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**THE SEEDS OF IDEOLOGY: HISTORICAL
IMMIGRATION AND POLITICAL
PREFERENCES IN THE UNITED
STATES**

Paola Giuliano and Marco Tabellini

**ECONOMIC HISTORY
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Abstract

We study the long run effects of immigration on US political ideology. We establish a new result: historical European immigration is associated with stronger preferences for redistribution and a more liberal ideology among Americans today. We hypothesize that European immigrants moving to the US in the early twentieth century brought with them their preferences for redistribution, with long-lasting effects on political attitudes of US-born individuals. After documenting that immigrants' economic characteristics and other standard economic forces cannot, alone, explain our results, we provide evidence that our findings are driven by immigrants with a longer exposure to social-welfare reforms in their countries of origin. Consistent with a process of horizontal transmission from immigrants to natives, results are stronger where historical inter-group contact was more frequent, and are not due to transmission within ancestry groups. Immigration left its footprint on American political ideology starting with the New Deal, and persisted since then.

JEL Classification: D64, D72, H2, J15, N32, Z1

Keywords: Immigration, Preferences for Redistribution, Political Ideology, cultural transmission

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The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States*

Paola Giuliano[†] Marco Tabellini[‡]

March 2021

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1 Introduction

The rise in international migration has renewed interest in its political effects among economists and political scientists. Despite the large literature on the short run impact of immigration, much less is known about the *long run* effects that immigrants have on natives’ political preferences and ideology (Alesina and Tabellini, 2020). Existing works have shown that, in the short run, ethnic diversity and immigration tend to reduce preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999, 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Luttmer, 2001) and to increase support for far-right parties (Dustmann et al., 2019; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Halla et al., 2017), even though in some cases pro-social attitudes can arise (Bazzi et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2020).

However, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic evidence exists on the long run effects of immigration on natives’ political ideology. Distinguishing between the short and the long run is important, since the effects of immigration may be very different depending on the time horizon that one considers. First, because of repeated interactions, natives’ (negative) stereotypes of immigrants may eventually fade away (Allport, 1954). Second, a vast literature has documented that immigrants tend to assimilate economically and culturally as they spend more time in receiving countries (Abramitzky et al., 2014, 2020a; Borjas, 1985). As immigrants become more similar to natives, it may be easier for the former to be accepted by the latter. Third, and complementing the previous mechanism, it is possible for immigrants’ political, economic, and social preferences to spill over into natives’ values.

In this paper, we address these questions in the US context – historically defined a nation of immigrants and a “melting pot” society (Kennedy, 1964) – studying, in particular, the long run effects of historical immigration on American political ideology and preferences for redistribution. We focus on the Age of Mass Migration, the largest episode of immigration in American history, when more than 30 millions Europeans moved to the United States (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). We combine cross-county variation in exposure to historical (1910-1930) European immigration with preferences for redistribution and political ideology of American born respondents obtained from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) today.

To identify the causal effect of immigration, we construct a version of the shift-share instrument, widely used in the literature (Card, 2001). The instrument combines the share of immigrants born in each European country and living in a given

US county in 1900 with the number of new migrants from that country moving to the US in subsequent decades. As in Burchardi et al. (2019) and Tabellini (2020), we construct a “leave-out” version of the instrument, which nets out individuals who eventually settled in the county. Aggregating across all immigrant groups, and averaging over the three decades (1910, 1920, and 1930), we recover the average predicted number of immigrants, which we then scale by the baseline population to construct the average (predicted) immigrant share in the county.

The Age of Mass Migration represents an ideal setting to examine the long run effects of immigration not only because it is the largest episode of immigration in American history, but also because it offers key advantages for the purposes of identification. Between 1910 and 1930, major shocks, exogenous to local conditions across US counties, influenced immigration from different European countries differentially. First, World War I (WWI) generated a significant break in European immigration, which was stronger for countries directly involved in the war and not part of the Allies (Greenwood and Ward, 2015). Second, in 1921 and 1924, US Congress passed the Immigration Acts that drastically reduced immigration, especially for Southern and Eastern European countries – precisely those areas that had sent more migrants in the previous two decades (Abramitzky et al., 2019b; Goldin, 1994).

These shocks sharply lowered the persistence of immigrant inflows from specific countries to specific US counties. As a result, they assuage concerns that the same counties might have received large flows of immigrants from the same sending regions across decades (Jaeger et al., 2018). Also, and perhaps most importantly, such exogenous shocks, by differentially affecting migration flows of different sending countries over time, reduce concerns about causal identification in shift-share designs, which have been recently studied in a growing number of papers (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2020; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). We discuss these concerns, as well as the different exercises we implement to address them, when describing our empirical strategy in Section 4 and when presenting our results in Section 5.

Using this instrument, we find that US born respondents living in counties with higher historical immigration are, today, more likely to oppose spending cuts, prefer higher taxes to finance the fiscal deficit, and support both welfare spending and a higher minimum wage. These effects are quantitatively large: according to our estimates, relative to respondents living in a county at the 25th percentile of the historical immigrant share, individuals in a county at the 75th percentile are 4.7% and

4.6% more likely to support welfare spending and to oppose spending cuts respectively. Immigration also has a strong, long run impact on liberal ideology and support for the Democratic Party. A 5 percentage point – or, 40% of the inter-quartile range – increase in the average immigrant share is associated with a 6.5% higher likelihood that US born respondents identify with the Democratic Party.

In the second part of the paper, we examine the mechanisms through which historical immigration influenced natives' preferences for redistribution and their political ideology. After showing that our results cannot be explained solely by the socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants, by their selection, or by other standard economic forces, we turn to our most preferred interpretation. We argue that immigration left its footprint on American ideology via the transmission of political preferences from immigrants to natives. We provide different pieces of evidence in support of this mechanism.

First, we compare the effects of German immigrants arrived before and after the implementation of the major 1884 Bismarck welfare reform – the first compulsory health insurance ever implemented in the world, and a key step towards universal access to healthcare (Bauernschuster et al., 2019; Scheubel, 2013). Consistent with our hypothesis, only Germans arrived in the US after 1884 (i.e. after being exposed to the reform) had an impact on American ideology and preferences for the welfare state. Conversely, despite being observationally similar to those migrating after the 1880s, Germans arrived between 1850 and 1880 had a small and, if anything, negative effect on natives' left-leaning ideology in the long run.

Second, we derive a measure of exposure to the welfare state that counts the years since the introduction of different social welfare reforms – from compulsory education to pensions to healthcare to unemployment and occupational injuries – across European countries up until 1930. We combine the country-specific experience with the welfare state in a county-level index that assigns weights in proportion to the share of each immigrant group (relative to all European immigrants) in the county. We show that higher exposure to social welfare reforms strongly predicts natives' preferences for redistribution and liberal ideology today, even after controlling for the direct effect of immigration as well as for immigrants' economic characteristics. Then, to more directly test our hypothesis, we split the sample between counties with values of the welfare exposure index above and below the median. We document that the effects of immigration are stronger when immigrants came from countries with a

longer history of exposure to the welfare state.

Controlling for immigrants’ economic characteristics assuages the potential concern that the heterogeneous effects of immigration, depending on exposure to the welfare state, may capture economic differences across sending regions. We also show that the index does not pick up historical institutional characteristics of European countries, and that historical exposure to social welfare reforms is highly correlated with preferences of European immigrants (outside the US) today. As an additional test of our proposed mechanism, we run a horse-race between immigrants arrived during the 1850-1900 period and those arrived after 1900. Since most reforms were introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century or at the beginning of the twentieth century, one would expect immigrants arrived before 1900 to have a smaller or null effect. Consistent with this view, we indeed find that only the post-1900 European immigrants influenced long run American political ideology.¹

Third, we further document patterns consistent with a horizontal transmission of preferences – from immigrants to natives – by using different proxies for the frequency of historical inter-group contact. We show that the effects of immigration are larger in counties with higher historical inter-marriage rates and residential integration, and when immigrants came from countries whose language was closer to English. While anecdotal and historical accounts suggest that immigrants influenced American culture in the domains of music, cinema, and cuisine (Hirschman, 2013), to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically document a similar impact on economic preferences and on political ideology.

An alternative mechanism, not in contrast with the previous one, is that both the ancestry composition (Burchardi et al., 2019) and the preferences of specific ancestry groups (Fernández and Fogli, 2009) persisted over time. That is, the political ideology prevailing in a county today may be the result of a process of vertical transmission within a given group, rather than the spillover of ideology between groups (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). We provide two pieces of evidence against this alternative mechanism. First, using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), we replicate the analysis controlling for respondents’ ancestry, and restricting attention to individuals with US born grandparents. Second, we show that results remain unchanged when controlling for contemporaneous county ancestral composition.

¹Furthermore, immigrants arrived in the nineteenth century found, relative to those arrived after 1900, a less densely populated country, where the “frontier culture” likely contributed to the idea of “rugged individualism” (Bazzi et al., 2020; Turner, 1893).

In the last section of the paper, we link the past to the present, following the evolution of American ideology over time. Our results indicate that the presence of immigrants had a strong effect on one of the largest instances of redistribution in US history – the New Deal – and that such effect persisted after this initial shock. Existing accounts note that immigrants were fundamental in explaining the New Deal electoral alignment, as they were among the groups hit hardest by the Great Depression (Clubb and Allen, 1969; Degler, 1964; Lubell, 1952). Andersen (1979) proposes a “mobilization” theory according to which support for Roosevelt had its roots in the 1928 elections, when Alfred Smith – the first Roman Catholic to run for presidency in American history, who also had an immigrant background – attracted a large segment of the immigrant urban electorate to the Democratic Party. Our results support this conjecture. We show that, while there is no relationship between historical immigration and the Democratic vote share until the 1928 elections, precisely in this year such relationship jumps, becoming strongly positive, and persisting until today.

Our paper speaks to different strands of the literature. First, to our knowledge we are the first to document that historical ethnic diversity can have a positive effect on preferences for redistribution in the long run. This finding complements the existing literature, which has thus far documented a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution or political ideology in the short run (Alesina et al., 1999, 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Luttmer, 2001). We conjecture and provide evidence that these seemingly contrasting findings can be reconciled, if immigrants’ preferences are transmitted to natives over time.

This mechanism is also consistent with the “contact hypothesis” (Allport, 1954), according to which repeated interactions between groups can, under certain circumstances, favor inter-group relations and promote the transmission of values from one group to the other.² We speculate that, even if ethnic diversity brought about by European immigrants initially triggered natives’ backlash (Tabellini, 2020), it might have eventually led to stronger cohesion partly because it was “not too high”, and it was possible for European immigrants and natives to feel part of the same, racial group.

Second, we complement the literature on immigrants’ assimilation. Many papers have studied the pace at which immigrants assimilate economically and culturally

²See also Bazzi et al. (2019) and Lowe (2020) among others for the positive effects of immigration and inter-group contact on inter-group relations.

(Abramitzky et al., 2014, 2020a,b; Borjas, 1985); others have documented that immigrants’ culture persists across generations (Alesina et al., 2013; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Grosjean, 2014), and analyzed the effectiveness of different assimilation policies (Fouka, 2020; Lleras-Muney and Shertzer, 2015). We take a different perspective, and show that immigrants’ culture can be transmitted to natives. While immigrants’ contribution to American economic development, trade, entrepreneurship, and innovation has been largely documented (Sequeira et al., 2020; Fulford et al., 2020; Burchardi et al., 2019; Kerr and Mandorff, 2020; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Moser et al., 2014), to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first systematic analysis on the long run effects of immigration on ideology and socio-economic preferences of Americans.

Third, our paper speaks to the vast literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011, for a review). We highlight a novel channel – namely, the transmission of values from immigrants to natives – that can shape individuals’ views of the welfare state. Our findings also complement those in Bazzi et al. (2020), who document that frontier exposure in the nineteenth century fostered a culture of “rugged individualism”, which persisted over the long run. We identify another historical factor – European immigrants and their exposure to the welfare state in their home countries – that influenced American ideology in the opposite, more liberal, direction. In this respect, we also contribute to the growing literature on the Age of Mass Migration (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017), complementing, in particular, studies on its economic and political short run effects (Abramitzky et al., 2019b; Tabellini, 2020) as well as those on its long run impact on economic development (Sequeira et al., 2020).

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Age of Mass Migration

Between 1850 and 1920, around 30 millions Europeans moved to the United States (Hatton and Williamson, 1998).³ Until 1890, most immigrants came from Northern and Western European countries, but gradually, as both transportation costs fell and

³Immigration to the US was restricted for Chinese and Japanese immigrants, following the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1908 Gentleman’s Agreement respectively (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017), but there were no legal restrictions to European immigration.

income rose, more and more migrants left poorer countries in Southern and Eastern Europe (Figure A.1). After a temporary slowdown between 1890 and 1900, immigration skyrocketed to unprecedented levels (Figure A.2). This, together with the compositional shift towards new, culturally more distant sending countries, increased concerns about both immigrants' assimilation and the negative consequences on wages and employment of native workers (Higham, 1955).

The political climate grew increasingly hostile towards European immigrants. After several attempts, in 1917, US Congress introduced a literacy test that required all immigrants arriving to the US to be able to read and write (Goldin, 1994). The literacy test was introduced when European immigration had already been drastically reduced by WWI. After the end of the war, between 1919 and 1921, immigration flows went back to their 1910 levels, fueling natives' fears of a new "invasion". Eventually, in 1921, the Quota Emergency Act introduced a temporary cap to immigration, which was made permanent and more stringent in 1924, with the passage of the National Origins Act (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). The quotas were explicitly designed to reduce the inflows from Southern and Eastern Europe, whose immigrants were considered culturally far and unwilling and unable to assimilate (Higham, 1955).⁴

The combined effects of WWI and the quotas were dramatic: immigration to the US dropped and remained negligible until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Figure A.3). A key feature of both shocks is that different nationalities were affected differentially. On the one hand, WWI had a larger impact on countries that were not part of the US allies (with the German case being an emblematic one). On the other, the quotas reached their goal and disproportionately restricted the inflow of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. This is depicted in Figure A.4, which plots the share of European immigrants entering the US from "high" and "low" restriction countries, as classified in Abramitzky et al. (2019b).⁵

The quotas – and to some extent WWI – restricted immigration especially from countries that had sent disproportionately more immigrants between 1900 and 1914, thereby creating a trend-break in the country-mix of immigrants moving to the US. Since immigrants cluster geographically in receiving countries, such changes led to

⁴The 1921 Emergency Quota Act mandated that the number of European immigrants from each country entering the US in a given year could not exceed 3% of the stock from that country living in the US in 1910. With the 1924 National Origins Act, the limit was lowered to 2%, and the base year was moved to 1890, so as to further restrict immigration from "new sending countries". Furthermore, the total number of immigrants that could be admitted in a given year was capped at 150,000 (Goldin, 1994).

⁵See Table A1 in Abramitzky et al. (2019b) for the list of high and low restrictions countries.

substantial variation in both the number and the “mix” of immigrants received by different US counties between 1910 and 1930.

2.2 European Immigrants and American Ideology

Abundant evidence exists on the contribution of European immigrants to the US economy and to the American society more broadly. As noted by historian Maldwyn Jones, American economic development was “...due in significant measure to the efforts of immigrants...[who] supplied much of the labor and technical skill needed to tap the underdeveloped resources of a virgin continent” (Jones, 1992, pp. 309–310). Echoing Jones, John F. Kennedy wrote that immigrants contributed to “every aspect of the American economy” (Kennedy, 1964, p. 88). Consistent with these and similar accounts, Sequeira et al. (2020) show that European immigration had a positive effect on income per capita and economic growth in the US – an effect that persisted and grew over time.

Given the contribution of European immigrants to a wide range of domains, there are reasons to expect that immigration had a long-lasting impact on American ideology and political preferences as well. The most obvious channel through which immigration could have affected ideology is income. Given the positive long run impact of immigration on income per capita documented in Sequeira et al. (2020), one would expect lower support for redistribution and, more broadly, the emergence of a right-leaning ideology (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).

Another factor that may have shaped long-run natives’ ideology is immigrants’ selection. If more individualistic individuals were more likely to migrate (Knudsen, 2019), they might have transmitted such ideology to natives, reinforcing beliefs in effort rather than luck, and reducing preferences for redistribution (Piketty, 1995). This mechanism might have been further compounded by the fact that more successful immigrants were more likely to stay in the US (Abramitzky et al., 2019a). Relatedly, if immigrants experienced a high degree of social mobility in the past, this could have reduced their preferences for redistribution both in the past and today (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Piketty, 1995; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000).

Finally, immigrants may have moved Americans’ ideology to the right and reduced their preferences for redistribution by increasing ethnic and racial diversity. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that the welfare state is smaller in the US than in Europe

because the former is a more racially and ethnically diverse country. Consistent with this idea, Tabellini (2020) finds that European immigration led to a reduction in redistribution across American cities between 1910 and 1930. A related argument, discussed in Lipset and Marks (2000), is that socialism never succeeded in the United States partly because of the (ethnically) heterogeneous background of the American working class.

While the channels discussed above suggest that historical immigration may have lowered natives' preferences for redistribution, it is *a priori* possible that the opposite happened, and that European immigrants led to a more liberal ideology and to stronger preferences for redistribution among natives over time. Indeed, many Europeans had been exposed to social welfare programs in their countries of origin. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany provided to its citizens both public education and retirement income (Flora, 1983). Similarly, as of 1890, public education was offered in France, Italy, Sweden, and in many other European countries (Bandiera et al., 2018). In addition, pensions and social welfare reforms were introduced across Europe in the first two decades of the twentieth century (Galasso and Profeta, 2018).

Exposure to social welfare programs at home might have increased immigrants' expectations and demand for similar policies in the US.⁶ Adding to the direct effects of immigrants' demand, over time, preferences of Europeans might have gradually spilled over into American ideology, through a process of horizontal transmission favored by inter-group interactions. While the literature typically views assimilation as driven by immigrants converging towards natives' culture (Abramitzky et al., 2020a; Advani and Reich, 2015; Eriksson, 2020), in principle, it is possible for the opposite to happen. In the US context, Hirschman (2013) describes several examples where immigrants' preferences and culture spilled over onto those of natives – from the film industry to sports and cuisine.

In many cases, immigrants were (cultural) “innovators”, who set standards that persisted for decades, eventually becoming integral parts of the American culture. Beyond culture, there is evidence of immigrants' contribution also in a number of specific institutions. For instance, the kindergarten was imported to the US by the German immigrant Friederich Fröbel (Ager and Cinnirella, 2020), while the university

⁶Another interpretation, not in contrast with the previous one, is that welfare reforms were introduced earlier in countries where the population had stronger (latent) preferences for redistribution.

system adopted by US states built on the Prussian model (Faust, 1916).

This discussion suggests that the long run effects of immigration on American ideology are *ex-ante* ambiguous. On the one hand, income effects, immigrants' selection, ethnic heterogeneity, and natives' reactions are consistent with a negative relationship between immigration and preferences for redistribution. On the other hand, if immigrants arrived with a more liberal ideology and with stronger preferences for redistribution relative to natives, and if such preferences traveled across groups, counties that received more European immigrants might house individuals with higher demand for social welfare and with more liberal attitudes today.

3 Data

3.1 Historical Data

Historical county characteristics. Data on the number of European immigrants and their characteristics (e.g. income score, literacy, English proficiency, and employment in manufacturing) at the county-decade level are taken from the full count US Censuses (Ruggles et al., 2020). From the same source we also obtain several 1900 county variables (e.g. Black and urban share of the population; labor force participation; employment share in manufacturing; occupational income score).⁷ Our analysis also includes geographic coordinates and railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020). Detailed information about each variable and its sources is provided in Table A.1.⁸

Panels A and B of Table 1 present the summary statistics for the historical variables and for the main immigrants' characteristics of our sample, respectively. The 1910-1930 immigrant share for the average county in our sample is 5.5%, but this masks substantial heterogeneity across space. Immigrants were concentrated in the North-East and in the Mid-West as well as in California. Much fewer of them instead settled in the US South at the time (Figure 1). Importantly for our analysis, which only exploits within-state variation, the historical presence of European immigrants varied substantially across counties within the same state (Figure A.5).

⁷For literacy and English proficiency (resp. labor market outcomes), we restrict the sample to individuals 15 or older (resp. men between 15 and 64). Since prior to 1940 no data on wages or income was reported in the US Census, we follow the literature (Abramitzky et al., 2014), and use occupational income scores, which are constructed by assigning to an individual the median income of his job category in 1950.

⁸We fix county boundaries to 1930, applying the harmonization procedure from Perlman (2016).

Exposure to social welfare reforms. We measure exposure to the welfare state in the countries of origin using the year of introduction of social welfare reforms across the European countries in our sample (Table A.2). Data on education reforms come from Bandiera et al. (2018), except for Germany and Austria for which we instead rely on the original data in Flora (1983).⁹ The year of introduction of pension reforms is taken from Galasso and Profeta (2018). We rely on Flora (1983) for the remaining reforms: health, unemployment insurance, and occupational injuries.

Leveraging individual level data from the US Census, we count the number of years between the date in which a country introduced a given reform and the year of arrival in the US of immigrants from that country. We then take the average exposure across the different types of reforms for immigrants from each country moving to the US in each decade between 1910 and 1930.¹⁰ Denoting this with $pr_{j\tau}$ and the immigrant share of each group (relative to all immigrants in the county) with $\gamma_{jc\tau}$, the county-specific index of exposure can be written as:

$$PR_{c\tau} = \sum_j \gamma_{jc\tau} \times pr_{j\tau} \quad (1)$$

Averaging $PR_{c\tau}$ across decades, we obtain the average exposure to reforms (brought about by immigration) in county c between 1910 and 1930. To ease the interpretation of coefficients, we standardize the index by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation. Results can therefore be interpreted as the effects of one standard deviation increase in the index of (historical) exposure to social welfare reforms.

3.2 Preferences for Redistribution and Political Ideology

We measure political ideology and preferences for redistribution relying on nationally representative data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), an online survey available since 2005 and widely used in the literature (Acharya et al., 2016; Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki, 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019). Conveniently for our purposes, the CCES reports the county of residence of respondents, and contains a wide range of questions – from political ideology and voting behavior to preferences for redistribution and views on the role of government. Appendix C describes the CCES

⁹Bandiera et al. (2018) also build their dataset from Flora (1983), but attribute to Germany and Austria education reforms carried out in the eighteenth century. We instead prefer to consider the reforms of the late nineteenth century, since these in our view capture more centralized (and thus, for our purposes meaningful) reforms.

¹⁰If a country did not introduce any given reform prior to 1930, we set this variable to zero.

in more detail. We restrict attention to American born individuals, and focus on eight questions – four for political ideology, and four for preferences for redistribution – coded so that higher values refer to more liberal (i.e. closer to the Democratic Party) ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution.¹¹

Panels C and D of Table 1 report the summary statistics for each of the eight outcomes, while Table C.2 presents the characteristics of respondents in our sample. Since not all questions were asked in all years and because not all individuals answered all questions, the number of respondents varies ranging from a minimum of around 186,000 (support for an increase in the minimum wage) to a maximum of more than 422,000 (party affiliation). The average ideology score is 2.86, while 37% and 50% of respondents identify with the Democratic Party and voted for a Democratic candidate in the last Presidential elections respectively. Around 58% of respondents in our sample oppose spending cuts and are in favor of financing the deficit with taxes, while slightly more than 70% of them are in favor of increasing the minimum wage.

4 Empirical Strategy

To study the long run effects of European immigration on American ideology, we estimate a specification of the form:

$$y_{icst} = \alpha_s + \gamma_t + \beta imm_{cs} + X_{cs} + W_{icst} + u_{icst} \quad (2)$$

where y_{icst} refers to ideology or preferences for redistribution of respondent i living in county c in year t . The key regressor of interest is the average European immigrant share of the county population between 1910 and 1930, imm_{cs} . We always control for state and survey wave fixed effects, α_s and γ_t , for individual characteristics of respondents, W_{icst} (a quadratic in age, gender, race dummies, marital and employment status, educational attainment and income dummies), and for a large array of historical county variables, X_{cs} , described in Section 5 when presenting our results.¹² Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

¹¹See Table C.1 for the exact wording, the range of the corresponding answer, and the years in which each question is available.

¹²There are 12 income categories – from less than 10,000 to more than 150,000 US dollars. We include dummies for each of them. See Table C.2 for more details. We do not include contemporaneous county controls, since any variable for the current period might be directly or indirectly affected by historical immigration (Sequeira et al., 2020). As such, these would be “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).

4.1 Instrument for Historical Immigration

The main threat to our identification strategy is that the location of immigrants between 1910 and 1930 was influenced by county-specific factors that were also correlated with the long run evolution of American ideology at the local level. To overcome this concern, in addition to controlling for historical county characteristics and for state fixed effects, we construct a version of the shift-share instrument widely used in the immigration literature (Card, 2001).

The instrument predicts the number of immigrants received by each county in each decade from 1910 to 1930 by interacting 1900 settlements of different ethnic groups with subsequent migration flows from each sending (European) country. Similarly to Burchardi et al. (2019) and Tabellini (2020), as suggested in Adao et al. (2019), we construct a “leave-out” version of the shift-share instrument, by excluding immigrants who eventually settled in a given county. Formally, the predicted number of immigrants received by county c during decade τ is given by

$$\tilde{Z}_{c\tau} = \sum_j sh_{jc} Imm_{j\tau} \quad (3)$$

where sh_{jc} is the share of immigrants from country j living in county c as of 1900 (relative to all immigrants from country j in the US), and $Imm_{j\tau}$ is the number of immigrants arrived from country j in the US between decade $\tau - 1$ and decade τ , net of those that eventually settled in county c . Since we are interested in predicting the total number of immigrants in the county, we add the 1900 immigrant stock to the predicted flows for 1910, and then recursively sum the flows for subsequent decades predicted by $\tilde{Z}_{c\tau}$. Finally, we compute the average number of predicted immigrants in the county for the three decades 1910, 1920, and 1930, and scale it by 1900 county population. We denote the predicted average immigrant share in county c with Z_{cs} , and we use it to instrument for the average immigrant share, imm_{cs} , in equation (2).

The shift-share instrument exploits two sources of variation. First, it relies on cross-sectional variation in 1900 immigrants’ enclaves of different countries across US counties.¹³ Second, it leverages time-series variation in migration patterns across sending regions. As discussed in Section 2.1, between 1900 and 1930, nation-wide

¹³Figure A.6 plots the share of immigrants from different European origins living in selected US counties in 1900, and confirms the geographic clustering of different groups already documented in the literature (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). Focusing on Massachusetts, Figure A.7 verifies that a similar degree of variation exists also for counties within the same state.

shocks – WWI and the Immigration Acts – exogenous to county-specific conditions dramatically changed both the number and the composition of immigrants moving to the US.

4.1.1 Instrument Validity

The validity of shift-share designs has been studied in recent work (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2020; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Jaeger et al., 2018). Below we discuss the various threats to identification and how we tackled them. Section 5.2 describes these and other robustness checks, which are then reported in Appendix B.

One threat to identification is that the county characteristics that attracted European immigrants from specific countries before 1900 may be correlated both with patterns of migration across European origins from 1910 to 1930 and with the long run evolution of American ideology at the local level (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). While we cannot observe the ideology of native-born individuals at the county level at the beginning of the twentieth century, we proxy for political preferences with the vote share of the Democratic Party in presidential elections at baseline. Reassuringly, results are unchanged when controlling for these political variables; also, and importantly, there is no relationship between the instrument and the Democratic vote share until the late 1920s.

In addition, we control for a large array of county-fixed and 1900 characteristics (see Section 5.1). To isolate more directly the variation in immigrants’ composition exploited by the instrument, we separately control for the initial share of immigrants from each European country. This exercise tests whether the instrument disproportionately relies on specific destination-origin combinations, which may also be spuriously correlated with the long run evolution of preferences across US counties (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). We complement this robustness check by controlling separately for the share of European immigrants arrived before 1900. This is important, since one may be concerned that, mechanically, the shift-share instrument predicts larger immigration in counties with more immigrants before 1900 and, at the same time, that these earlier immigrants had an effect on political preferences and ideology of natives.¹⁴

A second threat to the validity of the instrument is that it may be correlated with

¹⁴Results are also unchanged when controlling for the 1900 share of “internal” migrants – an indicator of both economic attractiveness and socially progressive attitudes of the county.

specific shocks hitting US counties that both affected local conditions and influenced emigration patterns across European countries. We address this concern by including a measure of predicted labor demand, which combines the 1900 industrial composition of US counties with industry national growth rates (Tabellini, 2020), and controlling for railroad connectivity (Sequeira et al., 2020). Restricting attention to non-southern states, we also replicate the analysis accounting for the 1940-1970 Great Migration of African Americans – a major shock to the racial composition of non-southern counties (Boustan, 2016). Moreover, as in Sequeira et al. (2020), we predict emigration from Europe exploiting solely variation in weather shocks across countries.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as noted in Abramitzky et al. (2019b) and Tabellini (2020) among others, WWI and the Immigration Acts make our setting particularly suitable for the use of the shift-share instrument. This is because these shocks induced a sharp change in the immigration patterns prevailing until 1915, which had also contributed to the formation of the 1900 immigrant settlements. This reduces the serial correlation in migration flows from the same country of origin to the same local destination – a feature that might invalidate the shift-share design by conflating the short and the long run effects of immigration (Jaeger et al., 2018).¹⁵ The differential impact of such exogenous, nation-wide shocks across European countries is also key to reduce more general concerns about the validity of shift-share designs, as formally shown in Borusyak et al. (2020).

5 Main Results

5.1 Historical Immigration and American Ideology

We begin our analysis by investigating the long run effects of European immigration on political ideology and preferences for redistribution of American born individuals today. Before presenting our formal regression results, we show the variation in the raw data in Figure A.8, where we plot the distribution of the voting-Democrat dummy in presidential elections (Panel A) and of support for welfare spending (Panel B), after partialling out state fixed effects. Two patterns emerge. First, for both outcomes, we observe a strong variability throughout the country. Second, the distribution of both support for the Democratic Party and preferences for redistribution somewhat

¹⁵For instance, while the correlation in predicted immigration within the same destination over time is around .95 for the period between 1980 and 2010 (Jaeger et al., 2018), it is lower than .3 in our context.

resembles that of the historical presence of European immigrants (partialled out from state fixed effects and reported in Figure A.5).

In Table 2, we present results for our preferred specification, which includes a large number of historical controls, in addition to state and survey wave fixed effects and individual characteristics.¹⁶ OLS estimates, reported in Panel A, are always positive and highly statistically significant. 2SLS coefficients, presented in Panel B, show a very similar pattern: historical immigration is strongly associated with more liberal political ideology and with stronger preferences for redistribution among US born respondents today.¹⁷ Interestingly, OLS and 2SLS coefficients are very close, and never statistically different from each other – a pattern similar to that documented in Tabellini (2020) for the short run effects of European immigration across US cities. One explanation is that the pull factors that might have attracted immigrants to a county (e.g. strong labor demand) were offset by congestion costs that induced immigrants to select otherwise declining places. Alternatively, immigrants may have chosen their location based on local economic conditions prevailing at the time, and that these were not correlated with natives’ ideology (either in the past or today).

To interpret the magnitude of 2SLS estimates, note that a 5 percentage points increase in the average immigrant share – or, 40% of the inter-quartile range – is associated with a 1.3% higher probability of reporting a liberal ideology (column 1) and with a 6.5% higher likelihood of identifying with the Democratic Party (column 3), relative to the sample mean. Results are similar for preferences for redistribution: relative to respondents living in a county at the 25th percentile of the historical immigrant share, individuals in a county at the 75th percentile are 4.5% more likely to oppose spending cuts and 4.7% more likely to support welfare spending, relative to the sample mean (columns 5 and 6).¹⁸ The effects of immigration on support for an increase in the minimum wage and for funding state deficit through taxes (rather than via spending cuts) are quantitatively similar.

¹⁶Historical controls include geographical coordinates, 1910-1930 predicted industrial growth as in Tabellini (2020), railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), as well as the 1900: urban and Black share, male labor force participation, employment share in manufacturing, and occupational income scores. Results remain unchanged when estimating more parsimonious specifications, which do not include historical (Table B.12) or individual (Table B.13) controls.

¹⁷Panel C reports first stage estimates, and verifies that the instrument is strong, with the F-stat well above conventional levels. Figure A.9 presents the graphical analogue of these results by plotting the (bin) scatterplot for the first stage, after partialling out all controls included in Table 2.

¹⁸These numbers are obtained by multiplying the coefficients in columns 5 and 6 of Panel B by the inter-quartile range of the average fraction of immigrants in our sample (0.12), and dividing it by the mean of the dependent variable, reported at the bottom of each column in Table 2.

Coefficients on individual controls (reported in Table A.3) are in line with those estimated in the literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Race is probably the single most important determinant of preferences for redistribution and political behavior in the US. For political ideology, the standardized beta coefficient on historical immigration is roughly one third relative to that on a dummy for being a Black individual. The magnitude of the coefficient on historical immigration is half than that on the dummy for being a Black American for all questions pertaining to preferences for redistribution, except for support for welfare spending, for which the size is similar. In our sample, higher income is associated with lower desire for redistribution (in line with Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The standardized beta coefficient on historical immigration is approximately equal to the effect of having an income in the range of \$80,000-\$100,000 relative to having an income of less than \$10,000.

Summing up, this section has documented a strong effect of historical European immigration on preferences for redistribution and liberal ideology of American born individuals today. Our estimates are quantitatively large, and comparable in size to key determinants of preferences for redistribution and political behavior in the US, such as race and income. Section 6 explores the mechanisms behind these results.

5.2 Summary of Robustness Checks

In this section, we summarize the exercises performed to probe the robustness of our findings, which are described in detail in Appendix B.

First, we check that results are robust to the inclusion of baseline controls for the Democratic vote share in presidential elections (Table B.1). Second, Figures B.1 and B.2 replicate the analysis by including – one by one – the initial shares of each immigrant group in the county, i.e. sh_{jc} in equation (3). This exercise reduces concerns raised by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) that specific combinations of US counties and European countries of origin might be absorbing most of the variation in our data.¹⁹ Third, we construct a modified version of the instrument that predicts European migration using only variation in weather shocks across sending countries (Table B.2). Fourth, focusing on non-southern counties, we replicate results controlling for the instrumented 1940-1970 Black in-migration (Table B.3), when more than 4 million Black individuals moved to the US North and West (Boustan, 2016). In

¹⁹This exercise also deals with the possibility that the initial immigrant shares were not independent of cross-county pull factors systematically related to settlers’ state of origin.

addition, we verify that results are robust to controlling for the 1900 share of internal migrants (Table B.4).

We also replicate results *i*) using the average immigrant share for the full 1850-1930 period (Table B.5), and, as discussed in more detail in Section 6.2, controlling for the share of European immigrants that arrived before 1900 (Table B.6); *ii*) accounting explicitly for both ethnic diversity and polarization (Table B.7); *iii*) dropping counties above (resp. below) the 99th and 95th (resp. 1st and 5th) percentile of the 1910-1930 average immigrant share (Tables B.8 and B.9); *iv*) dropping the US South and aggregating the data to the commuting zone (CZ) level (Tables B.10 and B.11). Finally, we show that point estimates are unchanged when estimating specifications that include different sets of controls (Tables B.12 and B.13), and that the precision of results is unaffected by clustering standard errors at the CZ or at the state level (Tables B.14 and B.15).

6 Mechanisms

The positive effects of immigration on natives' preferences for redistribution and left-leaning ideology documented above stand in contrast with those from most existing papers. Focusing on the short run, the literature has uncovered a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). A similar pattern, together with natives' backlash and increased support for right-wing parties, has been found for immigration in a variety of contexts (Alesina et al., 2018; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017).²⁰ Our results are somewhat more consistent with those in Mayda et al. (2020) and Steinmayr (2020) who show, for the US and Austria respectively, that the effects of immigration may depend on the skills of immigrants and on the frequency and type of contact between immigrants and natives.

The long run focus of our work marks a key distinction with the existing literature, since the political effects of immigration may be very different in the long and in the short run. While ethnic and cultural diversity might shift natives' political preferences to the right in the short run, these effects may gradually dissipate and even flip sign over time. In this section, we explore two classes of mechanisms. First, we consider

²⁰Specifically for the Age of Mass Migration, Tabellini (2020) finds that European immigration reduced support for the Democratic Party, led to the election of anti-immigrant legislators, and lowered both public spending and tax rates across US cities between 1910 and 1930.

different economic forces, concluding that none of them, alone, can fully explain our results. Next, we turn to a “social transmission” mechanism. We conjecture, and provide evidence, that immigrants exposed to a more generous welfare state in Europe, who likely held stronger preferences for redistribution, transmitted their values to natives. We also show that a mere process of vertical transmission within ancestry groups cannot explain our findings.

6.1 Economic Mechanisms

Direct economic effects. Immigrants could have influenced natives’ preferences for redistribution through direct economic effects. The strong, positive effect of European immigration on long run income per capita shown in Sequeira et al. (2020) is somewhat inconsistent with this mechanism. If anything, direct economic forces should have led to weaker – rather than stronger – preferences for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Moreover, Tabellini (2020) finds that even natives working in highly exposed sectors (e.g. manufacturing) and occupations (e.g. laborers) did not experience significant wage or employment losses, suggesting that immigration was unlikely to increase income inequality.²¹ In Appendix E.1, we provide additional, although admittedly imperfect, evidence that (immigrant driven) inequality is unlikely to explain our findings by showing that our results are robust to controlling for income inequality today (Tables E.1 and E.2). Since the latter is measured several decades after historical immigration, it may be a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008); we thus interpret these results as merely suggestive.

Immigrants’ economic characteristics. A second possibility is that immigrants from different regions brought with them specific skills and economic characteristics, which in turn influenced the evolution of natives’ ideology. We address this concern in Appendix E.2, where we separately control for a number of instrumented immigrants’ characteristics (occupational income scores, ability to speak English, literacy, and employment in manufacturing). When adding these controls, the historical average immigrant share remains strongly positive and highly significant. Moreover, coefficients on each additional control are imprecisely estimated and quantitatively close to zero (Table E.3, Panels A to D). Results remain unchanged also when including all instrumented controls simultaneously (Table E.3, Panel E), and when adding an

²¹These results are consistent with those obtained for the contemporaneous period: there is very limited, if any, evidence that immigration to the US has increased inequality (Card, 2009).

index of immigrants’ intergenerational mobility (Table E.4 in Appendix E.3). Overall, these patterns suggest that immigrants’ economic characteristics are unlikely to be a major mechanism behind our findings.

Immigrants’ selection. Immigrants might have influenced natives’ preferences for redistribution also via selection (Borjas, 1987). However, were this mechanism at play, one would expect it to lower, rather than to increase, natives’ preferences for redistribution. For one, focusing on Scandinavia, Knudsen (2019) shows that immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration were more likely to be individualistic, and so less supportive of redistribution.²² Furthermore, return migration during this period was often above 30% (Bandiera et al., 2013), and stayers were positively selected (Abramitzky et al., 2019a). One would thus expect Europeans who permanently settled in the US to put more weight on effort rather than luck, and to prefer a smaller welfare state (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).

One final concern, related to selection, is that immigrants after 1900 settled in areas that were disproportionately more urban (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017), where the “frontier culture” of rugged individualism was weaker (Bazzi et al., 2020; Turner, 1893). One may thus worry that counties with a higher 1910-1930 immigrant share already hosted individuals with a more liberal ideology, and also attracted migrants with stronger preferences for redistribution. In Appendix E.4 (Table E.5), however, we show that our results are unchanged when controlling for the total frontier exposure from Bazzi et al. (2020).²³

6.2 Immigrants and the Transmission of Ideology

The literature views immigrants’ assimilation as a one-sided process, with minorities converging to the norms of the majority (Abramitzky et al., 2020a; Fouka, 2020). Yet, it is possible for native-born individuals to gradually absorb the ideology that immigrants bring with them. By analyzing a period that spans more than a century, our work has the potential to unveil such spillover process – something that studies focusing on the short run may be unable to do. In this section, we explicitly test the social transmission mechanism, providing different pieces of evidence that immigrants who were more exposed to welfare reforms in Europe are associated with larger effects

²²These findings are in line with the “voluntary settlement hypothesis”, according to which immigrants tend to be highly independent individuals (Kitayama et al., 2006).

²³Consistent with findings in Bazzi et al. (2020), instead, a longer experience with the frontier is associated with weaker preferences for redistribution and with more conservative ideology.

on natives’ preferences for redistribution today. Decomposing the transmission process, we also show that horizontal (from immigrants to natives) rather than vertical (within immigrant groups across generations) transmission is more likely to explain our results.

The German example. We begin with the case of Germany – an emblematic example, because of the major social welfare reform implemented by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1884. In Appendix E.5, we describe this specific episode and analysis in detail. In Table E.6, we estimate OLS regressions similar to our baseline specification, comparing the effects of Germans arrived between, respectively, 1850 and 1880, and 1885 and 1930. If exposure to the welfare state shaped immigrants’ preferences, which in turn spilled over into those of natives, Germans arrived after the reform should have a stronger impact on natives’ ideology in the long run. Consistent with our hypothesis, only the 1900-1930 German share enters positively and significantly, while the coefficient on the 1850-1880 German share is quantitatively small, negative, and imprecisely estimated.²⁴

Exposure to social welfare reforms. Next, we consider a broader proxy for exposure to the welfare state – one that encompasses most European countries in our sample, and includes different social welfare reforms. We use the index described in Section 3.1 to measure the exposure to social welfare reforms that European immigrants had in their countries of origin prior to emigration. We instrument the index, by replacing the actual immigrant shares of each group (in a county and decade) with the predicted ones. Figure A.10 shows that, after partialling out state fixed effects, the predicted index of reforms (which is highly correlated with its actual counterpart) takes on higher values in the Mid-West, which hosted many immigrants from Scandinavia and Germany – sending areas with a relatively high number of years of exposure to welfare reforms. Yet, the index varies substantially across the country, suggesting that our analysis is unlikely to capture regional patterns, which would be anyway absorbed by state fixed effects.

In Table A.4, we augment our preferred specification by including the instrumented index of reforms.²⁵ The main effect of immigration remains in line with that in Table 2. However, differently from other immigrants’ characteristics, the coefficient on the index of reforms is positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively large.

²⁴Appendix E.5 also documents that Germans moving before and after 1884 were similar along observable characteristics, and that their settlement patterns largely overlapped (Figure E.1).

²⁵The index is standardized to have zero mean and a standard deviation of one (Section 3.1).

One standard deviation increase in exposure to reforms is associated with a 1.8% and 2.8% higher probability of voting for the Democratic Party (column 4) and oppose spending cuts (column 5), respectively. These effects are similar to those implied by a 5 percentage points (equivalent to the sample mean, or 40% of the inter-quartile range) increase in the average fraction of immigrants.

We also examine one additional implication of the social transmission mechanism. That is, the effects of immigration should be stronger when immigrants had been more exposed to social welfare programs in their countries of origin. To test this idea, we separately estimate the effects of immigration for counties with the index of exposure to reforms above and below the median, reporting 2SLS coefficients in Figure 2 (see also Table A.5).²⁶ Consistent with our hypothesis, the effects are larger in counties with exposure above the sample median (orange bars), with the coefficient on historical immigration being always statistically significant, positive, and quantitatively large. Conversely, in counties with immigrants' exposure to reforms below the median (blue bars), the coefficient on immigration becomes smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated.

Is the index of reforms capturing preferences for redistribution? Interpreting the results for the index of historical preferences for redistribution may be complicated for a number of reasons. First, the index could pick up other immigrants' economic characteristics. To address this concern, in Appendix E.6.1, we include instrumented immigrants' economic characteristics, replicating both exercises described above (Tables A.4 and A.5). Reassuringly, Tables E.7 and E.8 show that, even though the F-stat falls below conventional levels in some cases, results always remain in line with those from our preferred specification. These patterns indicate that our previous findings cannot be explained by the possible correlation between exposure to the welfare state and economic characteristics of immigrants.

A second potential concern is that exposure to social welfare reforms captures, more broadly, the influence of the institutions prevailing in the country of origin. In contrast with this possibility, Appendix E.6.2 shows that results are unchanged when separately controlling for different proxies for institutional quality. Reassuringly, while the index of institutional quality are never statistically significant and quantitatively small, coefficients on both the immigrant share and the index of ex-

²⁶To reduce concerns of endogeneity, we perform the split using the predicted – rather than the actual – index of reforms.

posure to reforms remain strongly positive and precisely estimated (Tables E.9 and E.10).

Third, one may be worried that the (predicted) index of preferences for redistribution is correlated with baseline (natives’) ideology. To address this potential issue, in Appendix E.6.3, we verify that results for our sample split are unchanged when controlling for the baseline Democratic vote share (Table E.11). As an additional robustness check, we also replicate the analysis using only pensions and education reforms (Tables E.12 and E.13) – the two most common reforms implemented in Europe prior to the 1920s. This rules out concerns that results may be driven by few, uncommon reforms.

Finally, exposure to social welfare reforms in the country of origin may be a poor proxy for immigrants’ preferences for redistribution. To address this possibility, in Appendix E.6.4, we validate our approach using the European Social Survey (ESS). Following Luttmer and Singhal (2011) and focusing on European immigrants to more precisely measure the portability of preferences from the country of origin, we first show that, today, immigrants from countries that introduced welfare reforms earlier have stronger preferences for redistribution (Table E.14).²⁷ Then, we construct an index based on preferences for redistribution expressed by European immigrants in the ESS, and replicate the analysis conducted with its historical counterpart above. Both when adding the (ESS-based) instrumented index of preferences for redistribution (Table E.15) and when splitting the sample above and below the median of such index (Table E.16), results remain in line with our baseline ones.

Pre-1900 immigrants. Since most reforms were introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century or at the beginning of the twentieth century, we conjecture that only Europeans moving to the US after 1900 should drive our results, because of their higher exposure to welfare reforms in their countries of origin. Instead, those arrived before 1900 should have a smaller effect (if any at all).²⁸ To test this hypothesis, in Appendix E.6.5, we replicate our baseline 2SLS specification by separately controlling for the average share of immigrants in the 1850-1900 period (Table E.17).

In line with our conjecture, the coefficient on the 1910-1930 immigrant share remains positive and is never statistically different from that reported in Table 2.

²⁷See also Appendix C.2 for more details about the ESS.

²⁸Moreover, immigrants arrived during the nineteenth century faced a less densely settled country, where the “frontier culture” of rugged individualism (Turner, 1893) may have dampened a left-leaning political ideology. Indeed, 1890 marks the end of the “frontier era” (Bazzi et al., 2020).

Instead, coefficients on 1850-1900 immigration are quantitatively small and not statistically significant. These patterns suggest that post-1900 immigrants, who had accumulated higher exposure to the welfare state, were more important than those arrived during the nineteenth century to shape preferences of natives.²⁹

6.3 Channels of Transmission

Results presented in Section 6.2 are consistent with a process of social transmission, where historical exposure to social welfare reforms influenced immigrants' ideology, which in turn shaped the geography of political preferences in the United States over the long run. Thus far, we have assumed that such process took place horizontally, and that immigrants' preferences spilled over to natives. An alternative interpretation – not in contrast with our preferred one – is that both ethnic settlements and group-specific preferences persisted over time. In this scenario, the positive relationship between exposure to welfare reforms and preferences for redistribution today may be explained by the vertical transmission of ideology across generations within the same immigrant groups. In this section, we first provide evidence in support of inter-group contact and horizontal transmission. Next, we show that our main findings cannot be explained solely by vertical transmission.

6.3.1 Inter-Group Contact and Horizontal Transmission

If horizontal transmission of preferences was an important mechanism behind our results, the effects of immigration should be stronger when historical inter-group contact was more frequent, and when it was easier for immigrants and natives to understand (and trust) each other. To test this hypothesis, we develop two measures of historical inter-group contact: intermarriage and residential integration. For each immigrant group, we construct the 1900 average share of individuals who, respectively, were married to a native of native parentage and had at least one native neighbor of native parentage. Then, we interact it with the predicted immigrant share (relative to all other immigrants) in a county-decade. Finally, we sum these predicted values across all immigrant groups in each county, and take the average across decades.³⁰

²⁹As discussed in Appendix B.6, the inclusion of pre-1900 immigration is important also for identification. In particular, results in Table E.17 assuage the concern that the instrument mechanically predicts a larger immigrant share between 1910 and 1930 in counties that had more immigrants (overall) in 1900.

³⁰The index of residential integration builds on the procedure used in Logan and Parman (2017). See Appendix D for more details.

Figures A.11 and A.12 plot both measures, after partialling out state fixed effects, and show that there is substantial variation between the two across counties. Moreover, the geographic distribution of either index does not overlap with that of the index of exposure to reforms (Figure A.10). Estimating separate regressions for counties above and below the median of predicted intermarriage and residential integration, we find that the impact of immigration is stronger in counties with higher intermarriage (Figure 3) and residential integration (Figure 4). For most outcomes, 2SLS coefficients for counties with values of inter-group contact above the median (orange bars) are twice as large as those for counties below the median (blue bars).³¹ These patterns seem to also indicate that vertical transmission within the same ancestry group (coupled with the persistence of ethnic settlements) is unlikely to explain all of our results. In fact, if this were the main channel, the effects should be smaller, and not larger, where immigrants and natives interacted more often.

In Appendix E.7, we examine one additional force that might have promoted the horizontal transmission of ideology: linguistic similarity. We conjecture, and provide evidence, that immigrants whose language was “closer” to English should have transmitted their ideology to natives more easily. This is for two reasons. First, higher linguistic similarity should make it easier for individuals speaking different languages to communicate and to understand each other. Second, linguistic distance is a proxy for cultural similarity, and a large literature has shown that individuals that have more similar cultures tend to trust each other more (Guiso et al., 2009). Defining immigrants as linguistically “far” and “close” to English following Chiswick and Miller (2005), we show that, while both groups are associated with a more liberal ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution among natives today, the effects are an order of magnitude larger, and more precisely estimated, for the latter than for the former (Table E.24).

6.3.2 Persistence of Preferences within Ancestry Groups

If ethnic settlements are sticky and if ancestry-specific preferences persist over time, our previous findings may be, at least in part, explained by vertical transmissions

³¹Coefficients and F-stats corresponding to Figures 3 and 4 are reported in Tables A.6 and A.7 respectively. In Appendix E.7, we verify that results are unchanged when including the baseline Democratic vote share (Tables E.19 and E.20) and when controlling for instrumented immigrants’ characteristics (Tables E.21 and E.22), reducing concerns that immigrants in either sample self-selected in areas that had a pre-existing differential ideology or had specific economic characteristics. Appendix D presents additional robustness checks on results for residential integration.

across generations (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). We test this idea using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), which offers two key advantages for our purposes compared to the CCES.³² First, it includes the ancestry of respondents; second, it reports the nativity of both their parents and their grandparents. We can thus test, although imperfectly, whether our findings are driven by the persistence of preferences within ancestry groups.

Following the literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), we select three questions for political behavior and four measures for preferences for redistribution, coding them so that higher values refer to more liberal ideology and stronger support for redistribution.³³ Then, we replicate our baseline analysis (Table 2). Because of the very limited sample size, we only include Census division – rather than state – dummies; as in Table 2, however, we include all historical and individual controls. Results are reported in Table A.8.

To mirror the CCES analysis, Panel A restricts attention to US born respondents, and verifies that our results are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 2. Next, in Panel B, we add dummies for respondent’s ancestry. 2SLS coefficients remain virtually unchanged, indicating that a mere mechanism of vertical persistence within ancestry groups is unlikely to explain our findings. In Panels C and D, in addition to controlling for ancestry dummies, we restrict the sample to individuals with both parents and both grandparents born in the US respectively. Despite the reduction in sample size, coefficients remain in line with those reported in Panels A and B. Overall, this exercise indicates that the relationship between historical immigration and contemporaneous preferences for redistribution, likely mediated by immigrants’ exposure to the welfare state in their country of origin, cannot be explained (only) by a process of vertical transmission.³⁴

In Appendix E.8, we provide another piece of evidence against the mechanism of vertical persistence. Specifically, we compute the share of the county population that, in 2000, had European ancestry, and show that our main results are robust to controlling for it (Table E.25). Since the 2000 European ancestry share is measured after our main treatment (i.e. the historical average immigrant share), and as such

³²As we note in Appendix C.3, both the sample size and the number of counties included in the GSS are substantially smaller than in the CCES. Appendix C.3 presents summary statistics of the GSS sample (Table C.6), and compares the characteristics of counties available in the two surveys (Table C.7).

³³See Table C.5 for the exact wording of each question.

³⁴In unreported results, to address the concern of small (and selected) sample in the county-level GSS dataset, we verified that results are similar when estimating regressions at the CZ and at the state level.

may be a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), this exercise should be viewed as suggestive. Yet, we find it reassuring that the coefficient on historical immigration is left unchanged.

7 From the Past to the Present

Sections 6.2 and 6.3 provide evidence that immigrants brought with them higher preferences for the welfare state, and transmitted them to natives. In this section, we trace out the evolution of this process. In an influential contribution, Andersen (1979) proposes a “mobilization” theory, arguing that immigrants were fundamental in explaining the New Deal electoral realignment. According to this view, support for Franklin D. Roosevelt (in the 1932 elections) had its origins in 1928, when Alfred Smith, an urban Catholic of immigrant background, attracted the immigrant vote to the Democratic Party. In subsequent years, the process of realignment continued, partly reinforced by the fact that immigrants were hit hard during the Great Depression (Clubb and Allen, 1969; Degler, 1964; Lubell, 1952).

We examine the idea that “Al Smith, the rags-to-riches scion of the Fulton Fishmarket, was responsible for bringing the children of ‘new immigration’ into an increasingly welfare-oriented Democratic party” (Clubb and Allen, 1969) in two ways. First, to inspect when the “shift” discussed in Clubb and Allen (1969) took place, we estimate the relationship between the Democratic vote share in presidential elections and the 1910-1930 average immigrant share across counties, from 1900 until today. Figure 5 plots 2SLS results from our preferred specification.³⁵ It shows that the 1910-1930 fraction of immigrant was largely uncorrelated with the Democratic vote share until 1924 (included), but that the coefficient abruptly spikes in 1928, when it becomes strongly positive and statistically significant. Although data on voting behavior by ethnicity (or, nativity) do not exist, we view these patterns as consistent with the “mobilization” hypothesis proposed by Andersen (1979). Furthermore, the quantitatively small and imprecisely estimated coefficient before 1928 is reassuring, as indicates the lack of “pre-trends”.

Second, we study the effects of European immigration on the generosity of New

³⁵Electoral returns at the county level come from Clubb et al. (1990) for 1900-1968, and from Leip’s Atlas (Leip, 2018) for 1972-2016. We weigh regressions by 1900 population in order to recover the effects of immigration on the average US county, and to make our county-level analysis comparable to that conducted above when using individual level survey data. Results are unchanged when estimating unweighted regressions.

Deal spending – one of the largest instances of social reforms in American history. We conjecture that the presence of European immigrants, with their stronger support for redistribution, influenced the local allocation of relief programs. Following Fishback et al. (2003), we divide New Deal expenditures in four categories: relief expenditures, public work programs, farm programs, and housing loans and insurance.³⁶ The relief expenditure program – directed to areas with high unemployment – was by far the most redistributive one. The redistributive content of other programs was instead much lower. The farm program allocated more money to areas with larger farms, higher average incomes, and higher share of wealthier citizens. Similarly, public work programs targeted areas with higher average retail sales per person, while loan programs distributed more funds to areas with higher levels of per capita retail sales, and with a higher percentage of households rich enough to pay income taxes. We thus expect the effect of immigration, if any, to be larger for relief expenditures.

Table 3 reports 2SLS results for regressions that, in addition to state fixed effects, include all the historical county controls used in our baseline specification (Table 2).³⁷ To assess the implied magnitude of coefficients and to ease comparisons across outcomes, we also report standardized beta coefficients in square brackets. Consistent with our hypothesis, the 1910-1930 immigrant share is strongly associated with relief expenditure per capita (column 1); instead, for other programs, coefficients have a small standardized beta coefficient, which in some cases is even negative (column 2, for public work programs) or not statistically significant (column 4, for housing loans). Notably, results remain unchanged when controlling for the severity of the Great Depression (Panel B), proxied for with the 1929-1933 sales growth rate as in Feigenbaum (2015) and Fishback et al. (2003).

8 Conclusions

A large and growing literature has studied the short run political effects of immigration, documenting that, often, immigrants trigger natives’ backlash and reduce preferences for redistribution. However, much less is known about the impact that immigration has on natives’ political ideology in the long run. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap, exploiting variation in the presence of European immigrants across

³⁶For more details, see Fishback et al. (2003).

³⁷As for Figure 5, regressions are weighed by 1900 county population, but results are unchanged when estimating unweighted regressions.

US counties between 1910 and 1930 to examine how historical immigration shaped the geography of political preferences in United States today.

Using a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001), we find that US born individuals living in counties with a higher historical immigrant share are, today, more left-leaning, more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate, and more supportive of government spending and redistribution. These results run counter to the large literature on the short-run effects of ethnic diversity and immigration (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Tabellini, 2020). Exploring the mechanisms, we provide evidence that standard economic forces – such as direct income effects, immigrants’ economic characteristics, and selection – cannot, alone, explain our results. Instead, we propose, and test, the hypothesis that immigrants brought with them their preferences for the welfare state, which were in turn transmitted to US born individuals.

Consistent with this idea, US counties where the “immigrant mix” originated from European countries with a longer history of social welfare reforms display, today, stronger preferences for redistribution and higher support for the Democratic Party. In line with a social transmission mechanism, immigration had a stronger effect when immigrants had been more exposed to welfare state policies prior to their arrival. Distinguishing between horizontal (from immigrants to natives) and vertical (within ancestry groups across generations) diffusion, we find that the former is more likely than the latter to explain our results. Indeed, the effects of immigration are stronger (today) in counties with a historically higher frequency of inter-group contact, and remain unchanged when controlling for respondents’ ancestry and restricting attention to US born individuals whose parents and grandparents were also born in the US.

Findings in this paper highlight the importance of distinguishing between the short and the long run effects of diversity and immigration. Immigrants might generate backlash, and reduce natives’ preferences for redistribution upon arrival. Yet, they may eventually lead to higher social cohesion and stronger desire for generous government spending over a longer horizon of time. Moreover, our results indicate that immigrants’ assimilation is not a one-sided process, and that, instead, immigrants’ preferences might spill-over and be transmitted to natives, thereby contributing to the development of a diverse and complex culture.

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
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
Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Average Immigrant Share of the County Population (1910-1930)




Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the average share of European Immigrants in the period 1910-1930 in our sample. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure 2. Heterogeneous Effects: Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms




Notes: the bars report 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on historical immigration for counties with exposure to social welfare reforms above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). See Table A.5 for formal 2SLS estimates.

Figure 3. Heterogeneous Effects: Intermarriage (1910-1930)




Notes: the bars report 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on historical immigration for counties with exposure to social welfare reforms above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). See Table A.6 for formal 2SLS estimates.

Figure 4. Heterogeneous Effects: Residential Integration (1910-1930)



Notes: the bars report 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on historical immigration for counties with exposure to social welfare reforms above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). See Table A.7 for formal 2SLS estimates.

Figure 5. Effect of Historical Immigration on Democratic Vote Share



Notes: the figure plots 2SLS point coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals in dashed lines) on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share. The dependent variable is the Democratic vote share in presidential elections in a county-election year. Regressions are weighed by 1900 county population, and include state fixed effects, and historical controls. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Historical County Variables					
Fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	0.055	0.067	0	0.389	2,939
Predicted fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	0.022	0.042	0	0.570	2,939
Urban share (1900)	0.135	0.218	0	1	2,939
Black share (1900)	0.134	0.213	0	0.935	2,939
Employment share in Manufacturing sector (1900)	0.060	0.065	0	0.442	2,939
Labor force share (1900)	0.832	0.058	0.397	1	2,939
Occupational score (1900)	2.839	0.151	2.363	3.305	2,939
Industry growth index (1910-1930)	0.069	0.055	-0.038	0.244	2,939
Railroad connectivity (1850-1900)	24.36	17.37	0	50	2,939
Panel B: County Immigrants' Characteristics (1910-1930)					
Exposure to welfare reforms	0	1	-3.365	4.140	2,898
Share of English-speaking immigrants	0.831	0.064	0.332	0.983	2,898
Share of literate immigrants	0.907	0.053	0.326	0.994	2,898
Immigrants' occupational score	2.536	0.092	0.841	2.634	2,898
Immigrants working in manufacturing	0.284	0.027	0.073	0.411	2,898
Panel C: CCES Ideology					
Ideology	2.857	1.151	1	5	353,031
Party affiliation scale (R to D)	4.220	2.210	1	7	368,268
Democratic party indicator	0.371	0.483	0	1	358,251
Voted Democratic candidate	0.497	0.500	0	1	283,642
Panel D: CCES Preferences for Redistribution					
Oppose spending cuts	0.582	0.493	0	1	328,884
Support welfare spending	2.799	1.199	1	5	130,634
Support minimum wage increase	0.710	0.454	0	1	163,209
Finance deficit with taxes	0.400	0.266	0	1	251,058

Table 2. Immigration, Redistribution, Ideology – Baseline Specification

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.781*** (0.141)	2.151*** (0.262)	0.525*** (0.050)	0.389*** (0.065)	0.230*** (0.054)	1.005*** (0.238)	0.295*** (0.056)	0.104*** (0.031)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.725*** (0.191)	2.039*** (0.361)	0.491*** (0.070)	0.380*** (0.089)	0.222*** (0.076)	1.099*** (0.380)	0.284*** (0.079)	0.111*** (0.039)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.243*** (0.092)	1.245*** (0.092)	1.245*** (0.092)	1.240*** (0.092)	1.246*** (0.092)	1.257*** (0.094)	1.243*** (0.089)	1.242*** (0.093)
KP F-stat	182.7	184.2	182.7	181.1	183.7	180.2	195.4	177.1
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean(s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 Black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.


Table 3. Immigration and New Deal Expenditures

Dep. Variables	Relief Expenditure	Public Work Program	Farm Program	Housing Loans and
	per capita	per capita	per capita	Insurance per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Baseline Specification</i>				
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	177.7*** (26.24) [0.256]	-48.96** (21.27) [-0.031]	122.4*** (19.04) [0.084]	43.43 (67.28) [0.059]
KP F-stat	528.8	528.8	528.8	528.8
Observations	2,896	2,896	2,896	2,896
<i>Panel B: Controlling for Sales Growth Rate</i>				
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	178.1*** (26.30) [0.257]	-45.18** (21.08) [-0.029]	119.2*** (19.03) [0.082]	41.50 (67.86) [0.057]
Sales Growth Rate	1.285 (4.335) [0.006]	21.06*** (4.992) [0.045]	-17.48*** (4.072) [-0.041]	-10.34 (7.990) [-0.048]
KP F-stat	525.7	525.7	525.7	525.7
Observations	2,894	2,894	2,894	2,894
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	76.94(47.03)	31.82(43.72)	37.35(52.83)	68.83(71.33)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.06(0.07)	0.06(0.07)	0.06(0.07)	0.06(0.07)
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables and the sales growth rate are taken from Fishback et al. (2003). Relief Expenditure (column 1) and Public Work Program (column 2) per capita refer to the total amount of Relief grants and public works grants, respectively; Farm Program per capita (column 3) aggregates loans and grants provided by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and the Rural Electrification Administration; Housing Loans and Insurance per capita (column 4) refers to the total amount of grants and loans provided by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, the Farm Housing Administration (insured loans), and the US Housing Administration. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. All regressions include state fixed effects, historical controls and are weighed by 1900 county population. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.


A Additional Figures and Tables - Online Appendix

Figure A.1. Immigrants by Region




Notes: Share of immigrant stock living in the United States, by sending region and by decade. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.2. Total Number of Immigrants (in Thousands)




Notes: Annual inflow of immigrants to the United States (1850-1930). Source: Migration Policy Institute.

Figure A.3. Immigrants as Percent of US Population




Notes: the solid line shows the number of legal immigrants as a percent of US population. The dashed line includes also the estimated number of illegal immigrants, available from 2000 onwards. Source: the number of legal immigrants comes from the Migration Policy Institute, while the number of illegal immigrants was taken from the Pew Research Center tabulations.

Figure A.4. Share of European Immigrants: “High” and “Low” Restrictions




Notes: Share of European immigrants entering the US in each year between 1900 and 1930, classified as coming from countries exposed to “high” and “low” restrictions to immigration according to Abramitzky et al. (2019b). Source: Authors’ calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.5. Average Immigrant Share – Partialling Out State Fixed Effects




Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the average share of European Immigrants in the period 1910-1930 in our sample after partialling out state fixed effect. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.6. Share of Immigrants from Selected Countries in Different Counties



Notes: share of individuals of European ancestry living in US counties in 1900, for selected ethnic groups. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).


Figure A.7. Share of Immigrants from Selected Countries in Massachusetts, 1900




Notes: share of individuals of European ancestry living in Massachusetts counties in 1900, for selected ethnic groups. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.8. Ideology and Preferences for Redistribution – Partialling Out State Fixed Effects

Panel A: Voted Democratic Candidate




panel B: Support Welfare Spending




Notes: the two maps plot the quintiles of two outcomes, respectively voted for Democratic candidate at Presidential Elections and support state welfare spending after partialling out state fixed effect.
Source: CCES

Figure A.9. First Stage (Residual Bin-Scatterplot)




Notes: The y-axis (resp. x-axis) reports the actual (resp. predicted) average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The scatterplot pools observations into 50 bins. Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residuals of the two variables, after partialling out state fixed effects, and 1900 historical controls. The red, solid line refers to the slope of the first stage coefficient, which is also reported in the main diagram (with associated clustered standard errors at the county level).

Figure A.10. Exposure to Welfare Reforms: Partialling Out State Fixed Effects




Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the predicted measure of exposure to social welfare reforms after partialling out state fixed effect. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.11. Intermarriage (1910-1930): Partialling Out State Fixed Effects



Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the predicted measure of the average intermarriage rate between 1910 and 1930 after partialling out state fixed effect. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.12. Residential Integration (1910-1930): Partialling Out State Fixed Effects



Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the predicted measure of residential integration computed in the period 1910-1930 after partialling out state fixed effect. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Table A.1. Independent Variables: Definition and Source

Variable	Description	Source
Fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of European Immigrant share over decade county population	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Predicted fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of predicted European Immigrant share over 1900 county population (Leave-out instrument adapted from Tabellini, 2020)	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Urban share (1900)	People in places with +2,500 inhabitants over county population	ICPSR Study 2896, Haines et al. (2010)
Black share (1900)	Black share over county population	ICPSR Study 2896, Haines et al. (2010)
Labor force share (1900)	Men in labor force over men aged 15-64	Ruggles et al. (2020)
Employment share in manufacturing sector (1900)	Share of men employed in manufacturing, relative to men in the labor force	Ruggles et al. (2020)
Occupational score (1900)	Average of $\log(1+\text{occupational score})$ for men in the labor force	Ruggles et al. (2020)
Industry growth index	Share of employment in different industries in each county in 1900 interacted with the national growth rate of each industry for each decade between 1900 and 1930.	Data from Ruggles et al. (2020), adapted from Tabellini (2020)
Connectivity to the railroad (1850-1900)	Years of connection to the Railroad in the period 1850-1900	Sequeira, Nunn, and Qian (2020)
County geographic coordinates	Latitude and longitude of the county centroid.	Manson et al. (2020)
Exposure to social welfare reforms	Average exposure to social welfare reforms for each immigrant group, weighted by the 1910-1930 relative immigrant share in the county. A value of 0 is assigned if a given reform was not introduced in the country of origin prior to 1930. The country-level value is constructed by taking the average across decades (1910 to 1930) of the number of years of exposure between the reform year and the emigration year of individual migrants.	Flora (1983); Bandiera et al. (2018); Galasso and Profeta (2018)
Share of English-speaking immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the share of English-speaker immigrants over all immigrants. Sample restricted to men and women aged at least 15	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Share of literate immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the share of literate immigrants over all immigrants. Sample restricted to men and women aged at least 15	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Immigrants' income score (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the average on labor force of $\log(1+\text{occupational score})$. Labor force restricted to immigrant men aged 15-64	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Immigrants working in manufacturing (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the share of immigrants (men aged 15-64) employed in manufacture over immigrants in labor force	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)

Table A.2. Immigrants and Exposure to Welfare Reforms (Year of Introduction)

Countries	Education	Pension	Injuries	Health	Unemployment
Albania	1928	-	-	-	-
Austria	1869	1906	1887	1888	1920
Belgium	1914	1900	1903	1894	1920
Bulgaria	-	1924	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	1906	-	-	-
Denmark	1814	1891	1898	1892	1907
Estonia	-	1924	-	-	-
Finland	1921	-	1895	-	-
France	1882	1910	1898	1898	1905
Germany	1871	1889	1871	1883	1927
Greece	1834	-	-	-	-
Hungary	-	1928	-	-	-
Ireland	1892	1908	1897	1911	1911
Italy	1877	1919	1898	1886	1919
Latvia	-	1922	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	1922	-	-	-
Netherlands	1900	1901	1901	1929	1916
Norway	1827	-	1894	1909	1906
Poland	1918	1927	-	-	-
Portugal	1835	-	-	-	-
Romania	-	1912	-	-	-
Russia	1918	1922	-	-	-
Spain	1857	1919	-	-	-
Sweden	1842	1913	1901	1891	-
Switzerland	1874	-	1881	1911	1924
United Kingdom	1880	1908	1897	1911	1911
Yugoslavia	-	-	-	-	-

Notes: the table presents the list of European countries included in our analysis, together with the year in which welfare reforms. The date reported for education reforms is based on Bandiera et al. (2018), except for Austria and Germany. In the latter case, we follow the definition in Flora (1983). Year of introduction of pension reforms comes from Galasso and Profeta (2018). We rely on Flora (1983) for the remaining reforms.

Table A.3. Baseline Specification with Individual Controls Coefficients

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.725*** (0.191)	2.039*** (0.361)	0.491*** (0.070)	0.380*** (0.088)	0.222*** (0.076)	1.099*** (0.380)	0.284*** (0.079)	0.111*** (0.039)
Age	-0.004*** (0.001) [-0.048]	0.025*** (0.002) [0.180]	0.003*** (0.001) [0.110]	0.0003 (0.001) [0.011]	0.005*** (0.0004) [0.162]	-0.002 (0.002) [-0.026]	0.003*** (0.001) [0.098]	-0.001*** (0.0003) [-0.085]
Age squared	-2.53e-05** (1.12e-05) [-0.035]	-0.0003*** (2.13e-05) [-0.193]	-3.01e-05*** (4.60e-06) [-0.098]	-1.65e-05*** (5.28e-06) [-0.052]	-6.10e-05*** (4.41e-06) [-0.195]	-4.75e-05*** (1.55e-05) [-0.065]	-3.54e-05*** (5.28e-06) [-0.125]	1.07e-05*** (2.89e-06) [0.062]
Female	0.216*** (0.006) [0.094]	0.404*** (0.011) [0.091]	0.117*** (0.003) [0.120]	0.094*** (0.003) [0.094]	0.084*** (0.003) [0.085]	0.090*** (0.010) [0.037]	0.113*** (0.003) [0.125]	0.044*** (0.002) [0.084]
Black	0.258*** (0.016) [0.070]	1.744*** (0.038) [0.250]	0.382*** (0.008) [0.249]	0.418*** (0.009) [0.265]	0.133*** (0.005) [0.086]	0.424*** (0.017) [0.106]	0.191*** (0.006) [0.127]	0.058*** (0.003) [0.062]
Other Race	0.031*** (0.011) [0.008]	0.391*** (0.025) [0.050]	0.064*** (0.005) [0.038]	0.061*** (0.006) [0.034]	0.0096** (0.005) [0.006]	0.0375** (0.017) [0.009]	0.0344*** (0.006) [0.022]	-0.0126*** (0.003) [-0.013]
Married	-0.396*** (0.009) [-0.171]	-0.624*** (0.017) [-0.140]	-0.103*** (0.004) [-0.105]	-0.145*** (0.005) [-0.143]	-0.118*** (0.003) [-0.119]	-0.191*** (0.015) [-0.080]	-0.076*** (0.004) [-0.083]	-0.060*** (0.002) [-0.112]
Widowed	-0.293*** (0.015) [-0.054]	-0.441*** (0.028) [-0.042]	-0.076*** (0.006) [-0.033]	-0.119*** (0.007) [-0.052]	-0.072*** (0.006) [-0.031]	-0.114*** (0.022) [-0.021]	-0.042*** (0.007) [-0.083]	-0.047*** (0.004) [-0.037]
Divorced	-0.194*** (0.010) [-0.057]	-0.329*** (0.019) [-0.050]	-0.064*** (0.004) [-0.045]	-0.073*** (0.005) [-0.049]	-0.045*** (0.004) [-0.031]	-0.065*** (0.014) [-0.018]	-0.024*** (0.005) [-0.018]	-0.030*** (0.003) [-0.038]
Unemployed	0.004 (0.011) [0.001]	-0.030* (0.018) [-0.003]	-0.026*** (0.004) [-0.013]	-0.016*** (0.005) [-0.007]	0.013*** (0.004) [0.006]	0.160*** (0.017) [0.029]	0.042*** (0.006) [0.019]	-0.001 (0.003) [-0.001]
Out Labor Force	0.026*** (0.006) [0.011]	0.067*** (0.012) [0.015]	0.005** (0.003) [0.005]	0.017*** (0.003) [0.016]	0.046*** (0.003) [0.046]	0.148*** (0.010) [0.061]	0.023*** (0.003) [0.025]	0.026*** (0.002) [0.048]
High School	-0.009 (0.016) [-0.004]	-0.107*** (0.030) [-0.022]	-0.005 (0.007) [-0.006]	-0.023*** (0.008) [-0.020]	-0.009 (0.008) [-0.009]	-0.197*** (0.026) [-0.073]	-0.025*** (0.007) [-0.025]	-0.016*** (0.005) [-0.027]
More than High School	0.190*** (0.016) [0.076]	0.122*** (0.031) [0.026]	0.016** (0.007) [0.015]	0.043*** (0.009) [0.039]	0.036*** (0.007) [0.034]	-0.065** (0.025) [-0.073]	-0.063*** (0.007) [-0.064]	0.021*** (0.005) [0.036]

Table A.3, Continued

Income 10-20K	0.055*** (0.015) [0.013]	0.092*** (0.023) [0.011]	0.028*** (0.006) [0.016]	0.017** (0.007) [0.009]	0.038*** (0.006) [0.021]	-0.102*** (0.021) [-0.023]	0.007 (0.006) [0.004]	0.005 (0.004) [0.005]
Income 20-30K	0.028* (0.015) [0.008]	0.039 (0.024) [0.006]	0.021*** (0.006) [0.014]	0.001 (0.007) [0.001]	0.007 (0.006) [0.004]	-0.311*** (0.022) [-0.081]	-0.002 (0.006) [-0.002]	-0.014*** (0.004) [-0.017]
Income 30-40K	0.005 (0.015) [0.002]	-0.012 (0.024) [-0.002]	0.019*** (0.006) [0.013]	-0.002 (0.007) [-0.001]	-0.009 (0.006) [-0.006]	-0.456*** (0.021) [-0.123]	-0.028** (0.007) [-0.020]	-0.024*** (0.004) [-0.029]
Income 40-50K	-0.004 (0.015) [-0.001]	-0.079*** (0.024) [-0.011]	0.009 (0.006) [0.006]	-0.008 (0.007) [-0.005]	-0.027*** (0.006) [-0.017]	-0.538*** (0.022) [-0.136]	-0.049*** (0.007) [-0.033]	-0.034*** (0.004) [-0.040]
Income 50-60K	-0.013 (0.015) [-0.003]	-0.122*** (0.025) [-0.017]	0.005 (0.007) [0.003]	-0.013* (0.008) [-0.008]	-0.043*** (0.006) [-0.026]	-0.581*** (0.022) [-0.146]	-0.067*** (0.007) [-0.044]	-0.038*** (0.004) [-0.044]
Income 60-70K	-0.006 (0.015) [-0.001]	-0.105*** (0.026) [-0.013]	0.007 (0.007) [0.004]	-0.003 (0.007) [-0.001]	-0.040*** (0.007) [-0.022]	-0.603*** (0.023) [-0.135]	-0.067*** (0.007) [-0.044]	-0.038*** (0.004) [-0.038]
Income 70-80K	0.011 (0.016) [0.003]	-0.108*** (0.027) [-0.013]	0.008 (0.007) [0.005]	-0.004 (0.008) [-0.002]	-0.048*** (0.006) [-0.026]	-0.577*** (0.023) [-0.131]	-0.073*** (0.007) [-0.045]	-0.036*** (0.004) [-0.038]
Income 80-100K	0.033** (0.016) [0.009]	-0.097*** (0.027) [-0.013]	0.012* (0.007) [0.007]	0.007 (0.008) [0.004]	-0.048*** (0.006) [-0.029]	-0.624*** (0.023) [-0.154]	-0.079*** (0.007) [-0.053]	-0.034*** (0.004) [-0.039]
Income 100-120K	0.041** (0.016) [0.009]	-0.082*** (0.028) [-0.009]	0.019*** (0.007) [0.010]	0.017** (0.008) [0.009]	-0.050*** (0.007) [-0.025]	-0.604*** (0.023) [-0.127]	-0.093*** (0.007) [-0.054]	-0.028*** (0.004) [0.027]
Income 120-150K	0.044** (0.017) [0.009]	-0.106*** (0.031) [-0.011]	0.012 (0.007) [0.005]	0.020** (0.009) [0.010]	-0.052*** (0.007) [-0.024]	-0.608*** (0.025) [-0.120]	-0.088*** (0.008) [-0.046]	-0.023*** (0.005) [-0.021]
Income > 150K	0.078*** (0.019) [0.017]	-0.080** (0.033) [-0.009]	0.019** (0.007) [0.009]	0.034*** (0.009) [0.017]	-0.053*** (0.008) [-0.026]	-0.606*** (0.027) [-0.125]	-0.089*** (0.009) [-0.049]	-0.024*** (0.006) [-0.022]
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
KP F-stat	182.7	184.2	182.7	181.1	183.7	180.2	195.4	177.1
Mean(s.d.) fraction of Immigrants	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. This table reports all individual controls associated with the regressions reported in Table 2, Panel B. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1 of the paper. Square brackets report beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.4. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.782*** (0.188) [0.057]	2.142*** (0.355) [0.081]	0.508*** (0.070) [0.088]	0.406*** (0.086) [0.068]	0.239*** (0.075) [0.040]	1.154*** (0.375) [0.080]	0.298*** (0.079) [0.055]	0.122*** (0.038) [0.038]
Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms	0.059*** (0.018) [0.039]	0.101*** (0.031) [0.035]	0.016*** (0.006) [0.025]	0.025*** (0.008) [0.037]	0.017*** (0.006) [0.026]	0.053*** (0.018) [0.034]	0.014*** (0.005) [0.023]	0.010*** (0.003) [0.029]
KP F-stat	213.6	216.8	217.6	211.4	217.3	211.3	216	222.8
Observations	313,597	326,286	317,388	252,450	291,621	116,693	145,104	222,823
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of exposure to social welfare reforms is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.5. Sample Split around Predicted Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms Median

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Welfare Reforms Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.744*** (0.448) [0.126]	3.938*** (0.861) [0.149]	0.746*** (0.171) [0.129]	0.846*** (0.213) [0.141]	0.604*** (0.172) [0.102]	1.427*** (0.424) [0.099]	0.624*** (0.136) [0.115]	0.310*** (0.086) [0.097]
KP F-stat	77.80	78.12	77.79	76.15	77.44	77.77	81.81	75.07
Observations	158,048	163,815	159,434	127,275	146,130	57,922	72,592	113,399
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.85(1.15)	4.17(2.21)	0.36(0.48)	0.49(0.50)	0.58(0.49)	2.81(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)
<i>Panel B: Welfare Reforms Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.351 (0.229) [0.025]	1.433*** (0.443) [0.054]	0.423*** (0.077) [0.073]	0.197* (0.103) [0.033]	0.066 (0.085) [0.011]	1.005** (0.472) [0.070]	0.156 (0.102) [0.029]	-0.004 (0.041) [-0.001]
KP F-stat	241	244.8	241.9	234.9	241.9	218	235.7	259.3
Observations	156,257	163,200	158,664	125,739	146,145	59,054	72,843	109,929
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.90(1.14)	4.34(2.21)	0.40(0.49)	0.53(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.83(1.19)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of exposure to social welfare reforms is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Here the sample is split around the median of this index in the estimation sample (-0.094). Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.6. Sample split around Predicted Intermarriage (1910-1930)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Intermarriage Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.577*** (0.429) [0.114]	3.604*** (0.866) [0.136]	0.720*** (0.157) [0.124]	0.842*** (0.180) [0.140]	0.420*** (0.151) [0.071]	1.450*** (0.408) [0.101]	0.563*** (0.149) [0.103]	0.161* (0.082) [0.050]
KP F-stat	449	451.1	451.1	457.8	463.3	468.1	459.5	451.5
Observations	157,825	163,983	159,566	126,910	146,347	58,428	72,966	112,980
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.81(1.15)	4.10(2.21)	0.35(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.79(1.19)	0.69(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)
<i>Panel B: Intermarriage Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.569** (0.230) [0.041]	1.777*** (0.433) [0.067]	0.455*** (0.079) [0.079]	0.336*** (0.099) [0.056]	0.188** (0.093) [0.032]	1.121** (0.475) [0.078]	0.236*** (0.091) [0.043]	0.063 (0.046) [0.020]
KP F-stat	404.5	407.3	407	408.1	400.5	402.7	414.2	410
Observations	156,480	163,032	158,532	126,103	145,928	58,548	72,468	110,348
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.94(1.15)	4.42(2.20)	0.41(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.86(1.20)	0.74(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. The measure of intermarriage is the predicted average share of intermarried over married immigrants in 1910-1930 period: we consider an immigrant to be intermarried if married with a native with both parents being native. Here the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (0.048). Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.7. Sample Split around Predicted Residential Integration (1910-1930)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential Integration Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.013*** (0.601) [0.146]	4.673*** (1.087) [0.176]	0.821*** (0.240) [0.142]	0.884*** (0.285) [0.148]	0.671*** (0.210) [0.113]	2.016*** (0.665) [0.140]	0.981*** (0.223) [0.180]	0.189 (0.134) [0.059]
KP F-stat	100.7	101.7	101.4	98.68	104.2	96.98	99.55	103
Observations	158,820	165,437	160,782	126,998	147,178	58,375	73,215	111,802
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.80(1.14)	4.12(2.23)	0.36(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.80(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)
<i>Panel B: Residential Integration Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.334 (0.263) [0.024]	1.424*** (0.467) [0.054]	0.433*** (0.082) [0.075]	0.245** (0.110) [0.041]	0.067 (0.095) [0.011]	1.067** (0.510) [0.074]	0.142 (0.107) [0.026]	0.033 (0.049) [0.010]
KP F-stat	100.7	101.7	101.4	98.68	104.2	96.98	99.55	103
Observations	155,485	161,578	157,316	126,016	145,097	58,600	72,220	111,526
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.96(1.15)	4.40(2.18)	0.40(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.84(1.19)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described Section 4.1. Residential integration (1910-1930) is defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017): the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (-0.357). Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.8. Redistribution, Ideology and Immigration – GSS

Dep. Variables	Party scale (R vs D)	Liberal vs Conservative	Voted Democratic Candidate	Assistance to the Poor	Welfare Spending	Government vs individual	Government role
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
<i>Panel A: People born in US</i>							
Historical Fraction of immigrants	2.148*** (0.564)	1.167*** (0.280)	0.300*** (0.113)	0.695*** (0.234)	0.391* (0.221)	0.428* (0.258)	1.027*** (0.307)
<i>First Stage</i>							
Predicted historical fraction of immigrants	1.541*** (0.128)	1.535*** (0.127)	1.531*** (0.129)	1.560*** (0.126)	1.512*** (0.128)	1.546*** (0.126)	1.545*** (0.126)
KP F-stat	144.6	147.1	141.9	152.2	139.2	150.1	151.1
Observations	18,533	16,242	15,457	9,128	9,208	10,880	10,750
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	4.18(2.01)	3.86(1.40)	0.56(0.50)	1.73(0.77)	2.53(0.69)	3.01(1.14)	2.88(1.20)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	
<i>Panel B: People born in US + Controlling for ancestry</i>							
Historical Fraction of immigrants	1.871*** (0.546)	1.120*** (0.279)	0.301*** (0.113)	0.668*** (0.216)	0.386* (0.213)	0.413* (0.246)	0.951*** (0.305)
<i>First Stage</i>							
Predicted historical fraction of immigrants	1.534*** (0.127)	1.530*** (0.126)	1.525*** (0.128)	1.554*** (0.126)	1.509*** (0.127)	1.543*** (0.125)	1.542*** (0.125)
KP F-stat	145.6	147.3	142.3	152.5	140.1	151.8	153
Observations	18,533	15,967	15,457	8,973	9,053	10,695	10,566
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	4.18(2.01)	3.86(1.40)	0.56(0.50)	1.73(0.77)	2.53(0.69)	3.01(1.14)	2.88(1.20)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	
<i>Panel C: People born in US+Controlling for ancestry + Parents born in US</i>							
Historical Fraction of immigrants	1.900*** (0.535)	1.139*** (0.312)	0.311*** (0.115)	0.702*** (0.212)	0.388* (0.232)	0.447 (0.273)	0.920*** (0.310)
<i>First Stage</i>							
Predicted historical fraction of immigrants	1.546*** (0.131)	1.542*** (0.130)	1.540*** (0.132)	1.569*** (0.129)	1.522*** (0.132)	1.562*** (0.132)	1.561*** (0.131)
KP F-stat	139.9	141.8	136.1	147	133.1	139.4	141.7

Table A.8, Continued

Observations	16,722	14,407	13,931	8,103	8,176	9,628	9,520
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	4.15(2.02)	3.84(1.39)	0.55(0.50)	1.72(0.77)	2.53(0.69)	3.00(1.14)	2.87(1.20)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.08(0.08)	0.08(0.08)	0.08(0.08)	0.08(0.08)	0.08(0.08)	0.08(0.08)	
<i>Panel D: People born in US+Controlling for ancestry + Parents and Grandparents born in US</i>							
Historical Fraction of immigrants	2.023*** (0.642)	0.926** (0.423)	0.409*** (0.142)	1.053*** (0.227)	0.357 (0.290)	0.219 (0.320)	0.597* (0.327)
<i>First Stage</i>							
Predicted historical fraction of immigrants	1.577*** (0.145)	1.574*** (0.144)	1.570*** (0.147)	1.588*** (0.148)	1.562*** (0.143)	1.592*** (0.145)	1.589*** (0.143)
KP F-stat	119	120.2	114.1	115	119.7	120	123.8
Observations	11,734	10,026	9,773	5,671	5,767	6,719	6,670
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	4.16(2.04)	3.82(1.40)	0.54(0.50)	1.74(0.77)	2.54(0.69)	3.03(1.14)	2.90(1.20)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.07(0.08)	0.07(0.08)	0.07(0.08)	0.07(0.08)	0.07(0.08)	0.07(0.08)	
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from GSS surveys. See Table C.5 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Additional Material (Not for publication)

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B Appendix – Robustness Checks

In this section we present a variety of robustness checks.

B.1 Controlling for Baseline Democratic Vote Share

We start by addressing the possibility that immigrants settled in counties that, historically, were already more liberal and where the support for the Democratic Party was stronger. If this were to be the case, and if such political preferences (of natives) persisted over time, our estimates may be biased by the spurious correlation between past ideology and European historical immigration. While our instrument should deal with this concern, one may be worried that the 1900 settlements of European immigrants were themselves correlated with political ideology of the native born.

In Table B.1, we augment our baseline specification (reported in Panel B of Table 2) by controlling for the county level Democratic vote share in presidential elections of 1900 and 1904. Since for a few counties electoral data are not available for these years, before presenting these results, we replicate the baseline specification, restricting attention to counties for which electoral data exist (see Panel B of Table B.1). Next, in Panel C, we also include the baseline vote share for the Democratic Party in Presidential elections. Reassuringly, all coefficients remain precisely estimated and quantitatively very close to those reported in the baseline specification of Table 2 and displayed in Panel A of Table B.1 to ease comparisons. Moreover, in unreported results, we replicated Table B.1 by varying the definition of “baseline” years (1900 or 1904 alone; including elections of 1908 and/or 1912; combining elections until 1912), and our estimates remained virtually unchanged.

Table B.1. Baseline Specification Controlling for Democratic Share in Presidential Elections

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.725*** (0.191)	2.039*** (0.361)	0.491*** (0.070)	0.380*** (0.089)	0.222*** (0.076)	1.099*** (0.380)	0.284*** (0.079)	0.111*** (0.039)
KP F-stat	182.7	184.2	182.7	181.1	183.7	180.2	195.4	177.1
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
<i>Panel B: 2SLS Baseline - Counties with Electoral data (1900-1904) not missing</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.736*** (0.193)	2.076*** (0.363)	0.498*** (0.071)	0.388*** (0.089)	0.231*** (0.076)	1.125*** (0.381)	0.290*** (0.079)	0.112*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	183.5	184.9	183.4	182.1	184.5	180.8	195.9	177.5
<i>Panel C: 2SLS Controlling for Democratic Share (1900-1904)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.737*** (0.194)	2.074*** (0.361)	0.497*** (0.069)	0.387*** (0.088)	0.231*** (0.076)	1.123*** (0.378)	0.291*** (0.080)	0.113*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	185.2	186.7	185.1	184	186.2	182.8	198	178.8
Observations	300,232	312,504	303,937	241,568	279,365	111,877	139,164	213,247
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y


Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. In Panel C, we control for the (county-level) average Democratic vote share in Presidential Elections for 1900 and 1904. Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

B.2 Controlling for Initial Immigrant Shares

Next, we examine the possibility that the 1900 settlements of specific European groups across US counties might be correlated with both the long-run political ideology of Americans (or, with factors that determined them) and the migration patterns of that specific immigrant group in each decade between 1900 and 1930. As shown formally in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020), if this were to be the case, the validity of the instrument would be threatened. Following an approach similar to that used in Tabellini (2020), we replicate the analysis for each of our eight outcomes by adding – one by one – the share of each European group in the county in 1900 (relative to all immigrants from that group in the United States).


We plot 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% intervals) for each of these separate regressions in Figures B.1 and B.2, reporting the point estimate associated with the baseline specification as the first dot from the left to ease comparisons. In all cases, coefficients remain quantitatively close to, and never statistically different from, our baseline estimates. Only for the 9th dot from the left, which plots results for the regressions that include the 1900 share of French immigrants, we note a slight drop in the magnitude of the coefficient. But, even in this case, results remain close to our baseline ones.

Figure B.1. 2SLS Coefficients, Controlling for Initial Shares: Political Ideology



Notes: The Figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of the historical fraction of immigrants augmenting the specification reported in Table 2 with the 1900 immigrant share from each sending country, separately. The first coefficient plotted in the figure corresponds to the baseline specification. The ninth coefficient refers to the specification that includes the 1900 share of French immigrants in the county (relative to all immigrants from France in the US as of 1900).

Figure B.2. 2SLS Coefficients, Controlling for Initial Shares: Preferences for Redistribution



Notes: The Figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of the historical fraction of immigrants augmenting the specification reported in Table 2 with the 1900 immigrant share from each sending country, separately. The first coefficient plotted in the figure corresponds to the baseline specification. The ninth coefficient refers to the specification that includes the 1900 share of French immigrants in the county (relative to all immigrants from France in the US as of 1900).

B.3 Predicting European Immigration Using Weather Shocks

In this section, we deal with the possibility that the inflow of immigrants from different European countries during a decade were endogenous to local political or economic conditions in selected US counties (which might have also received a disproportionate number of immigrants from those countries prior to 1900). We do so by replacing the actual number of immigrants from country j entering the US in decade τ , $Imm_{j\tau}$ in equation (3) in the main text, with that predicted exploiting solely variation in weather shocks across European countries over time, $Imm_{j\tau}^W$. More specifically, following Sequeira et al. (2020) and Tabellini (2020), for each year between 1900 and 1930, we estimate the relationship between weather shocks and the outflows of emigrants using the following equation:

$$\ln Imm_{jt} = \sum_{s=1}^4 \sum_{m \in M} \beta_{j,s,m} I_{j,t-1}^{Temp,s,m} + \sum_{s=1}^4 \sum_{m \in M} \gamma_{j,s,m} I_{j,t-1}^{Precip,s,m} + \epsilon_{j,t-1} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

The dependent variable is the log of immigrants from European country j arrived in the US in year t .³⁸ $I_{j,t-1}^{Temp,s,m}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the average temperature in season s of year $t - 1$ falls in the range m . $I_{j,t-1}^{Precip,s,m}$ is the equivalent dummy variable for precipitation. As in Sequeira et al. (2020), we consider the following six ranges m : more than 3 standard deviations below the mean; between 2 and 3 standard deviations below the mean; between 1 and 2 standard deviations below the mean; between 1 and 2 standard deviations above the mean; between 2 and 3 standard deviations above the mean; and more than 3 standard deviations above the mean.

After estimating separately equation (B.1) for each country j , we predict $\widehat{\ln Imm}_{j,t}$ for each country j in each year t using the coefficients $\beta_{j,s,m}$ and $\gamma_{j,s,m}$ as defined above.³⁹ Then, we aggregate predicted flows at the decade level for each European country

³⁸Data come from Willcox (1929). European countries are slightly different from the ones in the main sample: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary (including Austria and Czechoslovakia), Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia (including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland), Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

³⁹See Tabellini (2020), Appendix B2 for more details.

$$Imm_{j\tau}^W = \sum_t \exp(\ln \widehat{Immig}_{j,t}) \quad (\text{B.2})$$

We report results from this exercise in Table B.2, presenting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B respectively. As it appears, also in this case, the instrument is positively and significantly correlated with the actual immigrant share. However, the point estimate in the first stage is an order of magnitude smaller relative to our baseline instrument – a pattern consistent with the fact that this instrument only captures variation in immigration induced by precipitation and temperature shocks, and not by other potential push factors like income shocks (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). Also, while the F-stat for weak instruments falls relative to that of our baseline specification, it nonetheless always remains above conventional levels. Reassuringly, 2SLS estimates remain positive, precisely estimated, and in line with baseline ones (see Table 2, Panel B). Also in this case, a larger immigrant share is associated with more left-leaning and liberal ideology and with stronger preferences for redistribution among natives.

Table B.2. Alternative Instrument: Weather Instrument

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.940*** (0.248)	2.476*** (0.478)	0.564*** (0.096)	0.517*** (0.118)	0.304*** (0.100)	1.360*** (0.419)	0.338*** (0.094)	0.175*** (0.046)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.097*** (0.020)	0.097*** (0.020)	0.097*** (0.020)	0.096*** (0.020)	0.097*** (0.020)	0.098*** (0.020)	0.099*** (0.020)	0.097*** (0.020)
KP F-stat	23.15	23.30	23.18	22.90	23.27	23.19	24.35	22.65
Observations	311,885	324,522	315,672	251,063	290,068	116,153	144,350	221,654
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean(s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The Table replicates Table 2 but the baseline instrument is replaced with the instrument constructed exploiting variation in weather shocks across European countries, as described in the text of Appendix B. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B.4 Controlling for the Black Great Migration

Between 1940 and 1970, during the second Great Migration, more than 4 million African Americans left the US South, migrating to northern and western cities (Boustan, 2016; Collins, 2020). An important determinant, though not the only one, of the Great Migration was the increase in demand for manufacturing employment. Since many European immigrants between 1910 and 1930 were employed in this sector (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Tabellini, 2020), one may be worried that the destinations chosen by Black migrants between 1940 and 1970 also had large immigrant enclaves at the turn of the twentieth century. If this were to be the case, and, more precisely, if our instrument were correlated with Black inflows between 1940 and 1970, our estimates may be biased. On the one hand, race is, together with income, the single most important variable that shapes individuals' preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). On the other hand, recent work by Calderon et al. (2020) shows that the second Great Migration had a strong, positive effect on the Democratic vote share and on support for the civil rights movement outside the US South.

To address these concerns, focusing on non-southern counties, we construct an instrument for the average Black share in each decade between 1940 and 1970, and augment our baseline specification (Table 2, Panel B) by separately controlling for it.⁴⁰ The instrument for the average Black share is constructed following the same logic as the baseline instrument for European immigration described in Section 4.1.⁴¹ In particular, after excluding southern states, we compute the share of Black individuals who were born in a southern state and who, as of 1930, were living in a non-southern county, relative to all Black individuals born in that (southern) state and living in another state in that year. Then, we predict the number of Black migrants in each county and decade by interacting these shares with the number of Black migrants from each southern state in each decade between 1940 and 1970, and summing over all southern states.⁴² To obtain the predicted stock of Black individuals, we add

⁴⁰Following the literature (Boustan, 2016), we consider part of the US South the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.

⁴¹Our approach replicates that implemented by Calderon et al. (2020). The only difference with the instrument for European immigrants of Section 4.1 is that, because of data limitation, we cannot construct a "leave-out" version of the instrument for Black in-migration.

⁴²Data on Black migration rates come from Bowles and Lee (2016) and from Gardner and Cohen (1992). County level data on Black population between 1940 and 1970 come from the County Databooks (Haines et al., 2010), while we use the full count US Census (Ruggles et al., 2020) to construct the 1930 shares of African Americans residing in

recursively the predicted flows. Finally, we divide by 1940 population and take the average across decades.

We report 2SLS results in Table B.3. In Panel A, we replicate the specification of Table 2 in the main text, restricting the sample to the counties for which the instrument for the Black migration can be constructed. As one can see, results remain largely unchanged. Next, in Panel B, we add the (instrumented) 1940 to 1970 average fraction of Black Americans in the county. Reassuringly, results are in line with those from our baseline specification: in all cases, historical European immigration is strongly and positively associated with both liberal ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution. Interestingly, the point estimate on the average Black share is positive, although not statistically significant, and quantitatively small.⁴³

The positive, albeit statistically insignificant, effects of the Great Migration on preferences for redistribution might be surprising, especially in light of the large literature that has documented a negative relationship between racial heterogeneity and demand for government spending (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). However, two factors can help explain this apparent puzzle. First, as already mentioned above, Calderon et al. (2020) find that Black in-migration between 1940 and 1970 increased support for the Democratic Party and for the civil rights movement, not only among African Americans, but also among white residents. Since Democratic ideology is bundled with preferences for a larger welfare state, it is possible that Black in-migration also increased demand for redistribution. Second, Alesina et al. (2004) find that higher racial heterogeneity is associated with a higher number of local jurisdictions across US counties. This implies that white residents might have created their own school and special districts so as not to share public goods with African Americans. As a result, their demand for redistribution may have remained unchanged. These forces may have counterbalanced the “standard” negative effect of diversity on preferences for redistribution, leading to a “close to zero” effect of the Great Migration.

each northern county and born in a southern state.

⁴³To ease the interpretation of results, we report standardized beta coefficients in square brackets.

Table B.3. Baseline Specification, controlling for Black Great Migration (1940-1970)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.645*** (0.212)	1.972*** (0.374)	0.515*** (0.070)	0.360*** (0.094)	0.186** (0.078)	1.155*** (0.436)	0.269*** (0.084)	0.087** (0.043)
KP F-stat	374	379.6	377.2	363.6	372.7	339.5	355.5	405
<i>Panel B: 2SLS Controlling for Black share</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.652*** (0.212) [0.046]	2.019*** (0.399) [0.075]	0.516*** (0.075) [0.086]	0.387*** (0.100) [0.063]	0.205** (0.086) [0.034]	1.098*** (0.371) [0.074]	0.265*** (0.083) [0.048]	0.095** (0.047) [0.029]
Fraction of Black Americans	-0.028 (0.331) [-0.001]	-0.192 (0.584) [-0.005]	-0.005 (0.111) [-0.001]	-0.110 (0.145) [-0.013]	-0.076 (0.124) [-0.009]	0.223 (0.448) [0.011]	0.013 (0.105) [0.002]	-0.030 (0.073) [-0.007]
KP F-stat	196.2	195.4	195.2	192.7	195.6	186.3	198	206.5
Observations	196,066	203,560	198,134	159,128	182,644	73,347	90,494	140,812
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.96(1.15)	4.38(2.19)	0.40(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.84(1.19)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is Section 4.1. Data on Black migration rates come from Bowles and Lee (2016) and from Gardner and Cohen (1992). County level data on Black population between 1940 and 1970 come from the County Databooks (Haines et al., 2010), while we use the full count US Census (Ruggles et al., 2020) to construct the 1930 shares of African Americans residing in each northern county and born in a southern state. We restrict our sample to counties for which data on Black Great Migration are available. Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B.5 Historical Internal Migrants

One may be concerned that the instrument – in particular, the 1900 ethnic enclaves – were correlated with the presence of internal migrants. This may be problematic for two different reasons. First, a higher share of internal migrants may be a proxy for stronger economic attractiveness, which may in turn be correlated with long-run shifts in political ideology. Second, internal migrants may have a direct effect on original residents’ attitudes towards diversity, contributing to the development of a more liberal ideology and offering more fertile grounds for the emergence of a “melting pot” society.⁴⁴

To address these and similar concerns, we augment our baseline specification (Table 2) including the 1900 share of individuals born in another state. Since the US Census did not report internal migration status prior to 1940, and because only state – and not county – of birth is available, it is not possible to control for the share of internal migrants, within and between states. We are thus forced to rely on between-states migrants as a proxy for the prevalence of internal migration, as done in previous work (Bandiera et al., 2018; Tabellini, 2020).⁴⁵ In particular, we construct the share of household heads born in another state relative to all of those living in the county in 1900. We report results in Table B.4. Reassuringly, they remain close to those obtained in the main specification (Table 2).

⁴⁴It is also possible that a higher share of internal migrants reflects a county’s initial openness to diversity, which persisted over time, influencing American-born preferences today.

⁴⁵While imperfect, this measure should address the concerns described above, since pull factors are stronger between rather than within states, and because diversity is likely to increase more in response to between, rather than within, state migration.

Table B.4. Baseline Specification, Controlling for Natives' Internal Migration

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical fraction of Immigrants	0.735*** (0.196)	2.061*** (0.371)	0.492*** (0.072)	0.380*** (0.090)	0.223*** (0.077)	1.094*** (0.376)	0.281*** (0.079)	0.112*** (0.040)
KP F-Stat	190.3	191.8	190.2	188.4	191.3	186.5	202	185.9
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean(s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
1900 Internal Migration	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 2 augmenting the specification by controlling for a proxy for the rate of natives' internal migration at the county level in 1900. This variable is constructed following Bandiera et al. (2018) and restricting the sample to native household heads of native parentage. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

B.6 Immigrants Before 1900

In Table B.5 we verify that our results are robust to extending the sample period used to define the average European immigrant share to 1850-1930. Since our instrument is constructed using the 1900 settlements of European immigrants, we cannot conduct this exercise with 2SLS. However, the similarity of OLS and 2SLS estimates in our main results (see Tables B.12 and 2) bolsters our confidence in the OLS analysis for the 1850 to 1930 period.

Panel A of Table B.5 reports the baseline OLS results obtained for the 1910 to 1930 period (also shown in Panel A of Table 2), while Panel B replicates them for the 1850-1930 decades. As noted in Sequeira et al. (2020), when going back to pre-1900 decades, some counties are not available. For this reason, in Panel C, we repeat this exercise including only counties for which we have observations in all decades. Reassuringly, results are always quantitatively and qualitatively close to those reported in Panel A: in all cases, historical immigration is strongly and positively associated with liberal ideology and higher preferences for redistribution among American voters today.⁴⁶

In addition, as also discussed in the main text (see Section 6.2, Table E.17), we explicitly check whether our results are robust to controlling for the share of European immigrants arrived before 1900. Replicating the analysis conducted above, Table B.6 estimates the 2SLS regression reported in Table 2, separately controlling for the immigrant share between 1850 and 1900. As noted in Section 6.2, not only our main results for the effects on the 1910-1930 fraction of immigrants are left unchanged; but also, the share of pre-1900 immigrants is not statistically significant and quantitatively smaller.

⁴⁶Results (unreported) remain unchanged also when defining the period of interest from 1850 to 1920, or from 1860 to 1920 as done for instance in Sequeira et al. (2020).

Table B.5. Ideology, Preferences for Redistribution, and Immigration (1850-1930) – OLS estimates

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline Specification</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.781*** (0.141)	2.151*** (0.262)	0.525*** (0.050)	0.389*** (0.065)	0.230*** (0.054)	1.005*** (0.238)	0.295*** (0.056)	0.104*** (0.031)
<i>Panel B: All Counties (1850-1930) Baseline Specification</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.665*** (0.122)	1.684*** (0.241)	0.405*** (0.049)	0.328*** (0.056)	0.192*** (0.046)	0.819*** (0.196)	0.250*** (0.049)	0.088*** (0.027)
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
<i>Panel C: Counties not missing for all decades (1850-1930)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.704*** (0.131)	1.727*** (0.266)	0.414*** (0.054)	0.334*** (0.063)	0.186*** (0.053)	0.847*** (0.217)	0.270*** (0.054)	0.077*** (0.029)
Observations	249,879	260,394	253,189	200,736	232,706	93,869	116,131	176,183
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.14)	4.30(2.21)	0.39(0.49)	0.52(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. Data are based on Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020). The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1850 and 1930. Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.6. Controlling for Historical Immigration (1850-1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical fraction of immigrants (1910 - 1930)	0.494* (0.281) [0.036]	1.694*** (0.574) [0.064]	0.406*** (0.114) [0.070]	0.283** (0.136) [0.047]	0.169 (0.115) [0.029]	0.992* (0.519) [0.069]	0.204* (0.118) [0.038]	0.095* (0.058) [0.030]
Historical fraction of immigrants (1850 - 1900)	0.239 (0.160) [0.0222]	0.360 (0.349) [0.0174]	0.0887 (0.0703) [0.0196]	0.1000 (0.0779) [0.0214]	0.0553 (0.0642) [0.0120]	0.113 (0.207) [0.0101]	0.0822 (0.0663) [0.0194]	0.0164 (0.0341) [0.00659]
KP F-Stat	116.4	116.9	116.4	115.9	116.4	114.8	122.8	112.9
Observations	313,983	326,684	317,777	252,789	291,987	116,878	145,269	223,085
Mean (s.d.) dep. var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm. (1910-1930)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.1(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm. (1850-1900)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B.7 Controlling for Ethnic Diversity and Polarization

In this section, we explore the relationship between political ideology, European immigration, and ethnic diversity. As noted in Section 6 in the main text, a large literature has documented a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Tabellini (2020) finds that such relationship was evident also during the Age of Mass Migration: in US cities where (immigrant induced) ethnic diversity was higher, public spending and tax rates were lower. In light of these results, one may wonder if our positive estimates for the effects of immigration on preferences for redistribution are, at least partly, due to the fact that we are not accounting for ethnic diversity explicitly.

To examine this possibility, we augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for the (instrumented) ethnic diversity brought about by European immigrants. Following the literature (Alesina et al., 1999), we define ethnic diversity in county c and decade τ as $ED_{c\tau} = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_{cj\tau}^2$, where $\gamma_{cj\tau}$ is the share of immigrants from country c (relative to all other European immigrants) in county c in decade τ . As done also in the paper, we then take the average across decades, in order to obtain the 1910-1930 average ethnic diversity in a given county. When instrumenting the index of ethnic diversity, we replace the actual share of each immigrant group (relative to other groups in each county in each Census year) with that predicted using the shift-share instrument constructed in the main text (see Section 4.1).

Recent work by Bazzi et al. (2019) has shown that the effects of ethnic diversity (or, fractionalization) might partly capture those of polarization. When ethnic fractionalization is high, i.e. when there are many small minority groups that are roughly equal in size, but group polarization is low, inter-group relations are more likely to lead to social cohesion. This can be for a variety of reasons: first, no specific group will dominate over the others, and there may be incentives to cooperate, since the number of groups is relatively high; second, chances that a few groups become “more visible” to natives fall, thereby lowering the probability of scapegoating. On the other hand, when polarization is high, i.e. when there are few large but distinct groups, social cohesion may be impaired by diversity. For this reason, we also construct an index of polarization, and augment our analysis by controlling for it.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Following Bazzi et al. (2019), for each county c and decade τ , we define the index of polarization as $P_{c\tau} = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_{cj\tau}^2 (1 - \gamma_{cj\tau})$, where $\gamma_{cj\tau}$ is the share of immigrants (relative to other European immigrants) from country j in county c in decade τ . We then average over the three decades. As for ethnic diversity, we use the predicted, rather than actual county-immigrant group-decade shares when constructing the instrumented versions of the index.

2SLS results for this exercise are reported in Table B.7, which shows not only that the coefficient on the historical fraction of immigrants is unchanged, but also that ethnic diversity has a *positive* effect on both liberal ideology and preferences for redistribution, although its precision varies across outcomes. Consistent with findings in Bazzi et al. (2019), the coefficient on polarization is negative, albeit never statistically significant.

We speculate that the, somewhat surprising, positive coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is due to the fact that the diversity brought about European immigrants was relatively contained in size. On the one hand, when levels of diversity are not “too high”, at least in the medium to long run, social cohesion can be enhanced, consistent with recent work by Bazzi et al. (2019). On the other, although slowly and at varying rates, European immigrants eventually became fully integrated into the American society (Abramitzky et al., 2020a), in part helped by the arrival of new outsiders like African Americans from the US South, who looked even more different from white natives than European immigrants (Fouka et al., 2018).

Table B.7. Controlling for Ethnic Diversity and Polarization

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical fraction of Immigrants	0.749*** (0.196) [0.054]	2.086*** (0.364) [0.079]	0.500*** (0.070) [0.086]	0.397*** (0.090) [0.066]	0.227*** (0.078) [0.038]	1.102*** (0.380) [0.077]	0.277*** (0.078) [0.051]	0.122*** (0.041) [0.038]
Ethnic diversity	0.285 (0.198) [0.023]	0.543 (0.358) [0.023]	0.094 (0.073) [0.018]	0.176** (0.089) [0.033]	0.074 (0.078) [0.014]	0.176 (0.226) [0.014]	-0.009 (0.073) [-0.002]	0.087** (0.040) [0.030]
Polarization Index	0.085 (0.204) [0.008]	0.074 (0.393) [0.004]	0.012 (0.081) [0.003]	0.040 (0.097) [0.008]	0.011 (0.081) [0.002]	-0.153 (0.240) [-0.014]	-0.105 (0.077) [-0.025]	0.091** (0.044) [0.037]
KP F-Stat	14.07	14.06	14.04	14.09	14.11	14.26	14.31	13.55
Observations	313,597	326,286	317,388	252,450	291,621	116,693	145,104	222,823
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.88 (1.15)	4.26 (2.21)	0.38 (0.49)	0.51 (0.50)	0.59 (0.49)	2.82 (1.20)	0.72 (0.45)	0.41 (0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 2 augmenting the specification by controlling for the index on Ethnic Diversity and Polarization. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The index on Ethnic Diversity and Polarization are reconstructed using national group shares and come from Bazzi et al. (2019). Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B.8 Additional Robustness Checks

Dropping potential outliers. As an additional robustness check, we verify that our results are robust to omitting counties with very large and very low immigration, and that could be potential outliers. In Tables B.8 and B.9, we replicate our baseline results trimming observations in counties with average 1910-1930 European immigration below (resp. above) the 1st and the 5th (resp. the 99th and 95th) percentiles respectively. Reassuringly, in all cases coefficients are in line with those reported in Table 2 (Panel B).

Alternative geographies. In Table B.10, we verify that our results are robust to excluding the US South, where identification with the Democratic Party and, more broadly, political preferences may have been greatly influenced by the history of race relations (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Schickler, 2016).⁴⁸

Next, we show that our estimates are unchanged when defining the European immigrant share at the Community Zone (CZ) – rather than at the county – level (Table B.11). This exercise deals with the possibility that European immigration triggered selective “White flight”, inducing more conservative natives to emigrate in response to the arrival of European immigrants. If this were to be the case, our findings may be unduly affected by sample selection. However, Table B.11 documents that, even when aggregating the unit of analysis to CZs, all our results remain unchanged.⁴⁹

Estimating less stringent specifications. Table 2 reports results from a specification that already includes a large set of controls. In addition to state and survey wave fixed effects, we include individual respondents’ characteristics, and the following county-specific historical controls: geographical coordinates, 1910-1930 predicted industrial growth as in Tabellini (2020), railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and the 1900 urban and Black share, male labor force participation, employ-

⁴⁸As noted above, we consider part of the US South the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia.

⁴⁹CZs are defined as clusters of counties that feature strong commuting ties within, and weak commuting ties across CZs. Importantly, the boundaries of CZs are time-invariant, and are defined on the basis of post 1960s migration patterns (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996). This implies that, for the early twentieth century, they represent a very large definition of “local” labor market, not to mention political jurisdiction. In unreported results, we also verified that our estimates are unchanged when aggregating counties to State Economic Areas (SEAs), as in Abramitzky et al. (2019b). SEAs are county aggregates that should correspond (roughly) to CZs for the early twentieth century.

ment share in manufacturing, and occupational income scores.⁵⁰ We now show that the coefficient on the 1910-1930 average immigrant share remains similar – both in size and in precision – when estimating more parsimonious specifications. Specifically, in Table B.12, we only include state and survey wave fixed effects and respondents’ characteristics. While the 2SLS point estimate becomes somewhat larger, it remains highly statistically significant and quantitatively close to that reported in Table 2. Next, in Table B.13, we replicate the baseline specification of Table 2 by omitting individual controls. Since the characteristics of respondents are measured after the treatment of interest (i.e. average historical immigration), one may be worried that these are “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), and as such should not be included in the analysis. Reassuringly, Table B.13 verifies that 2SLS estimates are quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged.

Clustered standard errors. Our results are obtained clustering standard errors at the county level. To address potential concerns of spatial correlation, we now replicate Table 2 by clustering standard errors at the CZ and at the state level, respectively. It is reassuring to note that 2SLS results, reported in Tables B.14 and B.15 respectively, remain virtually unchanged.

⁵⁰Individual respondents’ characteristics include: a quadratic in age, gender, race dummies, marital and employment status, educational attainment, and income dummies.

Table B.8. Baseline Specification, Trimming Outliers (1st-99th Percentiles of Immigration)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.656*** (0.176)	1.976*** (0.367)	0.449*** (0.075)	0.325*** (0.091)	0.225*** (0.071)	0.680*** (0.190)	0.237*** (0.069)	0.102** (0.041)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.244*** (0.123)	1.245*** (0.123)	1.246*** (0.124)	1.242*** (0.124)	1.247*** (0.124)	1.265*** (0.128)	1.244*** (0.121)	1.239*** (0.122)
KP F-stat	101.9	102.2	101.7	100.6	101.1	97.85	105.1	103.4
Observations	308,637	321,049	312,310	248,451	286,935	114,766	142,652	219,553
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.25(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The Table replicates Table 2 but restricting the sample to counties with average fraction of immigrants above the 99th percentile (0.3277) and below the 1st percentile (0.0004). KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table B.9. Baseline Specification, Trimming Outliers (5th-95th Percentiles of Immigration)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.749*** (0.221)	2.187*** (0.466)	0.479*** (0.095)	0.391*** (0.114)	0.243*** (0.091)	0.567*** (0.220)	0.295*** (0.083)	0.122** (0.051)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.124*** (0.116)	1.124*** (0.116)	1.125*** (0.116)	1.119*** (0.117)	1.128*** (0.117)	1.143*** (0.121)	1.135*** (0.116)	1.122*** (0.115)
KP F-stat	93.62	94.01	93.36	92.12	92.57	89.12	95.92	94.69
Observations	284,177	295,424	287,394	228,801	264,049	105,540	131,376	202,821
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.24(2.21)	0.38(0.48)	0.50(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.81(1.19)	0.71(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.09(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.09(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The Table replicates Table 2 but restricting the sample to counties with average fraction of immigrants above the 95th percentile (0.2601) and below the 5th percentile (0.0013). KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.10. Baseline Specification Excluding US South

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.686*** (0.143)	1.972*** (0.258)	0.515*** (0.050)	0.372*** (0.064)	0.183*** (0.053)	0.932*** (0.267)	0.240*** (0.059)	0.086*** (0.032)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.664*** (0.198)	1.932*** (0.356)	0.504*** (0.066)	0.359*** (0.089)	0.180** (0.074)	1.140*** (0.419)	0.257*** (0.083)	0.098** (0.040)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.370*** (0.062)	1.370*** (0.062)	1.373*** (0.062)	1.368*** (0.063)	1.372*** (0.063)	1.387*** (0.066)	1.361*** (0.063)	1.373*** (0.061)
KP F-stat	483.8	493.2	490	480.1	481	443	473.4	513.5
Observations	209,290	217,383	211,578	169,799	194,978	78,047	96,691	150,791
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.94(1.15)	4.33(2.19)	0.39(0.49)	0.53(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.83(1.19)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)	0.13(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 2 excluding US South States (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia). The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table B.11. Baseline Specification Aggregating at the Commuting Zone Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.826*** (0.191)	2.188*** (0.374)	0.511*** (0.069)	0.398*** (0.087)	0.297*** (0.071)	1.039*** (0.240)	0.330*** (0.084)	0.124*** (0.043)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.734*** (0.213)	1.763*** (0.435)	0.403*** (0.089)	0.331*** (0.104)	0.306*** (0.084)	1.127*** (0.309)	0.308*** (0.105)	0.152*** (0.049)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.332*** (0.152)	1.334*** (0.152)	1.334*** (0.152)	1.334*** (0.155)	1.342*** (0.154)	1.341*** (0.156)	1.323*** (0.148)	1.331*** (0.151)
KP F-stat	76.40	76.82	76.62	74.37	76.25	73.53	79.51	77.82
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 2 aggregating the geography used to define the fraction of immigrants from the county to the Commuting Zone level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.12. Baseline specification – Individual Controls Only

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.151*** (0.158)	2.781*** (0.290)	0.611*** (0.061)	0.583*** (0.070)	0.348*** (0.060)	1.440*** (0.307)	0.406*** (0.063)	0.198*** (0.030)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.420*** (0.117)	1.421*** (0.116)	1.422*** (0.117)	1.418*** (0.118)	1.423*** (0.116)	1.433*** (0.118)	1.420*** (0.113)	1.424*** (0.117)
KP F-stat	146.8	149.3	148	144.5	150.3	146.2	159.2	147.7
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.13. Baseline specification – Historical Controls Only

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.052*** (0.199)	2.749*** (0.359)	0.609*** (0.078)	0.575*** (0.094)	0.284*** (0.066)	1.181*** (0.359)	0.280*** (0.060)	0.156*** (0.040)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.243*** (0.092)	1.244*** (0.092)	1.245*** (0.092)	1.240*** (0.092)	1.245*** (0.092)	1.255*** (0.093)	1.245*** (0.089)	1.239*** (0.093)
KP F-stat	182.9	184	182.9	180.9	183.4	180.7	195.2	176.7
Observations	353,031	368,268	358,251	283,642	328,884	130,634	163,209	251,058
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.86(1.15)	4.22(2.21)	0.37(0.48)	0.50(0.50)	0.58(0.49)	2.80(1.20)	0.71(0.45)	0.40(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Historical controls include: 1900 Black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table B.14. Baseline specification – Clusters at the Commuting Zone Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.725*** (0.181)	2.039*** (0.341)	0.491*** (0.072)	0.380*** (0.096)	0.222*** (0.068)	1.099*** (0.333)	0.284*** (0.073)	0.111** (0.043)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.243*** (0.123)	1.245*** (0.123)	1.245*** (0.123)	1.240*** (0.123)	1.246*** (0.123)	1.257*** (0.126)	1.243*** (0.119)	1.242*** (0.125)
KP F-stat	102.1	102.9	102	101	102.6	100.2	109.2	99.37
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described Section 4.1. The table replicates the specification in Table 2, clustering at the commuting zone level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.15. Baseline specification – Clusters at the State Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.725*** (0.221)	2.039*** (0.415)	0.491*** (0.083)	0.380*** (0.123)	0.222** (0.091)	1.099*** (0.409)	0.284*** (0.093)	0.111* (0.060)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.243*** (0.149)	1.245*** (0.148)	1.245*** (0.149)	1.240*** (0.148)	1.246*** (0.148)	1.257*** (0.149)	1.243*** (0.146)	1.242*** (0.150)
KP F-stat	69.84	70.51	70.02	70.40	70.57	70.81	72.68	68.16
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described Section 4.1. The table replicates the specification in Table 2, clustering at the state level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

C Appendix – Survey Data

C.1 Cooperative Congressional Election Study

As mentioned in Section 3.2, the CCES is a nationally representative survey conducted online in November of every year since 2005. We use it to measure ideology and preferences for redistribution of native-born American respondents. In particular, for ideology and political behavior, we use the Cumulative CCES Common Content dataset (Kuriwaki, 2018), which combines all surveys between 2006 and 2018, for a total of more than 450,000 respondents. For all other questions, we instead combine surveys for the years in which each question is available. The Cumulative dataset includes a sub-set of questions that are common to all survey waves, and whose answers can be more easily interpreted.⁵¹

The CCES also asks a large number of demographic and socioeconomic questions such as nativity, age, gender, marital status, income, and education and, crucially for our purposes, the county of residence of respondents. Differently from most other surveys, such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) or the General Social Survey (GSS), the CCES offers a key advantage: its sample size is very large and nationally representative even at the county level. This is key for our empirical analysis, which exploits cross-county variation in exposure to the presence of European immigrants between 1910 and 1930.

⁵¹See <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910/DVN/II2DB6> for more details.

Table C.1. Dependent Variables: Definition and Construction

Variable	Question	Answers coded as	Years
Panel A. CCES Ideology			
Ideology	In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?	From 1=very conservative to 5=very liberal	2006-2018
Party Affiliation Scale (R to D)	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as: Strong democrat, not very strong democrat, lean democrat, independent, lean republican, not very strong republican, strong republican.	From 1=strong republican to 7=strong democrat	2006-2018
Democratic Party Indicator	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a: democrat, republican, independent.	Indicator equal 1 for Democrat, 0 for Republican or Independent	2006-2018
Voted Democratic Candidate	For whom did you vote for President of the United States?	Indicator equal 1 if voted Democrat and 0 for Independent or Republican	2006-2018
Panel B. CCES Preferences for Redistribution			
Oppose spending cuts	The federal budget deficit is approximately XXX trillion this year. If the Congress were to balance the budget it would have to consider cutting defense spending, cutting domestic spending (such as Medicare and Social Security), or raising taxes to cover the deficit. What would you most prefer that Congress do - cut domestic spending, cut defense spending, or raise taxes?	Indicator equal 1 if preferred option is not to cut spending	2006, 2008, 2010-2018
Support welfare spending	State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas below? Welfare spending.	From 1=most decrease to 5=most increase	2014, 2016, 2018
Support minimum wage increase	Do you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage to \$X an hour over the next two years, or not? OR If your state put the following questions for a vote on the ballot, would you vote FOR or AGAINST? Raise the minimum wage to \$X/hour?	Indicator equal 1 if in favor	2006-2008, 2016, 2018
Finance deficit with taxes	If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 0 to 100	Normalize range to 0-1, where 1=100% taxes and 0% cuts	2006-2017

Table C.2. Summary Statistics, CCES - Individual Characteristics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Age	50.200	16.161	18	109	381,308
Female	0.540	0.498	0	1	381,308
Male	0.460	0.498	0	1	381,308
Black	0.111	0.314	0	1	381,308
White	0.795	0.404	0	1	381,308
Other	0.094	0.291	0	1	381,308
Single	0.263	0.440	0	1	380,009
Married	0.558	0.497	0	1	380,009
Widowed	0.049	0.215	0	1	380,009
Separated	0.130	0.337	0	1	380,009
No High School	0.030	0.172	0	1	381,308
High School	0.286	0.452	0	1	381,308
More than High School	0.684	0.465	0	1	381,308
Employed	0.512	0.500	0	1	381,101
Unemployed	0.061	0.240	0	1	381,101
Out of Labor Force	0.426	0.495	0	1	381,101
Income < 10K	0.046	0.210	0	1	339,197
10K < Income < 20K	0.084	0.277	0	1	339,197
20K < Income < 30K	0.115	0.319	0	1	339,197
30K < Income < 40K	0.118	0.322	0	1	339,197
40K < Income < 50K	0.104	0.306	0	1	339,197
50K < Income < 60K	0.102	0.302	0	1	339,197
60K < Income < 70K	0.075	0.263	0	1	339,197
70K < Income < 80K	0.080	0.272	0	1	339,197
80K < Income < 100K	0.094	0.292	0	1	339,197
100K < Income < 120K	0.068	0.251	0	1	339,197
120K < Income < 150K	0.054	0.226	0	1	339,197
Income > 150K	0.060	0.238	0	1	339,197

C.2 European Social Survey

In Section 6.2 of the main text and in Appendix E.6.4, we validate the use of exposure to historical social welfare reforms as a proxy for immigrants’ preferences for redistribution. We do so by using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), focusing on first generation (European) immigrants. We restrict attention to first generation immigrants in order to more precisely isolate the “portability of preferences” (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).

The European Social Survey (ESS) is a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted in around 38 countries in Europe since 2002, every two year.⁵² Our analysis includes survey rounds from 1 to 8, i.e. until 2016, and all the countries that are available therein. The number of respondents in each wave varies from 40,000 to 56,000 for a total of 326,678 respondents overall. The ESS collects demographic and socioeconomic characteristic of respondents, and elicits political ideology as well as attitudes towards social exclusion and preferences for redistribution. Consistent with the literature (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), we measure preferences for redistribution using individuals’ response to the following statement in the ESS: “Government should reduce differences in income levels”. The possible answers range from 1 (for *Strongly Agree*) to 5 (for *Strongly Disagree*). We recode the variable so that higher values correspond to stronger preferences for redistribution.

Table C.3 reports names and the definition of the variables. In Table C.4, we present the summary statistics for the sample considered in the exercise conducted in Appendix E.6.4, and summarized in Section 6.2 of the paper. Panel A reports respondents’ characteristics, while Panel B presents their proxy for preferences for redistribution.

⁵²The exact number of countries varies across survey waves. Data can be downloaded at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>.

Table C.3. Variable Description - ESS

Variable	Question	Answers coded as
Panel A. Preferences for Redistribution		
Preferences for Redistribution	Government should reduce differences in income levels. 1= Strongly Agree to 5 Disagree Strongly. 7=Refusal, 8=Don't know. 9=No answer	Scale from 1=Disagree Strongly to 5=Strongly Agree
Panel B. Main Regressor and Individual Controls		
Country of Residence		
Country of Birth		
Age		
Gender	Gender of the respondent	Coded as 1=male, 2=female
Years of Education	Years of education	Logarithm(1+years of education)
Marital Status	Legal marital status: single, married or in a civil union, separated, divorced, widowed.	Coded as 1=single, 2=married or in a civil union, 3=divorced or separated, 4=widowed
Employment Status	Main activity, last 7 days.	Coded as 1=out of the labor force, 2=unemployed, 3=employed
Income	Household's total net income, all sources	Coded as 1 to 9 for the first nine deciles and 10 for higher levels

Table C.4. ESS - Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Individual Characteristics					
Age	50.140	18.020	13	114	16,092
Male	0.436	0.496	0	1	16,121
Female	0.564	0.496	0	1	16,121
Single	0.218	0.413	0	1	15,624
Married	0.559	0.497	0	1	15,624
Widowed	0.104	0.305	0	1	15,624
Separated/Divorced	0.119	0.324	0	1	15,624
Log of Years of Education	2.594	0.387	0	4.489	16,066
Employed	0.501	0.500	0	1	16,023
Unemployed	0.065	0.246	0	1	16,023
Out of Labor Force	0.434	0.496	0	1	16,023
1st Decile	0.063	0.243	0	1	13,956
2nd Decile	0.088	0.283	0	1	13,956
3rd Decile	0.087	0.282	0	1	13,956
4th Decile	0.099	0.299	0	1	13,956
5th Decile	0.101	0.301	0	1	13,956
6th Decile	0.094	0.292	0	1	13,956
7th Decile	0.082	0.275	0	1	13,956
8th Decile	0.076	0.265	0	1	13,956
9th Decile	0.090	0.286	0	1	13,956
Higher Levels	0.076	0.265	0	1	13,956
Panel B: Individual Outcome					
Preferences for Redistribution	3.873	1.034	1	5	16,121

C.3 General Social Survey

In Section 6.3 of the main text, we rely on data from the General Social Survey (GSS) – a repeated cross-sectional, nationally representative survey collected in the United States since 1972. The GSS interviews a nationally representative sample of English speaker individuals, who are independently drawn from the population and who are at least 18 years old. The survey has been conducted every year up to 1991, except for 1979 and 1981, and every two years since then (and until 2018). We use data from 1972-2010.⁵³

As the CCES and the ESS, the GSS also collects socioeconomic and demographic information of respondents as well as their political ideology and preferences for redistribution. While the GSS sample is an order of magnitude smaller than the CCES one, reducing the precision of the analysis (especially at the county level), it offers a unique advantage for our purposes: it also records an individual’s ancestry and the country of birth of both her parents and her grandparents. This allows us to restrict the analysis to natives with native parents and grandparents and, as discussed in Section 6.3 of the main text, to control for the ancestry of respondents.

Table C.5 describes the key outcome variables considered in the analysis conducted in Section 6.3 of the main text. We proxy for respondents’ political views and preferences for redistribution with three (Party affiliation – Democratic vs. Republican; Ideology – liberal vs. conservative; and whether the person voted for a Democratic candidate in the last presidential elections) and four (welfare spending; spending for assistance to the poor; government vs individual responsibility; and, government involvement in the economy) variables respectively. As in our main analysis, all variables are coded so that higher values correspond to more liberal views and higher preferences for redistribution.

In Table C.6, we present the summary statistics for the main dependent variables and controls used in the GSS analysis. Finally, in Table C.7, we compare the characteristics of counties in our main CCES sample and in the GSS sample. As expected, the GSS sample has a larger actual immigrant share and is more likely to be drawn from urban areas. However, and somewhat reassuringly, the difference between counties is much smaller for the instrument; moreover, the characteristics of immigrants historically settling in counties with GSS respondents (today) are very similar to the

⁵³County identifiers are available since 1993.

immigrants' characteristics observed in the full sample.

Table C.5. Variable Description - GSS

Variable	Question	Answers coded as	Years
Panel A. Preferences for Redistribution			
Party scale - R vs D	Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?	From 1=Strong Republican to 7=Strong Democrat	1993-2010
Liberal vs Conservative	We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?	From 1=Extremely Conservative to 7=Extremely Liberal	1993-2010
Voted Democratic Candidate	Voted for the Democratic Party at the last Presidential Elections	Indicator equal to 1 for Democratic Party, 0 for Republican.	1993-2010
Welfare Spending	We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on Welfare?	From 1=too much to 3=too little	1993-2010
Assistance to the poor	We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to name some of these too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on assistance to the poor?	From 1=too much to 3=too little	1993-2010
Government vs Individual	Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?	From 1=People's responsibility to 5=Government's responsibility	1993-2010
Government role	Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?	From 1=Government doing much to 5=Government do more	1993-2010

Table C.6. GSS - Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Individual Characteristics					
Age	46.316	17.158	18	89	25,965
Female	0.557	0.497	0	1	26,044
Male	0.443	0.497	0	1	26,044
Black	0.141	0.348	0	1	26,044
White	0.786	0.410	0	1	26,044
Other	0.073	0.260	0	1	26,044
Single	0.238	0.426	0	1	26,029
Married	0.482	0.500	0	1	26,029
Widowed	0.089	0.285	0	1	26,029
Separated/divorced	0.191	0.393	0	1	26,029
No High School	0.170	0.376	0	1	25,971
High School	0.288	0.453	0	1	25,971
More than High School	0.542	0.498	0	1	25,971
Employed	0.667	0.471	0	1	25,373
Unemployed	0.035	0.183	0	1	25,373
Out of Lab. Force	0.298	0.457	0	1	25,373
Lower than \$1000	0.014	0.117	0	1	22,859
\$1000 to 2999	0.012	0.110	0	1	22,859
\$3000 to 3999	0.010	0.100	0	1	22,859
\$4000 to 4999	0.010	0.097	0	1	22,859
\$5000 to 5999	0.013	0.113	0	1	22,859
\$6000 to 6999	0.013	0.115	0	1	22,859
\$7000 to 7999	0.014	0.119	0	1	22,859
\$8000 to 9999	0.024	0.154	0	1	22,859
\$10000 - 14999	0.079	0.270	0	1	22,859
\$15000 - 19999	0.069	0.254	0	1	22,859
\$20000 - 24999	0.081	0.273	0	1	22,859
\$25000 or more	0.659	0.474	0	1	22,859
Panel B: Individual Outcomes					
Party affiliation - D vs. R	4.223	1.983	1	7	25,436
Liberal vs conservative	3.868	1.403	1	7	22,215
Voted Dem - Presidential Elections	0.549	0.498	0	1	21,069
Welfare Spending: too little vs too much	1.753	0.775	1	3	11,721
Spending for assistance to the poor: too little vs too much	2.539	0.685	1	3	11,915
Government vs individual responsibility - help poor	3.047	1.165	1	5	14,101
Government should do more vs is doing too much	2.924	1.218	1	5	13,860

Table C.7. GSS vs. CCES

Variables	Main Sample		GSS Sample	
	N	Mean/Std. Dev.	N	Mean/Std. Dev.
Fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	2,939	0.055 (0.067)	326	0.083 (0.082)
Predicted fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	2,939	0.022 (0.042)	326	0.030 (0.035)
Urban share (1900)	2,939	0.135 (0.218)	326	0.329 (0.319)
Black share (1900)	2,939	0.134 (0.213)	326	0.134 (0.181)
Employment share in manufacturing sector (1900)	2,939	0.060 (0.065)	326	0.107 (0.084)
Labor Force share (1900)	2,939	0.832 (0.058)	326	0.803 (0.047)
Occupational Score (1900)	2,939	2.839 (0.151)	326	2.952 (0.180)
Share of English-speaking immigrants	2,898	0.831 (0.064)	324	0.815 (0.056)
Share of Literate Immigrants	2,898	0.907 (0.053)	324	0.895 (0.040)
Immigrants' Occupational Score	2,898	2.536 (0.092)	324	2.550 (0.024)

D Appendix – Index of Residential Integration

In Section 6.3, we explore the heterogeneity of the effects of European immigration by splitting counties above and below the sample median of (predicted) average 1910-1930 residential integration of immigrants. In what follows, we explain the procedure used to construct the index, and the robustness exercises we performed. Following Logan and Parman (2017), we exploit full count US Census manuscript files to identify next-door neighbors, and construct a measure assessing the likelihood of inter-group interactions given the observed neighborhood composition.

In the procedure developed by Logan and Parman (2017), neighbors are first identified according to the position of household heads in census records; then, individuals are split according to whether they belong to the majority or the minority group. Differently from Logan and Parman (2017), who consider the Black-white racial classification to assign individuals across groups, we use nativity and parentage to define members of the majority and minority group. We define as part of the “majority group” native-born individuals with both native-born parents.⁵⁴ Members of the minority group, instead, include first-generation immigrants from European countries in our sample (see also Table A.2).

Logan and Parman (2017) propose two computational procedures, which turn out to deliver rather similar results. We follow the less stringent one, and include all households with at least one (and not necessarily both) observed neighbor. We briefly describe the procedure here, referring the interested reader to Logan and Parman (2017) for a more detailed discussion. Let X_m be the number of immigrants with native-born neighbors in a county. This number is first compared to the expected number that one would obtain under complete integration, $E(\overline{X_m})$, i.e. a situation in which individuals were randomly assigned within neighborhoods independently of nativity (and parentage). Next, X_m is compared to what one would observe under complete segregation, $E(\underline{X_m})$, i.e. a situation where there is complete segregation along group lines, and immigrants living next to a native would be only the two individuals on either end of the immigrant neighborhood.

With these definitions at hand, the index of residential segregation in county c , μ_c , is computed as:

⁵⁴In our specifications, we include all natives with native parents (irrespective of race), but results are unchanged when restricting attention to white individuals. Indeed, the correlation between the index of integration constructed using, respectively, all and white-only natives of native parentage is as high as 0.9.

$$\mu_c = \frac{E(\overline{X_m}) - X_m}{E(\overline{X_m}) - E(X_m)} \quad (\text{D.1})$$

To ease the interpretation of results, we multiply μ_c by -1 , so that the index increases as immigrant residents become more integrated with natives in a county.⁵⁵

As we discuss in the main text (Section 6.3), in Table A.7 we examine the heterogeneous effect of historical immigration, depending on the intensity of inter-group contact by splitting the sample above and below the median value of a predicted version of the index in equation (D.1). To construct the predicted index of residential integration, we proceed as follows. First, we compute an index of integration for each country j as of 1900 in county c , μ_{jc} . Next, we interact it with the predicted 1910-1930 county immigrant share (relative to all immigrants) from each country. Finally, as for the other immigrants' characteristics, we sum over all European countries. Effectively, this predicted measure of integration, which highly correlates with the actual one, exploits the residential patterns of each group in each county as of 1900 to apportion the inflows of immigrants between 1910 and 1930. In this way, we do not capture potentially endogenous trends in residential segregation, which may be correlated with changes in natives' political preferences and ideology.

As highlighted by Logan and Parman (2017), this measure is defined for heterogeneous communities, and becomes less precise as the size of a group becomes small, i.e. when $m_{all} \rightarrow 0$. This is purely a computational issue, and may lead to extreme values of the index. Since in some counties the size of immigrants from country j can be close to zero, in our most preferred specification we drop country-county residential integration index (μ_{jc}) below and above the 5th and 95th percentiles respectively.⁵⁶ As an additional robustness check, in what follows, we replicate results presented in Appendix Table A.7 with two different strategies.

First, to limit the “small group” concern just described, we follow Fouka et al. (2018), and aggregate European immigrants into eight macro-regions: Northern Europe; Southern Europe; Central-Eastern Europe; Western Europe; Russian Empire; United Kingdom; Ireland; and, Germany.⁵⁷ Results are reported in Table D.2. Reas-

⁵⁵Note that the index in equation (D.1) can be negative if the area is more integrated than in a random assignment scenario.

⁵⁶Reassuringly, in unreported analysis, we replicated our results using less stringent trimming criteria, or without trimming at all. All our findings remained unchanged.

⁵⁷We keep Germany and Ireland as independent countries because they, alone, are relatively large. The largest group in the “Southern European” group is represented by the Italians. Results are robust to using different classifications to assign countries to macro-regions. See Table D.1 for the classification of individual countries in the different

surprisingly, also in this case, the effects of immigration are substantially larger and more precisely estimated for counties above the sample median of residential integration. Also, and importantly, in most cases, the magnitude of coefficients remains close to that of estimates presented in Table A.7.

Second, in Table D.3, we present results obtained from a more straightforward residential integration index. This is computed using the standard Logan and Parman (2017) strategy, and simply classifying immigrants and natives according to their nativity and parentage. That is, we do not compute any immigrant-county specific residential segregation index (μ_{jc}). Instead, we simply compute the index of integration as of 1900 (to reduce concerns of endogeneity) for European immigrants and natives of native parentage. Also in this case, our findings are in line – both quantitatively and qualitatively – with those reported in Table A.7.

Table D.1. European Macro-regions

European Macro-regions	Countries
Northern Europe	Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
United Kingdom	England Scotland Wales
Ireland	Ireland
Southern Europe	Albania Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Central and Eastern Europe	Austria Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia
Germany	Germany
Western Europe	Belgium France Netherlands Switzerland
Russian Empire	Estonia Latvia Lithuania Russia

Notes: the table presents the list of European countries included in our analysis, aggregated by European macro-regions. We follow this classification to compute the index of residential integration in Table D.2.

Table D.2. Sample Split around Residential Integration (1910-1930) - European Macro-regions

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential Integration Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.639*** (0.575) [0.119]	3.774*** (1.062) [0.142]	0.637*** (0.239) [0.110]	0.702** (0.275) [0.117]	0.626*** (0.209) [0.106]	1.495** (0.636) [0.104]	0.782*** (0.214) [0.144]	0.132 (0.134) [0.041]
KP F-stat	61.41	60.06	61.49	67.01	60.85	67.65	61.03	60.02
Observations	157,850	164,434	159,771	126,121	146,329	58,048	72,810	111,163
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.80(1.14)	4.12(2.23)	0.36(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.80(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.04(0.04)
<i>Panel B: Residential Integration Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.405 (0.251) [0.029]	1.541*** (0.452) [0.058]	0.446*** (0.080) [0.077]	0.275*** (0.105) [0.046]	0.0946 (0.092) [0.016]	1.081** (0.500) [0.075]	0.144 (0.103) [0.026]	0.060 (0.047) [0.019]
KP F-stat	279.9	282.2	281.5	283	283	273.2	290.2	272.5
Observations	156,455	162,581	158,327	126,892	145,946	58,927	72,624	112,164
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.96(1.15)	4.39(2.19)	0.40(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.84(1.19)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Residential integration (1910-1930) is defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017). The predicted measure is the same as in Table A.7 but European countries are aggregated in macro-regions (see Table D.1 for the classification). The sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (-0.366). Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.3. Sample Split around Residential Integration (1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential Integration Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.241*** (0.596) [0.162]	4.207*** (1.070) [0.159]	0.682*** (0.229) [0.118]	0.885*** (0.266) [0.148]	0.596*** (0.196) [0.101]	1.631*** (0.596) [0.113]	0.918*** (0.205) [0.169]	0.190 (0.122) [0.060]
KP F-stat	243.4	245.8	246.9	235.8	241.9	232.3	248.6	242.8
Observations	158,045	164,597	159,989	126,161	146,454	58,072	72,883	111,286
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.79(1.14)	4.11(2.23)	0.36(0.48)	0.47(0.50)	0.56(0.50)	2.79(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)
<i>Panel B: Residential Integration Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.393 (0.271) [0.029]	1.489*** (0.476) [0.056]	0.443*** (0.082) [0.077]	0.273** (0.113) [0.046]	0.071 (0.099) [0.012]	0.999* (0.541) [0.070]	0.134 (0.116) [0.025]	0.038 (0.053) [0.012]
KP F-stat	215.8	217.5	216.5	217.6	218.6	203.5	223.4	212.9
Observations	156,260	162,418	158,109	126,852	145,821	58,904	72,551	112,041
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.97(1.15)	4.41(2.18)	0.41(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.62(0.49)	2.85(1.19)	0.74(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Residential integration (1900) is defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017): the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (-0.270). Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 4.1. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

E Appendix – Additional Results

E.1 Controlling for Income Inequality

As discussed in Section 6.1 of the paper, one potential concern with our results is that historical immigration increased income inequality – either in the short or in the long run – in turn inducing natives to demand more redistribution. Studies on the more recent period tend to find that immigration had, if anything, a very limited impact on US income inequality (Card, 2009). Similarly, Tabellini (2020) provides suggestive evidence that European immigration was unlikely to increase inequality in the short run.

To more directly assess the possibility that historical immigration influenced natives’ preferences for redistribution via changes in inequality, we augment our baseline specification (Table 2 in the main text) with different measures of contemporaneous income inequality measured in 2000. Following the literature (Autor et al., 2008), we construct the ratio of log wage ratios for full-time, full-year workers computed at the following percentiles: 90 to 10; 90 to 50; and, 50 to 10.⁵⁸ Due to data limitation, we are forced to construct these measures at the CZ (rather than at the county level). We thus present two different sets of results.

First, in Table E.1, we augment our county-level baseline specification by including income inequality measured in the corresponding CZ. Second, in Table E.2, we replicate the analysis at the CZ level. Panel A of both tables replicates the baseline specification. In Panels B to D, we include each of the three measures of income inequality described above respectively. Finally, in Panel E we include all of them simultaneously. Reassuringly, results remain always quantitatively and qualitatively close to those of the baseline specification.

When interpreting these patterns, one should remember that income inequality is measured several years after our treatment (historical immigration), and as such may be a “bad control” (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Thus, we view results in Tables E.1 and E.2 as suggestive. Yet, the fact that the point estimate on the historical average immigrant share remains unchanged is consistent with the idea that our findings are unlikely to be driven by (immigrant induced) changes in income inequality.

⁵⁸As in Autor et al. (2008), we exclude self-employed workers, and construct full-time, full-year weekly wages focusing on workers who worked for at least 40 weeks and at least 35 hours per week.

Table E.1. Controlling for Wage Inequality – County Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.758*** (0.195)	2.177*** (0.367)	0.520*** (0.071)	0.402*** (0.089)	0.225*** (0.078)	1.126*** (0.383)	0.285*** (0.082)	0.120*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	166.1	167.2	165.9	164.8	166.9	164.9	176	160.6
<i>Panel B: Wage Inequality 90/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.741*** (0.195)	2.151*** (0.367)	0.514*** (0.071)	0.396*** (0.089)	0.222*** (0.078)	1.104*** (0.382)	0.281*** (0.082)	0.120*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	166	167.1	165.9	164.7	166.8	164.7	175.8	160.6
<i>Panel C: Wage Inequality 90/50</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.736*** (0.195)	2.149*** (0.367)	0.514*** (0.071)	0.394*** (0.089)	0.220*** (0.077)	1.104*** (0.383)	0.280*** (0.082)	0.119*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	165.5	166.7	165.4	164.3	166.3	164.3	175.5	160.2
<i>Panel D: Wage Inequality 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.752*** (0.195)	2.164*** (0.367)	0.517*** (0.071)	0.400*** (0.089)	0.224*** (0.078)	1.116*** (0.382)	0.283*** (0.082)	0.120*** (0.040)
KP F-stat	166.6	167.7	166.5	165.3	167.5	165.4	176.4	161.1
<i>Panel E: Wage Inequality 90/10; 90/50; 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.716*** (0.200)	2.139*** (0.377)	0.505*** (0.073)	0.383*** (0.091)	0.212*** (0.079)	1.038*** (0.384)	0.279*** (0.083)	0.120*** (0.041)
KP F-stat	159.9	161.1	160	158.7	160.6	158.6	169	155.5
Observations	304,460	316,673	308,017	245,257	283,041	113,506	140,761	216,131
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.89(1.15)	4.27(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Wage inequality is proxied with the ratio of log wage for full-time, full-year workers at the following percentiles: 90 to 10 (Panel B); 90 to 50 (Panel C); and, 50 to 10 (Panel D). Regressions include individual controls and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.2. Controlling for Wage Inequality – Commuting Zone Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.810*** (0.223)	2.030*** (0.453)	0.454*** (0.092)	0.396*** (0.107)	0.319*** (0.088)	1.221*** (0.317)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.052)
KP F-stat	65.50	65.68	65.55	64.12	65.56	64.89	67.74	66.20
<i>Panel B: Wage Inequality 90/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.807*** (0.223)	2.025*** (0.449)	0.453*** (0.091)	0.395*** (0.106)	0.319*** (0.088)	1.214*** (0.313)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.052)
KP F-stat	65.53	65.71	65.58	64.15	65.59	64.93	67.77	66.23
<i>Panel C: Wage Inequality 90/50</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.804*** (0.223)	2.022*** (0.452)	0.452*** (0.092)	0.394*** (0.106)	0.318*** (0.088)	1.212*** (0.315)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.051)
KP F-stat	65.63	65.82	65.68	64.26	65.70	64.99	67.85	66.30
<i>Panel D: Wage Inequality 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.811*** (0.223)	2.032*** (0.448)	0.454*** (0.090)	0.396*** (0.107)	0.319*** (0.088)	1.220*** (0.314)	0.334*** (0.110)	0.171*** (0.052)
KP F-stat	65.84	66.02	65.89	64.46	65.91	65.29	68.07	66.53
<i>Panel E: Wage Inequality 90/10; 90/50; 50/10</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.789*** (0.227)	2.011*** (0.459)	0.444*** (0.092)	0.383*** (0.107)	0.311*** (0.089)	1.139*** (0.310)	0.340*** (0.110)	0.170*** (0.051)
KP F-stat	64.29	64.53	64.44	62.92	64.42	63.75	66.46	65.05
Observations	304,460	316,673	308,017	245,257	283,041	113,506	140,761	216,131
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.89(1.15)	4.27(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d) fraction of imm.	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.09)	0.10(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Wage inequality is proxied with the ratio of log wage for full-time, full-year workers at the following percentiles: 90 to 10 (Panel B); 90 to 50 (Panel C); and, 50 to 10 (Panel D). The Table replicates Table 2 aggregating the geography used to define the fraction of immigrants from the county to the Commuting Zone level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.2 Controlling for Immigrants' Economic Characteristics

As discussed in Section 6.1 of the paper, immigrants from different regions may have brought with them specific skills and economic characteristics, and these, in turn, may have influenced the evolution of natives' ideology in the long-run. Relative to natives, immigrants – especially from Southern and Eastern Europe – were more likely to work in the manufacturing sector, to hold unskilled jobs, and to be illiterate (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). Similarly, there was substantial variation in the income level of immigrants from different groups. While Abramitzky et al. (2014) show that not all European immigrants faced an earnings penalty relative to natives upon arrival, for many of them such gap actually existed, and it typically took more than one generation to close it (Abramitzky et al., 2020b). As a result, it is possible that counties receiving more immigrants, in particular from poorer European countries, developed a set of institutions and norms that were conducive to more generous welfare programs. Once these institutions were in place, preferences of both natives and immigrants might have adapted to them.

To test whether immigrants' economic characteristics can explain our results, we construct a set of indexes that account for the economic characteristics brought about by immigration. Specifically, for each decade and for each county, we compute *i*) immigrants' average occupational income score as well as the share of immigrants who were: *ii*) able to speak English; *iii*) literate; and *iv*) employed in manufacturing. We then take the mean of each variable during the 1910-1930 period, in order to obtain the average value of each characteristic brought about by immigrants in a given county-decade.

We construct a corresponding instrument for each index using a logic similar to that of the instrument for social welfare reforms presented in the main text. We first compute the average value of the variables described above for each immigrant group between 1910 and 1930 at the national level. Next, we interact this country-specific value with the predicted share of immigrants in a given county in each decade (relative to all other immigrant groups), sum across groups in that county (in each decade), and finally take the average over the three decades.⁵⁹

We then augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for (the instrumented version of) each of these indexes. 2SLS results are reported in Table E.3.

⁵⁹The predicted share of immigrants in each county and decade is constructed using the country-specific values used to build our main instrument (see equation (3) in Section 4.1 of the paper).

In Panel A, we start by controlling for the share of immigrants who were able to speak English; then, in Panels B, C, and D we consider, respectively, log occupational income scores, the employment share in manufacturing, and literacy. Not only the coefficient on immigration remains positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively close to that reported in Table 2 (Panel B). But also, and perhaps more importantly, no systematic pattern for the effects of each economic characteristic of immigrants emerges. In Panel E, we present a specification where all immigrants' characteristics are simultaneously included. Also in this case, the average immigrant share in the county remains strongly positive, highly significant, and quantitatively similar to those from the baseline specification.

In Table E.3, we also present the F-stat for the joint significance of all instruments. With the exception of the specifications in which we include the occupational income score (Panel B) and all controls simultaneously (Panel E), the F-stat is above conventional levels. Reassuringly, when evaluating the partial AP F-stats for each individual first stage (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), which we do not report to save space, we note that they are always above conventional levels.⁶⁰

Overall, the evidence presented in this section indicates that the positive relationship between historical immigration and both preferences for redistribution and political ideology is unlikely to be explained by the economic characteristics that European immigrants brought with them.

⁶⁰For instance, in the specific case of Panel B, the AP F-stat for the immigrant share and for the average occupational scores is, respectively, 155 and 66.

Table E.3. Redistribution, Ideology and Immigration – Including Immigrants’ Characteristics

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: English Speaking Ability</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.858*** (0.240)	2.251*** (0.437)	0.572*** (0.080)	0.477*** (0.106)	0.266*** (0.091)	1.290*** (0.434)	0.372*** (0.091)	0.134*** (0.046)
English-speaking Immigrants	0.231 (0.224)	0.366 (0.403)	0.136* (0.076)	0.163 (0.101)	0.077 (0.081)	0.321 (0.238)	0.152* (0.078)	0.040 (0.043)
KP F-stat	131.1	134.1	135.5	135.5	129.1	134.5	137.6	133.9
<i>Panel B: Occupational Income Score</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.695*** (0.195)	1.971*** (0.368)	0.478*** (0.072)	0.368*** (0.090)	0.215*** (0.077)	1.135*** (0.381)	0.270*** (0.081)	0.109*** (0.040)
Immigrants’ Income Score	0.144 (0.168)	0.356 (0.325)	0.074 (0.058)	0.066 (0.076)	0.030 (0.070)	-0.194 (0.220)	0.069 (0.082)	0.007 (0.040)
KP F-stat	8.458	8.972	8.941	9.058	8.869	8.202	8.396	8.911
<i>Panel C: Employment in Manufacturing</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.832*** (0.205)	2.205*** (0.387)	0.530*** (0.075)	0.434*** (0.093)	0.256*** (0.080)	1.290*** (0.394)	0.325*** (0.081)	0.141*** (0.040)
Immigrants working in Manufacturing	-0.897** (0.445)	-1.361* (0.800)	-0.311** (0.149)	-0.438** (0.193)	-0.278* (0.154)	-1.492*** (0.510)	-0.336** (0.142)	-0.241*** (0.092)
KP F-stat	228.1	230.9	231.1	227.9	224.3	233.8	238.6	227.7

Table E.3, Continued

<i>Panel D: Literacy</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.844*** (0.218)	2.260*** (0.403)	0.557*** (0.074)	0.471*** (0.098)	0.259*** (0.084)	1.211*** (0.412)	0.344*** (0.087)	0.120*** (0.043)
Share of Literate	0.343 (0.276)	0.629 (0.503)	0.185** (0.092)	0.253** (0.125)	0.107 (0.102)	0.313 (0.290)	0.172* (0.102)	0.027 (0.055)
KP F-stat	99.76	101.8	102.4	101.3	96.41	98.95	101.1	98.89
<i>Panel E: All Immigrants' Characteristics</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.797*** (0.246)	2.097*** (0.450)	0.547*** (0.083)	0.437*** (0.108)	0.254*** (0.093)	1.348*** (0.435)	0.361*** (0.092)	0.139*** (0.047)
KP F-stat	5.687	6.608	7.294	7.632	5.949	5.249	6.231	5.837
Observations	313,597	326,286	317,388	252,450	291,621	116,693	145,104	222,823
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean(s.d.)fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Instr. Immigrants' Characteristics	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 Black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). The definition and construction of the variables related to immigrants' characteristics can be found in Table A.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

E.3 Accounting for Immigrants' Intergenerational Mobility

Another mechanism discussed in Section 6.1 of the paper is that the experience of European immigrants in the US might have influenced their own preferences for redistribution, and in turn spilled over into those of natives. In particular, if immigrants did not experience significant occupational upgrading, or if the degree of intergenerational mobility for their kids was lower than for kids of natives, counties that received more immigrants historically might have developed over time stronger preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

We address this possibility using data from Abramitzky et al. (2020b), and construct the county-average rate of immigrants' intergenerational mobility, weighed by the share of immigrants from each group in each county in each decade between 1910 and 1930. We adopt a strategy similar to that used for immigrants' economic characteristics described in Appendix E.2 above. Specifically, for each immigrant group, we interact its 1910-1930 average share in a county (relative to all other foreign born) with the group-specific rate of intergenerational mobility computed by Abramitzky et al. (2020b). When constructing the corresponding instrument, we use the predicted rather than the actual immigrant share in the county, but the logic remains the same. We obtain a county-level index by summing these county-group specific values across all European groups.⁶¹ To ease the interpretation of results, we standardize the index by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation.

Next, we augment the most stringent specification of Table E.3, Panel E, by controlling for the instrumented index of intergenerational mobility of immigrants in the county. 2SLS results, reported in Table E.4, show that the coefficient on the average immigrant share remains positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively close to that reported in our baseline specification.⁶² Instead, the point estimate on the index of intergenerational mobility is quantitatively small and never statistically significant.

⁶¹We can construct this index only for the subset of immigrant groups for which data in Abramitzky et al. (2020b) are available. Reassuringly, the groups for which data are not available represent less than 10% of all European immigrants moving to the US in this period.

⁶²As for Panel E of Table E.3, also in this case, the F-stat for weak instruments is below conventional levels, indicating that results should be interpreted with some caution.

Table E.4. Intergenerational Mobility Index

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.790*** (0.249)	2.062*** (0.452)	0.541*** (0.083)	0.430*** (0.108)	0.238** (0.093)	1.334*** (0.434)	0.356*** (0.091)	0.141*** (0.047)
Immigrants' Intergenerational Mobility Index	0.004 (0.019)	0.019 (0.036)	0.004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.007)	0.008 (0.020)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.004)
Observations	313,597	326,286	317,388	252,450	291,621	116,693	145,104	222,823
KP F-stat	4.997	5.823	6.404	6.785	5.221	4.631	5.536	5.130
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean(s.d.)fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Immigrants' Characteristics	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of social mobility is built from Abramitzky et al (2019) and reflects, by nationality, the predict income rank of son whose immigrant father was in 25th income percentile; the variable is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The Table replicates the specification of Panel E in Table E.3. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.4 European Immigrants and Frontier Exposure

Yet another potential concern about our interpretation is that immigrants after 1900 disproportionately moved to urban areas (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). As shown in Bazzi et al. (2020), these places were characterized by a shorter (if any) exposure to the “frontier culture”, which was in turn conducive to the development of rugged individualism (Bazzi et al., 2020; Turner, 1893). If the average immigrant share in our analysis and the exposure to the frontier were negatively correlated, one may thus worry that our results are partly driven by the fact that *i*) immigrants selected more liberal counties to begin with; and *ii*) migrants in our sample had stronger preferences for redistribution than the average European migrant moving to America during this period.

To address this concern, we augment our preferred specification (Table 2), by controlling for the total frontier exposure from Bazzi et al. (2020).⁶³ Reassuringly, as shown in Table E.5, the point estimate on the average immigrant share remains positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively similar to that reported in Table 2. Consistent with findings in Bazzi et al. (2020), instead, the coefficient on total frontier exposure is negative and, in most cases, statistically significant.

These results show how different historical experiences – historical European immigration on the one hand and exposure to the frontier culture on the other – shaped long run American political ideology in opposite directions. Comparing the magnitude of coefficients, the historical fraction of immigrants seems to have a larger effect on ideology and preferences for redistribution relative to frontier exposure, at least in our context. For instance, one standard deviation increase in frontier exposure (0.11) is associated with a .7% lower probability of reporting a liberal ideology (column 1) and 1.8% lower likelihood of identifying with the Democratic Party (column 3), respectively. These numbers are, roughly, 2% and 10% for the historical immigrant share. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in frontier exposure lowers opposition to spending cuts (column 5) by 1.1% and support for welfare spending (column 6) by 0.2%. Instead, one standard deviation increase in the historical immigrant share raises opposition to spending cuts and support for welfare spending by 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively.

⁶³This variable is constructed as follows. In each Census year, between 1790 and 1890, a binary indicator is defined that takes the value of one if a county was on the frontier. The total frontier experience is then obtained as the sum of indicators of frontier status from 1790 to 1890. We rescale the variable dividing it by 100, so that it ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 0.63.

Table E.5. Controlling for Frontier Exposure

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.677*** (0.191)	1.965*** (0.357)	0.476*** (0.070)	0.355*** (0.087)	0.208*** (0.075)	1.077*** (0.385)	0.262*** (0.081)	0.107*** (0.039)
Total Frontier Experience	-0.204*** (0.073)	-0.311** (0.137)	-0.063** (0.026)	-0.107*** (0.035)	-0.059* (0.031)	-0.100 (0.074)	-0.095*** (0.023)	-0.018 (0.014)
Observations	314,305	327,015	318,098	253,014	292,275	116,976	145,435	223,328
KP F-stat	185.9	187.3	185.9	184.3	186.9	183.3	198.6	180.3
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean(s.d.)fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The measure of exposure to frontier culture is from Bazzi et al. (2020) and it is rescaled by 100. Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.5 The German Example

In Section 6.2 of the paper, we consider the case of Germany, which experienced a major social welfare reform under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1884. We compare the effects of German immigrants who migrated to the US before and after the implementation of the reform. We conjecture that, if exposure to the welfare influenced immigrants’ preferences, which in turn spilled over into those of natives, Germans arrived after the reform should have a stronger impact on natives’ preferences for redistribution in the long run.

The core of Bismarck’s welfare program was the approval of the Compulsory Health Insurance Bill – the first compulsory health insurance ever implemented in the world and considered as a key step in the direction of universal access to health-care (Bauernschuster et al., 2019; Scheubel, 2013) – and the Accident Insurance Bill in 1884.⁶⁴ These two reforms became effective in December 1884 and covered all industrial manual laborers employed “in factories, iron-works, mines, ship-building yards and similar workplaces” (Leichter, 1979). The reform required both employees and employers to make contributions to a fund that would then be used in case workers fell sick or injured.⁶⁵

Restricting attention to German immigrants, we estimate a regression similar to our baseline specification (equation (2)), except that the two regressors of interest are now the average German share between, respectively, 1850 and 1880, and 1900 and 1930 (and arrived after 1884).⁶⁶ Table E.6, which includes survey wave and state fixed effects as well as all historical controls of Table 2, reports OLS results. It documents that only the 1900-1930 German share enters positively and significantly, while the coefficient on the 1850-1880 share is quantitatively small, negative, and imprecisely

⁶⁴These reforms were later augmented with the the Old Age and Disability Insurance Bill in 1889 (and subsequently adopted in 1891). The insurance program was introduced by Bismarck in response to increased social unrest among the German working class (Rosenberg, 1967).

⁶⁵Workers were eligible to paid leave amounting to at least half of their wage for 13 weeks. In addition, workers were eligible to receive free medical and dental care and prescribed medicine for a maximum of 13 weeks as well as treatment in hospitals for a maximum of 26 weeks. At discretion of the employers, workers’ dependents were eligible to free healthcare too. See Bauernschuster et al. (2019), Leichter (1979), and Scheubel (2013) for more details about the reform.

⁶⁶Since Census data for 1890 is not available, we consider decades 1900 through 1930, and restrict attention to all German immigrants arrived after 1884. Importantly for our purposes, immigration from Germany was sustained both before and after 1884. According to the official immigration statistics in Willcox (1929), almost 2.5 million Germans entered the United States between 1850 and 1880, and 1.9 million of them immigrated between 1886 and 1930 (data between 1925 and 1930 were digitized by Tabellini, 2020, from the *Commissioner General of Immigration*). Between 1881 and 1885, another 960,000 individuals moved to the US. Our analysis excludes German immigrants arrived between 1881 and 1884. The boundaries of Germany changed several times. Ruggles et al. (2020) classify as “Germans” individuals born in one Germany’s administrative areas circa 1900. See https://usa.ipums.org/usa/1860_1870_release_notes.shtml for more details.

estimated. This is consistent with our hypothesis: exposure to social welfare reforms changed immigrants' preferences (and, perhaps expectations) about the size of the government; as immigrants moved to the US, their ideology likely spilled over onto that of natives.

Reassuringly, Germans moving before and after 1884 were very similar to each other along observable characteristics. On average, 90% of German immigrants were literate between 1850 and 1880; this number was slightly higher (95%) among those arrived after 1884. Similarly, 90% of German men in working age (15-64) were in the labor force between 1850 and 1880, while 92% of them were in the labor force after 1884. Moreover, Germans moved to a very similar set of counties. Figure E.1 plots the share of German immigrants across counties for the two periods, and shows that, indeed, there is almost complete overlap between the places that received German immigrants between 1850 and 1880 and between 1884 and 1930, respectively.


Table E.6. Ideology, Redistribution and Immigration – the German Example

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Fraction of German Immigrants(1900-1930)	2.887** (1.250) [0.025]	7.882*** (2.368) [0.035]	1.941*** (0.454) [0.039]	1.753*** (0.574) [0.034]	1.154** (0.459) [0.023]	3.615*** (1.313) [0.029]	1.161*** (0.401) [0.025]	0.368 (0.278) [0.014]
Fraction of German Immigrants(1850-1880)	-0.166 (0.162) [-0.007]	-0.489 (0.336) [-0.011]	-0.105 (0.067) [-0.011]	-0.129* (0.077) [-0.013]	-0.134** (0.062) [-0.014]	-0.216 (0.194) [-0.009]	-0.093 (0.070) [-0.011]	-0.054 (0.038) [-0.010]
Observations	310,919	323,508	314,683	250,409	289,179	115,850	143,885	220,836
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.27(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of German Imm.(1900-1930)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)	0.01(0.01)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of German Imm.(1850-1880)	0.04(0.05)	0.04(0.05)	0.04(0.05)	0.04(0.05)	0.04(0.05)	0.04(0.05)	0.04(0.05)	0.04(0.05)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y


Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressors of interest are the average fraction of German immigrants over county population between 1850 and 1880 and between 1900 and 1930. German immigrants in the second period are restricted to those arrived after 1884. Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure E.1. Fraction of German Immigrants over County Population

Panel A: Period 1850-1880



Panel B: Period 1900-1930



Notes: the two maps plot the average share of German Immigrants (over county population) in the periods 1850-1880 and 1900-1930, respectively. In the latter period, we restrict the sample to Germans arrived after 1884. Source: Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

E.6 Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms: Additional Results

E.6.1 Controlling for Immigrants' Economic Characteristics

As discussed in Section 6.2, one may be worried that the effects of historical exposure to reforms were driven by the correlation between exposure to the welfare state and the economic characteristics of immigrants from countries that introduced reforms earlier (or later). In this section, we verify that the impact of the index of exposure to reforms as well as the differential effects of immigration, depending on the exposure that immigrants had to reforms in Europe, are robust to controlling for immigrants' (instrumented) economic characteristics.

Specifically, we augment the specification estimated in both Table A.4 and Table A.5 by adding all instrumented immigrants' characteristics (see Table E.3, Panel E). Reassuringly, all results, reported in Tables E.7 and E.8, remain in line with those obtained from our baseline specification. As one may see, in some of the specifications, the F-stat falls below conventional levels, indicating that results should be interpreted with some caution. Nevertheless, the stability of 2SLS coefficients is reassuring, and indicates that our key findings are unlikely to be driven by the correlation between the history of social welfare reforms and immigrants' economic characteristics.

E.6.2 Controlling for Institutional Quality

A second concern with the index of exposure to social welfare reforms is that the latter might capture the influence of the institutions prevailing in the country of origin of immigrants more broadly. We address this possibility by constructing an index of exposure to democracy based on the Polity 2 index.⁶⁷ As we did with social welfare reforms, for each immigrant, we count the number of years in which the country of origin of the individual was democratic, up to the year of emigration; as for the index of reforms, we then average across immigrant groups and decades to obtain the "average exposure to democracy" brought about by immigration.⁶⁸ Table E.9 augments the regressions reported in Table A.4, controlling for the instrumented index of exposure to democracy. Reassuringly, the effects of social welfare reforms remain unchanged, whereas the democracy index is always statistically insignificant

⁶⁷This variable, widely used in political science and political economy, is taken from the Polity IV Project (Gurr et al., 2016).

⁶⁸Consistent with the literature (Besley and Persson, 2019; Persson and Tabellini, 2009), we define a country as democratic if the Polity 2 index is strictly greater than zero.

and unstable in both sign and magnitude. In Table E.10, we replicate this analysis by also controlling for an index that captures the quality of constraints on the executive. Also in this case, results remain unchanged. To measure constraints on the executive we use the variable xconst-2 taken from the Polity IV Project.

Table E.7. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms - Immigrants' Economic Characteristics

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.800*** (0.238) [0.058]	2.102*** (0.437) [0.079]	0.548*** (0.082) [0.095]	0.439*** (0.105) [0.073]	0.255*** (0.090) [0.043]	1.347*** (0.432) [0.094]	0.362*** (0.091) [0.067]	0.139*** (0.045) [0.044]
Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms	0.049*** (0.018) [0.032]	0.083*** (0.032) [0.029]	0.011* (0.006) [0.017]	0.018** (0.008) [0.028]	0.014** (0.006) [0.022]	0.040** (0.018) [0.025]	0.008 (0.005) [0.013]	0.008** (0.003) [0.022]
KP F-stat	7.632	9.019	9.823	11.06	8.071	7.693	8.572	7.935
Observations	313,597	326,286	317,388	252,450	291,621	116,693	145,104	222,823
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Instr. Immigrants' chs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of exposure to social welfare reforms is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2 and instrumented immigrants' characteristics. The definition and construction of the variables related to immigrants' characteristics can be found in Table A.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.8. Sample Split around Predicted Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms Median

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Welfare Reforms Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.805*** (0.622) [0.131]	3.854*** (1.132) [0.145]	0.738*** (0.207) [0.127]	0.899*** (0.279) [0.150]	0.683*** (0.216) [0.116]	1.608*** (0.573) [0.112]	0.677*** (0.182) [0.124]	0.367*** (0.103) [0.115]
KP F-stat	14.49	14.96	14.91	16.23	14.51	5.340	16.08	16.22
Observations	157,340	163,086	158,724	126,711	145,476	57,639	72,261	112,894
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.85(1.15)	4.17(2.21)	0.36(0.48)	0.49(0.50)	0.58(0.49)	2.81(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)
<i>Panel B: Welfare Reforms Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants(0.267)	0.406 (0.516) [0.029]	1.477*** (0.092) [0.056]	0.486*** (0.119) [0.084]	0.269** (0.098) [0.045]	0.057 (0.524) [0.009]	1.215** (0.114) [0.085]	0.230** (0.050) [0.042]	-0.0003 [-8.98e-05]
KP F-stat	4.708	5.172	5.466	5.767	4.805	4.619	5.263	4.934
Observations	156,257	163,200	158,664	125,739	146,145	59,054	72,843	109,929
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.90(1.14)	4.34(2.21)	0.40(0.49)	0.53(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.83(1.19)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d) fraction of imm.	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Instr. Immigrants' chs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of exposure to social welfare reforms is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Here the sample is split around the median of this index in the estimation sample (-0.094). Regressions include state fixed effects, individual and historical controls as in Table 2 and instrumented immigrants' characteristics. The definition and construction of the variables related to immigrants' characteristics can be found in Table A.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.9. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms and Democracy

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.158*** (0.204)	2.775*** (0.374)	0.628*** (0.077)	0.598*** (0.089)	0.381*** (0.075)	1.588*** (0.377)	0.422*** (0.079)	0.188*** (0.036)
Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms	0.043** (0.019)	0.069** (0.034)	0.009 (0.006)	0.016* (0.008)	0.012* (0.006)	0.035* (0.019)	0.007 (0.005)	0.008** (0.003)
Exposure to Democracy	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.025)	4.18e-05 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)	0.012 (0.018)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.003)
Observations	313,561	326,246	317,353	252,419	291,584	116,679	145,089	222,793
KP F-Stat	135.5	138.5	137.6	133.6	137.9	138.3	140.4	137.3
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.52(0.51)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The table replicates Table A.4 augmenting the specification by controlling for average exposure of immigrants to democracy in the country of origin. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.10. Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms, Democracy and Constraints on the Executive

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.875*** (0.215)	2.352*** (0.399)	0.571*** (0.077)	0.474*** (0.095)	0.282*** (0.084)	1.360*** (0.423)	0.313*** (0.090)	0.132*** (0.042)
Exposure to Social Welfare Reforms	0.058*** (0.018)	0.097*** (0.031)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.008)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.018)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)
Exposure to Democracy	0.022 (0.017)	0.046 (0.030)	0.014** (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)	0.055** (0.025)	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.004)
Executive Constraints	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.000 (0.006)	-0.006* (0.003)
KP F-Stat	96.52	99.29	99.26	96.15	99.99	99.77	100.2	98.66
Observations	313,561	326,246	317,353	252,419	291,584	116,679	145,089	222,793
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. Panel A replicates Table A.4 augmenting the specification by controlling for exposure of immigrants to constraints on the executive and democracy in the country of origin. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.6.3 Additional Robustness Checks

One may also worry that results in Table A.5 are driven by the fact that immigrants with higher exposure to social welfare reforms were more likely to settle in counties that were already more Democratic. To deal with this issue, we replicate the sample split exercise reported Table A.5 by separately controlling for the baseline Democratic vote share in presidential elections. Results, reported in Table E.11, remain unchanged. Also in this case, the effects of immigration are an order of magnitude larger in counties above the median of exposure to social welfare reforms.

As a further check, we show that our findings are robust to focusing on the two most common reforms – pensions and education – that were implemented in Europe prior to 1930 (Table A.2). In Table E.12, we replicate Table A.4, constructing the index of exposure using only education and pension reforms. Next, in Table E.13, we split the sample according to the (predicted) values of the index that only includes the two classes of reforms. Reassuringly, in both cases, results are unchanged, indicating that our findings are not influenced by rare episodes of other types of reforms.

Table E.11. Sample Split around Predicted Exposure to Welfare Reforms Median - Controlling for Democratic Share

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Welfare Reforms Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.828*** (0.463) [0.132]	4.171*** (0.893) [0.157]	0.790*** (0.176) [0.136]	0.899*** (0.222) [0.150]	0.646*** (0.175) [0.109]	1.551*** (0.434) [0.108]	0.648*** (0.138) [0.119]	0.326*** (0.088) [0.102]
KP F-stat	81.26	81.77	81.28	79.27	80.98	81.08	85.98	78.16
Observations	147,115	152,569	148,455	118,442	136,129	53,937	67,713	105,468
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.86(1.15)	4.19(2.21)	0.37(0.48)	0.49(0.50)	0.58(0.49)	2.81(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.07)	0.08(0.07)
<i>Panel B: Welfare Reforms Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.350 (0.228) [0.025]	1.427*** (0.436) [0.054]	0.422*** (0.075) [0.073]	0.192* (0.100) [0.032]	0.067 (0.085) [0.011]	1.011** (0.464) [0.070]	0.159 (0.101) [0.029]	-0.005 (0.041) [-0.002]
KP F-stat	256.2	260.3	257.1	250	256.8	231.2	249.8	274.5
Observations	153,117	159,935	155,482	123,126	143,236	57,940	71,451	107,779
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.90(1.14)	4.33(2.21)	0.40(0.49)	0.52(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.83(1.19)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d) fraction of imm.	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic Share (1900-1904)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of exposure to welfare reforms is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Here the sample is split around the median of this index in the estimation sample (-0.089). The table replicates Table A.5 augmenting the specification by controlling for (county-level) average democratic share in 1900-1904 Presidential Elections. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.12. Exposure to Education and Pension Reforms

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.878*** (0.198) [0.064]	2.300*** (0.372) [0.087]	0.539*** (0.072) [0.093]	0.454*** (0.089) [0.076]	0.267*** (0.078) [0.045]	1.250*** (0.379) [0.087]	0.327*** (0.079) [0.060]	0.138*** (0.040) [0.043]
Exposure to Education and Pension Reforms	0.051*** (0.018) [0.035]	0.085*** (0.031) [0.030]	0.016*** (0.006) [0.025]	0.024*** (0.008) [0.037]	0.015** (0.006) [0.023]	0.048*** (0.018) [0.031]	0.014*** (0.005) [0.024]	0.009*** (0.003) [0.026]
KP F-stat	287	290.9	292.8	283.5	287.7	284.7	289.9	294.1
Observations	313,597	326,286	317,388	252,450	291,621	116,693	145,104	222,823
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of exposure to education and pension reforms is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.13. Sample Split around Predicted Exposure to Education and Pension Reforms Median

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Education and Pension Reforms Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.015*** (0.514) [0.146]	4.454*** (0.996) [0.168]	0.806*** (0.194) [0.139]	0.956*** (0.246) [0.159]	0.714*** (0.196) [0.121]	1.512*** (0.439) [0.105]	0.660*** (0.143) [0.121]	0.397*** (0.098) [0.125]
KP F-stat	54.77	55	54.58	53.67	54.14	55.60	58.20	52.34
Observations	158,181	163,983	159,608	127,410	146,375	58,196	72,950	113,543
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.85(1.15)	4.17(2.21)	0.37(0.48)	0.49(0.50)	0.58(0.49)	2.81(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)	0.08(0.06)
<i>Panel B: Education and Pension Reforms Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.400 (0.248) [0.029]	1.423*** (0.471) [0.054]	0.423*** (0.084) [0.073]	0.212* (0.108) [0.035]	0.081 (0.089) [0.014]	1.089** (0.493) [0.076]	0.211** (0.098) [0.039]	0.012 (0.044) [0.004]
KP F-stat	393.9	399.3	394.1	388.1	393	351	382.5	413.9
Observations	156,124	163,032	158,490	125,604	145,900	58,780	72,485	109,785
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.90(1.15)	4.35(2.21)	0.40(0.49)	0.52(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.83(1.20)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.11(0.10)	0.11(0.10)	0.11(0.10)	0.10(0.10)	0.10(0.10)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The measure of exposure to education and pension reforms is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Here the sample is split around the median of this index in the estimation sample (-0.046). Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.6.4 Measuring Immigrants' Preferences for Redistribution in the ESS

In this section, we first show that preferences for redistribution reported by European immigrants in the ESS are highly correlated with the year in which social welfare reforms were first implemented in their country of origin.⁶⁹ Next, we verify that using preferences for redistribution reported in the ESS by (first generation) European immigrants from the countries in our sample leaves results of Tables A.4 and A.5 in the main text unchanged.

Focusing on first generation immigrants, as done in Luttmer and Singhal (2011), to more accurately capture the portability of preferences, we estimate the following specification:

$$y_{ijt} = \gamma_t + \beta \log(\text{Reforms}_j) + X_{ijt} + \log(\text{GDP}_{2000,j}) + u_{ijt} \quad (\text{E.1})$$

where y_{ijt} is the stated preference for redistribution of respondent i from country j in survey wave t , which takes on higher values for stronger desire to redistribute (see the exact definition in Appendix C.2). We also control for wave fixed effects γ_t , a set of individual characteristics X_{ijt} , and the logarithm country j 's GDP in 2000.⁷⁰ The key regressor of interest is the average log of the years in which each welfare reform was introduced in country j .⁷¹ The vector of individual characteristics, X_{ijt} , includes: gender, a quadratic in age, income, logarithm of years of education, employment and marital status.⁷²

We report results in Table E.14. In column 1, we start from a parsimonious specification, which only includes survey wave fixed effects and the log of country of origin GDP. Next, in column 2, we augment the regression with all individual controls described above. Results in column 2, which represent our preferred specification for this exercise, are based on 13,233 observations – the number of respondents we are left with after restricting the sample to first generation immigrants from countries

⁶⁹See Appendix C.2 for a description of the ESS.

⁷⁰Results are unchanged when using GDP measured in other years. Data can be downloaded at <http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-7.0>.

⁷¹Our index of exposure to welfare state reforms includes: education, pension, injury plan, health, and unemployment reforms. See Section 3.1 for the sources of this variable and Table A.2 for the years of introduction of all reforms in each country in our sample.

⁷²We create ten different income dummies: the first nine exactly correspond to the first nine possible categories that are reported in the ESS question; the last dummy encompasses all higher levels of income. Employment status reports three different categories: employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force. Marital status includes the following four categories: single, married, divorced or separated, and widowed.

for which we have data on welfare reforms (see Table A.2).⁷³ Reassuringly, in both column 1 and column 2, the coefficient on the year of introduction of social welfare reforms is negative and statistically significant.

These results are reassuring, because they indicate that immigrants from countries that introduced social welfare reforms earlier have stronger preferences for redistribution today. We now go one step further, and verify that using ESS data to construct an index of immigrants' preferences for redistribution similar to that used in the main text leaves our findings unchanged (see Section 3.1 for the construction of the index and Section 6.2 for the results). To do so, we proceed as follows. First, we regress the stated preferences for redistribution used also in the previous paragraph against the log of the GDP of the country of origin, and take the residuals. Then, we collapse these residualized preferences for redistribution at the country level. Finally, we interact them with the (actual and predicted) share of immigrants from each country in each county in each decade, as we did in Section 3.1 when constructing the index of exposure to welfare reforms.

Then, we estimate our baseline specification, and report 2SLS results in Table E.15. As in Table A.4, also in this case, both the average immigrant share and the index of preferences for redistribution are statistically significant, and quantitatively large. Finally, we test the more stringent implication of the social transmission mechanism: in Table E.16, we split the sample above and below the median of the predicted index of preferences for redistribution constructed with the ESS data as before. Also in this case, results remain in line with those from our baseline specification (reported in Table A.5). That is, immigration has a stronger and quantitatively larger impact in counties where the predicted ESS-based index of preferences for redistribution is higher. In counties with the predicted index below the median, instead, the relationship is weaker and less precisely estimated.

⁷³Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Results are robust to using robust standard errors.

Table E.14. Immigrants' Preferences for Redistribution and Year of Introduction of Welfare Reforms in the Countries of Origin, European Social Survey

Dep. Variable	Preferences for Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)
Log Year of of Welfare Reforms	-4.526** (1.857)	-4.489*** (1.360)
Observations	15,923	13,233
Cluster	Y	Y
N. Clusters	26	26
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	3.87(1.04)	3.85(1.04)
Individual Controls	N	Y

Notes: Each regression controls for logarithm of GDP from the immigrants' countries of origin and includes survey year fixed effects. In column 2, we also add individual controls: gender, a quadratic in age, logarithm of years of education, employment and marital status, income. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Regressions use data from the European Social Survey, including rounds from 1 to 8. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table E.15. Controlling for Preferences for Redistribution in Country of Origin

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of immigrants	0.583*** (0.196) [0.042]	1.773*** (0.367) [0.067]	0.443*** (0.072) [0.076]	0.328*** (0.088) [0.055]	0.175** (0.075) [0.030]	0.958** (0.381) [0.067]	0.257*** (0.079) [0.047]	0.076* (0.039) [0.024]
Preferences for Redistribution in Country of Origin	0.034*** (0.011) [0.026]	0.064*** (0.020) [0.025]	0.012*** (0.004) [0.021]	0.013*** (0.005) [0.022]	0.011*** (0.004) [0.020]	0.037*** (0.013) [0.027]	0.006* (0.004) [0.012]	0.008*** (0.002) [0.027]
KP F-Stat	327.4	328.4	329.9	328.8	330	328.1	339.3	332
Observations	313,597	326,286	317,388	252,450	291,621	116,693	145,104	222,823
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.1(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.1(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCEs surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. The regressor on preferences for redistribution is obtained as the residual after regressing on logarithm of GDP. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 Black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.16. Sample Split around ESS index of preferences for redistribution

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: ESS Index Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction	0.851*** (0.263) [0.062]	2.150*** (0.477) [0.081]	0.524*** (0.086) [0.091]	0.460*** (0.104) [0.077]	0.263** (0.107) [0.044]	1.512*** (0.482) [0.105]	0.327*** (0.096) [0.060]	0.192*** (0.048)
KP F-stat	226.2	228.4	227	223.7	226.6	235.6	239.4	208.3
Observations	157,135	163,179	158,790	126,533	145,668	58,140	72,110	110,456
<i>Panel B: ESS Index Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction	0.285 (0.188) [0.021]	1.155*** (0.415) [0.044]	0.325*** (0.088) [0.056]	0.099 (0.086) [0.017]	0.002 (0.074) [0.000]	0.150 (0.199) [0.010]	0.045 (0.079) [0.008]	-0.050 (0.041) [-0.016]
KP F-stat	230	231.2	231.6	229	233.8	226.5	240.4	241.7
Observations	157,170	163,836	159,308	126,481	146,607	58,835	73,325	112,872
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.82(1.14)	4.16(2.21)	0.36(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.58(0.49)	2.79(1.19)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. ESS-based index of preferences for redistribution is obtained as the residual after regressing on logarithm of GDP. Here the sample is split around the median of this index in the estimation sample (0.169). Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 Black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.6.5 Immigrants Arrived Before 1900

As we discussed in the main text (Section 6.2), most reforms were introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century (Table A.2). This implies that European immigrants moving to the US after 1900 had accumulated a higher exposure to those reforms. At the same time, immigrants arrived during the nineteenth century faced a less densely settled country, where the “frontier culture” of rugged individualism (Turner, 1893) may have dampened a left-leaning political ideology.⁷⁴ For these reasons, we expect immigrants arrived before 1900 to have a smaller effect (if any) on natives’ preferences for redistribution and ideology.

In Table E.17, we replicate our baseline 2SLS specification (Table 2) by separately controlling for the average share of immigrants in the 1850-1900 period.⁷⁵ The table shows that the effect of the 1910-1930 average immigrant share remains positive and statistically significant. In addition, while coefficients become somewhat smaller, they are not statistically different from those reported in Table 2. Furthermore, the point estimate on 1850-1900 immigration is small and not statistically significant at conventional levels. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis. They indicate that immigrants who moved to the US after 1900, and who had accumulated higher exposure to welfare reforms, were more important than those arrived before to influence natives’ political ideology in the long run. We corroborate this interpretation in Table E.18, where we show that the effects of exposure to social welfare reforms are unchanged when controlling for the pre-1900 immigrant share.⁷⁶

The robustness to the inclusion of pre-1900 immigration is important also for identification. Our instrument is based on the 1900 distribution of immigrants (across counties and countries of origin). One may thus be concerned that the instrument mechanically predicts a larger immigrant share between 1910 and 1930 in counties that had more immigrants (overall) in 1900. If pre-1900 immigration also triggered economic and political changes across counties (independent from those due to post-1900 immigration) that had long-lasting effects, this may pose a threat to the exclusion restriction. Results in Table E.17 weigh against this possibility.

⁷⁴Indeed, 1890 marks the end of the “frontier era” (Bazzi et al., 2020).

⁷⁵Since our instrument is based on the 1900 settlements of European immigrants, we are unable to instrument for pre-1900 immigrants, which, in our analysis, are considered as pre-determined. Moreover, a key challenge to the construction of an instrument for the 1850-1900 immigrant share is that, by 1850, very few immigrants from several countries (in particular, Southern and Eastern Europe) lived in the US.

⁷⁶As discussed in Appendix B.6, these results have also important implications for the validity of our identification strategy.

Table E.17. Controlling for Historical Immigration (1850-1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical fraction of immigrants (1910 - 1930)	0.494* (0.281) [0.036]	1.694*** (0.574) [0.064]	0.406*** (0.114) [0.070]	0.283** (0.136) [0.047]	0.169 (0.115) [0.029]	0.992* (0.519) [0.069]	0.204* (0.118) [0.038]	0.095* (0.058) [0.030]
Historical fraction of immigrants (1850 - 1900)	0.239 (0.160) [0.022]	0.360 (0.349) [0.017]	0.089 (0.070) [0.020]	0.100 (0.078) [0.021]	0.055 (0.064) [0.012]	0.113 (0.207) [0.010]	0.082 (0.066) [0.019]	0.016 (0.034) [0.007]
KP F-Stat	116.4	116.9	116.4	115.9	116.4	114.8	122.8	112.9
Observations	313,983	326,684	317,777	252,789	291,987	116,878	145,269	223,085
Mean (s.d.) dep. var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm. (1910-1930)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm. (1850-1900)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)	0.13(0.11)
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. Regressions replicate the specification in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.18. Historical Migration and Social Welfare Reforms (1850-1930)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical fraction of Immigrants (1910-1930)	0.566** (0.275)	1.830*** (0.563)	0.429*** (0.114)	0.316** (0.131)	0.192* (0.113)	1.063** (0.513)	0.222* (0.117)	0.110* (0.057)
Exposure to Welfare Reforms (1910-1930)	0.059*** (0.018)	0.101*** (0.031)	0.016*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.017*** (0.006)	0.054*** (0.018)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)
Historical fraction of immigrants (1850 - 1900)	0.223 (0.158)	0.325 (0.345)	0.083 (0.070)	0.092 (0.076)	0.049 (0.064)	0.096 (0.207)	0.078 (0.066)	0.012 (0.034)
KP F-Stat	62.61	63.55	63.03	61.91	62.94	62.03	67.06	58.20
Observations	313,275	325,955	317,067	252,225	291,333	116,595	144,938	222,580
Mean (s.d) dep. var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The table replicates Table 2 augmenting the specification by controlling for the average historical fraction of immigrants between 1850-1900 and average exposure to social welfare reforms between 1910-1930. The latter is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.7 Inter-Group Contact: Additional Results

In Section 6.3 of the paper, we showed that the effects of immigration are stronger in counties where historical inter-group contact was more common. In Tables E.19 and E.20, we address the possibility that areas with higher (predicted) intermarriage and residential integration were already more Democratic to begin with. We replicate Tables A.6 and A.7 by controlling for the baseline vote share for the Democratic Party in presidential elections.⁷⁷ Reassuringly, results are unchanged.

As a further robustness check, in Tables E.21 and E.22, we also replicate the analysis by controlling for immigrants’ instrumented economic characteristics (Table E.3, Panel E). Even though the F-stat falls below conventional levels in some cases, coefficients remain in line with those from our baseline specification. This exercise reduces concerns that our findings may be due to the correlation between immigrants’ economic characteristics and our proxies for inter-group contact.

Next, we provide additional evidence consistent with this channel, focusing on linguistic similarity. We expect immigrants whose language was “closer” to English to transmit their ideology to natives more easily for two reasons. First, lower linguistic distance should facilitate communication between different groups. Second, linguistic distance is a proxy for cultural similarity, which is typically associated with inter-group trust (Guiso et al., 2009).

Building on this intuition, we split immigrants’ origins as linguistically close and far using the classification from Chiswick and Miller (2005). We define immigrants as linguistically far (resp. close) to English if their linguistic distance is above (resp. below) the median in the sample of countries.⁷⁸ Then, we replicate the analysis estimating (in the same regression) the effects of immigrants from linguistically far and close countries using 2SLS. Results are reported in Table E.24.

While immigrants from linguistically close and far countries are both associated with a more liberal ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution among natives today, the effect is an order of magnitude larger, and more precisely estimated, for immigrants coming from linguistically close countries. This difference is evident also when considering the standardized beta coefficients, which are reported in square brackets.

⁷⁷As already discussed in the main text, the baseline period is defined as the average electoral results for 1900 and 1904. However, our estimates are robust to using different (baseline) election years.

⁷⁸See Table E.23 for the list of countries that are, respectively, close to and far from English.

Table E.19. Sample split around predicted Intermarriage (1910-1930) - Controlling for Democratic share

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Intermarriage Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.467*** (0.434) [0.106]	3.650*** (0.876) [0.138]	0.734*** (0.160) [0.127]	0.826*** (0.183) [0.138]	0.375** (0.154) [0.064]	1.270*** (0.414) [0.088]	0.506*** (0.151) [0.093]	0.120 (0.084) [0.037]
KP F-stat	436.1	438.2	438.1	443.4	449.3	456.2	447.5	437.5
Observations	149,298	155,199	150,994	120,050	138,540	55,314	69,143	106,844
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.82(1.15)	4.11(2.21)	0.35(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.58(0.50)	2.79(1.19)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)
<i>Panel B: Intermarriage Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.564** (0.232) [0.041]	1.769*** (0.435) [0.067]	0.453*** (0.079) [0.078]	0.329*** (0.098) [0.055]	0.191** (0.092) [0.032]	1.121** (0.466) [0.078]	0.237*** (0.090) [0.044]	0.063 (0.047) [0.020]
KP F-stat	407.4	410.3	410.1	411.6	403.2	406.2	416.9	412.1
Observations	150,934	157,305	152,943	121,517	140,825	56,563	70,020	106,403
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.94(1.15)	4.42(2.20)	0.41(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.85(1.20)	0.74(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic share (1900-1904)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. This table replicates Table A.6 augmenting the specification by controlling for democratic share. The latter is computed as the average share at Presidential Elections in 1900 and 1904 at the county-level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.20. Sample Split around predicted Residential Integration (1910-1930) - Controlling for Democratic share

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential Integration Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.884*** (0.597) [0.137]	4.878*** (1.061) [0.184]	0.908*** (0.217) [0.157]	0.962*** (0.279) [0.16]	0.707*** (0.207) [0.12]	1.957*** (0.587) [0.136]	0.950*** (0.222) [0.175]	0.232** (0.108) [0.073]
KP F-stat	106.6	107.7	107.4	104.8	109.8	100.3	105.2	110.1
Observations	148,737	155,076	150,677	118,863	137,997	54,772	68,669	104,608
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.79(1.14)	4.13(2.23)	0.36(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.80(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)
<i>Panel B: Residential Integration Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.371 (0.264) [0.027]	1.478*** (0.469) [0.056]	0.443*** (0.082) [0.076]	0.257** (0.111) [0.043]	0.085 (0.094) [0.014]	1.107** (0.507) [0.077]	0.152 (0.108) [0.028]	0.039 (0.049) [0.012]
KP F-stat	266.3	267.8	267.2	269.7	269.3	249.7	273	262.5
Observations	151,495	157,428	153,260	122,705	141,368	57,104	70,495	108,639
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.96(1.15)	4.40(2.18)	0.40(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.84(1.19)	0.74(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Democratic share (1900-1904)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. This table replicates Table A.7 augmenting the specification by controlling for democratic share. The latter is computed as the average share at Presidential Elections in 1900 and 1904 at the county-level. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.21. Sample split around predicted Intermarriage (1910-1930) - Instrumented Immigrants' characteristics

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Intermarriage Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.372*** (0.461) [0.100]	3.336*** (0.908) [0.126]	0.687*** (0.166) [0.119]	0.774*** (0.199) [0.129]	0.360** (0.165) [0.061]	1.228*** (0.440) [0.085]	0.537*** (0.156) [0.099]	0.146* (0.086) [0.046]
KP F-stat	6.528	7.038	6.856	6.258	6.765	6.414	7.189	6.949
Observations	157,117	163,254	158,856	126,346	145,693	58,145	72,635	112,475
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.81(1.15)	4.10(2.21)	0.35(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.79(1.19)	0.69(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)	0.06(0.05)
<i>Panel B: Intermarriage Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.321 (0.296) [0.023]	1.301** (0.530) [0.049]	0.403*** (0.101) [0.069]	0.302** (0.120) [0.050]	0.122 (0.111) [0.021]	1.275** (0.550) [0.089]	0.255** (0.106) [0.047]	0.096* (0.056) [0.030]
KP F-stat	8.934	9.343	9.477	10.36	9.121	9.163	10.18	10.24
Observations	156,480	163,032	158,532	126,103	145,928	58,548	72,468	110,348
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.94(1.15)	4.42(2.20)	0.41(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.86(1.20)	0.74(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Instr. immigrants' chs.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. This table replicates Table A.6 augmenting the specification by adding instrumented immigrants' characteristics. The definition and construction of the variables related to immigrants' characteristics can be found in Table A.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.22. Sample Split around predicted Residential Integration (1910-1930) - Instrumented Immigrants' characteristics

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential Integration Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.342*** (0.650) [0.170]	5.586*** (1.161) [0.211]	1.008*** (0.257) [0.174]	1.155*** (0.302) [0.193]	0.799*** (0.222) [0.135]	2.108*** (0.744) [0.147]	1.088*** (0.226) [0.200]	0.136 (0.140) [0.043]
KP F-stat	7.579	7.793	7.865	8.233	7.641	7.740	8.343	8.122
Observations	158,112	164,708	160,072	126,434	146,524	58,092	72,884	111,297
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.80(1.14)	4.12(2.23)	0.36(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.80(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)	0.03(0.04)
<i>Panel B: Residential Integration Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.765** (0.308) [0.055]	1.953*** (0.552) [0.074]	0.562*** (0.093) [0.097]	0.431*** (0.127) [0.072]	0.208* (0.109) [0.035]	1.644*** (0.524) [0.114]	0.301*** (0.111) [0.055]	0.110* (0.057) [0.035]
KP F-stat	27.94	27.63	28.14	30.57	28.20	26.35	25.61	33.19
Observations	155,485	161,578	157,316	126,016	145,097	58,600	72,220	111,526
Mean (s.d.) dep. variable	2.96(1.15)	4.40(2.18)	0.40(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.84(1.19)	0.73(0.44)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Instr. immigrants chs. Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.1. This table replicates Table A.7 augmenting the specification by adding instrumented immigrants' characteristics. The definition and construction of the variables related to immigrants' characteristics can be found in Table A.1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.23. Countries and Linguistic Distance

Linguistic Distance	Countries
Close	Belgium France Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland UK
Far	Albania Austria Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Denmark Estonia Finland Germany Greece Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Portugal Romania Russia Spain Yugoslavia

Notes: the table presents the list of European countries included in our analysis according to their linguistic distance with respect to English as defined by Chiswick and Miller (2005)

Table E.24. Immigrants from Linguistically Close/Far Countries

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical fraction of immigrants (Close)	1.455*** (0.348) [0.054]	3.773*** (0.678) [0.073]	0.833*** (0.127) [0.074]	0.770*** (0.160) [0.066]	0.526*** (0.128) [0.046]	1.967*** (0.409) [0.070]	0.570*** (0.114) [0.054]	0.328*** (0.077) [0.053]
Historical fraction of immigrants (Far)	0.311 (0.249) [0.013]	1.065** (0.482) [0.024]	0.300*** (0.093) [0.031]	0.161 (0.113) [0.016]	0.051 (0.095) [0.005]	0.617 (0.495) [0.025]	0.122 (0.101) [0.013]	-0.013 (0.052) [-0.002]
KP F-Stat	75.19	75.63	75.46	74.51	74.88	72.79	78.59	75.95
Observations	314,015	326,715	317,809	252,783	291,999	116,850	145,305	223,113
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm. (Close)	0.05(0.04)	0.05(0.04)	0.05(0.04)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.04)	0.05(0.04)	0.05(0.04)	0.05(0.04)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm. (Far)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)
Individuals controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressors of interest are the average fraction of European immigrants from either linguistically far or close countries over county population between 1910 and 1930. The classification of the countries come from Tabellini (2020). Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

E.8 Controlling for Contemporaneous Ancestry Composition

In this paragraph, we provide one additional piece of evidence against the possibility that our results are solely explained by a mechanism of vertical transmission across generations, within the same ancestry group. In particular, drawing on US Census records, we compute the share of the county population with a European ancestry as of 2000.⁷⁹ Because our CCES sample is restricted to US born individuals, we subtract from the number of individuals reporting a European ancestry the number of first generation immigrants (from that specific country in each US county in 2000).

With this measure at hand, we replicate our baseline specification (Table 2) by separately controlling for the share of the county population with European ancestry (net of the individuals who are themselves immigrants, as just noted). Results are reported in Table E.25. While we acknowledge that this measure may be endogenous, and we lack an instrument for it, we can nonetheless test whether the 2SLS coefficient on the historical average immigrant share remains in line with that presented in the main text (and reported in Panel A of Table E.25 to ease comparisons). Reassuringly, when adding the measure of (contemporaneous) ancestry, in Panel B, the effects of historical immigration remain positive, quantitatively large, and statistically significant. This suggests that the persistence of both settlement patterns and ancestry-specific preferences (across generations) cannot, alone, explain our main findings.

⁷⁹We are able to match all the European countries considered in our analysis (Table A.2) except for Spain, which is not reported in contemporaneous Census data.

Table E.25. Historical Immigration and European Ancestry

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.721*** (0.192)	1.979*** (0.365)	0.473*** (0.070)	0.373*** (0.089)	0.212*** (0.076)	1.056*** (0.360)	0.270*** (0.077)	0.104*** (0.039)
Observations	314,302	327,012	318,095	253,012	292,272	116,975	145,431	223,326
KP F-stat	186.8	188	186.5	184.6	187.1	182.3	198.4	182.4
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.26(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.82(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean(s.d.)fraction of imm.	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)	0.09(0.08)
Mean(s.d.)fraction with European Ancestry	0.43(0.16)	0.43(0.16)	0.43(0.16)	0.43(0.15)	0.43(0.16)	0.43(0.16)	0.43(0.16)	0.43(0.15)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table C.1 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The measure of European ancestry share is from Manson et al. (2020): it is computed as the sum over European countries in our sample of the share of people with ancestors from country j minus immigrants from the same country in 2000. Regressions include individual and historical controls as in Table 2. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

