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JEL Classification: D72, J15, N92

Keywords: race, diversity, civil rights, Great Migration

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1 Introduction

Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million African Americans left the US South for the North and West in one of the country's largest internal migration movements, referred to as the Second Great Migration (henceforth, Great Migration). The Great Migration temporally coincided with the development and eventual success of the civil rights movement – a turning point in the history of race relations in the US – which culminated in the passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Given the resistance of southern politicians to extend the franchise to Black Americans, northern legislators and grassroots organizations based in the North, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), played a key role in the process of enfranchisement (Lawson, 1976). Are these trends causally related? Did northward migration contribute to the growth of the civil rights movement?

The inflow of Black voters may have shifted northern politicians' incentives to introduce civil rights legislation, since African Americans were largely disenfranchised in the South, but faced no voting restrictions in the North. A growing Black population might have also expanded the organizational capacity of the Black civil rights movement (McAdam, 1982), promoting the development of Black activism. At the same time, a large literature has documented that racial diversity often triggers backlash among members of the majority group (Alesina et al., 1999; Dustmann et al., 2019; Enos, 2016). Black migrants may have thus generated political opposition among northern whites, reducing support for civil rights. Moreover, recent work in economics has found that the Great Migration increased residential segregation (Boustan, 2010) and lowered the economic and social mobility of African Americans in the long run (Derenoncourt, 2021). This, together with whites' backlash, may have reduced Black Americans' political empowerment and hindered the development of the civil rights movement.

The idea that the Great Migration lowered whites' support for civil rights seems at odds with the evidence presented in Figure 1. The figure plots the relationship between the 1940 to 1960 change in the Black population across non-southern US states and racial attitudes of *white* survey respondents in 1964 – the year in which the Civil Rights Act was passed.[1] White respondents living in states that received more Black migrants were more likely to consider civil rights as the most important problem facing

[1]The underlying OLS regressions partial out Census divisions dummies, the 1940-1960 change in state population, individual characteristics of survey respondents, and 1940 state-level socio-economic controls.

the country (Panel a) and to express warmer feelings towards Black Americans (Panel b). They had similarly warmer feelings towards the NAACP (Panel c) and the CORE (Panel d) – two grassroots organizations that played a key role in the success of the civil rights movement (Schickler, 2016; Sugrue, 2008).

In this paper, we show that these correlations reflect a causal relationship between the Great Migration and support for civil rights in the US North and West, not only among Black Americans but also among segments of the white electorate. We measure support for civil rights outside the US South using two sets of political outcomes. The first one captures voters' preferences. We focus on the county-level Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. This choice is motivated by recent evidence that, although the Democratic Party was openly segregationist and stubbornly defended white supremacy in the South until the early 1960s (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Lawson, 1976), by the end of the 1930s in the North and West it had unambiguously become the party defending Black people's interests and pushing for racial equality, especially at the local level (Schickler, 2016; Wasow, 2020).[2] To isolate support for civil rights from economic or other considerations of voters driving party choice, we complement this outcome with more direct proxies, such as the presence and activity of civil rights grassroots organizations (the CORE and the NAACP) as well as survey data. The second set of political variables captures the race-related ideology and behavior of Congress members. We measure this focusing on Congressional Districts (CDs), and using ideology scores derived from past voting behavior on civil rights bills (Bateman et al., 2017) and signatures on discharge petitions – a procedure used in US Congress to force bills out of legislative committees and to the floor for a vote – to promote civil rights legislation (Pearson and Schickler, 2009; Schickler, 2016).

To establish causality, we estimate stacked first difference regressions, controlling for state time-varying unobservable characteristics, and allowing counties and CDs to be on differential trends depending on their initial Black population share and political conditions. To account for potentially endogenous migration, we construct a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001; Boustan, 2010) that assigns Black outflows from each southern state to northern counties based on pre-existing settlements of African Americans outside the South. One way to express the identifying assumption behind the instrument is the following. Conditional on controls (county and state by decade fixed effects, and differential trends for 1940 Democratic Party incumbency and

[2]Below, we provide evidence consistent with this idea. On party realignment see also Caughey et al. (2020).

Black population share), support for civil rights after 1940 should not be simultaneously correlated with the 1940 composition of African Americans' enclaves in northern counties *and* with patterns of out-migration from different southern states after 1940. After presenting the main results below, we perform several robustness checks to corroborate the validity of our empirical approach, building on insights from the recent econometric literature on shift-share designs (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2021; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Jaeger et al., 2018).

Using this strategy, we find that Black in-migration had a strong, positive impact on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. Our estimates imply that one percentage point increase in the Black population share raised the Democratic vote share by 1.8 percentage points, or 4% relative to the 1940 mean. This is a large effect: even under the aggressive assumption that all Black migrants immediately voted for the Democratic Party upon arrival, support for the Democrats must have increased among northern residents because of Black inflows. Consistent with the view that African Americans were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern cities (Moon, 1948), we find that Black in-migration had a positive but quantitatively small impact on turnout. Given existing evidence that the Great Migration caused "white flight" (Boustan, 2010; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019), we verify that Black inflows did not lead to white out-migration or to changes in the composition of white residents at the county level, and replicate our analysis at the commuting zone (CZ) level.

Changes in voting patterns are mirrored by shifts in the ideology and behavior on racial issues of legislators. Similar to Autor et al. (2020), we construct a cross-walk that matches counties to CDs, and develop a procedure that assigns CD boundaries, which changed over time due to redistricting, to the geography of Congress 78 (1943-1945), which we take as our baseline. CDs that received more African Americans were represented by legislators with a more liberal ideology on racial issues, who were also more likely to sign discharge petitions aimed at promoting civil rights bills. These average effects mask substantial heterogeneity and increasing polarization across and within parties.

Next, we explore the mechanisms linking Black migration to support for civil rights. One pathway for our results is the changed composition of the electorate. Local northern fringes of the Democratic Party, which were better positioned to incorporate Black voters both in terms of racial ideology and of economic policies, benefited from the entry of African Americans in the northern electorate (Grant, 2020; Schickler, 2016).

A second pathway was local activism, which may have exerted additional pressure on northern legislators. Black in-migration fed into local grassroots actions, by allowing existing civil rights organizations to reach a critical mass and by favoring the development of new ones (Biondi, 2021; McAdam, 1982). Confirming this idea, we find that Black arrivals increased both the presence of local NAACP chapters and the frequency of non-violent pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by CORE.

Our electoral results, however, suggest that the direct effect of Black voters alone is not enough to explain the increase in the Democratic vote share caused by the Great Migration. Estimated magnitudes indicate that some white voters had to switch to the Democratic Party. A back of the envelope calculation that rests on estimates on Black registration and voting behavior from historical accounts (Glantz, 1960) confirms this idea. This exercise shows that approximately 7 white voters would have to switch to the Democratic Party for every 10 Black migrants in order to match the estimated coefficient on the change in the Black population share. We corroborate this interpretation using historical survey data, estimating state level cross-sectional regressions.[3] In the years preceding the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA), white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1960 held more favorable views on race relations, considered racial equality as one of the most fundamental issues for the country, and were more likely to vote for the Democratic Party. Furthermore, using a subset of the CORE data, we document that not only Black, but also white individuals joined pro-civil rights protests.

One mechanism driving whites' support for civil rights might have been heightened awareness of conditions faced by Black people in the South. Writing in 1944, Swedish economist and Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal noted that "[t]he average Northerner does not understand the reality and the effects of such [Southern] discriminations...[t]o get publicity is of the highest strategic importance to [Black people]" (Myrdal, 1944). To test this channel, we compiled a list of all known lynchings committed by white offenders against Black victims in the US South between 1940 and 1964. We searched for these episodes in local newspapers of non-southern counties, identifying them with the joint mention of the name of the victim and the place of the lynching. By conducting a series of event studies, we document that, in the weeks following a lynching, northern local newspapers were more likely to report the episode in counties that had received more African Americans in previous years.

[3]There is no county level survey data with a sufficiently large sample size for this period.

A second, possibly complementary, mechanism is the formation of a cross-race alliance between Black voters and progressive segments of the Democratic coalition, as suggested by the political science literature (Adams, 1966; Frymer and Grumbach, 2020; Schickler, 2016). In line with this idea, we document that CORE demonstrations were more frequent where, at baseline: the share of whites employed in manufacturing was higher; the presence of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) – the main force behind industrial unionism – was stronger; and elections were more competitive.[4] Consistent with labor unions supporting a cross-race coalition only, or especially, when labor markets were tight (Bailer, 1944), pro-civil rights demonstrations occurred only where labor demand, predicted using a Bartik-style approach, was stronger.

Additional heterogeneity analyses further support the notion that progressive whites were more likely to respond to Black in-migration. Pro-civil rights protests were concentrated in counties with a history of lower racial discrimination, and higher racial tolerance, for instance as measured by the presence of miscegenation laws. These patterns are consistent with the Great Migration raising support for civil rights among socially progressive whites through channels like increased salience of the "race problem" (Allport, 1954; Myrdal, 1944).

Our findings should be interpreted in the temporal context of our study, which covers the pre-1964 period. The southern focus of the civil rights agenda during this time may have facilitated support for civil rights among northern whites, as it concerned a relatively abstract national-level issue with little direct impact on the North.[5] At the same time, the developments of that period persisted until today. Using county-level data for the contemporary period, we find that white residents living in counties that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1970 hold warmer feelings towards Black people and commit fewer hate crimes against them.

Our results speak to several strands of literature in economics and political science. Most centrally, they contribute to a large literature on the civil rights movement. Several papers have studied the consequences of the Civil Rights and the Voting Rights Acts (Aneja and Avenancio-Leon, 2019; Bernini et al., 2018; Cascio et al., 2010; Cascio and Washington, 2014; Reber, 2011), while many others, building on Carmines and

[4]While we cannot directly test this conjecture, it is possible that a cross-race coalition spurred by the labor movement favored the emergence of a shared identity around economic class, rather than race, leading some working class white voters to embrace the civil rights cause (Bonomi et al., 2021; Shayo, 2020).

[5]For instance, it was not until the 1968 Federal Housing Act that the US government prohibited residential discrimination – one of the main tools used in the US North to *de facto* segregate African Americans. Busing, a highly contentious issue for race relations in the North, did not become a major point of conflict until the early 1970s.

Stimson (1989), have investigated the causes of the southern "dealignment" (Besley et al., 2010; Kousser, 2010; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Trende, 2012; Wright, 2013). Although several other forces contributed to the development of the civil rights movement, our work sheds light on the specific role of the Great Migration. Our findings are also consistent with and complement Schickler (2016) and Grant (2020) who, respectively, argue that the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic coalition after the New Deal and the rising pivotal role of Black voters at the national level due to the Great Migration were important mechanisms behind party realignment in American politics.

Our work also complements the literature on the relationship between voters' demand and politicians' behavior (Caughey and Warshaw, 2018; Jones and Walsh, 2018; Kroth et al., 2016; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Mian et al., 2010; Miller, 2008). Closest to our paper, Cascio and Washington (2014) document that the Voting Rights Act (VRA) shifted the distribution of local spending across southern counties towards Black Americans' preferences, once the latter became eligible to vote. We expand on their findings by focusing on the US North rather than the South, and by analyzing one of the potential causes, rather than consequences, of the VRA – i.e., the response of northern politicians to the change in the characteristics and demands of their constituency due to Black in-migration.

Finally, we contribute to the vast literature on the Great Migration (Collins, 2021). Although several papers in economics have studied the effects of the Great Migration on whites' residential decisions, intergenerational mobility, immigrant assimilation, and public finance (Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2021; Fouka et al., 2021; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019; Tabellini, 2018), little evidence exists on its political effects.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Great Migration

Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million African Americans left the US South for northern and western destinations. This unprecedented migration episode is usually referred to as the Second Great Migration. From 1915 to 1930, the First Great Migration brought to the North 1.5 million Black migrants. However, the Second Great Migration – from now onwards the Great Migration – was substantially larger in magnitude and had more profound implications for American politics and race relations (Boustan,

2016). Most Black migrants moved to urban centers in the Northeast and mid-West, but the Great Migration was a geographically widespread phenomenon, which also affected the West and less urbanized areas outside the South (Figure 2).[6]

Black migrants were pulled to the North and West by economic opportunities and pushed out of the South by racial oppression, political disenfranchisement, and poor working conditions (Boustan, 2016). On the one hand, the outbreak of WWII increased demand for labor in northern and western factories, raising the potential gains from migration. Even after the WWII-related labor demand shock was over, higher expectations of upward social and economic mobility kept attracting African Americans to the North at least until the late 1960s. On the other hand, widespread violence and disenfranchisement, together with a separate and unequal school system, provided strong incentives for Black Americans to leave the South (Feigenbaum et al., 2020; Margo, 1991). Moreover, the mechanization of agricultural harvest in the 1940s and 1950s reduced demand for labor in the already depressed southern agricultural sector, further increasing the pool of prospective migrants (Grove and Heinicke, 2003; Whatley, 1985).

Out-migration from the South was strongest during the 1940s, with a Black emigration rate of almost 15%, but remained high until the late 1960s (Figure A.1). As a consequence of this migration episode, during which the US South lost 40% of its 1940 Black population, the racial profile of the United States changed dramatically. While only 25% of African Americans were living outside the South in 1940, this figure had increased to more than 50% by 1970. On average, the Black population share of the population in northern and western cities moved from less than 4% to more than 15% in just three decades. These numbers were an order of magnitude higher for main hubs like Chicago, Detroit, or St. Louis, where the Black population share of the population moved from 8, 9, and 11% to 32, 43, and 41% respectively (Gibson and Jung, 2005).[7]

2.2 Black Migrants and Northern Politics

The demographic change induced by the Great Migration had the potential to alter the political equilibrium, especially in industrial and urban centers. In the US South, Black Americans faced *de jure* disenfranchisement through the use of literacy tests,

[6] When defining the US South, we follow the Census classification but, as in Boustan (2010), we exclude Maryland and Delaware – two states that received net Black inflows during the Great Migration (Table A.1). As Figure 2 makes clear, most counties in California are missing from our sample due to the lack of data on Congressional elections at the county level for this historical period. We return to this point in Section 3 and in Appendix D.

[7] In rural counties, the Black population share remained substantially lower and rarely exceeded 2 or 3%.

poll taxes, and grandfather clauses (Cascio and Washington, 2014; Lawson, 1976). On the contrary, they could, and in fact did, vote in the North (Moon, 1948). The literature on social movements suggests that the enfranchisement of Black migrants may have increased both the organizational capacity of the civil rights movement and the pressure exerted by the Black community on local politicians (McAdam, 1982). This is consistent with the patterns that we observe in the data: in 1940, 213 northern and western counties had at least one local NAACP chapter; this number had increased to 293 by 1960 (Figure A.2). Similarly, the CORE was created by a group of students from the University of Chicago in 1942, and its activity (e.g., non-violent demonstrations and sit-ins) increased substantially over time: while only about 20 CORE events were organized in the 1940s, this number increased to more than 75 in the 1950s, and more than quadrupled in the early 1960s (Figure A.3).[8]

During the First Great Migration, both Democrats and Republicans had tried to incorporate African Americans into their voting bloc. However, the New Deal had better equipped the Democratic Party to address the demands of Black Americans outside the US South (Caughey et al., 2020; Schickler, 2016). Figure A.4 plots the share of northern Democrats (blue bars) and Republicans (red bars) voting in favor of civil rights bills between Congresses 78 (1943-1945) and 88 (1963-1965). Both in the 1940s and in the 1950s, Democrats in the North were more likely to support civil rights bills.[9] However, the partisan difference was rather small. As noted in Schickler et al. (2010), even though roll call votes are informative for inferring legislators' preferences, they have an important limitation: only a small number of issues were actually considered for a vote in the House. This was especially true of civil rights bills during this historical period, which were often blocked by Congressional committees led by powerful southern Democrats (Schickler, 2016).[10] To more precisely evaluate party positions on civil rights, we thus rely on a more direct measure of legislators' commitment to racial equality: signatures on discharge petitions (Pearson and Schickler, 2009; Schickler et al., 2010).

Discharge petitions are a means to circumvent Congressional committees, and move bills to the floor for a vote, and were frequently used by northern Congress members

[8]Between 1960 and 1964 alone, the CORE organized 290 events. The frequency of CORE demonstrations then steadily declined after the passage of the Civil Rights Act.

[9]Figure A.5 documents that the pattern is reversed once the US South is included. See Table A.2 for the detailed list of bills, and Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress years to calendar years and the definition of Congress periods.

[10]Between 1933 and 1948, only 19 civil rights bills reached the floor of the House (Schickler et al., 2010).

to promote civil rights bills.[11] Relative to voting behavior, signatures on discharge petitions reflect both legislators' ideal points and their preference intensity (Schickler et al., 2010). Since signing discharge petitions was sometimes considered as going against Congressional norms (Oleszek, 2013), such an action was potentially costly for legislators. Hence, signatures on discharge petitions are more likely to reflect legislators' commitment to racial equality, relative to voting on final bills.[12]

Confirming the evidence presented in Schickler (2016) and Schickler et al. (2010), Figure 3 documents that non-southern Democratic Congress members were at least 30 percentage points more likely than their Republican counterparts to sign a discharge petition to promote civil rights legislation between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 82 (1951-1953). The gap rose to more than 50 percentage points in the following decade (Figure 3).[13] Democratic legislators were more likely to sign petitions on any topic during the period of interest (Schickler et al., 2010), but this difference does not drive the patterns we observe. Comparing the party-level difference in propensity to sign petitions on civil rights versus other topics, we find that to be higher for Democrats in all Congress periods (Figure A.6).

The previous discussion indicates that, during the period of our study, non-southern Democrats were more committed to supporting civil rights legislation than Republicans. This pattern was reflected in the voting behavior of African Americans. Existing evidence suggests that at least 70% of registered Black voters outside the South were voting Democratic already in 1936 – a share that gradually increased over time (Bositis, 2012). Similar estimates emerge from historical case-studies. For instance, focusing on eight northern cities, Glantz (1960) documents that between 70% and 85% of Black registered voters voted for the Democratic Party in the 1948 and 1952 elections. Moon (1957) provides evidence that the majority of voters living in wards of northern and western cities predominantly inhabited by Black residents voted for the Democratic Party in the 1952 and 1956 elections.

While northern Black residents and Black migrants were attracted to the Democratic Party because of its position on racial issues, they were also more closely aligned

[11] More specifically, discharge petitions could be filed if a proposed bill remained stuck in the Rules Committee (resp. a legislative committee) for more than seven (resp. twenty) days (Beth et al., 2003). Petitions required 218 signatures for the bill to be moved to the floor. See also Appendix C.

[12] In order to focus on petitions that were politically relevant, we adopt the convention used in Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler (2016), restricting attention to discharge petitions that received at least 25 signatures. Relaxing this restriction leaves all statistics and results unchanged.

[13] See Table A.4 for detailed summary statistics on discharge petitions signatures by civil rights topics.

to its economic agenda than to that of Republicans. The incorporation of Black voters into the Democratic bloc was further facilitated by the more progressive fringes of the Democratic coalition. Organized labor, headed by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), had started to actively include African Americans in labor union ranks since the 1930s.[14] As more traditional crafts unionism represented by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was openly segregationist, this meant a shift away from traditional labor union practices. Abundant anecdotal evidence exists that labor unions openly endorsed civil rights and backed African Americans in their fight for racial equality (Adams, 1966; Bailer, 1944). For instance, CIO leader J. Brophy declared in 1944 that "behind every lynching is the figure of the labor exploiter...who would deny labor its fundamental rights". Similarly, in 1942 Walter Reuther, a highly influential figure in the United Automobile Workers (UAW), declared that "...[racial discrimination] must be put on top of the list with union security and other major union demands" (Zieger, 2000).

In line with the previous statements, evidence from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac shows that, for the 42 cases in which the NAACP took a clear position on a proposed piece of legislation between 1946 and 1955, the CIO openly took the very same position in 38 cases, and never took a position conflicting with that of the NAACP (Schickler, 2016). A class-based racially and economically liberal coalition offered additional leverage to Black activists pressuring northern Democrats on the civil rights agenda.

3 Data

This section describes the key outcomes of the paper. Appendix C provides a more detailed description of all data sources, which are also listed in Table C.1.

Political outcomes. We rely on two main political outcomes to measure support for civil rights. First, we consider the county-level Democratic vote share in Congressional elections from 1940 to 1970 (Clubb et al., 1990). This choice is motivated by the evidence discussed in Section 2.2 that, by the early 1940s, Democrats had become the champions of racial equality outside the US South, and that such support was more likely to emerge in Congressional rather than Presidential elections (Caughey et al.,

[14] Using data from Gallup, Farber et al. (2021) document that, while non-southern white men were significantly more likely than Black men to be union members in 1940, this pattern had been reversed by 1960.

2020; Schickler, 2016). To enrich our understanding of the political effects of the Great Migration, we also examine voter turnout.

Our second main outcome is legislators' ideology on racial issues. We measure it using the scores constructed in Bateman et al. (2017), which are a function of legislators' past voting behavior on race-related bills. As the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), the Bateman et al. (2017) scores take more negative values for more liberal positions.[15] We complement this outcome by using signatures on discharge petitions on racial issues, taken from Pearson and Schickler (2009). Both ideology scores and signatures on discharge petitions are measured at the CD, rather than county, level. We harmonize CD boundaries using a time-invariant cross-walk, described in detail in Appendix B. In order to end our analysis with the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act, and to minimize issues posed by redistricting, we restrict attention to years between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 88 (1963-1965).[16]

Local support for civil rights. Since the aforementioned political outcomes may also capture factors unrelated to support for civil rights, we complement them with two additional variables. The first one is the presence of chapters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), available for the early 1940s and the early 1960s from Gregory and Estrada (2019). The second one is the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) – an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago that coordinated sit-ins and similar forms of civil disobedience mainly across northern cities to protest against segregation in the South – taken from Gregory and Hermida (2019).

Whites' attitudes. A central goal of our analysis is to understand if the political changes caused by Black in-migration were at least in part driven by changes in whites' racial attitudes. We measure these using the American National Election Studies (ANES). The ANES is a nationally representative survey that elicits individuals' preferences, political ideology, and socioeconomic and demographic characteristics over time. Starting from the mid to late 1950s, the ANES began to include questions on attitudes towards racial equality and on support for civil rights. While the ANES con-

[15] Bateman et al. (2017) develop two versions of the scores – one that assumes that the ideal points of legislators remain constant over time ("constrained" scores), and one that instead does not make such assumption ("agnostic" scores). Our results are robust to using either measure.

[16] See Table A.3 for the definition of Congress periods used in our analysis. Since signatures on discharge petitions are available only for selected Congresses, we are forced to end our analysis with Congress 82 (1951-1953), when considering this variable.

tains respondents' county of residence, we are unable to leverage county-level variation due to the limited number of counties included in the survey and to the low number of respondents per county. We instead rely on cross-state variation in attitudes of white respondents interviewed between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s.

We measure whites' attitudes also using data from historical Gallup surveys, and from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) and FBI hate crime records, for more recent years. These data and the corresponding sources are described in detail in Appendix C, and are introduced as they become relevant.

Descriptive statistics. Our final dataset is composed of the 1,263 non-southern counties (and, for the analysis on legislators, 285 CDs) for which electoral data are available for all Census years. Since data on Congressional elections are not available for all years in several counties in California, our baseline analysis excludes most of the state (Figures 2 and A.7). All results are unchanged when considering the unbalanced sample, which includes California (Appendix D).

Table 1 presents summary statistics for our main variables, reporting 1940 levels in Panel A and their (decadal) changes in Panel B. The Black population share in the average county in our sample was around 3.5% in 1940, and increased to almost 9% in 1970 (not shown). These average values mask substantial heterogeneity. Figure A.7 plots the 1940 Black population share for the counties in our sample. In 1940, non-southern Black residents were concentrated in the urban centers of the Northeast and the Midwest, in border states, and in the West. In 1940, the Black population share was already as high as 8% in Cook County (IL), and rose to 21.5% by 1970. Similarly, the Black population share in Philadelphia County (PA) increased from around 12% in 1940 to almost 35% in 1970, whereas that in Clark County (NV) rose from less than 3% to about 10% during the same period (Figure A.8).

The 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was on average 46.5%. In Congress 78, civil rights scores were on average negative (-0.87), and their decadal change was close to zero, even though this masks important differences between both parties and Congress periods (Bateman et al., 2017; Schickler, 2016). Signatures on discharge petitions were more common in the 78 to 82 than in the 83 to 88 Congress period (Table A.5), and their subjects changed markedly over time. While the poll tax and anti-discrimination employment (FECP) legislation were the most common topics during the 1940s, 5 of the 8 discharge petitions filed between Congress 83 and Congress

88 concerned the CRA.[17]

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Estimating Equation

To study the political effects of the Great Migration, we stack the data for the three decades between 1940 and 1970, and estimate

$$\Delta y_{c\tau} = \delta_{s\tau} + \beta \Delta Bl_{c\tau} + \gamma X_{c\tau} + u_{c\tau} \tag{1}$$

where $\Delta y_{c\tau}$ is the change in the outcome of interest in county (or, CD) c during decade τ. In the county-level analysis, $y_{c\tau}$ refers to the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections. When examining the mechanisms, we introduce additional outcomes, such as the presence of local NAACP chapters and the occurrence of pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by the CORE.

The key regressor of interest, $\Delta Bl_{c\tau}$, is the change in the Black population share in county c during decade τ. $\delta_{s\tau}$ includes interactions between decade and state dummies, and $X_{c\tau}$ is a vector of interactions between decade dummies and 1940 county characteristics. In order to identify the effects for the average county, we weigh regressions by 1940 county population, but results are robust to estimating unweighted regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Our preferred specification includes the 1940 Black population share and a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940 Congressional elections. In Appendix D, we add more interactions to probe the robustness of our results. Since equation (1) is taken in stacked first differences and always controls for interactions between period and state dummies, the coefficient of interest, β, is estimated from changes in the Black population share within the same county over time, as compared to other counties in the same state in a given period.

In the CD-level analysis, $y_{c\tau}$ is the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) or the signature on discharge petitions on civil rights related legislation. In order to minimize changes in CD boundaries and to end our analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA (Congress 88, 1963-1965), we restrict attention to two – rather than three – periods: from Congress 78 (1943-1945) to Congress 82 (1951-1953); and,

[17] See Appendix C for the list of discharge petitions on civil rights by topic and Congress (Table C.2).

from Congress 82 (1951-1953) to Congress 88 (1963-1965).[18] Instead, for signatures on discharge petitions, we are forced to estimate equation (1) only for the 78-82 Congress period, when a sufficient number of petitions were filed both at the beginning and at the end of the decade. As for the county-level analysis, regressions are weighed by CD population, and standard errors are clustered at the CD level.

4.2 Instrument for Changes in Black Population

The key empirical challenge for our analysis is that Black migrants might have sorted in places that were already undergoing economic and political changes. To overcome these and similar concerns, we predict Black inflows in northern area c during decade τ using a version of the shift-share instrument commonly adopted in the migration literature (Boustan, 2010; Card, 2001). The instrument predicts the change in the Black population in county c during decade τ by interacting the share of Black migrants born in southern state j and living in northern county c in 1940 (relative to all Black migrants born in state j living outside that state in 1940), sh_{jc}, with the number of Black migrants who left state j during period τ, $Bl_{j\tau}$:

$$Z_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in South} sh_{jc} Bl_{j\tau} \tag{2}$$

Since we are interested in the effects of changes in the Black population share, we scale $Z_{c\tau}$ by 1940 county population.

As discussed in Boustan (2010) among others, Black settlements in the North were highly persistent over time. At the turn of the twentieth century, as African Americans started to move northwards, migration patterns were influenced by the newly constructed railroad network. For instance, the presence of the *Illinois Central*, which connected several Mississippi counties to Chicago and a number of southern railroads to northern hubs in Missouri and Illinois, explains why Black migrants from Mississippi were disproportionately concentrated in Chicago or St. Louis (Grossman, 1991). The stability of Black enclaves was further reinforced by the process of chain migration during the First Great Migration (Collins and Wanamaker, 2015). Figure A.9 plots the share of Black migrants born in Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas living in selected northern counties in 1940, documenting the wide variation in settlement patterns across

[18] Appendix D documents that results are not sensitive to the exact definition of Congress periods, and that there is no evidence that strategic redistricting is driving any of our findings.

both destination and origin areas.

4.2.1 Identifying Assumptions and Instrument Validity

Several recent papers discuss the conditions for the validity of shift-share designs (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2021; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Jaeger et al., 2018). One way to express the identifying assumption behind the instrument is as follows. Conditional on controls, third factors affecting the trajectories of political conditions after 1940 must not be simultaneously correlated with both: *i*) the 1940 mix, in terms of southern state of origin, of Black enclaves across non-southern counties, and *ii*) emigration rates from different southern states after 1940.

As formalized in Borusyak et al. (2021), a large number of shocks that are orthogonal to changes in outcomes in the destination (in our setting, support for racial equality in non-southern counties) guarantee the validity of the shift-share design. Our instrument combines actual out-migration flows with a (southern) state to (northern) county migration matrix. For these reasons, we cannot immediately invoke the result in Borusyak et al. (2021). However, as described in detail in Appendix D, we verify that our results are unchanged when using versions of the instrument that are likely to meet the conditions in Borusyak et al. (2021).

First, as in Boustan (2010), we replace actual out-migration from southern states with that estimated by exploiting only conditions across southern counties (and then aggregated up to the state level), such as WWII spending, 1940 cotton acreage, and 1940 employment share in agriculture, manufacturing, and mining.[19] Second, and similar to Derenoncourt (2021), we develop an alternative version of the shift-share instrument, based on a linked sample of African American migrants between 1910 and 1930 from Abramitzky et al. (2020). This instrument, which is based on a county-to-county (rather than state-to-county) migration matrix, effectively exploits variation in predicted migration from more than 1,200 southern counties.[20] Since conditions across southern counties are plausibly orthogonal to the evolution of political ideology in northern counties (Derenoncourt, 2021), the identifying assumption is likely to hold

[19] Predicting out-migration using southern push factors also assuages the potential concern of serial correlation in migration flows from the same location to the same destination (Jaeger et al., 2018) over time.

[20] As discussed in Bailey et al. (2020), linked sample datasets have some important limitations. First, individuals that are matched using linking-algorithms may be "selected". Second, especially for non-white population, the match rate is low, implying that the migration matrix is quite sparse. For these reasons, we use the linked sample instrument only as a robustness check.

in this case (Borusyak et al., 2021).[21]

Push instruments already reduce concerns about spurious correlation with specific shocks hitting northern counties that both affected local conditions and influenced out-migration across southern states over time. We provide two additional pieces of evidence against this possibility. First, we document that the instrument is uncorrelated with either WWII spending or the generosity of New Deal relief programs – two of the most important pull factors for southerners migrating to northern destinations. Second, similar to Sequeira et al. (2020), we replicate the analysis by separately controlling for a measure of predicted labor demand, constructed by interacting the 1940 industrial county composition with the national growth rate of different industries between 1940 and 1970.

We also show that pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest are not correlated with the instrument. In addition, we interact period dummies with several 1940 county characteristics (e.g., the Black and the urban share of the population, support for the Democratic Party, and the share of employment in manufacturing) and with time-invariant geographic controls (e.g., distance from the Mason-Dixon line, latitude and longitude, distance from the closest city where the Forty-Eighters settled).[22]

These exercises assuage the concern that the characteristics of counties where Black migrants from specific states settled before 1940 may be correlated both with post-1940 Black migration and with changes in support for civil rights in northern counties (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). In particular, controlling for the interaction between the 1940 Black population share and period dummies, as we do in our preferred specification, implies that the instrument only exploits variation in the (southern state) composition of African Americans' enclaves across counties, holding constant the size of their Black populations.

Additional robustness checks are discussed after presenting our main results (Section 5.3), and described in detail in Appendix D.

[21] In Appendix D, we also present standard errors corrected using the procedure from Adao et al. (2019).

[22] Dippel and Heblich (2021) show that the Forty-Eighters – leaders of the failed 1848-1849 German revolution who migrated to the US – had long-lasting and profound effects on support for racial equality. One may thus be worried that distance from cities where the Forty-Eighters settled might be correlated both with enclaves of Black individuals born in southern states that sent more migrants after 1940 and with the evolution of political preferences in the US North and West.

5 Main Results

5.1 Congressional Elections

We start by studying the effects of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. Panel A of Table 2 estimates equation (1) with OLS in columns 1 to 3, and with 2SLS from column 4 onwards. Column 1 only includes state by decade fixed effects, while columns 2 and 3 add interactions between decade dummies and, respectively, the 1940 Black population share and an indicator for Democratic incumbency in 1940. In all cases, the point estimate on the change in the Black population share is positive and statistically significant.

Turning to 2SLS, Panel C shows that the instrument is strong, and the F-stat for weak instruments is always above conventional levels. In our preferred specification – which includes interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and *iii*) an indicator for Democratic incumbency in 1940 – the first stage coefficient implies that one percentage point increase in the predicted Black population share raises the actual Black population share by 0.75 percentage points (column 6).

2SLS estimates confirm OLS results, but are larger in magnitude, especially for our preferred specification (column 6) and when estimating long difference regressions (column 7). According to our preferred specification, one percentage point increase in the Black population share raised the Democratic vote share by 1.88 percentage points, or 4% relative to the 1940 mean. For large recipient counties such as Cook (IL) or Wayne (MI) county, where the Black population share increased by more than 15 percentage points between 1940 and 1970, Black in-migration had the potential to alter the political landscape dramatically. These findings likely reflect a combination of *i*) migrants' direct political engagement, and *ii*) changes in the preferences and voting behavior of existing residents. We return to this point in Section 6 below, when exploring the mechanisms, but we already note that the 2SLS coefficient in column 6 of Panel A is statistically different from 1 at the 5% level.

The difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates indicates that Black migrants selected areas where support for the Republican Party was rising faster. This might have happened because these counties were experiencing faster income growth.[23] Another

[23] Consistent with this idea, in our sample there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the change in the Democratic vote share and a number of proxies for economic growth, such as population growth, population density, and industrial expansion.

possibility, not in contrast with the previous one, is that the IV identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE) for counties that received more Black migrants because of family networks and not because of economic conditions. If Black individuals moving to a specific location due to the presence of networks were more politically engaged relative to economic migrants, this could explain why OLS coefficients are smaller than 2SLS ones.

Panel B of Table 2 estimates the impact of Black in-migration on turnout in Congressional elections. The coefficient in our preferred specification (column 6) is positive and statistically significant, although smaller than for the Democratic vote share. Specifically, our estimates indicate that one percentage point increase in the Black population share raised turnout by around 0.75 percentage points, or 1% relative to its 1940 mean. As for vote shares, OLS coefficients are smaller than 2SLS ones – in this case even negative. The positive effect on turnout is in line with qualitative evidence that Black migrants were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern and western counties (Moon, 1948; Schickler, 2016).

A potential concern with the interpretation of our findings is that Black arrivals induced white residents that opposed the civil rights cause to move (Boustan, 2010). To address this issue, in column 8 of Table 2, we replicate the analysis considering a larger geographic unit, the commuting zone (CZ), which contained both central cities and their suburbs. Reassuringly, the magnitude and the precision of the estimates for the Democratic vote share is unchanged (if anything, the coefficient becomes somewhat larger).[24] In Section 5.3, we summarize additional robustness checks conducted to assuage the concern of (potentially selective) "white flight".

The effects on Democratic vote share are driven primarily by changes in the 1940s and 1960s (Table E.1 in Appendix E.1.1).[25] They are present not only in Congressional, but also in Presidential elections (Appendix E.1.1), though estimated magnitudes are smaller in the latter case, consistent with civil rights support originating primarily from local northern Democrats in contrast to the party's national platform (Schickler, 2016).

[24]The coefficient for turnout remains similar in magnitude, but loses statistical precision.

[25]One interpretation for these patterns is that the economic downturns of the 1950s temporarily halted the progress of race relations, cooling off whites' support for racial equality (Sugrue, 2014). Conducting the analysis separately by decade also assuages concerns raised by the recent econometric literature on the presence of heterogeneous effects in generalized difference-in-differences designs (De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021). We return to this point below (Section 5.3 and Appendix D).

5.2 Ideology Scores and Discharge Petitions

Ideology scores. In Table 3, we consider the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017), which, as noted above, take more negative values for more liberal voting behavior on civil rights bills. Columns 1 to 3 present results for the change in agnostic ideology scores, stacking the data for the 78 (1943-1945) to 82 (1951-1953) and the 82 (1953-1955) to 88 (1963-1965) Congress periods, reporting OLS, 2SLS, and first stage coefficients in Panels A, B, and C respectively. Following Autor et al. (2020), to deal with mean reversion, in addition to the controls included in our preferred specification above, we also add the interaction between period dummies and the baseline ideology score of legislators. The 2SLS coefficient reported in column 1 (Panel B) is negative, but quantitatively small and imprecisely estimated.[26]

When examining results separately by Congress period, a more nuanced picture emerges. Black in-migration had a strong, negative effect on the ideology scores of legislators in the first Congress period (column 2), and a negligible, positive, and not statistically significant effect in the second period (column 3). While the F-stat falls below conventional levels in column 2, suggesting that our estimates should be interpreted with caution, these findings indicate that legislators' ideology moved to the left between Congress 78 and Congress 82, and did not change significantly afterwards.[27] Results are robust to focusing on the constrained version of the ideology scores (columns 4 to 6).

In Appendix E.1.2, we document that the average effects estimated in Table 3 mask rising polarization on racial issues along party lines. Figure E.1 plots 2SLS coefficients for the impact of the Great Migration on the probability of electing a legislator with a given ideology (from most liberal to most conservative), for each of the two Congress periods respectively. During the 1940s (Panel A), Black in-migration had a strong, positive effect on the probability of electing a liberal Democrat, while reducing the probability of electing both moderate Democrats and conservative Republicans. If anything, the probability of electing a moderate Republican increased with Black inflows, even though results are not statistically significant. During the 1950s (Panel B), instead, Black in-migration increased the probability of electing a conservative Re-

[26] As for other tables, the discrepancy between OLS and 2SLS estimates indicates that Black migrants were more likely to move to areas with growing support for Republican, more conservative legislators.

[27] In unreported results, we verify that the level of statistical significance of the coefficient in column 2 of Table 3 is unchanged when using identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals, which are robust to weak identification (Andrews et al., 2019).

publican, while reducing that of electing a moderate Republican. Such rightward shift may have been motivated by strategic considerations, as the GOP tried to win the votes of whites who were becoming increasingly concerned about the racial mixing of their neighborhoods (Sugrue, 2014). The effects of Black in-migration on the probability of electing Democrats with different ideological stances are very small in size and imprecisely estimated. Since results during the 1940s are quantitatively larger than those in the 1950s, on average, legislators' ideology moved to the left. However, when inspecting these dynamics more carefully, polarization becomes evident.

Signatures on discharge petitions. For the analysis of discharge petitions, we focus on the 1940s, when multiple petitions were filed and signed on the same topics – fair employment legislation (FEPC), the poll tax, and anti-lynching legislation – both at the beginning and at the end of the decade. The small number of petitions filed during the 82-88 Congress period does not allow such an analysis for the later period.

We estimate a first difference regression for the 78-82 Congress period, plotting 2SLS coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) in Figure 4. Black in-migration increased the probability of signing a discharge petition on all topics, with the effect being quantitatively larger and more precisely estimated for FEPC legislation than for the other categories.[28] These effects are not driven by Democrats' tendency to sign more discharge petitions on average (see Section 2.2). Estimates in Figure 4 are unchanged when controlling for the average number of discharge petitions signed by legislators in each CD between Congress 78 and Congress 82 (Figure A.10); moreover, Black in-migration has no effect on the change in the probability of signing a discharge petition on non-civil rights topics (column 5 of Table A.6).

5.3 Robustness Checks

5.3.1 Addressing White Flight

We already showed that our findings are unchanged when conducting the analysis at the CZ level (Table 2, column 8), reducing concerns about white flight. In Appendix D, we perform additional exercises, briefly summarized here. First, we replicate the analysis conducted in Boustan (2010), and document that Black in-migration did lead to white

[28]Table A.6 reports the coefficients associated with Figure 4. The change in the probability of signing a petition on FEPC, anti-lynching legislation, and the poll tax is taken over Congresses 81 to 78, 80 to 77, and 79 to 77 respectively. Since petitions on the three topics were not always signed in the same Congress year and were not always comparable with each other (Table C.2), we checked the robustness of our results using alternative time windows. Reassuringly, they always remained similar to those presented in Figure 4.

departures in central cities, but not in counties in our sample (Tables D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4). Since the central city-suburb divide does not overlap with county boundaries, the reallocation of whites between cities and suburbs was likely absorbed within counties. Second, we show that Black inflows were not associated with changes in the composition of white residents and, consistent with Boustan (2009), did not have any impact on whites' labor market outcomes (Tables D.5 and D.6).

5.3.2 Summary of Additional Robustness Checks

Appendix D presents additional robustness checks. First, we verify that results remain unchanged when constructing versions of the instrument that only exploit variation in push factors across southern counties (Tables D.7 and D.8), and that rely on a county-to-county migration matrix to construct the initial shares (Table D.9). Second, we show that the instrument is uncorrelated with two potential pull factors: WWII spending and New Deal relief programs (Table D.10), and we replicate the analysis controlling for predicted industrialization, constructed by exploiting the 1940 industrial composition of non-southern counties (Table D.11). Third, we check that there are no pre-trends in the outcomes (Tables D.12 and D.24). Fourth, we show robustness to interacting period dummies with several 1940 or time-invariant county characteristics, such as county geographic coordinates, distance from the Mason-Dixon line and from the closest city where the Forty-Eighters moved to, the employment to population ratio, and the urban share (Table D.13).

We also verify that results: *i*) are robust to considering an unbalanced sample that includes all county-decade observations for which outcomes are available, excluding potential outliers, estimating alternative specifications, and measuring electoral outcomes in different ways (Tables D.14, D.15, D.16, and D.17); *ii*) are not driven either by the inflow of southern whites (Table D.15) or by the simultaneous entry of news outlets such as television or the radio (Table D.18); *iii*) are robust to accounting for heterogeneous treatment effects in generalized difference-in-differences designs discussed in De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille (2020) and Goodman-Bacon (2021) among others (Tables D.19 and D.20); and, *iv*) are robust to clustering standard errors at the CZ level and to using the procedure suggested in Adao et al. (2019) to adjust standard errors (Tables D.21 and D.22).

Finally, we document that CD-level results: *i*) are unchanged when using different timing conventions (Tables D.25 and D.26); *ii*) are robust to restricting the sample to

CDs that only span the counties from the balanced dataset (Table D.27); and, *iii*) are not influenced by strategic gerrymandering, possibly induced by Black in-migration (Table D.28, Figures D.8 and D.9).

6 Mechanisms

Results in Section 5 show large changes in the political equilibrium as a result of the Great Migration. Here, we investigate in more detail the channels behind these changes. The influx of Black voters with distinct preferences could have driven support for racially progressive Democratic Congress members and exerted pressures on them to promote civil rights legislation. We show that an additional pathway for pressure on politicians was the growth of civil rights organizations and grassroots activism in northern in-migration areas.

Next, we explore the reactions of the white electorate. White voters might have responded to Black in-migration with backlash against policies promoting racial equality. Findings in this section suggest the opposite: the Great Migration increased support for civil rights among whites. We provide evidence that the salience of southern conditions in northern counties and the role of the labor movement and progressive Democrats are two important pathways for this effect.

6.1 Black Organizations and Pro-Civil Rights Activism

In a seminal contribution, McAdam (1982) stresses the importance of Black organizations in the development of the civil rights movement. McAdam's argument focuses on the South, but northern destinations of Black migrants also became centers of organized activism. The growth of the Black population raised the number of grassroots civil rights groups and promoted denser activist networks. These organizations' targets were primarily local, protesting discrimination in employment, schools and local politics in cities like New York, Detroit, and Philadelphia (Biondi, 2021; Countryman, 2007). Despite their local nature, such events played a critical role in escalating the battle for equality to the national level (Theoharis and Woodard, 2016). Black churches, the institutional center of the civil rights movement in the South (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1986), also played a similar role in northern migrant destinations. Examples include Harlem's Abyssinian Baptist Church, led by Adam Clayton Powell Jr., a prominent civil rights figure and the first African American to represent New York in Congress.

Besides the density of migrant networks, the experience of migration, the distance from the oppressive South, and the newfound sense of political efficacy gave northern Black organizations greater militancy. Describing Black communities in the US North, Bloom (2019) writes that these were "independent of whites, aggressive, and insistent upon equality, and had cast off the sense of black inferiority. These new behavioral characteristics blossomed as they became independent of white domination and developed some measure of organization, including the growth of the NAACP."

Our own data provides direct causal evidence for the effect of the Great Migration on the growth of Black social movements. In Table 4, we focus on the 1940-1960 change in the probability that a county had a NAACP chapter in place, presenting OLS and 2SLS estimates in column 1 and in columns 2-3, respectively.[29] 2SLS results indicate that Black in-migration had no effect on the presence of the NAACP (column 2). However, the impact of Black inflows becomes positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively relevant for counties that did not have a chapter in 1940 (column 3).[30] This pattern is consistent with the idea that the Great Migration favored the geographic expansion of the NAACP (see also Figure A.2). The data do not allow us to capture the effects of Black in-migration on the change in the number of NAACP members. Thus, we are likely under-estimating the impact that the Great Migration had on the overall growth of the NAACP.

In the remainder of Table 4, we turn to the frequency of protests organized by CORE in support of civil rights. The key regressor of interest is the decadal change in the Black population share. We replicate our preferred specification using OLS and 2SLS in columns 4 and 5, respectively. Black in-migration strongly affected protest activity, with one percentage point increase in the Black population share leading to a 5.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of protests. CORE was created in 1942, and the frequency of events in our sample of counties between 1942 and 1944 (included) was 0.09. Our estimates thus imply that one percentage point increase in the Black population share raised CORE demonstrations by more than 60% relative to their pre-1945 values. Another way to gauge the magnitude of these estimates is to consider that the average change in the probability of CORE-led protests in our sample is 0.138. Hence, one percentage point increase in the Black population share explains more than one third of the change in pro-civil rights demonstrations across non-southern counties

[29] As noted above, data on NAACP chapters are only available for 1940 (or earlier) and 1960.

[30] In column 3, the F-stat falls below conventional levels, but statistical precision is unchanged when using identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals.

between 1940 and 1970. We refer the interested reader to Appendix E.2, where we use information on the cause and the target of the protest to analyze the heterogeneity of results across type of events (Figures E.2-E.3 and Table E.3). These results reveal the local nature of civil rights organizing in the North, with demonstrations protesting access to goods, education and housing.

6.2 White Political Preferences and Racial Attitudes

Quantifying white voting behavior. Table 2 shows that Black in-migration increased the Democratic vote share by more than one for one, pointing to the importance of changes in northern residents' voting patterns. Said differently, the increase in the Democratic vote share documented in Section 5.1 cannot be explained by the inflow of Black migrants alone. Because not all Black eligible voters were voting in 1940, and not all of those who voted cast their votes for the Democratic Party, at least some of the potential switchers were African American. To understand whether party switching came exclusively from Black voters, we perform a back of the envelope calculation of the number of white voters who needed to switch for every Black migrant in order to match our preferred 2SLS estimates. In a nutshell, our exercise relies on the best available estimates of voting behavior of both races in 1940, and estimates the number of whites who would have to switch to the Democratic Party for different scenarios of Black voting behavior in 1960.

To quantify the role of white voters, one would need disaggregated data on voting behavior by race, which is not systematically available for this historical period.[31] We rely instead on estimates of Black voting patterns from areas of selected cities whose residents were disproportionately Black. The most comprehensive study that we could retrieve is Glantz (1960). The author focuses on census tracts of eight northern cities (Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, New York City, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis) whose population was at least 90% African American. Matching demographic information with voting and registration records for these census tracts, Glantz (1960) estimates voting behavior among Black residents in the Presidential elections of 1948, 1952, and 1956.

Before detailing how we use these estimates to compute the number of white switch-

[31] The Current Population Survey (CPS) voting and registration supplements are available only starting from 1976. See also https://cps.ipums.org/cps/codebooks.shtml#voter_codebooks. Historical surveys, such as the ANES or Gallup are not well suited to estimate Black political participation because of the limited (and possibly selected) sample.

ers, a few remarks are in order. First, the estimates are obtained from eight large cities, and may thus not be fully representative of our sample. Nonetheless, given that most Black migrants moved to industrial centers, the setting considered in Glantz (1960) is likely not very different from the average county in our context. Moreover, the numbers from Glantz (1960) are similar to those obtained in different studies, for a different period and a different sample of cities (Bositis, 2012; Moon, 1957). Second, Glantz (1960) focuses on Presidential, rather than Congressional, elections. Since Black voters were more likely to support the Democratic Party in Congressional elections (see Section 2.2), we should if anything over- (resp. under-) estimate the number of potential Black (resp. white) switchers. Third, Glantz (1960) is silent about the behavior of Black migrants. We assume that the latter behaved in the same way as northern Black residents. Given historical evidence that Black migrants were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern cities (Moon, 1948), this assumption is relatively innocuous.

With these caveats in mind, we proceed as follows. We begin by relying on the 1948 estimates from Glantz (1960) to fix turnout and number of votes cast for Democrats among Black northerners in 1940. These numbers are 42.48% and 74.46% for turnout and Democratic support, respectively. Next, we calculate the total number of votes for the Democratic Party for the average county in our sample in 1940, and use that to back out turnout and total votes cast for the Democrats among white northerners. Having fixed voting behavior by race in 1940, we compute the number of new votes for the Democrats implied by one percentage point increase in the Black population share according to the 2SLS estimate of our preferred specification (1.885). Finally, we ask how many white votes are needed to match that number, under different assumptions about Black voters' behavior.[32] We compute the total number of white switchers as the difference between the implied number of votes cast for the Democrats by white northerners and the counterfactual number of votes that whites would have cast based on their 1940 turnout and Democratic support.

Results are reported in Figure 5, which plots the Democratic vote share and turnout among Black northerners on the x- and y-axes, respectively. Contour lines depict the implied number of white switchers per 10 Black migrants needed to match our estimate of the effect of Black migration for different values of each of these two components of

[32]For the average county, one percentage point increase in the Black population share corresponds to 654 individuals – or, 206 new votes for Democrats, and 72 for Republicans (remember that not all Black migrants were eligible to vote; and not all eligible voters did vote).

Black voting behavior. For a given level of Democratic support, higher turnout among Black eligible voters reduces the number of whites needed to switch to Democrats to explain our estimate; similarly, the number of white switchers is decreasing in the Democratic vote share among Black Americans, for given Black turnout. The figure also makes it clear that, for a large range of values of Black voting behavior, the number of white switchers implied is positive. Only for very large values of the parameters, there are no white switchers or whites move in the opposite direction, i.e., from the Democratic to the Republican Party. These scenarios correspond to the area above the black contour line in the top-right part of Figure 5.

To benchmark plausible scenarios for Black voting behavior in 1960, we turn to the estimates obtained in Glantz (1960). The red cross marks the values of turnout and Democratic vote share estimated among Black northerners in 1956. According to these estimates, the implied number of white northern residents who would have to switch to the Democrats in 1960 in order to match the estimated effect of the increase in the Black population is 7 (per 10 Black migrants). Since Glantz's calculation rests on several assumptions, the exact number should be taken as approximate. Nonetheless, this exercise suggests that the effects of the Great Migration on the northern political equilibrium did not come from Black voters alone. Indeed, the values of Democratic support and turnout among Black voters that would prevail in a scenario without white switchers, or with white voters increasing their support for the GOP, are an order of magnitude larger than those estimated in Glantz (1960) and in other works in the historical literature (Bositis, 2012; Moon, 1957).

Evidence from historical survey data. We complement the previous results with historical survey data from the ANES, which records individual-level responses and the respondent's race. We are unable to conduct a county-level analysis because of the limited number of counties and of respondents per county included in the survey (see Appendix C). We instead perform this exercise at the state level. Since questions on racial views are available only from the end of the 1950s, we estimate cross-sectional regressions, correlating whites' racial attitudes and political preferences in surveys conducted in years close to the CRA with the (instrumented) 1940-1960 change in the Black population share in their state of residence.[33] We include survey year and Census region

[33] Although some of these questions were asked also after 1964, we refrain from using any post-CRA survey because of the potential effect of the bill on whites' racial attitudes (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Wheaton, 2020). In Appendix E.5, however, we document that the effects of the Great Migration on whites' racial attitudes were long-lasting.

fixed effects and a set of 1940 state (manufacturing share, urban share, share of unionized workers, Black population share, and an indicator for Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections) and individual (gender, marital status, and fixed effects for both age and education) controls.[34] We restrict attention to white respondents living in non-southern states. To deal with the potential concern that white respondents may have moved across states because of Black in-migration, we further restrict attention to whites living in their state of birth.

In Table 5, the dependent variable is the feeling thermometer of white respondents towards African Americans, the NAACP, and the Democratic Party in columns 1 to 3 respectively.[35] Confirming the OLS regressions plotted in Figure 1, white respondents living in states that received more African Americans between 1940 and 1960 expressed warmer feelings towards Blacks. The magnitude is substantive: one percentage point difference across states in the change in the Black population share implies a 3.3 percentage point (or 5% relative to the mean) difference in respondents' thermometers. Similar results obtain for feelings towards the NAACP. Black in-migration is also positively associated with feeling thermometers towards the Democratic Party, even though coefficients are smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated.

In column 4, the outcome is a dummy equal to one if support for civil rights was considered by respondents as one of the most important problems for the country in 1960 and 1964. Since this variable is positively correlated with the Black thermometer, we interpret it as a proxy for whites' support for civil rights. Black in-migration significantly increases the probability that respondents consider civil rights one of the country's most important problems. The coefficient implies that one percentage point increase in the Black population share between 1940 and 1960 is associated with a 3.4 percentage points (or, 30% higher probability) of reporting civil rights as the most important problem in the two ANES surveys asked before the CRA.

Finally, we consider whites' political preferences. Black in-migration increases support for the Democratic party among white respondents (column 5). The relationship is an order of magnitude stronger when restricting attention to 1964 (column 6), consistent with civil rights being a more prominent issue during the year that led to the

[34]Since party identification may be endogenous to Black inflows, we do not include it in our baseline specification. Adding this control, as well as union membership, does not change any of our results. Results are also robust to including further 1940 state level controls such as the share of immigrants, the share of unskilled workers, and other socioeconomic or political variables.

[35]Since feeling thermometers towards African Americans and other racial organizations were not asked before 1964, we restrict attention to this year. Thermometers range from 0 to 100, with higher numbers reflecting more positive attitudes.

passage of the CRA. Appendix E.3.1 verifies that similar patterns hold when using data from Gallup (Table E.4).

Evidence from protests. The evidence on whites' attitudes and policy preferences from the ANES is consistent with findings on whites' behavior. Returning to CORE demonstrations, we restrict attention to a subset of protests for which the race of participants can be identified. Column 6 of Table 4 replicates column 5 using as dependent variable the change in the probability of CORE protests with both Black *and* white participants. This represents a (very conservative) lower-bound for the probability that whites joined pro-civil rights demonstrations, since participants' race was reported only for approximately 40% of CORE events, and we define a protest as having white participants only when their presence was explicitly reported. The point estimate is smaller than that of the baseline specification (column 5), but remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result is evidence for greater direct involvement of whites in the civil rights movement in Great Migration destinations, likely facilitated by the growth in the density and organizational capacity of Black organizations in those locations.

6.3 What Can Explain Whites' Support for Civil Rights?

Multiple mechanisms can explain why Black in-migration shifted some whites' political preferences and racial attitudes. We explore two prominent explanations identified by prior literature: increased awareness of Black oppression in the South (Myrdal, 1944), and the formation of a class-based cross-race coalition between white and Black members of the working class (Adams, 1966; Sugrue, 2008).

It is worth pointing out that we are unable to quantify the relative importance of each mechanism, both because it is hard to measure them in isolation and because economic and social factors likely interacted, reinforcing each other. For instance, frequent contacts in an environment where Black and white workers had common goals and shared a common class identity may have reduced some of the barriers that traditionally inhibited the formation of a racially diverse coalition (Allport, 1954; Bonomi et al., 2021).

Evidence on information transmission. We begin by testing Myrdal's hypothesis on the role of information. We use a list of known lynchings against African Americans between 1940 and 1964 in the US South, compiled from the Monroe Works Today

project.[36] We searched for mentions of these episodes in non-southern newspapers available on the website Newspapers.com. We identify a lynching using the joint mention of the name and surname of the victim and the place where the lynching occurred in the same newspaper page. We restrict attention to a window of 4 weeks before and 26 weeks after each episode, and focus on the subsample of 492 counties for which newspaper data is available.[37] Our dataset comprises a total of 1,041 newspapers, only 5 of which explicitly targeted an African American audience. In what follows, we consider all newspapers, but results are unchanged when excluding from our sample the 5 African American ones.

We organize the data at the (northern) county-week-episode level, defining as "week 0" the week in which the lynching occurred (in a southern state). We create an indicator variable if, in a given week, at least one mention of the lynching was found in a county's local newspapers. Focusing on weeks 0 to 26, we regress this indicator against the instrumented 1940-1960 change in the Black population share in the county. We include state, episode, and week fixed effects.[38] Results from this exercise are reported in Table 6.

Column 1 considers any lynching that occurred between 1940 and 1964. In the weeks following the lynching of a southern Black victim, local newspapers of northern counties were more likely to report the episode in areas that had received more African Americans between 1940 and 1964. No effect is present for lynchings that occurred between 1940 and 1944 (column 2). This indicates that Black in-migration, and not other county-specific characteristics, increased the probability that a southern lynching was reported in a northern newspaper. Consistent with an information transmission mechanism driven by migration, columns 3 to 5 show that the coefficient on the change in the Black population share becomes larger as we focus on lynchings that happened in later years.

We next explore the dynamics behind the patterns just described in an event-study

[36] See also https://plaintalkhistory.com/monroeandflorencework/explore/map2-credits.html.

[37] Table A.7 compares the characteristics of the full sample and the counties in the "newspapers' sample". Not surprisingly, counties in the newspapers' sample had a higher total population, a higher Black population share, and were more likely to be urban in 1940. They also experienced a slightly larger increase in their (actual and predicted) Black population share. However, reassuringly, the Democratic vote share and turnout – both in 1940 levels and in changes – are remarkably similar between the two sets of counties. Table A.8 verifies that our main results are unchanged when focusing on the sample of counties for which local newspapers could be located.

[38] Since the regressor of interest is defined at the county level, we cannot include county fixed effects. As in the main analysis, regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

design. In Table 7, we consider a window of 4 weeks before and up to 26 weeks after a lynching, and interact the change in the Black population share with an indicator equal to one for weeks after the lynching. We control for a full battery of county, episode, and week by state fixed effects.[39] Panel A focuses on the 1940-1960 change in the Black population share. Mentions of a lynching increase significantly when considering years after 1945 (column 3), and the pattern becomes stronger for episodes that occurred later (columns 4 to 6). As before, Black in-migration has no effect on mentions of lynchings that happened between 1940-1944 (column 2). Panel B confirms results of Panel A focusing on the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black population share in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6). Figure 6 visually displays the dynamics, zooming in on the 12 weeks around the event – 4 weeks before and 8 weeks afterwards. There is no relationship between the mention of a lynching and the change in the Black population share in the weeks before the event. The effect of Black in-migration jumps on the week of the lynching, and then gradually fades away, persisting for at least one month after the event.

Consistent with an information transmission mechanism, the effect of Black in-migration on the probability of a lynching being mentioned in a northern county is larger when that lynching happened in the predicted southern origin of the county's Black migrants (Table A.9).

Appendix D.8 shows that these results are not driven by outliers and hold when replicating the analysis separately for each lynching, verifying robustness to possible treatment effect heterogeneity in the case of two-way fixed effects estimation (De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021). Appendix D.8 also documents that newspaper mentions of lynchings are not correlated with other trends in media markets, and remain unchanged when controlling for TV penetration and radio connectivity.

Evidence on cross-race political coalition. As discussed in Section 2.2, starting in the late 1930s, labor unions led by the CIO became a crucial ally to African Americans' struggle for equality. The labor movement coordinated with the NAACP and other Black organizations on a joint agenda of civil rights and progressive economic policy (Schickler, 2016). To explore the role of the labor movement, we split counties above and below the median of different proxies for the presence and strength of organized labor, or for its incentives to align with Black voters. We report results in Figure

[39] County (resp. state by week) fixed effects absorb the main effect of the change in the Black population share (resp. the post-event dummy).

7 and Table A.10, always defining the variables so that higher values refer to stronger presence of, or incentives for, unions to support the civil rights movement.

The surge in civil rights protests was concentrated in counties with a higher share of white workers in manufacturing – the sector where unions were most widespread (Bailer, 1944; Farber et al., 2021). In line with these results, the effects of the Great Migration were stronger, although not statistically different, in counties belonging to states where CIO membership rates were higher.[40] Pro-civil rights protests were also more frequent where political competition – defined as one minus the absolute value of the margin of victory in 1940 Congressional elections – was higher. This finding is consistent with labor unions (and the Democratic Party) having stronger incentives to coordinate events where the Black vote was more valuable. Precisely in these areas, a better organized political machine could have made a difference in attracting and mobilizing pivotal, Black and white, voters (McAdam, 1982).

Labor unions, and white workers more generally, should have supported racial equality more when labor markets were tighter. Indeed, inter-group contact is more likely to lead to cooperation when it happens in contexts with no competition over scarce resources (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967).[41] Consistent with this idea, Black in-migration led to more demonstrations only where predicted labor demand was stronger. Instead, when predicted labor demand was low, Black inflows significantly reduced the probability of pro-civil rights demonstrations.[42] These findings are in line with anecdotal accounts noting that backlash was more likely to emerge during economic downturns (Bailer, 1943; Sugrue, 2014). They also accord with the electoral results discussed in Appendix E.1.1 (Table E.1), which document that the Great Migration had no effect on the Democratic vote share in the 1950s – a decade characterized by slack labor markets and economic recession.

Individual-level data from the ANES also support the idea of a cross-race coalition in which organized labor played a crucial role. In Figure E.4, we replicate the analysis of Table 5 (column 4), examining the effects of Black in-migration on perceptions of civil rights as the most fundamental issue facing the country, for different groups of respondents. The relationship is stronger among union members and self-identified

[40]CIO membership rates are not available at the county level in a systematic way. We thus rely on 1939 state-level CIO membership from Troy (1957).

[41]Several papers document that anti-minority sentiments are more likely to arise during times of hardship (Grosfeld et al., 2020; Oster, 2004; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012).

[42]We predict labor demand using a Bartik-style approach, interacting 1940 industry shares at the county level with national growth rates of each industry in each subsequent decade.

Democrats. The opposite is true for self-identified Republicans. We note that party identification is endogenous; nonetheless, these patterns confirm the existence of a class-based alliance. Consistent with results on the behavior of Congress members, they also indicate that Black inflows might have increased polarization on racial issues within the northern electorate.

Additional mechanisms. Other complementary mechanisms could explain the effect of the Great Migration on support for civil rights in the North. First, news outlets such as the TV and the radio may have amplified the information channel documented above. Data availability allowed us to measure information diffusion on lynchings using newspapers. It is likely that similar dynamics were at play in radio and TV programs. Our results are not confounded by these processes (Table D.23 and Figures D.6 and D.7), but they may represent a lower bound of information effects, as various news outlets likely complemented each other, reinforcing the effects of the Great Migration.

Second, and consistent with a channel of information diffusion, it is possible that southern Black leaders strategically organized events in the South to attract attention of northern residents in migration destination counties. Studying this additional force goes beyond the scope of our paper. Such strategic activism by Black leaders is, however, entirely consistent with our results on media reporting of southern lynchings.

A third potential mechanism is selective sorting of white residents, correlated with patterns of Black migration. This does not only encompass white flight in direct response to Black arrivals, but also other migration patterns; for instance, the spread of air conditioning during the 1960s made the South a more attractive destination for older white residents, who may have held more conservative racial attitudes (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008). Various tests indicate that such patterns are unlikely to be correlated with movements of Black Southerners to the North and West (column 8 of Table 2 and analyses in Appendix D).[43]

Several of the above channels, like the spread of the TV and strategic organizing by Black activists, could have promoted support for civil rights in the North even in the absence of the Great Migration. Our research design does not allow us to assess the relative importance of the Great Migration relative to these other factors; we do not claim it was the single, or even the most important, determinant of northern racial attitudes. Nonetheless, our analysis shows that the Great Migration had a significant and quantitatively large effect on the northern political and social equilibrium, both

[43] ANES analyses are conducted at the state level, further reducing the plausibility of a sorting mechanism.

directly, by changing the composition of the electorate, and indirectly, by influencing the views of white northern residents.

6.4 Heterogeneity and Long Run Effects

Heterogeneity in whites' responses. Which northern white residents were most likely to support civil rights in in-migration counties? The salience of racial violence in the South might have been more impactful for northerners with pre-existing liberal tendencies. To test this idea, we split the sample above and below the median of different proxies for progressive attitudes in the local electorate. We report results in Figure A.11, rescaling the variables so that higher values refer to socially more progressive counties.[44]

Results are an order of magnitude larger in counties with lower historical discrimination, as proxied by a discrimination index constructed in Qian and Tabellini (2020). The index combines historical data from a variety of sources, such as local presence of the KKK and the lynching of Black Americans up to 1939. The same pattern, though less pronounced, is evident when splitting counties as belonging to states with (blue bars) and without (orange bars) miscegenation laws (Dahis et al., 2020). Civil rights protests also increased more in counties located closer to a destination of German political migrants of the failed 1848 revolutions. Dippel and Heblich (2021) show that the presence of the "Forty-Eighters" was associated with stronger support for racial equality.

Our findings do not necessarily imply that all white residents welcomed Black migrants into their neighborhoods. Both existing work (Boustan, 2010) and our own analysis (Table D.3) indicate that the Great Migration increased within-county racial segregation as whites exerted more effort to avoid sharing public goods with Black Americans (Alesina et al., 1999). At the same time, segregation responses might have been compatible with support for civil rights. For one, civil rights legislation was, at least until 1965, a matter that affected mostly the US South. Additionally, increased segregation may itself have helped defuse whites' animosity caused by Black migration into white neighborhoods.

Appendix E.4 provides evidence consistent with the latter conjecture (Table E.6).

[44] Formal 2SLS estimates are reported in Table A.10. In a few instances, the F-stat falls below conventional levels. Reassuringly, the level of significance presented in the table is consistent with that derived using identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals, which are reported in the case of weak instrument as suggested in Andrews et al. (2019).

First, Black in-migration increased the frequency of CORE demonstrations only in counties with higher 1940 residential segregation. That is, support for civil rights increased more in counties where inter-group contact in the housing market was lower. Second, in line with results in Alesina et al. (2004), Black inflows led to the creation of more school districts in counties where residential segregation was higher. One interpretation of these patterns, consistent with historical evidence (Sugrue, 2008), is that population sorting within counties and the creation of independent jurisdictions might have reduced potential backlash by allowing whites to live in racially homogeneous communities, where the probability of sharing public goods with Black Americans was low. This, in turn, could have facilitated support for civil rights as a national-level policy issue, and progressive voting motivated by abstract principles of racial equality.

Persistence of whites' racial attitudes. An important question is whether the short run patterns documented above persisted over time, resulting in a permanent shift in whites' racial attitudes. To examine this possibility, we rely on survey and racially motivated hate crime data for the more recent period at the county level. To save space, this discussion is extensively presented in Appendix E.5, but we briefly summarize the key findings here. First, relying on survey questions asked in the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES) between 2008 and 2018, we document that white respondents living in counties that received more African Americans during the Great Migration (measured as the 1940 to 1970 change in the Black population share of the county population) are more supportive of affirmative action and express lower racial resentment (Table E.7). Second, using data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, we find that higher Black in-migration between 1940 and 1970 reduces hate crimes against African Americans after 2000 (Tables E.8 and E.9). This relationship is largely driven by a lower number of hate crimes against African Americans committed by white perpetrators, and it is absent for racially motivated hate crimes against non-minority groups (Table E.10).

These results are consistent with findings in Bursztyn et al. (2021) for attitudes towards Muslim immigrants across US counties in the long run. Examining the mechanisms of persistence – including intergenerational transmission of preferences, horizontal social spillovers, and geographic sorting over the long run – goes beyond the scope of this paper. We leave these fascinating questions for future research.

7 Conclusions

The Great Migration was one of the largest episodes of internal migration in American history. Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million Black Americans left the US South for northern and western destinations. During this same period, the civil rights movement struggled and eventually succeeded in eliminating institutionalized discrimination and formal impediments to Black political participation. In this paper, we show that these two phenomena are causally linked.

Using a shift-share instrument, we find that Black in-migration increased the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections and favored the election of legislators who were more likely to promote a civil rights agenda outside the US South. An important mechanism identified in our work is the growth of Black organizations, which increasingly mobilized not only Black but also white residents. We provide further direct and indirect evidence for the mobilization of white northerners. We identify the diffusion of information on Black Americans' oppression in the South and cross-race political alliances with roots in the New Deal coalition as important channels driving progress towards racial equality in the northern United States.

When contrasted with other works on the political effects of migration, our results raise an intriguing set of questions. Under what conditions can migration and inter-group contact more broadly lead to the formation of cross-group coalitions? When, instead, is backlash from original residents more likely to prevail? In the specific context of the Great Migration and of the civil rights movement, our evidence suggests that cross-race cooperation can emerge when individuals belonging to different groups share similar goals and identities (in this context, class-based), and when information about discrimination becomes available to majority group members, particularly those already more open to diversity.

At the same time, for such cooperation to be sustained, inter-group competition and conflict over resources cannot be too large. Civil rights before 1965 was a national-level issue with direct ramifications mainly for the South. This likely facilitated support for racial equality among northern whites who were not materially affected. Our analysis also indicates higher support for civil rights in time periods and counties with better economic conditions. Taken together, these results support the conclusions of an emerging literature, which shows that context is an important determinant of the effects of inter-group contact on cross-group relations and attitudes (Bazzi et al., 2019; Lowe, 2021; Rao, 2019; Steinmayr, 2020).

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Great Migration and Northern Whites' Attitudes

(a) Most Important Issue: Civil Rights

(b) Thermometer: Blacks



(c) Thermometer: NAACP

(d) Thermometer: CORE



Notes: Each panel plots the relationship between the 1940 to 1960 change in the Black population across non-southern US states and racial attitudes of white ANES respondents in 1964. The underlying OLS regressions partial out Census divisions dummies, the 1940-1960 change in state population, individual characteristics of survey respondents, and 1940 state-level socio-economic controls. Individual controls include: age, gender, educational attainment, and marital status. State-level controls include: Black population share, Democratic incumbency, share in manufacturing, share of workers in the CIO, and urban share. *Source:* ANES Cumulative File (2015).

Figure 2. Change in Black Population Share, 1940 to 1970



Notes: The map plots the 1940 to 1970 change in the Black population share for the non-southern counties (1,263) in our sample. *Source:* Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure 3. Discharge Petitions on Civil Rights Signed by Non-Southern Legislators



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of non-southern Democratic (resp. Republican) members of Congress signing discharge petitions in favor of civil rights bills between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 88 (1963-1965). The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 Congress periods, while the remaining bars display results for each of the two Congress periods separately. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. *Source:* adapted from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

Figure 4. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the 1940-1950 change in the Black population share on the corresponding change in the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator. The first dot on the left ("All") includes discharge petitions on employment protection legislation (FEPC), to promote anti-lynching legislation, and to abolish the poll tax. The three remaining dots refer to each of the three issues. Results and details of the specification are reported in Table A.6.

Figure 5. Estimates on the Behavior of White Voters



Notes: The figure plots the number northern white residents who would have to start voting for the Democratic Party per 10 Black migrants, given turnout and Democratic vote share among non-southern Black residents. The solid line in black indicates combinations of turnout and Democratic vote share among non-southern Black residents that are associated with 0 white switchers. The red cross indicates the number of white switchers corresponding to the preferred scenario indicated in Glantz (1960).

Figure 6. Newspapers – Event Study



Notes: The figure plots 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% intervals) on the 1940-1960 change in the Black population share in county-week level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if any mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in newspapers of the (non-southern) county in each week. Week 0 refers to the week when the lynching occurred. See the main text for more details. All regressions control for state and lynching episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure 7. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics – Political and Economic Forces



Notes: The bars report the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in the Black population share for the change in the probability of CORE demonstrations for counties with each 1940 variable above (resp. below) the sample median in dark (resp. light) grey. Section 6.3 describes how each variable is constructed. Coefficients and standard errors reported in Table A.10.

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: 1940 levels						
Black Share (County)	3.60	2.10	0.04	0	46.50	1,263
Black Share (CD)	6.80	7.20	0.047	0	25.40	285
Democratic Vote Share	46.55	49.00	12.91	0	85.00	1,263
Turnout	69.39	69.60	8.29	23.00	97.90	1,263
Civil Rights Scores	-0.87	-0.81	0.71	-2.01	1.43	285
Panel B: Changes						
Black Share (County)	1.78	0.72	2.53	-11.88	12.79	3,789
Black Share (CD)	5.25	5.58	2.81	-1.26	12.86	570
Democratic Vote Share	1.53	0.67	11.11	-67.19	72.80	3,789
Turnout	-6.49	-13.50	17.06	-64.30	43.00	3,789
Civil Rights Scores	0.07	0	0.71	-2.91	1.95	570

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the list of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. When relevant, county variables are collapsed at the Congressional District level, fixing boundaries to Congress 78 (1943-1945) as explained in the text. Democratic vote share and turnout refer to Congressional elections, and civil rights scores are the agnostic ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017). Panel A presents 1940 values (except for ideology scores, which refer to Congress 78, 1943-1945), while Panel B reports decadal changes for each of the variables.

Table 2. Congressional Elections

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS	(8) 2SLS
Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share (1940 mean: 46.55)								
Change Black Share	0.537*** (0.108)	0.538*** (0.124)	0.611*** (0.146)	0.712*** (0.162)	1.255*** (0.277)	1.885*** (0.439)	1.938*** (0.464)	2.015*** (0.626)
Panel B: Change in Turnout (1940 mean: 69.39)								
Change Black Share	-0.274** (0.121)	-0.298*** (0.112)	-0.293*** (0.109)	0.094 (0.187)	0.399* (0.235)	0.756** (0.348)	0.809** (0.356)	0.665 (0.459)
Panel C: First stage								
Predicted Change Black Share				0.976*** (0.261)	1.002*** (0.260)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.803*** (0.249)	0.859*** (0.283)
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD	FD
Unit	County	County	County	County	County	County	County	CZ
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X	X
F-Stat				13.95	14.88	10.57	10.42	9.21
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	1,263	1,200

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table reports stacked first difference regressions in columns 1 to 6, and long difference regressions in column 7. Column 8 replicates column 6 by aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in Panel A (resp. Panel B). Panel C reports the first stage associated with 2SLS regressions. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and state dummies. 1940 Black share (resp. 1940 Dem Incumbent) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black population share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. In column 8, controls and clustered standard errors are at the CZ level. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table 3. Changes in Legislators' Ideology

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower Values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: OLS						
Change Black Share	0.008	-0.139***	0.049**	0.002	-0.150***	0.044**
	(0.014)	(0.036)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.041)	(0.022)
Panel B: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	-0.051	-0.300***	0.046	-0.054	-0.337***	0.058
	(0.039)	(0.116)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.124)	(0.059)
Panel C: First stage						
Predicted Change	1.570***	1.054***	1.944***	1.553***	1.050***	1.917***
Black Share	(0.438)	(0.377)	(0.557)	(0.442)	(0.377)	(0.564)
F-Stat	12.87	7.814	12.19	12.35	7.770	11.57
Observations	570	285	285	570	285	285
Congress Period	78-82; 82-88	78-82	82-88	78-82; 82-88	78-82	82-88

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower values of the score refer to more liberal ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress period 78-82 and 82-88). See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. Panel A reports OLS results and Panel B reports 2SLS results, while Panels C presents first stage estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the ideology score in the district in Congress 78. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 4. NAACP Chapters and CORE Demonstrations

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	1[NAACP Chapter]			1[CORE Demonstrations]		
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Panel A: Main Estimates						
Change Black Share	-0.022**	-0.029	0.070**	0.025***	0.057***	0.033**
	(0.008)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share		0.780***	0.624**		0.758***	0.758***
		(0.231)	(0.247)		(0.233)	(0.233)
F-stat		11.41	6.392		10.57	10.57
Observations	1,263	1,263	1,069	3,789	3,789	3,789
No NAACP in 1940			X			
White Participants						X

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the presence of NAACP chapters (columns 1-3) and the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE (columns 4-6). Column 3 restricts attention to counties with no NAACP chapter in 1940. Column 6 defines the dependent variable as a dummy equal to one only for demonstrations that were joined by at least some white participants. The main regressor of interest is the 1940-1960 (resp. decadal) change in the Black population share in columns 1-3 (resp. columns 4-6), which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 5. Whites' Attitude from the ANES

Dependent Variable	Feeling Thermometer Towards			MIP	1[Vote]	
	Blacks	NAACP	Democrats	Civil Rights	Democratic	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 2SLS						
Change Black Share	3.262***	2.821**	1.895*	0.034**	0.039***	0.080***
	(1.169)	(1.404)	(1.041)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.015)
Panel B. First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	2.609***	2.763***	2.611***	2.748***	2.845***	2.490***
	(0.415)	(0.458)	(0.416)	(0.439)	(0.436)	(0.392)
F-stat	39.57	36.47	39.36	39.20	42.63	40.28
Observations	561	453	562	927	1,648	402
Mean Dependent Variable	62.37	54.93	68.91	0.111	0.490	0.602

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North, and residing in their state of birth. All columns, except columns 4 and 5, refer to 1964 only. Columns 4 and 5 include respondents interviewed in survey waves: 1960 and 1964; and 1956 to 1964, respectively. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is the feeling thermometer towards each group at the top of the corresponding column. Higher values of the thermometer refer to warmer feelings. In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports that supporting civil rights is among the most important issues facing the country at the time of the interview. See Appendix C for exact wording and additional details on the construction of the variable. In columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted (resp. intended to vote) for the Democratic Party in the previous (resp. upcoming) election. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 change in the Black population share in the state, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black population share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). Columns 4 and 5 include survey year fixed effects. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 6. Evidence from Northern Newspapers: Cross-sectional Regressions

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Main Estimates					
Change Black Share	0.253**	0.135	0.348**	0.532**	0.677**
	(0.128)	(0.086)	(0.163)	(0.235)	(0.301)
Panel B: First Stage					
Predicted Change	1.071***	1.032***	1.098***	1.093***	1.081***
Black Share	(0.289)	(0.287)	(0.291)	(0.291)	(0.289)
F-stat	13.76	12.95	14.26	14.08	13.96
Observations	311,803	141,332	170,471	79,721	59,665
State FE	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X
Week FE	X	X	X	X	X
Sample	1940+	1940-1944	1945+	1950+	1955+

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 492 counties in our sample for which newspapers' data are available. The table reports county-week-episode level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in the local newspapers of the county in each week from 0 to 26. Week 0 is defined as the week in which the lynching occurred. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 change in the Black population share in the county, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include state, week, and episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. The last row of the table indicates the sample of lynchings considered. When the last year is not specified, it corresponds to 1964 (included). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 7. Evidence from Northern Newspapers: Event-Study Design

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1940-1960 Change in Black Share						
Change Black Share * POST	0.237*	0.113	0.325**	0.476**	0.691**	1.050***
	(0.126)	(0.085)	(0.162)	(0.228)	(0.306)	(0.262)
F-stat	13.61	12.76	14.04	13.78	13.5	12.87
Observations	357,979	162,303	195,671	91,544	68,520	22,047
Events	1940+	1940-1944	1945+	1950+	1955+	1960+
Panel B. Decadal Changes in Black Share						
Change Black Share * POST	0.248	0.764**	1.127**	0.262	1.194*	1.825***
	(0.161)	(0.317)	(0.447)	(0.189)	(0.625)	(0.534)
F-stat	20.96	22.95	22.51	8.433	8.624	8.227
Observations	162,303	195,671	91,544	266,429	68,520	22,047
Change Black share	1940-1950	1940-1950	1940-1950	1950-1960	1950-1960	1950-1960
Events	1940-1944	1945+	1950+	1940-1949	1955+	1960+
County FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-week FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 492 counties in our sample for which newspapers' data are available. The table reports county-week-episode level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in the local newspapers of the county in each week from -4 to 26. Week 0 is defined as the week in which the lynching occurred. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 (resp. decadal) change in the Black population share in the county in Panel A (resp. Panel B) interacted with an indicator for weeks 0 and above (POST). The change in the Black population share is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include county, state by week, and episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6) of Panel B consider the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black population share. The last row of the table indicates the sample of lynchings considered. When the last year is not specified, it corresponds to 1964 (included). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Additional Material (Not for publication)

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A Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A.1. Black Emigration Rates from the South, by Decade



Notes: The figure plots the Black emigration rate from the US South for each decade. *Source:* adapted from Boustan (2016).

Figure A.2. Local NAACP Chapters: 1940 and 1960



Notes: The map plots counties with local NAACP chapters in 1940 (light green polygons) and in 1960 (dark green polygons indicate new ones). *Source:* Authors' calculations Gregory and Estrada (2019).

Figure A.3. CORE Demonstrations over Time



Notes: The figure shows the evolution of CORE demonstrations in non-Southern US from 1942 to 1970. Light blue bars (resp. solid red line) plot the number (resp. the distribution frequency) of demonstrations. *Source:* adapted from Gregory and Hermida (2019).

Figure A.4. Northern Legislators' Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democratic (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 88 (1963-1965). The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon in Congress between Congress 78 and Congress 88 are listed in Table A.2. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. *Source:* Authors' calculations from ICPSR (2010).

Figure A.5. Overall Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democratic (resp. Republican) members of US Congress voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 88 (1963-1965). The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon between Congress 78 and Congress 88 are listed in Table A.2. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. *Source:* Authors' calculations from ICPSR (2010).

Figure A.6. Discharge Petitions: Partisan Difference by Topic



Notes: The figure plots the partisan difference (Democrats – Republicans) in the share of non-southern Congress members signing discharge petitions on, respectively, civil rights issues (dark bars) and any other topic (light bars). The values plotted in this figure are computed as follows. First, we calculated the share of Democrats and Republicans who signed discharge petitions on issues that pertained to civil rights and on issues that did not. Then, we took the difference between these two numbers. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. *Source:* adapted from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

Figure A.7. 1940 Black Population Share



Notes: The map plots the 1940 Black population share for the non-southern counties in our sample. *Source:* Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.8. Black Population Share in Northern Counties, 1940 vs 1970



Notes: Black population share for selected non-southern counties in 1940 (light blue) and in 1970 (black). *Source:* Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.9. Share of Southern Born Black Americans in Northern Counties, 1940



Notes: Share of African Americans born in selected southern states living in non-southern counties in 1940. *Source:* Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure A.10. Signatures on Discharge Petitions – Controlling for Non-Civil Rights Issues



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the 1940-1950 change in the Black population share on the corresponding change in the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator. The figure replicates the specification reported in Table A.6 and Figure 4, augmented by controlling for the average number of discharge petitions on issues other than civil rights signed by legislators in each CD between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 82 (1951-1953).

Figure A.11. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics – Social and Cultural Forces



Notes: The bars report the marginal effect of changes in the Black population share (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights for counties that are more (resp. less) socially progressive in dark (resp. light) grey. Section 6.3 describes how each variable is constructed. Coefficients and standard errors reported in Table A.10.

Table A.1. List of Southern States

Alabama	North Carolina
Arkansas	Oklahoma
Florida	South Carolina
Georgia	Tennessee
Kentucky	Texas
Louisiana	Virginia
Mississippi	West Virginia

Notes: The table presents the list of southern states considered in our analysis. We follow the Census definition except for Delaware and Maryland: as in Boustan (2010) we assign these to the North, as they were net recipient of Black migrants during this period.

Table A.2. Civil Rights Bills Voted in the House, 1943-1964

Congress	Year	Bill Number	Issue	Democrats Voting Yes	Republicans Voting Yes
78	1943	HR-7	Poll Tax	0.830	0.795
79	1945	HR-7	Poll Tax	0.842	0.697
80	1947	HR-29	Poll Tax	0.913	0.982
81	1949	HR-3199	Poll Tax	0.942	0.696
81	1950	HR-4453	FEPC	0.790	0.720
84	1956	HR-627	Civil Rights Act	0.914	0.875
85	1957	HR-6127	Civil Rights Act	0.927	0.843
86	1960	HR-8601	Civil Rights Act	0.843	0.813
88	1964	HR-7152	Civil Rights Act	0.918	0.817

Notes: The table lists the bills voted upon in the House of Representatives between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 88 (1963-1965). The last two columns report the share of northern Democrats (resp. Republicans) who voted in favor of each bill relative to all northern Democrats (resp. Republicans).

Table A.3. Congress Legislatures and Calendar Years

Panel A. Congress Ligislatures to Calendar Years

Congress Number	Years
78	1943–1945
82	1951–1953
83	1953–1955
87	1961–1963
88	1963–1965

Panel B. Definition of Congress Periods (baseline)

Congress Period	Years
78–82	1943-1953
82–88	1953-1965

Panel C. Definition of Congress Periods (alternative)

Congress Period	Years
78–83	1943-1955
82–87	1953-1963
83–88	1955-1965

Notes: The table presents the list of Congress legislatures considered (Panel A) and the Congress periods defined (Panel B and Panel C) in our analysis. For each Congress year (Panel A) or period (Panels B and C), the corresponding calendar years are reported. Congress periods reported in Panel B are the ones used in the main analysis.

Table A.4. Discharge Petitions, by Party

	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
Panel A: Congress period: 78 (1943-1945) – 82 (1951-1953)						
Share Democrats	0.564	0.552	0.500	0.138	-	0.422
Share Republicans	0.304	0.239	0.132	0.024	-	0.147
Panel B. Congress period: 83 (1953-1955) – 88 (1963-1965)						
Share Democrats	-	-	0.632	-	0.677	0.651
Share Republicans	-	-	0.043	-	0.175	0.154

Notes: The table presents the share of Democrats and Republicans signing discharge petitions on each topic reported in the top row for the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congresses in Panel A (resp. Panel B). When no discharge petition of a given type was filed in a congress period, the corresponding entry is left missing. Table A.5 reports additional summary statistics for signatures on discharge petitions. See Table C.2 for the complete list of discharge petitions (by date and by topic).

Table A.5. Discharge Petitions: Summary Statistics

Panel A: Discharge Petitions by Issue - Congress Period

	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
Congress 78 to 82	4	3	5	2	0	14
Congress 83 to 88	0	0	2	1	5	8

Panel B: Discharge Petitions by Legislator – Summary Statistics

	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.
Congress 78 to 82	0.772	0.600	0.553	0	2.333	285
Congress 83 to 88	0.441	0.385	0.298	0	1.286	285

Notes: Panel A presents the number of discharge petitions filed in the two Congress periods (78-82 and 83-88) by type. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the number of petitions signed per legislator for the Congressional Districts in our sample, in either Congress period. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years.

Table A.6. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions

Dependent Variable	Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions per Legislator				
	Total	FEPC	Anti-Lynching	Poll-Tax	Non-Civil Rights
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: 2SLS					
Change Black Share	1.128***	0.668**	0.231*	0.182*	0.197
	(0.419)	(0.299)	(0.126)	(0.102)	(0.202)
	[2.192]	[2.074]	[1.015]	[0.786]	[0.197]
Panel B: First Stage					
Predicted Change	1.054***	1.054***	1.054***	1.054***	1.054***
Black Share	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.377)
F-stat	7.814	7.814	7.814	7.814	7.814
Observations	285	285	285	285	285
Dep. Variable Mean	1.752	0.744	0.194	-0.150	2.706

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in number of signatures on discharge petition per legislator between the beginning and the end of the 1940 decade (see the main text for more details). Column 1 considers all discharge petitions on civil rights issues, while columns 2 to 4 focus on employment protection legislation (FEPC), Anti-Lynching legislation, and Poll Tax discharge petitions respectively. Column 5 considers all discharge petitions that are not related to civil right issues. Data on discharge petitions were kindly shared by Kathryn Pearson and Eric Schickler (see also Pearson and Schickler, 2009). The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1950 change in the Black population share in the congressional district, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the ideology score in the district in Congress 78. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.7. Summary Statistics for Newspapers and Baseline Samples

Sample	Newspapers Sample			Baseline Sample		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
1940 Total Population	113,680	327,882	492	65,400	215,158	1,263
1940 Black Share	0.043	0.042	492	0.036	0.043	1,263
1940 Urban Share	0.758	0.252	492	0.682	0.292	1,263
1940 Share in Manufacturing	0.281	0.110	492	0.264	0.120	1,263
1940 Congressional Democratic Vote Share	47.49	12.86	492	46.55	12.91	1,263
1940 Congressional Turnout	68.60	7.872	492	69.39	8.298	1,263
Avg. Decadal Change in Black Share	2.432	2.765	1,476	1.778	2.529	3,789
Avg. Decadal Predicted Change in Black Share	1.106	1.212	1,476	0.863	1.155	3,789
Avg. Decadal Change in Democratic Vote Share	1.578	10.66	1,476	1.528	11.12	3,789
Avg. Decadal Change in Turnout	-6.699	16.69	1,476	-6.485	17.07	3,789
1940-1970 Change in Black Share	7.295	7.512	492	5.334	6.949	1,263
1940-1970 Predicted Change in Black Share	3.319	3.587	492	2.589	3.423	1,263
1940-1970 Change in Democratic Vote Share	4.733	15.67	492	4.585	16.38	1,263
1940-1970 Change in Turnout	-20.10	9.661	492	-19.45	9.826	1,263

Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations of selected variables for the 492 counties for which newspapers data are available and for the 1,263 counties in the full sample.

Table A.8. Baseline Estimates in Counties with Newspapers

Dep. Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.731***	0.756**	0.998*
	(0.439)	(0.639)	(0.348)	(0.536)
Panel B: First stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.700**	0.758***	0.700**
	(0.233)	(0.308)	(0.233)	(0.308)
F-stat	10.57	5.177	10.57	5.17
Observations	3,789	1,476	3,789	1,476
Sample	Baseline	Newspapers	Baseline	Newspapers

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6) by restricting the sample to the counties for which local newspapers could be located (columns 2 and 4). Columns 1 and 3 report the baseline estimation. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.9. Evidence from Local Newspapers: Heterogeneous Effects

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change Black Share*	0.428***	0.210	1.346***	0.652*	1.087**	1.139
POST	(0.149)	(0.131)	(0.510)	(0.345)	(0.434)	(0.74)
F-stat	25.04	12.27	16.92	21.63	26.94	5.846
Observations	59,878	298,031	33,385	162,121	14,859	53,644
Change Black Share	1940-1960	1940-1960	1940-1950	1940-1950	1950-1960	1950-1960
Events	1940-1964	1940-1964	1945-1964	1945-1964	1955-1964	1955-1964
County FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-week FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lynching in	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 492 counties in our sample for which newspapers' data are available. The table reports county-week-episode level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in the local newspapers of the county in each week from -4 to 26. Week 0 is defined as the week in which the lynching occurred. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 (resp. 1940-1950 and 1950-1960) change in the Black population share in columns 1 and 2 (resp. in columns 3-4 and 5-6) interacted with an indicator for weeks 0 and above (POST). The change in the Black population share is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include county, state by week, and episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Columns 1, 3, and 5 focus on episodes that occurred in the southern states that, according to the instrument, had sent more Black migrants to the county over the period. Columns 2, 4, and 6 restrict attention to episodes happening in any other (southern) state. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table A.10. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics

Dependent Variable	Change in Pr.(Civil Rights Demonstration)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A:	*Above Median*				*Socially Progressive*		
Change Black Share	0.059***	0.061***	0.076***	0.169***	0.171***	0.084***	0.061***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.031)	(0.018)
	{ 0.01 }	{ <0.01 }	{ <0.01 }	{ <0.01 }	{ <0.01 }	{ <0.01 }	{ <0.01 }
F-Stat	12.75	16.05	17.94	10.98	27.13	4.945	19.33
Observations	1,893	1,848	1,908	1,894	1,869	2,322	1,896
Panel B:	*Below Median*				*Socially Conservative*		
Change Black Share	-0.020	0.038**	-0.004	-0.089**	0.042**	-0.008	-0.022
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.028)
	{ 0.22 }	{ 0.19 }	{ 0.84 }	{ 0.04 }	{ 0.09 }	{ 0.73 }	{ 0.47 }
F-Stat	11.40	6.760	6.382	12.80	11.04	2.410	2.410
Observations	1,896	1,941	1,881	1,895	1,866	1,467	1,893
1940 Characteristic	Share in Manufacturing	Share CIO Workers	Political Competition	Predicted Economic Growth	Discrimination Index	Miscegenation Laws	Distance 48ers City

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern counties (see Table A.1 for the list of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. Columns 1 to 4 (resp. 5 to 7) split the sample according to values of county characteristics above and below the sample median (resp. classified as socially progressive and conservative). See the main text (Sections 6.3 and 6.4) for more details. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Curly brackets report the p-value for the identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.11. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Dependent Variable	Change in Ideology Indicator of Elected Congress Members			
	Liberal Democrat (1)	Moderate Democrat (2)	Moderate Republican (3)	Conservative Republican (4)
Panel A: 78-82; 82-88 Congresses				
Change Black Share	0.065	-0.062	-0.024	0.024
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.029)	(0.033)
F-Stat	12.87	12.87	12.87	12.87
Observations	570	570	570	570
Panel B: 78-82 Congresses				
Change Black Share	0.322**	-0.298*	0.164	-0.176**
	(0.128)	(0.172)	(0.130)	(0.079)
F-Stat	7.814	7.814	7.814	7.814
Observations	285	285	285	285
Panel C: 82-88 Congresses				
Change Black Share	-0.036	0.030	-0.098*	0.103**
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.042)
F-Stat	12.19	12.19	12.19	12.19
Observations	285	285	285	285

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the ideology indicator of the Congress member in office. The ideology indicators are defined as: i) liberal (resp. moderate) Democrat if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Democratic Party members in Congress 78; ii) moderate (resp. conservative) Republican if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Republican Party members in Congress 78. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. Panel A refers to Congress periods 78-82 and 82-88; Panel B refers to Congress period 78-82; Panel C refers to Congress period 82-88. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the ideology score in the district in Congress 78. K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B Matching Counties to Time-Invariant Congressional Districts

When studying the effects of Black inflows on the behavior of northern legislators, we face two main difficulties. First, while the African American population and other demographic variables are measured at the county level, legislators' behavior is available at the CD level. Second, the boundaries of CDs change over time due to redistricting. We overcome both challenges by first matching counties to CDs, and then by constructing a time-invariant cross-walk to map CDs that get redistricted over time to their baseline geography.

B.1 County-CD Crosswalk

To overcome the first problem, and to assign to each CD the corresponding "Black in-migration shock" we perform a spatial merge of 1940 county maps with CDs, following the procedure used in Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).[45] Since there is no one-to-one mapping between counties and CDs, two cases can arise. First, some CDs are wholly contained within a single county; in this case, we directly assign county level variables to CDs, assuming that the effect of Black in-migration is uniform within the county. Second, some CDs straddle county boundaries. In such cases, we assign county level values to the CD, weighting them by a county's area share of the CD.[46] Figure B.1 displays the county (gray lines) to CD (Black lines) mapping just described for Congress 78 (1943-1945), restricting attention to non-southern states.

[45] The only difference with their procedure is that we use counties rather than CZs.

[46] Following Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), we test the robustness of our results using other weights, such as maximum area.

Figure B.1. CD-County Map

Notes: The figure presents a map of counties (gray lines) and Congressional Districts (black lines) for the non-South US during Congress 78.

B.2 Time Invariant CD Crosswalk

Until the early 1960s, there was no pre-determined rule mandating states to redraw CD boundaries after each decennial Census. Moreover, especially in the North, gerrymandering was substantially less common than it is today (Snyder and Ansolabehere, 2008). Between 1900 and 1964, despite major demographic shifts induced by international and internal migration (Boustan et al., 2018), redistricting across non-southern districts was typically non-strategic (Engstrom, 2013). If anything, the lack of systematic redistricting rules likely introduced a pro-rural bias: more densely populated areas (i.e. urban areas) grew gradually under-represented at the CD level, likely diluting the effects of Black inflows, which were concentrated in urban centers (see Figure 2 in the main text).[47] However, even during the 1940-1965 period, the boundaries of many CDs were changed, often multiple times. To overcome this empirical challenge and following Autor et al. (2020), we develop a procedure that allows us to match all CDs

[47]This observation suggests that our analysis should identify a lower bound for the effects of Black inflows on legislators' (pro-civil rights) behavior.

between 1930 and 1970 to a baseline Congress.[48]

We define Congress 78 (1943-1945) as our baseline Congress year for two main reasons. First, although the Congress 76 might have been a more natural choice (as it corresponds to the 1940 Census year), several CDs underwent redistricting between this Congress year and Congress 78. In contrast, very few states redistricted between Congress 78 and Congress 82 (1951-1953).[49] Second, Congress 78 is the earliest Congress for which CD-level population estimates are available from Adler (2003), thus allowing us to benchmark the population figures estimated in our procedure with other measures. We thus rely on Congress 78 as our baseline year, and consider the following two Congress periods: 78 (1943-1945) to 82 (1951-1953), which we match to the 1940 to 1950 Census decade; and, 83 (1953-1955) to 88 (1963-1965), which we match to the 1950 to 1960 year.[50] We perform a number of robustness checks to show that our results do not depend on the choice of the baseline Congress year, and that they are qualitatively similar when restricting the sample to CDs that did not undergo redistricting over the 78 to 82 Congress period.

Using this timing convention, for every Congress between 71 (1929-1931) and 91 (1969-1971), we perform a spatial merge between CD maps and the map corresponding to Congress 78. Then, political outcomes (e.g. ideology scores, number of discharge petitions signed by legislators, etc.) are collapsed to Congress 78 using a weighting procedure similar to that adopted when matching counties to CDs. The logic of our strategy is simple: we fix the 1944 (i.e. Congress 78) geography of CDs, and we link them to CDs that represented the same geographic area in subsequent (or previous) Congress years.[51] Then, we calculate a weighed average of political outcomes that correspond to the area originally represented by CDs according to the 1944 map.

To illustrate this procedure, we ask how Congress 78 would have looked like, had its geography persisted until Congress 86. We now explain how we proceed to collapse the political outcomes corresponding to the geography of Congress 86 "back" to that of Congress 78. Suppose that the area represented by a single CD in Congress 78 gets split in two separate CDs by Congress 86. To assign political variables of new CDs

[48] While our analysis focuses on years after 1940, we also construct the cross-walk for the pre-1940 decade in order to perform several robustness and falsification checks.

[49] See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress years to calendar years and the definition of Congress periods.

[50] The reason to consider Congress 88 in the second decade is that this was the Congress that approved the CRA.

[51] When states have more than one district, we drop at-large Congressional seats from the spatial merge (e.g. at-large seats for the state of New York are dropped between 1933 and 1945).

back to the level of the original CD, we adopt a weighting procedure, based on weights constructed in four steps. First, we overlay the map of the initial CD to that of the two CDs in Congress 86, and divide the area in cells derived by this spatial merge. Second, we assign the 1940 county population to each cell in proportion to the area share of the cell that is included in the county. Third, we sum over all cells that compose the CD to obtain an estimate of CD population as of Congress 78. Finally, we divide the area of each cell by such estimated CD population.

Political variables corresponding to the geography of Congress 78 for subsequent Congress years are computed by taking the weighed average of the outcomes of the newly formed CDs, using the weights constructed as explained above.

C Data Appendix

In what follows we first provide additional details about the data used in the paper (Appendix C.1), and then describe the survey data from the ANES, Gallup, and the CCES (Appendix C.2).

C.1 Additional Details on Data Sources

Black in-migration and demographic variables. Data on Black and total population as well as on other demographic variables for non-southern counties come from the County Databooks, from Haines et al. (2010), and from the 1940 full count Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2020). We also collected data on Black migration rates from Gardner and Cohen (1992) and Bowles et al. (2016) for 1940-1950 and for 1950 to 1970 respectively.

Electoral outcomes. As discussed in the main text, we focus on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. This choice is motivated by the fact that, since the New Deal, Democrats had become the pro-Black party outside the US South (Caughey et al., 2020; Moon, 1948). Such racial realignment was more likely to emerge in Congressional than in nation-wide Presidential elections (Schickler, 2016).[52] In addition to the Democratic vote share, we also consider voter turnout, defined as the share of votes cast in the election over the total number of eligible voters in the county. In Appendix E below, we provide additional results for Presidential elections.

Data for both Congressional and Presidential elections are taken from Clubb et al. (1990). Since Census data are available at the decennial level, and because Congressional elections are held every two years, we focus on electoral returns for exact Census years from 1940 to 1970. In a number of instances, Congressional election results are not available at the county level. As described in the main text, our analysis is restricted to the 1,263 non-southern counties for which Congressional election data are available for all Census decades between 1940 and 1970 (and with at least one Black American in 1940). However, as documented in Appendix D, all results are unchanged when conducting the analysis with the unbalanced sample of counties. When considering Presidential elections, before taking the first difference with the baseline election decade, we assign the 1948 (resp. 1968) elections to Census year 1950 (resp. 1970).[53]

[52] See also the discussion conducted in Section 2.2 of the paper.

[53] Results remain similar when using different timing conventions.

Legislators' ideology. We measure the ideology of northern legislators on civil rights using the scores constructed by Bateman et al. (2017). As for the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), legislators are assigned a score that is a function of their past voting behavior and takes more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) positions. We rely on the Bateman et al. (2017) scores for two reasons. First, they are calculated by restricting attention solely to civil rights bills, as classified by Katznelson and Lapinski (2006). Second, they allow the policy content to be Congress specific and to vary over time. Bateman et al. (2017) develop two versions of the scores – one that assumes that the ideal points of legislators remain constant over time ("constrained scores"), and one that instead does not make such assumption ("agnostic scores"). All results are robust to using either of the two versions.

Signatures on discharge petitions. During the historical period considered in our analysis, the prevailing seniority system gave southern committee chairs substantial control over the type of bills that were discussed in the House. In particular, since southern Democrats controlled key committees, such as the Rules Committee, they could block any proposed civil rights-related bill (Schickler, 2016). In most cases, civil rights bills reached the floor and were voted in the House only when a discharge petition was successful at collecting at least 218 signatures. A discharge petition can be filed if a bill or a resolution has remained stuck in the Rules Committee for at least seven days or in a legislative committee for at least twenty days. Once a petition is filed, it moves to the floor, where it can be voted on, if it is signed by at least 218 Congress members (Beth et al., 2003).

We rely on the dataset assembled by Pearson and Schickler (2009), who were able to locate the names of legislators who signed any discharge petition between Congress 71 (1929-1931) and Congress 94 (1975-1977).[54] Following the definition used in Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler (2016), we restrict attention to discharge petitions relating to racial issues filed between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 88 (1963-1965), and use signatures on such petitions as a proxy for a legislator's involvement with (and support for) civil rights. Table C.2 reports the list of discharge petitions on civil rights from Pearson and Schickler (2009) filed between Congress 73 (1933-1935) and Congress 91 (1969-1971), by Congress and topic. The last column presents

[54]Except for this recently assembled dataset, the names of Congress members who sign the discharge petitions are made public only when the petition is able to collect at least 218 signatures. We thank the authors for kindly agreeing to share their data with us.

the number of signatures on the corresponding petition. Both in the analysis and in the statistics presented in Section 2.2, we adopt the convention used in Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler (2016), restricting attention to discharge petitions that received at least 25 signatures.[55]

In a robustness exercise discussed in the main text (see Section 5.2), we also make use of signatures on discharge petitions on topics that are unrelated to civil rights filed between Congress 78 (1943-1945) and Congress 82 (1951-1953). During this period, 71 petitions on topics other than civil rights legislation and that received more than 25 signatures were filed.[56] They spanned from social security to agriculture to labor. Defense and military affairs were the most frequent issue with, on average, 68 signatures between Congress 78 and Congress 82.[57]

Local support for civil rights. We obtain measures of local support for the civil rights movement from two sources. First, we use the dataset assembled by Gregory and Hermida (2019) combining a variety of sources that includes the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the CORE – an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago that coordinated sit-ins and similar forms of civil disobedience mainly across northern cities to protest against segregation in the South. Second, we obtained data on the presence of NAACP chapters from Gregory and Estrada (2019). These data are available only for the early 1940s and the early 1960s. For both CORE and NAACP datasets, we match the geographic coordinates of an event or of a NAACP chapter to the centroid of each county in our sample.

Whites' attitudes. We collect data on whites' racial attitudes and stance on civil rights from three, nationally representative surveys: the ANES (ANES Cumulative File, 2015), the CCES (Kuriwaki, Shiro, 2018), and Gallup (Gallup Organization, 2018). Both the ANES and Gallup are cross-sectional datasets that report individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as their political ideology. Starting from the mid to late 1950s, both surveys began to elicit respondents' views on racial equality and their support for civil rights. The ANES contains respondents' county of residence, while Gallup only records their state. However, even in the ANES, we are unable to exploit county-level information, due to the limited number of counties (56) included in the survey. For this reason, as explained in the main text, we

[55]This restriction is immaterial for the results presented in Section 5.2 of the main paper, since all the petitions on civil rights topics available to perform the analysis were signed by more than 25 legislators.

[56]Overall, 108 non-civil rights petitions were filed between Congress 78 and Congress 82.

[57]For more details about discharge petitions see Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler et al. (2010) among others.

correlate the change in the Black population share at the state level with attitudes of white respondents interviewed between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s (when the CRA was passed).[58]

To evaluate the long-run effects of the Great Migration, we also rely on the CCES (see Appendix E.5.1). As the ANES and Gallup, the CCES is a nationally representative survey that records individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as their political ideology and racial attitudes. The key advantage of the CCES is its sample size, which is large even at the county level. Since the survey was asked for the first time in 2006, we cannot use it to estimate the short-run effects of the Great Migration on whites' racial attitudes.

Appendix C.2 describes the three surveys and the questions used in our analysis in detail.

Local newspapers. When examining the mechanisms, we use data retrieved from the website Newspapers.com on the mention of lynchings against African Americans happening in the US South between 1940 and 1964. The list of lynchings was retrieved from the Monroe Work Today project.[59] To identify mentions of a lynching in a non-southern newspaper in our sample, we scrape the pages of newspapers available at Newspapers.com by searching for the joint appearance of the name and surname of the victim and the exact location where the lynching occurred. Data used in our analysis come from 1,041 newspapers (only 5 of which were African American).[60] We restrict the search window to the 30 days before and the 180 days after the lynching, aggregating the data to the week level so as to reduce noise.

Hate crimes. As an additional proxy for whites' racial attitudes, we consider hate crime data compiled by the FBI as part of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016).[61] The data were

[58] Since a more comprehensive set of questions on racial attitudes was asked in the ANES relative to Gallup, we focus most of our analysis on the former, using the latter to validate results.

[59] See also https://plaintalkhistory.com/monroeandflorencework/explore/map2-credits.html.

[60] To classify newspapers as "Black" and "non-Black", we manually searched for the name of the newspaper on the Library of Congress. We defined a newspaper as "Black" if, according to the Library of Congress, it included African American subjects. It is of course possible that a non-Black newspaper had African American subject, so our definition of Black newspapers might include some "false positive". Since we are interested in understanding whether non-Black newspapers were more vocal on civil rights, this type of bias would go against us. 58 newspapers retrieved on Newspapers.com were not found in the Library of Congress. In these instances, we manually searched for these newspapers – none of them was African American.

[61] Hate crimes are defined as *criminal offenses that are motivated, in whole or in part, by an offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity* (FBI Report, 2015).

collected from 1991 to 2018. We focus on hate crimes reported from 2000 (included) onwards for two reasons. First, the number of agencies that collected the records grew during the 1990s, becoming stable only in the last years of the decade. This implies that, until the late-1990s, the quality of the data (and the degree to which they can be compared over time) is relatively low. Second, we prefer to keep the focus of our long-term analysis similar across sources: since (as noted above) CCES data are available only after 2006, we include hate crimes from 2000 to have a similar time-window.

Based on the location of the reporting agency, as provided by the Originating Agency Identifier (ORI), incidents are matched to counties in our sample. We restrict the sample by dropping counties for which an agency did not report any hate crime for all years within a 5-year interval. This is done both to keep a fully balanced sample and to increase the confidence in the quality of the underlying data.

Conveniently for our purposes, the data record the race of both the victim and the offender. This allows us to construct two main variables: the number of hate crimes against African American victims; and, the number of hate crimes against African American victims perpetrated by white offenders. For each of the two variables, we define the hate crime *rate* as follows. First, we divide the period from 2000 to 2015 into three symmetric 5-year intervals. Next, we scale the number of crimes by the Black population in a county using the closest "beginning-of-interval" year for which population was reported. That is, hate crimes from 2000 to 2004 are scaled by the Black population in 2000; those from 2005 to 2009 are scaled by the 2005 population, and so on.[62]

We begin by considering the cumulated number of hate crimes, scaled by the "relevant" population, from 2000 to 2015. Next, to smooth potential noise in the data, we consider the average hate crime rate across the three time intervals.[63] The same procedure is used for hate crimes against Black victims perpetrated by white offenders, and for racially motivated hate crimes against non-minority groups (used in a robustness exercise).

[62]Results are unchanged when defining the denominator using always the Black population in 2000.

[63]As shown below, results are always very similar.

Table C.1. Variable Description

Variable	Description	Source
Democratic vote share	Democratic vote share in Congressional elections.	Clubb et al. (1990)
Turnout	Turnout rate in Congressional elections.	Clubb et al. (1990)
Civil rights score (Agnostic)	Ideology score constructed as a function of a legislator's past voting behavior on civil rights bills (as classified by Katznelson and Lapinski (2006)). It allows the ideal points of legislators to change over time.	Bateman et al. (2017)
Civil rights score (Constrained)	Ideology score constructed as a function of a legislator's past voting behavior on civil rights bills (as classified by Katznelson and Lapinski (2006)). It assumes that the ideal points of legislators remain constant over time.	Bateman et al. (2017)
Signatures on discharge petitions	Share of legislators who signed a discharge petition in each Congress period and Congressional District. Discharge petitions are considered separately for topics that do and do not pertain to civil rights or racial equality.	Pearson and Schickler (2009)
NAACP chapters	Dummy equal to one if the county had at least one NAACP chapter. Data available for 1940 (or earlier) and 1960. Data on NAACP chapters are also available for years 1957 and 1964: these are pooled together with the 1960 ones.	Gregory and Estrada (2019)
CORE demonstrations	Number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago.	Gregory and Hermida (2019)
Newspapers mentions of lynghings	Mentions of lynchings against African Americans happening in the US South between 1940 and 1964 (as compiled in the Monroe Works Today project) in non-southern newspapers.	Newspapers.com (last accessed August 2020)
Black population	Black population over total county population.	Authors' calculation from Haines et al. (2010)
White population	White population over total county population.	Authors' calculation from Haines et al. (2010)
Instrumented change in Black share	Share of Black migrants born in southern state j and living in northern county c in 1940 (relative to all Black migrants born in state j living outside that state in 1940) interacted with the number of Black migrants who left state j during period τ.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020). Black migration data are from Gardner and Cohen (1992) and Bowles et al. (2016)
White share in manufacturing	Share of white individuals employed in manufacturing in 1940 and in 1960. Sample restricted to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)

Table C.1 Continued

White high skilled share	Share of white individuals employed in professional, technical and managerial occupations in 1940 and in 1960. Sample restricted to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
White share in labor force	Share of white individuals in labor force in 1940 and in 1960. Sample restricted to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
White share aged 65+	White men aged 65 or above over white population in 1940 and in 1960.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
White share aged 35-	White individuals aged between 18 and 35 over white population in 1940 and in 1960.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
White employed share	Share of white individuals employed in 1940 and in 1960. Sample restricted to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Whites' occupational score	Average of the log(occupational income score) in 1940 and in 1960. Sample restricted to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Whites' wage	Average of the log (salary income) in 1940 and in 1960. Sample restricted to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Share workers in CIO	State-level CIO membership.	Troy (1957)
Predicted economic growth	County-level measure of predicted economic growth constructed by interacting the employment share in 1-digit industries in each county in 1940 with the national growth rate (computed omitting the US South) of each industry for each decade between 1940 and 1970.	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Discrimination index	First principal component of political and social discrimination at the county-level: the presence of the Ku Klux Klan from 1915 to 1940, the number of lynchings until 1939, the Democratic vote share in Congressional and Presidential elections between 1900 and 1930, racial wage inequality, and the index of residential segregation, isolation, and dissimilarity from Logan and Parman (2017).	Qian and Tabellini (2020)
Miscegenation laws	State enoforcement of anti-miscegenation (mixed-race marriage) laws.	Dahis et al. (2020)
Distance 48ers cities	Distance of county centroids from the closest city where the Forty-Eighters settled.	Cities identified as in Dippel and Heblich (2021)

Table C.2. Discharge Petitions by Type and Date

Congress	Number	Topic	Total Signatures
73	14	House Restaurant Desegregation	145
74	32	Lynching	218
75	1	Lynching	75
75	5	Lynching	218
76	10	Lynching	218
76	12	Lynching	59
76	34	Poll Tax	49
77	1	Poll Tax	218
77	3	Lynching	59
77	4	Poll Tax	31
77	15	Lynching	29
78	1	Poll Tax	10
78	3	Poll Tax	219
78	5	Lynching	82
78	18	FEPC	41
79	1	Poll Tax	218
79	3	Lynching	150
79	4	FEPC	187
79	24	Public Accommodation	6
80	2	Poll Tax	41
80	9	Lynching	80
81	7	Housing Discrimination	24
81	20	FEPC	110
81	21	FEPC	100
82	6	FEPC	16
83	4	Public Accommodation	71
83	5	FEPC	72
84	5	Civil Rights Act	148
85	1	Civil Rights Act	105
85	6	Civil Rights Act	3
86	3	Civil Rights Act	214
88	2	Anti-Discrimination	4
88	5	Civil Rights Act	174
91	11	Fair Employment	136

Notes: The table reports the list of all pro-civil rights discharge petitions filed between Congresses 73 (1933-1935) and 91 (1969-1971). *Source:* adapted from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

C.2 Survey Data

C.2.1 The American National Election Studies (ANES)

The American National Election Studies (ANES) is a cross-sectional, nationally representative survey conducted since 1948 by the University of Michigan every two or four years depending on the waves. As noted in Gentzkow (2016), the ANES is considered the "gold standard" when it comes to measure political ideology and cultural or social attitudes of Americans in the second part of the twentieth century. The ANES asks questions on demographics, party affiliation, political attitudes, and ideology. Moreover, and crucially for our purposes, since the mid-late 1950s, respondents are asked about their views on civil rights legislation and racial equality and, in some instances, about their attitudes towards integration.[64]

In each wave, between 1,500 and 2,000 respondents were interviewed. We restrict the sample to whites living in non-southern states and who did not move from their state of birth (to reduce concerns of endogenous migration response). This leaves us with an average of roughly 850-900 individuals for whom we can consistently include the following controls: marital status, gender, and fixed effects for education and age.[65] In principle, additional characteristics, such as union status, party affiliation and identification are available. Since these may be endogenous to Black migration, however, we do not control for them in our baseline specification. Most of our analysis uses data from the surveys of 1960 and 1964, but, in a few cases, we were able to obtain data also from other years. As noted above, the ANES reports also the county of respondents. However, due to the very limited number of counties (56) and to the small sample size of respondents per county, we cannot conduct the analysis at this level. We instead estimate state-level regressions, as explained in the main text.

Table C.3 (Panel A) presents the questions considered to measure racial attitudes and views towards civil rights. The first column presents the name of the variable; the second one includes the exact wording of the question; the last column lists the years for which the question was available. The first variable listed refers to "feeling thermometers" towards different groups. In particular, for 1964, ANES respondents were asked about their feeling thermometers towards different political and socio-demographic

[64] More details on ANES sampling methodology and data are available at http://www.electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/nes012492.pdf.

[65] We create dummies for: high school dropouts; high school graduates; having at least some college; having at least a college degree.

groups, including Black Americans, the Democratic, and the NAACP. Thermometer values are such that higher values refer to warmer feelings towards members of the group.[66] We use the answers given by respondents in Table 5 (columns 1 to 3).

The second variable listed in Table C.3, *Most Important Problem*, refers to an open-ended question in which respondents were asked what they considered (up to) the three most important problems for the US in the year of the survey. From such open-ended question the ANES created one specific category that includes racial and public order related issues. For 1960 and 1964, the ANES coded respondents' answers in categories that reflected their attitudes towards civil rights and integration. We verify that whites who considered civil rights one of the most fundamental issues for the country reported a higher feeling thermometer towards Black Americans (a relationship that is statistically significant at the 1% level).[67] This variable, which we interpret as a proxy for support for civil rights among white respondents, is used in column 4 of Table 5.

Finally, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5, we exploit ANES questions concerning political preferences in surveys in years between 1956 and 1964. In particular, individuals were asked to indicate the party they had voted (resp. intended to vote) in the previous (resp. upcoming) elections. From this variable, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they voted or intended to vote for the Democratic Party.

C.2.2 Gallup

We validate the results obtained using the ANES with Gallup, which elicited respondents' views about salient political and social issues since 1935.[68] As for the ANES, also Gallup is a repeated cross-sectional dataset from which individual level characteristics are available.[69] Starting from the mid-1950s, Gallup asked questions about racial attitudes. As discussed extensively in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), Gallup data have been only recently made available due to the efforts of the Roper Center, which

[66] The ANES asked respondents about their feeling thermometers towards the two parties also in years other than 1964. However, since we are interested in studying whites' racial attitudes, we limit our analysis to 1964, i.e. the only year for which both political and racial groups or organizations were included.

[67] Since the Black thermometer is available for 1964 but not for 1960, we could validate the "Most Important Problem" variable only for 1964.

[68] See also https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/featured-collections/gallup-data-collection.

[69] With the exception of union membership, marital status, and state of birth, all individual characteristics available in the ANES (see Appendix C.2.1) are available for Gallup as well.

digitized hundreds of historical surveys.[70] As for the ANES, we restricted attention to white respondents living in non-southern states in years before 1965.[71] In practice, so as to keep the sample consistent across questions, we focused on years 1963 and 1964, when different questions, comparable to those from the ANES, were asked. We report the wording and the survey years for which these two questions are available in Panel B of Table C.3.

Starting from the top of Panel B, Gallup respondents who had at least one child in school were asked whether they would object to send their kids to a school with few, half, and more than half Black pupils. Parents who responded that they would not object to sending their kids to a school with few Black students were subsequently asked if they would object to a situation with half Black pupils in the school. If they had no objections to such question, they were asked about a situation in which the school was more than half Black. Most parents (90%) did not object to send their kids to schools with only a few Black pupils. Instead, more heterogeneity existed when parents were asked about a situation in which half or more than half of the school were racially mixed. Specifically, 30% of parents who did not object to send a kid to a school that had few Black pupils were against sending their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black. Of those that did not object to send their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black, 38% were against a situation in which more than half of the pupils in the school were Black.

Given these patterns, we focus on the answer to the scenario in which half of the pupils in the school were Black. In our view, and consistent with existing evidence (Sugrue, 2008, 2014), racial mixing was not perceived as a threat when (school or neighborhood) integration entailed only a limited number of Black migrants. Instead, racial animosity and whites' backlash was more likely to emerge as the share of Black Americans in the local (white) community increased. The variable *1[Object to Half Black Pupils in School]* at the top of column 1 in Table E.4 is thus a dummy equal to 1 if parents did object to sending their kids to a school with at least half of students being Black.[72]

The second question used in our analysis is meant to capture whites respondents'

[70] More information about Roper Center data can be found here: https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/. We thank Kathleen Joyce Weldon for invaluable help in the data collection and data cleaning process.

[71] Since state of birth was not consistently asked, we cannot restrict attention to non-movers when using Gallup data.

[72] The sample size is relatively small – 851 respondents – since only parents with kids in school were asked this question.

acceptance of racial diversity in politics. Specifically, as in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), we consider whether respondents would vote for a Black candidate had their party nominated the individual for the Presidential race (see second row in Panel B of Table C.3).[73] In column 2 of Table E.4, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they would vote for a Black candidate, *1[Vote for Black Candidate]*.[74]

In 1964, given the prominence of the issue, Gallup questionnaires included a question about the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Among the about 1,000 respondents, approximately 70% of them did approve the law just passed by Congress. We create a dummy equal to one if a respondent supported the CRA (*Approve Civil Rights Act* in Panel B of Table C.3). This variable is considered as outcome in column 3 of Table E.4.

Finally, we consider a question that elicits respondents' view on how the Kennedy Administration was handling the process of racial integration. Specifically, we create a dummy equal to one if an individual stated that in her view, racial integration was proceeding "at the right pace or not fast enough" (see the last row in Table C.3, Panel B). This variable is used as outcome in column 4 of Table E.4.[75]

C.2.3 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)

The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) is a nationally representative survey conducted online in November of every year since 2005. It is one of the most widely used survey datasets in political economy and political science (Acharya et al., 2016; Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki, 2020; Hopkins et al., 2019). We use it to measure racial attitudes of white respondents living in the counties in our sample.[76] As noted above, the CCES allows us to complement the short run evidence obtained from the ANES and Gallup, zooming in onto the county-level and evaluating the long term persistence of the Great Migration on whites' racial attitudes.

We focus on white respondents who, at the time of the survey, live in one of the counties in our sample. We were able to match all but 13 counties. This leaves us with between, approximately, 96,000 and 100,000 survey respondents living in 1,250 counties. We consider two specific questions. The first one, *Affirmative Action* in

[73] In 1963 this question was asked to around 2,000 respondents.

[74] Kuziemko and Washington (2018) investigate whites' respondents to this question also for years after 1965. Instead, in order not to confound our results with potential whites' backlash we stop in 1963 – the last year before the passage of the CRA.

[75] As it appears from Table E.4, this question is available for a significantly larger number of respondents (more than 17,000) relative to all other questions. This is because the question was asked repeatedly in 1963.

[76] More details about the CCES sampling methodology and data can be found at https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/.

Table C.3 (Panel C), elicits respondents' views over affirmative action (with higher values referring to higher support for it).

The second variable (*Racial Resentment* in Table C.3, Panel C) is a measure of racial resentment. Following Fouka and Tabellini (2021), we construct this variable by taking the average of the answer given by each respondent to three questions that ask whether an individual agrees that: slavery, prejudice, and discrimination "have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class", or "if [B]lacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites", and that "other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Black should do the same without any special favors". To make questions comparable to each other, we recode them so that higher values always indicate more resentment. Since the three questions are not asked in all years, we construct the average over the questions that are asked in each year for which they are available. To ease the interpretation of this variable, as in Fouka and Tabellini (2021), we standardize it by subtracting its mean and dividing it through its standard deviation.

The affirmative action question is available for all years from 2008 to 2014 (included), while the index of racial resentment is non-missing for the period 2008-2014 and for year 2018. The exact wording of each question is reported in Table C.3 below. The two variables are used as outcomes in Appendix E.5.1, Table E.7.

The CCES also asks a large number of demographic and socioeconomic questions such as nativity, age, gender, marital status, income, and education and, crucially for our purposes, the county of residence of respondents. As explained in Appendix E.5.1, we always include age, age squared, gender, family income, marital status, employment status, and education attainment.

Table C.3. Questions from Survey Data

Variable Name	Wording	Years
	Panel A. ANES	
Feeling Thermometer Towards [Group]	There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these groups... Where would you put (group) on the thermometer?	1964
Most Important Problem	What would you personally feel are the most important problems the government should try to take care of when the new president and congress take office in January. (Do you think of any other problems important to you)	1960 and 1964
Vote Democratic	1 if voted/intend to vote for the Democratic Party in the last/upcoming Presidential Elections	1956-1964
	Panel B. Gallup	
Object to Half Black Pupils in School	Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where half of the children are [Black]	1963
Black Candidate	There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a [Black] would you vote for him	1963
Approve Civil Rights Act	As you know, a civil rights law was recently passed by Congress and signed by the President. In general, do you approve or disapprove this law?	1964
Racial Integration at the Right Pace/Not Fast Enough	Do you think the Kennedy Administration is pushing racial integration too fast or not fast enough?	1963
	Panel C. CCES	
Affirmative Action	Some people think that if a company has a history of discriminating against blacks when making hiring decisions, then they should be required to have an affirmative action program that gives blacks preference in hiring. What do you think? Should companies that have discriminated against blacks have to have an affirmative action program? Values in [1,4] range: higher values stand for stronger support for affirmative action	2008-2014
Racial Resentment	Individual-level average of three survey items: (*i*) The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Black should do the same without any special favors; (*ii*) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class; and (*iii*) It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. The resulting index is standardized and increasing in racial resentment	2008-2014, 2018

Notes: Panel A, B and C list variables and questions taken from, rspectively, the ANES, Gallup, and CCES. The wording reported for variable *Most Important Problem* in Panel A is taken from the 1960 survey, but remains almost identical in all other years considered.

D Robustness Checks

In this section, we present a variety of robustness checks. First, we show that Black in-migration did not systematically trigger white out-migration in the counties in our sample, and that there was no change either in the characteristics of white residents or in their labor market outcomes. Second, we construct alternative versions of the instrument that predict Black out-migration from each southern state exploiting only variation across local push factors and that rely on a county-to-county (instead of state-to-county) migration matrix. The latter exercise allows us to invoke the result obtained in Borusyak et al. (2021) for the validity of shift-share instruments in the presence of a high number of plausibly exogenous "shifts".

Third, we document that the instrument is uncorrelated with county-specific pull factors that might have influenced pre-1940 Black settlements, and that results are unchanged when simultaneously controlling for local economic growth, predicted using a Bartik methodology. Importantly, we also verify that our findings are not driven by pre-existing trends.

Fourth, we show that results are robust to *i*) interacting period dummies with a variety of 1940 county characteristics; *ii*) extending the analysis to the unbalanced sample of counties for which electoral outcomes were not consistently available; *iii*) omitting potential outliers; *iv*) considering alternative proxies for support for the Democratic Party; *v*) estimating different specifications (including stacked panel regressions in "levels" rather than a model in stacked first differences); *vi*) controlling for the (instrumented) simultaneous inflow of southern born white migrants; *vii*) accounting for contemporaneous TV entry and connection to the radio; *viii*) addressing potential concerns related to heterogeneous treatment effects in generalized difference-in-differences designs (De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021); and *ix*) clustering standard errors at the CZ level or applying the correction procedure in Adao et al. (2019). We also perform a number of checks to probe the robustness of results on newspaper mentions (see Section 6.3 in the main text).

Finally, we document that CD-level results: *i*) are not influenced by pre-existing trends; *ii*) are robust to using different timing conventions to map Black inflows to Congress periods; *iii*) are unchanged when restricting the sample to CDs that span only the counties included in our balanced sample; and, *iv*) are unlikely to be driven by strategic gerrymandering.

D.1 Addressing White Flight

As discussed in the main text, a potential concern with our findings is that Black in-migration triggered white flight among northern residents (Boustan, 2010). This scenario would be problematic because our estimates would conflate the causal effect of the Great Migration with compositional changes in the county electorate due to whites' out-migration. In what follows, we provide different pieces of evidence that, in our sample, the Great Migration was not associated with white departures at the county level.

In column 8 of Table 2, we already replicated the preferred county-level specification using as geographic unit the CZ, which contains both central cities and the neighboring suburbs.[77] Reassuringly, the effects of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share remain statistically significant and become, if anything, larger in magnitude.[78] Next, to more directly inspect the presence of white flight, we replicate the analysis conducted in Boustan (2010) for the counties in our sample. We regress the decadal change in white population against the corresponding change in Black population. We consider the number of white and Black residents both to make our analysis directly comparable to that in Boustan (2010) and because this is the most appropriate specification to examine the migration response of northern residents (see also Peri and Sparber, 2011, and Shertzer and Walsh, 2019). We report 2SLS results in Panel A of Table D.1, presenting the associated first stage in Panel B.

We start from a parsimonious specification, which only includes interactions between state and period dummies (column 1). Panel B verifies that the instrument is strong, and the F-stat is well above conventional levels.[79] Turning to Panel A, 2SLS coefficients are positive, quantitatively small, and imprecisely estimated. In column 2, we include the same set of controls as in our preferred specification (see Section 5.1 in the paper). Also in this case, Black in-migration is associated with a small, positive, and imprecisely estimated effect on white population.

The bottom rows of Table D.1 report the average 1940 white population and the

[77] CZs have become the standard measure of "labor markets" in the US at least since the work by Autor and Dorn (2013). CZs were developed by Tolbert and Sizer (1996) using commuting patterns to create clusters of counties characterized by strong commuting ties within CZs and weak commuting ties across CZs.

[78] Coefficients for turnout are no longer statistically significant, but the point estimate remains close to that reported in the main text.

[79] The point estimate in Panel B indicates that one additional predicted Black migrant is associated with 2.5 more Black residents in the county. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than, but in line with, that reported in Boustan (2010).

average change in Black and white population during the period for the counties in our sample. The coefficient in column 2 (Panel A) implies that 1,000 more Black residents in a county – or, half of the average change in Black population over the period – were associated with around 300 more white residents. Considering that, on average, the 1940 white population was 62,760, this represents a negligible change (0.4% relative to the baseline white population). Columns 3 and 4 show that results are robust to including only counties with baseline urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320), and to interacting the 1940 urban share of the population with period dummies. Results are also unchanged when estimating long-difference regressions (Table D.2).

Two observations help reconcile our findings with those in Boustan (2010). First, Boustan (2010) focuses on central city to suburb migration, fixing city boundaries to 1940, whereas we consider counties. Second, the (historical) central city-suburb divide does not overlap with county boundaries; hence, the reallocation of white population *between* central cities and suburbs was likely absorbed *within* counties. Table D.3 provides evidence consistent with this conjecture. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2, we restrict attention to the 110 counties that are included in the MSAs considered in Boustan (2010), and replicate our previous analysis. Also in this sample, the Great Migration had no effect on changes in white population. In columns 3 and 4, we instead focus on central cities, and define the dependent variable as the change in white population living there. Now, as in Boustan (2010), Black in-migration becomes strongly associated with white out-migration.[80]

This analysis indicates that, at the county level, Black in-migration did not trigger white out-migration. However, one may still be concerned that the Great Migration led to selective white departures, which altered the composition of white residents. To address this possibility we proceed as follows. First, we collect data from the 5% sample of the 1960 Census of Population and from the full count Census of 1940.[81] Given the limited sample size and geographic coverage of the 1960 Census, we aggregate the data to the CZ and conduct the analysis at this level.[82] Next, restricting attention to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school, we create the share of residents in

[80]Results are unchanged when estimating long difference regressions (Table D.4).

[81]For 1950 and 1970, only a 1% sample is available, limiting substantially the geographic coverage of the datasets.

[82]Not all CZs spanning the counties in our sample can be identified in the 1960 Census. Table D.5 shows that restricting attention to the sample of CZs that can be identified in the 1960 Census leaves our political results unchanged.

this group who were: *i*) high skilled; *ii*) employed in manufacturing; and, *iii*) in the labor force. To account for potential changes in the age structure of white residents, we also create the share of white individuals who are, respectively, above the age of 65 and below the age of 35. Finally, we estimate long difference regressions, where the 1940 to 1960 change in each of the variables above is regressed against the corresponding (instrumented) change in the Black population share, including our preferred set of controls. 2SLS and first stage results are reported, respectively, in Panels A and B of Table D.6. The coefficient on the change in the Black population share is always imprecisely estimated, quantitatively small, and does not display any consistent pattern across outcomes.

Using the approach just described, in columns 6 to 8 of Table D.6, we also show that Black inflows did not increase labor market competition for white residents.[83] This confirms existing evidence that northern labor markets were highly segmented along racial lines, and African Americans rarely – if at all – directly competed for jobs with whites (Boustan, 2009).

[83] As before, we restrict attention to men of age 18 or more who were not in school. Since data on employment, occupation, or wages are separately available by race (and gender or age) only from micro-censuses, we focus on years 1940 and 1960, and conduct the analysis at the CZ level.

Table D.1. Black in-Migration and Change in White Population

Dependent Variable	Change White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black	0.349	0.339	0.307	0.270
Population	(0.349)	(0.349)	(0.347)	(0.365)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black	2.436***	2.459***	2.475***	2.436***
Population	(0.352)	(0.341)	(0.330)	(0.344)
F-Stat	47.87	51.88	56.26	50.15
Observations	3,789	3,789	1,896	3,789
Baseline Controls		X	X	X
High Urban			X	
Urban Share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	1,942	1,942	3,750	1,942
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	62,760	62,760	107,291	62,760
Avg. Change White Pop.	9,362	9,362	15,951	9,362

Notes: The sample is a panel of the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B, respectively. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including interactions between period dummies and the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table D.2. Black in-Migration and Change in White Population (Long Differences)

Dependent Variable	Change White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. 2SLS				
Change Black population	0.364	0.353	0.321	0.286
	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.324)	(0.341)
Panel B. First Stage				
Predicted Change Black population	2.460***	2.484***	2.501***	2.461***
	(0.340)	(0.330)	(0.319)	(0.332)
F-Stat	52.30	56.76	61.50	55.06
Observations	1,263	1,263	632	1,263
Baseline controls		X	X	X
High urban			X	
Urban share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	5,828	5,828	11,251	5,828
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	62,760	62,760	107,291	62,760
Avg. Change White Pop.	28,086	28,086	47,853	28,086

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B, respectively. The dependent variable is the 1940-1970 change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Columns 2 to 4 further include *i*) the 1940 Black population share; and *ii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.3. Black in-Migration and White Flight

Dependent Variable	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Population	0.238	0.342	-2.103***	-2.161***
	(0.324)	(0.305)	(0.413)	(0.431)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black	2.821***	2.753***	1.432***	1.443***
Population	(0.280)	(0.295)	(0.150)	(0.174)
F-stat	101.4	87.18	91.27	68.81
Observations	330	330	153	153
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	18,554	18,554	23,745	23,745
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	368,851	368,851	584,749	584,749
Avg. Change White Pop.	55,003	55,003	-21,961	-21,961

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 110 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the 51 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B, respectively. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) the 1940 Black population share; and *ii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level (resp. MSA level), in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.4. Black in-Migration and White Flight (Long Differences)

Dependent Variable	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Population	0.247	0.347	-1.784***	-1.682***
	(0.307)	(0.288)	(0.295)	(0.279)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change	2.828***	2.762***	1.584***	1.748***
Population	(0.294)	(0.312)	(0.151)	(0.181)
F-stat	92.81	78.30	109.4	93.66
Observations	110	110	51	51
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	55,662	55,662	120,055	120,055
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	368,851	368,851	584,749	584,749
Avg. Change White Pop.	165,009	165,009	-65,884	-65,884

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 110 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of Southern states) contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the 51 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B, respectively. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include: *i*) the 1940 Black population share; and ii) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level (resp. MSA level), in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.5. Congressional Elections (CZ), Restricted Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	2.015***	2.083***	0.665	0.901*
	(0.626)	(0.620)	(0.459)	(0.492)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change	0.859***	0.996***	0.859***	0.996***
Black Share	(0.283)	(0.319)	(0.283)	(0.319)
Sample	Baseline	Restricted (1960 Census)	Baseline	Restricted (1960 Census)
F-Stat	9.209	9.765	9.209	9.765
Observations	1,200	351	1,200	351

Notes: The table replicates the CZ level results reported in Table 2 (column 8) by restricting the sample to CZs for which 1960 US Census data are available. Columns 2 and 4 report the results for the restricted sample while columns 1 and 3 show baseline results. The dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (resp. turnout) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. in columns 3 and 4). Panel B reports first stage coefficients. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.6. Black in-Migration and Changes in Whites' Characteristics

	(1) High Skilled	(2) In Manufacture	(3) In Labor Force	(4) 65+	(5) 35-	(6) Employed	(7) Log Occupational Scores	(8) Log Wages
Panel A: 2SLS								
Change Black Share	0.466	0.213	0.116	0.014	-0.505	0.081	0.001	0.019
	(0.380)	(0.584)	(0.297)	(0.243)	(0.437)	(0.348)	(0.006)	(0.056)
Panel B: First Stage								
Predicted Change Black Share	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***	0.904***
	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.272)
F-stat	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42
Observations	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
1940 Mean Dep. Variable	13.48	21.38	85.80	11.51	40.78	78.33	3.113	6.045
Avg. Change Black Share	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895

Notes: In columns 1 to 3 and column 6 the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 not enrolled in school who are: i) high skilled (column 1); ii) employed in manufacturing (column 2); iii) in the labor force (column 3); and v) employed (column 6). In column 4 (resp. 5) the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 who are 65 or older (resp. 35 or younger). In columns 7 and 8, the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the log occupational score and in log wages for white men above 18 not enrolled in school. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The analysis is restricted to the 117 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.2 Push Factors Instrument

D.2.1 Instrument Construction and Zeroth Stage

Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the "shifts" – in our case, decadal Black migration from each southern state – are exogenous to local conditions. They propose a correction method, where the "shift-share" instrument is expressed in terms of the "shift" components. This method, however, can be implemented only when the number of "shifts" is large. In our setting, we can only rely on 14 southern states, and so we cannot directly implement the transformation proposed in Borusyak et al. (2021).

Nevertheless, we provide evidence that southern (state) migration flows are orthogonal to northern (county) conditions. We construct a modified version of the instrument that, rather than using actual Black out-migration, estimates it exploiting variation solely induced by local push factors. Following Boustan (2010, 2016) and Derenoncourt (2021), we model emigration from each southern county for each decade between 1940 and 1970 as a function of local push factors. In particular, we estimate an equation of the form

$$mig_{kj\tau} = \alpha_j + \beta_\tau Push_{kjt_0} + u_{kj\tau} \tag{3}$$

where $mig_{kj\tau}$ is the Black net migration rate in county k of southern state j during decade τ, and $Push_{kjt_0}$ is a vector of economic and political conditions at baseline, which we allow to have a time-varying effect across decades. These include the 1940: share of land cultivated in cotton; share of farms operated by tenants; share of the labor force in, respectively, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. As in Boustan (2016), we also include WWII spending per capita and the 1948 vote share of Strom Thurmond in Presidential elections.[84]

Our most preferred specification includes state fixed effects, α_j, but results are unchanged when omitting them (see also Boustan, 2016). Finally, in contrast with Boustan (2010, 2016), we fix the characteristics of southern counties to 1940 (or, for Thurmond vote share, 1948) rather than using the beginning of each decade to reduce concerns of correlated shocks between northern and southern counties.[85] As an

[84]Data on the cotton share comes from the Census of Agriculture, the vote share of Thurmond was taken from David Leip's Atlas, while all remaining variables were collected from the County Databooks.

[85]Following Boustan (2016), in counties where the Black migration rate was above 100, we replace it with the latter value. We also exclude counties with less than 30 Black residents in 1940. All results are robust to relaxing these restrictions.

additional robustness check, we also selected the southern county characteristics to predict Black out-migration using the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator ("LASSO"), as done in Derenoncourt (2021). Below, we report results obtained using this alternative procedure to construct the push version of the instrument.

Results from equation (3) are reported in Table D.7. Columns 1 to 3 refer to, respectively, the 1940-1950, the 1950-1960, and the 1960-1970 decade. All coefficients have the expected sign. A higher share of land in cotton in 1940 is associated with subsequent emigration. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1940-1950 decade, possibly because cotton mechanization was more prevalent in the 1950s (Grove and Heinicke, 2003). As in Boustan (2016), a higher share of the labor force in mining and agriculture is associated with a larger emigration rate in all decades. Similarly, reflecting a more hostile political environment, counties with a higher vote share for Thurmond in 1948 are predicted to have a higher emigration rate, even though the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1950s. Finally, consistent with WWII spending increasing labor demand, the Black in-migration rate is higher in counties with more WWII contracts during the 1940s (but, as expected, not in subsequent decades).[86]

After estimating equation (3), we construct the predicted number of migrants by multiplying the fitted values from (3) by the beginning of decade Black population. We then aggregate these (predicted) flows to obtain the predicted number of Black migrants from each state in each decade, $B\hat{l}_{s\tau}$. Finally, we replace the actual number of Black migrants, $Bl_{s\tau}$, with this predicted value to construct a modified version of the shift-share instrument in equation (2) in the main text.

D.2.2 Results

Table D.8 replicates our preferred specification for the Democratic vote share (columns 1-2) and turnout (columns 3-4) using the push-factor version of the instrument. In Panel A, we present 2SLS estimates, while in panel B we present the associated first stage. Columns 1 and 3, report results obtained using the push instrument constructed with the southern characteristics described above in the zeroth stage. Columns 2 and 4 turn to the version of the push instrument obtained by selecting predictors of southern Black out-migration with the LASSO procedure (Derenoncourt, 2021).

Reassuringly, both versions of the instrument are strong, with the KP F-stat above

[86] All other coefficients have the expected signs.

conventional levels. Moreover, the 2SLS estimates are in line with – in fact, for the Democratic vote share, stronger than – those presented in the main text.

Table D.7. Zeroth Stage

Dependent Variable	Net Black Migration Rate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share Land in Cotton	-0.191	-0.271**	-0.324***
	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.094)
Share Farms with Tenants	0.056	-0.009	-0.158**
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.064)
WWII Spending per Capita	1.984***	0.361	-0.216
	(0.331)	(0.364)	(0.299)
Thurmond Vote Share	-0.163***	-0.042	-0.254***
	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.051)
Share LF in Manufacturing	-0.342***	-0.195**	-0.111
	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Share LF in Mining	-0.326	-0.506***	-0.536***
	(0.218)	(0.181)	(0.206)
Share LF in Agriculture	-0.447***	-0.446***	-0.174***
	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.054)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.226	0.212	0.164
Observations	1,235	1,235	1,235
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the net Black migration rate for southern counties for each decade indicated at the bottom of the table. All regressors refer to 1940, except for Thurmond vote share, which is the vote share of Thurmond in 1948 Presidential elections, and WWII spending per capita, which is measured over the entire WWII period. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.8. Replicating Results with Push Instrument

Dependent Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	2.196***	2.590***	0.791**	0.690**
	(0.519)	(0.662)	(0.334)	(0.326)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.848***	0.781***	0.848***	0.781***
	(0.260)	(0.247)	(0.260)	(0.247)
F-stat	10.65	10.02	10.65	10.02
10.65	10.02			
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
3,789	3,789			
Push Instrument	Baseline	LASSO	Baseline	LASSO

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6) using the version of the instrument constructed with southern specific "push" factors. Columns 1, and 3 (resp. columns 2-4) report results for the "push" instrument constructed using the baseline (resp. LASSO) procedure. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, and turnout. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.3 Alternative Instrument: Linked Data Initial Black Shares

In this section, we construct an alternative instrument using a county-to-county (rather than a state-to-county) migration matrix. Using the linked dataset made available by Abramitzky et al. (2020), we consider African Americans who were living in a southern county in 1910 and who had moved to another county by 1930. We choose this time frame because it spans the two decades during which the First Great Migration occurred, but results are robust to using other time windows as well.[87] For each (non-southern) county in our sample, we then compute the number of African Americans who were living in that county in 1930 and originated from any southern county.[88] We scale this by the total number of African

[87]This approach is similar to that used in Derenoncourt (2021), but has the advantage of including migrants that moved between 1910 and 1930, rather than only between 1935 and 1940.

[88]As documented in Dahis et al. (2020), this time period was characterized by a high "passing rate", with African Americans changing their racial identity so as to "pass for whites". We keep only African Americans whose race was coded as "Black" in both 1910 and 1930.

Americans who were living in the (southern) origin county in 1910 and moved to another county by 1930. We take these as our "initial Black settlements". They are identical, in spirit, to those used to construct the baseline instrument, but vary at the county-to-county (rather than state-to-county) level.[89]

Then, we proceed as before: for each origin, we interact the initial share of African Americans in each non-southern county in our sample with the decadal number of Black migrants who left the southern county in each decade between 1940 and 1970. We thus obtain the predicted number of Black migrants who moved to a non-southern county in each decade from each southern county. Aggregating this across all origins, we obtain the decadal predicted number of African American migrants, which we then scale by the 1940 (non-southern) county population to recover the predicted change in the Black population share. We construct two versions of this alternative instrument: one that uses actual migration flows; and, one that instead uses the predicted flows computed in Appendix D.2 above.

While this instrument rests on initial shares that are constructed using a linked sample, and may thus be at least partly "selected" (Bailey et al., 2020), it has a key advantage: it implies that the shift-share instrument now depends on a very large (more than 1,200) number of shifts. As discussed above, Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the "shifts" – in our case, decadal Black migration from each southern origin – are exogenous to local conditions. Thus, as long as out-migration flows across southern counties are uncorrelated with changes in the political conditions of specific non-southern counties, the identifying assumption of the instrument is not violated. Using predicted rather than actual county out-migration flows further corroborates support for the validity of this condition.

In Table D.9 (Panel A), we replicate our baseline results using the two versions of the alternative instrument just described, focusing on the Democratic vote share and turnout in columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 respectively.[90] Columns 1 and 4 replicate the baseline specification reported in Table 2 (column 6) in the main text. Columns 2 and 5 (resp. columns 3 and 6) show that results remain similar when considering the alternative version, constructed with the actual (resp. predicted) southern decadal migration flows.

Together with results in Appendix D.2, this exercise increases the confidence that our main findings are not driven by local pull shocks simultaneously correlated with the pre-1940 distribution of Black settlements across northern counties.

[89] As for the baseline instrument, the denominator of the initial shares of African Americans includes all individuals from the origin county who were living in any other county – in or out the US South – by 1930.

[90] Panel B reports the first stage. When using the alternative instrument that relies on predicted migration flows, the F-stat falls slightly below conventional levels.

Table D.9. Replicating Results with IV based on Linked Data

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.660***	1.911***	0.756**	0.678**	0.689**
	(0.439)	(0.316)	(0.378)	(0.348)	(0.339)	(0.338)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change	0.758***	1.693***	1.870***	0.758***	1.693***	1.870***
Black Share	(0.233)	(0.511)	(0.646)	(0.233)	(0.511)	(0.646)
F-stat	10.57	10.95	8.385	10.57	10.95	8.385
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Instrument	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification using the version of the instrument constructed with the linked sample from Abramitzky et al. (2020), for which a county-to-county migration matrix is used to define the initial Black population shares. Columns 1 and 4 replicate the baseline specification reported in Table 2 (column 6). Columns 2 and 5 (resp. columns 3 and 6) report results with the alternative instrument using actual (resp. predicted) migration flows. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share and turnout. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.4 Local Pull Shocks and Predicted Economic Growth

In Table D.10, we investigate if the instrument constructed in equation (2) in the main text is correlated with county-specific pull factors. We consider two such factors that might have been particularly relevant in this context: WWII contracts and New Deal spending.[91] As discussed in Boustan (2016), the surge in demand across northern and western factories triggered by WWII was one of the pull factors of the Great Migration. Similarly, the generosity of New Deal spending might have influenced the location decision of African Americans prior to 1940, while at the same time having long-lasting effects on political conditions across northern counties.

The dependent variable in Table D.10 is the change in predicted Black in-migration, scaled by 1940 county population. The main regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita (Panel A) and generosity of New Deal (Panel B). Columns 1 to 3 consider each decade separately, whereas column 4 focuses on the long difference (1940-1970) change in predicted Black in-migration. We always include the set of controls used in our most preferred specification – i.e., state dummies, the 1940 Black population share, and a dummy equal to 1 if in 1940 the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republican vote share in Congressional elections – and weigh regressions by 1940 county population. Reassuringly, in all cases the coefficient is imprecisely estimated and quantitatively small.

To further mitigate concerns that the instrument may be spuriously correlated with economic pull shocks, in Table D.11, we augment the baseline specification by separately controlling for a measure of labor demand growth predicted using a Bartik-type approach (similar to, e.g., Sequeira et al., 2020, and Tabellini, 2020). Restricting attention to non-southern counties, we first compute the 1940 share of employment in each 1-digit industry in each county; then, we interact these initial shares with the national growth rate of employment in that industry.[92] To ease comparison, we report the baseline 2SLS specification in columns 1 and 3 for Democratic vote share and turnout, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 verify that results remain quantitatively similar, in fact slightly larger, when including the Bartik measure of predicted labor demand.

[91] WWII contracts refer to 1940-1945 war-related spending (including contracts for: equipment, industrial production facilities, and military facilities) relative to 1940 county population. New Deal spending is defined as New Deal grants (Relief, Public Works, Farm Programs, and Housing) relative to 1930 county population.

[92] To more precisely proxy for labor demand shocks in non-southern industries, we compute the national growth rate for the non-South only. Results are unchanged when including the US South to compute national demand growth.

Table D.10. Placebo Check: Key Pull Forces

Dependent Variable	Predicted Change in Black Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: WWII				
Spending Per Capita	0.049	0.033	0.026	0.108
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.116)
Panel B: New Deal				
Spending Per Capita	-0.122	-0.103	-0.057	-0.283
	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.084)	(0.250)
Observations	1,263	1,263	1,263	1,263
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970	1940-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 county population. Each column considers the period specific to the decade reported at the bottom of the table. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. In Panels A and B, the regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita and New Deal spending per capita, respectively. See Appendix C for a detailed description of the two variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p$<$ 0.01, ** p$<$ 0.05, * p$<$ 0.1.

Table D.11. Replicating Results Controlling for Predicted Economic Growth

Dependent Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	1.885***	2.135***	0.756**	1.010**
	(0.439)	(0.584)	(0.348)	(0.459)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.781***	0.758***	0.781***
	(0.233)	(0.247)	(0.233)	(0.247)
F-stat	10.57	10.02	10.57	10.02
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Control	Baseline	Economic Growth	Baseline	Economic Growth

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Table 2 (column 6) controlling for a measure of labor demand growth predicted using a Bartik type approach, as described in the main text. To ease comparisons, columns 1 and 3 report the baseline specification. Columns 2 and 4 augment the regressions with the additional Bartik control. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in columns 1-2 (resp. 3-4). All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.5 Testing for Pre-Trends

In Table D.12, we perform a key placebo check, and show that there is no correlation between pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest and the (instrumented) change in the Black population share.[93] Table D.12 reports results for the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6). To ease comparisons, columns 1 and 4 present the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6); next, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate our analysis restricting attention to counties for which "pre-trends" regressions can be estimated.[94] Results remain very similar to those in the baseline sample. Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends, regressing the 1930 to 1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black population share. Reassuringly, the coefficient is not statistically significant and very different from that estimated in the baseline specification.

[93] Appendix D.9 below conducts a similar test (at the CD level) for legislators' ideology.

[94] 18 counties in our sample did not have data for Congressional elections in 1930.

Table D.12. Testing for Pre-Trends: Congressional Elections

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.955***	0.185	0.756**	0.734**	0.017
	(0.439)	(0.452)	(0.369)	(0.348)	(0.343)	(0.255)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.765***	0.842***	0.758***	0.765***	0.842***
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.250)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.250)
F-Stat	10.57	10.77	10.53	10.57	10.77	10.53
Observations	3,789	3,735	1,245	3,789	3,735	1,245
Specification	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends

Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates for the change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in columns 1 and 3 (resp. 4 and 6). Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification (see Table 2, column 6). Columns 2 and 5 replicate the baseline specification restricting attention to counties for which the change in the Democratic vote share and turnout between 1934 and 1940 can be computed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate first difference regressions for the 1930-1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black population share. Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.6 Differential Trends by County Characteristics

In Table D.13, we address concerns that 1940 Black settlements (from each southern state) might be correlated with county-specific characteristics that had a time varying effect on changes in political conditions. We interact period dummies with several 1940 or time invariant county characteristics. Column 1 replicates the baseline specification estimated in Table 2 (column 6) in the main text. For completeness, we also report first stage estimates at the bottom of each table. Columns 2, 3, and 4 include a set of time-invariant geographic controls interacted with decade dummies: latitude and longitude of county centroid, distance from the Mason-Dixon line, and distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (Dippel and Heblich, 2021). In all cases, coefficients remain statistically significant and quantitatively close to those estimated in the baseline specification. This exercise assuages the potential concern

that the instrument may be correlated with distance from key locations (including the US South) that might also influence the evolution of political ideology in northern counties.

Columns 5 to 7 augment the baseline specification by including interactions between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: *i*) male employment to population ratio; *ii*) share of employment in manufacturing; and, *iii*) urban share. The coefficient remains statistically significant and, for both the Democratic vote share and turnout, increases in magnitude when adding the manufacturing share of employment and the urban share of the population.[95]

[95]Even in these cases, however, the coefficient is not statistically different from that obtained from the baseline specification (column 1). In columns 6 and 7, the KP F-stat falls below conventional levels, due to the stringent nature of the exercise performed, but, again the results are qualitatively unchanged. Moreover, results are unchanged when using identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals, reported in the case of weak instrument, as suggested in Andrews et al. (2019).

Table D.13. Congressional Elections: Controlling for 1940 County Characteristics

	(1) 2SLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share							
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.929***	1.959***	1.892***	1.841***	2.206***	2.710***
	(0.439)	(0.476)	(0.461)	(0.440)	(0.423)	(0.657)	(0.913)
Panel B: Change in Turnout							
Change Black Share	0.756**	0.812**	0.745**	0.759**	0.770**	0.869*	1.456**
	(0.348)	(0.396)	(0.347)	(0.348)	(0.349)	(0.451)	(0.743)
Panel C: First Stage							
Predicted Change	0.758***	0.723***	0.743***	0.756***	0.761***	0.598***	0.458***
Black share	(0.233)	(0.232)	(0.229)	(0.228)	(0.234)	(0.217)	(0.175)
Control	Baseline	Coordinates	Distance Mason	Distance 48ers City	Employment to Population	Manufacturing Share	Urban Share
F-Stat	10.57	9.744	10.53	11.03	10.57	7.614	6.87
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Panel A (resp. Panel B) for the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) results reported in Table 2 (column 6). Column 1 reports baseline results. The remaining columns include the interaction between period dummies and, respectively: *i*) latitude and longitude of county centroid (column 2); *ii*) distance from the Mason-Dixon line (column 3); *iii*) distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (column 4); *iv*) the 1940 male employment to population ratio (column 5); *v*) the 1940 share of employment in manufacturing (column 6); and *vi*) the 1940 urban share (column 7). Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7 Additional Robustness Checks

D.7.1 Results for the Unbalanced Sample

As discussed in Section 3 of the main text, data on Congressional elections are not consistently available for all counties – a problem that is particular evident for California (see Figure 2 in the main text). In our analysis, we consider a strongly balanced sample, which includes only the counties for which data on Congressional elections were available in all Census decades from 1940 to 1970. We now verify that results are unchanged when including all counties for which outcomes are available in at least one Census decade.

Figures D.1 and D.2 plot the distribution of the 1940-1970 change in the Black population share (Panel A) and the 1940 Black population share (Panel B) for the balanced sample used in the main paper and the unbalanced sample of counties for which electoral outcomes are available in at least one decade, respectively.[96] The sample included in Figure D.2 covers a higher number of counties (and, almost the entire state of California, which is instead missing – except for 4 counties – in our baseline sample).

Table D.14 replicates our results including the additional counties. To ease comparisons, columns 1 and 3 report the baseline estimates (Table 2, column 6). Columns 2 and 4 show that our results are very similar when considering the unbalanced sample. In the case of turnout (column 4), the coefficient becomes smaller and less precisely estimated. However, and most importantly for us, neither the magnitude nor the precision of coefficients for the Democratic vote share is significantly affected.

[96] As noted in the paper, we always restrict attention to counties with at least one African American resident in 1940.

Figure D.1. Black Population Share - Balanced Sample

Panel A: Change (1940-1970)



Panel B: Baseline (1940)



Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black population share and the 1940 Black population share of the county population in Panels A and B, respectively. The sample is restricted to the 1,263 non-southern counties in the fully balanced (baseline) dataset. *Source:* Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Figure D.2. Black Population Share - Unbalanced Sample

Panel A: Change (1940-1970)



Panel B: Baseline (1940)



Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black population share and the 1940 Black population share of the county population in Panels A and B, respectively. The sample includes the 1,328 non-southern counties for which electoral outcomes are available in at least one decade. *Source:* Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020).

Table D.14. Congressional Elections, Unbalanced Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.653***	0.756**	0.371*
	(0.439)	(0.279)	(0.348)	(0.224)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	1.177***	0.758***	1.177***
	(0.233)	(0.313)	(0.233)	(0.313)
F-stat	10.57	14.17	10.57	14.17
Observations	3,789	3,900	3,789	3,900
Sample	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Table 2 (column 6) - which is reported in columns 1 and 3 - focusing on the unbalanced sample (columns 2 and 4). The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share and turnout. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.2 Controlling for 1940 Democratic Vote Share

In our baseline analysis, we interact period dummies with a dummy equal to 1 if the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was greater than the Republican one to allow counties to be on different trends depending on Democratic incumbency (and potentially deal with mean reversion). To more flexibly account for initial support for the Democratic Party, in column 2 of Table D.15, we replicate the baseline analysis (reported in column 1 to ease comparisons) by interacting the 1940 Democratic vote share with period dummies. Results are virtually unchanged.

D.7.3 Dropping Potential Outliers

As discussed in the main text, some areas of the US North and West, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, received a disproportionately large inflow of Black migrants between 1940 and 1970. Others, instead, received very few African Americans. In our main analysis we omit counties with zero Black individuals in 1940, so as to compare counties that received different numbers of migrants with each other (and exclude from this comparison counties

that did not have any Black resident in 1940). We now show that all results are robust to restricting the sample in different ways.

First, in columns 3 and 4 of Table D.15, we restrict attention to counties for which the predicted and the actual Black population share was strictly positive in all decades between 1940 and 1970. Not surprisingly, results are unchanged. Next, in column 5 (resp. 6), we exclude counties at the top 1^{st} (resp. 5^{th}) and at the bottom 99^{th} (resp. 95^{th}) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration. Also in this case, results remain in line with those of our baseline specification.

D.7.4 Controlling for Southern White In-Migration

Yet another potential concern is that Black in-migration might be correlated with simultaneous white inflows from the South. As documented in Gregory (2006) among others, between 1940 and 1970 even more whites than Black Americans left the US South. The historical evidence suggests that African Americans were significantly more likely than whites to settle in metropolitan areas either in the Northeast or in the West, while white migration was more evenly distributed across the non-South (Gregory, 1995). However, it is still possible that the patterns of white and Black migration from the South were correlated with each other. If this were to be the case, at least part of our findings might be due to the arrival of white – rather than Black – migrants. Due to data limitations, we cannot measure the actual change in southern born white migrants after 1940 at the county level. However, to at least partly overcome this problem, we construct a predicted measure of white in-migration from the US South implementing the same procedure used to construct the instrument for Black in-migration (see equation (2) in the main text).

Specifically, we first compute the share of whites born in each southern state who were living in a non-southern county as of 1940. Next, we interact these shares with the number of white migrants from each southern state in each decade between 1940 and 1970. Finally, for each non-southern county and for each decade, we sum the predicted number of whites moving from each origin over all southern states to obtain the total number of (predicted) white migrants moving to county c during decade τ. In formulas, this measure is given by:

$$ZW_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in South} sh^{w}_{jc} Wh_{j\tau} \tag{4}$$

where sh^{w}_{jc} is the share of whites born in southern state j and living in non-southern county c in 1940, relative to all whites born in j living outside this state; and $Wh_{j\tau}$ is the number of whites who left southern state j during decade τ.

Then, in column 7 of Table D.15, we augment our baseline specification by separately

controlling for the predicted southern white in-migration. Reassuringly, in all cases, results are similar to those in our preferred specification.

Table D.15. Additional Robustness Checks: Congressional Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share							
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.887***	1.904***	1.895***	2.028***	2.478***	2.168***
	(0.439)	(0.385)	(0.447)	(0.442)	(0.498)	(0.529)	(0.510)
Panel B: Change in Turnout							
Change Black Share	0.756**	0.637**	0.795**	0.761**	0.675*	0.481	0.558*
	(0.348)	(0.300)	(0.356)	(0.349)	(0.390)	(0.354)	(0.330)
Panel C: First Stage							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.834***	0.747***	0.755***	0.771***	0.774***	0.710***
	(0.233)	(0.241)	(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.264)	(0.229)	(0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	11.97	10.41	10.51	8.512	11.45	9.260
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,129	3,549	3,712	3,446	3,789
Specification	Baseline	1940 Dem Vote Share	Drop IV Equal to 0	Drop Black Share Equal to 0	Trim Top 99 and Bottom 1 Pctile	Trim Top 95 and Bottom 5 Pctile	Southern White In-migration

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Table 2, column 6 (which is also reported in column 1) by: *i*) replacing the interaction between period dummies and the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy with that with the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (column 2); *ii*) considering only counties with predicted (resp. actual) Black population share strictly positive in all decades in column 3 (resp. column 4); *iii*) trimming counties at the top 1^{st} (resp. 5^{th}) and at the bottom 99^{th} (resp. 95^{th}) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration in column 5 (resp. column 6); and *iv*) controlling for predicted southern white in-migration (column 7). Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.5 Additional Outcomes

In the paper, we focus on the Democratic vote share as the main electoral outcome of interest. In Table D.16, we verify that results are unchanged when considering different proxies for support for the Democratic Party in Congressional elections. Column 1 presents our main 2SLS results for the Democratic vote share (Table 2, column 6). Next in columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is defined respectively as the Democratic vote margin and as a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was larger than the Republicans vote share. In both cases, Black in-migration is associated with an increase in support for the Democratic Party.

Table D.16. Additional Outcomes: Congressional Elections

Dependent Variable	Change in		
	Democratic Vote Share	Democrats-Republicans Vote Margin	1[Higher Democratic Vote Share]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: 2SLS			
Change Black Share	1.885***	3.651***	0.050***
	(0.439)	(0.875)	(0.013)
Panel B: First Stage			
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Table 2, column 6 (which is also reported in column 1). In columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is, respectively, the Democrats-Republicans vote margin in Congressional elections, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections. Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.6 Stacked Panel Specification

In this section, we verify that our results are robust to estimating stacked panel regressions separately controlling for county fixed effects, rather than taking the model in

(stacked) first differences. Specifically, we stack the data for the four decades between 1940 to 1970 (included), and run a regression of the form:

$$y_{ct} = \xi_c + \delta_{st} + \beta Bl_{ct} + \gamma X_{ct} + u_{ct} \tag{5}$$

where y_{ct} refers to the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections or to the probability of CORE demonstrations in county c in year t, ξ_c and δ_{st} are county and state by year fixed effects, and Bl_{ct} is the Black population share in county c in year t. As for the stacked first difference specification, X_{ct} includes interactions between period dummies and baseline Black population share and Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections.[97]

In our baseline specification, we used predicted Black inflows in each decade to instrument for the change in Black population. However, when estimating equation (5), an instrument is needed for Black population in each year from 1940 to 1970. That is, 1940 can no longer be used as "baseline" year to predict Black inflows. Also, since we are now interested in Black population (relative county population) rather than in its change, we need an instrument for the stock – and not the change – of Black Americans in the county. We thus modify the baseline instrument constructed in the main text in two ways. First, we use 1930 settlements of African Americans across northern counties to apportion post-1930 out-migration from the South. Second, after predicting the inflow of Black migrants to county c in the ten years prior to year t, we recursively add previous predicted inflows to generate a measure of predicted stock.[98]

With this instrument at hand, we proceed to estimate equation (5) with 2SLS. We report results in Panel A of Table D.17, presenting the first stage in Panel B. Focusing on Democratic vote share and turnout respectively, we report the baseline (stacked first difference) specification in columns 1 and 3 to ease comparisons, and the stacked panel regressions in columns 2 and 4. The first stage remains strong, with the F-stat becoming slightly larger than in the baseline specification, and results for the Democratic vote share are again positive and statistically significant.[99] Since both the mean and the standard deviation of the Black population share differ from

[97] Since in a stacked panel setting 1940 is our first estimation year, we measure the baseline Black population share and Democratic incumbency in 1930. Results are unchanged if we measure both variables in 1940.

[98] As before, we scale the predicted number of Black migrants by 1940 county population. Results are unchanged when dividing it by 1930 population.

[99] The 2SLS coefficient for turnout is now imprecisely estimated, but the relative instability of coefficients for turnout was already something we noted in the main text.

those of its change, in Table D.17, we also report standardized beta coefficients to ease comparisons. As it appears, the point estimate for the Democratic vote share is now smaller than in the stacked first difference specification. However, and reassuringly, it remains quantitatively sizeable.

Table D.17. Stacked Panel Specification

Dependent Variable	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black	1.885***	1.082***	0.756**	0.203
Share	(0.439)	(0.164)	(0.348)	(0.168)
	[0.148]	[0.041]	[0.399]	[0.334]
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change	0.758***	1.162***	0.758***	1.162***
Black Share	(0.233)	(0.278)	(0.233)	(0.278)
F-stat	10.57	17.08	10.57	17.08
Observations	3,789	5,036	3,789	5,036
Specification	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel

Notes: The table replicates the baseline stacked first difference specification (Table 2, column 6) using a stacked panel specification. The dependent variable is the (resp. the change in) Democratic vote share and turnout in columns 2 and 4 (resp. in columns 1-3). Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population. Columns 1 and 3 include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. Columns 2 and 4 include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1930 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1934. Results in columns 2 and 4 are unchanged when including interactions using 1940 values (rather than pre-1940 values). Beta coefficients reported in square brackets. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

D.7.7 Controlling for TV Entry and Radio Exposure

In this section, we verify that our results for the effects of Black in-migration on the Democratic vote share are not driven by the simultaneous entry of TV or the extent to which counties were connected to the radio. It is possible, for instance, that counties that received more African Americans were also more likely to experience the entry of TV networks, which were rolled out across counties in a staggered fashion precisely during this historical period (Gentzkow, 2006). If TV networks allowed northern (Black and white) residents to learn about the conditions prevailing in the South, this channel, rather than the inflow of Black migrants, may be responsible for our political results. Similarly, if the instrument were correlated with the extent of radio connectivity across counties, and if the latter were to increase the chance of exposure to the "southern issue", our findings may be upward biased. On the opposite, if the instrument were correlated with either media outlet (or both), northern residents' attention may have been crowded out from the information brought about by Black migrants, resulting in downward bias in our estimates.

In Table D.18, we address these and related concerns, by replicating our preferred specification (Table 2, column 6) controlling for different proxies to media exposure. First, using data from Gentzkow (2006), we retrieve the first year in which the TV reached any given county.[100] We interact the first year of TV entry in a county with period dummies, reporting results in column 2 of Table D.18. Next, in column 3, we control for a dummy equal to one in all decades in which the TV was present in the county. In column 4, we replicate column 3 by creating a dummy equal to one only in the decade of TV entry (and zero otherwise). Reassuringly, in all cases coefficients remain similar to those from the baseline specification (reported in column 1 to ease comparisons).

In column 5, we turn to radio connectivity. For each county in 1940, we proxy for the strength of radio signal with the measure of signal path loss of affiliated radio stations as computed in Russo (2021).[101] We then interact this measure of radio connectivity with period dummies to allow counties to be on differential trends depending on their radio exposure. Also in this case, neither the magnitude nor the precision of coefficients

[100] The original data are at the Designated Market Area (DMA). We matched each county to the corresponding DMA using the cross-walk provided by Gentzkow (2006).

[101] This is a a standard measure used in the media literature (Gagliarducci et al., 2020; Wang, 2021), and is based on the technical characteristics of radio transmitters as well as on the topography of receiving areas. We thank Gianluca Russo for sharing the data on radio signal with us.

is affected. Finally, in column 6, we simultaneously control for the interaction between decade dummies and both *i*) the first year of TV entry, and *ii*) the 1940 signal loss. Once again, results are unchanged.

An additional concern, specific to pro-civil rights activism, may be that Black organizations and leaders in the Black community strategically chose to conduct rallies in counties that were being simultaneously connected to either the TV or the radio (or both). If this were the case, our CORE results may be biased. In contrast with this idea, however, we verify that the estimates for the activity of the CORE are unchanged, when controlling for TV entry and radio connectivity (Table D.18, Panel C). Overall, this exercise indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by the spurious correlation between Black in-migration and exposure to news outlets.

As discussed in the main text (Section 6.3), it is possible that the positive effects of the Great Migration on support for civil rights were amplified by the presence of TV and radio, which may have facilitated the spread of information about the conditions prevailing in the South and the coordination of Black organizations and their pro-civil rights activism. Due to space constraints, we are unable to examine this idea in our paper, and leave it to future research.

Table D.18. Replicating Results Controlling for TV and Radio Exposure

	(1) 2SLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share						
Change black	1.885***	1.752***	1.952***	1.975***	1.920***	1.799***
Share	(0.439)	(0.426)	(0.464)	(0.445)	(0.456)	(0.441)
Panel B: Change in Turnout						
Change black	0.756**	0.468*	0.774**	0.686*	0.815**	0.523*
Share	(0.348)	(0.253)	(0.360)	(0.353)	(0.371)	(0.295)
Panel C: Change in 1[CORE demonstrations]						
Change black	0.057***	0.054***	0.052***	0.059***	0.057***	0.053***
Share	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
F-Stat	10.57	15.67	10.30	10.62	10.15	13.12
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
TV entry year		X				X
TV in decade			X			
TV entry decade				X		
Radio Signal					X	X

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Tables 2 (column 6) and 4 (column 5), controlling for several measures capturing the county exposure to TV and radio. To ease comparisons, column 1 reports the baseline specification. The dependent variable is the change in: Democratic vote share (Panel A), turnout (Panel B), and the probability of CORE demonstrations (Panel C). In column 2 we control for the TV entry year, in column 3 for a dummy equal to one in all decades in which the TV was present in the county, in column 4 for a dummy equal to one only in the decade of TV entry, in column 5 for radio signal strenght. In column 6 we simultaneously add the TV and radio controls used in columns 2 and 5. All controls are interacted with period dummies. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: p¡ 0.01, p¡ 0.05, p¡ 0.1.

D.7.8 Treatment Heterogeneity in Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators

In this section, we address concerns on generalized difference-in-differences settings with staggered treatment adoption (in our case, differential changes in the Black population share over time and across space). A recent literature has shown that, in two-way fixed effects models, already-treated units are kept as controls (De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021). In the presence of heterogeneous effects across groups experiencing treatment at different points in time, this might introduce bias.[102] Addressing this concern in our setting poses two complications. First, in each period, a county receives a different (continuous) treatment – namely, the change in the Black population share. Second, we have to deal with the fact that we estimate our model with 2SLS. We thus pursue two different strategies.

We start by estimating the effect of Black in-migration separately in each decade. A decade-by-decade specification has the advantage of eliminating the problem that counties may be (differentially) treated at different points in time. Indeed, already treated counties cannot be used as controls for newly treated ones. Hence, changes in treatment effects over time are not subtracted from the difference-in-differences estimate, and cannot produce negative weights (see De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020, p. 2971-2972, and Goodman-Bacon, 2021, p.3). We present results in Table D.19, where we report the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6) in column 1 to ease comparisons, and the point estimate associated with each subsequent decade in columns 2 to 4. This exercise is also presented in Appendix E.1.1, where we comment on the interpretation of the results. Here, we simply note that, in all decades, the point estimate for the effect of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share is positive and, except for the the 1950s, quantitatively large and statistically significant.

Second, we perform a more stringent test that uses information in all decades, thereby exploiting all the variation in changes in the Black population share. We define a binary treatment variable, making sure that each newly treated unit is never compared to an already treated one for each decade. Specifically, we proceed as follows. First, we estimate the first stage of the change in the Black population share on the instrument, and obtain its best linear prediction. Next, we calculate the median of this prediction and define as treated (resp. controls) the units with values above (resp. below) the median. Then, for each decade, we verify that newly treated counties are

[102] More generally, two-way fixed effects estimates can be expressed as a weighed sum of the average treatment effects (ATE) in each group and period, with weights that may be negative (in which case, for example, the estimated coefficient may be negative while all the ATEs are positive).

compared to never treated ones, up to the relevant decade. That is, in the 1940s, treated counties are compared to the control group; in the 1950s, counties already treated in the 1940s are dropped, and the comparison occurs between counties newly treated in 1950s and counties that (according to our definition) are never treated up to the 1950s. The same procedure is applied to the 1960s. In the last step, the treatment and control groups for each decade are stacked into a single dataset, as in recent work by Gagliarducci and Tabellini (2021).

In Table D.20, we present two different sets of results, focusing on the Democratic vote share and on turnout in columns 1-3 and 4-6 respectively.[103] First, in columns 2 and 5, we estimate a reduced form specification that includes our preferred set of controls, but replaces the (instrumented) change in the Black population share with the dummy variable described above. The point estimate for the Democratic vote share (column 2) is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.[104] Second, in columns 3 and 6, we replicate our preferred 2SLS specification (Table 2, column 6) by restricting the sample to counties that were not "already treated" in previous decades, according to the binary treatment variable described in the previous paragraph. Reassuringly, the point estimate for the Democratic vote share (column 3) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.[105]

[103] To ease comparisons, columns 1 and 4 report results from the baseline specification.

[104] As explained above, for the binary treatment approach, we separately estimate the linear prediction in the first stage. For this reason, standard errors do not account for the fact that the regressor itself introduced additional sampling uncertainty. To address this issue, we report clustered, bootstrapped standard errors (obtained using 1,000 replications).

[105] If anything, the 2SLS coefficient for the Democratic vote share becomes slightly larger. The point estimates for turnout remain positive, but are less stable – a pattern already observed above.

Table D.19. Congressional Elections by Decade

Dependent Variable	Congressional Elections			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Democrat Vote Share				
Change Black Share	1.885***	2.944**	0.665	2.495**
	(0.439)	(1.480)	(0.557)	(1.247)
Panel B: Turnout				
Change Black Share	0.756**	0.979	0.125	1.431
	(0.348)	(0.701)	(0.642)	(1.166)
Panel C: First Stage				
Predicted Change	0.758***	0.792***	0.755***	0.726**
Black Share	(0.233)	(0.248)	(0.218)	(0.293)
F-stat	10.57	10.21	11.96	6.128
Observations	3,789	1,263	1,263	1,263
Decade	All	1940s	1950s	1960s

Notes: The table replicates column 6 of Table 2 for Congressional elections separately for each decade in columns 2 to 4. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. In column 1, these controls are interacted with period dummies. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.20. Stacked-by-Event Design

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change Black Share	1.885***	2.751*	2.956**	0.756**	0.290	1.029
	(0.439)	(1.635)	(1.415)	(0.348)	(0.927)	(0.663)
Main Regressor	Baseline	Binary	Continuous	Baseline	Binary	Continuous
F-stat	10.57		11.12	10.57		11.12
Observations	3,789	2,508	2,508	3,789	2,508	2,508

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Table 2 (column 6) in columns 1 and 4. Columns 2 and 5 present estimates obtained using the binary treatment variable and the sample described in the text. Columns 3 and 6 estimate the 2SLS estimator in the sample defined by the binary treatment. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses for columns 1, 3, 4 and 6. Bootstrap Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses for columns 2 and 5. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.7.9 Standard Errors Correction

In Table D.21, we address the potential concern of spatial correlation. To do so, we replicate our baseline results for Democratic vote share and turnout (reported in columns 1 and 3 to ease comparisons) by clustering standard errors at the CZ level. Reassuringly, the precision of the estimates is barely affected (columns 2 and 4).[106]

Next, in Table D.22, we deal with the possibility that standard errors associated with the shift-share instrument may be excessively small – a potential concern recently formalized in Adao et al. (2019). The first row reports the 2SLS coefficient from the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6). Subsequent rows present the 95% confidence intervals associated with this specification and those derived using the procedure in Adao et al. (2019).[107]

Reassuringly, even when applying the correction procedure from Adao et al. (2019), the 95% confidence intervals for the Democratic vote share do not include 0, and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 5% level. Consistent with the relative instability of results for turnout already discussed above, confidence intervals become very large, with an associated p-value of 0.28.

It is important to note that, in our setting, we rely on only 14 "shifters" – the southern states from which Black out-migration is measured. For this reason, one should evaluate the exercise described in Table D.22 with caution. Nevertheless, in light of these results, we conclude that the effects of the Great Migration on support for civil rights estimated in our work are unlikely to be due to noise.

[106] Panel B of Table D.21 reports the corresponding first stage.

[107] This procedure is based on the assumption of independence of the shifters across counties conditional on controls and the initial shares. Adao et al. (2019) show that imposing restrictions on the conditional distribution of the shifters is a sufficient condition for standard errors to remain valid under any correlation structure of the residuals that is not accounted for by other methods.

Table D.21. Correcting for Spatial Correlation

Dependent Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	1.885***	1.885***	0.756**	0.756**
	(0.439)	(0.444)	(0.348)	(0.373)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***
	(0.233)	(0.245)	(0.233)	(0.245)
F-stat	10.57	9.540	10.57	9.540
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Specification	Baseline	CZ	Baseline	CZ

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Table 2 (column 6) correcting standard errors for spatial correlation. The dependent variable is the change in, respectively, the Democratic vote share (columns 1-2), and turnout (columns 3-4). Columns 1 and 3 report the baseline results, and columns 2 and 4 present results obtained with CZ clustered standard errors. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.22. Confidence Intervals Adjusted for Robust Inference

Dependent Variable	Change in	
	Democratic Vote Share	Turnout
	(1)	(2)
Panel A: 2SLS		
Change Black Share	1.885	0.756
Panel B: 95% Confidence Intervals		
Baseline CI	(1.024, 2.746)	(0.074, 1.437)
Adao et al. (2019) CI	(0.479, 3.291)	(-0.634, 2.145)
F-stat	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification of Table 2 (column 6) applying the standard errors correction method developed in Adao et al. (2019). We report the 2SLS point estimate at the top of the table. In subsequent rows, we present the 95% confidence intervals associated with the baseline specification and those obtained applying the procedure in Adao et al. (2019). The dependent variable is the change in, respectively, the Democratic vote share (columns 1), and turnout (columns 2). All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments.

D.8 Robustness Checks on Newspapers' Results

In this section, we perform two different sets of robustness checks. First, we address the concern, already discussed above for Congressional elections (Appendix D.7.8), that in the presence of treatment heterogeneity, two-way fixed effects estimators might be biased if already treated units are used as controls when new units are treated (De Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021). We begin by clarifying why the issues related to treatment effects heterogeneity should not be a particular concern for newspapers' results presented in the paper (see also Section 6.3). Then, we provide different robustness checks that address additional issues.

Note that, for each lynching in our sample, the treatment variable (namely, the change in the Black population share in the county) does not vary over the weeks before and after the event. This reduces concerns that our estimates may suffer from the issue just described, precisely because treatment is not changing over time.[108] Nevertheless, one may be worried about results in Table 7 in the main text, since they are obtained by combining many difference-in-differences estimates – one for each of the lynchings in our sample. To address this concern, in Figure D.3, we report 2SLS coefficients associated with each lynching episode separately. The figure reveals that the positive coefficients shown in Table 7 in the main text are unlikely to stem from negative weights multiplying negative effects in some lynching events. Indeed, the vast majority of coefficients are positive and large.

Before turning to the second robustness exercise, three additional comments are warranted. First, and consistent with results reported in the main text, events occurring after the mid-1940s seem to be associated with larger coefficients – precisely as one would expect if the Great Migration acted as an "information multiplier". This is captured by the linear fit reported in Figure D.3. Second, one may be worried that our results are driven by the lynching occurring in 1964. As it appears, the linear fit for the post-1945 events remains positive, and the trend-break is evident also in this case. Moreover, we replicate Figure 6, dropping the 1964 event. We report results in Figure D.4, presenting the full sample estimates in black, and the restricted ones in white. Reassuringly, results are barely affected. This indicates that our findings are not driven by the 1964 event. Third, to avoid the possibility that some of the "treatment" weeks for one episode are used as "controls" for another one, in Figure D.5, we

[108] Remember that the issue of negative weights in the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects in two-way fixed effects estimators may be problematic only when the treatment changes over time.

replicate Figure 6 by keeping only those events that do not overlap. Also in this case, results are unchanged.

The second robustness check that we perform is close, in spirit, to that conducted above for Congressional elections and CORE demonstrations (Appendix D.7.7), where we verified that TV entry or radio connectivity are not driving our findings for the Democratic vote share. We start by replicating results for the baseline specification, reported in Table 6 in the main text. Table D.23 replicates Table 6 by adding, in each panel, the different proxies for exposure to the media market already described in Appendix D.7.7. In Panel A, we add as control the first year of TV entry in the county; in Panels B and C, we control for a dummy equal to one in all decades (resp. in the first decade) in which the TV was present in (resp. entered) the county; in Panel D, we include the 1940 radio signal strength; and, in Panel E, we simultaneously control for the first year of TV entry and the strength of radio signal. While the precision and the size of coefficients vary across specifications, they always remain qualitatively and quantitatively in line with those of Table 6 in the main text.

These patterns suggest that neither TV entry nor radio connectivity can explain the higher newspapers' reporting of southern lynchings in counties that received more African Americans.[109] In Figures D.6 and D.7, we also check that the pattern depicted in Figure 6 in the main text is similar when controlling for each of the proxies for media exposure mentioned above. In particular, Figure D.6 includes each individual measure in a separate panel, while Figure D.7 controls simultaneously for the first year of TV entry and for radio signal strength. Reassuringly, also in this case, results are in line with those presented in the main text: mentions of a southern lynching jump right after the episode, and remain high for around 5 weeks, declining gradually over time.

[109] As already noted above, it might be interesting to examine the potential complementarity across media sources. We leave this to future research.

Figure D.3. 2SLS Coefficients for Each Separate Lynching



Notes: The figure plots the coefficients on the change in the Black population share obtained by estimating the specification in Table 7 for each lynching event separately. The dotted, orange, line plots the linear fit for the period 1940-1945, while the solid, blue line depicts the linear fit for years 1945 to 1964. The dashed red line plots the linear fit for the period 1945-1963.

Figure D.4. Event Study: Dropping 1964 Lynching



Notes: The figure replicates the event study reported in Figure 6 in the main text with (black dots) and without (white dot) the 1964 lynching. Week 0 refers to the week when the lynching occurred. All regressions control for state and lynching episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure D.5. Event Study: Dropping Overlapping Events



Notes: The figure replicates the event study reported in Figure 6 in the main text excluding overlapping events. Week 0 refers to the week when the lynching occurred. All regressions control for state and lynching episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Table D.23. Replicating Newspapers Results Controlling for TV and Radio Exposure

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: controlling for TV entry year					
Change Black	0.372*	0.210	0.505*	0.717*	0.906*
Share	(0.209)	(0.139)	(0.267)	(0.370)	(0.482)
F-stat	9.885	9.280	10.19	10.29	10.31
Panel B: controlling for TV in decade					
Change Black	0.280**	0.134	0.380**	0.532**	0.677**
Share	(0.139)	(0.094)	(0.173)	(0.235)	(0.301)
F-stat	12.57	11.14	13.46	14.08	13.96
Panel C: controlling for TV first decade					
Change Black	0.253**	0.135	0.345**	0.554**	0.687**
Share	(0.128)	(0.087)	(0.161)	(0.241)	(0.304)
F-stat	13.87	13.16	14.27	13.07	13.19
Panel D: controlling for Radio signal					
Change Black	0.292**	0.170*	0.389**	0.578**	0.736**
Share	(0.137)	(0.093)	(0.172)	(0.244)	(0.313)
F-stat	17.35	16.33	17.98	17.85	17.68
Panel E: controlling for TV entry year and Radio signal					
Change Black	0.436*	0.263	0.576*	0.797*	1.008*
Share	(0.240)	(0.162)	(0.303)	(0.414)	(0.536)
F-stat	12.08	11.02	12.66	12.92	13.02
Observations	311,803	141,332	170,471	79,721	59,665
State FE	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X
Week FE	X	X	X	X	X
Weeks	0 to 26	0 to 26	0 to 26	0 to 26	0 to 26
Sample	1940+	1940-1944	1945+	1950+	1955+

Notes: The Table replicates results reported in Table 6 by adding as control: *(i)* the first year of TV entry (Panel A); *(ii)* a dummy equal to one in all decades in which the TV was present (Panel B); *(iii)* a dummy equal to one the first decade in which the TV was present (Panel C); *(iv)* radio signal strength (Panel D); and simultaneously, the first year of TV entry and the radio signal strength (Panel E). These controls enter each regression being interacted with period dummies. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure D.6. Event Study: Controlling for Media Outlets



Notes: The figure replicates the event study reported in Figure 6 in the main text controlling for the proxy for media exposure indicated in the title of each panel. In the top panels, "1st year TV entry" (resp. "Decade TV presence") refers to the exact year in which TV started broadcasting (resp. a dummy equal to one in all decades in which TV was present); in the bottom panels, "1st decade TV entry" (resp. "Radio signal") refers to a dummy equal to one in the decade in which TV started broadcasting (resp.the strength of radio signal). Week 0 is the week when the lynching occurred. All regressions control for state and lynching episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure D.7. Event Study: Controlling for TV and Radio Exposure



Notes: The figure replicates the event study reported in Figure 6 in the main text controlling simultaneously for the first year of TV entry and for radio signal strength. Week 0 refers to the week when the lynching occurred. All regressions control for state and lynching episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

D.9 Robustness Checks on CD Results

D.9.1 Testing for Pre-Trends

Table 3 in the main text shows that Black in-migration moved legislators' ideology to the left between 1940 and 1950. In Table D.24, we check that this pattern does not capture pre-existing trends. Similar to what we did for the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections (Section D.5 above), we construct the pre-period change in the ideology scores, considering the ideology scores prevailing during Congress 71 (corresponding to years 1929-1931). Then, we estimate 2SLS regressions for the pre-period change in the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores against the instrumented change in the Black population share, controlling for the same variables included in our baseline specification (i.e. state dummies, and baseline: *i*) Black population share; *ii*) Democratic incumbency indicator; and, *iii*) ideology score.[110]

To ease comparisons, we report the baseline specification for the 78-82 Congress period – when Black in-migration induced a liberal shift in legislators' ideology – in columns 1 and 4 for the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores, respectively. Since the pre-period change in ideology could not be estimated for all CDs, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate columns 1 and 4 restricting attention to CDs for which the pre-trend check can be performed. When doing so, the F-stat falls substantially, suggesting that results should be interpreted with caution. However, the point estimate remains negative, quantitatively close to that obtained for the full sample, and statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.074 and 0.054 for agnostic and constrained scores respectively). Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends. Reassuringly, the point estimate is positive, close to zero, and imprecisely estimated. Also, note that in this case, the F-stat is again above conventional level, increasing the confidence that the estimated coefficient is a "true zero". These patterns indicate that the main results documented above are not influenced by a spurious correlation between the instrument and potential pre-existing trends in ideology of legislators.

[110] As usual, regressions are weighed by baseline CD population.

Table D.24. Testing for Pre-Trends: Ideology Scores

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores			Constrained Scores		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black	-0.300***	-0.223*	0.016	-0.337***	-0.281*	0.029
Share	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.032)	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.035)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predcted Change	1.054***	1.056**	1.851***	1.054***	1.056**	1.851***
Black Share	(0.377)	(0.528)	(0.562)	(0.377)	(0.528)	(0.562)
F-stat	7.814	3.998	10.84	7.770	3.914	10.60
Observations	285	201	201	285	201	201
Specification	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends (1940-1960)	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends (1940-1960)

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates and Panel B reports first stage estimates. Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification for Congress period 78-82 (see Table 3, columns 2 and 5), and columns 2 and 5 replicate this by restricting attention to counties for which the change in the scores for the pre-period can be constructed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate 2SLS regressions for the change in the ideology scores between Congress 71 and Congress 78 against the instrumented 1940-1960 change in the Black population share. The pre-period is defined using the Congress 71 (1929-1931). See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, and include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the baseline ideology score. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.9.2 Alternative Timing Conventions for Congress Periods

In our baseline specification for the effects of the Great Migration on legislators' ideology, we map the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black population share to the 78-82 (resp. 82-88) Congress period. This is done in order to include the longest periods without redistricting while at the same time ending the analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA. We now verify that our results are robust to using different timing conventions.

First, in Table D.25, we define the second period as ending with Congress 87 (1961-1963), rather than Congress 88 (1963-1965). The structure of the table mirrors that of Table 3 in the main text: columns 1 to 3 consider the agnostic version of the scores, while columns 4 to 6 focus on the constrained one. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, whereas Panel B presents the first stage. Results are in line with those in the main text. Mechanically, estimates for the first Congress period (columns 2 and 5) are unchanged. Results for the second Congress period (columns 3 and 6) become slightly smaller in size, but remain imprecisely estimated and very close to zero. If anything, the stacked specification in columns 1 and 4 is now marginally statistically significant with a p-value of 0.081 and 0.09, respectively.

Second, in Table D.26, we define the end of the first period with Congress 83 (1953-1955), in order to have two symmetric periods. While the coefficient on the Great Migration remains highly negative and precisely estimated in the first period, it becomes statistically significant (and positive) in the second period, consistent with results on polarization discussed in Section 5.2 in the main text.

In both tables, the number of observations is slightly different than that in our baseline specification reported in the main text. This is because, in Congresses 83 and 87, ideology scores are missing for 4 and 3 CDs respectively. Since the scores constructed in Bateman et al. (2017) use past voting behavior of legislators, it is possible that in a few instances (as it happens for Congresses 83 and 87) there are not enough data points to estimate the ideology scores. Reassuringly, all our results are identical when replicating the baseline specification (with the original timing convention) omitting the CDs missing in Tables D.25 and D.26.

Table D.25. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Ending Analysis with Congress 87

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	-0.087*	-0.300***	-0.004	-0.086*	-0.337***	0.013
	(0.050)	(0.116)	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.124)	(0.064)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.571***	1.054***	1.946***	1.554***	1.050***	1.920***
	(0.438)	(0.377)	(0.558)	(0.442)	(0.377)	(0.564)
F-Stat	12.88	7.814	12.19	12.36	7.770	11.57
Observations	567	285	282	567	285	282
Congress Period	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-82 and 82-87). See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the ideology score in the district in Congress 78. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.26. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Symmetric Congress Periods

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	-0.037	-0.444***	0.123***	-0.040	-0.489***	0.139***
	(0.036)	(0.156)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.165)	(0.049)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.570***	1.054***	1.944***	1.552***	1.050***	1.917***
	(0.436)	(0.376)	(0.555)	(0.441)	(0.375)	(0.562)
F-Stat	12.94	7.857	12.25	12.42	7.817	11.62
Observations	562	281	281	562	281	281
Congress Period	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-83 and 83-88). See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the ideology score in the district in Congress 78. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.9.3 Alternative Samples

Our CD-level analysis is based on the balanced sample of CDs for which outcomes could be systematically found in all Congress periods. However, these CDs slightly differ from those that span the balanced county sample used in Section 5 of the paper. For robustness, we thus replicate the results for ideology scores reported in Table 3 of the paper, restricting attention to the CDs that include only the counties in the balanced sample. Results are reported in Table D.27 (Panel B). Reassuringly, they remain virtually unchanged relative to the baseline ones (reported in Panel A to ease comparisons).

Table D.27. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Alternative Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores			Constrained Scores		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Main estimates						
Change Black	-0.051	-0.300***	0.046	-0.054	-0.337***	0.058
Share	(0.039)	(0.116)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.124)	(0.059)
F-stat	12.87	7.814	12.19	12.35	7.77	11.57
Observations	570	285	285	570	285	285
Panel B: Counties in Main Sample Only						
Change Black	-0.056	-0.303***	0.047	-0.059	-0.339***	0.059
Share	(0.041)	(0.117)	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.126)	(0.063)
F-stat	11.31	7.642	10.32	10.89	7.603	9.837
Observations	566	283	283	566	283	283

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – "Agnostic" scores in columns 1 to 3, and "Constrained" scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-82 and 82-88). Panel A reports the main estimates of Table 3. Panel B replicates the main estimates focusing on the counties from our main sample. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the ideology score in the district in Congress 78. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.9.4 Redistricting, Black Inflows, and Political Outcomes

One potential concern with results in Section 5.2 is that the decision of redistricting a CD may have been at least partly driven by the arrival of African Americans. If this were to be the case, and if redistricting had an effect on political outcomes, our results may be biased. As noted in Appendix B, until 1964 (i.e. the end of our sample period), redistricting was unlikely to be strategic (Engstrom, 2013), and was typically mandated at the state level. We exploit the fact that between Congress 78 and Congress 82, five states in our sample (Arizona, Illinois, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) required their CDs to redistrict, and test whether redistricting was systematically correlated with either Black inflows or changes in political conditions (e.g. party switches, changes in legislators' ideology, etc.).[111]

[111]This check cannot be performed between Congress 83 and Congress 88 because most CDs were subject to redistricting in this period.

In Table D.28, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting, and is regressed against: *i*) changes in the Black population share (with OLS in column 1 and with 2SLS in column 2); *ii*) a dummy if the CD underwent a party switch; and, *iii*) the change in the Bateman et al. (2017) ideology score (column 4). Since the dependent variable varies at the state level, we cannot control for state fixed effects; yet, we include (as in our baseline specifications) the 1940 Black population share and the 1940 Democratic dummy. Reassuringly, the coefficient is never statistically significant, does not display any systematic pattern, and is always quantitatively small. Overall, this exercise thus suggests that neither changes in the Black population share nor changes in political conditions were systematically associated with state-mandated redistricting.

Next, we inspect more directly the possibility that Black inflows led to strategic gerrymandering across CDs. In particular, we rely on the measure of (non-)compactness recently introduced by Kaufman et al. (2021), which is based on the geographic shape of CDs, and captures the "compactness evaluations" made by judges and public officials responsible for redistricting.[112] We prefer to use this measure, instead of an alternative proxy based on the vote distribution, because it provides evidence of (potential) gerrymandering at the CD level. In turn, this allows us to investigate the relationship between non-compactness and Black inflows. The measure of compactness can take values between 1 and 100, with higher values indicating less compact districts, i.e. a higher probability of gerrymandering.

We start by analyzing descriptively the trends of non-compactness between Congress 71 (1929-1931) and Congress 90 (1967-1969) in Figure D.8. Consistent with the existing literature discussed in Appendix B, for the period considered in our analysis – between Congress 78 and Congress 88 – average compactness changes very little. Reassuringly, other aggregate measures, such as the standard deviation and the interquantile range, do not show any detectable changes either (not shown). Interestingly, and again consistent with existing studies, non-compactness starts to increase precisely after Congress 88, suggesting that after 1964 strategic gerrymandering might have become gradually more common.

Then, we study the relationship between Black inflows and non-compactness during our sample period. To do so, we proceed as follows. First, we assign the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black population share to each Congress in the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congress period. Second, we estimate 2SLS regressions where the dependent variable is the measure of non-compactness specific to each Congress number (for the relevant decade) and the main regressor of interest is the instrumented change in the Black population share. Figure D.9 reports the implied 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals)

[112] We thank the authors for making their codes available to us.

from previous regressions corresponding to a one standard deviation change in the Black population share.

If the arrival of African Americans induced northern politicians to strategically change the boundaries of CDs, we would expect the association between changes in the Black population share and non-compactness to increases over time. Reassuringly, there is no statistically significant relationship between the change in the Black population share and the measure of non-compactness in any Congress year. Our estimates are also quantitatively small. For instance, one standard deviation increase in the Black population share (around 2.8 percentage points) increases compactness of Congress 78 by 2 points – a negligible effect when compared to a mean of 45 and to a standard deviation of 16. Moreover, coefficients do not display any increasing trend over time, suggesting that strategic gerrymandering in response to Black arrivals was very unlikely to occur during our sample period.

Table D.28. Redistricting Checks

Dependent Variable	1[Non-Redistricting State]			
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS
Change Black Share	0.015	0.043		
	(0.013)	(0.039)		
Party Switch			0.084	
			(0.061)	
Change Ideology Scores				-0.008
				(0.049)
F-stat		16.41		
Observations	285	285	285	285

Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting between Congress 78 and Congress 82. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress numbers to calendar years. In columns 1 and 2, the main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share during the 1940-1950 decade. Column 1 (resp. column 2) presents OLS (resp. 2SLS) results. Columns 3 and 4 regress the redistricting state dummy against, respectively, a dummy equal to 1 if the CD experienced a party transition during the 78-82 Congress period, and the change in Bateman et al. (2017) scores. All regressions include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure D.8. Average Non-Compactness, Congress 71^{st}-90^{th}



Notes: The figure presents the area-weighed average non-compactness for each Congress between Congress 71 and Congress 90. The red, vertical lines, corresponding to Congresses 78 and 88 isolate the sample period considered in our paper.

Figure D.9. Black In-Migration and Non-Compactness



Notes: The figure presents the 2SLS coefficient with the corresponding 95% confidence interval implied by one standard deviation change in the Black population share during the corresponding decade. The dependent variable is the CD non-compactness score from Kaufman et al. (2021). The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1950 (resp. 1950 to 1960) change in the Black population share for Congresses between 78 and 82 (resp. between 83 and 88), which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940.

E Additional Results

E.1 Additional Evidence on Political Outcomes

E.1.1 Electoral Outcomes

Columns 1 to 3 of Table E.1 replicate the analysis conducted in the main text (Section 5.1) separately for each of the three decades, focusing on the preferred specification (Table 2, column 6). The Great Migration had a very strong effect on the Democratic vote share in both the 1940-1950 (column 1) and the 1960-1970 (column 3) decades. Conversely, the point estimate becomes smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant for the 1950s (column 2). Turnout follows a similar pattern, with a higher point estimate in the 1940s and in the 1960s, but results are imprecise and never statistically significant.[113]

One interpretation of these findings is that the 1940s saw the dawn of the civil rights movement, which was partly spurred by the Double V Campaign organized by African American activists during WWII (Qian and Tabellini, 2020). The 1960s culminated with the passage of the CRA and the VRA and, even though in the later period whites' backlash erupted in many northern and western cities (Collins and Margo, 2007; Reny and Newman, 2018), this may have been partly offset by greater engagement among Black Americans. The lack of significance and the smaller magnitude of the coefficient for the 1950s is consistent with the idea that the economic downturn at least temporarily halted the progress of race relations, and cooled off whites' support for racial equality (Sugrue, 2014).

As discussed in Schickler (2016), support for racial equality was stronger within the local fringes of the Democratic Party. Moreover, when it came to national politics, African Americans remained more skeptical about the commitment of Democrats to the civil rights cause. Replicating the preferred specification of Table 2 in the main text for Presidential elections, column 4 of Table E.1 confirms this idea. For the Democratic vote share (Panel A), the coefficient on the change in the Black population share remains statistically significant and positive, but is one third smaller than for Congressional elections. The point estimate on turnout (Panel B) is instead similar to – if anything slightly larger than – that for Congressional elections.

[113]The F-stat falls below conventional levels for the 1960-1970 decade, suggesting that one should interpret results with some caution. Statistical precision remains unchanged when using identification-robust Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals, reported in the case of weak instrument, as suggested in Andrews et al. (2019).

E.1.2 Political Polarization

To examine the possibility that the Great Migration increased political polarization, we follow the approach used in Autor et al. (2020) and Tabellini (2020) for trade and immigration respectively. We define liberal (resp. moderate) Democrats those legislators with an ideology score below (resp. above) the median score for Democrats in Congress 78. Likewise, moderate (resp. conservative) Republicans are defined as Congress members with an ideology score below (resp. above) the median score for Republicans in Congress 78. Table E.2 estimates our baseline stacked first difference specification, using as dependent variable the change in the probability of electing a liberal Democrat, a moderate Democrat, a moderate Republican, and a conservative Republican in columns 1 to 4 respectively.

In Panel A, we pool both Congress periods together. Black in-migration had a positive, but small and not statistically significant, effect on the probability of electing a liberal Democrat. The remaining coefficients are also imprecisely estimated. However, when considering each Congress period in isolation, a different picture stands out. In the 1940s (Panel B), Black in-migration had a strong, positive effect on the probability of electing a liberal Democrat (column 1), while reducing the probability of electing both moderate Democrats (column 2) and conservative Republicans (column 4). If anything, Black inflows raised the probability of electing a moderate Republican (column 3), although results are not statistically significant. During the 1950s (Panel C), in stark contrast with the previous decade, Black in-migration increased the probability of electing a conservative Republican, while reducing that of electing a moderate Republican. Black in-migration had no effect on the probability of electing Democrats with different ideological stances.

Figure E.1 plots the coefficients reported in Panels B and C of Table E.2. These results suggest that the Great Migration led to changes in legislators' ideology both between and within parties. In the 1940s, Black inflows triggered a general shift towards a more liberal ideology on racial issues within both parties. Moreover, and in line with a between-party adjustment, the probability of electing a (liberal) Democrat increased more than that of electing a (moderate) Republican. In the 1950s, most of the action came from internal changes within the GOP, with legislators moving to the right. Such rightward shift may have been motivated by strategic considerations, as the GOP tried to win the votes of whites who were becoming increasingly concerned about the racial mixing of their neighborhoods (Sugrue, 2014).

As we noted in the main text, since results during the 1940s are larger than those in the 1950s, on average, legislators' ideology moved to the left. Yet, when inspecting these dynamics more carefully, a clear pattern of increasing polarization emerges. While only suggestive, this evidence is consistent with the possibility that local responses to the Great Migration might have been partly influenced by national considerations. Even though Democrats "lost the South" by promoting the civil rights agenda (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018), this strategy might have allowed them to win urban areas of the West and the North. At the same time, the Republican Party might have tried to strengthen its conservative position at the national level, so as to attract dissatisfied southern whites leaving the Democratic Party.

Table E.1. Congressional Elections by Decade and Presidential Elections

Dependent Variable	Congressional Elections			Presidential Elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Democrat Vote Share				
Change Black Share	2.944**	0.665	2.495**	0.567***
	(1.480)	(0.557)	(1.247)	(0.197)
Panel B: Turnout				
Change Black Share	0.979	0.125	1.431	0.805***
	(0.701)	(0.642)	(1.166)	(0.282)
Panel C: First Stage				
Predicted Change	0.792***	0.755***	0.726**	0.758***
Black Share	(0.248)	(0.218)	(0.293)	(0.233)
F-stat	10.21	11.96	6.128	10.57
Observations	1,263	1,263	1,263	3,789
Decade	1940s	1950s	1960s	All
Avg. Change Black Share	1.350	1.838	2.147	1.778

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table replicates column 6 of Table 2 for Congressional elections separately for each decade in columns 1 to 3, and for Presidential elections in column 4. The main regressor of interest is the 1940-1960 (resp. decadal) change in the Black population share in column 4 (resp. columns 1-3) and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. In column 4, these controls are interacted with period dummies. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.2. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Dep. Variable	Change in Ideology Indicator of Elected Congress Members			
	Liberal Democrat	Moderate Democrat	Moderate Republican	Conservative Republican
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 78-82 congresses (1943-1953)				
Change Black Share	0.331**	-0.306*	0.165	-0.177**
	(0.135)	(0.181)	(0.136)	(0.082)
F-Stat	7.068	7.068	7.068	7.068
Observations	286	286	286	286
Panel B: 82-88 congresses (1951-1965)				
Change Black Share	-0.020	0.013	-0.101*	0.108**
	(0.042)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.046)
F-Stat	10.60	10.60	10.60	10.60
Observations	285	285	285	285

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the ideology indicator of the Congress member in office. The ideology indicators are defined as: i) liberal (resp. moderate) Democrat if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Democratic Party members in Congress 78; ii) moderate (resp. conservative) Republican if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Republican Party members in Congress 78. Panel A refers to Congress period 78-82; Panel B refers to Congress period 82-88. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress years to calendar years and the definition of Congress periods. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share in the district; *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in the district in Congress 78; and *iv*) the ideology score in the district in Congress 78. K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure E.1. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Panel A: 1940s



Panel B: 1950s



Notes: Each bar reports 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of changes in the Black population share on the change in the probability of electing a member of the House with the corresponding political orientation between Congress 78 and Congress 82 (Panel A) and between Congress 82 and Congress 88 (Panel B). The ideology indicators are defined in the main text. See Table A.3 for the mapping of Congress years to calendar years and the definition of Congress periods.

E.2 Additional Evidence on CORE Demonstrations

Using detailed information on the cause and the target of the protest available in the CORE dataset, we classified the pro-civil rights demonstrations in different categories. Figure E.2 plots the number of events in each of the top four categories – discrimination in access to goods and services (e.g. restaurants or hotels), school segregation, residential segregation, and police brutality – as a share of all demonstrations in our sample.[114] Each bar in the figure also indicates the share of events within each category that concerned national (dotted bar area) and local (Black bar area) issues. Almost two thirds of the events concerned local issues – such as boycotting a local taxi company for its discriminating hiring process in Seattle or protesting against a white-only barbershop in Chicago – but there existed substantial heterogeneity across categories. For instance, while more than 80% of the events organized to demand a reduction in residential discrimination were focused on local issues, almost 40% of demonstrations in the "access to goods" category were conducted on a more national platform.

Relying on this classification, Figure E.3 replicates the analysis of Table 4 (column 5) in the main text for each category separately. The first four dots from the left report 2SLS coefficients when the dependent variable is the change in the probability of demonstrations for each of the causes reported in Figure E.2. The remaining two crosses on the right report results for the change in the probability of local and national demonstrations respectively.[115] Even though the point estimate is always positive, it is statistically significant and quantitatively larger for protests against discrimination in access to goods and services and against school segregation. The coefficient is also larger and more precisely estimated for demonstrations with local, rather than national, targets – something to be expected, since the CORE was operating through local branches.

[114] Since events were classified according to either the cause or the target of the demonstration, the categories in Figure E.2 do not add to one.

[115] Table E.3 presents the corresponding 2SLS coefficients.

Figure E.2. Frequency of CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the number of CORE demonstrations as share of all events occurring in our sample period, for each of the four main categories described in the text. The portion of the bar filled with oblique lines (resp. dots) refers to the share of events of each category that involved local (resp. national) issues. *Source:* adapted from Gregory and Hermida (2019).

Figure E.3. Black in-Migration and CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the change in the Black population share on the change in CORE demonstrations. The first dot from the left considers all demonstrations in our sample; the next four dots refer to each specific cause, reported on the x-axis; the two dots on the right refer to demonstrations that involved, respectively, local and national issues. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. The corresponding estimates are reported in Table E.3.

Table E.3. CORE Demonstrations, by Type

Dependent Variable		Cause				Relevance	
	All	School/ College	Housing	Police Brutality	Access to Goods	Local	National
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: 2SLS							
Change Black Share	0.057***	0.037*	0.030*	-0.005	0.057***	0.068***	0.032**
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Panel B: First Stage							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***	0.758***
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.233)
F-stat	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Panel A (resp. B) reports 2SLS (resp. first stage) estimates. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the probability of a protest in each category occurring over a decade. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.3 Additional Evidence from Historical Surveys

E.3.1 Evidence from Gallup

Table E.4 complements the analysis presented in Section 6.2 of the paper using data from Gallup for the 1963 and 1964 waves.[116] Consistent with results from the ANES, white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants were less likely to object to the idea of racial mixing in schools (column 1) and more supportive of the CRA (column 2). Even though Black in-migration is positively associated with the probability that white respondents would vote for a Black president were their party to nominate one (column 3), this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. There is instead no relationship between the Great Migration and respondents' views on whether the process of racial integration was proceeding at the right pace (column 4).[117]

E.3.2 Evidence on the Role of Labor Unions from the ANES

In Section 6.3 of the paper, we discussed the role that labor unions might have played in increasing demand for racial equality in the northern and western electorate. Here, we provide one additional piece of evidence on this mechanism using the ANES data. In particular, we investigate the heterogeneity behind results presented in column 4 of Table 5 in the main text, which showed that the Great Migration was positively correlated with the probability that white respondents considered the civil rights issue as the most important problem for the country.

Figure E.4 documents that these patterns are significantly stronger for union members (second, black bar) and for Democrats (fourth, blue bar).[118] Instead, for Republicans we observe a negative, and statistically significant, relationship between state level increases in the Black population share and support for civil rights. Since union status and partisanship may be endogenous to the Great Migration, results in Figure E.4 should be viewed as merely suggestive. However, they paint a picture coherent with our previous discussion. Moreover, they indicate that, even though Black in-migration increased overall support for civil rights among whites, it had very different effects on voters of either party, thereby raising political polarization in the electorate.

[116] See Appendix C.2.2 for more details on the data.

[117] The number of observations varies across questions, since some of these were asked repeatedly during 1963 and 1964. This is particularly evident for the question on the pace of racial integration (column 4).

[118] See Table E.5 for the 2SLS coefficients plotted in Figure E.4.

Table E.4. Additional Evidence on Whites' Attitudes: Gallup

Dependent Variable	1[Object to Half Pupils in School]	1[Approve Civil Rights Act]	1[Vote for Black Candidate]	1[Racial Integration: Right Pace vs Not Fast Enough]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: 2SLS				
Change Black Share	-0.043**	0.038***	0.072	0.000
	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.045)	(0.012)
Panel B: First Stage				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.273***	2.202***	2.400***	2.432***
	(0.217)	(0.348)	(0.579)	(0.360)
F-Stat	110.2	40.07	17.15	45.53
Observations	851	931	2,073	17,478
Mean Dependent Variable	0.289	0.706	0.525	0.320

Notes: The sample is restricted to white Gallup respondents living in the US North and to years 1963-1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent: i) objects to having half of the classroom composed of Black pupils (column 1); ii) approves the Civil Rights Act introduced in 1964 (column 2); iii) would vote for a Black candidate, were her party nominating one (column 3); and iv) thinks that the process of racial integration is occurring at the right pace or not fast enough (column 4). See Appendix C.2 for exact wording. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions include region and survey year fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender and age and education fixed effects) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black population share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.5. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites

Dependent Variable	1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: 2SLS						
Change Black Share	0.090***	0.033*	0.068***	0.013	-0.045***	0.047***
	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Panel B: First Stage						
Predicted Change Black Share	2.517***	2.749***	2.648***	2.770***	2.874***	2.729***
	(0.483)	(0.396)	(0.431)	(0.417)	(0.412)	(0.438)
F-Stat	27.18	48.25	37.79	44.09	48.72	38.81
Observations	277	648	376	551	310	617
Sample	Union Members	Non-Union Members	Identified Democrat	Identified Non-Democrat	Identified Republican	Identified Non-Republican
Mean Dependent Variable	0.119	0.107	0.119	0.105	0.094	0.119

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in years 1960 and 1964, and residing in their state of birth. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports that supporting civil rights is among the most important issues facing the country at the time of the interview. See Appendix C.2 for exact wording. The regressor of interest is the state level 1940-1960 change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 state population. Each column restricts attention to white respondents who belong to the group reported at the bottom of the table. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include survey year and region fixed effects and individual controls of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status), and control for 1940 state characteristics (Black population share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Figure E.4. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites



Notes: The figure plots 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for a regression where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent considers the civil rights issue one of the most fundamental issues for the country (see also Table 5, column 4). The first two bars refer to respondents who are not and who are union members (light and dark colors respectively); the third and fourth (resp. fifth and sixth) bars restrict attention to individuals who are not and who are Democrats (resp. Republicans), with darker colors referring to members of the group. Results and details of the specification are reported in Table E.5.

E.4 Residential Segregation and Local Governments

The lack of (between county) white flight and the higher support for civil rights among some white voters do not imply that all white residents welcomed Black migrants into their neighborhoods. In fact, Black migration may have increased racial residential segregation and efforts of whites to avoid sharing public goods with Black Americans (Alesina et al., 1999, 2004). In this section, we confirm that these patterns were at play in our context. We also provide evidence that this mechanism may have amplified the positive effect of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights. Notably, higher residential segregation is compatible with higher support for civil rights. For one, until 1965, civil rights legislation was a matter that affected mostly the US South. Furthermore, higher levels of segregation may have helped defuse whites' animosity caused by Black migration into white neighborhoods.

Column 1 of Table E.6 provides evidence consistent with these ideas focusing on CORE demonstrations. Panel A replicates results in Table 4 (column 5), whereas Panels B and C split the sample in counties with 1940 residential segregation (constructed using the procedure in Logan and Parman, 2017) below and above the median, respectively. Black in-migration increased the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations only in counties with higher residential segregation. Said differently, support for civil rights increased *more* in counties where inter-group contact in the housing market was *lower*. This may have happened because residents of initially segregated counties had little contact with Black Americans, and were able to further isolate themselves from inter-racial tensions that Black migration may have brought to neighborhoods and housing markets. To achieve this goal, whites could create more homogeneous local jurisdictions.

In columns 2 to 5 of Table E.6, we examine whether the Great Migration increased the number of local jurisdictions using data from the Census of Government. We replicate the regressions in column 1 focusing on the change in the (log of) number of: *i*) total jurisdictions (column 2); *ii*) school districts (column 3); *iii*) special districts (column 4); and, *iv*) municipalities (column 5). In the full sample (Panel A), Black in-migration had a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of local jurisdictions (column 2) – a pattern driven by school districts (column 3) and, to a lesser extent, municipalities (column 5). Yet, this happened only in counties with residential segregation above the median (Panel C).

One interpretation, consistent with the historical evidence (Sugrue, 2008), is that,

since higher residential segregation lowered the probability that Black and white pupils shared the same school district, whites' incentives to create local jurisdictions were stronger in more segregated counties. Coupled with findings in column 1, this suggests that population sorting within counties and the creation of independent jurisdictions might have reduced potential backlash by allowing whites to live in racially homogeneous communities, where the probability of sharing public goods with Black Americans was low.

Table E.6. Black in-Migration, Residential Segregation, and Local Governments

Dependent Variable	Change in	Change Log(Number of Local Governments)			
	1[Pro-civil rights protest]	Total	School districts	Special districts	Municipalities
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Full Sample					
Change Black Share	0.057***	0.052***	0.098***	-0.015	0.019**
	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.008)
F-stat	10.57	12.91	12.91	12.91	12.91
Observations	3,789	3,777	3,777	3,777	3,777
Panel B: Residential Segregation below Median					
Change Black Share	0.023	-0.051	-0.027	-0.147	0.031
	(0.024)	(0.086)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.034)
F-stat	9.712	9.712	9.712	9.712	9.712
Observations	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449
Panel C: Residential Segregation above Median					
Change Black Share	0.054**	0.050***	0.092***	-0.024	0.018*
	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.010)
F-stat	7.762	9.677	9.677	9.677	9.677
Observations	1,449	1,437	1,437	1,437	1,437

Notes: Panel A estimates the baseline specification from Table 4 (column 5). Panel B (resp. C) estimates the same set of regressions for counties with residential segregation below (resp. above) the sample median. Residential segregation refers to the index constructed in Logan and Parman (2017). In columns 2 to 5 the dependent variable is the (log) number of: *i*) total jurisdictions (column 2); *ii*) school districts (column 3); *iii*) special districts (column 4); and, *iv*) municipalities (column 5). All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black population share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

E.5 Long Run Effects

Survey results obtained in Section 6.2 of the main text and in Appendix E.3 suggest that Black in-migration increased support for civil rights and improved racial attitudes among northern white residents. These findings beg the question of whether the change in whites' racial attitudes persisted over time or, instead, was short-lived. For instance, higher support for civil rights in the years that led to the CRA may have been partly influenced by the perception that social norms had changed, making it less acceptable to express racist attitudes (Bursztyn et al., 2020). As the salience of the civil rights issue faded away, whites' social image concerns may have declined. It is also possible that the passage of the CRA, and the gradual focus on northern *de facto* segregation, led to whites' backlash in northern counties (Eubank and Fresh, 2021; Reny and Newman, 2018; Wheaton, 2020).

While a full examination of the long run effects of the Great Migration on whites' racial attitudes goes beyond the scope of this paper, we provide evidence on this issue using two different data sources, both measured at the county level: first, whites' racial attitudes obtained from the CCES; second, racially motivated hate crimes recorded from the FBI.

E.5.1 Evidence from the CCES

We begin by focusing on the CCES – a large, nationally representative sample that was run for the first time in 2006 (see also Appendix C.2.3).[119] In Table E.7, we restrict attention to white respondents who live in the counties in our sample, and consider the two proxies for racial attitudes described in Appendix C.2.3: support for affirmative action (Panel A) and a measure of racial resentment (Panel B).[120] We present OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effects of the 1940 to 1970 change in the Black population share in columns 1 to 3 and in columns 4 to 6 respectively, introducing a gradually more stringent set of controls. For brevity, we focus on the most preferred specification (column 6), which includes state and survey year fixed effects, individual respondents' characteristics, and, to mirror the preferred specification in the main text, the 1940

[119] Questions on racial attitudes were first asked in 2008. For this reason, our analysis here starts from that year. See also Table C.3 (Panel C).

[120] See Table C.3 for the exact wording and the years in which questions were asked. For 13 counties that are present in our historical analysis we did not have any CCES respondent.

Black population share as well as the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy.[121]

Results indicate that white respondents who, at the time of the survey, live in a county that received more African Americans between 1940 and 1970 are more likely to support affirmative action and express lower levels of racial resentment. Coefficients are quantitatively large. For example, according to the point estimate in Panel B (column 6), one percentage point increase in the Black population share between 1940 and 1970 is associated with a 10% lower racial resentment among white respondents.[122]

These patterns are consistent with those obtained at the state level in the ANES and Gallup analysis. Furthermore, they suggest that the positive effect of the Great Migration on whites' racial views was long-lasting, and that Black in-migration led to a permanent shift in racial attitudes among whites.

E.5.2 The Great Migration and Hate Crimes

We complement the survey analysis conducted thus far by examining the relationship between the Great Migration and racially motivated hate crimes over the long run. As discussed in Appendix C.2.3, hate crime data are available from 1991 onwards. However, both to increase the reliability of the data (see Appendix C.2.3) and to keep the time frame consistent with that used for the CCES above, we restrict attention to hate crimes committed between 2000 and 2015 (included). We estimate the county-level counterpart of the individual regressions estimated for the CCES in Appendix E.5.1, controlling for state fixed effects and for 1940 county characteristics. To keep the analysis consistent with that presented in the main paper, we weigh regressions by 1940 county population, and cluster standard errors at the county level.[123]

Tables E.8 and E.9 present the results. In Panel A of Table E.8, the dependent variable is the cumulated hate crime rate against African Americans in a county between 2000 and 2015.[124] In Panel B, we restrict attention to hate crimes suffered by African Americans and committed by white offenders. Focusing on the preferred 2SLS

[121] Individual controls include: age, age squared, gender, family income, marital status, employment status, and education attainment. Results are unchanged when including additional historical county characteristics (e.g., 1940 employment to population ratio, manufacturing employment share, urban share, etc.). We do not include any contemporaneous county characteristic, since these may be "bad controls" (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

[122] The p-values associated with coefficients on the change in the Black population share for affirmative action and racial resentment are, respectively, .082 and .058.

[123] As explained in in Appendix C.2.3, we omit counties for which no hate crime was reported in a 5-year period. This is why the sample drops from 1,263 (in the main paper) to 1,040 (for this exercise).

[124] As noted in Appendix C.2.3, the number of hate crimes is scaled by the Black population at the beginning of each 5-year period, from 2000 onwards.

specification (column 6), we observe that the Great Migration is associated with a steep reduction in hate crimes against Black Americans, and that this effect is largely driven by hate crimes committed by white offenders.

To interpret the magnitudes of the coefficient in Panel A of Table E.8, consider that one percentage point increase in the Black population share (between 1940 and 1970) is associated with 33 fewer hate crimes per 100,000 people – or, about 6% relative to the sample mean. Results are quantitatively similar when focusing on crimes committed by white offenders (Panel B). Table E.9 confirms these results by using as dependent variable the average hate crime rate computed over the three 5-year periods from 2000 to 2015 (see Appendix C.2.3).

To rule out the possibility that these results simply capture a general trend towards lower hate crimes in counties that received more Black Americans during the Great Migration, we run a placebo check. In Table E.10, the dependent variable is the cumulated (resp. average) hate crime rate against non-minority groups in Panel A (resp. Panel B). Coefficients are very close to zero and not statistically significant at conventional levels.

E.5.3 Discussion

Taken together, findings in this section confirm our main results in the paper. That is, Black in-migration is associated with warmer feelings among whites towards African Americans, and with higher support for racial equality. Importantly, this relationship is evident even after more than three decades, and is not confined to attitudes. Rather, it also manifest itself in tangible actions, such as (lower) hate crimes.

Several mechanisms may account for the positive relationship between the Great Migration and whites' racial attitudes over the long run. First, white individuals who grew up during the years that led to the passage of the CRA may have developed stronger beliefs in racial equality, transmitting these to the next generation (Schindler and Westcott, 2020). Second, cross-racial interactions may have increased whites' liberal attitudes over race relations through social, horizontal spillovers (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020). Third, while we did not find any evidence of geographic sorting in the short run, it is possible that, over a longer period of time, white individuals moved to places with a more similar ideology (Bishop, 2009).[125] Examining these, and additional,

[125]For instance, areas that received more Black Americans may have attracted more liberal whites, while inducing more conservative individuals to move to more racially homogeneous places.

channels goes beyond the scope of this paper. We leave this fascinating topic to future research.

Table E.7. Long-term Effects: Whites' Attitudes from the CCES

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Panel A. Support for Affirmative Action (mean: 1.95)						
Change Black Share	0.841***	0.760***	0.813***	0.937***	0.580*	0.642*
(1940-1970)	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.195)	(0.360)	(0.331)	(0.369)
F-stat				46.48	56.82	52.67
Observations	100,465	100,465	100,465	100,465	100,465	100,465
Panel B. Racial Resentment (mean: 0.069)						
Change Black Share	-0.828***	-0.709***	-0.806***	-1.044***	-0.569*	-0.725*
(1940-1970)	(0.176)	-0.185	(0.198)	(0.348)	(0.342)	(0.382)
F-stat				45.99	56.42	51.71
Observations	96,051	96,051	96,051	96,051	96,051	96,051
State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X
1940 Dem incumbent			X			X

Notes: The sample is restricted to CCES white respondents living in the counties in our sample in the period 2008-2018 (Panel A) and 2010-2018 (Panel B). The dependent variables are measures of support for affirmative action (resp. racial resentment) in Panel A (resp. Panel B): higher values of support for affirmative action (resp. racial resentment) correspond to higher support (resp. higher resentment). Coefficients are multiplied by 100 to ease interpretation. The main regressor of interest is the county level 1940-1970 change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. OLS and 2SLS results are reported in columns 1 to 3 and columns 4 to 6 respectively. Columns 1 and 4 include state and survey year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 5 add the 1940 Black population share; columns 3 and 6 further control for 1940 Democratic incumbency. All specifications control for individual characteristics: age, age squared, gender, family income, marital status, employment status, and education attainment. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.8. Long-term Effects: Cumulative Hate Crime Rate

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Panel A. Any Offender; Black Victim (mean: 545.9)						
Change Black Share	-42.44***	-35.09***	-32.50***	-71.37***	-36.69***	-32.95***
(1940-1970)	(8.313)	(7.113)	(7.670)	(13.86)	(9.671)	(12.401)
F-stat				19.33	21.26	16.58
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Panel B. White Offender; Black Victim (mean: 325.5)						
Change Black Share	-24.77***	-19.84***	-19.02***	-44.97***	-22.92***	-22.36***
(1940-1970)	(5.347)	(4.478)	(4.819)	(8.179)	(5.580)	(7.193)
F-stat				19.33	21.26	16.58
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X
1940 Dem incumbent			X			X

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 1,042 counties in our sample for which hate crime data are consistently available (see Appendix C.1). The dependent variable is constructed by summing hate crimes against Black Americans in each 5-year period between 2000 and 2015, and scaling them by the Black population at the beginning of each period. To ease interpretation, hate crime rates are multiplied by 100,000. Panel A (resp. Panel B) includes hate crimes committed by any offender (resp. white offenders). The main regressor of interest is the county level 1940-1970 change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. OLS and 2SLS results are reported in columns 1 to 3 and columns 4 to 6 respectively. Columns 1 and 4 include state and survey year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 5 add the 1940 Black population share; columns 3 and 6 further control for 1940 Democratic incumbency. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Regression weighed by 1940 county population. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.9. Long-term Effects: Average Hate Crime Rate

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Panel A. Any Offender; Black Victim (mean: 182.1)						
Change Black Share (1940-1970)	-13.87*** (2.911)	-10.39*** (2.388)	-9.870*** (2.740)	-27.73*** (6.501)	-11.64*** (3.645)	-11.11** (4.668)
F-stat				19.33	21.26	16.58
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Panel B. White Offender; Black Victim (mean: 108.5)						
Change Black Share (1940-1970)	-7.967*** (1.860)	-5.816*** (1.508)	-5.747*** (1.777)	-16.73*** (3.831)	-7.043*** (2.240)	-7.228** (2.866)
F-stat				19.33	21.26	16.58
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X
1940 Dem incumbent			X			X

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 1,042 counties in our sample for which hate crime data are consistently available (see Appendix C.1). The dependent variable is constructed by averaging hate crimes against Black Americans in each 5-year period between 2000 and 2015, and scaling them by the Black population at the beginning of each period. To ease interpretation, hate crime rates are multiplied by 100,000. Panel A (resp. Panel B) includes hate crimes committed by any offender (resp. white offenders). The main regressor of interest is the county level 1940-1970 change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. OLS and 2SLS results are reported in columns 1 to 3 and columns 4 to 6 respectively. Columns 1 and 4 include state and survey year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 5 add the 1940 Black population share; columns 3 and 6 further control for 1940 Democratic incumbency. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Regression weighed by 1940 county population. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.10. Long-term Effects: Cumulative Hate Crime Rate, Non-Minority Group Victims

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Panel A. Cumulative Hate Crime Rate (mean: 8.995)						
Change Black Share (1940-1970)	0.641** (0.319)	0.444 (0.312)	0.462 (0.284)	1.142** (0.500)	-0.193 (0.240)	-0.318 (0.368)
F-stat				19.34	21.26	16.58
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
Panel B. Average Hate Crime Rate (mean: 2.270)						
Change Black Share (1940-1970)	0.158** (0.080)	0.109 (0.078)	0.114 (0.071)	0.281** (0.126)	-0.053 (0.060)	-0.083 (0.093)
F-stat				19.34	21.26	16.58
Observations	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040	1,040
State FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
1940 Black share		X	X		X	X
1940 Dem incumbent			X			X

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 1,042 counties in our sample for which hate crime data are consistently available (see Appendix C.1). In Panel A (resp. Panel B), the dependent variable is constructed by summing (resp. averaging) hate crimes against any victim that is not an ethnic minority in each 5-year period between 2000 and 2015, and scaling them by the county white population at the beginning of each period. To ease interpretation, hate crime rates are multiplied by 100,000. The main regressor of interest is the county level 1940-1970 change in the Black population share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. OLS and 2SLS results are reported in columns 1 to 3 and columns 4 to 6 respectively. Columns 1 and 4 include state and survey year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 5 add the 1940 Black population share; columns 3 and 6 further control for 1940 Democratic incumbency. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Regression weighed by 1940 county population. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.