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DP15221

**HOW CAN BILL AND MELINDA GATES
INCREASE OTHER PEOPLE'S
DONATIONS TO FUND PUBLIC
GOODS?**

Dean Karlan and John List

DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

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Centre for Economic Policy Research
33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801
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JEL Classification: D12, D71, D82, H41, O12

Keywords: Public Goods, Charitable fundraising, asymmetric information, Matching grant

Dean Karlan - dean.karlan@gmail.com
Northwestern University and CEPR

John List - jlist@uchicago.edu
University of Chicago

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Dean Karlan and John A. List*

August 2020

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Contact info: Dean Karlan: karlan@northwestern.edu; Northwestern University, Innovations for Poverty Action, Jameel Poverty Action Lab and NBER; John A. List: jlist@uchicago.edu; University of Chicago and NBER. The authors thank TechnoServe for collaborating on this field experiment, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for providing the matching grant to TechnoServe, Conor Dowling and Harvard University’s Institute for Quantitative Social Science for providing access to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (and its funder, the National Science Foundation), NORC for collaboration on the AmeriSpeak survey, and Omar Parbhoo, ideas42 and Charity Navigator for providing data to the curated-list test reported herein. All opinions reported here are those of the authors and not of TechnoServe or of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Karlan thanks the Alfred B. Sloan Foundation and the National Science Foundation for support; List thanks the Templeton Foundation for support. We thank Nathan Barker, Shannon Coyne, Ellen Degnan, Selvan Kumar, Peter Lugthart, Rachel Strohm, James Tan, Natalia Torres and Jonathan Vayness for research assistance.

I. Introduction

For the nonprofit sector, imperfect information on the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations can lead both to underprovision of public goods as well as a misallocation of resources. On the extensive margin, skeptical altruists may be unwilling to contribute to public goods because they lack sufficient information on the effectiveness of nonprofits. On the intensive margin, less-skeptical individuals may be donating but not as effectively as they could be. Large donors, especially those willing to pay search costs to determine which charities are effective, may be key to solving this market failure (Vesterlund 2003). Matching grants by large donors potentially change the price of the public good, and in fact are often modelled as such in economics. But instead (or as well as) they may function as a quality signal by a large lead donor.

We examine this notion in partnership with TechnoServe, a poverty-focused nonprofit organization, by comparing a matching grant identified as from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (“BMGF”) to a matching grant from an anonymous donor. The BMGF treatment led to more people giving and more funds raised before the end of the matching grant period. The increased giving persisted after the matching grant period as well. As such, there may be a role for large high-profile donors, who may be better equipped to assess the quality of private organizations, to attenuate this market failure by announcing their gifts publicly. Naturally, public giving also may be motivated by vanity or to generate social mimicry (see, e.g., Karlan and McConnell (2014)). We discuss such alternative interpretations in the conclusion.

The early seminal economic models of philanthropy did not consider lead donors and sequential charitable gifts (Andreoni 1990; 1989), but instead developed a theory of giving that focused on the private consumption utility of giving—the “warm glow”—alongside other motives such as altruism. However, an increasing amount of evidence from the field suggests an important role for leadership giving (i.e., large publicly-announced gifts) in encouraging others to give. For example, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) reports that announcing higher levels of seed money increases giving, but that the offer of a rebate contingent on achievement of a fundraising goal has no discernible impact on giving; Huck and Rasul (2011) finds that seed money outperforms matching for raising funds from non-lead donors; and Gneezy et al. (2014) finds that seed money generates about the same increase in giving as a matching grant for an education nonprofit. Similarly, Karlan and List (2007) finds that announcing a matching grant increases giving for a liberal, politically-oriented charity, but that this increase is unaffected by changes in the matching ratio (i.e., the price). The underlying mechanism at work in such studies remains ill-understood, however.¹

The theoretical literature also has yet to coalesce around the underlying motivation for why leadership gifts work. If donors have perfect information, a simple public goods model has a clear prediction: a lead gift may crowd-out other giving unless it changes the price for smaller donors. In an organizational behavior context, Hermalin (1998) explores the role of leadership within a firm, and shows that with symmetric information about the marginal product of effort, there is a stable equilibrium where everyone in the organization free rides to a certain extent. However, if there is asymmetric information, then the leader can convince the followers to exert full effort by

¹ Other work suggests that upfront money may not be generally perceived as a signal of charity quality. For example, Meier (2007) finds that in a fundraising campaign for two social funds at a university, students respond positively to a matching grant in the short run, but reduce their post-matching period contribution, leading to no higher aggregate giving (which is what would be expected if it were a signal of quality).

exerting full effort herself—leading by example—which serves as a signal to workers that effort has a high marginal product. Applied to public goods, Hermalin’s findings suggest a role for leadership giving, independent of warm-glow utility, based on the asymmetry of information about the returns to different charitable organizations.

More closely linked to our work, Vesterlund (2003), which builds on Andreoni (1998), develops a novel theory that seeks to explain sequential fundraising. Similarly to Hermalin, Vesterlund assumes that donors possess imperfect information about charity quality, and thus learning by small donors about giving patterns of large, informed donors may crowd-in other giving via its information value rather than crowd-out giving via a free-riding effect (laboratory results also support this finding, as shown in Kumru and Vesterlund (2010)). Andreoni (2006) adds richly to the model by including two important variations: the public good can take on more than two quality levels, and the leader can be treated as endogenous rather than exogenous. The first variation admits an extra dilemma, since only extraordinarily large gifts by the leader can signal that the charity is of high quality. The second variation creates an informational public good, leading to an equilibrium in which only the richest single person is the leader. Andreoni’s extensions cogently explain how charities can serve as important ‘middle-men’ in transforming donor preferences into immediate actions. Matches (if they signal quality) could lower the information acquisition cost for donors, and thus shift charitable giving towards more effective charities (e.g., see Krasteva and Yildirim 2013). In a model endogenizing production of quality information, Krasteva and Yildirim (2016) also shows that lowering the cost of information for donors should raise the equilibrium number of quality nonprofits, although at an extreme, with too many donors only seeking the best charities, more quality information could have a deleterious effect on competition in the nonprofit sector.

Encouraging donations using matching by a large lead donor is merely one method of addressing the information asymmetry problem in charitable giving. It also is important to ask whether donors respond to information on quality presented more directly, and whether donors express a demand for more such information. The evidence on both questions is mixed in three related papers reporting on a series of laboratory experiments. First, Brown, Meer and Williams (2017) randomizes showing third party evaluations of highly-rated charities and finds evidence that such information affects the choice of charity, but not the choice to give at all nor the choice for how much to give. Second, Berman et al. (2018) finds stronger shifts in donations from information about the cause of a charity than from information about its effectiveness. Third, Metzger and Günther (2019) finds fairly low demand for information about quality relative to demand for information about administrative expenses. However, providing information on quality to people who want it does shift their donations towards the organizations that are reported as more effective. It is difficult to disentangle low demand for information in general from low demand for a particular type of information. Donors vary in their opinions and understanding of what constitutes good evidence of effectiveness. Indeed, the typical donor erroneously believes that administrative expense ratios are good proxies for cost effectiveness, although evidence suggests that expense ratios are only informative in the extreme cases where they may be signs of fraud or gross dysfunction (see Steinberg and Morris 2010; Karlan 2011).

Outside of the laboratory, Yörük (2016), using a regression discontinuity approach, finds that Charity Navigator “stars” (ratings from 1 to 4 that are based on financial health, accountability and transparency, but not on estimates of impact) lead to higher donation levels for small charities but

not for large charities. Finally, in a test of one nonprofit's fundraising appeal to its prior donors, Karlan and Wood (2016) finds that adding a few paragraphs about a scientifically-conducted impact evaluation² of the charity has no impact on likelihood of giving or amount given on average, but identifies important heterogeneities: larger prior donors gave more and small prior donors gave less, relative to the control group.

To move the literature in a new direction, we teamed with TechnoServe, a medium-sized (\$81m 2014 revenue) charity focused on international development and poverty reduction, to conduct two natural field experiments through their normal direct mail fundraising efforts. In our primary field experiment, we examine the impact of naming the matching donor, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), versus not providing the identity of the matching donor, for a \$2:\$1 matching gift. The sample consists entirely of individuals who had *not* previously donated to TechnoServe (i.e., 'cold list donors'). Importantly, we also obtained information about the type of charities the potential donor had previously supported.³ This non-experimental categorization of potential donors allows us to test for heterogeneous treatment effects in the spirit of our theory. We also track long-term (one year) giving after the experimental window for matched giving concludes, which is important for parsing the mechanism through which the matching grant affects donations.

In the second field experiment, also with TechnoServe, we examine the impact of a matching grant provided by the BMGF (also at a ratio of \$2:\$1) versus a control group that received no match offer. The sample for this experiment consisted entirely of prior donors, or 'warm list donors,' to TechnoServe, and helps to establish that the treatment effect from naming BMGF is indeed positive relative to control, not merely positive relative to anonymous (i.e., that "anonymous" did not produce a negative treatment effect).

This second field experiment does not put forward new knowledge *per se*, although the validation of the conventional finding that matching grants raise money relative to a control is helpful in order to strengthen the interpretation of the first experiment. Due to logistical constraints with the partner and donor, it was not possible to conduct the two tests simultaneously and within the same sample. For research purposes, too, the benefits of doing would not have been obvious, since the increased comparability from adding a no-match treatment arm to the main experiment would have reduced the statistical power of named versus anonymous donor test.

In the first, primary experiment, we find that the quality signal of naming BMGF as the source of matching funds increased the probability of an individual making a donation in the three months following the solicitation by 26% (from 0.84% to 1.06%, $p < 0.01$) and increased the average revenue per solicitation by 42% (from \$0.31 to \$0.44, $p < 0.01$). In the second experiment, the BMGF matching grant (compared to no match) increased the probability of giving in the three months following the solicitation by 83% (from 0.47% to 0.86%, $p < 0.01$) and the average revenue per solicitation by 75% (from \$0.16 to \$0.28, $p < 0.01$).

We also find interesting heterogeneous effects of the quality signal in the primary experiment: the impact on respondents who were past donors to BMGF-supported, poverty charities is roughly five times larger than the impact on donors to other types of charities. We posit that individuals

² The charity, Freedom from Hunger, had previously conducted a randomized trial to measure the impact of its business education program for clients of microcredit organizations (Karlan and Valdivia 2010).

³ This is attainable because, as is typical in direct marketing, TechnoServe rents mailing lists from other charities for direct marketing to acquire new donors.

who have previously given to worldwide poverty issues are more likely to identify the BMGF as a large foundation dedicated to poverty alleviation (as opposed to identifying BMGF as a Microsoft corporate foundation, or lacking familiarity with it entirely). We present evidence supporting this correlation from survey questions that we added to the Americans in the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) survey in 2012. Individuals more aware of BMGF's activities may be more likely to perceive the matching donation as a quality signal, since BMGF is capable of incurring significant costs to identify worthy causes. Thus, our preferred interpretation is that the matching donation from the BMGF has a larger average impact on the response rate and amount given because the information signaled by the BMGF gift allows donors to overcome the market failure associated with asymmetric information, and to act on their altruism. Importantly, in both field experiments we also observe donations to TechnoServe after our experimental match period (i.e., more than three months after the solicitation).⁴ We discuss the implications of both the short run and long-run responses in the discussion along with alternative theories that could explain these patterns.

We recognize however that responsiveness to the BMGF name may be a by-product of mere attention, or of celebrity-fascination and mimicry. To test more directly the quality signal theory, we conducted a survey experiment under the AmeriSpeak Panel by NORC (a nationally representative survey). We briefly described TechnoServe, and then randomized whether to inform respondents that BMGF supported TechnoServe, an anonymous donor supported TechnoServe, or neither. We then asked their perception, based on this information, of the quality of TechnoServe. Key here is that our dependent variable is directly their stated belief on quality, rather than their decision to donate. We find that informing donors about BMGF being a large donor to TechnoServe increased the likelihood that survey respondents rated TechnoServe as high quality from 27% to 35% (se=3%), although this result is no longer statistically significant when using the continuous (scaled 1-5) measure of quality rather than binary.

We also provide more evidence from a third field experiment, conducted in December 2017 by Charity Navigator, a large charity rating website, and ideas42. Website viewers to Charity Navigator were randomized to see either a link to a list of BMGF-chosen organizations to fight child malnutrition or a link to a list of the same organizations fighting child malnutrition but without explanation for how they were chosen. The list labeled as BMGF-chosen raised twice as much money, but did not lead to more people donating.

Our results have important implications for the design of fundraising campaigns, and add to a growing body of empirical literature analyzing the psychology and economics of charitable giving. In addition, the results open up the possibility that large donors can mitigate inefficiently low levels of funding to public goods not only through their direct contributions but also by allowing others to learn about their "lead" contribution. This insight could also be applied to resolving other market failures, such as sub-optimal consumption of green goods or production of new technologies, by encouraging governments or other large donors to send quality signals through leadership giving.

⁴ Although some post-matching period responses could plausibly be simply late returns of gifts intended for the match, we have data for 85 months after the matching period, and the post-immediate-response period giving is not heavier immediately after the initial three month matching period.

II. Experimental Motivations, Design and Results

Experiment #1: Named Matching Grant vs. Unnamed Matching Grant, Sample of Cold-List Donors

Lesser-known charities often experience difficulty in raising funds. This is commonly attributed to a lack of public awareness about the nature and quality of the work they perform. If potential donors have preferences over organizational quality, lesser-known organizations may benefit from quality signals to attract more donors. A leadership gift may be such a quality signal if the small donor assumes that lead donors engage in rigorous due diligence before making lead gifts. Naturally, the identity of the lead donor may be critical for the small donor to trust that the due diligence was thorough and accurate.

We designed a fundraising campaign in collaboration with TechnoServe. TechnoServe, a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization, aims to raise the incomes of entrepreneurial men and women in impoverished countries by helping them build their businesses and farms. TechnoServe works in Asia, Africa, Central America, and South America, and relies on individual contributions as well as large grants to finance its mission. BMGF is a major donor to TechnoServe, and provided the necessary matching funds for this set of field experiments.

In the primary experiment with TechnoServe, half of a sample of potential donors were offered a 2:1 matching grant from a named and prestigious donor (the BMGF), and the other half were offered a 2:1 matching grant from an unnamed, anonymous donor. The randomization process and distribution of the letters were carried out by a direct marketing firm hired by TechnoServe.

Our sample consists of a distinct pool of 61,466 prospective donors in the United States who had previously given to charities other than TechnoServe, but had not given to TechnoServe itself (i.e., they are ‘cold-list donors’ to TechnoServe). Since TechnoServe rented names of donors from other charities, we can identify the source charity (i.e., at least one other charity the donor has given to in the past) for all prospective TechnoServe donors in our sample. We use this information to examine heterogeneity among the potential donors—assessing whether the quality signal provided by BMGF is stronger or weaker if the source charity is a BMGF-supported poverty charity. Solicitation letters were mailed in December 2009 with a statement that the match was available only for a “limited time.” The unstated deadline was April 2010. Responses were initially tracked until December 2011, and ultimately until May 2017.

We identify the charities as “BMGF-supported, poverty” if they have received prior support from BMGF (all of which, in our sample, work on poverty issues) according to the publicly available 990s from each of the source charities. The BMGF-supported, poverty charities are Accion (n=7408) and Freedom from Hunger (n=8660). The other charities, coded as zero for this variable, are American Indian College Fund (n=6392), Drug Policy Alliance (n=6653), TAG: Tony and Alicia Gwynn Foundation (n=4349), USA for UNHCR (n=10978), Women for Women (n=5570), multiple sources (unknown which ones, n=11,401), and unknown (n=69). It is important to note that while we could not induce exogenous variation in the subjects’ pre-treatment donation set, our main identification assumption is that those who have given to BMGF-supported, poverty charities in the past will be marginally better informed about the quality of a poverty charity and the role of BMGF in this space. Preferences may also vary between these two groups of donors, but baseline comparisons allow us to infer their importance.

Table 1 presents empirical results for experiment 1 (BMGF versus anonymous), including summaries of giving both during and after the match period. Tests for heterogeneity based on the source of the prospective donor’s name are also included. Table 2 presents results from the post-experimental survey, to help understand the heterogeneity reported in Table 1. Table 3 presents empirical results for experiment 2 (BMGF matching versus control).

Because we are analyzing data from a randomized experiment, our empirical strategy is straightforward. For both experiments, we use OLS to estimate the following specification:

$$Y = a_0 + a_1T_1 + e,$$

where Y is the dependent variable and T_1 is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent was exposed to the treatment. Using a binary indicator of whether the solicitee gave any amount as the dependent variable estimates how the treatment affected the average probability of an individual giving. Using donation amount as the dependent variable estimates treatment effects on average revenue per solicitation. We also estimate a third specification which deviates from the experimental design (because of the shift on the extensive margin) and examines the average gift amount for those who respond to treatment versus control. Note this result could be a by-product of a treatment effect on amount an individual gives, or a by-product of a selection effect on shifting the extensive margin on likelihood of giving.

Solicitations that named BMGF as the matching donor are much more effective than solicitations that did not name the matching donor. In this case, the named leadership gift increased the average revenue per solicitation in the three months following the solicitation by 42% (from \$0.31 to \$0.44); p-value of difference < 0.01). The naming treatment also increased the probability of an individual giving: the naming gift increased giving rates in the three months following the solicitation by 26% (from 0.84% to 1.06%, p-value of difference < 0.01).

Importantly, the treatment effect did not dissipate after the initial three month period: the giving rate in the long-run (Panel B reports month 4 through year 7) also increases from 0.53% to 0.70% (p-value of difference = 0.01), and the change in the average size of gifts in the long run, unconditional on giving, from \$1.34 to \$1.97 is also positive but not significant statistically at conventional levels (p-value of difference = 0.11). The increase in the long run giving rate is similar in magnitude to the short run increase (from 0.84% to 1.07%, p-value of difference < 0.01) in giving. Examining year two alone, results are consistent (not in table): likelihood of giving shifts from 0.35% to 0.48% (p=0.02). This may reflect the effect of a durable quality signal, a “foot in the door” effect, or some combination of the two.

We can dig deeper into this result by focusing more closely on the types of donors who responded to the announcement that BMGF provided the matched funding. Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1 report the differential treatment effect based on the source of the prospective donor. We use OLS to estimate the following specification, examining heterogeneity by donor type:

$$Y = a_0 + a_1T_1 + a_2P*T_1 + a_3P + e,$$

where T_1 is a dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual was exposed to the quality signal, and P is a binary variable indicating whether the individual previously gave to one of the “BMGF-supported, poverty” charities.

For the binary outcome of whether the solicitee donates any amount, previous donors to BMGF-supported & poverty-oriented organizations are 0.41 percentage points (p-value = 0.03) more responsive to solicitations that name BMGF than are non-poverty donors. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that naming BMGF acts as a quality signal for those donors who understand the size and importance of BMGF in the field of international development. In fact, we find no BMGF-naming effect for donors whose names we received from non-poverty related charities. Although one should be cautious when interpreting these data because previous donation patterns could proxy for other constructs, the empirical results are consistent with the notion that there is a large signaling effect for donors who understand that BMGF is a major funder in this area.

To examine whether having given to a poverty charity is, in fact, an indication of familiarity with BMGF, we added questions to the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)⁵, a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults. In our 10-question CCES module (see Appendix 1), 1000 respondents were asked about their charitable donations (including whether to charities they identify as poverty related) in the past year and their familiarity with, and impression of, the BMGF. Specifically, we examine two key questions:

1. “Next, we want to know how familiar you are with the activities of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. On a scale of 1 to 3, how familiar are you with what they support? (a) I am not familiar with what they do. (b) I can name the causes they support, but not any organizations. (c) I can name both causes and organizations they support.”
2. “Next, we want to know what your impression is of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. (a) Very unfavorable (b) Unfavorable (c) Average (d) Favorable (e) Very favorable (f) Unknown / I have no impression.”

For the first question, since only 2.5% respondents choose (c), we combined (b) and (c), creating a binary variable equal to one for Familiar with Type of Causes BMGF Supports. For the second question only 7% choose unfavorable impressions, and our interest is in familiarity with BMGF more so than their opinion of them. Thus we convert question two into a binary variable equal to one if the respondent has any impression, either positive or negative, of BMGF.

Table 2 presents these CCES results split by donor type. Overall, these results support our conjecture that those who give to poverty charities are also more familiar with the BMGF. Column 3 shows that donors to a BMGF-supported, poverty charity were 15 percentage points more likely than non-donors to be familiar with the causes (p-value of difference < 0.01) that BMGF supports, and 12 percentage points more likely to have an opinion on the BMGF’s activities (p < 0.01).

Column 7 provides a robustness test by comparing the difference-in-difference between poverty charities and religious charities: is the difference in familiarity between those who support poverty charities and those who do not support poverty charities (column 1-3) greater than the difference in familiarity between supporters and non-supporters of religious charities (columns 4-6)? We find that for our “familiarity with causes that BMGF supports” outcome, the difference-in-difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01) but for our “having any impression of BMGF” outcome, we cannot reject the null (p = 0.23). We believe that, in net, this supports the argument that those who

⁵ The CCES, administered by YouGov Polimetrix, uses a matched random sample technique. The survey is stratified on voter registration status, state size, and competitiveness of congressional districts. Registered voters are oversampled.

give to poverty charities are indeed more familiar with BMGF, and thus more likely to see BMGF's actions as a signal of quality.

This heterogeneity helps to shed light on a potential alternative hypothesis: perhaps merely naming any donor, rather than having an anonymous matching donor, sends the quality signal. If this were the case, then we would observe a positive treatment effect from individuals who we have categorized as being less familiar with poverty charities. Since we find a null effect for people who gave to religious charities, and a positive effect for donors to poverty charities, we conclude that the specific donor name itself matters, not merely the act of naming any donor.

Experiment #2: Matching Grant versus Non-Matching Grant, Sample of "Warm-List" Donors

To establish the positive effect of a matching grant in this context, we also estimate the elasticity for donations with a matching grant compared to those without a match. As discussed above, several theories suggest that a matching grant may not generate higher giving. To wit, individuals may believe the lead donor will donate the money regardless, perceive the charity as more satiated (i.e., the marginal product for the next dollar to the public good is small), or simply shift donations inter-temporally but not increase total giving. The empirical evidence is mixed. Karlan and List (2007) finds that matching grants increase giving to a liberal politically-oriented charity, but only in states that voted more liberally in presidential elections. Meier (2007) finds matching grants increase giving in the short run but not the long run. Finally, Karlan, List, and Shafir (2011) find that matching grants work positively for recent supporters but negatively for prior-but-not-recent supporters. This mixed evidence makes imperative the need for refinement of our theoretical understanding of the conditions under which matching grants change the donation patterns of heterogeneous groups of donors.

Our sample consists of 51,971 prior donors to TechnoServe (as compared to Experiment 1, which was conducted on a mailing list rented from other charities; we discuss generalizability issues in the conclusion). Solicitation letters were mailed in December 2009 with a matching deadline stated as "limited time." Responses were tracked until March 2011 (i.e., a much shorter period than the first experiment). Donors were randomly assigned to receive letters with or without information about the BMGF's \$2:\$1 matching grant. The randomization process and distribution of the letters were carried out by a direct marketing firm hired by TechnoServe.

Table 3 presents results from this second field experiment to test whether a BMGF-named matching grant generates a positive treatment effect relative to no match. Our aim is to address the concern that perhaps a BMGF-named matching grant did not raise more money relative to no match, but rather the "anonymous" treatment effect is negative, relative to a no match treatment. As it was not viable to include a pure control in the first experiment, the second experiment provides evidence to support the assertion that the BMGF match has a positive treatment effect relative to no mention of a match. The charitable fundraising literature on lead gifts also supports the claim that matching grants typically do raise more funds (Karlan and List 2007), although exceptions exist (Karlan, List, and Shafir 2011). Response rates for the BMGF-named match in experiment two do differ considerably from the response rates for the BMGF-named match in experiment one, thus highlighting that there are important differences generated by the different timing, sample, material, and content of the mailers. We do not have any hypothesis, however, about how those factors may change the treatment effect of the BMGF match.

Panel A shows that the announcement of a matching grant from BMGF was effective at increasing donations from warm list (prior) donors during the matching period. We find that average revenue per solicitation in the three months following the solicitation was \$0.12 higher among respondents who received the treatment mailer (\$0.28) than among those who received the control (\$0.16), an increase of 75%, and the likelihood of giving increased by 0.39 percentage points, an increase of 83% (from 0.47% to 0.86%). The match did not increase gift size among those who gave (over three months, \$32.13 in treatment compared to \$33.89 in control) - its effect was simply to increase the probability of giving.

Long term results also produced similar effects as observed in the primary experiment. Here, the long term effects are more meaningful than in the primary experiment, since the sample in the second experiment consists of prior donors. Thus everyone, treatment and control, continued to receive similar solicitations after the experimental period. (In contrast, for “cold-lists” like the one used for the primary experiment, names are merely rented for the initial solicitation; thus, non-responders do not continue to get solicitations in the months and years following.) Panel B of Table 3 shows that individuals who received the treatment are more likely to give again, after the matching period ended: the likelihood of long-run giving increases from 0.23% among the control group to 0.45% among the treated group (p-value of difference < 0.01), and the average long-run gift unconditional on giving increases from \$0.10 to \$0.34 (p-value of difference = 0.05). Restricting the analysis to months 13-16 (rather than months 4-16, as shown in the table), results are similar: likelihood of giving shifts from 0.12% to 0.22% (p=0.007). These results reinforce the idea that the matching grant does not affect individual giving through the price mechanism, but rather through a quality signal that retains its value after the initial direct marketing solicitation and generates a more loyal donor.

Experiment #3: Survey Experiment Results on Effect of BMGF Lead Donation on Perceived Quality of TechnoServe

Naming BMGF as a lead donor of TechnoServe may trigger more donations not because of a quality signal, but because it grabs attention better, or triggers a desire to mimic a celebrity. If such mechanisms are the driving force of the observed result from experiment #1, then we would not observe an increase in perceived quality of the charity as a result of learning about BMGF being a large donor. We test this directly via a survey experiment.

We added questions to a July, 2020 survey by NORC at the University of Chicago under their nationally representative AmeriSpeak Panel (see Appendix 2 for full details on wording). The primary sampling frame for AmeriSpeak is the 2010 NORC National Frame, a multistage probability sample that fully represents the U.S. household population. Participants were recruited to the panel via U.S. mail notifications, telephone interviews and in-person field interviews. The panel supports mixed mode data collection, with some respondents answering via web and some via phone (NORC 2020). Respondents answered our questions as well as questions on seven other topics ranging from COVID-19 to the gig economy. The order in which surveys were presented to participants was randomized. The mean age of our sample was 55, 41% were male, and the mean income was \$75,399 (standard deviation = \$51,510).

All individuals in our sample were first informed about TechnoServe and their overall mission and activities: “TechnoServe is a nonprofit organization which aims to raise the incomes of entrepreneurial men and women in impoverished countries by helping them build their businesses

and farms. TechnoServe works in Asia, Africa, Central America, and South America. Since 1968, TechnoServe has helped build or expand thousands of businesses in over 30 countries, including dairy cooperatives in Kenya, cashew farmers in Mozambique, and coffee growers in Tanzania. TechnoServe receives funding from both large donors and small donors.”

Then, individuals were randomized into one of four treatments (2x2) or a control. Individuals were told either that BMGF is one of TechnoServe’s largest donors, an anonymous donor is one of TechnoServe’s largest donors, or control (no statement made). Furthermore, for the two large donor statements, half were also told that “Prior to giving [BMGF/staff from the anonymous donor] conducted research on the operations and costs and benefits of TechnoServe, making sure the organization meets the foundation’s quality and impact standards.” We refer to this as the “due diligence” sub-treatment. We had competing hypotheses for how this would affect our main test of BMGF vs anonymous (vs control). The due diligence sub-treatment could enhance the quality signal, by bluntly pointing out to the survey respondent what the role of a lead donor could be. On the other hand, the additional information about due diligence could distract attention from the identity of the lead donor, thus reducing the effect of BMGF over anonymous (and relative to control). Or the information on due diligence could be a quality signal but the two quality signals act as substitutes (i.e., diminishing returns to quality signals).

The key dependent variable is as follows: "Based on the information you've been provided, how would you rate the likely quality of TechnoServe as a charity? (1 - Poor, 2 - Fair, 3 - Good, 4 - Very Good, 5 - Excellent)." We analyze this question as both a continuous and a binary variable (high quality = 1 for very good and excellent, which is 27% of the responses for the control group). We include two specifications, with and without control variables for age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, employment status, income, and survey mode.

Table 4 Columns 1-4 report the main results. We find that identifying BMGF as a large donor increases the mean quality score by 0.02 (se=0.09, control group mean = 3.04), with similar results for anonymous donor; thus, this is a null result. However, when scoring the dependent variable as a binary outcome equal to one for “very good” or “excellent”, and zero otherwise, we find an increased likelihood of 7pp (se=4pp, control group mean = 27%) for the BMGF treatment, relative to control, and no increased likelihood for the anonymous donor. Critically, the difference between BMGF and anonymous is statistically significant (p-value<=0.01 and <=0.02, depending on whether or not control variables are included in the specification). We find that this effect is driven by the sub-treatments without any reference to due diligence (reported in Columns 5-8). As discussed above, we posit competing hypotheses for the direction of the due diligence treatment. In net, the fact that the impact of the BMGF name only works without the due diligence reference does weaken this result, since at a minimum it shows a lack of robustness to inclusion of this additional information.

Experiment #4: BMGF-Curated Charities vs Control, Charity Navigator Website Experiment

We also provide complementary evidence on the effect of the BMGF name on donation decisions by reporting on an experiment conducted in December 2017 by Charity Navigator on their website, in collaboration with ideas42.⁶ Charity Navigator’s main page had a pulldown menu option for “Hot Topics”, and the first option in this pulldown menu was randomized to say either “Bill and

⁶ See Parbhoo et al. (2018) for more discussion.

Melinda Gates Foundation Share Picks of Organizations Saving Millions of Children from Malnutrition” (treatment) or “Organizations Saving Millions of Children from Malnutrition” (control). Table 5 reports these results. With 1,030,000 observations (individuals visitors to the website), treatment raised \$0.016 per website visitor and control raised \$0.007 (p-value for difference =0.048), but there was no statistically significant difference on the likelihood of giving (0.0075% versus 0.0078%, p-value=0.87) and the treatment actually generated fewer clicks on the list. Combining this with the matching grant results may tell an important story. As we learn from the Charity Navigator website test, being “curated” as a BMGF-endorsed charity does not make individuals more likely to take action, but for those taking action it does inspire them to give more. Perhaps the power of combining the BMGF quality signal with a matching grant intends to motivate people to take action (giving now) as well as give more, whereas a mere “curated by” notice is not sufficiently inspiring to shift the extensive margin.

III. Discussion

We report results from two natural field experiments on donations and one survey experiment that explore techniques to leverage a large lead donor to raise further funds towards poverty reduction efforts in developing countries. Much controversy remains about aid effectiveness (Easterly 2006; Sachs 2006), and such debates may cause doubt, and thus inaction, for potential donors. Quality signals may alleviate some of these concerns, thus raising more money for developing countries’ causes.

Historically, matching grants have been modelled by economists as changing the price of a public good. Indeed, the theoretical work has followed common practice: phrases used in promoting matching grants often refer to price in numeric terms (e.g., “triple your impact!”). But they also could be implicitly signaling that a donor with more resources has invested in identifying this charity as particularly effective. This allows small donors to free-ride on the research of the large donor and support the same charity. Recent theoretical work (e.g., Vesterlund 2003) and laboratory experiments (e.g., Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund 2007) suggest this quality signal channel as a possible mechanism.

We have four core findings from two randomized fundraising appeals by TechnoServe and one survey experiment on a representative sample of residence in the United States. First, a matching grant from Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation outperforms a matching grant from an anonymous donor (the primary experiment). Second, a matching grant from Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation outperforms no matching grant (the secondary experiment). Third, both of these results persist a year later, well after the matching grant opportunity ended. And, fourth, from the survey experiment we learn that merely identifying BMGF as a large donor to TechnoServe increases the likelihood that an individual perceives TechnoServe as high quality, although this result only is found when defining perceived quality as a binary variable, not continuous. We posit that this result on perceived quality is consistent, albeit not dispositive, evidence that BMGF is triggering more donations due to a quality signal and not merely an attention-grabbing or celebrity-mimicking mechanism.

The persistence of the effect we posit is important, particularly in ruling out the “price” effect as to why the matching grant is working. This is an important implication of the secondary experiment in which the BMGF match was tested against no match for a group of prior donors. Because the secondary experiment was conducted with prior donors to TechnoServe, both treatment and

control continued to receive solicitations in the year following the test. Yet, the matching grant treatment effect persisted, continuing to generate more giving even after the matching grant period ended.⁷

Naturally, we cannot rule out other interpretations for why individuals may respond more to the BMGF-named matching grant versus an anonymous matching grant. Perhaps instead of a quality signal, individuals simply wanted to emulate one of the richest people in the world, akin to a celebrity effect (e.g., see Alatas et al. 2019). Health behaviors such as preventive screenings also have been observed to follow news about popular celebrities being diagnosed with diseases. This is likely not an information effect as much as an attention effect (although naturally that is hard to distinguish). Such a vainglorious motivation would work through the same mechanisms that causes donors to give more when attractive women solicit a donation (e.g., see Landry et al. 2006). Albeit indirect evidence, we note that the observed effect is driven by individuals who donated previously to poverty charities. Thus, if the emulate-the-rich effect is the true mechanism, it would need to only work on a sample of individuals who previously gave to poverty charities, and not to those who gave to non-poverty charities. This seems unlikely, leading to what we believe is the more likely interpretation: those who gave to poverty charities are more informed about the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the work it does to screen and choose charities. Furthermore, the survey experiment provides evidence that the quality signal is indeed a key mechanism through which naming BMGF generates higher donations. Naturally both mechanisms can be at play, so whereas the survey experiment provides support for the quality signal theory, it in no way disposes of the celebrity-mimicking or attention-grabbing theory.

For the lead donors and nonprofits, we suggest two further considerations. First, thinking beyond matching grants, are there cheaper methods of signaling quality? For example, what if the BMGF simply made a media push naming specific charities that they grade as excellent. Why signal to donors through this matching grant mechanism? Perhaps the money makes the matching grant a credible signal, whereas merely stating the name of the charity without the grant would not be as credible to donors. Or perhaps merely naming the charity as vetted by BMGF would work to raise more money for them, and these are simply alternative paths to generate similar quality signals. Second, while here we examine whether the match acts as a quality signal, a match also increases the return to making more informed decisions by donors and thus may prompt more effort by donors to acquire quality information (e.g., see theoretical work by Krasteva and Yildirim (2013)).

Although the literature has clearly learned a great deal from static exercises, the true potential of field experimentation will not be reaped from any one experiment but rather from a collection of related experiments that help to provide a more complete and robust understanding of the motivations of charitable giving. Further work is needed to understand how different factors, such as the activity of the charity, the identity of the leader (in terms of its quality and connection to solicitees), and the description of the leader should be incorporated into models of giving. Of course, our examination is one test with one nonprofit and of one matching donor. And, likewise,

⁷ The first experiment was conducted on a “cold list,” i.e., individuals who had not previously donated to TechnoServe. These names are rented from other charities, and thus if individuals do not respond then TechnoServe does not “own” their names for the purpose of making solicitations later. Thus a persistence of the treatment effect here *could* be about a quality signal, but it also could be driven by a more mechanical foot-in-the-door effect (Freedman and Fraser 1966) by which TechnoServe now did “own” donors’ names and could continue to solicit from them without having to rent their names again from another charity.

there is no single mechanism through which matching grants work across all settings. Thus, with further replication and extension, and transparency in reporting such tests, more can be done to understand in what contexts specific mechanisms are influential. This both improves our theoretical understanding of why people give to charities and how such decisions are made, and provides practical guidance to lead donors and nonprofits on how to raise funds for effective causes.

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Appendix 1: 10 Questions added to the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey

YAL371

Special instructions: None.

Have you donated money to charity in the past year?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

YAL372

Special instructions: Only ask if YAL371==1 (“yes”).

How much did you donate in the past 12 months to charity?

YAL373

Special instructions: Only ask if YAL371==1 (“yes”).

Have you donated to any religious-based charity, for example a church or place of worship?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

YAL374

Special instructions: Only ask if YAL373==1 (“yes”).

How much did you donate to religious-based charity in the past 12 months?

YAL375

Special instructions: Only ask if YAL371==1 (“yes”).

Have you donated to any charity doing work internationally on poverty?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

YAL376

Special instructions: Only ask if YAL375==1 (“yes”).

How much did you donate to charities doing work internationally on poverty in the past 12 months?

YAL377

Special instructions: None.

Next, we want to know how familiar you are with the activities of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. On a scale of 1 to 3, how familiar are you with what they support?

- 1 I am not familiar with what they do.
- 2 I can name the causes they support, but not any organizations.
- 3 I can name both causes and organizations they support.

YAL378

Special instructions: Only ask if YAL377==2 OR 3. (Do not ask if YAL377==1 [“I have no idea.”]).

Please name up to 3 of the main causes that you believe they support.

YAL379

Special instructions: Only ask if YAL377== 3. (Do not ask if YAL377==1 OR 2.).

Please name up to 3 of the organizations that you believe they support.

YAL377a

Special instructions: None.

Next, we want to know what your impression is of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

- 1 Very unfavorable
- 2 Unfavorable
- 3 Average
- 4 Favorable
- 5 Very favorable
- 6 Unknown / I have no impression.

Appendix 2: Survey Experiment included in June 2020 NORC AmeriSpeak Panel

Introductory Text for All Survey Respondents

TechnoServe is a nonprofit organization which aims to raise the incomes of entrepreneurial men and women in impoverished countries by helping them build their businesses and farms. TechnoServe works in Asia, Africa, Central America, and South America. Since 1968, TechnoServe has helped build or expand thousands of businesses in over 30 countries, including dairy cooperatives in Kenya, cashew farmers in Mozambique, and coffee growers in Tanzania. TechnoServe receives funding from both large donors and small donors.

Treatment #1: BMGF as large donor + due diligence

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is one of Technoserve's largest donors. Prior to giving, BMGF staff conducted research on the operations and costs and benefits of TechnoServe, making sure the organization meets the foundation's quality and impact standards.

Treatment #2: BMGF as large donor

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is one of Technoserve's largest donors.

Treatment #3: Anonymous large donor + due diligence

An anonymous donor is one of Technoserve's largest donors. Prior to giving, staff from the anonymous foundation conducted research on the operations and costs and benefits of TechnoServe, making sure the organization meets the foundation's quality and impact standards.

Treatment #4: Anonymous large donor

An anonymous donor is one of Technoserve's largest donors.

Control: No additional language

Survey Question (outcome variable)

Based on the information you've been provided, how would you rate the likely quality of TechnoServe as a charity?

- Poor
- Fair
- Good
- Very Good
- Excellent

For binary transformation, "very good" and "excellent" = 1, otherwise 0.

Table 1: Matching Grant From Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation versus from Anonymous Donor (Experiment #1, Primary Experiment)
Means (Standard Errors) and OLS
Sample: Non-Prior Donors to Organization

	Mean Comparisons of Treatment and Control Mean (SE)			OLS Results for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Coefficient (SE)	
	Treatment: BMGF Named	Control: Anonymous	P-value from T-test Col 1<>Col 2	Treatment: BMGF Named	Interaction term: BMGF Treatment X Prospect's name acquired from poverty- related charity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Short Run Response (Months 0 to 3)					
% Donated	1.06 (0.06)	0.84 (0.05)	<0.01	0.11 (0.09)	0.41 (0.19)
\$ Given, Unconditional on Giving	0.44 (0.03)	0.31 (0.03)	<0.01	0.07 (0.05)	0.23 (0.10)
\$ Given, Conditional on Giving	41.05 (2.35)	36.45 (2.17)	0.15	2.70 (3.99)	7.70 (6.26)
Number of solicitations	30,731	30,735			61,466
Number of donors	326	258			584
Number of donations	352	285			637
Panel B: Long Run Response (Month 4 to Year 7)					
% Donated	0.70 (0.05)	0.53 (0.04)	<0.01	0.08 (0.07)	0.34 (0.15)
\$ Given, Unconditional on Giving	1.97 (0.26)	1.34 (0.30)	0.11	0.44 (0.50)	0.72 (0.71)
\$ Given, Conditional on Giving	281.89 (31.77)	253.00 (52.54)	0.64	37.16 (82.16)	-6.79 (100.59)
Number of solicitations	30,731	30,735			61,466
Number of donors	163	215			378
Number of donations	1,028	836			1,864
Panel C: Total Response (Month 0 to Year 7)					
% Donated	1.07 (0.06)	0.84 (0.05)	<0.01	0.12 (0.09)	0.41 (0.19)
\$ Given, Unconditional on Giving	2.41 (0.28)	1.65 (0.31)	0.07	0.51 (0.53)	0.95 (0.76)
\$ Given, Conditional on Giving	224.89 (23.35)	196.30 (34.72)	0.49	26.23 (55.37)	18.11 (70.15)
Number of solicitations	30,731	30,735			61,466
Number of donors	329	258			587
Number of donations	1,380	1,121			2,501

Treated individuals received a solicitation letter with a \$2:\$1 matching grant offer that named BMGF as the matching donor, while individuals in the control group received a solicitation with a \$2:\$1 matching grant offer that described the matching donor as being anonymous. For Column 4-5 OLS specification, we identify charities as “poverty-oriented” if they have received prior support from BMGF. These charities include Accion and Freedom from Hunger. Non-poverty charities are American Indian College Fund, Drug Policy Alliance, TAG: Tony and Alicia Gwynn Foundation, USA for UNHCR, and Women for Women. Information on support from BMGF was determined by accessing the publically available 990 tax records of each of the non-profit organizations. Orthogonality test for source of name, from regression of assignment to treatment on indicator variable for source of donor: F-test = 0.04, p-value > 0.99. OLS regressions in Columns 4-5 include a control for poverty-related charity and robust standard errors.

Table 2: Correlation between Familiarity with Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Donation History, from CCES Survey

	Gave in Prior Year to Poverty Charity?			Gave in Prior Year to Religious Charity?			Equality of Poverty Charity and Religious Charity Differences
	Mean (se)			Mean (se)			F-test (p-value)
	Donor	Non-Donor	Difference	Donor	Non-Donor	Difference	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Proportion Familiar with type of causes BMGF supports	0.43	0.28	0.15	0.33	0.30	0.03	8.67
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(<0.01)
Number of Observations	209	779	988	395	599	994	985
Proportion with Any Impression of BMGF	0.66	0.54	0.12	0.61	0.54	0.06	1.45
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.23)
Number of Observations	208	779	987	395	598	993	984

These data come from questions added to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) for 1,000 observations. Column 7 reports the results from two linear probability model regressions, predicting "Familiar with type of causes that BMGF supports" and "Any Impression of BMGF", with two binary dependent variables (has given to poverty charity, and has given to religious charity). Column 7 then reports the F-test and p-value for the equality of the coefficients on the two dependent variables. "Poverty charity" refers to a charity doing work internationally on poverty. "Religious charity" refers to, for example, a church or house of worship. When asked to report their familiarity with the BMGF, respondents were given three options: (a) unfamiliar, (b) could name the causes supported by BMGF but not any organizations (n=283), and (c) could name both the causes and organizations supported by BMGF (n=25). Due to the small size of the third cell, we combined (b) and (c) here, to create a binary variable for familiarity. For the second question, respondent's impression of the BMGF, respondents who recorded an opinion (very unfavorable, unfavorable, average, favorable, or very favorable) as opposed to answering "Unknown/I have no impression" are counted as having "Any Impression of BMGF". There were between 2 and 11 missing values for different questions. Two observations were dropped because they reported 100,000,000 in donations to charity, using a digit sequence that appeared fake (e.g., 123456789). These two respondents also provided seemingly fabricated numbers for amount donated to faith-based and/or poverty-oriented charities.

Table 3: Matching Grant versus No Matching Grant (Experiment #2)
Means (Standard Errors)
Sample: Prior Donors to Organization

	Treatment: BMGF Match	Control: No Match	P-value from T-test Col 1<>Col 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Short Run Response (Months 0 to 3)			
% Donated	0.86 (0.06)	0.47 (0.04)	<0.01
\$ Given, Unconditional on Giving	0.28 (0.02)	0.16 (0.02)	<0.01
\$ Given, Conditional on Giving	32.13 (1.75)	33.89 (3.44)	0.65
Number of solicitations	25,985	25,986	
Number of donors	224	121	
Number of donations	234	128	
Panel B: Long Run Response (Months 4 to 16)			
% Donated	0.45 (0.04)	0.23 (0.03)	<0.01
\$ Given, Unconditional on Giving	0.34 (0.12)	0.10 (0.02)	0.05
\$ Given, Conditional on Giving	75.18 (25.85)	45.47 (6.67)	0.28
Number of solicitations	25,985	25,986	
Number of donors	117	59	
Number of donations	207	110	
Panel C: Total Response (Months 0 to 16)			
% Donated	0.87 (0.06)	0.47 (0.04)	<0.01
\$ Given, Unconditional on Giving	0.62 (0.13)	0.26 (0.04)	<0.01
\$ Given, Conditional on Giving	71.08 (14.13)	56.06 (6.47)	0.33
Number of solicitations	25,985	25,986	51,971
Number of donors	225	121	346
Number of donations	441	238	679

Treated individuals received a solicitation letter with information about a "limited time" \$2:\$1 BMGF matching grant, while individuals in the control group received a solicitation without information about a matching grant. P-values in Column 3 are from a two-sample t-test with unequal variances.

Table 4: Survey Experiment Results on Effect of BMGF Lead Donation on Perceived Quality of Technoserve (Experiment #3), from NORC AmeriSpeak Panel

OLS

	Quality (1-5)	Quality (1-5)	High Quality (Binary)	High Quality (Binary)	Quality (1-5)	Quality (1-5)	High Quality (Binary)	High Quality (Binary)
BMGF identified as large donor to TechnoServe (1)	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)				
Anonymous donor identified as large donor to TechnoServe (2)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)				
BMGF identified as large donor, no mention of due diligence (3)					0.12 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)	0.09 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
BMGF identified as large donor, with mention of due diligence (4)					-0.07 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Anonymous identified as large donor, no mention of due diligence (5)					-0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Anonymous identified as large donor, with mention of due diligence (6)					0.04 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
p-value BMGF = Anonymous (1)=(2)	0.64	0.89	0.01	0.02				
p-value BMGF without due diligence = Anonymous without due diligence (3)=(5)					0.10	0.11	0.04	0.04
p-value BMGF with due diligence = Anonymous with due diligence (4)=(6)					0.30	0.15	0.15	0.28
Control variables included	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Control group mean	3.04	3.04	0.27	0.27	3.04	3.04	0.27	0.27
Control group standard deviation	(0.94)	(0.94)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.94)	(0.94)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Number of observations	959	959	976	976	959	959	976	976

These data come via NORC at the University of Chicago. The NORC survey utilizes the nationally representative AmeriSpeak Panel. The primary sampling frame for AmeriSpeak is the 2010 NORC National Frame, a multistage probability sample that fully represents the U.S. household population. Participants were recruited to the panel via U.S. mail notifications, telephone interviews and in-person field interviews. The panel supports mixed mode data collection, with some respondents answering via web and some via phone. (AmeriSpeak Technical Overview 2020). Respondents saw our survey in addition to seven others on topics ranging from COVID-19 to the gig economy. The order in which surveys were presented to participants was randomized. The mean age of our sample was 55.2, 40.8% were male, and the mean income was \$75,399 (standard deviation = \$51,510). The survey question reported here is as follows: "Based on the information you've been provided, how would you rate the likely quality of TechnoServe as a charity? (1 - Poor, 2 - Fair, 3 - Good, 4 - Very Good, 5 - Excellent)." For binary transformation, =1 when response was 4 or 5. Control variables include age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, employment status, income, and survey mode. Robust standard errors are used.

**Table 5: BMGF Named vs Not Named as Curator
on Charity Navigator Pulldown Menu (Experiment #4)**

**Sample: Visitors to Charity Navigator website
Means (Standard Errors)**

	Treatment: BMGF Named as Curator (1)	Control: BMGF Not Named as Curator (2)	P-value from T-test Col 1<>Col 2 (3)
1/100ths % Donated	0.78 (0.12)	0.75 (0.12)	0.87
\$ Given * 100, Unconditional on Giving	1.63 (0.42)	0.74 (0.18)	0.05
\$ Given, Conditional on Giving	209.07 (42.85)	97.84 (17.51)	0.02
Clicked to see list of charities (100/0)	0.49 (0.01)	0.63 (0.01)	<0.01
Number of unique visitors to website	525,197	504,803	1,030,000
Number of donations	41	38	79

The treatment menu header read, "Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Share Picks of Organizations Saving Millions of Children from Malnutrition." The control header read, "Organizations Saving Millions of Children from Malnutrition". P-values in Column 3 are from a two-sample t-test with unequal variances.