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DP14696

**DRIVEN BY INSTITUTIONS, SHAPED BY
CULTURE: HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE
SECULARIZATION OF MARRIAGE IN
ITALY**

David De La Croix, Fabio Mariani and Marion Mercier

**ECONOMIC HISTORY
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JEL Classification: Z12, J12, I25, N34, O4

Keywords: Secularization, Human Capital, Marriage, Divorce

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Driven by Institutions, Shaped by Culture: Human Capital and the Secularization of Marriage in Italy*

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May 2, 2020

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1 Introduction

The relationship between economic development and secularization, commonly defined as a historical process through which religion loses social and cultural significance, is widely debated. While the proponents of the so-called “secularization hypothesis” regard secularization as a corollary of the rise of income and human capital, especially in Western countries (Bruce 2011), other scholars have argued, since Tocqueville (1835), that empirical evidence is at odds with such a thesis (Stark 1999; Franck and Iannaccone 2014) and that other mechanisms drive the persistence of religious behaviours (e.g., Bentzen 2019). Moreover, the process of secularization has followed different trajectories across the World – with Europe being a frontrunner – and can be seen not only as a consequence, but also as a determinant of development and growth (McCleary and Barro 2006; Strulik 2016b).

This research establishes links between prosperity, human capital, and religious behavior (like Iyigun (2015), Rubin (2017), and Becker, Nagler, and Woessmann (2017), among others), and additionally uncovers some of the fundamental determinants of the education–secularization nexus. We look at a specific dimension of secularization, the spread of civil marriage. According to Anderson (1975), this is a dimension of major importance, as “Throughout nineteenth-century Europe and America the law of marriage was one of the touchstones of the decline of the confessional state, second only to the issue of religious instruction in schools in the extent of its reverberations”. We establish, both empirically and theoretically, that the link between human capital and secular behavior depends on socio-cultural norms, and is crucially affected by institutional reform, concerning in particular divorce legislation. On the one hand, we find that the correlation between secularization and human capital is larger in the presence of weaker family ties, i.e. when social interactions are dominated by civil society, as opposed to the extended family. Cultural differences regarding the roles of family and civil society thus appear to produce diverging patterns of secularization when human capital grows. On the other hand, we show that the legalization of divorce does not simply bring about a higher prevalence of civil marriage, but reshapes the relationship between human capital and secularization by making the choice of civil marriage more responsive to education.¹ A specificity of our approach is that, unlike most of the economic literature on religion, we regard human capital and religiosity as individual choices which are both endogenous and affected by external cultural and institutional forces. We thus abstain from a causal interpretation of the correlation between education and secularization, but are inclined to see the relative strength of family ties and the legalization of divorce as impacting upon the changing relationship between human capital and civil marriage.

We consider a country with relatively late secularization, Italy. Unlike most developed

¹One may argue that the introduction of divorce is itself a manifestation of secularization. It is worth noting, however, that divorce is only possible for civil marriages, and became legal in several countries well before the Enlightenment and the spread of secular values.

countries, in Italy the type of marriage (religious or civil) is recorded in official data. Therefore, information on the date and type of marriage is available at both the municipal and individual level, and can be ideally combined with the available measures of education and human capital.

Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps and is based on two different, highly informative datasets that – to the best of our knowledge – have never been used to investigate the economic determinants of marriage behaviors. First, we take advantage of a panel of census data and emphasize a robust, positive within-municipality link between human capital and the share of civil marriages over the 1971–2011 period. We further show that the correlation between education and secularization is bigger (i) in municipalities where social capital is stronger and/or family ties are weaker, and (ii) after the introduction of divorce in 1970. When the accumulation of human capital is accounted for, we also uncover a negative correlation between income and the incidence of civil marriage, thus lending credence to the idea that it is education, rather than economic prosperity as such, which goes hand in hand with the spread of secular values. Second, we complement this municipality-level empirical exploration with a micro analysis of survey data, which allows us to observe the characteristics of individuals who married between 1926 and 1998. The individual data confirm the results at the aggregate level: in particular, civil marriage is positively correlated with human capital, but negatively with income. Moreover, the education–secularization link appears to be heterogeneous: (i) across individual characteristics – namely, the strength of family ties – and (ii) over time, i.e. before and after the legalization of divorce.

We then provide a theoretical rationale for our main empirical results. To this end, we build a model in which agents can choose between civil and religious marriage. In this setting, which is novel in the marriage literature, religiosity, education, and marriage choices emerge endogenously as equilibrium outcomes, while divorce occurs when the quality of the match is hit by a non-economic negative shock.² A key feature of our theory is that individuals take into account that, if they divorce, they can remarry only in the civil form. In such a case, they give up the return from the investment in religion that they may have made earlier in their lives: if divorce and remarriage are possible, investing in human capital has thus a higher expected return than investing in religious capital. This mechanism lies at the basis of the positive link between education and secularization, which is thus shaped by the various costs of marriage and divorce. For instance, if economic transactions rely more on social capital than on family networks, divorce is relatively less expensive, and human capital ends up being more strongly associated with secular marriage. Such a theory is agnostic regarding the psychological or cognitive explanations of religiosity, and focuses on economic incentives. In other words, we do not need to assume that education directly influences religious beliefs through increased critical thinking, scientific knowledge and the like, in order to establish a positive correlation between human capital and secularization.

²See Chiappori, Radchenko, and Salanié (2018) on the measurement of such a shock.

Our theory can also explain how the legalization of divorce unleashed the forces of secularization in marriage in Italy. The option to divorce increases the return to human capital as compared to religious capital. This makes human capital more complementary to civil marriage, and strengthens the correlation between human capital and religiosity both across households and across municipalities. The idea that institutional change modifies the relative returns to secular *vs* religious investments and paves the way for further secularization is also supported by Cantoni, Dittmar, and Yuchtman (2018), according to whom the Protestant Reformation increased the return to secular investment at the expense of religious investment.³

Our research is related to three different strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the vast empirical literature studying the interplay between development and secularization.⁴ A number of papers emphasize a negative relationship between economic development (as proxied by income or education) and religiosity (see, for instance, Paldam and Gundlach (2013), Hungerman (2014) and Arias-Vazquez (2012)). In a consistent but more complex fashion, others find evidence of a negative, two-way relationship between income and religious participation (Herzer and Strulik 2017; Lipford and Tollison 2003).⁵ Finally, a set of papers call the secularization thesis into question by observing a positive association between education and religiosity (Brown and Taylor 2007), between income and religiosity (Buser 2015), or by arguing that neither income nor education attainment matter for church attendance (Franck and Iannaccone 2014). In this literature, the paper the most closely related to ours is the one by Becker, Nagler, and Woessmann (2017) who take advantage of historical data on German cities (1890–1930) to find that education, not income, is negatively correlated with church attendance. In another paper that also tries to disentangle the roles of income and education, Chang, Lee, and Weng (2011) exploit subnational variations to show that literacy has a negative impact on religiosity in Taiwan, while unemployment has a positive effect. The positive correlation that we uncover between human capital and secularization, both at the aggregate and individual levels, corroborates the results of Becker, Nagler, and Woessmann (2017) and Chang, Lee, and Weng (2011), while the positive link between income and religious marriage is in line with Buser (2015). However, in contrast with these studies, our empirical analysis pushes the investigation further by looking into the fundamental determinants shaping the relationship between human capital and secularization.

Second, by providing a model of marriage secularization linked to educational choices,

³After the Reformation, university students increasingly shifted towards secular studies that would better prepare them for public sector jobs, rather than pursuing church-specific degrees.

⁴For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the economics of religion, see Iyer (2016).

⁵Some papers are also exclusively concerned with the relationship running from religiosity to economic performance. For instance, Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010) find that the effect of church membership on income is positive in high-income countries, but negative in low-income countries. Other consequences of religiosity are highlighted in the literature, see notably Berman, Iannaccone, and Ragusa (2018) on the role of decreasing religiosity in the fertility decline observed over the second half of the 20th century in Southern Europe.

our paper is related (and complementary) to the recent theoretical literature exploring the interdependence between secularization and economic growth. Among others, we would cite Strulik (2016b), who builds a unified growth model to explain how secularization is both a cause and a consequence of economic development. (Strulik 2016a) also studies an alternative mechanism of secularization: as income grows, individuals “optimally” give up their faith by choosing a reflective-analytical cognitive style (and secular leisure over religious activities). As mentioned above, the novelty of our approach lies in generating an equilibrium correlation between human capital and secular (*vs* religious) behavior which does not depend directly on preferences and cognitive attitudes.

Finally, we contribute to the empirical research on the effect of divorce legislation on the labor supply and on saving and investment behaviors. For instance, Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009), Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2015), Chiappori et al. (2017), and Voena (2015) show that agents’ incentives to invest in human or physical capital are significantly affected by changes in divorce laws, in particular concerning the division of property after divorce. Along with education, our paper considers a different type of investment decision intended to build up “religious capital,” and links it to the choice between religious and secular marriage. Similar to the existing literature, institutional reform turns out to be crucial for inducing changes in individual behavior, thus shaping the interplay between human capital and secularization.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information about the institutional framework, the differences between civil and religious marriages, and the evolution of divorce laws in Italy. Section 3 reports the results of our econometric analysis of the relationship between human capital and civil marriages, both at the municipal and individual levels. The model is set up and solved in Section 4, which presents and discusses our theoretical results. Section 5 concludes.

2 Marriage and Divorce in Italy

The legal framework regulating marriage and divorce in Italy underwent a few key changes in the 20th century. In 1929, the Kingdom of Italy and the Holy See signed the Lateran Treaty, which included a *concordat* regulating the relations between the Catholic Church and the Italian state. The *concordat* granted civil effects to church marriage, so that any Catholic marriage was automatically recognized by the state, and the principle of indissolubility of marriage was extended to civil marriages. In 1947, in the aftermath of World War II, the Lateran Treaty was fully integrated into the new republican constitution. Italy thus entered the 1950s with a legal framework that gave civil effect to marriages celebrated by the Catholic Church, and forbade divorce.⁶ A similar, albeit not identical institutional framework can be found in Spain, where religious marriages can also have immediate civil

⁶As far as civil marriages are concerned, they are not recognized by the Roman Catholic Church. As stated by the Code of Canon Law (1108 §1), “[o]nly those marriages are valid which are contracted before




Figure 1: Percentage of civil marriages over time.

effects. Appendix A.1 presents some descriptive statistics about marriages in Spain, which are very close to the Italian pattern described below.

In December 1970, after a few failed attempts to introduce a divorce law, the Italian Parliament passed the Fortuna–Baslini law 898, which legalized divorce. A referendum was then held in 1974, asking voters whether they wanted to repeal the Fortuna–Baslini law, but was defeated, by a margin of 59.26 % to 40.74%. In 1984, the revision of the Lateran Treaty confirmed the main staples of the concordatarian marriage, restricting the principle of indissolubility to religious marriages. In practice, this simply meant that Italian citizens who divorced after a religious marriage with civil effects could remarry, but only through a civil contract.⁷

The evolution of the aggregate proportion of civil marriages in Italy over time is displayed in Figure 1. Very few civil marriages (less than 5% of total marriages) were celebrated before the 1970s. An upward trend emerged from 1971 onward, with civil marriages accounting for about 43% of the total number of marriages in 2014.

One may question whether this trend is explained by an overall drop in marriage rates. This is, however, of limited concern. In particular, in Appendix B we show that declining marriage rates cannot explain more than 17% of the rise of civil marriages observed between 1971 and 2011. This allows us to focus our analysis, both empirical and theoretical, on the choice of the type of marriage (conditional on marrying).

the local ordinary, pastor, or a priest or deacon delegated by either of them, who assist, and before two witnesses.”

⁷The separation requirement for divorce was set to 5 years by the 1970 law. It was subsequently reduced twice: from 5 to 3 years in 1987, and to 1 year (6 months for consensual separations) in 2015.

This national evolution hides important territorial differences. Figure 2 presents the share of civil marriages provided by the censuses of 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 for all Italian provinces, as well as the geographical boundary between the Northern-Central and Southern regions.⁸ In 1971, the share of civil marriages was very low everywhere, with only a few provinces above the rate of 5%. A significant increase appeared in 1981, reflecting the national trend observed in Figure 1, but more markedly in the Northern provinces. This increasing trend in the North continued in 1991 and 2001, while the share of civil marriages remained virtually stable in the South. Eventually, most of the Northern provinces exhibited rates of civil marriages higher than 45% in 2011, when the share of civil marriages in the majority of Southern provinces remained below 35%.

To complement this picture, in Figure 3 we report the distribution of civil marriage rates in 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 across municipalities with a population larger than 5,000 in 1971.⁹ From 1971 to 2001, the share of municipalities with high rates of civil marriages increased, reflecting the national trend observed in Figure 1. Moreover, the last panel of Figure 3 suggests the emergence of a bimodal distribution with, roughly speaking, a group of municipalities concentrated around a 20% share of civil marriages and a group of municipalities reaching a 50% share.¹⁰ This is consistent with the different patterns in the Northern-Central and Southern provinces observed in Figure 2. Taken together, Figures 1–3 thus suggest that the generalized increase in civil marriages was accompanied by substantial divergence across regions.¹¹

3 Empirical Analysis

3.1 Civil Marriage and Education at the Municipal Level

We start by exploring the link between education and secularization in Italian municipalities, relying on the censuses of 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001, which cover about 8,000 municipalities (*comuni*).¹² Our regression analysis focuses on the sub-sample of nearly 2,000 municipalities with at least 5,000 inhabitants in 1971.¹³ The dependent variable used as

⁸We follow the standard definition of the South *vs* North and Center of Italy, as adopted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), according to which the South is made up of the following regions: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia.

⁹Only municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1971 are included, for consistency with the regression analysis presented in Section 3.1.

¹⁰The emergence of a bimodal distribution comes out even more clearly when considering only municipalities whose population exceeded 10,000 in 1971.

¹¹This is reminiscent of the modern growth process, with the “great divergence” coming as a by-product of sustained growth in terms of GDP per capita. See Galor (2011).

¹²Data on education are not available at the *comuni* level for 2011.

¹³We restrict our analysis to reasonably large municipalities for two reasons. First, we do not want our results to be driven by villages for which the shares of civil marriages and educated individuals are likely to be highly volatile (due to a small denominator). Second, Italian territorial disaggregation evolved significantly over the period covered by our panel, with most mergers concerning small municipalities. Focusing on larger municipalities allows us to stabilize the sample and avoid potential inconsistencies.




Figure 2: Share of civil marriages by province over time.




Figure 3: Distribution of the percentage of civil marriages across municipalities (N=1,965) at different dates

a measure of secularization is the share of civil marriages over the total number of marriages celebrated in municipality i and year t . Our main explanatory variable is the share of the population with secondary education or more.¹⁴ We proceed in three steps. First, we document the relationship between human capital and civil marriage (Table 1, Columns (1)-(3)). Second, we explore the heterogeneity in this relationship across local characteristics (Table 1, Columns (4)-(6)). Third, we investigate whether the link between education and civil marriage changed over time, in particular after divorce became legal (Table 2).

Our first specification, reported in Column (1) of Table 1, consists of a simple pooled OLS over the four waves of census, controlling for year dummies. The results point to a positive association between education and the share of civil marriages. In Column (2), we introduce municipality fixed effects to estimate a *within-municipality* correlation. The coefficient of interest proves very stable.

All time-invariant municipality-level potential confounders are accounted for by the municipality fixed effects in this specification, and the general trend in secularization in Italy is also taken into account through the year dummies. However, omitted time-varying municipality characteristics may bias the coefficients. In particular, the age structure of the population and income are expected to affect both the share of educated people in the municipality and the share of civil marriages. Column (3) includes additional controls to purge the estimates of these two types of potential confounders. Population size (in logarithm)

¹⁴Our results prove very robust to alternative measures of education, such as the share of the population with tertiary education or more, and to considering the number of civil marriages per capita as the alternative dependent variable (not shown for brevity).

Table 1: Civil marriages, education, and municipal-level characteristics.

<i>Dependent:</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>% civil</i>						
Higher education	0.691*** (0.0360)	0.704*** (0.0480)	0.396*** (0.0523)	0.474*** (0.0508)	0.347*** (0.0557)	0.440*** (0.0557)
Pop (ln)			2.709** (1.341)	2.281* (1.313)	3.155** (1.406)	2.545* (1.477)
Age			-0.137 (0.136)	-0.215 (0.132)	-0.139 (0.140)	-0.308** (0.149)
Accommodation overcrowding			0.701*** (0.0357)	0.225*** (0.0380)	0.732*** (0.0379)	0.654*** (0.0382)
Higher education x South				-0.484*** (0.0248)		
High. ed. x NGO employees pc (1981)					9.470** (3.956)	
High. ed. x consanguinity (1930–1934, province level)						-0.0444*** (0.00917)
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Munic. FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	7,842	7,842	7,842	7,842	7,320	6,818
R-squared	0.496	0.654	0.679	0.705	0.690	0.679
Nb of Munic.s	1,965	1,965	1,965	1,965	1,834	1,708

Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

and the average age in the municipality are introduced to account for demography.¹⁵ In the absence of a direct measure of income, we use a poverty-related variable available in the census data as a proxy, namely the index of accommodation overcrowding.^{16,17} After controlling for demography and income, we still observe a positive and significant association between within-municipality changes in education and the share of civil marriages. The point estimate suggests that a one percentage-point increase in the share of secondary-educated people is associated with a 0.4 percentage-point increase in the share of civil marriages on average.

These results highlight the importance of human capital in the process of secularization and lend support to the findings of Becker, Nagler, and Woessmann (2017): we reach a very similar conclusion by relying on a similar panel structure but considering a different measure of secularization (civil marriage *vs* church attendance), a different context (Italy 1971–2001 *vs* Prussia 1890–1930), and a larger dataset. In Column (3) of Table 1, we also

¹⁵Age is computed using the population shares of each age cohort, as available in the censuses.

¹⁶This variable is equal to the share of residents of a given municipality living in less than 40 square meters (for households with more than four people), in 40 to 59 square meters (for more than five people), or in 60 to 79 square meters (for more than six people).

¹⁷We obtain very similar results when using the average accommodation surface as a proxy for income (so that a larger average accommodation surface identifies a more affluent municipality), or the unemployment rate as an inverse proxy for income. In the latter case, however, the estimation sample shrinks because data on unemployment is not available for 1971.

put forward a negative relationship between income and civil marriages. The finding that income growth is negatively related to secularization in marriage in Italy is consistent with Buser (2015), but stands in contrast with Becker, Nagler, and Woessmann (2017), who find no association between income and church attendance, and Chang, Lee, and Weng (2011), who find a positive correlation between unemployment and religiosity. Finally, municipalities with a larger population seem to be characterized by a higher prevalence of civil marriage, while the average age is negatively (but not significantly) correlated to the share of civil marriages, suggesting that fewer civil weddings are celebrated in municipalities with an older population.

The rest of Table 1 digs deeper into the interplay between human capital and secular behavior. As mentioned in Section 2, the share of civil marriages increased earlier, and in a larger proportion, in the Northern and Central regions of Italy, as opposed to the South. To investigate whether this reflects an heterogeneity in the education–secularization nexus between the two parts of the country, Column (4) introduces the interaction between *Higher education* and a dummy variable *South*, taking the value one for Southern municipalities.¹⁸ The results show that the positive correlation between the spread of education and the increase in civil marriages is essentially driven by the North, while no such link seems to exist in Southern municipalities.

The *South* dummy is likely to capture fundamental differences across municipalities inducing heterogeneity in the education–secularization nexus. In particular, we expect the importance of family ties, as opposed to social capital and formal institutions, to shape the relationship between education and secularization, and to generate differences in the link between human capital and secular behaviors. Indeed, education is likely to be all the more correlated with decreasing religious marriages where social capital is stronger relative to family ties, thus lowering the benefits from belonging to a religious community. In the same context, not marrying in the church could be particularly stigmatized and could harm economic opportunities, thus mitigating the secularization-enhancing effect of education in places where family ties and informal links are more important for economic transactions than the market and/or formal institutions.¹⁹ We explore this possibility in Columns (5) and (6). Following Nannicini et al. (2013), in Column (5) as a proxy for social capital we use the number of NGO employees per capita, measured in 1981 (the earliest year at which this information is made available by ISTAT). Consistent with our hypothesis, the correlation between human capital and civil marriages is larger in municipalities where social capital is stronger.²⁰ As a proxy for the importance of family ties, in Column (6) we use the province-

¹⁸We use the same definition of North and South as in Section 2, see footnote 8.

¹⁹In Italy, a religious marriage is often a way to reinforce kinship ties and social alliances (see for instance Vignoli and Salvini 2014). Religious weddings usually have more attendees than civil weddings. For instance, in the FSS data which we analyze in Section 3.2, religious ceremonies are characterized by a significantly larger average number of guests than civil ones (namely, 110 versus 79).

²⁰We obtain very similar results when using the number of NGOs per capita instead of the number of NGO employees per capita.

level consanguinity rate between 1930 and 1934, provided by the Institute of Molecular Genetics of the CNR.²¹ In line with our intuition, the positive correlation between education and civil marriages is smaller in formerly more consanguineous municipalities, where we expect family ties to be stronger and more relevant in eliciting economic interactions.

Finally, as discussed in Section 2, we know that dramatic changes in the marriage and divorce legislation occurred over the course of the period covered by our data. In particular, divorce was not possible before December 1970, and the public debate which followed the legalization of divorce led to the 1974 referendum, which eventually confirmed the Fortuna-Baslini law and brought about a major cultural change in Italy. In Table 2, we explore whether the correlation between education and secularization in marriage evolved over time, with our panel starting in 1971, i.e. immediately after the introduction of divorce and before the 1974 referendum. Column (1) displays a cross-sectional estimation of our benchmark specification for 1971, while Column (2) pools together the years 1981, 1991, and 2001, controlling for year dummies. The coefficient of interest more than doubles and the difference between the two estimates is statistically significant. This suggests that the link between education and civil marriages is stronger over the 1981–2001 period than in 1971. In Column (3) we use all four census years and introduce an interaction term between *Higher education* and the dummy *After*, which we set equal to zero in 1971 and one afterwards. Consistent with Columns (1) and (2), we observe a positive, strongly significant coefficient for the interaction term, which is robust to the introduction of municipality fixed effects in Column (4). The education–secularization nexus thus appears to be mostly significant after the 1970s, once divorce was legal. In the next subsection, we will use individual data to further investigate whether this break in the relationship between human capital and secularization can be plausibly traced back to the legalization of divorce and is not simply the consequence of aggregate changes affecting the generation entering the marriage market in the 1970s.

Marriage-type choices seem to be also reflected in political attitudes towards divorce. In fact, after digitizing archival data on the 1974 referendum (Ministero dell’Interno 1977), we have computed – across the Italian municipalities of our sample – the coefficient of correlation between the share of civil marriages in 1971 and the share of votes in favor of repealing the divorce law at the referendum. The coefficient reaches 34%, with a p-value smaller than 1%.

Before moving on to the analysis of individual data, let us summarize our main results at the aggregate level. Overall, we observe a positive and robust *within-municipality* relationship between education and secularization in marriage, which is heterogenous across

²¹The original data set, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20060510163108/http://www.igm.cnr.it/Zei/Consangpnew.htm>, documents the prevalence of different types of consanguineous marriages at the province level, by 5-year sub-periods from 1910 to 1964. For our analysis, we focus on first-cousin marriages, which account for the majority of consanguineous unions. We use the 1930–1934 interval because it is the earliest period for which only a few provinces are missing. The results are robust to considering other types of consanguinity, and alternative periods of reference.

Table 2: Civil marriages and education: heterogeneity over time.

<i>Dependent:</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>% civil wed</i>	1971	1981-91-01	1971-81-91-01	
Higher education	0.199*** (0.0354)	0.443*** (0.0422)	-0.0564 (0.0479)	0.126 (0.0969)
Higher education x After			0.554*** (0.0428)	0.218*** (0.0632)
Year dummies		✓	✓	✓
Munic. FE				✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,965	5,877	7,842	7,842
R-squared	0.142	0.411	0.529	0.679
Nb of Munic.s	1,965	1,964	1,965	1,965

Controls include *Pop (ln)*, *Age* and *Accommodation overcrowding*.

Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

local characteristics and over time. Specifically, secularization is more responsive to education in municipalities where family ties are less important relative to social ties, and in the post-1971 period. Our regressions further suggest the existence of a negative relationship between income and the share of civil marriages. Let us also stress that our analysis may be relevant beyond the specific Italian context. In fact, in Appendix A.2 we run regressions similar to those of Tables 1 and 2 using data on Spanish provinces. The results are very much in line with those for Italy, which attests to the external validity of our analysis.

3.2 Civil Marriage and Education at the Individual Level

To better assess the role of socio-cultural norms and of the 1971 divorce law in shaping the link between education and marriage choices, we complement our municipality-level results with an analysis of survey data carried out at the individual level. In 1998, ISTAT started to systematize the collection of information concerning the family and its transformations through the “Family, social subjects and conditions of childhood” survey (*Famiglia, soggetti sociali e condizioni dell’infanzia*, henceforth FSS). The 1998 FSS survey was carried out on a random, representative sample of 24,000 families, with more than 50,000 individuals. Further iterations of the FSS followed. For our purposes, however, we focus on the earliest round of 1998, which allows us to observe more members of the generations directly affected by the legalization of divorce in the 1970s.

Exploiting individual data is useful for four main reasons. First, the choice of a marriage type is arguably an individual or family-level decision, so that analyzing its determinants at the micro level is very informative. It notably allows us to more precisely take into account unobservable factors linked to the age and generation of the newlyweds, by controlling for both cohort and age-at-marriage fixed effects. Second, the FSS data provides information

on the type of the first (or only) marriage, which makes sure that re-marriages which, by definition, can only be of a civil form, are not taken into account. Third, the survey contains questions related to the importance of family in the social and economic life of the respondents. This allows us to investigate more accurately whether the strength of family ties shapes the education–secularization nexus. Fourth, the FSS sample contains information on marriages celebrated between 1926 and 1998. The time depth in the marriage data is thus more adapted to the study of marriages preceding the introduction of divorce, as compared to the census data which provides only one anterior – or rather, contemporaneous – wave to the legalization of divorce. The analysis of the FSS data is thus key to understanding whether the legalization of divorce in the 1970s affected the link between education and secularization in marriage, by exploiting the heterogeneity in the dates of marriage across individuals of the same cohort who married at the same age.

Tables 3 and 4 report the results of our analysis of the education–civil marriage nexus and its heterogeneity across individual characteristics and over time. We estimate linear probability models over the sample of married people, with the dependent variable taking the value one if the respondent chose a civil marriage, and zero if she married in a church. To remain as close as possible to our municipality-level estimations, as an indicator of human capital we use a dummy variable equal to one for individuals who completed (at least) secondary education. We also control for region dummies and ten-year birth cohort dummies, to capture local and generational trends.²² The results of Column (1) of Table 3 establish a positive association between human capital and the likelihood of choosing a civil marriage. In Column (2), we add dummies for the age at marriage: although this entails a loss of observations due to missing data, the coefficient of interest remains positive and highly significant. Last, Column (3) considers the number of TVs at home as a proxy for income, which turns out to be negatively related to civil marriage, confirming the municipality-level results.²³ The coefficient associated with human capital remains very stable and the point estimate suggests that, among married people, individuals with secondary education or more are on average 1.4 percentage points more likely to have chosen a civil marriage than individuals who did not complete secondary education.

The rest of Table 3 documents the heterogeneity in the education–secularization nexus across individual characteristics. Consistent with Table 1, Column (4) shows that the coefficient of the education variable is much lower in the South. Columns (5) and (6) then provide evidence suggesting that strong family ties attenuate the responsiveness of secular behavior to human capital. To proxy for family ties, we successively use two dummy variables which take the value one if the respondent spends Sundays with her extended family, or lives in the same municipality as at least one of her siblings.

²²Our sample of analysis is balanced between women and men; additionally controlling for a dummy for gender does not affect our results.

²³Using alternative proxies for income, such as a homeownership dummy or a dummy variable indicating whether the house is equipped with a phone and heating yields very similar results.

Table 3: Civil marriages and education: individual-level estimations.

<i>Dependent:</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Civil marriage</i>						
Higher education	0.0225*** (0.00342)	0.0119*** (0.00367)	0.0138*** (0.00370)	0.0203*** (0.00540)	0.0185*** (0.00446)	0.0200*** (0.00505)
Number of TVs			-0.0108*** (0.00214)	-0.0105*** (0.00213)	-0.0103*** (0.00214)	-0.0108*** (0.00214)
Higher education x South				-0.0128* (0.00676)		
Sunday with extended family					-0.0152*** (0.00400)	
Higher education x Sunday with extended family					-0.0167** (0.00714)	
Sibling same municipality						-0.0112*** (0.00366)
Higher education x Sibling same municipality						-0.0153** (0.00664)
Region dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age at marriage dummies		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	34,973	29,165	29,165	29,165	29,165	29,165
R-squared	0.016	0.048	0.049	0.049	0.051	0.050

Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Civil marriages and education: individual-level heterogeneity over time.

<i>Dependent: civil marriage</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher education	0.000751 (0.00611)	0.0260* (0.0137)	0.0249*** (0.00658)	-0.00403 (0.00725)
After	0.00552 (0.00693)	0.00517 (0.00712)	0.0171** (0.00865)	0.00971 (0.00754)
Higher education x After	0.0171** (0.00740)	-0.0215 (0.0155)	-0.0128 (0.00930)	0.0266*** (0.00958)
Region dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cohort dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age at marriage FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Proxy for income	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sample (marriage year)	1926–1998	1951–1970	1972–1991	1962–1981
Cut-off year	1971	1960	1981	1971
Observations	29,165	9,159	14,402	13,244
R-squared	0.049	0.023	0.057	0.035

The proxy for income used in these estimations is the number of TVs at home.

Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, Table 4 investigates whether the education–civil marriage link is somewhat different for people who married before and after the legalization of divorce. Column (1)

departs from Column (3) of Table 3 by additionally introducing the interaction between education and the dummy variable *After*, equal to zero for all marriages celebrated until 1971 and to one for all marriages celebrated from 1972 onward. Consistent with our aggregate findings, in a specification which allows us to additionally control for the age and cohort of the newlyweds, the results indicate that the relationship between education and civil marriage becomes significantly positive only after the legalization of divorce.

In Columns (2) to (4), we exploit the time depth of the marriage data to provide additional support to our interpretation of this result: namely, we argue that rather than progressively strengthening over time, the relationship between human capital and secularization underwent a break in the 1970s which can be plausibly traced back to the legalization of divorce. We run two placebo tests. The idea is to create, within our sample, two time windows of equal size – 20 years – which are exempt from divorce reforms (1951–70 and 1972–91) and to compare them with a third 20-year window encompassing the 1971 reform (1962–81). In each case, we create a placebo *After* dummy which flags marriages celebrated in the second decade of the period. We run the specification of Column (1) on these placebo sub-samples in Columns (2) and (3). In both cases, the direct correlation between education and civil marriage is significant, but it does not significantly change after the placebo cut-off year.²⁴ If instead, as shown in Column (4), we focus on individuals married during the 1962–81 period, we still find that the education–secularization nexus becomes significant only after 1971.

Overall, the individual-level results displayed in Tables 3 and 4 are remarkably in line with those obtained at the municipality level, thus providing a set of well-defined, robust stylized facts against which the theoretical mechanisms we will now develop can be assessed.

4 Theory

Our econometric analysis highlights three main empirical regularities, namely that (i) there exists a positive correlation between human capital and the prevalence of civil marriage, and that such a correlation is larger (ii) if social capital is relatively strong and/or family ties are relatively weak, and (iii) after the legalization of divorce.

To uncover the economic mechanisms behind these empirical results, we develop a model of marriage choice (civil *vs* religious), in which forward-looking agents also decide how much to invest in religion and education by taking into account their future marriage outcomes. The degree of religiosity and the level of human capital are thus seen as equilibrium outcomes, affected by exogenous forces representing technology, culture, and institutions. Note that, given the arguably small role played by selection into marriage for the evolution of civil marriages (see Section 2 and Appendix B), our theory abstracts from the choice of getting married, and focuses exclusively on the choice of marriage type.

²⁴Moreover, Column (3) indicates that the trend in civil marriage accelerated after 1981, but independently from the education–secularization nexus.

4.1 Preferences and Endowments

We set up a 3-period model. Individuals, indexed by i , are characterized by idiosyncratic preferences with respect to spirituality, or inclination to religion, captured by the parameter φ_i . They are endowed with one unit of time in each period. In the first period, agents cannot be married and decide how to allocate their time between leisure l_i^j , education e_i^j , and religious practice r_i^j .²⁵

$$1 = l_i^j + r_i^j + e_i^j. \quad (1)$$

Index j denotes the type of marriage chosen by agents. If divorce is not allowed, only two marriage profiles are possible: individuals can either be in a civil marriage for both future periods (denoted by $j = \mathbf{CC}$), or in a religious marriage for both future periods ($j = \mathbf{RR}$). We assume that it is not possible to switch from a civil to a religious marriage between the second and third periods, so that the profile \mathbf{CR} is ruled out. If instead divorce is legal, a third possible marriage profile ($j = \mathbf{RC}$) becomes viable: agents who enter a religious marriage in the second period can divorce at the beginning of the third period, and remarry – although not in the church. It must be stressed that in our model all religious marriages also have civil effects, while two people can contract a civil marriage without being married religiously.²⁶

Education is acquired during the first period and allows agents to build up their human capital $h_i^j = h(e_i^j)$, which becomes available at the beginning of the second period and is used to work and generate income that will ultimately finance consumption.

In the second period, individuals get married (for the sake of simplicity, singleness is ruled out by assumption) and work. Getting married involves the key choice of our model, between a religious and a civil wedding. A religious ceremony costs time, namely a fraction $z \in (0, 1)$ of period 2's endowment. This is a reasonable assumption in our context, as a religious marriage implies some form of religious participation, and the future spouses are almost always required to attend some time-consuming “preparation activities” before the wedding.²⁷ We further impose that income is entirely consumed, so that

$$c_{2,i} = \begin{cases} h_i^j & \text{if } j = \mathbf{CC}, \\ (1 - z)h_i^j & \text{if } j = \mathbf{RR}, \mathbf{RC}, \end{cases}$$

A religious marriage, however, is also assumed to bring additional utility to more religious people. On the other hand, civil marriages do not cost time (agents who choose a civil celebration can spend the whole second period working), but do not provide spiritual utility

²⁵We thus highlight the opportunity cost of religious practice, in the fashion of Gruber and Hungerman (2008) and Strulik (2016a), among others.

²⁶This is an appropriate description of the Italian case, as defined by the institution of concordatary marriage (see Section 2).

²⁷Adequate preparation for marriage is explicitly prescribed by the Code of Canon Law (1063, 1064).

to the spouses. Throughout the second period and regardless of the type of celebration, marriage quality, denoted by m , is always good ($m = g > 0$).

At the beginning of the third period, agents observe the quality of their marriage which, different from the previous period, can be either good ($m = g$) or bad ($m = 0$). If it is bad, they can decide to divorce (at a cost k) and remarry.²⁸ We assume that all divorced individuals manage to remarry, and remarriages can only be of the civil form.²⁹ Consumption in the third period is thus given by

$$c_{3,i} = \begin{cases} h_i^j - k & \text{if } m_3 = 0 \text{ and } j = \mathbf{CC}, \mathbf{RC}, \\ h_i^j & \text{if } m_3 = g, \text{ or if } m_3 = 0 \text{ and } j = \mathbf{RR}, \end{cases}$$

The cost of divorce $k \in (0, \infty)$ can be interpreted as an indirect measure of socio-cultural factors. In particular, we expect k to be high in societies characterized by strong family ties, as the economic penalty or social stigma for breaking a marriage should be heavier when a greater weight is attached to family values and when family connections, rather than market interactions, are the basis economic transactions.³⁰ Similarly, since civic capital may provide an alternative to institutions such as the church or the family, the cost of divorce should be lower in societies with stronger social capital.

Unlike marriage quality, which can deteriorate, individuals' human capital remains the same throughout the second and third periods, and – net of the possible divorce cost – is used to finance consumption. We also assume for the sake of analytical parsimony that it depends linearly on first-period education according to

$$h_i = h(e_i) \equiv e_i. \quad (2)$$

The preferences of individual i , for marriage profile j (with $j = \mathbf{RR}, \mathbf{RC}, \mathbf{CC}$), are represented by the following inter-temporal utility function:

$$U_i^j = \sum_{t=1}^3 \beta^{t-1} u_{i,t}^j, \quad (3)$$

where the instantaneous utilities are simple enough to guarantee closed-form solutions later on in the analysis:

$$\begin{aligned} u_{i,1}^j &= l_i^j + \varphi_i \ln r_i^j, \\ u_{i,t}^j &= m_t + \eta_t^j r_i^j + \ln c_{i,t}, \quad t = 2, 3 \end{aligned}$$

²⁸The probabilistic description of marriage quality, as well as other features of the model – such as the divorce cost – are reminiscent of De La Croix and Mariani (2015).

²⁹In reality, a religious remarriage is highly unlikely in the Catholic Church, as it can only happen following a decree of nullity of a marriage by the Roman Rota which is issued under very special circumstances.

³⁰Family networks (as opposed to formal market institutions) may be more or less important for finding a job, carrying out production, or having access to credit. See for instance Kumar and Matsusaka (2009).

and $\beta \in (0, 1]$. The parameter $\varphi_i \in [0, \infty)$ is the individual-specific taste for religious practice. Vector η^j accounts for the impact of being religious on subsequent utility. It allows us to capture the additional utility provided by religious marriage to religious people. We thus assume that $\eta_t^j > 0$ when one is involved in a religious marriage, and $\eta_t^j = 0$ otherwise. In particular, we set $\eta_2^{\text{RR}} = \eta_3^{\text{RR}} = \eta_2^{\text{RC}} = \eta$, and $\eta_3^{\text{RC}} = \eta_2^{\text{CC}} = \eta_3^{\text{CC}} = 0$. As stated above, we also have that

$$m_2 = g,$$

and

$$m_3 = \begin{cases} g & \text{with probability} = 1 - p, \\ 0 & \text{with probability} = p, \end{cases}$$

where $p \in (0, 1)$ is the probability that the quality of marriage deteriorates after one period.

Agents select their preferred marriage profile by comparing the indirect utilities associated with each profile. To solve our model, we thus need to start by establishing agents' optimal choices of education and religious practice under each possible alternative.

Before solving for the optimal choices of households, let us highlight two features of our model. First, our characterization of marriage has two alternative interpretations: either we consider that agents are all women (or men) and their prospective spouses are all alike, or we assume that decisions are taken at the couple level, with couples resulting from perfectly assortative mating. Second, in order to preserve analytical tractability, we decide not to introduce other interesting elements stemming from our empirical analysis in the model. In particular, our theory will not reproduce the negative correlation between income and the prevalence of civil marriages found in the data: this would require introducing a specific good cost pertaining to religious marriages, and is left for future research.

4.2 Optimal Choices of Education and Religious Practice

We can now examine the utility associated with each of the three alternative marriage profiles. Let us start with the **RR** case. The relevant utility function is written

$$U_i^{\text{RR}} = l_i^{\text{RR}} + \varphi_i \ln r_i^{\text{RR}} + \beta [g + \eta r_i^{\text{RR}} + \ln((1 - z)e_i^{\text{RR}})] + \beta^2 [(1 - p)g + \eta r_i^{\text{RR}} + \ln e_i^{\text{RR}}]. \quad (4)$$

In the case of a lasting religious marriage, agents draw utility from religiousness r_i^{RR} in every period. In the second period, they sustain an opportunity cost related to preparing for a religious ceremony (time cost z). In the third period, they do not pay for divorce, but, with probability p , they incur the utility loss implied by an unhappy marriage.

The utility drawn from a **CC** marriage profile is

$$U_i^{\text{CC}} = l_i^{\text{CC}} + \varphi_i \ln r_i^{\text{CC}} + \beta (g + \ln(e_i^{\text{CC}})) + \beta^2 (g + p \ln(e_i^{\text{CC}} - k) + (1 - p) \ln e_i^{\text{CC}}), \quad (5)$$

which takes into account that agents do not obtain utility from religiosity beyond the first period, do not pay any cost for marrying in the second period, but will never face a bad marriage in the third period thanks to the option of divorcing (which implies the good cost k) and remarrying. Notice, however, that agents could in principle choose **CC** and yet decide not to divorce even if their marriage turns bad; for ease of presentation, we rule out this possibility by assuming that g is large enough (the formal condition on g will be detailed in Section 4.3).

Last, in case they leave their religious marriage open to divorce (profile **RC**), agents' utility is given by

$$U_i^{\text{RC}} = l_i^{\text{RC}} + \varphi_i \ln r_i^{\text{RC}} + \beta (g + \eta r_i^{\text{RC}} + \ln((1-z)e_i^{\text{RC}})) + \beta^2 (g + p \ln(e_i^{\text{RC}} - k) + (1-p)(\eta r_i^{\text{RC}} + \ln e_i^{\text{RC}})), \quad (6)$$

where the time cost z of a religious marriage is paid in the second period, and the cost of divorce k is paid in the third period if the first marriage turns bad. Remarrying ensures that the quality of marriage is good in the third period. However, since remarrying is always in the civil form, in the third period individuals incur the loss of the utility accruing from a religious marriage with probability p .

Conditional on the marriage profile, the first-period choice of education, leisure, and religious investment is given by

$$\{r_i^j, e_i^j, l_i^j\} = \arg \max U_i^j,$$

subject to the constraint specified in Equation (1).

Solving the necessary first-order conditions for this maximization program leads to the following optimal choices:

$$\begin{cases} r_i^{\text{RR}} = \frac{\varphi_i}{1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta} \\ e_i^{\text{RR}} = \beta(1 + \beta) \end{cases}, \quad (7)$$

$$\begin{cases} r_i^{\text{CC}} = \varphi_i \\ e_i^{\text{CC}} = \frac{\omega}{2} \end{cases}, \quad (8)$$

and

$$\begin{cases} r_i^{\text{RC}} = \frac{\varphi_i}{1 - \beta(1 + (1-p)\beta)\eta} \\ e_i^{\text{RC}} = \frac{\omega}{2} \end{cases}, \quad (9)$$

where

$$\omega \equiv k + \beta(1 + \beta) + \sqrt{k^2 + \beta^2(1 + \beta)^2 + 2k\beta(1 - \beta - 2\beta(1 + (1-p)))} \quad (10)$$

is a combination of parameters that does not involve φ_i . The following assumption ensures that we have interior solutions for the religiosity choice.

Assumption 1 *The parameters of the model are such that $1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta > 0$.*

We can now establish some key results regarding the optimal choices associated with alternative marriage profiles, showing that education and secularization correlate exclusively through the choice of marriage type.

Proposition 1 (Optimal choices)

1. *Across individuals choosing the same marriage profile j , education e_i^j and religiosity r_i^j are uncorrelated.*
2. *Education e_i is lower for those who choose the religious marriage profile **RR**.*
3. *Religiosity r_i is higher for those who choose the religious marriage profile **RR**.*

Proof. Result 1 flows from the fact that educational investment e_i^j does not depend on spirituality φ_i , while religious investment r_i^j is increasing in φ_i . Results 2 and 3 can be obtained by comparing optimal choices e_i^j and r_i^j across marriage profiles, so that $e_i^{\text{RC}} = e_i^{\text{CC}} > e_i^{\text{RR}}$ and $r_i^{\text{CC}} < r_i^{\text{RC}} < r_i^{\text{RR}}$. ■

4.3 Choosing a Marriage Profile

After solving for education and religiosity choices, we can compare the indirect utility functions $V^{\text{RR}}(\varphi_i)$, $V^{\text{CC}}(\varphi_i)$ and $V^{\text{RC}}(\varphi_i)$ to determine which marriage profile is chosen by individual i .

We assume that marriage choices are time consistent: the condition for this is detailed in Appendix E. Recall also that, for ease of presentation, we rule out the possibility that agents who choose the **CC** profile decide not to divorce if the quality of their marriage deteriorates. This requires imposing the following restriction on the parameters – which is relaxed in Appendix D to show that the results of our analysis remain qualitatively unchanged.

Assumption 2 *The parameters of the model are such that the utility of a successful marriage is high enough, i.e.*

$$g > \underline{g} \equiv \frac{\omega + 2\beta \left((1 + \beta) \left(\ln \left(\frac{2\beta(1+\beta)}{\omega} \right) - 1 \right) - \beta p \ln \left(\frac{\omega + 2(1+\beta)\beta}{\omega} \right) \right)}{2p\beta^2}.$$

We can then prove the following.

Lemma 1 *There exist unique $\bar{\varphi}$, $\hat{\varphi}$, and $\tilde{\varphi}$ such that*

$$V^{\text{CC}}(\bar{\varphi}) = V^{\text{RC}}(\bar{\varphi}), \quad V^{\text{RC}}(\hat{\varphi}) = V^{\text{RR}}(\hat{\varphi}) \quad \text{and} \quad V^{\text{CC}}(\tilde{\varphi}) = V^{\text{RR}}(\tilde{\varphi}).$$

There also exists $\check{z} \in (0, 1)$ such that:

- (a) *if $z < \check{z}$, we have $\bar{\varphi} < \tilde{\varphi} < \hat{\varphi}$, so that individuals characterized by $\varphi_i \leq \bar{\varphi}$ choose the **CC** regime, those with $\bar{\varphi} < \varphi_i \leq \hat{\varphi}$ choose **RC**, while those with $\varphi_i > \hat{\varphi}$ select **RR**;*




Figure 4: Indirect utility functions in the two cases of Lemma 1

(b) if $z \geq \check{z}$, we have $\hat{\varphi} \leq \tilde{\varphi} \leq \bar{\varphi}$, so that agents choose the **CC** regime if $\varphi_i \leq \tilde{\varphi}$, and the **RR** regime otherwise.

Proof. See Appendix C. ■

The explicit values of the thresholds reported in Appendix C highlight the importance of the cost of a religious marriage, z . In particular, if $z = 0$, it follows that $\tilde{\varphi} = \hat{\varphi}$ and $\bar{\varphi} = 0$, so that nobody chooses a civil marriage in the first place.

Figure 4 provides an illustration of the two cases of Lemma 1. In case (a), represented in the left panel, individuals with low spirituality φ_i choose **CC**, those with intermediary spirituality prefer **RC**, and those with high spirituality select **RR**. In case (b), as illustrated in the right panel, nobody chooses **RC**, while individuals with relatively low (high) spirituality prefer **CC** (**RR**).

The following Proposition summarizes how the choice of the marriage profile depends on the two key parameters of our model, k and z .

Proposition 2 *The threshold $\bar{\varphi}$ is increasing in z , but is independent of k . The thresholds $\hat{\varphi}$ and $\tilde{\varphi}$ are both decreasing in k . Moreover, $\tilde{\varphi}$ increases with z , while $\hat{\varphi}$ does not depend on z .*

Proof. The claim of the Proposition follows from the inspections of partial derivatives, as reported in Appendix C. ■

Note that there may exist parameter values such that nobody in our economy chooses **CC**, i.e. a civil first marriage. To rule out this possibility, we need people with low levels of religiosity to prefer **CC** to **RR**. In particular, we have to make sure that $\tilde{\varphi}$ is not negative. For this to be the case, we can check that $\lim_{g \rightarrow \underline{g}} \tilde{\varphi} > 0$, which is always true as long as $1 > \beta(1 - \beta)\eta$ – as stated by Assumption 1.

The choice of a marriage regime, **CC**, **RC**, or **RR**, amounts to deciding about divorce. Among all religious first marriages which turn bad, only some end up in a divorce: namely, those involving people who choose the **RC** profile. On the contrary, those having chosen **CC** will always divorce when the quality of their first marriage deteriorates. This is fully consistent with the findings of Impicciatore and Billari (2012), based on a sample of about 9,000 Italian marriages: civil marriages are more frequently followed by separation and divorce than religious ones. They further claim – and this would also be consistent with our theory – that such an effect is driven by the selection into civil marriages of individuals who are more likely to divorce.

4.4 Aggregate Outcomes

After having analyzed the mechanisms governing individual choices, we can turn to aggregate outcomes. In particular, depending on the distribution of φ_i we can compute the number of civil and religious marriages, divorces, and remarriages.

To this end, let us define $f(\varphi_i)$ as the density function of φ_i over the interval $(0, \infty)$, and $F(\varphi_i)$ as its cumulative distribution function. We consider identical overlapping generations of agents, and rule out the possibility of inter-generational marriage for simplicity (and without much loss of generality).

In this framework, the number of religious (first) marriages is given by

$$R \equiv \int_{\min(\tilde{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})}^{\infty} f(\varphi_i) d\varphi_i = \min(1 - F(\tilde{\varphi}), 1 - F(\hat{\varphi})) \quad (11)$$

while the number of divorces and remarriages is written

$$D \equiv (1 - p) \int_0^{\max(\tilde{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})} f(\varphi_i) d\varphi_i = (1 - p) \max(F(\tilde{\varphi}), F(\hat{\varphi})). \quad (12)$$

The share of civil marriages can then be computed as

$$C \equiv \frac{1 - R + D}{1 + D}. \quad (13)$$

Moreover, and given that $e_i^{\text{RC}} = e_i^{\text{CC}}$, average human capital is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{h} &\equiv \int_0^{\max(\tilde{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})} e^{\text{CC}} f(\varphi_i) d\varphi_i + \int_{\max(\tilde{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})}^{\infty} e^{\text{RR}} f(\varphi_i) d\varphi_i, \\ &= e^{\text{CC}} \max(F(\tilde{\varphi}), F(\hat{\varphi})) + e^{\text{RR}} (1 - \max(F(\tilde{\varphi}), F(\hat{\varphi}))). \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

The following Proposition establishes the effect of the main parameters of interest on marriages and average human capital.

Proposition 3 *Assuming $f(\varphi_i) > 0$ for all $\varphi_i \in (0, \infty)$, both the proportion of civil marriages and average human capital are increasing in z and decreasing in k .*

Proof. Follows from Proposition 2 and Equations (11), (12), (13), and (14). ■

Proposition 3 stipulates that human capital and the prevalence of civil marriage are positively correlated when k or z varies, even in the absence of a direct causal mechanism linking the choice of marriage type to education. In particular, two different economies (e.g. municipalities, as in Section 3.1), characterized by different values of k or z are expected to exhibit different levels of average education and civil marriage prevalence. Specifically, because of the effects of k and z on C and \bar{h} , we expect a higher proportion of civil marriages and a higher average level of human capital in the economy where z is larger, or k is smaller. Assuming that each municipality has a different z , depending on various traditions and culture, our model can reproduce the positive correlation observed in equilibrium between human capital and the prevalence of civil marriages which we established empirically in Section 3.

Along the same lines, we can compute average religiosity as

$$\bar{r} \equiv \int_0^{\min(\bar{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})} r^{CC} f(\varphi_i) d\varphi_i + \int_{\min(\bar{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})}^{\max(\bar{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})} r^{RC} f(\varphi_i) d\varphi_i + \int_{\max(\bar{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})}^{\infty} r^{RR} f(\varphi_i) d\varphi_i, \quad (15)$$

which is also negatively correlated with civil marriages.

4.5 Institutional Change: The Role of Divorce Laws

We can now move on to the analysis of the consequences of institutional change, and analyze whether our model can reproduce the empirical evidence reported in Tables 2 and 4 of Section 3. In particular, we would like to understand what happens following the legalization of divorce. To do so, we first characterize an alternative version of the model, with no divorce and only two marriage profiles, **RR** and **CC**, and then compare it to the benchmark model.

If divorce is not allowed ($j = \mathbf{RR}, \mathbf{CC}$), the relevant utility functions become

$$U_i^{\mathbf{RR}} = l_i^{\mathbf{RR}} + \varphi_i \ln r_i^{\mathbf{RR}} + \beta (g + \eta r_i^{\mathbf{RR}} + \ln((1-z)e_i^{\mathbf{RR}})) + \beta^2 ((1-p)g + \eta r_i^{\mathbf{RR}} + \ln e_i^{\mathbf{RR}}), \quad (16)$$

and

$$U_i^{\mathbf{CC}} = l_i^{\mathbf{CC}} + \varphi_i \ln r_i^{\mathbf{CC}} + \beta (g + \ln e_i^{\mathbf{CC}}) + \beta^2 ((1-p)g + \ln e_i^{\mathbf{CC}}). \quad (17)$$

The comparison of Equations (17) and (5) highlights that, in the absence of divorce, agents cannot insure themselves against the possibility of a marriage turning bad in the third period, even in the case of a civil marriage.

Optimal choices are given by

$$\begin{cases} r_i^{\text{RR}} = \frac{\varphi_i}{1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta} \\ e_i^{\text{RR}} = \beta(1 + \beta) \end{cases}, \quad (18)$$

and

$$\begin{cases} r_i^{\text{CC}} = \varphi_i \\ e_i^{\text{CC}} = \beta(1 + \beta) \end{cases}. \quad (19)$$

We can then claim what follows.

Proposition 4 *In the absence of divorce, investment in human capital is (i) independent of the marriage choice, and (ii) lower than in the benchmark model with divorce for agents choosing the **CC** profile.*

Proof. Follows directly from the inspection of Equations (18) and (19) and the comparison of Equations (19) and (8). ■

Claim (ii) of Proposition 4 can be understood as follows: if divorce is legal, agents are willing to invest more in education in order to have access to the (costly) option of divorce – unless they choose the **RR** marriage profile. This result echoes the literature stressing that the option of divorce provides an incentive to accumulate human capital (Güvenen and Rendall 2015).

We can now examine agents' choices of marriage profiles. This requires comparing the indirect utilities associated with **CC** and **RR**, which we denote by $W^{\text{CC}}(\varphi_i)$ and $W^{\text{RR}}(\varphi_i)$ to mark the difference with their counterparts in the benchmark case with legal divorce ($V^{\text{CC}}(\varphi_i)$ and $V^{\text{RR}}(\varphi_i)$).

We can then claim the following.

Lemma 2 *There exists a threshold*

$$\tilde{\varphi} = \beta \frac{\ln(1 - z)}{\ln(1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta)}, \quad (20)$$

*such that individuals characterized by $\varphi_i \leq \tilde{\varphi}$ choose the **CC** marriage profile, while those with $\varphi_i > \tilde{\varphi}$ prefer **RR**.*

Proof. The threshold value $\tilde{\varphi}$ can be found as the solution of $W^{\text{CC}}(\tilde{\varphi}) = W^{\text{RR}}(\tilde{\varphi})$, where indirect utilities are obtained by replacing optimal choices (18) and (19) in the utility functions (16) and (17). ■

Looking back at Section 4.3, it becomes apparent that the introduction of divorce brings about an increase in human capital and civil marriages. In fact, when divorce is legal, some people prefer **RC** to **RR**, and invest more in human capital to compensate for the divorce cost. The legalization of divorce thus affects the dynamics of the distribution of

education and secularization across regions: in a multi-region environment, the legalization of divorce would cause a divergence between economies characterized by different parameters.³¹ Indeed, while the marriage regime choice is obviously not affected by parameter k in the no-divorce case (as can be seen from the expression for $\tilde{\varphi}$ in Equation (20)), k becomes crucial for the choice between alternative marriage profiles when divorce is legal (as implied by Equations (21), (22), and (23) and Proposition 2). Similarly, parameter z plays a more important role when divorce is allowed, as it has a positive effect on the share of people choosing to divorce and remarry, and investing more in education. Proposition 4 states that, without divorce, education choices do not vary across marriage profiles, while agents adjust their investment in education to their marriage choices when divorce is legal. We can thus expect the prevalence of civil marriages to be correlated with human capital only if divorce is possible, which is consistent with our empirical results.

This suggests that, when evaluating the consequences of divorce for growth, the analysis should not be limited to the possible effects of marital disruption on children's outcomes, but should also incorporate the positive incentive on individual education choices, especially for women.

4.6 How Social Capital Strengthens the Link between Human Capital and Civil Marriage

We now investigate further under which conditions our model can reproduce one of our empirical results, namely that social capital strengthens the link between human capital and civil marriage. As discussed above, the cost of divorce k can be regarded as an inverse measure of the importance of civic and social capital.

Building on the literature on the difference between loose and tight kinship societies (Enke 2019) and on their respective advantages (De la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr 2018), let us consider two regions, one with well-developed civic institutions independent of kinship groups (k^L low) and another one where family networks predominate (k^H high). In each region, there is a large number of municipalities which are heterogeneous with respect to parameter z , which is assumed to follow the same distribution in both regions. Recall that the thresholds on φ_i depend on z , implying that the proportion of civil marriages varies across municipalities. On the other hand, while investments in education e^{RR} , e^{CC} , and e^{RC} are not affected by z , average human capital depends on z through the prevalence of each marriage type.

To interpret the result from Section 3 that the correlation between education and civil marriage is larger if social capital is higher and/or family ties are weaker, let us first consider the simplest case (b) of Figure 4, corresponding to $z \geq \tilde{z}$. The proportion of civil first

³¹The divergent patterns of secularization in marriage across Italian regions has been extensively documented in Section 2. Census data allows us to detect a similar trend in human capital accumulation, with a widening gap between Northern and Southern regions (evidence available upon request).

marriages is given by $F(\tilde{\varphi})$, and from Equations (12), (11), and (13), we can also retrieve the total prevalence of civil marriages (i.e. first marriages and remarriages) as

$$Y = \frac{(2-p)F(\tilde{\varphi})}{1+(1-p)F(\tilde{\varphi})}.$$

In each municipality, the average level of education, as given by Equation (14), can be expressed as

$$X = e^{\text{cc}}F(\tilde{\varphi}) + e^{\text{rr}}(1 - F(\tilde{\varphi})) = F(\tilde{\varphi})(e^{\text{cc}} - e^{\text{rr}}) + e^{\text{rr}}.$$

In a simple linear regression $Y = bX + \varepsilon$, the estimated coefficient would be

$$\hat{b} = \frac{\text{corr}(Y, X)\sigma(Y)}{\sigma(X)}.$$

The correlation $\text{corr}(Y, X)$ is a positive number, which depends on p (and is equal to 1 if $p = 1$). Furthermore, $\sigma(Y)/\sigma(X)$ is a negative function of $(e^{\text{cc}} - e^{\text{rr}})$, e^{cc} is a positive function of k , while e^{rr} does not depend on k . Hence, the gap $(e^{\text{cc}} - e^{\text{rr}})$ is a positive function of k , and the coefficient \hat{b} is thus a negative function of k . This implies that the regression coefficient \hat{b} is higher for municipalities characterized by k^L than for municipalities with k^H . In general, coefficient \hat{b} is expected to be a positive function of civic capital.

If instead we focus on case (a) of Figure 4, which arises if $z > \tilde{z}$, the share of first marriages which are not celebrated in the church is $F(\hat{\varphi})$. Accordingly, the total prevalence of civil marriages is given by

$$Y = \frac{(1-p)F(\hat{\varphi}) + F(\tilde{\varphi})}{1+(1-p)F(\hat{\varphi})},$$

while the average level of education, recalling that $e_i^{\text{rc}} = e_i^{\text{cc}}$, can be written as

$$X = F(\hat{\varphi})(e^{\text{cc}} - e^{\text{rr}}) + e^{\text{rr}}.$$

As $\hat{\varphi}$ does not depend on z (Proposition 2), the correlation between Y and X is zero, as well as the coefficient of a regression of X on Y . If we assume that z is distributed over the interval $(0, 1)$, which includes values that can be lower or higher than \tilde{z} , the correlation across all municipalities between X and Y is positive, although smaller than in case (b). It remains true that regression coefficient \hat{b} is larger for municipalities with k^L than for municipalities with k^H , as is the case in Table 2.

Hence, the loose kinship region displays a stronger link between human capital and civil marriage. Because the cost of divorce is lower in this region, civil marriage is more attractive, divorce is more likely, and the return to human capital is higher. Echoing the literature on the benefits enjoyed by loose kinship societies, our theory of endogenous marriage-type choice thus highlights a novel channel through which loose kinship may enhance growth.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we used the example of civil marriages in Italy to study the relationship between education and secularization and its determinants.

Taking advantage of a panel of thousands of Italian municipalities over four decades, we have established a robust, positive within-municipality correlation between human capital and the proportion of civil marriages. We have also identified two factors which shape this correlation: secularization appears to be more responsive to education where social capital is stronger and/or family ties are weaker, and when divorce is legal. The municipality-level evidence is corroborated by our findings on a large sample of individuals married between 1926 and 1998. Again, we find education to be positively correlated with civil marriage, and the education–secularization link to be heterogeneous across individual characteristics (namely, the strength of family ties) and over time, i.e. before and after the divorce law.

To make sense of our main empirical findings, we have set up a theoretical model in which agents decide how much to invest in religion and education, by taking into account how such choices affect their future marriage outcomes. A specificity of our approach is that we regard secularization – i.e. the choice of civil rather than religious marriage – and human capital as equilibrium variables, both affected by exogenous forces such as culture and institutional change. Thus, we do not need the existence of a direct effect of education on beliefs to explain the positive correlation between human capital and secularization. Instead, our theory puts the spotlight on a trade-off between two alternative types of investment: religious and human capital. By affecting the relative returns to these investments, culture and institutions determine the equilibrium patterns of education and secularization in marriage. In particular, we have shown that the legalization of divorce has been crucial to unleashing the forces of secularization, thus generating the positive association between human capital and secularization. Such a correlation also depends critically on socio-cultural factors which affect the costs of marriage and divorce: wherever the cost of divorce is high, because of the relative importance of the family as a social institution, civil marriage is less attractive and the relative returns to education are lower.

Overall, we believe that our analysis has several implications which can be relevant outside the specific context under study. First, we show that the forces of secularization may need institutional reform in order to be fully unleashed. More generally, major changes in individual behaviors may well be driven by economic incentives, but often need a significant liberalization of the legal framework to become salient. Second, in analogy with the comparative development literature, we find that deep-rooted cultural factors are key in explaining why socio-economic processes follow diverging patterns across different regions. Third, we highlight that divorce may have a positive influence on human capital accumulation through its effect on premarital investment. This deserves to be taken into proper account when evaluating the social consequences of divorce, along with the possibly negative, much debated consequences of divorce on children’s education and welfare.

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A Civil *vs* Religious Marriages in Spain

A.1 Trends in civil marriages

Like Italy, Spain confers an official status on religious marriages, which have civil effects as soon as that they are declared to the civil register, and without the need for a civil ceremony. The Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) provides yearly data on the universe of marriages registered in Spain, with information on their (civil or religious) type. We use them to compute the equivalent of Figure 1 in the case of Spain. The share of civil marriages over time is reported in Figure 5, with data covering the 1976–2011 period, and the vertical bar marking the legalization of divorce in 1981.




Figure 5: Percentage of civil marriages in Spain over time.

Very few civil marriages were celebrated before the 1980s. An upward trend then emerged, and the share of civil marriages represented more than 60% of the total number of marriages in 2011. Although shifted by about one decade, the Spanish pattern is thus quite comparable to the Italian one, with a clear take-off in the prevalence of civil marriages at the same period as the legalization of divorce. Note that the acceleration of the trend in the 2000s could plausibly be related to the civil reform of 2000 which affected, among others, divorce procedures.³²

A.2 Education and secularization

Beyond the rising share of civil marriages, one may question whether the results on the education–secularization link emphasized in Section 3.1 in the case of Italy can also be

³²In Spain, the other main reform of divorce procedures took place in 2005.

observed in Spain. To address this issue, we associate the aforementioned data on Spanish marriages with the four waves of Spanish censuses available on IPUMS – International database, and covering 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011.³³ We aim at reproducing the main specifications of Tables 1 and 2. The main variable of interest, *Higher education*, is taken from the census and defined in the same way: it is the share of the population with, at least, secondary education. Population size and average age are also provided by the census data. Unfortunately, we do not have a good proxy for income in the Spanish data, in particular because questions on amenities and dwelling characteristics were only introduced in 1991. Alternatively, we consider the share of the population that is not working (gathering inactive and unemployed people, as opposed to those currently working). Finally, data are available at the level of the 52 Spanish provinces, which yields a relatively small sample compared to the Italian one.

Columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 reproduce the specifications (1)-(3) of Table 1, and display very comparable results. In particular, the correlation between the share of the population with at least secondary education and the share of civil marriages is positive, significant, and robust to the inclusion of province fixed effects and controls for the size of the province population, average age, and share of workers. Note that, although its sign is consistent with the results of Table 1, the coefficient for *Not working* is not statistically significant in Column (3).

In Column (4), we introduce the interaction between *Higher education* and a proxy for social capital. We rely on the number of NGOs, available at the province level in the statistics yearbook of the Spanish Ministry of Interior.³⁴ The earliest year for which this information exists is 1994, and we divide it by population in 1991 as given by the census. Consistent with the results for Italy, the correlation between human capital and civil marriages appears to be larger in the Spanish provinces where social capital is stronger.

Finally, Column (5) reproduces specification (4) of Table 2, by introducing the interaction between *Higher education* and a dummy equal to one after the legalization of divorce. In the Spanish case, this dummy is thus equal to zero for the 1981 wave, and to one afterwards. As in the Italian case, the results suggest that the education–civil marriage nexus evolved over time, and became significant only once divorce was legal.

In the end, the patterns emerging from the exploration of the Spanish case, although based on less rich data, are very similar to those observed for Italy.

³³Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.2 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.2>

³⁴The *Anuario Estadístico del Ministro del Interior* is available at <http://www.interior.gob.es/web/archivos-y-documentacion/documentacion-y-publicaciones/anuarios-y-estadisticas>.

Table 5: Civil marriages and education in Spain.

<i>Dependent: % civil</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Higher education	1.078*** (0.128)	0.793*** (0.204)	1.069*** (0.246)	0.699** (0.263)	-0.276 (0.458)
Pop (ln)			3.085* (1.774)	2.225 (1.459)	4.977** (2.011)
Age			-0.756* (0.408)	-0.922** (0.413)	-1.179*** (0.364)
Not working			0.345 (0.218)	0.352 (0.216)	0.526** (0.230)
High. ed. x NGOs pc (1994)				0.0472*** (0.0126)	
High. ed. x After					1.266*** (0.425)
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Prov. FE		✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	208	208	208	208	208
R-squared	0.845	0.958	0.960	0.963	0.964
Nb of Prov.s	52	52	52	52	52

Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B Selection into Marriage

Section 2 shows that the share of civil ceremonies over all marriages rose dramatically from the seventies (see Figure 1). One may question whether and to what extent this trend is explained by selection into marriage, namely by a differential decline of marriage rates between more and less religious people.

We explore this issue by taking advantage of individual census data for 2001 and 2011, available from IPUMS – International database.³⁵ In Figure 6, we report women’s marriage rates by birth year, computed from these data. Marriage rates are calculated as the proportion of ever-married women (i.e. currently married, divorced and widowed) in the female population. Information is available for women born as early as 1916, although the figures obtained for the earliest generations might suffer from a survivor bias. To limit the under-estimation of marriage rates due to late marriage, we restrict our attention to women aged at least 40 at the time of the census, thus focusing on those born before 1961 (1971) for the 2001 (2011) wave.

Marriage rates appear to be fairly stable, in the 88–93% range, for women born up to the late 1950s. This suggests that the evolution in overall marriage rates is not likely to play a major role in explaining the post-1970 sharp rise of civil marriages, at least for marriages celebrated up to the end of the 1980s. Marriage rates, however, do decrease substantially for women born after the end of the 1950s.

³⁵Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 7.2 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.2>




Figure 6: Marriage rates by birth year.

It is then useful to go beyond the simple pattern displayed in Figure 6, and run a simulation exercise to quantify the extent to which declining marriage rates may have driven the increasing share of civil marriages depicted in Figure 1. To do so, we combine marriage rates per birth year with our previously computed share of civil marriages, to calculate a hypothetical share of civil marriages in 2011 in the “worst-case” scenario where the decrease in the rate of marriage between 1971 and 2011 is fully explained by religious people deciding not to marry.

We first associate the rate of marriage of women aged about 40 in 1971 and 2011 to the share of civil marriages in 1971 and 2011, respectively.³⁶ This allows us to derive the composition of the 1971 and 2011 cohorts (born in 1934 and 1971, respectively), between those who are single, those who married in the church and those who chose a civil marriage. The resulting figures are reported in the first two columns of Table 6.

Second, we build a counterfactual 2011 cohort, based on the assumption that the decrease in the marriage rate between 1971 and 2011 is completely driven by people who, if they married, would have chosen a religious marriage. The implied composition of the population, displayed in the bottom part of the third column of Table 6, allows us to calculate a counterfactual share of civil marriages. Had all those who did not marry chosen a religious ceremony instead, the share of civil marriages would have reached 33.1% in 2011.

³⁶Specifically, we match women born in 1971 with the rate of civil marriages observed in 2011, and women born in 1934 with the share of civil marriages observed in 1971. Ideally, we would rather associate women born in 1931 with civil marriages observed in 1971, but the 2001 census only provides 5-year cohorts. We use the marriage rate of women born in 1934 because, as can be seen in Figure 6, marriage rates among generations born before 1930 are slightly lower than among those born between 1935 and 1955 (which might be due to a survivor bias). Relying on the 1934 figure thus allows us to produce more conservative estimates.

Table 6: Counter-factual exercise.

		1971	2011	Counterfactual 2011
Share of civil marriages		3.9%	39.2%	33.1%
		$\Delta = + 35.3$ pp		
Generation aged ≈ 40		Born in 1934	Born in 1971	
Rate of marriage		91.9%	77.5%	
		$\Delta = - 14.4$ pp		
Population composition	Civil marriage	3.6%	30.4%	30.4%
	Religious marriage	88.3%	47.1%	47.1+14.4=61.5%
	Single	8.1%	22.5%	8.1%

To sum up, imputing the whole decrease in marriage rate between 1971 and 2011 to religious people can explain 6.1 of the 35.3 percentage points increase in the share of civil marriages over the period. That is, the declining marriage rate can account for at most 17.3% of the total rise in the share of civil marriages from 1971 to 2011.

This back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that selection into marriage is likely to have played a minor role in explaining the rise of civil marriages. This justifies our decision to focus both our empirical and theoretical analyses on the choice of the type of marriage, conditional on marrying.

C Proofs

C.1 Proof of Lemma 1

We start by computing the partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to φ_i . Since

$$\frac{\partial V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)}{\partial \varphi_i} = \varphi_i,$$

$$\frac{\partial V^{\text{rc}}(\varphi_i)}{\partial \varphi_i} = \frac{\varphi_i}{1 - \beta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\eta}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i)}{\partial \varphi_i} = \frac{\varphi_i}{1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta},$$

we have that $\partial V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)/\partial \varphi_i < \partial V^{\text{rc}}(\varphi_i)/\partial \varphi_i < \partial V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i)/\partial \varphi_i$. It follows that each pair of utility functions cannot cross more than once.

It can also be checked that $V^{\text{rr}}(\infty) > V^{\text{rc}}(\infty) > V^{\text{cc}}(\infty)$ and $V^{\text{cc}}(0) > V^{\text{rc}}(0)$. Moreover, $V^{\text{rc}}(0) > V^{\text{rr}}(0)$. This means that there exist the three values $\bar{\varphi}$, $\hat{\varphi}$, and $\tilde{\varphi}$, such that $V^{\text{cc}}(\bar{\varphi}) = V^{\text{rc}}(\bar{\varphi})$, $V^{\text{rc}}(\hat{\varphi}) = V^{\text{rr}}(\hat{\varphi})$, and $V^{\text{cc}}(\tilde{\varphi}) = V^{\text{rr}}(\tilde{\varphi})$.

Let us now focus on $\tilde{\varphi}$, the value of φ_i where V^{cc} crosses V^{rr} (from above, since $\partial V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)/\partial \varphi_i < \partial V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i)/\partial \varphi_i$). Two cases are possible.

If $V^{\text{rc}}(\tilde{\varphi}) > V^{\text{rr}}(\tilde{\varphi}) = V^{\text{cc}}(\tilde{\varphi})$, we have that (i) $V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i) > V^{\text{rc}}(\varphi_i) > V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i)$ for $\varphi_i \in (0, \bar{\varphi})$, (ii) $V^{\text{rc}}(\varphi_i) > \max(V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i), V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i))$ for $\varphi_i \in (\bar{\varphi}, \hat{\varphi})$, and (iii) $V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i) > V^{\text{rc}}(\varphi_i) > V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)$ for $\varphi_i \in (\hat{\varphi}, +\infty)$. This situation corresponds to case (a) of Lemma 1.

If instead $V^{\text{rc}}(\tilde{\varphi}) < V^{\text{rr}}(\tilde{\varphi}) = V^{\text{cc}}(\tilde{\varphi})$, we have that (i) $V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i) > \max(V^{\text{rc}}(\varphi_i), V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i))$ for $\varphi_i \in (0, \tilde{\varphi})$, and (ii) $V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i) > \max(V^{\text{rc}}(\varphi_i), V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i))$ for $\varphi_i \in (\tilde{\varphi}, +\infty)$. This is case (b) of Lemma 1.

Moreover, the analytical expressions for the threshold values of φ are given by

$$\tilde{\varphi} = \frac{\omega + 2\beta \left((1 + \beta) \left(\ln \left(\frac{2\beta(1+\beta)}{\omega} \right) - 1 \right) + \ln(1 - z) - \beta p \left(\ln \left(1 - \frac{2k}{\omega} \right) + g \right) \right)}{2 \ln(1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta)}, \quad (21)$$

$$\hat{\varphi} = \frac{\omega + 2\beta \left((1 + \beta) \left(\ln \left(\frac{2\beta(1+\beta)}{\omega} \right) - 1 \right) - \beta p \left(\ln \left(1 - \frac{2k}{\omega} \right) + g \right) \right)}{2 \ln \left(\frac{1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta}{1 - \beta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\eta} \right)}, \quad (22)$$

and

$$\bar{\varphi} = \frac{\beta \ln(1 - z)}{\ln(1 - \beta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\eta)}, \quad (23)$$

respectively. Finally, we obtain an explicit expression for \check{z} as

$$\check{z} = 1 - \left(\frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\eta} \right)^{\frac{\omega + 2\beta \left((1 + \beta) \left(\ln \left(\frac{2\beta(1+\beta)}{\omega} \right) - 1 \right) - \beta p \left(\ln \left(1 - \frac{2k}{\omega} \right) + g \right) \right)}{2\beta \ln \left(\frac{1 - \beta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\eta}{1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta} \right)}}. \quad (24)$$

C.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Consider the thresholds $\bar{\varphi}$, $\hat{\varphi}$, and $\tilde{\varphi}$, as given by Lemma 1.

We have that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \tilde{\varphi}}{\partial k} &= -\frac{\omega - 2(1 + \beta)\beta}{2k \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 - \eta(1 + \beta)\beta} \right)} < 0, \\ \frac{\partial \hat{\varphi}}{\partial k} &= -\frac{\omega - 2(1 + \beta)\beta}{2k \ln \left(\frac{1 - \eta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\beta}{1 - \eta(1 + \beta)\beta} \right)} < 0, \\ \frac{\partial \bar{\varphi}}{\partial k} &= 0; \\ \frac{\partial \tilde{\varphi}}{\partial z} &= \frac{\beta}{(1 - z) \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 - \eta(1 + \beta)\beta} \right)} > 0, \\ \frac{\partial \hat{\varphi}}{\partial z} &= 0, \\ \frac{\partial \bar{\varphi}}{\partial z} &= \frac{\beta}{(1 - z) \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 - \eta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\beta} \right)} > 0. \end{aligned}$$

The signs of the partial derivatives of the thresholds with respect to k can be unambiguously established after checking that $\omega - 2(1 + \beta)\beta > 0$.

C.3 Proof of Lemma 2

We start by following the same logic as the Proof of Lemma 1, and compute

$$\frac{\partial V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)}{\partial \varphi_i} = \varphi_i,$$

and

$$\frac{\partial V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i)}{\partial \varphi_i} = \frac{\varphi_i}{1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta}.$$

Given that $\eta > 0$, we can establish that $\partial V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)/\partial \varphi_i < \partial V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i)/\partial \varphi_i$, so that the two indirect utility functions cannot cross more than once.

Moreover, since $z \in (0, 1)$, we know that $V^{\text{rr}}(\infty) > V^{\text{cc}}(\infty)$ and $V^{\text{rr}}(0) < V^{\text{cc}}(0)$. This means that there exists one strictly positive value of φ_i , i.e. $\tilde{\varphi}$, such that $V^{\text{cc}}(\tilde{\varphi}) = V^{\text{rr}}(\tilde{\varphi})$, and $V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i) < V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)$ when $\varphi_i < \tilde{\varphi}$, while $V^{\text{rr}}(\varphi_i) > V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)$ when $\varphi_i > \tilde{\varphi}$.

A further look at the expression for $\tilde{\varphi}$ in Lemma 2 reveals that if $z = 0$ (a religious marriage is not costly), $\tilde{\varphi} = 0$ and everybody prefers to marry at church. If instead $z > 0$, but $\eta = 0$ (no utility gain from a religious marriage), $\tilde{\varphi} = +\infty$ and all the agents choose a civil marriage.

D Relaxing Assumption 2

Throughout Section 4, we developed our benchmark model under the assumption that agents who choose the **CC** marriage profile always decide to divorce if their marriage turns bad after one period. For this to be the case, we stipulated a formal condition on g , reported in Assumption 2. Such a condition ensures that if the utility of a good marriage is large enough, agents prefer to pay the cost of divorce and remarry if the quality of their relationship deteriorates.

We now show that if Assumption 2 is relaxed our analysis becomes more complicated, but delivers the same types of results as the benchmark.

Let us start by saying that, when divorce is not legal, the results of Section 4.5 (namely optimal choices and marriage profiles) remain unaffected.

However, when divorce is legal, we must take into account that agents who choose **CC** may decide not to divorce, and remain locked in a bad marriage if the inequality in Assumption 2 does not hold. With respect to Section 4, this implies that we have to rewrite the indirect utility associated with the **CC** marriage profile, which would become $V_a^{\text{cc}} = \max(V^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i), W^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i))$. In fact, if agents choose not to divorce even if their marriage deteriorates and divorce is legal, their indirect utility in the **CC** regime is equivalent to that in the case without divorce (i.e. $W^{\text{cc}}(\varphi_i)$), as described in Section 4.5.

Consequently, the logic of Lemma 1 is the same, but the value of φ_i such that agent i is indifferent between **CC** and **RC** must be rewritten and becomes $\tilde{\varphi}_a = \max(\tilde{\varphi}, \tilde{\tilde{\varphi}})$, where $\tilde{\varphi}$ and $\tilde{\tilde{\varphi}}$ are given by Equations (21) and (20), respectively.

Note also that our generalization has no bearing on the choice between **RR** and **RC**, since $\tilde{\tilde{\varphi}} < \bar{\varphi}$ (see Equations (23) and (20)).

E Ruling Out Time-Inconsistent Behavior

To avoid time-inconsistent behavior, we need to make sure that (i) agents who choose the **RR** profile do not want to divorce if their marriage turns bad, and (ii) agents who choose **RC** stick to their original plan and decide to divorce if their marriage turns bad.

We start with (i). We need agents who choose **RR** and see their marriage turn bad not to prefer to divorce and remarry in the third period. For this to be case, we must have that

$$\eta r_i^{\text{RR}} + \ln(e_i^{\text{RR}}) > g + \eta r_i^{\text{RR}} + \ln(e_i^{\text{RR}} - k),$$

and the above inequality is verified if

$$\varphi_i > \varphi' \equiv \frac{1 - \beta(1 + \beta)\eta (g - \ln(\beta(1 + \beta)) + \ln(\beta(1 + \beta) - k))}{\eta}. \quad (25)$$

As far as (ii) is concerned, we need

$$g + \ln(e_i^{\text{RC}} - k) > \eta r_i^{\text{RC}} + \ln(e_i^{\text{RC}}),$$

which is verified if

$$\varphi_i < \varphi'' \equiv \frac{(1 - \beta(1 + (1 - p)\beta)\eta) \left(g - 2 \arctan \frac{k}{B + \beta(1 + \beta)\eta} \right)}{\eta}. \quad (26)$$

Recall that people characterized by $\varphi_i < \hat{\varphi}$ choose **RC** over **RR**, while those with $\varphi_i > \hat{\varphi}$ prefer **RR** to **RC**. It follows that time inconsistency does not arise if $\varphi' < \hat{\varphi} < \varphi''$. It can be checked that such an inequality is verified if $g > \max(g_I, g_{II})$ where g_I and g_{II} solve $\varphi'(g_I) = \hat{\varphi}(g_I)$ and $\varphi''(g_{II}) = \hat{\varphi}(g_{II})$.