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DP15949

## Reducing Parent-School Information Gaps and Improving Education Outcomes: Evidence from HighFrequency Text Messages

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DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

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Samuel Berlinski, Matias Busso, Taryn Dinkelman and Claudia Martinez A.<br>Discussion Paper DP15949<br>Published 22 March 2021<br>Submitted 12 March 2021<br>Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK<br>Tel: +44 (0)20 71838801<br>www.cepr.org

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#### Abstract

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JEL Classification: I25, D8, N36
Keywords: Education, information experiment, parent-school communication, Chile
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# Reducing Parent-School Information Gaps and Improving Education Outcomes: Evidence from High-Frequency Text Messages* 

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First version: May 2016 This version: March 2021


#### Abstract

Grade retention and early dropout are two of the biggest challenges facing education systems in middle-income countries today, representing waste in school resources. We investigate whether reducing parent-school information gaps can improve outcomes that are early-warning signals for grade retention and dropout. We conducted an experiment in low-income schools in Chile to test the effects and behavioral changes triggered by a program that sends attendance, grade, and classroom behavior information to parents via weekly and monthly text messages. Our 18 -month intervention raised average math GPA by 0.09 of a standard deviation and increased the share of students satisfying attendance requirements for grade promotion by 4.5 percentage points. Treatment effects were larger for students at higher risk of later grade retention and dropout. We find some evidence of positive classroom spillovers. Leveraging existing school inputs to implement a light-touch, cost-effective information intervention can improve education outcomes in lower-income settings. [148 words]


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[^1]
## 1 Introduction

Grade retention and early dropout are two of the biggest challenges facing education systems in middle-income countries today. In Latin America, only $46 \%$ of students graduate from secondary school on time, and only $53 \%$ of young people aged 20 to 24 have completed their high school education [UNFPA and ECLAC, 2011]. These outcomes contribute to persistent education gaps between low- and high-income families. Researchers have identified absenteeism, failing grades, and classroom misbehavior as important early warning signals for grade retention and the likelihood that students will eventually drop out of school [Manacorda, 2012; Wedenoja, 2017]. While schools around the world routinely record these types of student outcomes, families often do not have timely access to this information. In this paper, we examine whether improving the frequency of communication between parents and schools can help improve students' academic outcomes, particularly among those who are at-risk of being retained at a given grade or of later dropout.

We conducted a randomized experiment in a sample of Chilean families to evaluate the effects of using weekly and monthly cellphone text messages to provide parents with information on students' attendance, grades, and classroom behavior. The intervention focuses on students in the last five grades of primary school. It targets information for parents during the years when attendance and grades start to matter, but before the risks of grade repetition or dropout significantly increase. Our main experimental sample includes about 1,000 children enrolled in seven low-income schools in a metropolitan area in Chile. The text message intervention (Papas al Dia) was deliberately designed to test a fairly lowtouch and low-cost intervention; easily and inexpensively implemented at scale. We did not teach parents how to interpret or use the information, and we did not provide any guidance to students, teachers or principals.

Our research design has several distinguishing features: First, the information treatment lasted one and a half years (spanning two school years) and over 44,000 text messages were delivered at different frequencies (weekly and monthly) during this time. As a result, we are able to examine whether the effects of messages changed over time or with the frequency of the messaging. Second, we randomly manipulated the share of treated students in each classroom to quantify spillover effects within classrooms. Third, after parents had some exposure to the program, we relied on a survey experiment to assess whether parents in treatment and control groups valued the frequent communication with schools differently, and whether willingness to pay was affected by a student's baseline educational performance. Fourth, we administered several rounds of surveys to measure whether the intervention led to changes in behaviors within the household.

We start by documenting fairly sizable gaps that exist between parents' knowledge and school reports of students' attendance and grades. Using a baseline survey and school records, we find that about one in four parents was unable to report correct information about a child's grades and attendance. Similar information gaps have been found in settings as diverse as the US [Bergman, 2021], Malawi [Dizon-Ross, 2019] and Colombia [Barrera-Osorio et al., 2020]. Moreover, we document that the parents of at-risk, low-achieving students are more likely to misreport grades and attendance. Narrowing this gap -between parents' understanding of their child's performance and the actual performance as documented by the school- is the initial target of our text messaging treatment.

The text messaging had positive impacts on grades and attendance. A comparison of the treated and control students shows that the intervention led to an increase in math GPA of 0.09 of a standard deviation; the probability of earning a passing grade in math increased by 2.7 percentage points (relative to a mean of $90 \%$ ). The intervention also reduced school absenteeism by 1 percentage point, and increased the share of students who satisfied the attendance requirements for grade promotion by 4.5 percentage points. These treatment effects are 60 percent larger when imperfect text message reception is taken into account that is, when one accounts for the effects solely among students whose parents did, indeed, receive the texts. ${ }^{1}$ These treatment effects are somewhat heterogeneous on initial academic performance. We find that low-performing at-risk students benefited the most from receiving the intervention. The effects on grades, attendance, and behavior are doubled for those students with a standard deviation more of our at-risk index.

We find evidence of positive classroom-level spillovers among treated students for grades and attendance. In addition to randomizing the assignment to receive the text message treatment at the individual student level, we randomized the share of students treated at the classroom level. To test for such potential spillovers, classes were randomized into groups with a high ( $75 \%$ ) or low ( $25 \%$ ) share of students whose parents participated in the texting program. This allowed us to test our hypothesis that classroom-level spillovers could play an important role in impacts, for a wide variety of reasons. For example, parents might share information with one another, potentially affecting social norms about how much parents should be involved in helping or monitoring their children in school. Peer effects among

[^2]students could be important, too. For instance, the utility of skipping school may depend on how many of a given student's friends also skip school. Although our design does not allow us to test for spillovers to the control group, the spillover results on treated students suggest that the positive direct effect on individual grades and attendance that we measure are likely underestimates of the impacts of a scaled-up version of this program in which all students would be treated.

Exploring the timing and frequency of text messages through the week and through the school year allows us to draw out some important policy implications for the design of these types of information interventions. We show that the positive effect on attendance fades out over the week: effects are larger immediately after parents receiving the text messages and decline as the days go by. This suggests that for outcomes where the student make daily choices -to attend or not to attend school- high frequency text messages are more beneficial than sporadic ones. We also show that the intervention is effective throughout the school year. Parents do not seem to get used to the information treatment. Taken together, these results suggest that the information treatments studied in this paper should be high frequency and sustained over time in order to increase their effectiveness.

To gain further insight into the channels that induced the intervention to change students' and parents' behaviors, we combined rich administrative data collected from each school with information collected through surveys conducted with parents and students before and after the program. We show that the text message treatment shrunk information gaps between parents and schools. Parents of at-risk students "correct" their understanding of their child's performance to the greatest degree (although results are not statistically significant at normal levels). Additionally, we show that parents used this new information when interacting with their children at home. The intervention changed parent behaviors at home. Treated students perceived that they received significantly more family support as a result of the intervention and students perceived that their parents were more involved in schools matters.

Consistent with these changes in parental behavior we find that some parents (especially those of students at-risk) are willing to pay for the information. We rely on a survey experiment to assess the willingness to pay for the information. For all parents, demand slopes downward; more parents are willing to pay at lower prices. Parents in the treatment group -who had already experienced receiving the text messages for several months- whose children were measured at-risk grade retention and dropout to begin with, are significantly more likely to say they are willing to pay for the continued service relative to control parents. We interpret this as evidence that these parents learned about their value of the program, and, as a result, they were more willing to pay for the service. This result echoes the findings of

Bursztyn and Coffman [2012], who show that Brazilian parents report being willing to pay for receiving regular updates on their child's absenteeism.

The text message intervention is characterized by low variable cost and a once in a life-time setup cost. Using the treatment effects estimates we find that a 0.01 of standard deviation increase in math grades has a variable cost of about US $\$ 1.18$ per student per year at market prices (rising to US $\$ 2 /$ year when we include the fixed set up costs). This program is cost-effective when compared to other interventions designed to improve learning outcomes.

There is a large and recent literature studying the effect of sending parents information about their children's activities and performance in school. This literature includes Bursztyn and Coffman [2012], Kraft and Dougherty [2013], Avvisati et al. [2014], Castleman and Page [2015], Kraft and Rogers [2015], De Walque and Valente [2018], Rogers and Feller [2018], Bergman and Chan [2019], Dizon-Ross [2019], Angrist et al. [2020], Barrera-Osorio et al. [2020], Bergman [2021], Bergman et al. [2020], and Gallego et al. [2020] among others. ${ }^{2}$ Much, although not all of this work, is based in the US. We make three contributions to this literature.

First, we show that taking simple steps to provide parents with timely, accurate information about their children's school performance can improve educational outcomes. Our results connect with a growing economics literature that identifies a lack of correct and timely information as one of the critical constraints on good decision-making. ${ }^{3}$ Having the right information at the right time is especially important in the context of students' education; adult caregivers act as agents for their children until the children are developmentally capable of making good choices about their own human capital or health investments. Our program offers one example of a simple intervention that can help parents to be more effective in this role, with potentially long-term positive impacts on educational attainment for children from low-income backgrounds, particularly those at-risk of poor education outcomes. Our results also suggest that once parents of the most at-risk students understand the value of such an information service, they may be willing to pay for at least part of the costs of measures that improve parent-school communication.

Second, our work contributes to the understanding of how to better design public poli-

[^3]cies that may help improve students' academic outcomes, given existing school resources and practices. Though efforts to improve school access, especially in developing countries, have been successful in recent decades, improving school quality has proved more elusive. Digitizing data already collected by schools, and providing these data to parents at high frequency over a sustained period of time offers an effective and relatively inexpensive way to improve grades and attendance outcomes, measures that are likely to reduce the probability that students drop out of school. Closing information gaps between parents and schools are feasible actions that can better leverage existing school inputs to improve student outcomes.

Third, relative to other types of parenting programs, our intervention is low cost, sustainable, and amenable to scale up in developing-country settings. By comparison, a number of recent parenting programs that have been found to be successful require more contact time between parents and schools [e.g. Avvisati et al., 2014; Banerji et al., 2017]; thus, these other interventions tend to be costly, and more difficult to scale. Our work most closely relates to that of Bergman and Chan [2019] who evaluated a low-cost program of improved parentschool communication in 22 middle and high schools in West Virginia. Both our intervention and that of Bergman and Chan [2019] provide information through high-frequency text messages. Our intervention additionally studies student's misbehavior outcomes and spillovers among the treated students, and directly addresses the willingness to pay of parents for continuing the service with specific monetary values. Thus, our intervention holds potential for scaling up in settings with limited resources. ${ }^{4}$

Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental setting, and documents the extent of parent-school information gaps at baseline. Section 3 describes the recruitment of participants in the intervention, the intervention itself, and treatment randomization. Section 4 describes the data we collected and used in our analysis, variable definitions, and instrument response rates. Section 5 discusses our estimation strategy, and analyzes the internal validity of our experiment. Sections 6 discusses the treatment effects on academic outcomes, heterogeneity, and spillovers. Section 7 explores the mechanisms behind those effects. Section 8 discusses whether the program was cost-effective. Section 9 concludes.

[^4]
## 2 Setting

School dropout is concentrated among the lower-income quintiles in Chile. For instance, in 2010 , only $65 \%$ of students in the lowest-income quintile complete high school, compared with over $96 \%$ of students in the highest-income quintile. Attendance, grades, and classroom behavior in elementary school are key factors affecting the risk of grade retention, which, in turn, increases the probability that students will drop out of school when they grow older [e.g. Manacorda, 2012; Wedenoja, 2017].

There are twelve years of mandatory school in Chile: eight of primary school and four of secondary school. To pass each grade students must attend at least $85 \%$ of school days in a school year, and must obtain a passing grade of 4.0 in all subjects (on a scale from one to seven). ${ }^{5}$ As a result, there is a strong correlation between attendance, subject grades, and grade retention. ${ }^{6}$

The transition from the final grade of primary school to the beginning of secondary school appears to be a point at which students are at high risk of grade retention or, in the worst case scenario, of dropping out of the school system. Even though grade retention is an outcome of concern during lower grades, it becomes even more of a concern as students progress through their school years. During grades 1-3 about $3 \%$ of students repeat their grade. Starting in grade 4 this percentage increases with each grade, finally reaching $5 \%$ by the end of primary school. In the first year of secondary school, the grade retention rate surges, reaching $13 \%$. This pattern is observed in our sample but it is also common in most Latin American countries [Bassi et al., 2015].

Our intervention focuses on students in the last five grades of primary school, where the median child age is 10 . It targets information for parents during the years when attendance and grades start to matter, but before the risks of grade repetition or dropout significantly increase.

Many parents do not have good information about their children school performance. Gaps in the information that schools and parents have about children have been identified in settings as diverse as the US [Bergman, 2021], Malawi [Dizon-Ross, 2019] and Colombia

[^5][Barrera-Osorio et al., 2020]. In general, examples in the literature suggest that most parents tend to overestimate their child's performance in school, and that parents who have less education themselves have worse information about their child's performance in school [Barrera-Osorio et al., 2020; Rogers and Feller, 2018; Bergman and Chan, 2019].

Figure 1: Baseline share of misinformed parents


Note: Y-axis presents the (lowess-smoothed) share of parents misinformed regarding their child's grades and attendance as measured by the at-risk index. Based on parent surveys at baseline. See notes for columns [2] and [3] of Table 6 for details on the construction of misinformation measures and Section 4 for the index construction.

In our setting, we also observe similar types of parent-school information gaps regarding the student's actual grades and attendance. Parents are usually provided with information about their child's progress every quarter through a report card that details a student's grades and number of absences. Teachers and principals also communicate with parents on an "as needed" basis for certain cases of misbehavior, regular absenteeism, and repeated low grades. Figure 1, based on data from our baseline survey described in Section 4, plots the share of parents whose report of the child's grade/attendance is at odds with the child's actual school performance before the intervention begun. We define a grade to be misreported if it deviates more than 0.5 points above or below the actual grade and Figure 1 graphs the share of grade misreports in blue. We define attendance to be misreported if the parents' report of the child's absence differs by two or more instances from actual absences recorded in the previous two weeks. Figure 1 graphs the share of attendance misreports in red. ${ }^{7}$ These

[^6]misreports are graphed against a summary measure - the at-risk index - of whether a child is considered at-risk of retention or dropping out (because of higher absenteeism, lower grades, or worse behavior in class) before the intervention. ${ }^{8}$

In our sample, $40 \%$ percent of parents of students with a baseline math grade below 4.5 did not know their children's test scores. Similarly, $70 \%$ percent of parents of students with an attendance rate of lower than 85 percent, did not know how many days their children had missed school in the previous two weeks. This is despite $75 \%$ of parents declaring that they almost always check their children's report. From the figure, we see that around $30-40 \%$ of parents who have children with a zero value of the at-risk index misreport grades/attendance. And the share of parents misreporting grades and attendance only increases as the child is considered more at-risk of grade retention/dropping out. These are the types of information gaps our intervention is designed to address. Moreover, the patterns in Figure 1 suggest that our intervention is likely to be particularly relevant for those children who are the most at-risk of grade retention/dropping out.

## 3 Experimental Design

In this section we outline the basic elements of our experiment: the recruitment of schools and parents, the randomization of students and classrooms, and the intervention.

Recruitment of participants. We worked with the Secretary of Education of two lowincome municipalities of Santiago (Chile) to recruit schools to join our study. ${ }^{9}$ In these schools, we held a series of meetings, inviting parents of all students in grade 4 or above to join the experiment. ${ }^{10}$ Over $50 \%$ percent of parents consented to participate. Consent rates by grade-level were roughly similar. Younger students, those not new to the school, and those with better baseline attendance and grades were somewhat more likely to consent. ${ }^{11}$

Randomization. We assigned students to treatment in two steps. First, we stratified by school grade-level, and randomly allocated classrooms (sections) to include a high- or low-share of students whose parents would receive text messages. In high-share classrooms,

[^7]$75 \%$ of students whose parents had consented to participate were treated; in low-share classrooms, $25 \%$ of students whose parents had consented were treated. Second, within each classroom, we randomized students whose parents had consented into treatment or control status, according to the shares allocated in the first-step randomization.

Intervention. Figure 2 shows the timeline of the Papas al Dia intervention (as well as of the data collection). The school year in Chile runs from March to December, with two weeks of winter vacation in July. A first welcoming message was sent to all participants in May of 2014. The intervention started before the winter break, and lasted until December 2015. The summer break happened from mid-December to early March.

Figure 2: Timeline
1st year Summer recess 2nd year


Note: The figure shows the timeline of the intervention and data collection implemented in 2014 and 2015.

Parents in the treatment group received weekly messages on attendance, and monthly messages on classroom behavior and math test scores (separately). We told parents how many days the child had attended school out of the previous school week (usually five days). We provided parents with the number of positive, neutral, and negative classroom behaviors that teachers had recorded in the classroom notebook over the prior month. We provided monthly updates on the record of all math test scores in the semester, the average of these scores, and the classroom average score for the same tests. Hence, parents learned information about their own child's math performance, as well as how their child performed relative to the classroom average. In addition, parents in both the treatment and the control group received text messages about school meetings, holidays, and other general school matters throughout the year. We refer to these as "general" messages. ${ }^{12}$ Parents of students in the control group continued learning about their child's academic performance through report cards that were sent home every quarter.

We collected data on attendance, grades, and behavior from school classroom books. Our research team scanned and entered these data into a digital platform, which then au-

[^8]tomated the sending of messages each week. We sent more than 44,000 text messages over 16 months: $68 \%$ provided information on attendance, $16 \%$ on math grades, and $16 \%$ on classroom behavior. ${ }^{13}$

## 4 Data

Data Sources. We use information from four data sources. First, we collected data on all students' math grades, daily attendance, and all behavior notes from classroom books for the years 2014 and 2015. These are daily-, weekly- and monthly-frequency data that, in some cases, we aggregate at an annual level. Second, we use student-level records provided by the central Ministry of Education of Chile. These records contain information on students' end-of-the-year school performance, including test scores, annual attendance rate, and grade retention, as well as basic demographic information. They are available for our sample of schools for the period from 2013 to 2015 and are use for allocating funding/subsidies across school. We use these data as pre-treatment controls and, also, to validate our main results. Third, we recorded all text messages' information such as day- and time-stamps, the messages' content, the name of the recipient parent, and the delivery status of the text message (i.e., whether the phone number received the message). Fourth, we administered several surveys to all parents and children participating in the experiment. Surveys were administered before the intervention took place (baseline), at the end of the first academic year, and at the end of the second academic year. Student surveys were conducted in class; parent surveys were administered during an initial parent meeting or sent home with children, who were encouraged to ask their parents to complete and return the surveys. ${ }^{14}$

Outcome Variables. ${ }^{15}$ We use data recorded by teachers in classroom books to measure our primary student outcomes: math grades, attendance rates and classroom behavior which we aggregate at the annual level. Using school records, we also measure outcome variables (i.e., grades, attendance rates, and an indicator for whether the student passed the grade) at an annual frequency at the end of each school year to validate our main sources. ${ }^{16}$ Using classroom books we also constructed monthly math grades and attendance rates. All math

[^9]grades were standardized using the corresponding grade-year control mean and standard deviation. ${ }^{17}$ In addition, we built two indicator variables for meaningful thresholds required to pass the grade: $85 \%$ of annual attendance for passing the grade, and the 4.0 math grade for passing the subject. Using classroom books we also measured negative behavior by adding all the behavioral entries during the school year (post-treatment) and then standardized the sum using the grade-year control distribution.

Our secondary outcome variables were designed to capture information gaps and certain behavioral responses to the treatment among students and parents. First, we built measures of information gaps by comparing survey questions that asked parents about their children's recent grades, absences, and behavior. We then compared parents' responses to students' responses and administrative records. Second, we asked parents and children a series of questions to compute pre-specified measures (i.e., several items that are aggregated into one variable usually referred to as a "scale") of study habits, academic efficiency, parental support, parental supervision, parental school involvement, and parental positive reinforcement. These were intended to capture any changes in home behaviors and parent-child or parent-school relationships that might result from the intervention. We administered a set of survey items from three sources: The University of Chicago Consortium on Chicago School Research; the Manual for the Patterns of Adaptive Learning Scales (PALS) developed by the University of Michigan; and scales on positive parenting developed by the Prevention Group at Arizona State University. We aggregated categorical answers into scales using a maximum likelihood principal components estimator. We then standardized answers using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. Overall, we find that each scale has good psychometric properties. ${ }^{18}$ We asked parents and their children a similar set of questions. Scales are highly correlated both across survey waves and between children and parents -further suggesting that the quality of these scales is high (See Tables F. 5 and F.6).

Finally, to assess how much parents value the information provided through out intervention, follow-up surveys asked parents about their willingness to pay for the text messages. ${ }^{19}$ Parents were randomly assigned a value $\$ \mathrm{~V}$ of (low) $\$ 500$ Chilean pesos, (medium) $\$ 1000$ and (high) $\$ 1500$ price (where $\$$ is Chilean pesos per month, and where $\$ 1,000$ is about USD

[^10]1.50).

At-risk index. We build an index to measure each student's risk of failing classes or dropping out later in life. Specifically, we rely on three variables measured before the intervention began: standardized attendance ( $\left.Z_{i}^{\text {attendance }}\right)$, math grades $\left(Z_{i}^{\text {grades }}\right)$, and negative behavioral notes $\left(Z_{i}^{\text {behavior }}\right) .{ }^{20}$ The at-risk index is then defined as a simple average of these measures $\left(\right.$ at - risk index $\left._{i}=\left(-Z_{i}^{\text {attendance }}-Z_{i}^{\text {grades }}+Z_{i}^{\text {behavior }}\right) / 3\right)$. The higher the value of this index, the worse grades, worse attendance, and worse classroom behavior the student has at baseline. Throughout the analysis, we rely on this index to assess the differential impact of the intervention on the primary and secondary outcomes for students with different values of the index.

Response rates. Baseline data from administrative sources are available for all students in the experimental sample (except for a handful of students who joined the schools mid-year in 2014). Administrative data are also complete for the first year of the experiment. During the second year of the experiment, due to the normal churn of students changing schools, we have information for $90 \%$ of the students. This attrition rate is similar for treated and control students. Regarding survey data, students' response rates were between $80 \%$ and $91 \%$ in the three waves. More data were missing for parents, particularly from follow-up surveys, for which response rates were between $54 \%$ and $73 \%$. Response rates were similar across treated and control students and parents. ${ }^{21}$

## 5 Estimation and experimental validity

### 5.1 Empirical strategy

Intention-to-treat effects (ITT). To identify the effect of sending parents high-frequency academic information on students' and parents' outcomes we use the two school years of the intervention and estimate individual-level regressions of the form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i c j g t}=\alpha+\beta T_{i c j g}+\psi X_{i c j g}^{0}+\gamma_{c j g}+\pi_{t}+\theta_{g}+\epsilon_{i c j g t} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Y_{i c j g t}$ is the outcome of student (or parent) $i$ in classroom $c$ of school $j$, in grade-level $g$, and year $t ; T_{i c j g}$ is an indicator for whether a child's parents were part of the randomized group that received the information treatment, and it is constant over time; $\theta_{g}$ are grade-

[^11]level fixed effects; and $\pi_{t}$ are year fixed effects. ${ }^{22} X_{i c j g}^{0}$ are the baseline standardized math grade and attendance rate. ${ }^{23}$ Finally, $\gamma_{c j g}$ are classroom-level fixed effects (strata in the experimental design). Despite the main randomized variation being at the student level, to be conservative, we cluster standard errors at the classroom level. ${ }^{24} \beta$ captures the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. Because we include classroom-level fixed effects $\left(\gamma_{c} j g\right)$, $\beta$ is identified through differences in individual-level treatment status within each classroom.

Average treatment effects on the treated (ATT). Even though the implementation of the treatment was perfect - in the sense that all parents in the treatment group were sent text messages, and no parent in the control group was sent text message with academic information - not all parents received all text messages. We discuss this further in Section 5.3. Thus, we estimate the average treatment effects among those who received the text messages (the ATT) using an instrumental variables approach. The second stage takes the following form:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i c j g t}=\alpha+\delta D_{i c j g t}+\psi X_{i c j g}^{0}+\gamma_{c j g}+\pi_{t}+\theta_{g}+\nu_{i c j g t} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $D_{i c j g t}$ is the share of topic-specific (i.e., attendance, math grades, or classroom behavior) text messages received by student $i$ 's parent in year $t$. We instrument $D_{i c j g t}$ with the individual-level randomized treatment variable, $T_{i c j g}$. For each outcome we use the topic specific share of messages received. ${ }^{25}$

Spillover effects. We exploit the differential exposure to treatment to estimate spillover effects of the intervention. Let $E_{c j g}$ be an indicator variable equal to one if classroom $c$ of grade-level $g$ in school $j$ was randomized to have $75 \%$ of students treated and is equal to zero if it was randomized to have $25 \%$ of students treated instead. We estimate the parameters of the following model:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i c j g t}=\alpha+\beta T_{i c j g}+\eta T_{i c j g} \times E_{c j g}+\psi X_{i c j g}^{0}+\gamma_{c j g}+\pi_{t}+\theta_{g}+\varepsilon_{i c j g t} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

The coefficient $\eta$ measures the differential treatment effect of the text-message interven-

[^12]tion in classrooms where a larger proportion of students was treated. Because of randomization, this coefficient's estimate allows us to quantify the size of the spillover effect on the treated students. Notice that if $\eta>0$ the intervention could also affect the control group. In that case the estimate of $\beta$ would be biased downward and thus represent a lower bound of the effect of text messages on all students' outcomes. ${ }^{26}$

In addition, because of imperfect compliance in text message delivery we estimate the ATT using instrumental variables, in which we augment equation (2) with a term $D_{i c j g t} \times K_{c j g}$ (where $K_{c j g}$ is the share of students in the classroom whose parents received at least half of the text messages that were sent to them) which we instrument with $T_{i c j g} \times E_{c j g}$.

### 5.2 Balance on pre-treatment observable characteristics

We compare the observable characteristics of students and parents assigned to the treatment and control groups before the intervention began. Table 1 shows total observations with available data (column 1); the average of each variable for the treatment group (column 2) and the control group (column 3); and the p-value of the null hypothesis that, conditioning on classroom (strata) fixed effects, the differences between treatment and control averages are zero (column 4). ${ }^{27}$

In our sample, $46 \%$ of students are female. The median age is 10 . Students in treatment and control groups have similar grades at baseline, with math and language scores around 5.1 (on a 1-7 scale), and similar attendance rates ( 90 percent). About $95 \%$ passed their grade in the year prior to the experiment. Panels B and C show parents' and students' scales from the baseline surveys. ${ }^{28}$ Before the intervention began, students in the treatment and control groups reporting putting in similar effort when studying at home, received the same family support and parental supervision. Their parents seemed to be equally involved in their school life. Finally, we built an indicator variable of whether parents graduated from high school using the highest level of completed education among all listed guardians in the household (mother, father, or other guardian, who is often a grandmother). We find that $70 \%$ of parents had completed high school, with no difference between treated and control

[^13]groups.
Table 1: Students and parents pre-treatment characteristics

|  | Obs. | Treatment Mean | Control <br> Mean | p-value of adj. dif. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] |
| Panel A: Administrative records |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 1066 | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.57 |
| Age | 1066 | 9.81 | 9.79 | 0.41 |
| New student | 1066 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.42 |
| Language grade | 976 | 5.10 | 5.07 | 0.85 |
| Math grade | 976 | 5.14 | 5.19 | 0.37 |
| Final avg. grade | 976 | 5.57 | 5.59 | 0.47 |
| Attendance rate | 976 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.53 |
| Passed grade | 1018 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 0.57 |
| Missing grades/attendance/pass data | 1066 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.41 |
| At-risk index | 1066 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.36 |
| Panel B: Parents' Survey Data |  |  |  |  |
| Study habits | 704 | $-0.07$ | 0.00 | 0.51 |
| Academic efficiency | 730 | -0.09 | 0.00 | 0.16 |
| Family Support | 739 | -0.12 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| Low Family Supervision | 709 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.72 |
| Parent School Involvement | 716 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.66 |
| Positive reinforcement | 738 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.31 |
| Parents completed high school | 775 | 0.71 | 0.68 | 0.74 |
| Panel C: Students' Survey Data |  |  |  |  |
| Study habits | 909 | -0.19 | 0.00 | 0.10 |
| Academic efficiency | 915 | -0.14 | 0.00 | 0.15 |
| Family Support | 864 | -0.15 | 0.00 | 0.12 |
| Low Family Supervision | 859 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.60 |
| Parent School Involvement | 858 | -0.12 | 0.00 | 0.59 |
| Positive reinforcement | 868 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.90 |

Note: Column [1] shows the number of observations with non-missing data, columns [2] and [3] the mean value of each baseline characteristic in the treated and control group, respectively. Column [4] reports the p-value on the treatment coefficient in a regression using each baseline characteristic as the dependent variable. All regressions include classroom fixed effects and robust standard errors are clustered at this level. Observable variables in Panel A correspond to 2013 except for new student variable that refers to 2014.

### 5.3 Delivery of text messages

All text messages were sent to parents as planned. However, not all text messages were actually received. Several factors contributed to reception failure. A message was more likely to fail if the network was very busy, if some technical problem surfaced within the network, or if a parent had changed their phone number during the experiment. To maximize the
chances that text messages reached parents, we sent the messages on Mondays, when the network was not as busy as on other days. ${ }^{29}$ At the beginning of the second school year during which the experiment took place, we also recontacted all consenting parents to verify or update their cellphone numbers.

Table 2 shows estimates obtained with equation (1) where the dependent variable is the total number of messages sent (first row) or received (second row) during the course of the experiment. The variables are computed for each type of message (attendance, grades, classroom behavior, general, and all) using information from the digital platform described in Section 3. Each point estimate shows the coefficient $\beta$, which estimates the differences in the total number of text messages sent to/received by parents in the treatment group and those in the control group.

By the end of 2015, when the experiment had run for one and a half school years, an average of 44 more text messages per year had been sent to parents in the treatment group than to parents in the control group. Over the same period, an average of 26 messages per year had been received by parents in the treatment group. This implies that almost $60 \%$ of sent text messages were successfully received by the end of the intervention. A success rate similar to those reported in the literature. Bergman and Chan [2019], for instance, report that about a third of treated parents never received messages that were sent.

Most of the messages were about attendance because these were sent weekly while classroom behavior and grade messages were sent monthly. These treatment messages were only sent to, and received by, parents assigned to the treatment group. By contrast, parents of students in the control group were sent (and received) general text messages at largely the same rate as those in the treatment group (column 5). ${ }^{30}$

The data suggest that the probability of receiving text messages is unlikely to be correlated with family-level characteristics that also affect child outcomes of interest. We might worry, for instance, that parents who have low attachment to the labor market and unstable incomes are also more likely to switch cell numbers. They would then be less likely to receive text messages about their children's academic performance. Children in these families may also have worse school outcomes. To assess this possibility, we estimated a model in which the dependent variable was the total share of successfully delivered text messages (total received/total sent) on baseline attendance and math grades, age, gender and classroom fixed effects. Students with higher baseline grades or attendance are no more (or less) likely to

[^14]receive text messages (see Appendix D. 3 for further discussion).
Table 2: Compliance by type of text message

|  | All | Attendance | Behavior | Grades | General |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| Text messages sent | $43.804^{* * *}$ | $29.876^{* * *}$ | $6.699^{* * *}$ | $7.298^{* * *}$ | -0.070 |
|  | $[0.714]$ | $[0.454$ | $[0.086]$ | $[0.132]$ | $[0.077]$ |
| Text messages received | $26.333^{* * *}$ | $17.651^{* * *}$ | $4.505^{* * *}$ | $4.334^{* * *}$ | -0.157 |
|  | $[0.775]$ | $[0.452]$ | $[0.122]$ | $[0.127]$ | $[0.122]$ |
| Observations | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 |

Note: "Text messages sent" refers to the cumulative number of text messages sent to student's parents. "Text messages received" refers to the cumulative number of text messages with a confirmed delivery status. Columns [2]-[5] report the $T_{i c j g}$ coefficient of equation (1) with the annual number of each type of text message as the dependent variable. Column [1] adds all types of text messages. Attendance, grades, and classroom behavior text messages were sent only to the treatment group. General text messages were sent to all treatment and control individuals. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \% ;^{* *}$ significant at $5 \%$; ${ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Beyond the matter of whether parents received text messages that were sent, there is also the question of whether the parents read the text of the messages that they received. In the follow-up surveys we asked parents if they had received text messages with information on their children school outcomes. We found that parents in the treatment group were more likely to answer that they had received text messages regarding their child's attendance, grades, and classroom behavior. Moreover, treated students were also aware that their parents were receiving this information from the school. ${ }^{31}$ We take this as evidence that parents in the treatment group read the text messages and, at the very least, discussed with their children the fact that they were receiving such message.

## 6 Results

### 6.1 Main results: improved students' academic outcomes

Table 3 presents the main results of our paper. We show the estimates of the intention-totreat (ITT, equation 1) and average treatment effects among those who actually received the text messages (ATT, equation 2) on our primary students' outcomes measured using

[^15]classroom books: math-grade outcomes at the end of each year (column 1), an indicator for whether the annual math grade was a passing grade (above 4.0) (column 2), yearly attendance rate (column 3) for each year, an indicator for whether attendance was above the $85 \%$ cutoff required for the student to pass the grade (column 4), and standardized total annual negative behavioral notes (column 5). ${ }^{32}$

The ITT estimates show positive and significant effects on students' school performance. Math grades improved by 0.081 of a standard deviation, and attendance improved by 1 percentage point.

Given that the text message reception rate was imperfect, as reported in Table 2, the ATT gives a more accurate picture of the impact of actual exposure to the text messages. First, text messages received by parents significantly increased students' math grades by more than 0.127 of a standard deviation. This positive impact on math grades pushed more students over the 4.0 cutoff for passing the subject by increasing this probability by more than 4 percentage points. Second, the information intervention also increased students' annual attendance rate by 1.5 percentage points. The treatment led to a 7.2 percentage point increase in the number of students who met the $85 \%$ attendance rate threshold needed to pass the grade. Third, on average for all students, the treatment did not have an impact on the occurrence of negative classroom behaviors. ${ }^{33,34}$

### 6.2 Information benefited more at-risk students

Table 4 shows estimates for students with different pre-treatment risk of failing grades. To estimate these effects, we interacted the at-risk index described in Section 4 with the randomized treatment indicator variable (in equation 1, Panel A) or the share of text messages that were received (in equation 2, Panel B). In the latter case, we used the interaction of the random treatment assignment and the subgroup indicator variables as an instrument.

[^16]Table 3: Treatment Effects on Grades, Attendance and Classroom Behavior

|  | Math grade | Math grade <br> $>4.0$ | Attendance <br> rate | Cumulative <br> attendance <br> $>85 \%$ | \# negative <br> beh. notes |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| ITT | $0.081^{*}$ | $0.027^{* *}$ | $0.009^{*}$ | $0.045^{*}$ | 0.007 |
|  | $[0.044]$ | $[0.013]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.024]$ | $[0.075]$ |
| ATT | $0.127^{*}$ | $0.042^{* *}$ | $0.015^{*}$ | $0.072^{*}$ | 0.011 |
|  | $[0.067]$ | $[0.020]$ | $[0.008]$ | $[0.037]$ | $[0.114]$ |
| Observations | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 |

Note: ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (1) were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (2) were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent was instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \% ;^{* *}$ significant at $5 \% ;{ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

The intervention had the largest impacts on math grades, attendance and improvements in behavior for students that were more at-risk before the intervention started. The treatment effects almost double for students with an at-risk index one standard deviation larger than the mean (which by construction of the index is zero for the control group). In Appendix Table A. 10 we show the treatment effect heterogeneity by each of the sub-components of the index. A one-standard-deviation increase in baseline math grades significantly lowers the effect of text messages on grades by 0.1 of a standard deviation.

Figure 3 explores this result in more detail by plotting the linear prediction of the treatment effects on monthly math grades (Panel A) and attendance rates (Panel B) along the distribution of the respective standardized baseline variable. We find that effects are larger and statically significant only for students with low baseline grades and attendance. Note that these results are consistent with the treatment increasing the probability of students achieving the attendance and math grades thresholds for passing the grade and subject. Appendix Table A. 10 also studies the heterogeneity by examining whether students received a negative classroom behavioral note in the months before the intervention. The intervention seems to have reduced the probability of having a negative behavioral note - but only for those students who misbehaved at baseline. These results are important because, taken together, they suggest that the intervention was effective precisely for the population of students who have a higher probability of dropping out in later years.

Table 4: Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects by At-Risk Index

|  | Math grade | Math grade <br> $>4.0$ | Attendance <br> rate | Cumulative <br> attendance <br> $>85 \%$ | \# negative <br> beh. notes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ITT | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| T |  |  |  |  |  |
| T x at-risk index | $0.082^{*}$ | $0.025^{*}$ | $0.009^{*}$ | $0.045^{*}$ | -0.015 |
|  | $[0.043]$ | $[0.013]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.024]$ | $[0.068]$ |
| ATT | $[0.070]$ | $[0.019]$ | $[0.007]$ | $0.076^{* * *}$ | $-0.208^{* *}$ |
| D |  |  |  | $[0.028]$ | $[0.093]$ |
| D x at-risk index | $0.225^{* *}$ | $[0.020]$ | $[0.008]$ | 0.072 | $[0.037]$ |

Note: The at-risk index is a simple average of standardized baseline attendance, math grades and negative behavioral notes. ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. $T$ refers to the randomized treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text-messages and zero otherwise). Coefficients were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent $(D)$ and its interaction with the at-risk index variable were instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment $(T)$ and its interaction with the same variable, respectively. All models include the at-risk index variable as control, baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \% ;^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Figure 3: Predicted Treatment Effect by Baseline Characteristics


Note: Figure shows linear predictions and $95 \%$ confidence intervals of the ATT estimates on math grades and attendance rate. Computed based on coefficients from columns [1] (interaction with math grade at baseline) and [3] (interaction with attendance at baseline) of Table A.10, respectively.

### 6.3 Peer effects: classroom-level spillovers

If there are peer effects in the classroom, we would expect our treatment to affect the outcomes of other children. For example, the value of skipping school may fall when friends are no longer truant [Bennett and Bergman, 2021]. Or, if a student's friends are working harder to improve their grades, that student's own effort to earn better grades may increase or decrease (if, for instance, there are ranking concerns [Tincani, 2018]). To estimate the indirect (peer) effects of the intervention from the spillovers associated with others being treated in the same classroom, we exploit the randomization of the different shares of students who were part of the treatment group in each classroom.

Table 5: Spillover Effects

|  | Math grade | Math grade $>4.0$ | Attendance rate | Cumulative attendance $>85 \%$ | \# negative beh. notes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
| Panel A: Treatment Effects |  |  |  |  |  |
| T | 0.065 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.009 | 0.117 |
|  | [0.053] | [0.015] | [0.007] | [0.034] | [0.094] |
| T x High-Share | 0.039 | 0.052* | 0.010 | 0.088* | -0.253* |
|  | [0.092] | [0.027] | [0.010] | [0.047] | [0.151] |
| Panel B: Students at-risk |  |  |  |  |  |
| T | 0.077 | 0.003 | 0.005 | 0.008 | 0.066 |
|  | [0.051] | [0.015] | [0.007] | [0.033] | [0.081] |
| T x High-Share | 0.023 | 0.053** | 0.009 | 0.087* | -0.197 |
|  | [0.090] | [0.027] | [0.010] | [0.046] | [0.140] |
| T x at-risk index | 0.018 | 0.033** | 0.010 | 0.097** | $-0.155$ |
|  | [0.064] | [0.016] | [0.011] | [0.038] | [0.139] |
| T x High-Share x at-risk index | 0.187* | -0.009 | 0.003 | -0.035 | -0.082 |
|  | [0.104] | [0.024] | [0.011] | [0.037] | [0.176] |
| Observations | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 |

Note: Panel A shows intention-to-treat effects estimates from equation (3) shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using OLS. $T$ refers to the randomized individual-level treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text messages and zero otherwise). High - Share refers to the randomized classroom-level treatment (equal to 1 for high-share classrooms and zero for low-share classrooms). Panel B adds the interactions with the student-level at risk index. At-risk index is a simple average of standardized baseline attendance, math grades and negative behavioral notes. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Models in Panel B additionally include the at-risk index variable as control. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \% ;^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Table 5 presents the results of the ITT spillovers for the same set of outcomes as in Table 3. Note that the interaction coefficient captures the differential effect of the spillovers by
comparing classrooms with high and low shares of treated students; in other words, it examines whether there is extra value evident in being in the text messaging program when many more classmates are also in the program. Such spillovers could be important, especially if such parent-school communication programs scale up to cover all enrolled students (rather than just a randomly selected treatment group). In all cases, the differential effect of being assigned to treatment in a high-share classroom improves educational outcomes of treated students -it is larger than the main effect of the treatment in low-share classrooms. ${ }^{35,36}$ This suggests positive spillovers of the intervention among treated students. A greater presence of treated peers in the classroom increases math grades and attendance and reduces misbehavior. With a higher share of treated peers, students are significantly more likely to meet the 4.0 passing grade cutoff, to reach the $85 \%$ attendance cutoff, and significantly decrease the number of negative notes. In some cases, however, because we split the sample to estimate these effects, we lack statistical power to reject that the coefficients are equal.

Panel B of Table 5 investigate if at-risk students benefit more from having a larger share of peers receiving the text message intervention. Although results are less precise, we find that positive impacts on math grade and the attendance rate as well as a reduction in negative behavior among the more at-risk treated students with a higher share of treated peers in their class (but these effects are not enough to differentially push these students above the thresholds for passing to the next grade).

The spillover results in Table 5 suggest that we would not expect any negative impacts of scaling up this intervention to cover all students. If anything, we should expect even larger impacts (and larger for students most at-risk) if everyone is treated.

### 6.4 Do parents forget about information in the text messages?

Parents who receive text messages might forget about the content of the messages after some time, and this could affect their decisions about whether to allow their children to miss a day of school. The majority of the weekly attendance text messages were sent on Mondays. We use daily attendance data to explore whether the effectiveness of the SMS messages fades within the week. ${ }^{37}$ Figure 4 depicts point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for models similar to that of equation (2), which was modified to include an interaction of the share of text messages received with days-of-the-week indicator variables. We find that the positive effect on attendance fades out over the week. Attendance by students in

[^17]the treated group is significantly higher than attendance of students in the control group on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays; by contrast, attendance rates are of the two groups are indistinguishable on Thursdays and Fridays. ${ }^{38}$ Rogers and Feller [2018] find similar results with a larger impact in the week immediately following the delivery of the treatment. This result has an important policy implication because it suggests that the treatment effect of the text messages are somewhat short-lived and therefore information treatments should be high frequency in order to be more effective.

Figure 4: Weekly Fade-out


Note: Coefficients obtained from the ATT estimates of Appendix Table A.12. Standard errors clustered at the classroom level. Confidence intervals are at the $90 \%$ level.

A related concern is that parents could at some point stop paying attention to the content of the communication, or stop internalizing the information after having received such messages over some period of time. Because our intervention lasted for one and a half school years we can explore the treatment effects over the months of the intervention. We estimated effects by month-groups through an instrumental variables model that interacts the share of text messages received with a set of indicator variables that identify groups of months since the beginning of the intervention. Panel A and Panel B of Figure 5 plot the estimates and confidence intervals on the impact on monthly attendance and monthly math grades, respectively. ${ }^{39}$

We find that the impact on attendance is mainly concentrated in the last months of the

[^18]intervention, although we cannot reject the null that all coefficients are equal. In the case of math grades, there is no clear pattern in the timing of the effect. This is consistent with students/parents dynamically optimizing attendance behavior. The intervention could have more of an impact on absenteeism than grades by the end of the year because that was when parents/students started to realize that the absences had accumulated enough to matter. From a policy perspective these results suggest that the effect of the intervention does not fade out. Thus, this type of information intervention could be sustained over time in order to increase its effectiveness.

Figure 5: Treatment Effects on Grades and Attendance Over Time
(a) Monthly Attendance
(b) Monthly Math Grade



Note: Coefficients are obtained from the ATT estimates (columns [1] and [3]) of Appendix Table A.13. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level. Confidence intervals are at the $90 \%$ level.

## 7 Why did academic outcomes improve?

We explore some of the underlying mechanisms that can explain why students' school performance improved after their parents received text messages. We show that the treatment was able to close existing parent-school information gaps about student performance. This new information seemed to have changed the way parents provide support and supervise their children at home.

### 7.1 Narrowed parent-school information gaps

We study whether the text messages reduced the prevailing parental information gaps regarding students' academic performance; to do this, we compare the accuracy of information among parents in the treated and control groups. We construct different measures of the
accuracy of parent's beliefs regarding their child's school performance. Specifically, we contrast parents' responses with student surveys, classroom books, and school records. We then estimate treatment effects using equation 1, in which the outcome variables are the misinformation measures.

Table 6 presents the ITT effects. Columns 1-2 measure parental misinformation regarding a student's attendance. Surveys asked parents about their child's absences with and without permission in the previous two weeks. We contrast parents' responses to students' own responses on total absences (column 1) and to actual absences recorded in classroom books (column 2). Columns 3-4 assess the effect of the intervention on parental information about students' grades. Columns 5-6 capture parental misinformation about students' misbehavior. In both cases we also contrast parents' responses with students' surveys responses (column 3 and 5) and with classroom books (column 4 and 6). In all cases, the outcome variable is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the parent response does not match the student's responses or school records. ${ }^{40,41}$

Pane A of Table 6 shows that all point estimates are negative. That is, text messages reduced information gaps about student attendance, grades and classroom behavior. Because our sample of parents who responded to the follow-up survey is relatively small, these reductions in information gaps are not always precisely estimated; nevertheless, coefficients are large and negative for all outcomes. The ITT estimates, for instance, show that text messages significantly reduced the probability that parents misreported the number of their child's absences; the likelihood of such misreporting fell by more than 7.5 percentage points, in comparison to the results from student surveys. When we compare parents' beliefs with classroom books, the results also show a decline in information gaps, but not to a degree that is statistically significant.

In addition, the information intervention seems to have improved the accuracy or parents' knowledge of their child's grades. Although not statically significant at conventional levels, coefficients are negative and stable across outcomes. We also find a significant improvement in the precision of parents' assessment about their child's misbehavior at school. Overall, these results suggest that treated parents had more accurate information about their child's grades, attendance and classroom behavior after the treatment. ${ }^{42}$

Panel B of Table 6 tests whether treatment effects vary for students with different baseline values of the at-risk index. The intervention seems to have improved the accuracy of

[^19]parents' beliefs about their child's grades and behavior for students with a higher at-risk index (although results are not statistically significant).

We have also explored effects on parental misinformation on other subjects not specifically targeted by the intervention. Again, we find negative coefficients, sometimes significant, across subjects, regardless of whether we compare parent responses with school records or with student surveys. This suggests that, in addition to reducing information gaps on the specific topics on which parents received information, the text message intervention seems to make parents pay more attention to how their children are doing in other (non-math) subjects. Treated parents have a more precise idea of their child's relative ranking across subjects (i.e., they show better knowledge of the subjects in which their child has her highest or lowest score). ${ }^{43}$

Table 6: Treatment Effects on Parental Misinformation

|  | Attendance Misinformation |  | Grades Misinformation |  | Behavior Misinformation |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All <br> absenteeism (Surveys) | All absenteeism (Admin.) | All grades (Surveys) | All grades (Admin.) | Misbehavior (Surveys) | Misbehavior (Admin.) |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| Panel A: Treatment Effects T | $\begin{gathered} -0.075^{*} \\ {[0.039]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.016 \\ {[0.040]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.010 \\ {[0.046]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.025 \\ {[0.036]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.079 * * \\ {[0.034]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.083^{* *} \\ {[0.038]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Panel B: Heterogeneity T $\mathrm{T} x$ at-risk index | $\begin{gathered} -0.078^{*} \\ {[0.040]} \\ -0.005 \\ {[0.066]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.010 \\ {[0.039]} \\ 0.047 \\ {[0.046]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.019 \\ {[0.048]} \\ -0.101 \\ {[0.061]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.028 \\ {[0.037]} \\ -0.028 \\ {[0.045]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.069^{* *} \\ {[0.033]} \\ 0.087 \\ {[0.056]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.087^{* *} \\ {[0.038]} \\ -0.048 \\ {[0.055]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Control mean Observations | $\begin{gathered} 0.535 \\ 992 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.392 \\ & 1143 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.398 \\ 827 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.319 \\ & 1185 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.639 \\ & 1140 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.470 \\ & 1188 \end{aligned}$ |

Note: Panel A shows intention-to-treat effects estimates from equation (1) shown on each column for each parental misinformation outcome. Coefficients were estimated using OLS. $T$ refers to the randomized individual-level treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text messages and zero otherwise). Panel B shows estimates of the heterogeneity treatment effects by adding the interaction with the baseline at-risk index. At-risk index is a simple average of standardized baseline attendance, math grades and negative behavioral notes. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Models in Panel B additionally include the at-risk index variable as control. Column outcomes are indicator variables constructed by contrasting responses in parent surveys with those of student surveys or administrative records (shown in parentheses). Column [1] measures parental misinformation in all absenteeism (with and without parent permission in the previous two weeks) contrasting the responses of parents parental misinformation in all absenteeism (with and without parent permission in the previous two weeks) contrasting the responses of paren
with those from students. Parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer at least one of the questions, or if at least one of the with those from students. Parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer at least one of the questions, or if at least one of the
answers (in bracket days) provided by students and parents do not match. Column [2] measures misinformation in all absenteeism (with and without permission) contrasting parent responses with classroom books. The ends of original bracket days in absences with and without permission are added to construct new bracket days. Parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer at least one of the questions, or if classroom books' records of absences over the previous two weeks do not fall in the range. Column [3] contrasts parent and student responses and parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer, or if answered grades' brackets do not match. Column [4] measures parental misinformation regarding all grades by contrasting parent responses about the student's last end-of-year grades with school records. Parents are treated as misinformed if they do not answer, or if the absolute difference between answered and actual grades is greater than 0.5 . Columns [5] and [6] measure misinformation about student misbehavior by contrasting parent answers with student answers, and with information from classroom books, respectively. Using a four-value scale, parents and students were asked about the degree of agreement with the student's misbehavior statements. For column [5], parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer at least one of the questions, or if the average absolute difference between parent and student answers are larger than the median (0.8). For column [6] parents are treated as misinformed if they do not answer; if the parent's average answer is equal to or larger than the median (2), and student did not misbehave according to classroom books; or if the parent's average answer is less than the median answer and student misbehaved in class according to books. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

[^20]
### 7.2 Increased parental involvement at home

By providing parents with information, the intervention led students and parents to respond with changes in behaviors at home - which, in turn, might then have resulted in better outcomes at school. To examine this, we analyze the responses to survey questions that were put to both parents (Panel A) and students (Panel B) in an identical manner. Columns 1 and 2 measure students' academic responses. Columns 3-6 looks at parents' behavioral responses, in terms of providing family support, providing supervision, involving themselves with school matters, and offering positive reinforcement. ${ }^{44}$

Table 7: Treatment Effects on Parental Behavior at Home

|  | Study habits | Academic <br> efficiency | Family <br> Support | Low Family <br> Supervision | Parent School <br> Involvement | Positive <br> reinforcement |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Panel A: Parent scales | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ | $[6]$ |
| T | -0.094 | 0.081 | -0.001 | 0.021 | 0.031 | -0.049 |
|  | $[0.079]$ | $[0.063]$ | $[0.083]$ | $[0.064]$ | $[0.063]$ | $[0.079]$ |
| Observations | 1042 | 1090 | 1108 | 1096 | 1116 | 1098 |
| Panel B: Student scales |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| T | 0.053 | -0.001 | $0.116^{*}$ | -0.078 | $0.114^{* *}$ | 0.017 |
|  | $[0.059]$ | $[0.059]$ | $[0.060]$ | $[0.049]$ | $[0.055]$ | $[0.057]$ |
| Observations | 1726 | 1728 | 1686 | 1693 | 1700 | 1692 |

[^21]We do not find a clear pattern nor statistically significant results for the information provided by parents in terms of how the treatment affected their self-declared behaviors. By contrast, however, treated students perceived that they received significantly more family support as a result of the intervention ( 0.18 of a standard deviation). This scale incorporated the students' answers to questions such as whether parents checked the child's homework, or provided motivation to them, or talked to them when needed. Moreover, the treatment also increased student's perception of their parents' level of school involvement. This perception was reflected in students' answers to questions about whether their parents contacted the

[^22]school director or teachers, or whether their parents attended school meetings. These results are consistent with those from Bergman [2021] and Bergman and Chan [2019], who find that the additional information provided to parents increased their contact with the school. ${ }^{45}$

### 7.3 Parents valued the information

In our follow-up surveys, we asked both treatment and control parents to tell us whether they would be willing to pay for a text message service that provided them with four monthly messages from schools about their child's performance and behavior in school. We implemented a survey experiment in which we randomized the price at which parents were given a "take it or leave it" offer: a high price of 1,500 CLP (Chilean pesos, or 2.2 USD) per month, a medium price of 1,000 CLP (or 1.5 USD) per month, or a low price of 500 CLP ( 0.74 USD ) per month.

Parents seem to value the information provided in the text messages. On average, 62 percent of parents who received the message said that were willing to pay to continue with the service. Table 8 uses this randomization and the survey responses from parents to estimate demand curves for the complete sample (column 1) and the control group (column 2). In column 3 we allow each experimental group to have a different response to the randomized price by including price assignment by treatment assignment interaction terms. In column 4 we explore whether the valuation of the information is different for parents of students with higher levels of risk of failing grades.

Overall, the demand curve for a service like the one we offered in our intervention is downward sloped. Column 1 shows that the share of parents willing to pay for the service falls by almost 15 percentage points as the price increases from low to medium levels; demand falls a further 24 percentage points when the price increases from medium to a high level. These patterns are similar in the control group (column 2). We then analyze whether the treatment induced parents to value the text messages program differently (column 3). We do not find that treated parents value the information differently than control parents.

It is likely, however, that not all families experienced the same "returns" to the text messages program. For example, the value of such a service may be relatively low for parents who have children who do well in school. In column 4 of Table 8, we present results

[^23]Table 8: Parental Willingness to Pay

|  | Complete Sample | Control Group | ITT | ITT (students <br> at-risk) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ |
| Medium Price | $-0.151^{* * *}$ | -0.058 | -0.086 | 0.010 |
| High Price | $[0.043]$ | $[0.069]$ | $[0.063]$ | $[0.123]$ |
|  | $-0.238^{* * *}$ | $-0.256^{* * *}$ | $-0.256^{* * *}$ | $-0.273^{* * *}$ |
| T x Low Price | $[0.039]$ | $[0.064]$ | $[0.059]$ | $[0.099]$ |
| T x Medium Price |  |  | 0.030 | 0.049 |
| T x High Price |  |  | $[0.063]$ | $[0.096]$ |
|  |  |  | -0.094 | -0.104 |
| Observations | 1,124 | 556 | $0.060]$ | $[0.129]$ |

Note: Outcome is an indicator variable for whether the parent reports being willing to pay for continued text message service (4 text messages per month from the school) after the end of the year. Columns [1] and [2] report estimates of being assigned a particular randomized priced $(1,500 \mathrm{CLP}, 1,000 \mathrm{CLP}$ or 500 CLP , the omitted category) for the complete sample (i.e., both treatment and control groups) and the control-group sample, respectively. Column [3] shows intention-to-treat effects estimates by interacting these randomized prices with the randomized treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text-messages and zero otherwise). Column [4] shows the same intention-to-treat effects estimates but restricting the sample to those students with high at-risk index ( $>$ mean). At-risk index is a simple average of standardized baseline attendance, math grades and negative behavioral notes. Coefficients were estimated using OLS. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \% ;^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.
that emerge when we restrict to the sample of parents whose children have an at-risk index above the mean. At the highest price, parents in the treatment group -who had already experienced receiving the text messages for several months- and whose children had not been not as successful in school to begin with are significantly more likely to say they are willing to pay the highest price for the continued service relative to control parents. At the low and medium price levels, there are no statistical differences on the willingness to pay between the treatment and control group. Figure 6 shows the proportion of parents who are willing to pay a positive amount to receive information about their children who are at different levels of risk (of failing classes). Among student at-risk, there are more parents who are willing to pay for the text message service; especially among those who have experienced the service before (i.e. those that were treated).

Figure 6: Share of parents willing to pay for text messages


Note: Y-axis presents the (lowess-smoothed) share of parents who report willing to pay for continued text message service by the at-risk index and treatment status. Based on parents follow-up surveys.

## 8 Cost-effectiveness

Our intervention led to 0.08-0.13 standard deviations gains in math grades and 1-1.5 percentage points increase in attendance, with larger effects for students at-risk. These effect sizes are slightly smaller than those found in the rest of the literature. A recent literature review (Escueta et al. [2020]) that focuses on technology in education in developed countries finds 13 experiments where information is sent to parents about student performance (e.g., attendance, behavior, or grades) through text messages and emails. For example, in Bergman [2021] parents receive automated texts about missing assignments and grades. In a sample of 462 students in grades 6-11 in Los Angeles, he finds that the intervention decreases missed assignments by $28 \%$ and leads to a gain of 0.21 standard deviations in mathematics grades. We expect a smaller impact for our intervention, as in the US the GPA depends on assignment submission, whereas in Chile the grades are based only on performance on class exams.

Regarding our intervention cost, as pointed out by Bergman and Chan [2019], these types of interventions leveraging technology to bridge parent-school communications gaps are characterized by low variable costs and a once in a life-time setup cost. In their study, the variable cost per text message was negligible. The fixed setup cost included a per student training cost of US $\$ 7$ if schools did not already have an electronic gradebook. In
our Chilean context, the initial fixed cost of setting up the digital platform was US\$1.63 per student. ${ }^{46}$ The cost of maintaining the digital platform that automated message sending was US $\$ 0.77$ per month per student. And the market value of sending text messages was US $\$ 0.05$ per message, with 6 text messages sent per month during our intervention, for 10 months in a school year. This results in a total variable cost per student of US $\$ 10.70$ per year. Therefore, the variable cost of a 0.01 standard deviation increase in math grade was US $\$ 1.18$ per student per year at market prices (US\$2 per year if we include the fixed setup cost for the two year program: $\left.0.5^{*} \mathrm{US} \$ 1.63+\mathrm{US} \$ 1.18\right) .{ }^{47}$ Our willingness to pay experiment suggested that about 60 percent of parents were willing to pay US $\$ 0.75$ per month (or more) for the program, thus covering more than six times the monthly variable costs of the program.

A program like Papas al Dia is cost-effective when compared to other interventions designed to improve learning outcomes. Busso et al. [2017] provides information on 21 low-cost interventions designated to improve student learning in primary schools. Strategies include tracking, funding for materials, lesson plans, non-monetary incentives and guided technology. The authors calculate the implementation cost of each intervention implemented in Colombia. The average cost per student for a 0.01 standard deviation gain in learning is US $\$ 4.42$, and the median cost is US $\$ 2.00 .{ }^{48}$ Our intervention compares very favorably cost-wise to these other approaches.

## 9 Conclusions

We present the results of a simple, effective, and low-cost intervention that uses existing data regularly collected by schools to improve the accuracy and timeliness of information parents have about their children' attendance, grades and classroom behavior.

We show that sending weekly text messages with attendance information, and monthly

[^24]text messages with math grades and classroom behavior outcomes decreases the prevailing information gap between what parents believe about their children's progress in school, and what schools report is the case. As a result of this more timely and frequent information, treated students report more family support (parents checked the child's homework, or provided motivation to them, or talked to them when needed) and more school involvement by their parents (parents contacted the school director or teachers, or whether their parents attended school meetings). We find that parents in both treated and control groups valued receiving information via text message and were willing to pay for it, especially those parents of initially low-achieving children. Treated parents of at-risk students had the highest willingness to pay for the program.

Providing parents with this information led to better students academic outcomes: (i) The intervention led to an increase in math GPA of 0.09 of a standard deviation; (ii) the probability of earning a passing grade in math increased by 2.7 percentage points (relative to a mean of $90 \%$ ); (iii) it reduced school absenteeism by 1 percentage point and (iv) increased the share of students who satisfied the attendance requirements for grade promotion by 4.5 percentage points. These treatment effects are 60 percent larger when imperfect text message reception is taken into account - that is, when one accounts for the effects solely among students whose parents did, indeed, receive the texts. Moreover, we find that atrisk students benefit the most from the intervention: these students exhibit even larger gains in math and in attendance, and have a much lower chance of notable negative in-class behavior. At a broad level, these findings suggest that efforts to reduce grade retention and school dropout in later grades may be supported by early interventions like Papas al Dia that have large benefits for those most at-risk of grade retention and dropout.

Our results generate further important insights for policy design. We find evidence that program effectiveness is higher when a larger share of parents receive the text messages. These positive spillover effects among the treated suggest that our impact estimates are underestimates of the effects of a scaled up version of this program, in which all students would be treated. We also find that the timeliness of the information delivery matters: the positive effect on attendance fades out over the week and that the intervention is effective throughout the school year but is more effective to reduce school absenteeism when approaching the end of the year. Taken together, these results suggests that the information treatments studied in this paper should be high frequency and sustained over time in order to maximize their effectiveness.

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## A Online Appendix: Tables

Table A.1: Students and parents pre-treatment characteristics in the Full-Sample

|  | Obs. | Treatment <br> Mean | Control <br> Mean | p-value of <br> adj. dif. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fanel A: Administrative records | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ |

Note: Column [1] shows the number of observations with non-missing data in the full sample, columns [2] and [3] the mean value of each baseline characteristic in the treated and control group, respectively. Column [4] reports the p-value on the treatment coefficient in a regression using each baseline characteristic as the dependent variable. All regressions include classroom fixed effects and robust standard errors are clustered at this level. Observable variables in Panel A correspond to 2013 except for new student variable that refers to 2014.

Table A.2: Students and parents pre-treatment characteristics (including High-Share class)

|  | Obs. | Treatment Mean | Control Mean | T p-value | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{T} \times \mathrm{HIGH} \\ \mathrm{p} \text {-value } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
| Panel A: Administrative records |  |  |  |  |  |
| Female | 1066 | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.26 | 0.27 |
| Age | 1066 | 9.81 | 9.79 | 0.41 | 0.86 |
| New student | 1066 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.48 | 0.82 |
| Language grade | 976 | 5.10 | 5.07 | 0.20 | 0.09 |
| Math grade | 976 | 5.14 | 5.19 | 0.85 | 0.45 |
| Final avg. grade | 976 | 5.57 | 5.59 | 0.23 | 0.43 |
| Attendance rate | 976 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.37 | 0.02 |
| Passed grade | 1018 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 0.57 | 0.82 |
| Missing grades/attendance/pass data | 1066 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.41 | 0.75 |
| At-risk index | 1066 | 0.04 | -0.01 | 0.11 | 0.14 |
| Panel B: Parents' Survey Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Study habits | 704 | -0.07 | 0.00 | 0.65 | 0.94 |
| Academic efficiency | 730 | -0.09 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.79 |
| Family Support | 739 | -0.12 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.73 |
| Low Family Supervision | 709 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.61 | 0.25 |
| Parent School Involvement | 716 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.04 |
| Positive reinforcement | 738 | -0.06 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.87 |
| Parents completed high school | 775 | 0.71 | 0.68 | 0.49 | 0.46 |
| Panel C: Students' Survey Data |  |  |  |  |  |
| Study habits | 909 | -0.19 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.35 |
| Academic efficiency | 915 | -0.14 | 0.00 | 0.24 | 0.84 |
| Family Support | 864 | -0.15 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Low Family Supervision | 859 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.48 | 0.71 |
| Parent School Involvement | 858 | -0.12 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Positive reinforcement | 868 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.74 | 0.72 |

Note: Note: Column [1] shows the number of observations with non-missing data, columns [2] and [3] the mean value of each baseline characteristic in the treated and control group, respectively. Columns [4] and [5] report p-values on the treatment coefficient and on the interaction between treatment and high-share classrooms in regressions using each baseline characteristic as the dependent variable. All regressions include classroom fixed effects and robust standard errors are clustered at this level. Observable variables in Panel A correspond to 2013 except for new student variable that refers to 2014.

Table A.3: Compliance by Year and type of text message

|  | All | Attendance | Behavior | Grades | General |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| Panel A: 2014 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Text messages sent | $29.777^{* * *}$ | $21.216^{* * *}$ | $4.545^{* * *}$ | $4.023^{* * *}$ | -0.007 |
| Text messages received | $19.843^{* * *}$ | $14.124^{* * *}$ | $3.097^{* * *}$ | $2.719^{* * *}$ | $[0.022]$ |
|  | $[0.570]$ | $[0.364]$ | $[0.101]$ | $[0.081]$ | -0.097 |
| Observations | 1438 | 1438 | 1438 | 1438 | $[0.068]$ |
| Panel B: 2015 |  |  |  |  | 1438 |
| Text messages sent | $60.225^{* * *}$ | $40.009^{* * *}$ | $9.242^{* * *}$ | $11.068^{* * *}$ | -0.094 |
|  | $[1.332]$ | $[0.864]$ | $[0.156]$ | $[0.252]$ | $[0.155]$ |
| Text messages received | $33.797^{* * *}$ | $21.660^{* * *}$ | $6.182^{* * *}$ | $6.204^{* * *}$ | -0.249 |
|  | $[1.265]$ | $[0.712]$ | $[0.203]$ | $[0.206]$ | $[0.245]$ |
| Observations | 1006 | 1006 | 1006 | 1006 | 1006 |

Note:Panel A uses the 2014 data of the intervention. Panel B uses the 2015 data of the intervention. Text messages sent refers to the cumulative number of text messages sent to student's parents in the full sample. Text messages received refers to the cumulative number of text messages with a confirmed delivery status. Columns [2]-[5] report the $T_{i c j g}$ coefficient of equation (1) with the annual number of each type of text message as the dependent variable. Column [1] adds all types of text messages. Attendance, grades, and classroom behavior text messages were sent only to the treatment group. General text messages were sent to all treatment and control individuals. All models include the baseline math grade and attendance rate as control variables and grade dummies. If baseline values are missing, we impute them using the classroom-level mean and flag these observations in the regression. Regressions additionally include year and classroom fixed effects and robust standard errors are clustered at the classroom level. * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$."

Table A.4: Compliance in the Full-Sample by type of text message

|  | All | Attendance | Behavior | Grades | General |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| Text messages sent | $41.999^{* * *}$ | $28.775^{* * *}$ | $6.436^{* * *}$ | $6.855^{* * *}$ | -0.067 |
|  | $[0.731]$ | $[0.457]$ | $[0.098]$ | $[0.152]$ | $[0.065]$ |
| Text messages received | $25.450^{* * *}$ | $17.156^{* * *}$ | $4.340^{* * *}$ | $4.124^{* * *}$ | $-0.171^{*}$ |
|  | $[0.722]$ | $[0.425]$ | $[0.119]$ | $[0.125]$ | $[0.103]$ |
| Observations | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |

Note: Text messages sent refers to the cumulative number of text messages sent to student's parents in the full sample. Text messages received refers to the cumulative number of text messages with a confirmed delivery status. Columns [2]-[5] report the Ticjg coefficient of equation (1) with the annual number of each type of text message as the dependent variable. Column [1] adds all types of text messages. Attendance, grades, and classroom behavior text messages were sent only to the treatment group. General text messages were sent to all treatment and control individuals. All models include the baseline math grade and attendance rate as control variables and grade dummies. If baseline values are missing, we impute them using the classroom-level mean and flag these observations in the regression. Regressions additionally include year and classroom fixed effects and robust standard errors are clustered at the classroom level. * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.5: Compliance with Surveys Data by type of text message

|  | All | Attendance | Behavior | Grades |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ |
| Panel A: Parents <br> Treatment | $0.235^{* * *}$ | $0.559^{* * *}$ | $0.533^{* * *}$ | $0.503^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.043]$ | $[0.048]$ | $[0.044]$ | $[0.044]$ |
| Observations | 555 | 565 | 561 | 567 |
| Panel B: Students <br> Treatment | $0.173^{* * *}$ | $0.131^{* * *}$ | $0.096^{* * *}$ | $0.163^{* * *}$ |
|  | $[0.039]$ | $[0.032]$ | $[0.026]$ | $[0.037]$ |
| Observations | 838 | 838 | 838 | 838 |

Note: Columns [1]-[4] report the treatment coefficient in a regression using each column parent's and student's self-declared text messages' reception as the dependent variable. Panel A uses parents' surveys data. Parents answer on a four-value scale the frequency in which they have received each type of text message ("never or almost never" to "always or almost always"). Outcomes are indicator variables equal to one if parent answer values 2,3 and 4 and zero otherwise. Panel B uses students' surveys data. Students indicate yes/no about whether their parents received each type of text message (indicator variable equals one for yes answer). Column [1] outcome equals one if at least one of the attendance, Grades and Behavior SMS outcomes equals one. Data comes from Endline 2015 surveys. All regressions include baseline controls and classroom fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the classroom level. * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

| Table A.6: Treatment Effects on Grades, Attendance and Behavior: School Records |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Math grade | Math <br> grade $>4.0$ | Attendance rate | Cumulative <br> atten- <br> dance <br> $>85 \%$ | Language grade | Natural science grade | History grade | Pass grade |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| ITT | $\begin{aligned} & 0.083^{*} \\ & {[0.044]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.019^{*} \\ & {[0.011]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ {[0.004]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.023 \\ {[0.021]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.102^{*} \\ & {[0.059]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.051 \\ {[0.044]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.090 \\ {[0.057]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ |
| ATT | $\begin{aligned} & 0.130^{*} \\ & {[0.068]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.030^{*} \\ & {[0.018]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ {[0.006]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.036 \\ {[0.032]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.157^{*} \\ & {[0.087]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.078 \\ {[0.066]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.139 \\ {[0.086]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ {[0.016]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 1946 | 1916 | 1916 | 2011 |

Note: Table shows treatment effects estimates on outcomes coming from school administrative records. ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (1) were estimated using OLS. AI refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.7: Treatment Effects by Year on Grades, Attendance and Behavior

|  | Math grade | Math grade $>4.0$ | Attendance rate | Cumulative <br> attendance $>85 \%$ | \# negative beh. notes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Panel A: } 2014 \\ & \text { ITT } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.126^{* *} \\ & {[0.050]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.049 * * * \\ {[0.015]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.009^{*} \\ & {[0.005]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.034 \\ {[0.028]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.045 \\ {[0.091]} \end{gathered}$ |
| ATT | $\begin{gathered} 0.186^{* * *} \\ {[0.072]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.072^{* * *} \\ {[0.021]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.014^{* *} \\ {[0.007]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.050 \\ {[0.039]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.068 \\ {[0.132]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 1063 | 1063 | 1063 | 1063 | 1063 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Panel B: } 2015 \\ & \text { ITT } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.043 \\ {[0.064]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ {[0.021]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.013 \\ {[0.008]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.065^{*} \\ & {[0.033]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.066 \\ {[0.076]} \end{gathered}$ |
| ATT | $\begin{gathered} 0.072 \\ {[0.103]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ {[0.033]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.022^{*} \\ & {[0.013]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.111^{* *} \\ & {[0.054]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.107 \\ {[0.119]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 948 | 948 | 948 | 948 | 948 |

Note: Panel A uses information of the frist year of the intervention (2014). Panel B uses information of the second year of the intervention (2015). ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (1) were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (2) were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent was instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \% ;^{* *}$ significant at $5 \% ;{ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.8: Treatment Effects on Grades, Attendance and Behavior: Robustness

|  | Math grade | Math grade <br> $>4.0$ | Attendance <br> rate | Cumulative <br> attendance <br> $>85 \%$ | \# negative <br> beh. notes |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Panel A: Full-Sample with Controls | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| ITT | 0.060 | 0.018 | 0.006 | $0.041^{*}$ | 0.001 |
|  | $[0.042]$ | $[0.013]$ | $[0.005]$ | $[0.022]$ | $[0.063]$ |
| ATT | 0.094 | 0.028 | 0.009 | $0.066^{* *}$ | 0.002 |
|  | $[0.064]$ | $[0.020]$ | $[0.008]$ | $[0.033]$ | $[0.095]$ |
| Observations | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 | 2444 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panel B: Main Sample with No Controls | 0.032 | $0.023^{*}$ | $0.012^{*}$ | $0.054^{* *}$ | 0.021 |
| ITT | $[0.055]$ | $[0.013]$ | $[0.006]$ | $[0.027]$ | $[0.073]$ |
| ATT | 0.050 | $0.036^{*}$ | $0.020^{* *}$ | $0.086^{* *}$ | 0.033 |
|  | $[0.084]$ | $[0.020]$ | $[0.010]$ | $[0.042]$ | $[0.111]$ |
| Observations | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 |

Note: ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (1) were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (2) were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent was instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment. Panel A uses the full sample (i.e. includes grade 8 in 2014 and the dropped school). Models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Panel B uses the main sample. Models only include classroom (randomization strata) and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; ${ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.9: Treatment Effects on Grades, Attendance and Behavior: School-Grade FE Specification

|  | Math grade | Math grade $>4.0$ | Attendance rate | Cumulative <br> attendance $>85 \%$ | \# negative beh. notes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] |
| ITT | $\begin{gathered} 0.068 \\ {[0.045]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.021^{*} \\ & {[0.011]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ {[0.004]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 \\ {[0.023]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.037 \\ {[0.072]} \end{gathered}$ |
| ATT | $\begin{gathered} 0.107 \\ {[0.070]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.033^{* *} \\ {[0.016]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.009^{*} \\ & {[0.006]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.048 \\ {[0.035]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.058 \\ {[0.110]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Observations | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 | 2011 |

Note: ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Equations (1) and (2) are modified to include baseline math grade and attendance rate class-level averages as controls and shcool-grade fixed effects instead of classroom fixed effects. Additionally, models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the school-grade level (shown in parentheses). ${ }^{*}$ significant at $10 \%{ }^{* *}$ significant at $5 \% ;{ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.10: Treatment Effects Heterogeneity: At-risk index components

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \& Math grade \& Math grade >4.0 \& Attendance rate \& Cumulative attendance $>85 \%$ \& \# negative beh. notes <br>
\hline \& [1] \& [2] \& [3] \& [4] \& [5] <br>
\hline ITT
T

$\mathrm{T} \times \mathrm{x}$ math grade \& \[
$$
\begin{gathered}
0.079^{*} \\
{[0.044]} \\
-0.078 \\
{[0.048]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.026^{* *} \\
{[0.013]} \\
-0.014 \\
{[0.013]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.009^{*} \\
{[0.005]} \\
-0.005 \\
{[0.004]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.045^{*} \\
{[0.024]} \\
-0.030 \\
{[0.020]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.011 \\
{[0.075]} \\
0.031 \\
{[0.045]}
\end{gathered}
$$
\] <br>

\hline T

$\mathrm{T} \times$ a attendance \& \[
$$
\begin{aligned}
& 0.081^{*} \\
& {[0.045]} \\
& -0.062 \\
& {[0.057]}
\end{aligned}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 0.026^{*} \\
& {[0.013]} \\
& -0.015 \\
& {[0.013]}
\end{aligned}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.009^{*} \\
{[0.005]} \\
-0.008 \\
{[0.006]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.046^{*} \\
{[0.024]} \\
-0.046^{* *} \\
{[0.020]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.013 \\
{[0.076]} \\
0.037 \\
{[0.049]}
\end{gathered}
$$
\] <br>

\hline T

T x behavior \& $$
\begin{gathered}
0.083^{*} \\
{[0.043]} \\
0.030 \\
{[0.027]}
\end{gathered}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.026^{*} \\
{[0.013]} \\
0.005 \\
{[0.009]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.009^{*} \\
{[0.005]} \\
0.003 \\
{[0.004]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.046^{*} \\
{[0.025]} \\
0.020 \\
{[0.018]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
-0.009 \\
{[0.067]} \\
-0.169^{* *} \\
{[0.068]}
\end{gathered}
$$
\] <br>

\hline ATT
D

D x math grade \& $$
\begin{gathered}
0.127^{*} \\
{[0.068]} \\
-0.122^{*} \\
{[0.074]}
\end{gathered}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.041^{* *} \\
{[0.020]} \\
-0.022 \\
{[0.019]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.015^{*} \\
{[0.008]} \\
-0.008 \\
{[0.007]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 0.072^{* *} \\
& {[0.037]} \\
& -0.048 \\
& {[0.030]}
\end{aligned}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.017 \\
{[0.115]} \\
0.048 \\
{[0.068]}
\end{gathered}
$$
\] <br>

\hline D

D x attendance \& $$
\begin{aligned}
& 0.132^{*} \\
& {[0.069]} \\
& -0.102 \\
& {[0.089]}
\end{aligned}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.041^{* *} \\
{[0.020]} \\
-0.025 \\
{[0.021]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.016^{* *} \\
{[0.008]} \\
-0.013 \\
{[0.009]}
\end{gathered}
$$
\] \& $0.077^{* *}$

$[0.038]$
$-0.073^{* *}$

$[0.029]$ \& $$
\begin{gathered}
0.017 \\
{[0.115]} \\
0.056 \\
{[0.072]}
\end{gathered}
$$ <br>

\hline D

D x behavior \& $$
\begin{gathered}
0.130^{* *} \\
{[0.066]} \\
0.052 \\
{[0.044]}
\end{gathered}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.041^{* *} \\
{[0.020]} \\
0.008 \\
{[0.016]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.015^{*} \\
{[0.008]} \\
0.005 \\
{[0.006]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
0.073^{*} \\
{[0.038]} \\
0.036 \\
{[0.031]}
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
-0.021 \\
{[0.101]} \\
-0.303^{* * *} \\
{[0.110]}
\end{gathered}
$$
\] <br>

\hline Observations \& 2011 \& 2011 \& 2011 \& 2011 \& 2011 <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

[^25]Table A.11: Spillover Effects (ATT)

|  | Math grade | Math grade <br> $>4.0$ | Attendance <br> rate | Cumulative <br> attendance <br> $>85 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | \# negative <br> beh. notes |  |
| Panel A: Treatment Effects | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ |

Note: Panel A shows estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent (D) and its interaction the classroom-level true share of consenters that received more than $50 \%$ of the text messages were instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment $(\mathrm{T})$ and its interaction with the random high-share classroom assignment. Panel B adds the interactions with the student-level at risk index. At-risk index is a simple average of standardized baseline attendance, math grades and negative behavioral notes. These variables are instrumented analogously. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Models in Panel B additionally include the at-risk index variable as control. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \% ; * * *$ significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.12: Treatment Effects Over the Week (Weekly Fade Out)

|  | Daily Attendance <br> $($ ITT $)$ | Daily Attendance <br> (ATT) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ |
| T x Monday |  |  |
|  | $0.013^{*}$ | $0.022^{*}$ |
| T x Tuesday | $[0.007]$ | $[0.012]$ |
| T x Wednesday | $0.016^{* *}$ | $0.026^{* *}$ |
|  | $[0.006]$ | $[0.011]$ |
| T x Thursday | $0.012^{*}$ | $0.021^{*}$ |
|  | $[0.007]$ | $[0.012]$ |
| T x Friday | 0.004 | 0.007 |
|  | $[0.006]$ | $[0.010]$ |
| Observations | 0.004 | 0.007 |
|  | $[0.007]$ | $[0.012]$ |

Note: Attendance outcome is measured at a daily basis. ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates. T refers to the randomized treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text-messages and zero otherwise) and is interacted with each day-of-the-week indicator variables. Coefficients were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated. Coefficients were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent (D) and its interaction with each day-of-the-week indicator variables were instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment (T) and its interaction with the same variables, respectively. All models include the day-of-the-week indicator variables as controls, baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), month, year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.13: Treatment Effects Over Time

|  |  | Math grade | Attendance rate | Negative beh. note |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | [1] | [2] | [3] |
| ITT | T x months 1-3 | $\begin{aligned} & 0.111^{*} \\ & {[0.057]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ {[0.006]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.015 \\ & {[0.075]} \end{aligned}$ |
|  | T x months 4-6 | $\begin{gathered} 0.048 \\ {[0.054]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ {[0.007]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.026 \\ & {[0.045]} \end{aligned}$ |
|  | T x months 7-9 | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 \\ {[0.071]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ {[0.007]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.051 \\ {[0.077]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | T x months 10-12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.109 * * \\ {[0.054]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.014^{*} \\ & {[0.008]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.045 \\ {[0.051]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | T x months 13-17 | $\begin{gathered} 0.054 \\ {[0.050]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.016^{*} \\ & {[0.009]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015 \\ {[0.054]} \end{gathered}$ |
| ATT | D x months 1-3 | $\begin{aligned} & 0.167^{*} \\ & {[0.086]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.023 \\ & {[0.113]} \end{aligned}$ |
|  | D x months 4-6 | $\begin{gathered} 0.072 \\ {[0.080]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ {[0.010]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.040 \\ & {[0.067]} \end{aligned}$ |
|  | D x months 7-9 | $\begin{gathered} 0.112 \\ {[0.113]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.082 \\ {[0.123]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | D x months 10-12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.182^{* *} \\ {[0.091]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.024^{*} \\ & {[0.014]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.072 \\ {[0.081]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | D x months 13-17 | $\begin{gathered} 0.087 \\ {[0.081]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.027^{*} \\ & {[0.016]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ {[0.086]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | Observations | 10,391 | 15,912 | 15,214 |

Note: Outcomes are measured at a monthly basis. ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. T refers to the randomized treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text-messages and zero otherwise) and is interacted with each group-of-months indicator variables. Coefficients were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent (D) and its interaction with each group-of-months indicator variables were instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment ( T ) and its interaction with the same variables, respectively. All models include the group-of-months indicator variables as controls, baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), month, year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \% ;^{* *}$ significant at $5 \% ;^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.14: Treatment Effects on Parental Misinformation (Baseline Outcome as Control)

|  | Attendance Misinformation <br> All absenteeism <br> (Surveys) |  | All absenteeism <br> (Admin.) | Grades Misinformation <br> All grades <br> (Surveys) | All grades <br> (Admin.) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | Behavior <br> Misinformation <br> Misbehavior <br> (Surveys) |
| Panel A: Treatment Effects <br> T | $-0.069^{*}$ | -0.016 | -0.014 | $[5]$ |  |
|  | $[0.039]$ | $[0.039]$ | $[0.044]$ | -0.024 | $[0.035]$ |

Note: Panel A shows intention-to-treat effects estimates (T) and estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated (D) on each column for each parental misinformation outcome. Panel B shows treatment effects heterogeneity. See Tables 6 and A. 15 for details on the estimation and outcomes. All models additionally include the outcome in the baseline survey as a control. If missing, we impute the mean and flag the observation in the regression. Misbehavior misinformation contrasted to classroom books (column [6] in Table 6) is not available because baseline outcome can not be computed with available data. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.15: Treatment Effects on Parental Misinformation (ATT)

|  | Attendance Misinformation |  | Grades Misinformation |  | Behavior Misinformation |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All absenteeism (Surveys) | All absenteeism (Admin.) | All grades (Surveys) | All grades (Admin.) | Misbehavior (Surveys) | Misbehavior (Admin.) |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] |
| Panel A: Treatment Effects D | $\begin{gathered} -0.111^{* *} \\ {[0.055]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.023 \\ {[0.056]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.014 \\ {[0.063]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.037 \\ {[0.051]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.114^{* *} \\ {[0.048]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.120^{* *} \\ {[0.054]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Panel B: Heterogeneity <br> D <br> D x at-risk index | $\begin{gathered} -0.115^{* *} \\ {[0.057]} \\ -0.006 \\ {[0.092]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.014 \\ {[0.055]} \\ 0.070 \\ {[0.066]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.034 \\ {[0.069]} \\ -0.155^{*} \\ {[0.089]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.041 \\ {[0.053]} \\ -0.041 \\ {[0.063]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.098^{* *} \\ {[0.048]} \\ 0.132^{*} \\ {[0.080]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.126^{* *} \\ {[0.054]} \\ -0.071 \\ {[0.081]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Control mean Observations | $\begin{gathered} 0.535 \\ 992 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.392 \\ 1143 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.398 \\ 827 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.319 \\ & 1185 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.639 \\ & 1140 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.470 \\ 1188 \end{gathered}$ |

Note: Panel A shows the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated from equation (2) shown on each column for each parental misinformation outcome. Coefficients were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent (D) was instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment. Panel B adds the interaction with the student-level at risk index. At-risk index is a simple average of standardized baseline attendance, math grades and negative behavioral notes. Coefficients were estimated using IV where D and its interaction with the at-risk variable were instrumented with $T$ and its interaction with the same variable, respectively. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Models in Panel B additionally include the at-risk index variable as control. Column outcomes are indicator variables constructed by contrasting responses in parent surveys with those of student surveys or administrative records (shown in parentheses). Column [1] measures parental misinformation in all absenteeism (with and without parent permission in the previous two weeks) contrasting the responses of parents with those from students. Parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer at least one of the questions, or if at least one of the answers (in bracket days) provided by students and parents do not match. Column [2] measures misinformation in all absenteeism (with and without permission) contrasting parent responses with classroom books. The ends of original bracket days in absences with and without permission are added to construct new bracket days. Parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer at least one of the questions, or if classroom books' records of absences over the previous two weeks do not fall in the range. Column [3] contrasts parent and student responses and parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer, or if answered grades' brackets do not match. Column [4] measures parental misinformation regarding all grades by contrasting parent responses about the student's last end-of-year grades with school records. Parents are treated as misinformed if they do not answer, or if the absolute difference between answered and actual grades is greater than 0.5. Columns [5] and [6] measure misinformation about student misbehavior by contrasting parent answers with student answers, and with information from classroom books, respectively. Using a four-value scale, parents and students were asked about the degree of agreement with the student's misbehavior statements. For column [5], parents are classified as misinformed if they do not answer at least one of the questions, or if the average absolute difference between parent and student answers are larger than the median ( 0.8 ). For column [6] parents are treated as misinformed if they do not answer; if the parent's average answer is equal to or larger than the median (2), and student did not misbehave according to classroom books; or if the parent's average answer is less than the median answer and student misbehaved in class according to books. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.
Table A.16: Treatment Effects on Parental Misinformation: Other Subjects Grades
Note: ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (1) were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients of equation (2) were estimated using IV where the share of opic-specific text messages received over those sent was instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment. All mode include the baseline math grade, atte rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed
them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Columns [1]-[8] measure parental misinformation in specific subject grades (Math, Language, History and Social Sciences and Natural Sciences). In columns [1], [3], [5] and [7] parents are treated as misinformed if they do not answer or if the answered grade bracket does not match to the actual grade from administrative data. In columns [2], [4], [6] and [8] parents are treated as misinformed if parent they do not know or if student and parent answered grades' brackets do not match. Columns [9] and [10] measure parental misinformation regarding student's best and worse subjects
based on grades. Parents are treated as misinformed if they do not answer or if the best (worse) subject based on administrative school records does not match the best considered as not-misinformed. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

Table A.17: Treatment Effects on Parental Behavior at Home (ATT)

|  | Study habits | Academic <br> efficiency | Family <br> Support | Low Family <br> Supervision | Parent <br> School <br> Involvement | Positive rein- <br> forcement |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Panel A: Parent scales | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ | $[6]$ |
| D | -0.139 | 0.120 | -0.002 | 0.030 | 0.044 | -0.071 |
| Observations | $[0.111]$ | $[0.090]$ | $[0.115]$ | $[0.090]$ | $[0.088]$ | $[0.111]$ |
| Panel B: Student scales | 1042 | 1090 | 1108 | 1096 | 1116 | 1098 |
| D | 0.082 | -0.001 | $0.179^{* *}$ | -0.120 | $0.175^{* *}$ | 0.026 |
|  | $[0.088]$ | $[0.089]$ | $[0.091]$ | $[0.074]$ | $[0.082]$ | $[0.084]$ |
| Observations | 1726 | 1728 | 1686 | 1693 | 1700 | 1692 |

Note: Table shows estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated from equation (2) shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent (D) was instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment. Outcomes are scales built with answers to surveys (see Tables F. 2 and F. 3 for details). Panel A shows results for scales built with answers parents gave to survey questions. Panel B shows results for scales built with answers students gave to survey questions. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate and outcome scales, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance or baseline outcomes were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \% ;{ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

## B Appendix: Prior Research

Table B. 1 presents an overview of the literature studying interventions providing information to children or parents to improve student's school outcomes.
Table B.1: Literature Review

| Study | Method | Sample | Information | Intensity | Effect | Explored mechanisms |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kraft and Dougherty [2013] <br> Dougherty [2013] | RCT | 140 students, grades 6 and 9, summer school program, Boston | Student's academic progress and class behavior, upcoming homework assignments and tests, and suggestions for student's improvement | Daily teacher-to-parent phone calls and daily written messages for five consecutive days | Increased the odds of completing homework by $40 \%$, decreased inclass misbehavior by $25 \%$, and increased class participation rates by $15 \%$ | Teacher-student relationships, parental involvement, student motivation |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Avvisati et al. } \\ & {[2014]} \end{aligned}$ | RCT | 34 middle-schools, 96 classes, 2008-2009 schoolyear, Paris | Advice on how to support and monitor children with school work | Three parent-school meetings every two-three weeks | Reduced truancy by $25 \%$ and the probability of being sanctioned and increased positive behavior (effectssize around $15 \%$ of a sd), no test scores improvement | Parent's school-and homebased involvement |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Castleman } \\ & \text { Page }[2015] \end{aligned} \text { and }$ | RCT | 5,753 recent high school graduates identified as college-intending, summer 2012, Dallas, Boston and Philadelphia | Text messages intervention: tasks required by the students' intended college required for successful matriculation + offer of counselor assistance via messages | A series 10 texts messages sent to students and their parents about every fivedays | Increased by 3 p.p. the likelihood to enroll at two-year institutions, more effective on students with low access to college-planning supports | - |
| Kraft and Rogers [2015] | RCT | 435 high school students in a summer credit-recovery program in the Northeastern US | Child's performance and behavior in school: on what their students were doing well and should continue doing (Positive treatment), or what their students needed to improve upon (improvement treatment) | Weekly one-sentence individualized messages from teachers to the parents | Decreased the percentage of students who failed to earn course credit by $41 \%$ | Parent-child interactions' content |
| De Walque and Valente [2018] | RCT | Girls in the last two grades of primary school, 173 schools, 2016 school year, Mozambique | Child's attendance (three treatments: (i) "information only"; (ii) (i) + cash transfers to parents conditional on regular attendance; (iii) (i) + cash transfers to girls in form of a voucher conditional on regular attendance) | Weekly attendance information through a report card over the school year | Effect of 4.5 p.p. on attendance (as large as $75 \%$ of the effect of the CCT treatment) | Parental monitoring |
| Rogers and Feller [2018] | RCT | 28,080 students, kindergarten to 12th grade; 20142015 school-year, School District of Philadelphia | Treatments: (i) reminder on importance of absences, (ii) student's number of absences, and (iii) student's relative absences | Up to five rounds of mailbased messaging throughout the school year | Most effective versions reduced total absences by $6 \%$ and chronic absenteeism by $10 \%$ or more, spillover effects on untreated cohabiting students, no effect on student performance | Parent's beliefs about total absences and relative absences |


| York et al. [2019] | RCT | 1,031 preschoolers, 201314 and 2015-16 school years, San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) | Parenting strategies | Three type of textmessages each week during eight months | Effect of 0.15 to 0.29 sd on parental involvement at home and school and of 0.11 SD on child's early literacy | - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Bergman } \\ & \text { Chan }[2019] \end{aligned} \text { and }$ | RCT | 1,137 students, grades 5 to 11,22 middle and high schools during 2015-2017, West Virginia | Missed assignments, grades, and class absences | Weekly alerts for assignments and absences and monthly alerts for grades, 32,000 text-messages | Reduced course failures by $28 \%$, increased class attendance by $12 \%$, and increased student retention by 1.5 pp , increased in-class exam scores by 0.1 SD (larger effects for below-median GPA students and high school students) | Accuracy of parents' beliefs about child's performance, parental behavioral responses |
| Dizon-Ross [2019] | RCT | 3,451 households with at least two children enrolled in grades 2-6, 39 schools, Malawi | Student's average performance on school tests (Report Cards) | Once after baseline survey visit | Improved what parents knew about their children and causes family educational investments to adjust | Parent's beliefs |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Angrist et al. } \\ & {[2020]} \end{aligned}$ | RCT | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 4,500 families } \quad \text { with } \\ & \text { primary-school-aged } \\ & \text { children, April-July } \\ & \text { (COVID-19 } \\ & \text { Bondemic), } \\ & \text { Botswana } \end{aligned}$ | Treatments: (i) SMS text messages with basic numeracy "problems of the week", (ii) (i) + phone calls which walk-through of the learning activities sent via text message | Weekly treatment over 4 months | The combined treatment increased the average numerical operation learned by 0.12 SD , the SMS messages only treatment effective when targeted | Children cognitive skills effects vs. effort effects. Parental educational investment. |
| Barrera-Osorio et al. [2020] | RCT | 4,371 students, grades 4 to 6, 31 public schools, Manizales, Colombia | Children's reading and math achievement + suggestions about how parents could engage with their children's education | Information delivered once at the end of the baseline household interview | Effect of 0.09 SD to 0.10 SD in student's performance (math and reading scores) in the first two semesters, effect fades out in year two | Information gap between beliefs and performance, parental behavioral responses. |
| Bergman [2021] | RCT + structural modeling | 279 students, grades 6 to 11, 2010-2011 school year, low-income communities in Los Angeles | Missed assignments and grades | Emails, text messages and phone calls several times a month over a six-month period | 0.19 SD increase in GPA and classes missed by students decreased by $28 \%$ | Parent's beliefs about child's efforts and parental monitoring |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Bergman et al. } \\ & {[2020]} \end{aligned}$ | RCT | 7,000 parents, 12 middleand high-schools, 2015, Washington DC | Missed classes, missed assignments and low-grades | Weekly automated textmessage alerts from January to June | Automatically enrolling parents improved student GPA by 0.06 points and reduced course failures by $9 \%$ | Enrollment defaults and simplification in technology adoption, decisionmakers beliefs on implementation strategies |
| Gallego et al. [2020] | RCT | 7,700 children, grades 7 and 8, 2013, Chile | Children's last week internet use and/or offering assistance with installing parental control software | Weekly SMS messages mainly sent during summer vacation | Information treatment reduced children's internet use by $6-10 \%$, no significant impacts from helping parents directly control their children's internet access | Parenting behavior (punishment and discussions about internet use), substitution for the presence of a parent at home without lowering parental involvement |

## C Appendix: Sample and Recruitment of parents

## C. 1 Sample of students

In early 2014, we worked with education leaders in a deprived administrative of Santiago de Chile to recruit schools to join our study. Eight schools consented to work with the program. All students enrolled in grades 4 through 8 in each of these schools were included in the study (a total of 85 classrooms and 1,447 students). Throughout the paper, we call this sample "full sample".

During 2015 one school (with 65 students) decided not to continue during the second academic year. Similarly, students in grade 8 participated during the first part of the experiment (a total of 316 students across the remaining schools). These students could not be treated or followed into secondary school. We also dropped them from the main analysis. Because randomization was done at the individual level stratifying by classroom we drop this school from the main analysis without invalidating the experimental design. Throughout the paper, we call this sample "main sample".

## C. 2 Recruitment of participants

During a series of school meetings, we invited parents of all children in grades 4-8 to participate in the project and over 50 percent of parents signed consent. Consent rates were very similar across grade-levels (Table C.1). Younger students, those not new to the school, and those with better baseline attendance and math grades were somewhat more likely to consent (see Table C.2).

Table C.1: Consent rate by grade level

| Grade level | Full Sample | Main Sample |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ |
| 4 | 0.57 | 0.58 |
| 5 | 0.49 | 0.50 |
| 6 | 0.54 | 0.55 |
| 7 | 0.52 | 0.52 |
| 8 | 0.53 |  |
|  |  |  |
| Total | 0.53 | 0.54 |

Note: $\mathrm{N}=2,720$ for the full sample and $\mathrm{N}=1,987$ for the main sample.

Table C.2: Likelihood to Consent

|  | Full Sample | Main Sample |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ |
| Age | $-0.013^{* *}$ | $-0.017^{* *}$ |
|  | $[0.006]$ | $[0.008]$ |
| New student in 2014 | $-0.092^{* * *}$ | $-0.087^{* *}$ |
|  | $[0.035]$ | $[0.039]$ |
| Attendance rate in 2013 | $0.744^{* * *}$ | $\left[.743^{* * *}\right.$ |
|  | $[0.116]$ | $0.138]$ |
| Math grade in 2013 | 0.013 | $[0.011]$ |
|  | $[0.010]$ | 1987 |

Note: The table shows the estimated coefficients of a regression of an indicator for whether the parent's student consented to participate in the intervention as the dependent variable. Column [1] uses the full sample (i.e. including grade 8 in 2014 and the dropped school). Column [2] uses the main sample.

## D Appendix: Intervention

## D. 1 Text messages: Production

The experiment offered each participating parent the chance to receive high frequency information about their selected child via text message. The specific information covered attendance, behavior and mathematics test scores of their child. In addition to the information text messages, parents of both treatment and control groups received general text messages about school meetings, holidays and other general school matters throughout the year.

Once the intervention began our project teams digitized the classroom books described in Section E.2, which contained information on attendance, behavior, and math score. This information was collected weekly and uploaded to a platform designed for the purpose of this study (called, in Spanish, Papás al Día) which turned the information into text messages for the treatment groups. Treated parents received weekly messages on attendance, and monthly messages on behavior and math test scores. In the case of attendance information, we told parents how many days out of the last week (usually five days) the child was in school. In the case of behavior information, we provided parents the number of positive, neutral and negative behavior notes recorded in the classroom books over the prior month. Regarding the math test scores, we provided monthly updates on the record of all math test scores, the average of these scores, and the class average score. Hence, parents learned information about their own child, as well as how their child performed relative to the class mean.

## D. 2 Timeline of distribution of text messages

The Chilean school year runs from March to December, with two weeks of winter vacation in July. We introduced parents to the intervention at school meetings located at school premises in May, and collected consent forms at these meetings. Since school meetings were not always well attended, we also sent project introduction materials and consent forms home with students and followed up by phone to get verbal and written consent.

In Chile, receiving a text message is free. The cost of text messages was paid by the research team.

Table D. 1 presents the first day and text of each of the text messages. On May 23rd, we first sent all participants, including those randomized to the control group, in seven out of eight schools a welcome text message to introduce the intervention and let them know they might expect further free messages from their child's school. The child was mentioned by name. This message helped identifying valid phone numbers for caregivers, following up on all undelivered welcome messages to correct phone numbers. After that, we started sending behavior text messages on July 9th, 2014; attendance text messages around June 13th, 2014; and math test scores text messages around July 14th 2014. The 8th school was incorporated into the experiment slightly later. The implementation milestones for this school were as follows: July 28th, 2014 (welcome message); August 1st, 2014 (first attendance message); August 11th 2014 (first math test score message); and August 12th, 2014 (first behavior message). Because winter vacations are taken in July, differential timing of the start of the intervention for the 8th school is of little consequence. The intervention continued for a second year. From April 2015 to December 2015, we continued to send text messages to treated parents in a retained sample of students. We recorded all text message information such as day and time, the message's content, the name of the recipient parent, etc.

Table D.1: Text messages

| text message Type | Frequency | Start Date | Text |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Behavior | Monthly text message | July 9th, 2014 (August 12th, 2014 for 8th school) | \{Name parent\}, according the school's record of $\{$ month\}, \{Name student $\}$ had \{Number\} positive notes and \{Number\} negative notes. Papas al dia |
| Attendance | Weekly text message | June 13th, 2014 (August 1st, 2014 for 8th school) | \{Name parent\}, according the school's record, \{Name student\} attended to school \{week attendance days $\}$ of \{week total days\}. Papas al dia. |
| Mathematics Scores | Monthly text message | July 14th 2014 (August 11th, 2014 for 8 th school) | \{Name parent\}, the math scores of \{Name student \} are \{List of student's grade $\}$ and his/her average now is \{Current GPA\}. The average in the class is \{Average class GPA\}. Papas al dia |

## D. 3 Text messages: Delivery

All text messages were sent as planned. However, not all text messages sent were delivered or received. Several factors contributed to message failure. A message was more likely to fail if the network was very busy, if there was some technical problem with the network, if parents turned off their phones or if they changed their numbers during the experiment. To maximize the chances of message receipt, we changed the dates of message delivery from Friday to Monday in August 2014, early on in the intervention. We also re-contacted all consenting parents in March 2015 to verify and/or update their cellphone numbers, to minimize the chance of message failure due to new phone numbers. We also gathered these data on the delivery status of the text message (i.e. whether the phone number received the message).

Technical reasons affecting whether a text message is successfully delivered or not (e.g. network overload at certain times of the day/week) are unlikely to be correlated with familylevel unobservables that also affect child outcomes. However, we check this possibility by regressing the total share of successful text messages (total received/total sent) of each type (attendance, grades, behavior and general text messages) on baseline attendance and math grades, age, gender and classroom fixed effects. Table D. 2 shows that students with higher baseline grades or attendance behaviors were no more (or less) likely to receive text messages that were sent.

Table D.2: Likelihood to receive sent text messages

|  | Main Sample |  |  |  | Full Sample |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Attendance | Grades | Behavior | General | Attendance | Grades | Behavior | General |
|  | [1] | [2] | [3] | [4] | [5] | [6] | [7] | [8] |
| Attendance in 2013 | $\begin{gathered} -0.155 \\ {[0.212]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.074 \\ & {[0.205]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.101 \\ {[0.204]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.075 \\ {[0.158]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.100 \\ {[0.200]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.054 \\ & {[0.195]} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.068 \\ {[0.200]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.021 \\ {[0.144]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Math grade in 2013 | $\begin{gathered} 0.019 \\ {[0.017]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.017 \\ {[0.019]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ {[0.017]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ {[0.016]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ {[0.017]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015 \\ {[0.015]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ {[0.011]} \end{gathered}$ |
| Students | 530 | 530 | 530 | 1066 | 710 | 710 | 710 | 1447 |

[^26]
## E Data Sources

## E. 1 School Records

Our analysis takes advantage of rich administrative data collected from several sources throughout the project. First, before the intervention, we collected basic demographic data (age, gender) and school performance data (e.g. average test scores, annual attendance rate, and grade repetition) from administrative school records (i.e. transcripts, called Actas in Spanish) provided by the Ministry of Education of Chile (MINEDUC). After that, to measure the impact of the intervention, we collected administrative school records for our sample schools at midline (end of year 1) and endline (end of year 2) using the same source. For students who left our sample of schools during the experiment, we collected their aggregate data on attendance and scores (subject-specific GPA) from the municipality school records and tried to track the remaining students by phone. This allowed us to fill in the missing midline and endline data.

## E. 2 Classroom books

Our research team also collected data (attendance, behavior note, and mathematics score) on a weekly basis throughout the duration of the experiment. Table E. 1 highlights the sources, frequency, and availability of this information. Once the intervention began, each of our project teams visited their assigned school once per week and collected the administrative data by photographing daily attendance entries, behavior reports, and all recent mathematics test records for all children in treated classrooms. For attendance data, the information was originally reported at a daily frequency ( 0 : absent, 1 : attended class, .: not in roster of students). We then aggregated this information at a weekly, monthly and yearly frequencies (as sum of days and percentage of days) to facilitate comparison with other sources of information. These attendance data are available since the school year starts in 2014. In the case of behavior outcomes, we collected all positive and negative notes recorded on a daily basis if they exist. We collected these data since June 2014. For aggregating the number of positive/negative records at the monthly level we considered only the months when the student was in the school. In the case of mathematics score, we collected all test scores recorded for each student on each month. We then aggregated these simple averages into a monthly score. The semester and annual averages were computed in the same way. Math scores data are available since when we started to send text messages in July 2014.

## E. 3 Surveys

We administered surveys to all participating parents and all children in all grades. Surveys were administered before treatment (baseline, around June 2014), at midline (end of year

Table E.1: Classroom books data

| Outcomes | Data Source | Years | Frequency |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Attendance | Attendance register <br> pictures | 2014 (since March), 2015 | Daily |
| Behavior | Behavior records pic- <br> tures | 2014 (since June), 2015 | Daily |
| Mathematics Test Score | Test records pictures | 2014 (since July), 2015 | Monthly |

1) and endline (end of year 2). Student surveys were administered in class; parent surveys were administered at the first parent meeting or sent home with children and encouraged to be returned to the school.

Baseline and follow-up parent surveys collected information on what parents knew about their child's attendance (questions were for a specific child in our sample), grades and behavior; their level of involvement with the school and the child; demographics and economic characteristics; and any concerns they had with schooling. Some of these questions were later used to form scales on study habits, academic efficiency, parental support, parental supervision, parental school involvement and parental positive reinforcement. We describe the estimation process underlying scales construction in detail in section F.1. Child surveys collected demographics, self-reported performance, engagement in schooling, engagement of parents, and information on their peer networks within the classroom. We also tested them on a few age-appropriate simple math problems.

Follow-up surveys also included specific questions regarding the intervention. For example, we asked parents how much they were willing to pay (WTP) to continue receiving text messages from their school. We randomly assigned one out of three WTP amounts to this question for each parent. In particular, we ask parents: "It is possible that next year your daughter's/son's school can send you regularly text messages with information about their school performance (attendance, grades, and behavior) four times a month. However, there might not be enough funds to provide this service free of charge. Thinking about how valuable would this service be for you, please tell us whether you will be willing to pay a month to receive four text messages a month, from April to December." Parents were assigned with equal probability to a value of $\$ 500, \$ 1000$ or $\$ 1500$. In addition, we asked if parents were receiving text messages with general school information and student's attendance, behavior and grades.

## F Variables' Construction and Description

Table F. 1 lists all the variables used in the paper, including details on their construction and sources.
Table F.1: Variable definitions and sources

| Variable definition | Variable name | Sources | Description |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Baseline characteristics Age <br> Gender | age <br> female | Administrative school records (Actas) provided by the MINEDUC | A student's age is computed based on his/her date of birth Dummy equal to 1 if female student; 0 if male student |
| Control variables Standardized Annual Math Test Score 2013* | math_std2013 attendance2013 | Administrative school records (Actas) provided by the MINEDUC | Baseline annual average math test raw scores are standardized within grade-cohort by the mean and standard deviation observed in the control group at 2013. <br> Baseline annual attendance rate recorded at the end of 2013. |
| Outcomes variables Standardized Monthly Math Test Score | A_month_std |  | Monthly average raw scores are computed as a simple average of all the test scores recorded on each month. All these monthly raw scores are standardized within grade-cohort by the mean and standard deviation observed in the control group at the corresponding point of measurement (2014 and 2015). |
| Standardized Annual Math Test Score | A_annual_std | Mathematics Test Records Pictures | Annual average scores are computed as a simple average from each semester average. Each semester average is computed from the simple average of all monthly test scores recorded in the semester. All these annual raw scores are standardized within grade-cohort by the mean and standard deviation observed in the control group at the corresponding point of measurement (2014 and 2015). |
| Annual Math Test Score higher than 4.0 | A_month_4_std |  | Dummy equal to 1 if a student scores above the passing score (4.0); 0 if a student scores below the passing score. |

* The baseline data exist for all students that were enrolled in our sample schools in 2013. For about half of the students who joined our sample schools in 2014, we collected their aggregate data on attendance and math scores from the municipality school records. For the remaining new students joining our sample schools in 2014, we assign classroom-level mean attendance and math grades to fill in the missing baseline data.

| Variable definition | Variable name | Sources | Description |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Monthly Attendance Rate | attendance_month |  | Monthly attendance rate is calculated by dividing the total number of days the student is present by the total number of days of attendance registered in each month. |
| Annual Attendance Rate | attendance_year | Daily Attendance Register Pictures | Annual attendance rate is calculated by dividing the total number of days the student is present by the total number of days of attendance registered in each school year. |
| Annual Attendance Rate higher than $85 \%$ | highattendance |  | Dummy equal to 1 if student's annual attendance rate is higher than $85 \%$; 0 if student's annual attendance rate is below $85 \%$. |
| Monthly Number of Positive Notes | beh_month_pos |  | Total number of positive notes recorded on each month. |
| Monthly Number of Negative Notes | beh_month_neg | Daily Behavior Records Pictures | Total number of negative notes recorded on each month. |
| Standardized Annual Math Test Score* | math_std | Administrative school records (Actas) | Annual average math test raw scores are standardized within grade-cohort by the mean and standard deviation observed in the control group at the corresponding point of measurement (2014 and 2015). |
| Annual Attendance Rate* | attendance | provided by the MINEDUC | Annual attendance rate recorded at the end of each year. |
| Passing grade | pass |  | Dummy equal to 1 if a student passes grade; 0 if a student repeats grade. |
| Treatment variables |  |  |  |
| Individual Level Treatment | T |  | Dummy equal to 1 if treated student; 0 if control student. |
| Strata | strata | Treatment dataset | Individual level treatment is stratified by school-grade-section level. |
| Year | year |  | This variable is used to indicate each year: 2014 and 2015. |
| Main sample | constant |  | Dummy equal to 1 if a consenting student remains in our sample school during the two consecutive years; 0 if a consenting student drops our sample school during the intervention. |

* Annual math scores and attendance rates are available at (Actas) for most students excluding for those who change schools and are no longer observed in our sample schools by the end of the year. In that case, we fill in the missing data on math scores and attendance with the annual data coming from math test records and attendance register for each year.


## F. 1 Survey Data: Construction of scales

Throughout the questionnaires we asked students and parents a series of questions (items) that we later used to form scales on: study habits, academic efficiency, parental support, parental supervision, parental school involvement and parental positive reinforcement. The survey items were drawn from: The University of Chicago Consortium on Chicago School Research, the Manual for the Patterns of Adaptive Learning Scales (PALS) developed by the University of Michigan, and scales on positive parenting developed by the Prevention Group at Arizona State University. These items were randomly mixed into the student and parents' survey instruments. Students and parents could give categorical answers of the type "strongly agree", "agree", etc. to each statement.

We aggregated student and parent answers into scales (indices) using a maximum likelihood (ML) principal components estimator where only one latent factor was retained to describe all responses to the same category of questions. The models were estimated on the treatment and control groups for baseline scales. For follow-up scales, models were estimated only in the control group and then results were applied to the full sample. After the prediction was computed to produce each scale, we standardized them using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. Each scale was pre-specified and had been previously used and validated in other studies.

In the Tables F. 2 and F. 3 we describe these scales and their properties at baseline. Column 1 states the scale name, the eigenvalue of each latent factor, and the Cronbach's alpha. Column 2 presents the items that belong to each scale. Column 3 shows the loading associated with each item. Rather than repeating the information, Table F. 4 summarizes the properties of these scales by the eigenvalue and Cronbach's Alpha for follow-up measures, both for parents and students.

Table F.2: Student Scales - Baseline

| Scale | Variable | Loadings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Study Habits | I always study for the exams | 0.622 |
| Eigenvalue: 2.134 | I spend free time doing homework and study | 0.516 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.750 | I try to do well my school work even though I do not find interesting | 0.448 |
|  | If I must study I do not spent time with friends | 0.428 |
|  | I always know the homework that I must present | 0.532 |
|  | I organize well my time to do my school work | 0.745 |
|  | I can organize school tasks and spent time with friends and family | 0.507 |
| Academic efficiency | I am sure that I can dominate all the school subjects | 0.674 |
| Eigenvalue: 2.279 | I am sure that I can understand the hardest things | 0.779 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.801 | I can do almost all the work or I give up | 0.540 |
|  | Even though subjects are hard I can learn | 0.696 |
|  | I can do the hardest homework if I try | 0.664 |
| Family support | My parents or guardians checked that I really made my homework | 0.454 |
| Eigenvalue: 2.100 | My parents or guardians motivated me to work hard at school | 0.489 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.753 | My parents or guardians supported me in activities outside school | 0.565 |
|  | My parents or guardians heard me when I needed to talk with them | 0.507 |
|  | My parents or guardians showed that they were proud of me | 0.739 |
|  | My parents or guardians helped me to take decisions | 0.729 |
| Low family supervision | I went alone to school | 0.757 |
| Eigenvalue: 1.490 | My parents or guardians checked the behavior and attendance book | -0.187 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.575 | I returned to home alone | 0.716 |
|  | I stayed alone at home without adult supervision | 0.347 |
|  | I left home without letting know my parents where I went or who I was with | 0.367 |
|  | I allowed that my parents or guardians spoke with my school friends | -0.042 |
|  | I went to school and did not enter or left home saying I will not assist | 0.214 |
|  | I signed in school but I left before class' end | 0.255 |
| Parent school involvement | My parents or guardians met with school's director | 0.549 |
| Eigenvalue: 1.782 | My parents or guardians met with school teachers | 0.529 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.665 | My parents or guardians contacted the director through e-mail | 0.649 |
|  | My parents or guardians contacted teacher through e-mail | 0.650 |
|  | My parents or guardians went to school meetings | 0.106 |
|  | My parents or guardians went to school events | 0.396 |
|  | My parents or guardians volunteered at school | 0.435 |
| Positive reinforcement | My parents or guardians thanked me for helping with housework | 0.549 |
| Eigenvalue: 3.405 | My parents or guardians told me they have fun with me | 0.727 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.862 | My parents or guardians congratulated me for my effort | 0.794 |
|  | My parents or guardians told me that I have outstanding qualities | 0.578 |
|  | My parents or guardians told me that they were proud of me | 0.770 |
|  | My parents or guardians congratulated me for having done well or having improved | 0.721 |
|  | My parents or guardians encouraged me when I was doing something hard | 0.706 |

Table F.3: Parent Scales - Baseline

| Scale | Variable | Loadings |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Study Habits | My son always studies for the exams | 0.693 |
| Eigenvalue: 3.187 | My son spends free time doing homework and study | 0.627 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.846 | My son tries to do well my school work even though he do not find interesting | 0.631 |
|  | If my son must study he does not spent time with friends | 0.450 |
|  | My son always knows the homework that he must present | 0.654 |
|  | My son organizes well time to do his school work | 0.858 |
|  | My son can organize school tasks and spent time with friends and family | 0.740 |
| Academic efficiency | I am sure that my son can dominate all the school subjects | 0.773 |
| Eigenvalue: 2.854 | I am sure that my son can understand the hardest things | 0.823 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.860 | My son can do almost all the work or he gives up | 0.504 |
|  | Even though subjects are hard my son can learn | 0.781 |
|  | My son can do the hardest homework if he tries | 0.845 |
| Family support | I checked that my son really made his homework | 0.555 |
| Eigenvalue: 2.156 | I motivated my son to work hard at school | 0.481 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.747 | I supported my son in activities outside school | 0.471 |
|  | I heard my son when he needed to talk with me | 0.533 |
|  | I showed that I was proud of my son | 0.752 |
|  | I helped my son to take decisions | 0.738 |
| Low family supervision | My son went alone to school | 0.715 |
| Eigenvalue: 1.586 | I checked the behavior and attendance book | -0.219 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.576 | My son returned to home alone | 0.872 |
|  | My son stayed alone at home without adult supervision | 0.377 |
|  | My son left home without letting me know where he went or with who he was | 0.235 |
|  | My son allowed that I speak with my school friends | -0.130 |
|  | My son went to school and did not enter or left home saying he will not assist | 0.179 |
|  | My son signed in school but he left before class' end | 0.139 |
| Parent school involvement | I met with school's director | 0.629 |
| Eigenvalue: 1.874 | I met with school teachers | 0.481 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.651 | I contacted the director through e-mail | 0.727 |
|  | I contacted teacher through e-mail | 0.714 |
|  | I went to school meetings | -0.071 |
|  | I went to school events | 0.301 |
|  | I volunteered at school | 0.338 |
| Positive reinforcement | I thanked my son for helping with housework | 0.440 |
| Eigenvalue: 2.960 | I told my son I have fun with me | 0.617 |
| Cronbach's Alpha: 0.839 | I congratulated my son for his effort | 0.756 |
|  | I told my son that he has outstanding qualities | 0.654 |
|  | I told my son that I was proud of him | 0.732 |
|  | I congratulated my son for having done well or having improved | 0.638 |
|  | I encouraged my son when he was doing something hard | 0.666 |

Table F.4: Parent and Student Scales at Follow-Up

| Year | Respondent | Scale | Eigenvalue | Cronbach's <br> Alpha |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| 2014 | Parent | Study habits | 2.775 | 0.809 |
| 2014 | Parent | Academic efficiency | 2.992 | 0.877 |
| 2014 | Parent | Family Support | 1.974 | 0.733 |
| 2014 | Parent | Family Supervision | 1.554 | 0.578 |
| 2014 | Parent | Parent School Involvement | 1.644 | 0.631 |
| 2014 | Parent | Positive reinforcement | 3.755 | 0.867 |
| 2015 | Parent | Study habits | 2.895 | 0.831 |
| 2015 | Parent | Academic efficiency | 2.642 | 0.840 |
| 2015 | Parent | Family Support | 2.236 | 0.778 |
| 2015 | Parent | Family Supervision | 1.480 | 0.537 |
| 2015 | Parent | Parent School Involvement | 1.716 | 0.666 |
| 2015 | Parent | Positive reinforcement | 3.458 | 0.858 |
| 2015 | Parent | Parent feelings | 1.080 | 0.539 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 2014 | Student | Study habits | 2.442 | 0.784 |
| 2014 | Student | Academic efficiency | 2.486 | 0.826 |
| 2014 | Student | Family Support | 2.412 | 0.795 |
| 2014 | Student | Family Supervision | 1.514 | 0.604 |
| 2014 | Student | Parent School Involvement | 1.902 | 0.685 |
| 2014 | Student | Positive reinforcement | 4.087 | 0.891 |
| 2015 | Student | Study habits | 2.246 | 0.760 |
| 2015 | Student | Academic efficiency | 2.623 | 0.837 |
| 2015 | Student | Family Support | 2.418 | 0.794 |
| 2015 | Student | Family Supervision | 1.236 | 0.478 |
| 2015 | Student | Parent School Involvement | 1.832 | 0.676 |
| 2015 | Student | Positive reinforcement | 4.145 | 0.890 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Note: See Table F. 2 and F. 3 for details on variables used in each scale. Parent feelings scale was only asked for parents in endline 2015.

## F. 2 Correlations between parental and student's scales

Table F. 5 shows, for each scale, the cross-sectional correlation between parents and students values. We find that there is a stable positive correlation between parent and student scales across the different survey waves (baseline, midline and endline).

Table F. 6 analyzes the correlation of each scale over time (baseline-midline and baselineendline), both for parents (Panel A) and students (Panel B). This correlation appears to be positive and stable in all cases.

Taken as a whole, this information suggests that scales seem to be capturing constructs that are similar across the different survey waves.

Table F.5: Parents and Students' Scales Correlation

|  | Baseline | Follow-Up 1 | Follow-Up 2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ |
| Study habits | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.34 |
| Academic efficiency | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.18 |
| Family Support | 0.23 | 0.31 | 0.27 |
| Low Family Supervision | 0.65 | 0.66 | 0.69 |
| Parent School Involvement | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.29 |
| Positive reinforcement | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.32 |

Note: Columns [1], [2] and [3] show the Pearson's correlation coefficient between parent and student scales at baseline (mid-2014), midline (end 2014) and endline (end 2015), respectively. Correlation figures are calculated with the main sample (excluding grade 8 in 2014 and dropped school).

Table F.6: Scales' Correlation Over Time

|  | Baseline - FU1 | Baseline - FU2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Panel A: Parents' Scales | $[1]$ | $[2]$ |
| Study habits |  |  |
| Academic efficiency | 0.56 | 0.51 |
| Family Support | 0.46 | 0.39 |
| Low Family Supervision | 0.56 | 0.51 |
| Parent School Involvement | 0.43 | 0.57 |
| Positive reinforcement | 0.54 | 0.42 |
|  |  | 0.53 |
| Panel B: Students' Scales |  |  |
| Study habits | 0.49 | 0.38 |
| Academic efficiency | 0.39 | 0.33 |
| Family Support | 0.59 | 0.46 |
| Low Family Supervision | 0.69 | 0.56 |
| Parent School Involvement | 0.44 | 0.35 |
| Positive reinforcement | 0.63 | 0.50 |

Note: Columns [1] and [2] show the Pearson's correlation coefficient between scales at baseline and midline (end 2014) and between scales at baseline and endline (end 2015), respectively. Panel A focus on scales constructed with parent answers. Panel B focus on scales constructed with student answers. All correlation figures are calculated with the main sample (excluding grade 8 in 2014 and dropped school).

## G Data Quality

## G. 1 Response rates

Table G. 1 summarizes the response rates of consenting students for the data sources described in Section E. Columns 1 and 2 present the response rate of all consenting students in our experiment with non-missing data for each year (i.e., full sample). Columns 3 and 4 show the statistics of consenting individuals in our main sample.

Table G.1: Response Rates

|  | Full sample <br> Total |  | Found(\%) | Main sample <br> Total <br> sought |  | Found(\%) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | sought |  | 1066 | 1.000 |  |  |
| Consent | 1447 | 1.000 |  |  |  |  |
| Panel A: Administrative Data |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Student outcomes |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2013 | 1334 | 0.922 | 976 | 0.916 |  |  |
| 2014 | 1439 | 0.994 | 1063 | 0.997 |  |  |
| 2015 | 1090 | 0.753 | 955 | 0.896 |  |  |
| Panel B: Survey Data |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Student surveys |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Baseline 2014 | 1332 | 0.921 | 970 | 0.910 |  |  |
| Endline 2014 | 1283 | 0.887 | 947 | 0.888 |  |  |
| Endline 2015 | 906 | 0.626 | 854 | 0.801 |  |  |
| Parent surveys |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Baseline 2014 | 1045 | 0.722 | 782 | 0.734 |  |  |
| Endline 2014 | 775 | 0.536 | 609 | 0.571 |  |  |
| Endline 2015 | 612 | 0.423 | 578 | 0.542 |  |  |

Note: Column [2] presents the response of consenting individuals with non-missing data. Column [4] presents the response rate of consenting individuals in the main sample (excluding all students enrolled in Grade 8 at the baseline and those from dropped school) who have non-missing data. Administrative data is considered available for a student if an individual has data on grades, attendance, and pass/fail/exited school status at the end of the year.

Administrative data is considered available for a student if an individual has data on math scores, attendance, and pass/fail/exited school status at the administrative school records (actas) by the end of the year. These data is available for most students excluding those who withdraw before the end of the school year. We use the administrative data of the last school in case students change schools during the school year to one of the schools in our sample. ${ }^{49}$

Panel A of Table G. 1 shows that we have baseline data for $92.2 \%$ of the full sample, and $91.6 \%$ of the main sample. The baseline data exist for all students enrolled in our sample schools in 2013, and for about half of the students who joined the school in $2014 .{ }^{50}$ For these

[^27]students who joined our sample schools in 2014, we assign classroom-level mean attendance and math grades to fill in missing baseline data. In all regressions, we use these imputed values and include an indicator variable denoting that the attendance/math grade baseline data are imputed. Focusing on the main sample, in 2014, these administrative data exist for $99.7 \%$ and in 2015 for $89.6 \%$ of the sample.

Most of the students who drop out of the full sample between 2014 and 2015 are those enrolled in grade 8 in 2014. As mentioned above, when they pass to grade 9 , many of them change schools. Other students who left our sample include those who repeated grade 4 and those who left the schools and move out of the municipality. Section G. 2 discusses these issues in detail.

Panel B shows the response rates for parents and student surveys. Whereas students present high response rates ( $90 \%$ in baseline and end of 2014 , and $80 \%$ in 2015 for the main sample), parents have more missing data, specially in follow-up surveys.

## G. 2 Attrition and entry

Table G. 2 describes the possible data status a student can have according to different data dimensions. Specifically, we analyze whether students change school or not, their final academic status in 2014, whether and when they were sent general text messages, and data availability (school records and classroom books). For each of these dimensions, we classify students into mutually exclusive categories. About $90 \%$ of the students are always in the same school and the majority of the attrition happens after the change of academic years.

## General observations by panel:

- School status. Change of school can be to an in-sample or to an out-of-sample schools (out of the municipalities participating in the study). Students that drop out of the sample are very likely moving to other municipalities (and changing school as a consequence).
- Final status 2014. We asses the final students that changed school during 2014 from the end of the year school records at their new school. However, there might be students for which we do not have information (those that in panel A appear as not found or to have changed to schools).
- Text message status. Those students with never sent general text messages are mainly students retired in 2014 and not found in 2015 ( 12 out of 18 in the main sample). From those 18, most of the treated students did not received either treatment text messages in 2014. 6 students never appear in text messages data.
- Data Availability (school records). 4 students were not found in the school records (actas) for which school, grades, and final status were imputed using classroom books.

Table G.2: Data Classification

| Dimension | Category | Main Sample | Full Sample |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| School status | Same school always | 942 | 991 |
|  | Change school during 2014 | 5 | 5 |
|  | Change school between 2014 and 2015 | 17 | 59 |
|  | Change school during 2015 | 5 | 6 |
|  | Not found between 2014 and 2015 | 97 | 321 |
| Final status 2014 | Passed | 1011 | 1312 |
|  | Failed | 28 | 38 |
|  | Retired | 27 | 32 |
|  |  |  | 907 |
| Text messages status | Sent messages in 2014 and 2015 | 139 | 958 |
|  | Sent messages only in 2014 | 399 |  |
|  | Sent messages only in 2015 | 18 | 2 |
|  | Never sent |  | 23 |
| Data availability status |  | 955 |  |
| School records | Available 2014 and 2015 | 108 | 1041 |
|  | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 3 | 335 |
|  | Missing 2014 and 2015 | 6 |  |
|  |  | 948 | 1004 |
| Classroom books | Available 2014 and 2015 | 371 |  |
|  | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 3 | 7 |

Note: Table presents the frequency distribution of students in the main and full samples for different dimensions and their categories. For all dimensions, $\mathrm{N}=1,066$ for main sample and $\mathrm{N}=1,382$ for full sample. The full sample does not include the school not participating in the study in year 2 .

- Data Availability (classroom books). We use annual (rather than high frequency) attendance and grades. Data is considered not missing when both attendance and grades are available. There are a few cases (15) in which the student withdrew early in the year and attendance takes very low values (more than half of the observations are zeros) and there are no available grades.


## Minor observations:

- We found two students in the main sample who only receive text messages in 2015. They have complete administrative data. It is likely that we did not have their correct phone number.
- Students with missing data in 2014 and 2015 (school records and classroom books) drop out of their schools before treatment (April/May/June of 2014).
- Within students that changed school during 2014 there is one that also changes school between 2014 and 2015 returning to the original one.

Table G. 3 presents how students are distributed when we consider the combination of the defined categories of Table G.2. We find that almost $90 \%$ of the sample passed 2014, and either remain in the same school and we have data for both years, or we do not find them in 2015 and, consequently, we only have data for 2014.
Table G.3: Data classification: Combined Categories

| School status | Final status 2014 | text messages status | Data Actas | Data Books | Freq. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Same school always | Passed | Sent messages in 2014 and 2015 | Available 2014 and 2015 | Available 2014 and 2015 | 873 |
| Not found between 2014 and 2015 | Passed | Sent messages only in 2014 | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 69 |
| Same school always | Passed | Sent messages only in 2014 | Available 2014 and 2015 | Available 2014 and 2015 | 26 |
| Same school always | Failed | Sent messages in 2014 and 2015 | Available 2014 and 2015 | Available 2014 and 2015 | 18 |
| Not found between 2014 and 2015 | Retired | Sent messages only in 2014 | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 11 |
| Not found between 2014 and 2015 | Retired | Never sent | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 9 |
| Same school always | Passed | Sent messages only in 2014 <br> Other combinations | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 8 52 |
| Total |  |  |  |  | 1066 |

Note: Table shows the frequency distribution for the main sample of the combination of categories in Table G. 2 .

## G. 3 Administrative records: no differential attrition

We next estimate an OLS regression model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable for each possible status and the independent variable is the treatment binary variable. Table G. 4 shows that there are no systematic differences between treatment and control students regarding all possible status of each dimension.

## G. 4 Survey data: no differential response rates

Table G. 5 shows that there are no significance differences in the surveys' response rate between the treatment and control group. This is true for all survey waves (baseline and the two follow-up) and both for students and parents.

Table G.4: Differential attrition of administrative records

| Dep. var | Treatment coeff. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Main Sample | Full Sample |
| School status |  |  |
| Same school always | 0.001 | -0.005 |
|  | [0.025] | [0.020] |
| Change school during 2014 | -0.002 | -0.001 |
|  | [0.005] | [0.004] |
| Change school between 2014 and 2015 | -0.008 | -0.003 |
|  | [0.012] | [0.015] |
| Change school during 2015 | -0.005 | -0.005 |
|  | [0.006] | [0.004] |
| Not found between 2014 and 2015 | 0.014 | 0.015 |
|  | [0.022] | [0.022] |
| Final status 2014 |  |  |
| Passed | 0.032* | 0.031** |
|  | [0.016] | [0.013] |
| Failed | -0.020 | -0.018 |
|  | [0.014] | [0.011] |
| Retired | -0.012 | -0.012 |
|  | [0.012] | [0.009] |
| Text messages status |  |  |
| Sent messages in 2014 and 2015 | -0.033 | -0.040 |
|  | [0.029] | [0.024] |
| Sent messages only in 2014 | 0.031 | 0.041* |
|  | [0.028] | [0.024] |
| Sent messages only in 2015 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
|  | [0.002] | [0.001] |
| Never sent | $-0.000$ | $-0.003$ |
|  | [0.009] | [0.007] |
| Data availability status |  |  |
| School records |  |  |
| Available 2014 and 2015 | -0.010 | -0.011 |
|  | [0.023] | [0.022] |
| Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 0.011 | 0.015 |
|  | [0.023] | [0.021] |
| Missing 2014 and 2015 | -0.002 | -0.004* |
|  | [0.002] | [0.002] |
| Classroom books |  |  |
| Available 2014 and 2015 | -0.000 | -0.017 |
|  | [0.024] | [0.021] |
| Available 2014 and missing 2015 | 0.002 | 0.022 |
|  | [0.024] | [0.022] |
| Missing 2014 and 2015 | -0.002 | -0.005* |
|  | [0.002] | [0.003] |
| Students | 1066 | 1382 |

Note: Column [1] shows the dependent variable of a regression of each category dummy on the treatment variable. The coefficients for the main sample and full sample are presented in column [2] and [3], respectively. text messages status relates to general text messages. All regressions are estimated by OLS including classroom fixed-effects (strata). Robust standard errors are clustered at the section level. * significant at $10 \%$; ${ }^{* *}$ significant at $5 \%$; ${ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

Table G.5: Surveys Differential Response Rate

|  | Obs. | Treatment <br> Mean | Control <br> Mean | p-value |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Panel B: Parents' Survey Data | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ |
| Baseline 2014 | 1066 |  |  |  |
| Endline 2014 | 1066 | 0.74 | 0.73 | 0.59 |
| Endline 2015 | 1066 | 0.58 | 0.57 | 0.36 |
| Panel C: Students' Survey Data |  |  | 0.54 | 0.70 |
| Baseline 2014 | 1066 | 0.92 |  |  |
| Endline 2014 | 1066 | 0.90 | 0.91 | 0.84 |
| Endline 2015 | 1066 | 0.80 | 0.88 | 0.38 |

Note: Column [1] shows the number of observations with non-missing data, column [2] and [3] the average response rate for treatment and control group, respectively, for the estimating sample (excluding grade 8 and dorpped school). Column [4] reports the p-value on the SMS coefficient in a regression using a dummy indicating response as the dependent variable. All regressions include controls for class fixed-effects (strata) and robust standard errors clustered at the section level. ${ }^{*}$ significant at $10 \% ;^{* *}$ significant at $5 \% ;{ }^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

## H Information and parenting styles

The effects of information interventions such as the one analyzed in this paper could be mediated by parenting styles (generally understood as the strategies parents use in raising their children). To examine this issue, we implemented a complementary randomized control trial to evaluate the effect of providing parents with tools to relate to their children more positively using an established "positive parenting" intervention.

We worked with educational psychologists at Arizona State University to adapt videos of their successful parenting intervention, "Family Check-up", which has been delivered to hundreds of low-income schools in the US (Lim et al. [2005]). These training videos provided parents with specific guidance about how to use the school-provided information on attendance, grades, and classroom behavior. The videos were distributed in DVD format. We stratified by school grade-level, and randomly allocated classrooms to receive or not receive the informational videos. Hence, this video-intervention was orthogonal to the text message intervention. Control classrooms received a placebo DVD with music. The video distribution was implemented in the fall of 2014. Let $V_{c j g}$ be an indicator variable equal to one if a parent of student $i$ in classroom $c$ of school $j$, grade-level $g$ received the video.

We are interested in estimating the effects on students of inducing parents to use a more positive parenting style when processing the information received via text message. Thus, we interact the individual-level treatment variable $T_{i c j g}$ with the classroom-level video treatment $V_{c j g}$ to estimate an intention-to-treat effect. Table G. 1 presents the results for additional effects (beyond the effects of the text message treatment) of receiving the parenting video treatment. Estimated coefficients of additional parent training through the video-delivered parenting intervention are, in general, positive and large. However, we lack statistical power to reject the null of no differential treatment effect for parents who received the parenting treatment. We take this as suggestive evidence that parents could benefit from receiving tools to improve their parenting styles towards a more positive one.

In order to assess if, upon receiving the information from the school, parents knew how to use it to change their children's behavior, we implemented a video-delivered parenting intervention which was randomly assigned to the experimental sample. This complementary intervention was designed to foster a more positive parenting style. We find that those parents that received the text message information treatment and the positive parenting intervention had larger treatment effects than those that did not. However, we lack statistical power to reject the null of no differential treatment. We take this as suggestive evidence that parents could benefit from receiving tools to improve their parenting styles towards a more positive one.

Table G.1: Additional Treatment Effects by Parental Training

|  | Math grade | Math grade $>4.0$ | Attendance rate | Cumulative <br> attendance $>85 \%$ | \# negative beh. <br> notes |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $[1]$ | $[2]$ | $[3]$ | $[4]$ | $[5]$ |
| T |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 0.071 | $0.034^{*}$ | $[0.018]$ | 0.008 | 0.028 |
|  | -0.013 | $[0.007]$ | $0.036]$ | $[0.113]$ |  |
| Observations | $[0.057]$ | 0.020 | $0.026]$ | $[0.010]$ | $[0.048$ |

Note:Table shows intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using OLS. T refers to the randomized individual-level treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text messages and zero otherwise). V refers to the classroom-level video treatment (equal to 1 for classrooms in which the DVD was distributed and zero otherwise). All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \%$; ${ }^{* *}$ significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.


[^0]:    Acknowledgements
    Julian Martinez-Correa provided excellent research assistance and multiple comments that improved the manuscript. Anna Koh Lee, Santiago Perez Vincent, Dario Romero, and Dario Salcedo provided excellent research assistance in early stages of the paper. We thank Bernardita Munoz, Daniela Alvarado and Paula Espinoza for superb support in fieldwork. Thomas Dishion and Anne Mauricio gave fabulous guidance on how to communicate with parents and the Family Check-Up approach. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding through J-PAL's Post-Primary Education Initiative, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Spencer Foundation, and a Chilean FONIDE grant (No. 711272). The study is registered as AEARCTR-0001059. The opinions

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[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ These math grade intention-to-treat effects are somewhat smaller than grade effects of other types of interventions in the literature. For example: Bettinger [2012] finds an increase of 0.15 of a standard deviation in math test scores resulted from a $\$ 15$ incentive used in grades 3 through 6 in Ohio. Kremer et al. [2009] finds an increase of 0.13 of a standard deviation in test scores as the result of offering expensive scholarships for two school years of high school to girls in grade 6 in Kenya. Bergman [2021] finds an increase of 0.19 of a standard deviation in test scores from a program involving communicating with parents of students in low-income schools in the US; the program evaluated by Bergman [2021] is similar to ours, but it used much more expensive ways of communicating parents.

[^3]:    ${ }^{2}$ Appendix B provides a summary of the results in these papers.
    ${ }^{3}$ See, for example, Nguyen [2008], Jensen [2010], Oreopoulos and Dunn [2013], Dinkelman and Martínez A [2014], for evidence on how educational outcomes improve after parents or students are informed about the returns to, or costs of, educational investments. Bettinger et al. [2012] and Fryer Jr [2016] are examples in which information alone was insufficient for improving educational attainment. Dizon-Ross [2019] studies a one-off information intervention with parents in Malawi, showing that the intervention improves what parents know about their children, and causes family educational investments to adjust to match newly revealed abilities of each child.

[^4]:    ${ }^{4}$ Bergman and Chan [2019] automated the process of gathering the data by scraping student information systems, this is possibly unfeasible in low- and middle-income countries where information is almost always collected on paper.

[^5]:    ${ }^{5}$ Students who fail one subject can still advance to the next grade if they maintain an average grade of 4.5 for the remaining subjects; students who fail two subjects can also advance if they maintain an average grade above 5.0 in the remaining subjects. In addition, the $85 \%$ attendance requirement can be lifted by the school board under special circumstances.
    ${ }^{6}$ Using administrative data we examined these same correlations in our sample prior to the start of the intervention. The correlation of average grade was 0.4 with attendance and -0.4 with grade retention. The correlation between school attendance and grade retention was -0.3 . Even conditional on age and gender controls, and taking into account grade-level and school fixed effects, the correlations between lower attendance, lower grades, and a higher risk of failing the grade are large and statistically significant at the $5 \%$ level.

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ Parents who did not respond to either question were also classified as misinformed. See notes on columns [2] and [3] of Table 6 for details.

[^7]:    ${ }^{8}$ We discuss how we construct this at-risk index in Section 4.
    ${ }^{9}$ Five schools were fully public while one was a publicly funded but privately administrated.
    ${ }^{10}$ Initially, students whose parents consented to participation in the experiment were in grades 4 to 8 in the eight schools that participated in the study. The composition changed in the second year. Students in grade 8 participated during the first year of the experiment, but these students could not be treated or followed into secondary school. Also one school decided not to continue during the second academic year. Because randomization was done at the individual level, stratifying by classroom, the main analysis does not include either the school that dropped out of the program, or the students who were in grade 8 at baseline. In the appendix, we show the main results when using this "full" sample as a robustness check.
    ${ }^{11}$ See Appendix C for more details regarding the sample and the characteristics of students whose parents consented to participate in the experiment and those whose parents did not consent.

[^8]:    ${ }^{12}$ Appendix D explains in detail the intervention: production of messages, timeline, and delivery. Appendix Table D. 1 provides a script of each type of message sent to parents.

[^9]:    ${ }^{13}$ Behavior data were difficult to collect. In Chile, each classroom has a notebook in which teachers can make comments about particularly good or bad behaviors of specific students. For example, the teacher might write, "Samuel concentrated well in reading," or "Taryn hit her friend during math class." We developed a system for categorizing such behavior "notes" as positive or negative, and followed these definitions in all classrooms.
    ${ }^{14}$ Appendix Section E provides more details and information on these data sources.
    ${ }^{15}$ Appendix F describes in detail each of the outcome and control variables used in this paper. It shows the specific data sources, and provides a description of how the variables were constructed.
    ${ }^{16}$ We relegate most of the results using these data to the appendix.

[^10]:    ${ }^{17}$ In computing the control mean and standard deviations we only use information of the students to consented to participate in the study.
    ${ }^{18}$ Appendix F. 1 describes how the scales were built. For both parents and students, we show the eigenvalue of each latent factor, the loading associated with each variable, and the Cronbach's alpha for each survey wave.
    ${ }^{19}$ We asked: "It is possible that next year your daughter's/son's school can send you regular text messages with information about their school performance (attendance, grades, and classroom behavior) four times a month. However, there might not be enough funds to provide this service free of charge. Thinking about how valuable this service would be for you, please tell us whether you will be willing to pay $\$ \mathrm{~V}$ pesos a month to receive four text messages a month, from April to December."

[^11]:    ${ }^{20}$ We use final attendance and math grades from the academic year prior to the beginning of the intervention and accumulated negative behavioral marks during the month prior to the start of the intervention.
    ${ }^{21}$ Appendix G shows the response rates for the different samples, years, and data sources. It also describes attrition from and entry to the sample, and the characteristics of those students in terms of their treatment status.

[^12]:    ${ }^{22} \theta_{g}$ and $\pi_{t}$ are not all collinear because there are 25 students who repeated a grade-level. Results are robust to the exclusion of these grade-level dummies.
    ${ }^{23}$ For a handful of students baseline values are missing. In those cases, we impute the control baseline variables using the classroom-level mean. We add an indicator variable in the regression model equal to one for these observations.
    ${ }^{24} \mathrm{~A}$ classroom is a unique combination of school, grade-level, and section in the first year of the intervention.
    ${ }^{25}$ For instance, in the attendance equation, we instrument the share of received text messages related to attendance with the randomized treatment indicator variable. The correlations between the share of attendance, math grades, and classroom behavior text messages received are all larger than 0.95 . Hence, results do not change when using different shares.

[^13]:    ${ }^{26}$ In our experimental design (i.e., with classroom fixed effects associated to the strata in which the treatment was individually randomized), we cannot estimate the differential spillover effects to compare the effects on a non-treated student in a classroom with a high or low share of treated peers in his or her classroom.
    ${ }^{27}$ Appendix Table A. 1 shows that observable characteristics are similar between treatment and control students when the full sample is used. Additionally, Appendix Table A. 2 reports a similar balance table to that shown in Table 1; it includes an additional variable to indicate whether the classroom was randomized to receive a high or low share of treatment, and the interaction with $T_{i c j g}$. Results are virtually the same as those shown in shown in Table 1.
    ${ }^{28}$ The survey items used to build these scales can be found in Appendix Tables F. 2 and F.3.

[^14]:    ${ }^{29}$ During the first month of the experiment, messages were sent on Fridays.
    ${ }^{30}$ Appendix Table A. 3 reports the treatment compliance in each year of the intervention (2014 and 2015). More messages were sent in 2015, when the intervention was implemented for a full school year, than in 2014 when the intervention was implemented during the second half of the school year. Appendix Table A. 4 presents the compliance for the full sample.

[^15]:    ${ }^{31}$ See Appendix Table A.5, which provides evidence of compliance with surveys for both parents and students.

[^16]:    ${ }^{32}$ Appendix Table A. 6 presents treatment effects on a set of outcomes measured with administrative data from the Ministry of Education. Results are essentially the same. In addition we find positive treatment effects on language (statistically significant at normal levels) and on science and history (although these are not statistically significant).
    ${ }^{33}$ Appendix Table A. 7 presents results separately for each year of the intervention (2014 and 2015). While the effects on math grades are larger in 2014, the impact on attendance rates appears to be stronger in the the second year of the intervention. Although in neither case we can reject equality of the point estimates across years.
    ${ }^{34} \mathrm{As}$ a robustness test, we present the results for the full sample (i.e., including students in grade 8 in 2014, and the school that dropped out of the program in 2015) (Panel A), and for the main sample but without controls (Panel B) (see Appendix Table A.8). Furthermore, Table A. 9 changes the econometric specification by replacing strata fixed effects by school-grade fixed effects, and including baseline controls at the classroom level. Results do not qualitatively change in any case. All coefficients' signs remain positive. Even though many coefficients become statistically not significant at standard levels, we cannot reject the null that they are equal to those reported in Table 3.

[^17]:    ${ }^{35}$ Appendix Table A. 11 presents the ATT.
    ${ }^{36}$ The null hypothesis that the treatment effect was zero in high-share classrooms is rejected at the $10 \%$ level in columns 2,3 and 4.
    ${ }^{37}$ After the first two months of the intervention, we started to systematically send all the text messages on Mondays. For this part of the analysis, we restrict the sample to this period.

[^18]:    ${ }^{38}$ Appendix Table A. 12 shows the estimated coefficients used to construct this figure. It also reports the corresponding ITT estimates.
    ${ }^{39}$ Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table A. 13 report the estimated coefficients used to construct this figure. The table also presents the results over time for the rest of the monthly outcomes and the analogous ITT estimates.

[^19]:    ${ }^{40}$ When comparing with classroom books, we allowed for a "mistake" of 1 absence and 0.5 points in the case of grades.
    ${ }^{41}$ Table A. 14 in Appendix A presents the results with the outcome at baseline as a control variable; the results remain unchanged.
    ${ }^{42}$ Appendix Table A. 15 reports the ATT estimates.

[^20]:    ${ }^{43}$ See Appendix Table A.16.

[^21]:    Note: Table shows intention-to-treat effects estimates from equation (1) shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using OLS. $T$ refers to the randomized individual-level treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text-messages and zero otherwise). Outcomes are scales built with answers to surveys (see tables F. 2 and F. 3 for details). Panel A shows results for scales built with answers parents gave to survey questions. Panel B shows results for scales built with answers students gave to survey questions. All models include the baseline math grade, attendance rate and outcome scales, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance or baseline outcomes were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in brackets). * significant at $10 \% ;^{* *}$ significant at $5 \% ;^{* * *}$ significant at $1 \%$.

[^22]:    ${ }^{44}$ See section F. 1 in the data appendix for details on how the scales were built, as well as the psychometric properties of each of them. Appendix Table A. 17 reports the ATT estimates for these outcomes.

[^23]:    ${ }^{45}$ To further assess whether parenting styles were a constraint to improve students' outcomes, we implemented a complementary randomized control trial to evaluate the effect of providing parents with tools to relate to their children more positively. The intervention followed an established "positive parenting" approach and was developed jointly with educational psychologists at Arizona State University. It was delivered to parents using a set of videos. The estimated coefficients were, in general, positive and large. However, we lack statistical power to reject the null of no differential treatment effect. Results are shown and discussed in Appendix H.

[^24]:    ${ }^{46}$ The setup cost for the platform was US $\$ 613.4$ per school in our intervention. Considering the average primary school size has 377 students, the cost per student is US\$1.63.
    ${ }^{47}$ The costs of putting the experiment into the field were higher. The text message cost per treated child was US $\$ 6.5$ per year. Once we included platform maintenance costs, a field team coordinator and web domain costs, the total cost per student comes to US $\$ 27$ per year.
    ${ }^{48}$ Busso et al. [2017] also provides information for 52 evaluations designed to improve student learning in secondary schools around the world. The strategies for which they find evidence of success include: (i) monetary incentives to students, (ii) "no excuses" models, (iii) extended school day, and (iv) vouchers, subsides or scholarships for students. The weighted average of the effect-sizes on test scores are respectively $0.16 \mathrm{SD}, 0.14 \mathrm{SD}, 0.08 \mathrm{SD}$ and 0.03 SD . Although this study does not include intervention costs for these alternative strategies, it is likely that our text message intervention used fewer resources than any of these four programs, and therefore was cheaper on a per student basis. McEwan [2015] provides a meta-analysis of randomized experiments of school-based interventions on learning in primary schools and finds 7 experiments that involve informational treatments. The mean effect size of these interventions is 0.049 ( p -value $=0.240$ ). Andrabi et al. [2017] find that providing report cards to parents in Pakistan lead to a closing in informational gaps and 0.11 SD gain in student outcomes.

[^25]:    Note: Table shows treatment effects heterogeneity estimates by each of the at-risk index components (standardized baseline attendance, math grades and negative behavioral notes). ITT refers to the intention-to-treat effects estimates shown on each column for each outcome. T refers to the randomized treatment (equal to 1 if parents were sent text-messages and zero otherwise). Coefficients were estimated using OLS. ATT refers to the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated shown on each column for each outcome. Coefficients were estimated using IV where the share of topic-specific text messages received over those sent (D) and its interaction with the baseline standardized variable were instrumented with the randomized assignment to treatment ( T ) and its interaction with the same variable, respectively. All models include the heterogeneity variable as control, always baseline math grade, attendance rate as control variables, classroom (randomization strata), year and grade-level fixed effects. If baseline values of baseline math grade/attendance were missing, we imputed them using the classroom-level mean and added an indicator variable for these imputed observations. Standard errors are clustered at the classroom level (shown in parentheses). * significant at $10 \%$; ** significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

[^26]:    Note: Table shows the coefficients of a regression of the total share of successful text messages (total received/total sent) of each column type (attendance, grades, behavior and general text messages) on attendance and math grades at baseline. Columns [1]-[4] present results for the main sample and columns [5]-[8] for the full sample. Regressions of columns [1]-[3] and [5]-[7] use the sample of treated students. Regressions of columns [4] and [8] use the sample of treated and control students. All regressions include controls for class fixed-effects, age and gender. Robust standard errors are clustered at the class level. * significant at $10 \% ;{ }^{* *}$ significant at $5 \%$; *** significant at $1 \%$.

[^27]:    ${ }^{49}$ In very few cases, we further use classroom books to impute missing data on math scores and attendance with the annual data coming from math test records and attendance register, respectively.
    ${ }^{50}$ We collected their aggregate data on attendance and math scores (subject-specific GPA) from the municipality school records.

