frac{\partial b_i^H}{\partial \log p_j} \Delta \log p_j \right] \Delta \log p_i$$

where b^H is the Hicksian budget share (holding fixed utility and demand shifters). Using

(6) in place of Δb above and the fact that $\frac{\partial b_i^H}{\partial \log p_i} = (1 - \theta_0)b_i(1 - b_i)$ for $i = j$ and $\frac{\partial b_i^H}{\partial \log p_j} = \theta_0 b_i b_j$ for $i \neq j$, yields the following

$$\Delta \log EV - \Delta \log Y \approx -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[(\varepsilon_i - 1)b_i \left(d \log I - \sum_{j \in N} b_j \Delta \log p_j \right) + b_i \Delta \log x_i \right] \Delta \log p_i,$$

which can be rearranged to give the desired expression. \square

Proof of Lemma 2. Setting nominal GDP to be the numeraire, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \log Y &= - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} b' d \log p \\ &= - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} b' \left[-\Psi d \log A - \Psi^F d \log L + \Psi^F d \log \Lambda \right] \\ &= \int_{t_0}^{t_1} b' \Psi d \log A - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} b' \Psi^F [d \log \Lambda - d \log L] \\ &= \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \lambda' d \log A + \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \Lambda' d \log L - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \Lambda d \log \Lambda \\ &= \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \lambda' d \log A + \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \Lambda' d \log L \end{aligned}$$

where the second line uses Proposition 6, and we use the fact that Using $\lambda' = b' \Psi$, $\Lambda' = b' \Psi^F$, and $b' \Psi^F d \log \Lambda = \Lambda' d \log \Lambda = 0$ because the factor shares always sum to one: $\sum_{f \in F} \Lambda_f = 1$. \square

Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that the macro equivalent variation at final preferences is defined by $EV^M = \phi$, where

$$V(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0}; x_{t_1}) = V(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_1})$$

Denote by $p(A, L, x)$ goods prices under technologies A , factor quantities L , and preferences x . Without loss of generality, we fix income at I . We have $p_{t_1} \equiv p(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}, x_{t_1})$ and

$$v_{t_1} \equiv v(p_{t_1}, I; x_{t_1}) = V(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_1}).$$

Define a hypothetical economy with fictional households that have stable homothetic preferences defined by the expenditure function $e^{ev}(p, u) = e(p, v_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) \frac{u}{v_{t_1}}$. Budget shares of this fictional consumer are $b_i^{ev}(p) \equiv \frac{\partial e^{ev}(p, u)}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial e(p, v_{t_1}; x_{t_1})}{\partial p_i}$. Given any technology vector, in this hypothetical economy we denote the Leontief inverse matrix by Ψ^{ev} and sales shares by λ^{ev} . Given technologies A_t and factor quantities L_t , we denote prices

in this hypothetical economy by p_t^{ev} . Changes in prices in this hypothetical economy satisfy

$$d \log p^{ev} = -\Psi^{ev} d \log A + \Psi^{evF} d \log \Lambda^{ev}, \quad (20)$$

where Ψ^{ev} is the fictitious Leontief inverse. Note that $p(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}, x_{t_1}) = p^{ev}(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1})$ and $p(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0}, x_{t_1}) = p^{ev}(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0})$, where we used the fact that $V(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0}; x_{t_1}) = v_{t_1}$. We will use the property that, with constant returns to scale, homothetic preferences, and constant income I ,

$$p^{ev}(A, aL) = \frac{1}{a} p^{ev}(A, L)$$

for every $a > 0$. Using the previous results,

$$\begin{aligned} V(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0}; x_{t_1}) &= v(p(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0}, x_{t_1}), I; x_{t_1}) \\ &= v(p^{ev}(A_{t_0}, e^\phi L_{t_0}), I; x_{t_1}) \\ &= v(e^{-\phi} p^{ev}(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}), I; x_{t_1}) \\ &= v(p^{ev}(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}), e^\phi I; x_{t_1}), \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality used the fact that the value function is homogeneous of degree 0 in prices and income. We thus have

$$v(p^{ev}(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}), e^\phi I; x_{t_1}) = v(p^{ev}(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}), I; x_{t_1}),$$

which can be re-expressed using the expenditure function as

$$EV^M = \log \frac{e(p^{ev}(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}), v_{t_1}; x_{t_1})}{e(p^{ev}(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}), v_{t_1}; x_{t_1})}.$$

This observation is a key step in the proof. Macro welfare changes can be re-expressed as micro welfare changes given changes in equilibrium prices in a fictional economy with preferences represented by $e^{ev}(p, u)$. As in the proof of Lemma 1, rewrite EV^M as

$$EV^M = - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N+F} \frac{\partial \log e(p, v_{t_1})}{\partial \log p_i} d \log p_i^{ev} = - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N+F} b_i^{ev} d \log p_i^{ev}.$$

Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2 (for the hypothetical economy), we obtain

$$EV^M = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i^{ev} d \log A_i + \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{f \in F} \lambda_f^{ev} d \log L_f.$$

□

In general, macro and micro welfare changes are not the same when preferences are unstable and nonhomothetic. However, when the PPF is linear, the following proposition shows that they coincide.

Proposition 11 (Macro vs. Micro Welfare). *Macro and micro welfare changes are equal ($EV^m = EV^M$) if preferences are stable and homothetic, or if factor income shares are constant (as in a one factor economy).*

Proof of Proposition 11. By the proof of Proposition 4, $EV^m = EV^M$ if and only if $p^{ev}(A_t, L_t) = p(A_t, L_t, x_t)$. This condition is immediate if preferences are homothetic and stable. Consider now the case in which preferences are non-homothetic and/or unstable but factor income shares, Λ , are constant. Then by Proposition 6, changes in prices in response to changes in A , L , and x are given by the following differential equation:

$$d \log p = -\Psi d \log A - \Psi^F d \log L.$$

Furthermore, note that changes in Ψ are determined by changes in Ω since $\Psi = (I - \Omega)^{-1}$. Since every $i \in N$ has constant returns to scale, changes in Ω_{ij} depend only on changes in relative prices for every $i \in N$. This means that changes in Ω only depend on changes in relative prices, therefore changes in Ψ depend only on changes in relative prices. Since x and utility v do not appear in any of these expressions, this means that prices and incomes $p(A, L, x)$ and $I(A, L, x)$, relative to the numeraire, do not depend on x and v . Thus, $p^{ev}(A_t, L_t) = p(A_t, L_t, x_t)$. □

Proof of Proposition 5. Differentiate real GDP,

$$\Delta \log Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_i(A(t); x(t)) \frac{d \log A_i}{dt} dt,$$

twice with respect to t_1 and evaluate the derivative at $t_1 = t_0$. This yields the desired expression. Following similar steps as in the proof of Proposition 3,

$$EV^M \approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \lambda_i - \sum_{j \in N} \frac{\partial \lambda_i^{ev}}{\partial \log A_j} \Delta \log A_j \right] \Delta \log A_i.$$

The term in square brackets is the change in sales shares due to changes in utility and

demand shifters. This expression can be written as

$$EV^M \approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log A' \frac{\partial \log v}{\partial \log A} \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log v} \right] \Delta \log A_i. \quad (21)$$

□

Proof of Proposition 7. Normalize nominal GDP to one. Applying Proposition 6 to a one-factor model yields

$$d \log p = -\Psi d \log A,$$

so that relative prices do not respond to changes in demand or income.

To solve for $\Delta \log Y$, use Proposition 5 in combination with the expression for $d \log p$ and $d \lambda$ in Proposition 6 in the case of one factor. To solve for EV^M , by Proposition 11, $EV^M = EV^m$. Solve for $EV^m - \Delta \log Y$ by plugging the expression for $d \log p$ into Proposition 2 and noting that $b' = \Omega^{(0)}$. □

Proof of Proposition 6. We normalize nominal GDP to be the numeraire. Then Shephard's lemma implies that, for each $i \in N$

$$d \log p_i = -d \log A_i + \sum_j \Omega_{ij} d \log p_j.$$

Furthermore, for $i \in F$

$$d \log p_i = -d \log A_i + d \log \Lambda_i.$$

Combining these yields the desired expression for changes in prices

$$d \log p = -\Psi d \log A + \Psi^F d \log \Lambda.$$

To get changes in sales shares, note that

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda &= b' \Psi \\ d \lambda &= d(b' \Psi) \\ &= b' \Psi d \Omega \Psi + db' \Psi \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\Omega_{ij}d \log \Omega_{ij} &= (1 - \theta_i)\Omega_{ij}(d \log p_j - \sum_k \Omega_{ik}d \log p_k) \\
d\Omega_{ij} &= (1 - \theta_i)\text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(i)}}(d \log p, I_{(j)}) \\
\sum_j d\Omega_{ij}\Psi_{jk} &= (1 - \theta_i)\text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(i)}}(d \log p, I_{(j)})\Psi_{jk} \\
&= (1 - \theta_i)\sum_j \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(i)}}(d \log p, \Psi_{jk}I_{(j)}) \\
[d\Omega\Psi]_{ik} &= (1 - \theta_i)\text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(i)}}(d \log p, \Psi_{(k)})
\end{aligned}$$

Meanwhile

$$\begin{aligned}
d \log b_i &= (1 - \theta_0) \left(d \log p_i - \sum_i b_i d \log p_i \right) + (\varepsilon_i - 1)d \log Y + d \log x_i \\
&= (1 - \theta_0)\text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}}(d \log p, I_{(i)}) + \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}}(\varepsilon, I_{(i)})d \log Y + \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}}(d \log x, I_{(i)}) \\
\sum_i db_i\Psi_{ik} &= \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}}\left((1 - \theta_0)d \log p + \varepsilon d \log Y + d \log x, \Psi_{(k)}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

Hence,

$$d\lambda' = \lambda'd\Omega\Psi + db'\Psi$$

can be written as

$$d\lambda_k = \sum_i \lambda_i(1 - \theta_i)\text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(i)}}(d \log p, \Psi_{(k)}) + \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}}(\varepsilon, \Psi_{(k)})d \log Y + \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}}(d \log x, \Psi_{(k)}).$$

□

Proof of Proposition 8. Consider intertemporal preferences

$$V(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0) = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(C_s).$$

Comparing economies t and t' , macro EV solves the following equation:

$$V(\mathbf{A}, \phi\mathbf{L}, \phi K_0) = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(C_s(\mathbf{A}, \phi\mathbf{L}, \phi K_0)) = \sum_{s=t'}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t'} u(C_s(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0)) = V(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0).$$

Since the economy t' is in steady-state, we are looking for

$$\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(C_s(\mathbf{A}, \phi \mathbf{L}, \phi K_0)) = \frac{1}{1-\beta} u(C(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0)).$$

Furthermore, since $(\mathbf{A}, \phi \mathbf{L}, \phi K_0)$ is also a steady-state (by Lemma 3 below), we are searching for

$$u(C(\mathbf{A}, \phi \mathbf{L}, \phi K_0)) = u(C(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0))$$

or

$$C(\mathbf{A}, \phi \mathbf{L}, \phi K_0) = C(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0).$$

Let $v(\mathbf{p}, I)$ be the static indirect utility function. Then we know that we are searching for

$$v(p(\mathbf{A}, \phi \mathbf{L}, \phi K_0), m) = v(p(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0), \phi m) = v(p(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0), m'),$$

where the first equality uses the fact within period relative goods prices do not depend on within period preferences (since the static PPF is linear). Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} \phi &= \frac{e(p(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0), v_{t_1})}{e(p(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0), v_{t_0})} = \frac{e(p(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0), v_{t_1})}{e(p(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0), v_{t_0})} \frac{e(p(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0), v_{t_1})}{e(p(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0), v_{t_1})} \\ &= \frac{e(p(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0), v_{t_1})}{e(p(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0), v_{t_0})} \frac{e(p(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{L}, K_0), v_{t_1})}{e(p(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{L}', K'_0), v_{t_1})} \\ &= \exp EV^m. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, we can use micro EV^m to calculate the change in macro welfare. \square

Lemma 3. *The steady-state choice of capital (and investment) is the same for any homothetic and stable within-period preferences.*

Proof. Suppose intertemporal welfare is given by

$$U_t = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} u(C_s),$$

where C_s is some homothetic aggregator of within-period consumption goods. Since all goods are produced with constant-returns to scale and every good uses the same homothetic bundle of capital and labor, we can write the consumption aggregator as depending on

$$C_s = G(L_{cs}, K_{cs})$$

for some function constant-returns-to-scale function G . Similarly, investment goods are

created according to some constant returns to scale function

$$I_s = H(L_{Is}, K_{Is}),$$

and the capital accumulation equation is

$$K_{s+1} = (1 - \delta)(K_s + I_s).$$

The Lagrangean is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} [& u(C_s) + \mu_s(G(L_{cs}, K_{cs}) - C_s) + \kappa_s(K_{s+1} - (1 - \delta)(K_s + H(L_{Is}, K_{Is}))) \\ & + \rho_s(L_s - L_{cs} - L_{Is}) + \psi_t(K_s - K_{cs} - K_{Is})] \end{aligned}$$

The first order conditions are

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_s} : u'(C_s) &= \mu_s \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K_{s+1}} : \kappa_s - \beta \kappa_{s+1}(1 - \delta) + \beta \psi_{s+1} &= 0 \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K_{Is}} : -\kappa_s(1 - \delta) \frac{\partial H_s}{\partial K_{Is}} &= \psi_s = \mu_s \frac{\partial G}{\partial K_{cs}} \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial K_{cs}} : \mu_s \frac{\partial G}{\partial K_{cs}} &= \psi_s \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L_{cs}} : \mu_s \frac{\partial G}{\partial L_{cs}} &= \rho_s \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L_{Is}} : -\kappa_s(1 - \delta) \frac{\partial H}{\partial L_{Is}} &= \rho_s. \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$-\kappa_s(1 - \delta) = \mu_s \frac{\partial G / \partial K_{cs}}{\partial H_s / \partial K_{Is}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa_s &= \beta \kappa_{s+1}(1 - \delta) - \beta \psi_{s+1} \\ u'(C_s) &= \beta(1 - \delta) u'(C_{s+1}) \frac{\partial G / \partial K_{cs+1}}{\partial G / \partial K_{cs}} \frac{\partial H_s / \partial K_{Is}}{\partial H_s / \partial K_{Is+1}} \left[(\partial H_s / \partial K_{Is+1})^{-1} + 1 \right]. \end{aligned}$$

In steady state we have

$$1 = \beta(1 - \delta) [1 + \partial H_s / \partial K_{Is}].$$

Hence, the capital stock and investment in steady-state are pinned down by the following

5 equations in 5 unknowns (K_C, K_I, K, L_C, L_I):

$$\begin{aligned}
1 &= \beta(1 - \delta) [1 + \partial H / \partial K_I], \\
\frac{K_C}{L_C} &= \frac{K_I}{L_I}, \\
K &= K_C + K_I, \\
L &= L_I + L_C, \\
\delta K &= (1 - \delta)H(L_I, K_I).
\end{aligned}$$

Since G does not appear in any of these equations, the steady-state investment and capital stock do not depend on the shape of the within-period utility function G . \square

Proof of Proposition 9. Start by setting nominal GDP to be the numeraire. To model the industry-structure, for each industry I , add two new CES aggregators. One buys the good for the household and one buys the good for firms. Let the price of the household aggregator be given by p_I^c and the price of the non-household aggregator be p_I^f and let p_I be the price of the original industry. Let firm i 's share of industry I from household expenditures be b_{iI} . Let the expenditure share of other firms on firm i be s_{iI} . We have

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{i \in I} b_{iI} &= 1 \\
\sum_{i \in I} s_{iI} &= 1.
\end{aligned}$$

Let λ_I^c and λ_I^f be sales of industry I to households and firms. Then we have

$$d\lambda_I = d\lambda_I^c + d\lambda_I^f.$$

The sales of an individual firm i in industry I is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
\lambda_i &= b_{iI}\lambda_I^c + s_{iI}\lambda_I^f \\
d\lambda_i &= db_{iI}\lambda_I^c + b_{iI}d\lambda_I^c + ds_{iI}\lambda_I^f + s_{iI}d\lambda_I^f \\
db_{iI} &= \text{Cov}_{b_I}(d \log x_{(iI)} + (1 - \sigma_I)d \log A_{(iI)}, I_{(i)}) \\
ds_{iI} &= \text{Cov}_{b_I}((1 - \sigma_I)d \log A_{(iI)}, I_{(i)}).
\end{aligned}$$

The gap between macro welfare and real GDP, $EV^M - \Delta \log Y$, is approximately given by

$$\frac{1}{2} d \log x \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial \log x} d \log A = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\sum_{j \in N} d \log x_j \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x_j} \right] d \log A_i,$$

where the sums can be re-written as

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\sum_{j \in N} d \log x_j \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x_j} \right] d \log A_i &= \sum_{i \in N} \left[d \log x \frac{\partial b_{iI}}{\partial \log x} \lambda_I^c d \log A_i + b_{iI} d \log x \frac{\partial \lambda_I^c}{\partial \log x} d \log A_i \right. \\ &\quad \left. + d \log x \frac{\partial s_{iI}}{\partial \log x} \lambda_I^f d \log A_i + s_{iI} d \log x \frac{\partial \lambda_I^f}{\partial \log x} d \log A_i \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The individual terms of this expression are:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i \in N} \left[d \log x \frac{\partial b_{iI}}{\partial \log x} \lambda_I^c d \log A_i \right] &= \sum_{i \in N} \text{Cov}_{b_I}(d \log x_{(iI)}, I_{(i)}) \lambda_I^c d \log A_i \\ &= \text{Cov}_{b_I}(d \log x_{(iI)}, \sum_{i \in N} I_{(i)} d \log A_i) \lambda_I^c \\ &= \text{Cov}_{b_I}(d \log x_{(iI)}, d \log A_{iI}) \lambda_I^c; \end{aligned}$$

$$\sum_{i \in N} \left[b_{iI} d \log x \frac{\partial \lambda_I^c}{\partial \log x} d \log A_i \right] = \mathbb{E}_{b_I}(d \log A_{iI}) d \log x \frac{\partial \lambda_I^c}{\partial \log x};$$

$$\sum_{i \in N} d \log x \frac{\partial s_{iI}}{\partial \log x} \lambda_I^f d \log A_i = 0;$$

and

$$\sum_i s_{iI} d \log x \frac{\partial \lambda_I^f}{\partial \log x} d \log A_i = \mathbb{E}_{s_I}(d \log A_{iI}) d \log x \frac{\partial \lambda_I^f}{\partial \log x}.$$

Of the four terms, two depend on changes on industry-level sales shares (the sum of which is denoted by Θ in the proposition), one of them is zero, and the remaining one (the first term) is the within-industry covariance of supply and demand shocks in the proposition. \square

Proof of Proposition 10. Consider a household with preferences given by

$$C = \left(\int_0^{x^*} c(x)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} dx \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}.$$

Note that budget shares are

$$\lambda^{ev}(x, t, t_1) = \frac{p(x, t)^{1-\sigma}}{\left(\int_0^{x^*(t_1)} p(x, t)^{1-\sigma} dx\right)}$$

$$\lambda(x, t) = \frac{p(x, t)^{1-\sigma}}{\left(\int_0^{x^*(t)} p(x)^{1-\sigma} dx\right)}$$

Hence

$$EV^m = \frac{I}{\left(\int_0^{x^*(t_1)} p(x)^{1-\sigma} dx\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}.$$

Next

$$\Delta \log EV^m = \Delta \log I - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda^{ev}(x, t, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x, t)}{dt} dx dt.$$

Without loss of generality, let's normalize changes in nominal income to zero. Let $\partial_i \lambda^{ev}$ refer to the partial derivative of λ^{ev} with respect to its i th argument. Differentiating and evaluating at the initial point, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \log EV^m}{dt_1} &= - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \partial_3 \lambda^{ev}(x, t, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x, t)}{dt} dx dt \\ &\quad - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \lambda^{ev}(x^*(t_1), t, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x^*(t_1), t)}{dt} \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} dt - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx \\ \frac{d^2 \log EV^m}{dt_1^2} &= - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \partial_3 \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx - \lambda^{ev}(x^*(t_1), t_1, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x^*(t_1), t_1)}{dt} \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \\ &\quad - \lambda^{ev}(x^*(t_1), t_1, t_1) \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \frac{d \log p(x^*, t_1)}{dt_1} - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \frac{d \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1)}{dt_1} \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx \\ &\quad - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1) \frac{d^2 \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1^2} dx \end{aligned}$$

Evaluating at the initial point this simplifies to

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \log EV^m}{dt_1} &= - \int_0^{x^*} \lambda(x) \frac{d \log p(x, t)}{dt} dx \\ \frac{d^2 \log EV^m}{dt_1^2} &= - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \partial_3 \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx - \lambda^{ev}(x^*(t_1), t_1, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x^*(t_1), t_1)}{dt} \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \\ &\quad - \lambda^{ev}(x^*(t_1), t_1, t_1) \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \frac{d \log p(x^*, t_1)}{dt_1} - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \frac{d \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1)}{dt_1} \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx \\ &\quad - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1) \frac{d^2 \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1^2} dx \end{aligned}$$

We note that

$$\lambda^{ev}(x, t, t_1) = \frac{p(x, t)^{1-\sigma}}{\left(\int_0^{x^*(t_1)} p(x, t)^{1-\sigma} dx\right)}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \log \lambda^{ev}(x, t, t_1)}{\partial t} &= (1 - \sigma) \left(\frac{d \log p(x, t)}{dt} - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda(x, t) \frac{d \log p(x, t)}{dt} dx \right). \\ \partial_3 \log \lambda^{ev}(x, t, t_1) &= \frac{\partial \log \lambda^{ev}(x, t, t_1)}{\partial t_1} = \left(-\lambda(x^*, t) \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Meanwhile, real consumption changes are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \log Y &= - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \int_0^{x^*(t)} \lambda(x, t) \frac{d \log p}{dt} dx dt \\ \frac{d \log Y}{dt_1} &= - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda(x, t_1) \frac{d \log p}{dt_1} dx \\ \frac{d^2 \log Y}{dt_1^2} &= -\lambda(x^*(t_1), t_1) \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \frac{d \log p}{dt_1} \\ &\quad - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \frac{d \lambda(x, t_1)}{dt_1} \frac{d \log p}{dt_1} dx - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda(x, t_1) \frac{d^2 \log p}{dt_1^2} dx \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\frac{d \log \lambda(x, t_1)}{dt_1} = (1 - \sigma) \left(\frac{d \log p(x, t)}{dt} - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda(x, t) \frac{d \log p(x, t)}{dt} dx \right) - \lambda(x^*, t) \frac{dx^*}{dt}.$$

Hence

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \log EV^m}{dt_1} &= \frac{d \log Y}{dt_1} \\ \frac{d^2 \log EV^m}{dt_1^2} &= \frac{d^2 \log Y}{dt_1^2} - \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \partial_3 \lambda^{ev}(x, t_1, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx - \lambda^{ev}(x^*(t_1), t_1, t_1) \frac{d \log p(x^*(t_1), t_1)}{dt} \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \\ &= \frac{d^2 \log Y}{dt_1^2} + \lambda(x^*) \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda(x) \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx - \lambda(x^*) \frac{d \log p(x^*(t_1), t_1)}{dt} \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \\ &= \frac{d^2 \log Y}{dt_1^2} + \lambda(x^*) \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \left[\int_0^{x^*(t_1)} \lambda(x) \frac{d \log p(x, t_1)}{dt_1} dx - \frac{d \log p(x^*(t_1), t_1)}{dt} \right] \\ &= \frac{d^2 \log Y}{dt_1^2} + \lambda(x^*) \frac{dx^*}{dt_1} \left[\mathbb{E}_\lambda \left[\frac{d \log p}{dt} \right] - \frac{d \log p(x^*)}{dt} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

□

Appendix B Extension to Other Welfare Measures

Our baseline measure of welfare changes is equivalent variation under final preferences. Alternatively, we could measure changes in welfare using compensating (instead of equivalent) variation, or by using initial (rather than final) preferences. We focus on equivalent variation with final preferences since it uses indifference curves in the final allocation to make welfare comparisons (that is, preferences “today” for growth-accounting purposes). In this appendix, we show that our methods generalize to the other welfare measures. If preferences are homothetic, then the expenditure function can be written as $e(p, u; x) = e(p; x) u$, so equivalent and compensating variation are equal. If preferences are stable, then the expenditure function can be written as $e(p, u; x) = e(p, u)$, so equivalent variation under initial and final preferences are equal (and the same is the case for compensating variation).

Recall that when preferences are homothetic, then the expenditure function can be written as $e(p, u; x) = e(p; x) u$. Hence, in this case, for any fixed x , compensating variation is equal to equivalent variation.

B.1 Micro welfare changes

We consider four alternative measures of micro welfare changes. For each measure, we present expression for global welfare changes and the approximate gap with real consumption.

The *compensating variation with initial preferences* is $CV^m(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}, p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_0}) = \phi$, where ϕ solves

$$v(p_{t_1}, e^{-\phi} I_{t_1}; x_{t_0}) = v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_0}). \quad (22)$$

The analog to (5) in Lemma 1 is

$$CV^m = \Delta \log I - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} b_i^{cv} d \log p_i, \quad (23)$$

where $b_i^{cv}(p) \equiv b_i(p, v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_0}); x_{t_0})$.

Whereas EV^m weights price changes by hypothetical budget shares evaluated at current prices for fixed *final preferences and final utility*, CV^m uses budget shares evaluated at current prices for fixed *initial preferences and initial utility*. An alternative way of calculating CV^m is to reverse the flow of time (the final period corresponds to the initial period), calculate the baseline EV measure under this alternative timeline, and then set $CV^m = -EV^m$.

We now briefly describe how to calculate b^{cv} to apply (29). For ex-ante counterfactuals, where $b(t_0)$ is known, we can construct $b^{cv}(p)$ between t_0 and t_1 by iterating on (7) starting at t_0 and going forward to t_1 . For ex-post counterfactuals, $b(t_0)$ can be obtained from past data, so we can construct $b^{cv}(p)$ by iterating on (7) starting at t_0 and going forward to t_1 .

To a second-order approximation

$$\Delta \log CV^m \approx \Delta \log I - b' \Delta \log p - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log p' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log p} \right] \Delta \log p \quad (24)$$

$$\approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} \right] \Delta \log p. \quad (25)$$

Recall that changes in budget shares due to non-price factors are multiplied by 1/2 in real consumption. However, they are multiplied by 0 in CV^m , since CV^m is based on budget shares at initial preferences and initial utility.

Combining Proposition 2 and (24), we see that up to a second order approximation,

$$0.5 (EV^m + CV^m) \approx \Delta \log Y.$$

That is, locally (but not globally) changes in real consumption equal a simple average of equivalent variation under final preferences and compensating variation under initial preferences.

Alternatively, we can measure the change in welfare using the *micro equivalent variation* with *initial preferences*, $EV^m(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}, p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_0}) = \phi$ where ϕ solves

$$v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_0}) = v(p_{t_0}, e^\phi I_{t_0}; x_{t_0}). \quad (26)$$

Globally, changes in welfare are

$$EV^m = \Delta \log I - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} b_i^{ev} d \log p_i, \quad (27)$$

where $b_i^{ev}(p) \equiv b_i(p, v(p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_0}); x_{t_0})$. The gap between changes in welfare and real consumption is, up to a first order approximation,

$$\Delta \log EV^m - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[-\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} \right] \Delta \log p.$$

Finally, the change in welfare measured using the *micro compensating variation* with *final*

preferences is $CV^m(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}, p_{t_1}, I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) = \phi$ where ϕ solves

$$v(p_{t_1}, e^{-\phi} I_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) = v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_1}). \quad (28)$$

Globally, changes in welfare are given by

$$CV^m = \Delta \log I - \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_{i \in N} b_i^{cv} d \log p_i, \quad (29)$$

where $b_i^{cv}(p) \equiv b_i(p, v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_0}); x_{t_1})$. The gap between changes in welfare and real consumption is, up to a first order approximation,

$$\Delta \log CV^m - \Delta \log Y \approx \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log x} - \Delta \log v \frac{\partial b_i}{\partial \log u} \right] \Delta \log p.$$

Note for EV with initial preferences or CV with final preferences, we must be able to separate demand instability from income effects. For this reason, to compute welfare changes, the elasticities of substitution are not sufficient — we must also know income elasticities or the demand shocks.

Finally, we note that real consumption can be interpreted as representing an alternative measure of welfare, defined as the sum of instantaneous welfare changes using current preferences at each point in time. In particular, real consumption can be written as

$$\Delta \log Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \frac{\partial EV^m(p(t), I(t), p(t), I(t); x(t))}{\partial p_{t_1}} dp(t) + \frac{\partial EV^m(p(t), I(t), p(t), I(t); x(t))}{\partial I_{t_1}} dI(t),$$

where, at every $t \in [t_0, t_1]$, the integrand is the instantaneous welfare change in response to changes in prices and income, dp and dI , measured using equivalent variation with preferences $x(t)$. In contrast to our welfare measures, this measure does not represent the welfare change over a single preference ordering, and is path dependent (it does not only depend only on initial and final income and prices).

B.2 Macro welfare changes

For each alternative micro welfare measure there is a corresponding macro welfare measure. For example, the *macro compensating variation* with *initial preferences* is $CV^M(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}, A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_0}) = \phi$, where ϕ solves

$$V(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}; x_{t_0}) = V(A_{t_1}, e^{-\phi} L_{t_1}; x_{t_0}).$$

In words, CV^M is the proportional change in final factor endowments necessary to make a planner with preferences $\succeq_{x_{t_0}}$ indifferent between the initial PPF (A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}) and PPF defined by $(A_{t_1}, e^{-\phi} L_{t_1})$.

Equation (11) in Proposition 4 applies using $\lambda^{cv}(A)$, the sales shares in a fictional economy with the PPF A, L but where consumers have stable homothetic preferences represented by the expenditure function $e^{cv}(p, u) = e(p, v_{t_0}, x_{t_0}) \frac{u}{v_{t_0}}$ where $v_{t_0} = v(p_{t_0}, I_{t_0}; x_{t_0})$. Growth accounting for welfare is based on hypothetical sales shares evaluated at current technology but for fixed initial preferences and initial utility. The only information on preferences we need to know is elasticities of substitution at the final allocation. As discussed above, CV^M is equal to $-EV^M$ if we reverse the flow of time.

The gap between changes in welfare and real GDP is, to a second-order approximation (the analog of that in Proposition 5) is

$$CV^M \approx \Delta \log Y - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log A' \frac{\partial \log v}{\partial \log A} \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log v} \right] \Delta \log A_i. \quad (30)$$

We can also define *macro equivalent variation with initial preferences*, $EV^M(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}, A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_0}) = \phi$, where ϕ solves

$$V(A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_0}) = V(A_{t_0}, e^{\phi} L_{t_0}; x_{t_0}).$$

Growth accounting for welfare is based on hypothetical sales shares evaluated at current technology for fixed initial preferences and final utility. In contrast to our previous measures, in order to implement this measure we must know initial demand shifters or income effects. The gap between changes in welfare and real GDP is

$$EV^M \approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[-\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} + \Delta \log A' \frac{\partial \log v}{\partial \log A} \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log v} \right] \Delta \log A_i. \quad (31)$$

Finally, define *macro compensating variation with final preferences*, $CV^M(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}, A_{t_1}, L_{t_1}; x_{t_1}) = \phi$, where ϕ solves

$$V(A_{t_0}, L_{t_0}; x_{t_1}) = V(A_{t_1}, e^{-\phi} L_{t_1}; x_{t_1}).$$

Growth accounting for welfare is based on hypothetical sales shares evaluated at current technology for fixed final preferences and initial utility, which requires information on demand shifters or income effects. The gap between changes in welfare and real GDP is

$$CV^M \approx \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \left[\Delta \log x' \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} - \Delta \log A' \frac{\partial \log v}{\partial \log A} \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log v} \right] \Delta \log A_i. \quad (32)$$

Appendix C Non-homothetic CES preferences

This appendix provides a derivation of the log-linearized expression (6). Changes in Marshallian budget share are given by

$$\begin{aligned} d \log b_i^M &= d \log p_i - d \log I + \sum_j \varepsilon_{ij}^M d \log p_j + \varepsilon_i^w d \log I + d \log x_i, \\ &= d \log p_i - d \log I + \sum_j \left(\varepsilon_{ij}^H - \varepsilon_i^w b_j \right) d \log p_j + \varepsilon_i^w d \log I + d \log x_i, \end{aligned}$$

where ε^H and ε^M are the Hicksian and Marshallian price elasticities, ε^w are the income elasticities, and $d \log x_i$ is a residual that captures changes in shares not attributed to changes in prices or income. The third line is an application of Slutsky's equation. When preferences are non-homothetic CES, then the Hicksian demand curve can be written as

$$c_i = \gamma_i \left(\frac{p_i}{\sum_j p_j c_j} \right)^{-\theta_0} u^{\zeta_i},$$

where γ_i and ζ_i are some parameters. The Hicksian price elasticity for $j \neq i$ is

$$\frac{\partial \log c_i}{\partial \log p_j} = \varepsilon_{ij}^H = \theta_0 \frac{p_j c_j}{I} = \theta_0 b_j.$$

Using this fact and the identity $\varepsilon_{ii}^H = -\sum_{j \neq i} \varepsilon_{ij}^H$, we can rewrite changes in budget shares as

$$\begin{aligned} d \log b_i^M &= \sum_j \left(\varepsilon_{ij}^H - \varepsilon_i^w b_j \right) d \log p_j + d \log p_i + (\varepsilon_i^w - 1) d \log I + d \log x_i \\ &= \left(1 - \sum_{j \neq i} \varepsilon_{ij}^H \right) d \log \frac{p_i}{I} + \sum_{j \neq i} \varepsilon_{ij}^H d \log \frac{p_j}{I} + \varepsilon_i^w \left[d \log I - \sum_j b_j d \log p_j \right] + d \log x_i \\ &= \left(1 - \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_0 b_j \right) d \log \frac{p_i}{I} + \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_0 b_j d \log \frac{p_j}{I} + \varepsilon_i^w \left[d \log I - \sum_j b_j d \log p_j \right] + d \log x_i \\ &= (1 - \theta_0(1 - b_i)) d \log \frac{p_i}{I} + \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_0 b_j d \log \frac{p_j}{I} + \varepsilon_i^w \left[d \log I - \sum_j b_j d \log p_j \right] + d \log x_i \\ &= (1 - \theta_0) \left[d \log p_i - \sum_j b_j d \log p_j \right] + (\varepsilon_i^w - 1) \left[d \log I - \sum_j b_j d \log p_j \right] + d \log x_i. \end{aligned}$$

Appendix D Additional details on the Baumol application

According to our results in Section 5, structural transformation caused by income effects or demand instability reduced welfare by roughly twice as much as structural transformation caused by substitution effects. To understand why the necessary adjustment is roughly twice as big, consider the second-order approximation in Proposition 4:

$$\Delta \log TFP^{\text{welfare}} \approx \Delta \log TFP + \frac{1}{2} \left[\sum_{i \in N} \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log x} \Delta \log x + \frac{\partial \lambda_i}{\partial \log v} \Delta \log v \right] \Delta \log A_i, \quad (33)$$

where

$$\Delta \log TFP \approx \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{i,t_0} \Delta \log A_i + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in N} \Delta \lambda_i \Delta \log A_i.$$

If changes in sales shares are due entirely to demand-driven factors, then the term in square brackets in (33) is equal to $\sum_{i \in N} \Delta \lambda_i \Delta \log A_i$, so

$$\Delta \log TFP^{\text{welfare}} \approx \sum_{i \in N} \lambda_{i,t_0} \Delta \log A_i + \sum_{i \in N} \Delta \lambda_i \Delta \log A_i.$$

In other words, the adjustment to the initial sales shares must be roughly twice as large as the adjustment to the initial sales shares caused by substitution effects.⁴⁰

In practice, both substitution effects and non-homotheticities are likely to play an important role in explaining structural transformation. To dig deeper into the size of the welfare adjustment outside our two polar cases, we use a simplified version of the model introduced in Section 4 calibrated to the US economy, accounting for input-output linkages and complementarities, and use the model to quantify the size of the welfare-adjustment as a function of the elasticities of substitution.

Remarkably, Proposition 4 implies that to compute the welfare-relevant change in TFP, we must only supply the information necessary to compute λ^{ev} . That is, since we know sales shares in the terminal period 2014, we do not need to model the non-homotheticities or demand-shocks themselves, and the exercise requires no information on the functional form of non-homotheticities or the slope of Engel curves or magnitude of income elasticities *conditional* on knowing the elasticities of substitution.

We map the model to the data as follows. We assume that the constant-utility final de-

⁴⁰These second-order approximations are more accurate if changes in sales shares are well-approximated by linear time trends, and the surprising accuracy of the second-order approximation is a result of this fact.

mand aggregator has a nested-CES form. There is an elasticity θ_0 across the three groups of industries: primary, manufacturing, and service industries. The inner nest has elasticity of substitution θ_1 across industries within primary (2 industries), manufacturing (24 industries), and services (35 industries).⁴¹ Production functions are also assumed to have nested-CES forms: there is an elasticity of substitution θ_2 between the bundle of intermediates and value-added, and an elasticity of substitution θ_3 across different types of intermediate inputs. For simplicity, we assume there is only one primary factor of production (a composite of capital and labor). We solve the non-linear model by repeated application of Proposition 6 in the fictional economy with stable and homothetic preferences.

We calibrate the CES share parameters so that the model matches the 2014 input-output tables provided by the BEA. For different values of the elasticities of substitution $(\theta_0, \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)$ we feed changes in industry-level TFP (going backwards, from 2014 to 1947) into the model and compute the resulting change in aggregate TFP. This number represents the welfare-relevant change in aggregate TFP. We report the results in Table 2.

Table 2: Percentage change in measured and welfare-relevant TFP in the US from 1947 to 2014.

$(\theta_0, \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)$	(1,1,1,1)	(0.5,1,1,1)	(1,0.5,1,1)	(1,1,0.5,1)	(1,1,1,0.5)
Welfare TFP	46%	46%	54%	48%	55%
Measured TFP	60%	60%	60%	60%	60%

The first column in Table 2 shows the change in welfare-relevant TFP assuming that there are no substitution effects (all production and consumption functions are Cobb-Douglas). In this case, all changes in sales shares in the data are driven by non-homotheticities or demand-instability, and hence welfare-relevant TFP has grown more slowly than measured TFP, exactly as discussed in the previous section. The other columns show how the results change given lower elasticities of substitution. As we increase the strength of complementarities (so that substitution effects are active), the implied non-homotheticities required to match changes in sales shares in the data are weaker. This in turn reduces the gap between measured and welfare-relevant productivity growth.

Table 2 also shows that not all elasticities of substitution are equally important. The results are much more sensitive to changes in the elasticity of substitution across more disaggregated categories, like materials, than aggregated categories, like agriculture, manu-

⁴¹In order to map this nested structure to our baseline model, good 0 is a composite of good 1-3, where good 1 is a composite of primary industries, good 2 is a composite of manufacturing industries, and good 3 is a composite of service industries. Goods 4-65 are the disaggregated industries. Finally, good 66 is the single factor of production.

facturing, and services.

To see why the results in Table 2 are differentially sensitive to changes in different elasticities of substitution, combine Propositions 7 and 11 to obtain the following second-order approximation:

$$\Delta \log TFP^{\text{welfare}} \approx \sum_i \lambda_i \Delta \log A_i + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j \in \{0\} + \mathcal{N}} (\theta_j - 1) \lambda_j \text{Var}_{\Omega^{(j)}} \left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} \Psi_{(k)} \Delta \log A_i \right). \quad (34)$$

The second term is half the sum of changes in Domar weights due to substitution effects (i.e. changes in welfare-relevant sales shares) times the change in productivities. Note that changes in these welfare-relevant sales shares are linear in the microeconomic elasticities of substitution. The importance of some elasticity θ depends on

$$\sum_j \lambda_j \text{Var}_{\Omega^{(j)}} \left(\sum_{k \in \mathcal{N}} \Psi_{(k)} \Delta \log A_i \right),$$

where the index j sums over all CES nests whose elasticity of substitution is equal to θ (i.e. all j such that $\theta_j = \theta$). Therefore, elasticities of substitution are relatively more potent if: (1) they control substitution over many nests with high sales shares, or (2) if the nests corresponding to those elasticities are heterogeneously exposed to the productivity shocks.

We compute the coefficients in (34) for our model's various elasticities using the IO table at the end of the sample. The coefficient on $(\theta_0 - 1)$, the elasticity of substitution between agriculture, manufacturing, and services in consumption is only 0.01. This explains why the results in Table 2 are not very sensitive to this elasticity. On the other hand, the coefficient on $(\theta_1 - 1)$, the elasticity across disaggregated consumption goods, is much higher at 0.21. The coefficient on $(\theta_2 - 1)$, the elasticity between materials and value-added bundles is 0.07. Finally, the coefficient on $(\theta_3 - 1)$, the elasticity between disaggregated categories of materials is 0.25. This underscores the fact that elasticities of substitution are more important if they control substitution in CES nests which are very heterogeneously exposed to productivity shocks — that is, nests that have more disaggregated inputs.

According to equation (34), setting $\theta_1 = \theta_2 = \theta_3 = 1$ (which is similar to abstracting from heterogeneity within the three broader sectors and heterogeneity within intermediate inputs), then θ_0 is the only parameter that can generate substitution effects in the model. This may help understand why more aggregated models of structural transformation (e.g. Buera et al., 2015 and Alder et al., 2019) require low values of θ_0 to account

for the extent of sectoral reallocation in the data.

Appendix E Non-CES Functional Forms

In this appendix, we generalize Proposition 6 beyond CES functional forms. To do this, for each producer k with cost function \mathbf{C}_k , we define the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution between inputs x and y as

$$\theta_k(x, y) = \frac{\mathbf{C}_k d^2 \mathbf{C}_k / (dp_x dp_y)}{(d\mathbf{C}_k / dp_x)(d\mathbf{C}_k / dp_y)} = \frac{\epsilon_k(x, y)}{\Omega_{ky}},$$

where $\epsilon_k(x, y)$ is the elasticity of the demand by producer k for input x with respect to the price p_y of input y , and Ω_{ky} is the expenditure share in cost of input y . For the household $k = 0$, we use the household's expenditure function in place of the cost function (where the Allen-Uzawa elasticities are disciplined by Hicksian cross-price elasticities and expenditure shares).

Following Baqaee and Farhi (2019b), define the *input-output substitution operator* for producer k as

$$\Phi_k(\Psi_{(i)}, \Psi_{(j)}) = - \sum_{1 \leq x, y \leq N+1+F} \Omega_{kx} [\delta_{xy} + \Omega_{ky} (\theta_k(x, y) - 1)] \Psi_{xi} \Psi_{yj}, \quad (35)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} E_{\Omega^{(k)}} ((\theta_k(x, y) - 1) (\Psi_i(x) - \Psi_i(y)) (\Psi_j(x) - \Psi_j(y))), \quad (36)$$

where δ_{xy} is the Kronecker delta, $\Psi_i(x) = \Psi_{xi}$ and $\Psi_j(x) = \Psi_{xj}$, and the expectation on the second line is over x and y . The second line can be obtained from the first using the symmetry of Allen-Uzawa elasticities of substitution and the homogeneity identity.

Then, Proposition 6 generalizes as follows:

Proposition 12. *Consider some perturbation in final demand $d \log x$ and technology $d \log A$. Then changes in prices of goods and factors are*

$$d \log p_i = - \sum_{j \in N} \Psi_{ij} d \log A_j + \sum_{f \in F} \Psi_{if}^F d \log \lambda_f. \quad (37)$$

Changes in sales shares for goods and factors are

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_i d \log \lambda_i = & \sum_{j \in \{0\} + N} \lambda_j \Phi_j \left(-d \log p, \Psi_{(i)} \right) \\ & + \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(d \log x, \Psi_{(i)} \right) + \text{Cov}_{\Omega^{(0)}} \left(\varepsilon, \Psi_{(i)} \right) \left(\sum_{k \in N} \lambda_k d \log A_k \right). \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

Since Φ_j shares many of the same properties as a covariance (it is bilinear and symmetric in its arguments, and is equal to zero whenever one of the arguments is a constant), the intuition for Proposition 12 is very similar to that of Proposition 6. Computing the equilibrium response in Proposition 12 requires solving a linear system exactly as in Proposition 6.

Appendix F Heterogeneous Agents

We consider a utilitarian SWF that sums the welfare of each agent h , measured in terms of initial prices, relative to initial aggregate income⁴²

$$W = \frac{\sum_{h \in I} e_h(\bar{p}, u_h)}{\sum_{j \in I} e_j(\bar{p}, \bar{u}_j)},$$

where I is the set of agents. Preferences can vary across households but, for simplicity, we assume that each h 's preferences are homothetic and stable.

For this case, in this appendix we show that to a second-order approximation,

$$\Delta \log W = \Delta \log Y + \frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}_{\chi} \left(-\mathbb{E}_b[\Delta \log p], \Delta \log I - \mathbb{E}_b[\Delta \log p] \right),$$

where χ is the initial distribution of expenditures by each agent, $\mathbb{E}_b[\Delta \log p]$ is the vector of inflation rates for each household, and $\Delta \log I$ is the vector of nominal income changes. The change in social welfare is greater than the change in real GDP if changes in real income negatively covary with inflation across households. There is no bias if preferences are aggregable, in which case $\mathbb{E}_b[\Delta \log p]$ is uniform across households, if real income growth is uniform or, more generally, if changes in household-level inflation rates are uncorrelated with changes in real income.

While the specific form of the gap between welfare and real GDP depends on the social

⁴²This social welfare function implements a version of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle whereby a change is deemed socially desirable if the winners can hypothetically compensate the losers. In this case, this hypothetical compensation is measured in terms of initial prices.

welfare function, if individuals' preferences are not aggregable, then there will always be a gap even if preferences at the individual level are stable and homothetic.

To establish these results, we first write the utilitarian social welfare function as

$$W = \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h,$$

where $\bar{\chi}_h$ is the ratio of agent i expenditures in total expenditures in the initial point, and $Y_h \equiv \frac{e_h(\bar{p}, u_h)}{e_j(\bar{p}, \bar{u}_j)}$ denotes the change in real consumption of agent h (or $\exp(EV_h^m)$, since preferences are stable and homothetic). We show that to a second order approximation

$$\Delta \log W \approx \Delta \log Y - \frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}_\chi(\mathbb{E}_{b_h}[\Delta \log p], \Delta \log Y_h),$$

where the covariance is applied across individuals using the probabilities implied by the vector χ at the initial point.

To see this,

$$\begin{aligned} d \log W &= \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h d \log Y_h, \\ d^2 \log W &= \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h (d \log Y_h)^2 + \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h d^2 \log Y_h - \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h d \log Y_h d \log W, \\ &= \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h (d \log Y_h)^2 + \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h d^2 \log Y_h - (d \log W)^2, \\ &= \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h (d \log Y_h)^2 + \frac{1}{W} \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h Y_h d^2 \log Y_h - (d \log Y)^2, \\ &= \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h (d \log Y_h)^2 + \sum_h \bar{\chi}_h d^2 \log Y_h - (d \log Y)^2, \end{aligned}$$

where we use the fact that $W = Y_h = 1$ and $d \log W = d \log Y$ at the initial point.

Next consider the change in real GDP:

$$\log Y = \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_i \frac{p_i(t) q_i(t)}{\sum_j p_j(t) q_j(t)} d \log q_i(t),$$

and

$$p_i q_i = \sum_h \chi_h b_{hi} \text{GDP},$$

where b_{hi} is the budget share of agent h on good i and GDP is nominal GDP. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
d \log q_i &= \sum_h \frac{q_{hi}}{q_i} d \log q_{hi} \\
&= \sum_h \frac{\chi_h b_{hi}}{\sum_g \chi_g b_{gi}} d \log q_{hi} \\
\log Y &= \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_h \chi_h \sum_i b_{hi} d \log q_{hi} \\
&= \int_{t_0}^{t_1} \sum_h \chi_h d \log Y_h.
\end{aligned}$$

Differentiating this with respect to t_1 gives

$$d \log Y = \chi \cdot d \log Y_{(h)}.$$

Differentiating again gives

$$\begin{aligned}
d^2 \log Y &= d\chi \cdot d \log Y_{(h)} + \chi \cdot d^2 \log Y_{(h)} \\
&= d\chi \cdot d \log Y_{(h)} + d^2 \log W - \sum_h \chi_h (d \log Y_h)^2 + d \log Y^2.
\end{aligned}$$

Using the fact that

$$d\chi_h = \chi_h d \log \chi_h = \chi_h \left[\mathbb{E}_{b_h} [d \log p] + d \log Y_h - \sum_j \chi_j \left[\mathbb{E}_{b_j} [d \log p] + d \log Y_j \right] \right],$$

we have evaluating at t_1 ,

$$\begin{aligned}
d^2 \log Y &= \sum_h \chi_h \left[\mathbb{E}_{b_h} [d \log p] + d \log Y_h - \sum_j \chi_j \left[\mathbb{E}_{b_j} [d \log p] + d \log Y_j \right] \right] d \log Y_h \\
&\quad + d^2 \log W - \sum_h \chi_h (d \log Y_h)^2 + d \log Y^2 \\
&= \sum_h \chi_h \mathbb{E}_{b_h} [d \log p] d \log Y_h + \sum_h \chi_h d \log Y_h d \log Y_h - \sum_h \chi_h d \log Y_h \sum_j \chi_j \left[\mathbb{E}_{b_j} [d \log p] + d \log Y_j \right] \\
&\quad + d^2 \log W - \sum_h \chi_h (d \log Y_h)^2 + d \log Y^2 \\
&= \text{Cov}_\chi (\mathbb{E}_{b_h} [d \log p], d \log Y_{(h)}) + d^2 \log W.
\end{aligned}$$

This implies that

$$d^2 \log W = d^2 \log Y - \text{Cov}_\chi(\mathbb{E}_{b_h}[d \log p], d \log Y_{(h)}).$$

Combining the first order and second order terms, changes in the social welfare function are given to a second order approximation by

$$d \log W + \frac{1}{2} d^2 \log W = d \log Y + \frac{1}{2} d^2 \log Y - \frac{1}{2} \text{Cov}_\chi(\mathbb{E}_{b_h}[d \log p], d \log Y_{(h)}).$$