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## **WORKPLACE KNOWLEDGE FLOWS**

Jason Sandvik, Richard Saouma, Nathan Seegert  
and Christopher Stanton

**INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION**

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*Jason Sandvik, Richard Saouma, Nathan Seegert and Christopher Stanton*

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Centre for Economic Policy Research  
33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK  
Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801  
[www.cepr.org](http://www.cepr.org)

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# WORKPLACE KNOWLEDGE FLOWS

## Abstract

What prevents the spread of information among coworkers, and which management practices facilitate workplace knowledge flows? We conducted a field experiment in a sales company, addressing these questions with three active treatments. (1) Encouraging workers to talk about their sales techniques with a randomly chosen partner during short meetings substantially lifted average sales revenue during and after the experiment. The largest gains occurred for those matched with high-performing coworkers. (2) Worker-pairs given incentives to increase joint output increased sales during the experiment but not afterward. (3) Worker-pairs given both treatments had little improvement above the meetings treatment alone. Managerial interventions providing structured opportunities for workers to initiate conversations with peers resulted in knowledge exchange; incentives based on joint output gains were neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge transmission.

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Jason Sandvik - [jason.sandvik@gmail.com](mailto:jason.sandvik@gmail.com)  
*Tulane University*

Richard Saouma - [richard@saouma.ch](mailto:richard@saouma.ch)  
*Michigan State University*

Nathan Seegert - [nathan.seegert@gmail.com](mailto:nathan.seegert@gmail.com)  
*University of Utah*

Christopher Stanton - [christopher.t.stanton@gmail.com](mailto:christopher.t.stanton@gmail.com)  
*Harvard Business School and CEPR*

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# Workplace Knowledge Flows

Jason Sandvik\*  
*Tulane University*

Richard Saouma†  
*Michigan State University*

Nathan Seegert‡  
*University of Utah*

Christopher Stanton§  
*Harvard Business School and NBER*

## Abstract

What prevents the spread of information among coworkers, and which management practices facilitate workplace knowledge flows? We conducted a field experiment in a sales company, addressing these questions with three active treatments. (1) Encouraging workers to talk about their sales techniques with a randomly chosen partner during short meetings substantially lifted average sales revenue during and after the experiment. The largest gains occurred for those matched with high-performing coworkers. (2) Worker-pairs given incentives to increase joint output increased sales during the experiment but not afterward. (3) Worker-pairs given both treatments had little improvement above the meetings treatment alone. Managerial interventions providing structured opportunities for workers to initiate conversations with peers resulted in knowledge exchange; incentives based on joint output gains were neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge transmission.

**Keywords:** Management practices; spillovers; peer effects; organizational design; randomized controlled trial (RCT).

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\*jsandvik@tulane.edu

†rs2@msu.edu

‡nathan.seegert@business.utah.edu

§cstanton@hbs.edu

# 1 Introduction

The best workers in many firms substantially outperform others (Lazear, 2000; Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2007; Lazear et al., 2015; Lo et al., 2016). Is this due to variation in natural abilities, or differences in knowledge about how to perform a job? To the extent that knowledge differences matter, what slows the diffusion of knowledge among coworkers? The literature on peer effects suggests that spillovers operate powerfully inside firms (Mas and Moretti, 2009; Bandiera et al., 2010), but the conditions for knowledge spillovers and the management practices that facilitate them are less clear.<sup>1</sup> Few controlled experiments assess knowledge spillovers under different management practices, and observational approaches can be challenging due to omitted variable bias (Manski, 1993; Glaeser et al., 2003; Guryan et al., 2009). To overcome these challenges, we worked with a sales firm to conduct a field experiment.

The experiment occurred in an inbound sales call center where workers (“agents” in the firm’s terminology) sell television, phone, and internet services to customers calling from across the United States. Calls are allocated to agents randomly, meaning that everyone within a division faces the same distribution of sales opportunities, and agent compensation depends on individual performance. Using the firm’s focal performance measure, revenue-per-call (RPC), sales productivity across agents varied dramatically prior to the experiment. Those at the 75th percentile of the distribution brought in approximately 48% more revenue on a given call than those at the 25th percentile, even after adjusting for sampling variation. Manager interviews and agent surveys cite varying knowledge of sales techniques as contributing to this dispersion, consistent with the importance of task-specific human capital (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004). For example, the most successful agents understand when and how to ask about customer needs; they know which products to bundle; they incorporate add-ons that increase revenue; and they redirect callers to feasible alternatives whenever they fail to qualify for specific products or promotions.

What limits the diffusion of this knowledge between coworkers? Knowledge seekers may face *initiation costs* that prevent them from gathering information. These costs include social concerns (e.g., reluctance to approach unfamiliar coworkers or a fear of signaling incompetence (Chandrasekhar et al., 2016; Edmondson and Lei, 2014)), coordination difficulties (e.g., setting up meetings), and search frictions (e.g., knowing whom to ask (Boudreau et al.,

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<sup>1</sup>Spillovers have been shown to drive productivity growth (Marshall, 1890; Jacobs, 1969; Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 1992; Barro, 1991; Romer, 1990), and there is a long history of work connecting the transfer of knowledge to physical proximity. A common view is that firms exist to facilitate best practice adoption and knowledge spillovers (Grant, 1996). However, there is often conflicting advice in academic and executive-focused publications on how to enable knowledge sharing within firms (Myers, 2015).

2017)). On the other hand, knowledge providers may lack the incentive to share knowledge, due to *contracting costs*. In many sales firms, including this one, a portion of compensation depends on (coarse) performance relative to other employees, potentially increasing opportunity costs of helping others. Contracting costs limit the ability of knowledge seekers to sufficiently compensate knowledge providers for exchanging information.<sup>2</sup>

The experiment was designed to assess the effectiveness of management practices that target initiation costs, contracting costs, and the combination of both costs. In the firm’s two main offices, 653 agents were assigned to four treatment cells using a clustered design based on the identity of their sales manager. Treatments occurred during a four-week period, labeled the intervention period. At the onset, agents were all paired with a randomly assigned partner from the same treatment, with some pairs rotating to new partners at the beginning of each subsequent week. Agents in the *Internal Control* group were paired and had their joint revenue-per-call gains (relative to the two weeks prior to the intervention period) displayed publicly, but they were given no additional incentives or instructions to take further actions, making them “passive pairs.” Three “active” treatments added additional layers on top of the partner pairings. The first active treatment, labeled *Structured-Meetings*, targeted initiation costs by encouraging worker-pairs to meet early in the week. Worksheets guided these agents to reflect on their own sales strengths and challenges and to seek and record advice from their partner.<sup>3</sup> Pairs completing worksheets were encouraged to meet again over a catered lunch near the end of the week. The second active treatment, labeled *Pair-Incentives*, targeted contracting costs by providing paired agents with explicit incentives to increase their joint revenue-per-call. The third active treatment, labeled *Combined*, included all elements of both the *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* treatments. An additional 83 salespeople, located in a third office, 600 miles away from the two main offices, provided an *External Control* group that was unaware of the experiment.

We estimate how treatments affect output using four weeks of pre-intervention data, the four-week intervention period itself, and 20 additional weeks of data after the interventions ended. Data from the post-intervention period allows us to distinguish between short-term effort changes and long-term sales gains, the latter of which are consistent with knowledge

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<sup>2</sup>Many models of person-to-person knowledge transfer assume that knowledge sharing is difficult to contract over (Morrison and Wilhelm Jr., 2004; Garicano and Rayo, 2017; Fudenberg and Rayo, 2017). Becker (1962) discusses the contracting costs associated with a firm that shares knowledge with employees. Specifically, trainees disproportionately benefit in the long run, while firms pay an upfront cost, leading to an under-provision of general skills training in firms. We present a short theoretical model in the appendix, illustrating how the treatments target initiation and contracting costs.

<sup>3</sup>One side of the worksheet asked agents to reflect on their performance that week (e.g., their most difficult call and how, in hindsight, it could have been improved). The other side had agents solicit the same responses from their partner and then asked them to write down the advice received from their partner while talking through sales problems.

acquisition from peer interactions.

We find that certain management practices that encourage knowledge sharing between coworkers can raise long-term productivity. The *Structured-Meetings* treatment was particularly effective, suggesting the constraint on knowledge flows is initiation costs on the part of knowledge seekers, not knowledge providers' lack of willingness to help. The experiment yields the following results.

1. Relative to both the *Internal Control* and *External Control* groups, the *Structured-Meetings* treatment yielded a 24% increase in revenue-per-call during the four-week intervention period, compared to a 13% increase in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment. Net revenue gains significantly exceeded implementation costs for both treatments.
2. Revenue-per-call gains in the *Combined* treatment were similar to those of the *Structured-Meetings* treatment during the intervention period.
3. Treatments targeting initiation costs induced knowledge transfers between peers, while treatments targeting contracting costs alone did not.
  - (a) The *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments yielded persistent performance increases through the post-intervention period. Twenty weeks after interventions formally ended, average sales in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments remained between 18% and 21% higher than the control groups.
  - (b) Agents in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment had post-intervention average sales changes that were statistically indistinguishable from either control group, pointing to effort changes, rather than knowledge acquisition, as the source of gains during the four-week intervention period.
  - (c) Heterogeneous effects by partner ability help to distinguish knowledge transfers from explanations around each agent solving his or her own problems through self-reflection or increasing effort due to an improved work environment. Agents in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments performed better across the intervention and post-intervention periods when paired with high-performers—agents with above median sales prior to the intervention. The largest gains occurred for low-performers when paired with high-performers. High-performers' own sales improved when paired with other high-performers, while their sales remained stable when paired with low-performers.
  - (d) Productivity dispersion fell in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments, largely due to the increased performance of agents in the lower tail of the performance distribution.

4. Results are similar for every sales measure tracked by the firm, including revenue-per-hour (RPH) and total revenue-per-week. The *Structured-Meetings* protocol did not detract from agents' ability to answer calls.
5. Although sales and call center jobs have high baseline turnover rates, the sales increases are not due to retention differences across treatments.

Content from participants' worksheet entries, survey responses, and interviews further support knowledge flows as the mechanism behind the persistent sales gains observed in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatment groups. These sources indicate that the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments induced partners to share knowledge, while the *Pair-Incentives* treatment did not. Furthermore, management believed that knowledge sharing occurred during the intervention period and continued afterward.

Between 72% and 82% of the worksheets used to document what transpired between partners in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments contain examples of contextual knowledge on improving sales. Partners' suggestions on these worksheets included new content to use when pitching product bundles, strategies to handle difficulties with customer credit checks (which occur for sales involving hardware installations), and tactics to offer selective discounts. Other worksheets contained only supportive statements, like "stay positive" or "be confident," rather than knowledge. In regressions of sales performance on measures of different worksheet content, agents with recorded knowledge on their worksheets had the largest persistent sales gains.

Because agents in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment had similar long-term gains to those in the *Combined* treatment, we infer that initiation costs, rather than contracting costs, most constrain workplace knowledge flows. Several additional results provide insight into what types of initiation costs are most likely in this setting. Survey evidence suggests search costs are relatively unimportant in this context because agents report that: (1) they believe help from high-performers would improve their sales and, consequently, their compensation and, (2) they can identify high-performers. We also find that sales changes are similar for agents regardless of their likely familiarity with their partner, which is inconsistent with search costs. In contrast, interview evidence is consistent with social costs limiting knowledge flows. For example, one interviewee said an "intimidation factor" had previously prevented her from asking coworkers for help, and that the structured meetings had given her an excuse to talk to one of the best sales agents in the company. Consistent with literature on the conditions under which individuals open up to others (Edmondson, 1999; Edmondson and Lei, 2014), the worksheet prompts and the *Structured-Meetings* protocol may have helped agents surface questions that they otherwise would not have asked. While the research design



cannot pinpoint the exact form of social costs, these pieces of evidence suggest that lowering social costs likely had a substantial effect on performance.

By reducing initiation costs, the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments increased individual workers' weekly earnings by \$35 to \$43 per week and firm revenues by \$580 to \$720 per agent-week during the intervention period. Given these effect sizes, one may question why the practices were not attempted earlier. First, the outcomes were not obvious to management (nor to the authors). In planning conversations, sales team leaders believed that joint incentives would drive knowledge sharing and revenue. Such beliefs are consistent with several studies on the efficacy of group incentives (Friebel et al., 2017; Englmaier et al., 2018). Human resource managers, instead, believed that a more directed approach was needed to encourage peer spillovers. Second, experimentation was necessary to uncover these findings, and *controlled* experiments had not been attempted within this firm.<sup>4</sup> Based on the outcome of the experiment, the firm's management has augmented its traditional onboarding with a process that closely follows the protocol from the *Structured-Meetings* treatment.

Our work links the literature on management practices with the determinants of "social learning" (Bloom et al., 2017, 2016; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011; Conley and Udry, 2010; Hanna et al., 2014). Specifically, we demonstrate that organizational policies may overcome widespread social costs that have been shown to limit the diffusion of information (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017). These results have obvious connections to the substantial literature on peer effects and mentoring in the workplace (Lyle and Smith, 2014; Lazear et al., 2015) while also relating to the challenges of implementing practices that facilitate peer spillovers (Garlick, 2014; Carrell et al., 2013).<sup>5</sup>

Our findings show that individuals stand to gain significantly from talking about workplace problems with coworkers, but they often fail to do so because of frictions that prevent them from seeking help. Similar frictions are likely important in many settings, and the gains from understanding and addressing them have the potential to be quite large (Battiston et al., 2017; Catalini, 2017; Cai and Szeidl, 2017; Hasan and Koning, 2017; Boudreau et al., 2017; Battiston et al., 2017). For organizations, these results may help explain the

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<sup>4</sup>Numerous studies underscore the notion that experiments are a useful tool to test new practices prior to firm-wide adoption, in part because results often are not obvious (Carpenter et al., 2005). For example, Jackson and Schneider (2015) find large and unanticipated productivity gains in an experiment on the introduction of checklists in auto repair shops.

<sup>5</sup>Most of the literature on peer effects largely focuses on settings with significant group-level components, including effort externalities (Mas and Moretti, 2009), effort complementarities (Friebel et al., 2017), internal competition (Chan et al., 2014), and social spillovers associated with choosing one's coworkers (Bandiera et al., 2005, 2013). The peer knowledge flows that we induced yielded measurable value, despite the lack of production interdependencies (workers sell autonomously in this firm).

relatively limited takeup of remote hiring or other forms of alternative work arrangements (Katz and Krueger, 2019), as spillovers from coworkers are important, even for individual work. We conclude that management practices within firms are important for unlocking the benefits of individual interactions that have been documented in cities and other contexts.

## 2 Experimental Setting

### 2.1 The Study Firm, Performance Metrics, and Agent Compensation

The experiment occurred in an inbound-sales call center from July to August of 2017, with data collection continuing after the conclusion of the interventions. At the time of the experiment, the firm employed over 730 salespeople in three geographically separate offices. The two offices involved in the experiment are within 50 miles of one another, whereas the third office, containing the *External Control* group, is located over 600 miles away. The firm contracts with television, phone, and internet providers to market and sell their services.<sup>6</sup> Sales agents are tasked with answering inbound calls from potential customers, accommodating customer needs, and explaining the benefits of premium service packages (upselling) when appropriate. The sales department contains six large divisions and several smaller divisions. Divisions can span multiple offices, are headed by one or two division presidents, and are uniquely characterized by the bundles of products, services, and brands offered for sale.<sup>7</sup> Divisions contain smaller teams of agents, led by a single manager. During the intervention, the average team size was 12.69 agents, with a standard deviation of 4.07.

Summary information about agent demographics, work patterns, and sales productivity is contained in Table 1, Column 1. The sales floor is predominately male, 68%, and is relatively young, with an average age of 26. Agents spend, on average, about 33 hours logged into the phone system per week, and 87% of agents work more than 32 hours per week. When not logged into the phone system, agents participate in group- and division-wide meetings and in one-on-one discussions with managers. The adherence measure captures the fraction of an agent’s logged-in time either spent on calls or waiting in the queue to receive an incoming call. The call queue is a function of when agents become available, with calls randomly allocated to those available. Agents spend about 80% of their logged-in time on calls or awaiting a call. In a given week, the average agent takes 62 calls, approximately two calls for

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<sup>6</sup>Such third-party selling is common in the United States, especially for nationwide service providers.

<sup>7</sup>For example, one division might only sell internet packages from provider A, while another might sell internet packages from provider B *and* satellite television packages.

every hour available to answer the phone. The firm records revenue from each call. Revenue is a transfer price that approximates the firm’s share of the total sale. (The remainder goes to the upstream provider.)<sup>8</sup>

To filter variation in the number of calls, the firm primarily assesses agent productivity based on revenue-per-call, (RPC). The firm also shared data with us on revenue-per-hour (RPH), total calls-per-week (total calls), and total revenue-per-week (revenue). The fact that calls are assigned at random to agents within a division allows us to use these metrics to measure the effects of treatments on individual sales productivity.

Agents are compensated in three ways. (1) They receive an hourly wage. The base wage starts at approximately 150% of minimum wage, with small hourly raises for every three months of tenure. Hourly wages are capped at approximately 200% of minimum wage. (2) They receive a weekly commission, where the fraction of total sales paid out to agents is a function of their relative efficiency, based on quintiles of revenue-per-call, quintiles of revenue-per-hour, and call quality, as captured by mandatory call audits each week. Each week, agents receive reports on their own revenue-per-call, revenue-per-hour, and how their numbers compare with the rest of the sales floor. The average (median) sales agent earns \$217.78 (\$185.45) per week in commissions. (3) They may receive small, occasional bonuses from temporary promotional activities.

## 2.2 Training, Development Practices, and Productivity Dispersion

When hired, agents are enrolled in a formal sales training class that lasts two weeks. Throughout training, they receive information largely through lectures and by listening in on other agents’ calls. Trainees then spend up to four weeks in a hands-on training program, taking calls under the supervision of a temporary training manager. The training manager familiarizes agents with the process of selling and educates them on the products being sold. Once trainees reach a threshold level of revenues, they graduate to a permanent team on the sales floor. Agents who fail to reach the threshold levels of performance within a designated number of weeks are usually let go. Agents on regular teams report in surveys that their primary point of contact for solving problems is their direct sales manager.

There is substantial dispersion in sales productivity among the agents. Using data from

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<sup>8</sup>Upstream service providers pay the firm for every sale in accordance with pre-negotiated schedules—some of which vary with the total number of products or services sold by the firm. To insulate the sales agents from the uncertainty surrounding aggregate sales and periodic contractual negotiations, the firm posts relatively fixed “transfer prices” that form the base revenue upon which agents are paid commissions. All use of the term “revenues” in this paper refers to sales priced in accordance with the internal transfer price schedule. These transfer prices remained constant during the entire data period.

the eight weeks preceding the interventions, we plot the overall dispersion in log revenue-per-call in Figure 1 for agents in the firm’s two main offices. We further decompose this variation to extract agent fixed effects, after removing time-by-division fixed effects. Agent fixed effects, representing persistent productivity differences across coworkers, have substantial dispersion, as shown in the density plot “Due to Person Effects” in Figure 1.<sup>9</sup> The interquartile range of log RPC due to agent effects is 0.39, meaning that, on a random call, an agent at the 75th percentile of the fixed effects distribution generates about 48% more expected revenue than an agent at the 25th percentile. The reported agent fixed effects capture baseline knowledge differences and any gains from job-specific experience. Although highly tenured agents are more productive on average, their performance also exhibits substantial dispersion: the interquartile range of log RPC fixed effects for agents with above median tenure is also 0.39. This motivates exploration of whether practices that encourage agents to exchange knowledge alter the mean and variance of the distribution of across-agent sales productivity.

Agents point to knowledge-based explanations for differences in performance. When surveyed about the determinants of top sellers’ success, 32% of agents credit their superior ability to determine and respond to customers’ needs. A further 29% believe the most important factor is a better sales process—knowing when to suggest products, how to overcome objections, and how to use the computer system to support the sale. Twenty-nine percent of agents respond that superior product knowledge gives top performers an edge.

We investigated two institutional details that we believed might limit knowledge flows, but interviews and the experimental results ultimately suggest that these are not the relevant constraints agents face. First, knowledge transmission requires inter-agent communication, and time away from the phone may result in fewer revenue-generating opportunities for an agent. However, there is usually downtime between calls, so helping others would rarely affect selling opportunities. Second, agent commission rates—that is, the fraction of their earned revenue paid out as commissions—are a weakly decreasing function of their coworkers’ success. Despite this, the probability that providing help to a coworker meaningfully shifts one’s own compensation is small.<sup>10</sup> Pre-experiment interviews suggested that agents are

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<sup>9</sup>We shrink the fixed effects to reduce the influence of sampling error using the procedure of [Lazear et al. \(2015\)](#).

<sup>10</sup>Commission rates are bucketed into coarse categories that depend on relative performance on revenue-per-call and revenue-per-hour. In interviews, agents describe their commission rate category as relatively fixed, reflecting that the likelihood that helping others influences one’s own compensation is very small. Changing one’s own compensation through helping others requires the agent providing assistance to be at the precipice of the performance threshold. In particular, helping another agent must either: (1) sufficiently detract from one’s own work such that performance falls from one quintile to another, or (2) deliver so much value to one’s partner that the latter leapfrogs the former and simultaneously bumps the focal agent into the lower performance quintile. In all cases, the agent’s take-home pay will drop by less than 10%.

aware of the incentive structure, but still would be willing to help others.

### 3 Experimental Design

We develop an illustrative model in Appendix A.1, in which agents combine effort and knowledge to generate revenue. The model allows for knowledge to flow freely between paired agents, provided the two have made sufficiently large, relationship-specific investments. Hindering such flows are initiation and contracting costs, though the magnitude of these costs and who bears them are empirical questions that the experimental design helps to uncover.

The design was pre-registered before treatments began.<sup>11</sup> All agents in the six largest sales divisions working in the firm’s two largest offices were eligible for treatment, resulting in 653 workers assigned to a treatment cell. Agents in the third location, 83, were not eligible for assignment to a treatment group, constituting a hold out *External Control* group.<sup>12</sup> Agents at the third location (600 miles away) were unaware of the experiment, as there is minimal interaction between workers in different offices.

All agents who were assigned to a treatment cell experienced four common changes associated with the experiment. First, agents were told, via posters around the office and announcements from support personnel, that the company was partnering with university researchers to study pairing agents together. Agents were directed to view a website for more information. (The text of the website is displayed in Appendix B.2.) Second, each agent was paired with a single, randomly chosen partner from his or her own treatment group, division, and office. Partner identities were announced at the beginning of the week. Half of the agents were assigned to rotate partners weekly, albeit agents were only able to infer whether they were in fixed or stable pairings on Day 1 of Week 2, when they either retained their former partner or were assigned a new, randomly chosen partner (repeat assignments

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<sup>11</sup>The RCT registry number is AEARCTR-0002332. The IRB approval at the University of Utah is IRB 00098156.

<sup>12</sup>The RCT Registry notes 650 treatment-eligible agents and 44 managers. The different numbers here reflect updated data given to us by the firm. There are three more workers in the sample than were logged in the pre-registration because more agents joined the sales floor after training than originally anticipated. Twenty-six new agents, those who just finished their formal training, entered the sample in the middle of the intervention, with 11 joining in week 2, and 15 joining in week 3. These new agents received the same treatment associated with their sales manager in the first week on the sales floor. The pre-registration was based on having 44 sales managers, but additional managers were added between planning the pre-registration and the implementation of treatments. In our final sample, we observe 52 different managers in the two main locations and an additional six managers in the third location. The RCT Registry sample size does not include the *External Control* group because these agents were not treatment eligible. The pre-registration protocol called for a four-week intervention period and at least three months of post-intervention data. We extended the analysis to 20 weeks of post-intervention data in response to seminar questions about the persistence of the findings.

were permitted).<sup>13</sup> Third, agents were notified that their own and their partners’ individual sales data was being shared with the university team. Fourth, all pairs had their joint performance scores published daily on TV monitors and on the firm’s internal messaging platform. These joint performance scores normalized the *percentage change* in the pair’s average revenue-per-call (RPC), relative to their RPC in the two weeks immediately preceding the interventions.<sup>14</sup>

Beyond these components common across all treatment-eligible agents, we term three treatment cells “active.” Each of these active treatments was designed to target different frictions: initiation costs, contracting costs, or both costs. In particular, the *Structured-Meetings* treatment targeted the initiation costs facing knowledge seekers, the *Pair-Incentives* treatment targeted knowledge providers’ potential contracting costs, and the *Combined* treatment explored whether both frictions jointly limit knowledge transfers.

### 3.1 Structured-Meetings Treatment

The *Structured-Meetings* treatment was designed to test the hypothesis that encouraging agents to seek help from their partners would result in knowledge exchanges. Agents in the treatment were prompted to talk through issues holding back their sales and to seek advice from their assigned partners. To facilitate these conversations, agents were encouraged to complete the following tasks: (1) fill out an individual self-reflective worksheet to prompt discussion prior to meeting with their partner; (2) converse with their partner and record their partner’s self-reflective responses and advice on their own worksheet; and (3) return completed worksheets to management by Wednesday of each week. Points of emphasis on the worksheets were sourced/created in collaboration with the firm’s leadership. Documentation of this worksheet can be found in Appendix B.3. Completion of these tasks was optional, but agents largely complied. Over 80% of the agents completed the worksheets used to direct conversations with their partner (see Appendix Table A.1). Those who turned in the worksheets could receive a free catered lunch on Wednesday or Thursday of the same week. During this lunch, agent-pairs were provided with high-end, local sandwiches (worth about \$7 each) and were prompted to discuss several additional talking points related to their prior interactions, although these conversations were not recorded or documented formally. Documentation of the talking points can also be found in Appendix B.3.

While the meetings between agents did not have fixed content (like a training manual) and

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<sup>13</sup> Some pairs were dissolved when one or both agents left the sample (e.g., termination of employment, taking a leave of absence, etc.); the partners of these departing agents were paired with a new, randomly chosen partner.

<sup>14</sup> Management advised us to avoid displaying negative scores. Hence, scores were normalized around 100, where 100 reflected pre-treatment productivity levels.

were largely self-guided, agents were provided with directions to meet with their partners and focus their conversations on recent sales calls. In this way, the *Structured-Meetings* treatment directly targeted initiation costs via nontrivial managerial practices, namely: creating the worksheets prompting the topics of conversation, asking workers to discuss their calls, and rewarding participants with sponsored lunches.

### 3.2 Pair-Incentives Treatment

The *Pair-Incentives* treatment was designed to test the hypothesis that explicit, joint output incentives would suffice for partners to exchange knowledge. Agent-pairs in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment could earn rewards for increasing their joint production. Specifically, at the end of each week, agent-pairs were bracketed with two other randomly chosen pairs, and the pair with the highest percentage increase in joint RPC was awarded the weekly prize. To prevent agents from feeling discouraged or adjusting their effort based on the real-time performance of a known set of other agent-pairs, no one was told which other pairs they would be competing against until a random drawing occurred at the end of each week (see Appendix B.1). Basing the reward probability on percentage increases of RPC relative to baseline performance was intended to prevent feelings of being disadvantaged if paired with a less productive partner. To increase the salience of the incentive, management suggested using prizes, such as golf vouchers, onsite massages, and tickets to activities. These prizes had the advantage of immediacy—with delivery at the end of each week. The cash-equivalent of each prize was approximately \$50. In surveys, agents reported an average valuation for the prizes of \$40, which equates to an 18% (22%) increase in weekly commission pay for the average (median) agent, or equivalently, a bit over 8% of the median agent’s total take-home pay. Far weaker group incentives have been found to generate meaningful productivity increases, albeit in a setting with strong interdependence among workers in production (Friebel et al., 2017).

While agents in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment were not given a protocol to transfer knowledge with their partners, they were free to do so. Nothing prevented them from engaging their partner in conversations like those in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment. In fact, the website copy introducing all active treatments explained the purpose of the exercise by saying, “We want to encourage you to talk about your calls with colleagues, and possibly meet some new people along the way” (see Appendix B.2). The *Pair-Incentives* treatment thus offers a test of whether workers with aligned incentives will self-organize to share knowledge.

### 3.3 Combined Treatment

The *Combined* treatment was designed to test the hypothesis that addressing both initiation costs and contracting costs would have a different joint effect than treatments addressing either initiation costs or contracting costs in isolation. Agent-pairs in the *Combined* treatment were given both the *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* treatments. Prizes were only based on comparisons with other pairs in the *Combined* treatment.

### 3.4 Control Groups

Agents in the *Internal Control* group received the common treatments. That is, they were made aware that data was being shared with university researchers, they were assigned a partner, and their joint performance scores were publicized. Like the treatments above, they were told that the experiment’s objective was to encourage discussion of their calls with their partners; however, they were not provided with a protocol to do so, nor were they provided with incentives to boost their joint sales. When designing the experiment, we expected any response to the revelation of information about joint performance to be minimal, but the design does allow us to test for this effect.<sup>15</sup>

The *External Control* group, which was never exposed to the experiment, allows for a comparison against each of the three active treatments and the *Internal Control*. If Hawthorne effects or responses to new information were important, we would expect that agents in the *Internal Control* would diverge from the *External Control*.

### 3.5 Treatment Assignment and Implementation Details

Figure A illustrates the allocation of agents to the different treatment and control groups. Agents were assigned to treatments based on the identity of their sales manager. The 653 agents in the two offices with active treatments were managed by 52 distinct sales managers during the intervention period (i.e., the four weeks when the management practice changes were in place). Among these managers, 13 were randomly designated to the *Internal Control*, along with their 186 sales agents. Similarly, 13 managers (158 agents) were allocated to the *Structured-Meetings* treatment, 12 managers (135 agents) were allocated to the *Pair-Incentives* treatment, and 14 managers (174 agents) were allocated to the *Combined* treatment. Across the treatment-eligible agents, the probability that an agent was assigned

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<sup>15</sup>While other studies have found that the introduction of public rank data (sometimes called rank incentives) may cause deviations from prior productivity (e.g., [Bandiera et al. \(2013\)](#)), rank incentives for individual agents were already present at this firm, because commission rates partially depend on relative—albeit less salient—comparisons of agents. According to the contingency results of [Blader et al. \(2019\)](#), rank displays comported with prior practices and therefore may have had minimal effects, relative to the baseline.



a partner reporting to his or her own manager was 0.40 each week, which ranged from 0.36 in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment to 0.47 in the *Combined* treatment. The *External Control* group in the distant office contained 83 agents supervised by six managers. As part of the design, movement between managers was restricted during the intervention period, and no agents switched managers during these four weeks.<sup>16</sup>

Table 1 splits demographics and performance information by treatment assignment. The agents in the three active treatment groups and the *Internal Control* group do not differ based on pre-intervention sales productivity or demographic characteristics. That is, treatment assignment is balanced across observables for treatment-eligible agents. P-values of randomization tests of mean differences in the *Internal Control* and active treatment groups are reported in the last column.<sup>17</sup> Although the *External Control* group had lower average sales per agent, sales trends in the *External Control* tracked those in the *Internal Control* and the three active treatments prior to the experiment. Section 4.1 discusses parallel trends tests prior to the intervention. We also test for balance across managers, the unit of randomization. Across treatment arms, managers are similar in age, tenure, gender, and in the average productivity of the agents they oversee. These manager-level averages, along with the p-values of randomization tests of differences in means, are displayed by treatment in Table A.2. During the intervention period, the average number of agents reporting to a manager is balanced across treatments.

To communicate treatment assignment and intervention guidelines, senior executives shared the details of the appropriate treatment with sales managers and support personnel, as they would be agents' first resource if they had questions. Managers and support personnel were told that the research staff would be allocating agents to different treatments in order "to better understand and improve [agent] motivation, [agent] retention, and ultimately, [agent] satisfaction." Staff were told to communicate this to agents, if asked. Posters around the office announced a "Sales Sprint" undertaken in conjunction with the help of university researchers that would last four weeks. Agents were directed to a website that explained their own treatment. (See Appendix B.2 for the text of communication.) Workers were provided with a specific login key, based on their treatment assignment, so they could only review details of their own treatment. Email and phone hotlines were established to answer questions that were not directed to sales managers. Finally, a subset of the authors

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<sup>16</sup>Agents typically switch managers on average between one to two times per year. After the intervention period, there was some reallocation of agents to other managers. Ninety-six agents had a different manager during at least one week between weeks 5 and 10 (the six weeks following intervention), and 277 agents were observed with a different manager during at least one week in the 20 weeks following the interventions.

<sup>17</sup>These tests are computed from a regression of the variable of interest on treatment-assignment dummies after clustering standard errors, based on manager identity (the level of assignment). P-values are for the joint test on these treatment-assignment dummies.

were on-site at least three days a week during the intervention period. Appendix B.1 provides details about the sequence of steps used to implement the intervention.




Figure A: Allocation of Agents to Treatments

## 4 Results Identified by the Experiment

This section presents evidence on treatment effects during the four weeks with active interventions and how these effects persist into the post-intervention period. Figure 2 shows average revenue-per-call (RPC) gains during the intervention period in all three active treatment groups.<sup>18</sup> Beginning with a pre-intervention baseline of \$61, RPC increased by \$11 for agents in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment, whereas the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments yielded an RPC increase of approximately \$15 relative to the pre-intervention mean. RPC did not change for agents in the *Internal* and *External* control groups. Figure 3 shows RPC by week for each treatment group. Positive effects were present for all three active treatments in week one (the first week of the intervention) and remained positive for the rest of the intervention period. Beyond week four, when interventions ended, RPC remained elevated for agents in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments. In contrast, average RPC immediately collapsed to the control mean for agents in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment.

The sales increases in weeks one through four were likely achieved through different channels. If knowledge was exchanged, then any associated productivity gains should persist. The experiment was intentionally designed to measure such persistence in the post-intervention period. Agents who were provided a protocol through which to exchange contextual knowledge with their partners in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments persistently increased their sales, likely by applying this new knowledge. The *Pair-Incentives* treatment, on the other hand, likely induced only transitory increases in effort. Supporting this interpretation, we show that treatment effects on sales are largest where knowledge exchange is most likely: for agents paired with high-performing partners and agents who document contextual knowledge on their worksheets.

### 4.1 Estimation and Inference with Difference-in-Differences

Our empirical strategy uses difference-in-differences, which 1) enables comparisons relative to the *External Control*, an office with lower levels of pre-experiment sales productivity than the treatment-eligible agents, and 2) increases power for analysis of heterogeneous responses by reducing the influence of between-subject or between-manager variability. Figure 3 provides support for this approach by showing similar pre-intervention trends across groups.<sup>19</sup> The

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<sup>18</sup>To facilitate comparisons of changes across groups, Figure 2 displays RPC normalized to the grand-mean in the week prior to the intervention period (week 0) for the active treatment groups. Table 1 presents non-normalized summary statistics, averaged across agents, in the pre-intervention period.

<sup>19</sup>To formally test for pre-trend differences, we interact time indicators and treatment indicators in the pre-intervention period. We test for pre-trends using both four and eight weeks of pre-intervention data. After regressing log RPC on these time-by-treatment indicators in the pre-intervention period, we fail to reject that any are statistically different from zero at the 10% level (the smallest p-value is 0.48).

main estimating equation is:

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Structured-Meetings}_i \times T_t + \beta_2 \text{Pair-Incentives}_i \times T_t + \beta_3 \text{Combined}_i \times T_t + \beta_4 \text{Internal-Control}_i \times T_t + \lambda_t + \theta_g + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{i,t}$  is a dependent variable of interest,  $i$  represents an agent,  $t$  represents a week,  $g$  represents a sales manager group,  $\lambda_t$  and  $\theta_g$  are week and sales manager fixed effects, respectively, and  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  is an idiosyncratic error term. The level effects of each treatment are subsumed by the sales manager fixed effects, because all agents reporting to a sales manager are assigned to the same treatment. Week fixed effects remove common time shocks that affect all workers. The indicator  $T_t$  is a placeholder for either the intervention period or the post-intervention period, indicating that interventions were either occurring or had occurred in the past. For example, when the sample includes the pre-intervention period (weeks -3 to 0) and the intervention period (weeks 1 to 4), the variable  $\text{Structured-Meetings}_i \times T_t$  is set to one during weeks 1 to 4 for those agents randomly assigned to the *Structured-Meetings* treatment and to zero otherwise. When the sample consists of the pre-intervention period and the post-intervention period (weeks 5 to 24), the variable  $\text{Structured-Meetings}_i \times T_t$  is set to one during weeks 5 to 24.

Standard errors are clustered at the manager level, the unit of treatment assignment. We also use randomization inference to compute exact p-values for the null of no treatment effects, as described by Young (2018). Subsequent tables present p-values of joint hypothesis tests of no significant treatment effects after accounting for clustered treatment assignment by manager and re-randomizing treatments across managers.

## 4.2 Treatment Effects on Log Revenue-per-Call During the Intervention Period

Table 2 presents treatment effects for log revenue-per-call during the intervention period.<sup>20</sup> The sample contains the four weeks of data in the pre-intervention period and the four weeks of data during the intervention period. Consistent with the graphical evidence, the active treatments resulted in large, statistically significant increases in sales. Randomization tests reject the joint null of no treatment effects for the three active treatments at the 1% level in all columns. Point estimates on log RPC range from 0.22 to 0.25 for *Structured-Meetings*. They are positive but smaller for *Pair-Incentives*, with point estimates between 0.13 and 0.14.

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<sup>20</sup>Skewness in the distribution of sales naturally motivates using a log transformation for revenue. We report estimates below that demonstrate the results are not sensitive to levels, logs, or alternate performance measures.

Wald tests at the bottom of the table reject equality of sales gains in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* treatments. Treatment effects for the *Combined* group are very similar to those for agents with *Structured-Meetings* alone, indicating that the additional benefit of addressing contracting costs was relatively small. In the final row, most specifications reject the hypothesis that the *Combined* treatment effect is greater than the sum of the individual *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* effects. That the incremental effect of adding the *Pair-Incentives* in addition to *Structured-Meetings* is smaller than the baseline effect of *Pair-Incentives* alone may indicate crowd out of monetary incentives or reduced salience of the incentives when presented in conjunction with the instructions surrounding the *Structured-Meetings* treatment.

The results are stable across different control groups. The specification in Column 1 is relative to the *Internal Control* (so  $\beta_4$  in equation 1 is omitted); Column 2 replaces the *Internal Control* group with the *External Control* as the baseline. Columns 3 and 4 add back the *Internal Control*. Estimates change little across columns. Agents in the *Internal Control* were aware of the experiment (see Appendix Table A.1, Panel B), had an assigned partner, and had publicized joint sales information, but they did not change their sales, relative to the (off-site) *External Control* group that was unaware of the experiment. The sales increases in the active treatments are thus unlikely to be driven by Hawthorne effects or by the common treatments across groups. Merely displaying performance information was not sufficient to improve sales, likely because most agents were already aware of their place in the distribution (see Online Appendix Figure OA.2). These estimated treatment effects are robust to the inclusion of agent fixed effects in Column 4 and are not due to differential turnover (discussed in Section 5.2).

The results from the intervention period point to the efficacy of treatments. Providing group-based incentives increased output, as in Friebel et al. (2017) and Bandiera et al. (2013). In addition, the *Structured-Meetings* treatment, meant to reduce initiation costs, resulted in larger sales increases than the *Pair-Incentives* treatment alone. This larger increase becomes apparent graphically in weeks 2 through 4 in Figure 3, as the effects of the *Pair-Incentives* treatment appear to decline relative to the immediate spike in the first week. While we cannot reject a uniform effect across weeks 1 to 4 in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment, average RPC does coincide with agents' pre-experiment reported valuations for the prizes each week.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>The average cost of the prizes was about \$50 each week. When surveyed about the value of each prize prior to the experiment, agents' average valuations for the prizes for weeks one through four were \$46, \$37, \$36, and \$40, respectively. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that if an incentive with subjective value of \$40 resulted in a 0.14 unit increase in log RPC relative to the control group during the intervention period, then to achieve the same 0.24 unit increase realized by agents in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment observed in Table 2, the incentives would need to have a subjective value in excess of \$69  $\approx (0.24 \times \$40)/0.14$ .

Any decline week to week in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment is minimally driven by agents becoming satiated after winning or discouraged after failing to win a prize. (See Table OA.1 in the Online Appendix).

These estimates provide some guidance for how output might respond when practice changes permanently remain in place. Following Athey and Stern (1998) and Ichniowski and Shaw (2003), the final row in Table 2 provides a test of whether the *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* treatments should be implemented together. These results indicate that the *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* treatments are substitutes, implying that evaluating whether to bundle the practices depends on the marginal benefit of the *Combined* treatment.<sup>22</sup> Using the results for log RPC, the *Combined* treatment increased sales by about 1% per call in addition to the *Structured-Meetings* effect, increasing revenue by about \$40 per week for each agent. Given that the per-agent cost of the *Pair-Incentives* treatment was about \$17 per week, the marginal gain from adding incentives appears to outweigh the incremental cost, but the results fall within the confidence intervals for the *Structured-Meetings* effect size in isolation. To understand the mechanism behind the treatments, we turn to their persistence in the post-intervention period.

### 4.3 Persistence of Treatment Effects in the Post-Intervention Period

To assess persistence of the observed sales gains, we re-estimate equation (1) with the four weeks of pre-intervention data and the post-intervention period, weeks 5 through 24. The results, reported in Table 3, are consistent with Figure 3 on the time series averages of RPC by treatment. Treatments addressing initiation costs lead to persistent gains. Agents in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment have log RPC that is 0.17 to 0.21 greater than agents in either control group, representing persistent sales gains between 18% and 23%. The *Combined* treatment also had positive gains in excess of 20% after interventions ended. Using randomization inference, the joint test of no persistent treatment effect for the three active treatments rejects the null at the 5% level in all columns.<sup>23</sup> Post-intervention sales gains for the *Pair-Incentives* group are statistically indistinguishable from either control group. This pattern of results points to different mechanisms behind the sales gains during the intervention period. The transitory gains in *Pair-Incentives* treatment indicate temporary effort increases, while the persistent gains in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments

<sup>22</sup>One possible reason the treatments are substitutes is crowding out of monetary incentives; see Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Ederer and Manso (2013), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), and Gneezy et al. (2011).

<sup>23</sup>The standard errors resemble those obtained when using two-way clustering by sales manager and week. (See Table OA.2 in the Online Appendix.)

are consistent with knowledge transmission between agents.

Columns 1–3 of Table 3 are analogous to the corresponding columns in Table 2 but with differing time periods. Comparing parameter estimates across tables indicates that about 80% of the initial sales gains in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments remain after interventions end. We find substantial persistence in sales gains for these treatments through the end of the post-intervention horizon, as detailed in Appendix Table A.3. Extended graphical evidence through 34 weeks in Figure OA.3 shows that treatment effects remain persistent beyond the end of the sample. Given these large, persistent gains, we attempted to validate them using “insider econometrics” approaches (Bartel et al., 2004). This entailed interviews with sales, operations, and HR executives, where we asked about the plausibility of effect sizes and the underlying mechanisms that may be responsible. These managers reported that adopting new sales techniques or fixing regularly occurring problems would provide agents with long-term gains. Management also observed that the *Structured-Meetings* treatment provided a pathway for agents to continue asking questions and gaining knowledge from their partners, even after the formal meetings and lunches ceased. They believed these follow-up interactions increased the likelihood that treated agents would sustain their higher sales.

A different possibility is that long-run gains arise due to the attrition of agents, but Columns 4 and 5 suggest that workforce composition changes are unlikely to be responsible for the persistent sales gains. Column 4 tests for sensitivity to agent attrition by using a balanced sample approach, where gains are estimated for the particular agents who remain at the firm during the post-intervention period. The balanced sample of agents in Column 4 is restricted to those agents who are present in the intervention period and remain in the data through at least week 19.<sup>24</sup> The number of agents in the sample falls to 388 unique agents, reflecting that 1) this is a high-turnover industry<sup>25</sup> and, more importantly, 2) turnover is seasonal. The experiment occurred immediately prior to a focal moving and back-to-school period, which is the highest turnover time of year for similar firms in both the local sales and call center industries. The estimated effects in the balanced sample are very similar to those in Column 3. Column 5 returns to the baseline sample of all agents, adding individual worker fixed effects. This specification provides an additional diagnostic that accounts for potential correlation between baseline productivity and retention throughout the post-intervention period. Like the results in Column 4, the specification with individual fixed effects is quite similar to those with only manager fixed effects. These results point to large, persistent

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<sup>24</sup>The word “balanced” is shorthand to reflect that these are agents who do not leave the sample, rather than to indicate that they are present in all weeks.

<sup>25</sup> Figure 1 of Hoffman et al. (2017) indicates that workers in similar types of service-sector jobs have a median completed tenure of about 100 days.

gains from treatment, rather than explanations based on worker sorting or the retention of the best agents. A complementary exercise provides visibility into whether the gains are driven by survivors who do not leave the firm by weighting the regressions by the inverse of the number of observations an agent is observed in the sample. The results in Online Appendix Table OA.3 show similar or slightly larger point estimates for the *Structured-Meetings* treatment and point estimates that range from slightly smaller and less precise (while remaining significant) to somewhat larger for the *Combined* treatment.

#### 4.4 Other Output Measures During the Intervention and Post-Intervention Periods

The main results are similar across revenue measures and are not sensitive to the level of aggregation. (See Appendix Table A.4 for results that aggregate to the manager level.) Table 4 presents difference-in-differences estimates of equation (1), where odd-numbered columns correspond to the analysis of changes during the intervention period and even-numbered columns to changes in the post-intervention period. All three active treatments lead to total revenue increases during the intervention period. In the post-intervention period, total revenue is \$817 higher than the controls in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment and \$811 higher than the controls in the *Combined* treatment. These increases in total revenue suggest that gains did not come at the expense of taking fewer calls or working fewer hours. The *Pair-Incentives* point estimate is indistinguishable from zero in the post-intervention period.

The next six columns repeat the analysis for revenue-per-hour (RPH), log RPH, and RPC in levels, all showing broadly similar results.<sup>26</sup> Comparisons of RPH and RPC allow for the possibility that RPC fails to account for time away from the phones while meeting with a partner, which would be evident if the RPH treatment effects were substantially lower. However, the *Structured-Meetings* treatment estimate of log revenue-per-hour is broadly similar to the estimate for log revenue-per-call in Column 3 of Table 2 for the intervention period. Effects sizes are slightly smaller for the *Pair-Incentives* and *Combined* treatments, relative to their log RPC analogs. Log revenue-per-hour remains 14 log points higher than the control groups for the *Structured-Meetings* treatment in the post-intervention period and is 16 log points higher for the *Combined* treatment. The results for RPC in Columns 7 and 8 show broadly similar patterns to the estimates using log RPC as the dependent variable.

A final question is whether any gains came at the expense of quality, a dimension that is

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<sup>26</sup>Estimated effects on total revenue in the post-intervention period are larger than in the intervention period, yet RPC and RPH effects in the post-intervention period are no greater than in the intervention period. This indicates that some of the gain in total revenue in the post-intervention period is likely due to increases in total hours spent working.



harder to observe. In other settings, it may be possible to increase revenue or profits through reduced service quality, but that is less of a concern here. There are no repeat interactions with customers, so the net revenue metrics mostly capture any effects of service quality deterioration. Upstream brand providers also perform call audits to ensure that sales agents accurately represent their products, but we do not have access to that data. However, as mentioned earlier, agents’ commissions include a quality multiplier based on these audited scores. With the commission data we have available, we construct a proxy for quality by considering how agents’ commissions, relative to revenue, vary with treatment. Appendix Table A.5 provides additional details and estimation results. We generally find no changes in this quality proxy. Conversations with managers did not surface concerns about quality reductions.

## 4.5 Sales Changes by Partner Performance

To further explore the mechanism, we leverage random agent pairings with high-performing partners to assess how partner (pre-intervention) performance affects treatment gains. For this analysis, we create a binary classification, sorting agents based on their sales productivity preceding the intervention. Agents are labeled “high-performers” if their productivity is above the median in the eight weeks prior to the intervention for their division; agents who join the firm during the intervention period are assumed to be low performers. (RPC for these agents is significantly below the median.) Figure 4 plots average RPC by treatment group and partner identity during the intervention and post-intervention periods. Average RPC is unaffected by partner quality in the *Internal Control* and the *Pair-Incentives* treatments. In both the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments, agents matched with high-performing partners have higher average RPC than agents matched with low-performing partners. Differences by partner quality remain in the post-intervention period, indicating that both concurrent and persistent gains are larger when agents are randomly matched with a more productive partner.

In line with the results in the theoretical appendix, we expect productivity gains to be largest for agents paired with high-performers if treatment induces contextual knowledge exchange that can be applied by others. We also expect this productivity gain to be larger for low-performers when paired with high-performers, compared to high-performers when paired with other high-performers. To estimate these effects, we interact partner quality

with treatment in the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{i,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Structured-Meetings}_i \times T_t + \beta_2 \text{Pair-Incentives}_i \times T_t \\
 & + \beta_3 \text{Combined}_i \times T_t + \gamma_1 \text{Structured-Meetings}_i \times T_t \times \text{High-Performing Partner}_t \\
 & + \gamma_2 \text{Pair-Incentives}_i \times T_t \times \text{High-Performing Partner}_t \\
 & + \gamma_3 \text{Combined}_i \times T_t \times \text{High-Performing-Partner}_t + \gamma_4 T_t \times \text{High-Performing Partner}_t \\
 & + \gamma_5 \text{Ever High-Performing Partner}_i + \lambda_t + \theta_g + \varepsilon_{i,t},
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where the variable  $T_t$  is again a placeholder to indicate either the intervention period or the post-intervention period. The parameters of interest are  $\gamma_1$ ,  $\gamma_2$ , and  $\gamma_3$ , comparing how high-performing partners affect sales productivity in different treatments. The parameter  $\gamma_4$  captures the baseline effect of having a high-performing partner for agents in the *Internal Control* group. The parameter  $\gamma_5$  allows for differences in the pre-intervention period that may be correlated with the propensity to match with a high-performing partner subsequently (Guryan et al., 2009). This analysis omits the *External Control* group, as these agents did not have partner assignments. We conduct the analysis where the dependent variable is RPC in levels, as it allows for assessment of the optimal assignment rule between high- and low-performers.<sup>27</sup>

Table 5 shows that agents randomly paired with a high-performing partner in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments had larger gains in RPC than did other agents during both the intervention and post-intervention periods. Agents paired with a high-performing partner during the intervention weeks increased revenue-per-call by an additional \$10.89 in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment over the baseline *Structured-Meetings* treatment effect of \$11.94 (Column 1).<sup>28</sup> High-performing partners in the *Combined* treatment raised average RPC by \$15.87 on top of the baseline treatment effect of \$7.51. Agents in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment did not have a statistically significant improvement on top of the baseline treatment effect of \$8.68 when they were paired with a high-performing partner. The last row of the table presents results from tests of the joint null that there are no heterogeneous effects by partner quality in the *Structured-Meetings*, *Pair-Incentives*, and *Combined* treatments. These tests come from wild cluster bootstrapping while imposing the null hypothesis (Roodman et al., 2019). We use this procedure as an alternative to randomization inference because the assignment of high- and low-performing partners happens at a level below the

<sup>27</sup>The analysis in logs is reported in Table OA.4 in the Online Appendix and provides qualitatively similar conclusions.

<sup>28</sup>In the columns corresponding to the intervention period, high-performing partners are defined based on the concurrent identity of the partner; i.e., the *High-Performing-Partner* dummy variable is applied at the agent-week level for those agents who rotated partners each week.

clustered unit of randomization.

The gains from being matched with a high-performing partner are largest for low-performing agents. Columns 2 and 3 split the sample depending on whether the agent is himself or herself a high-performer. Comparing these columns, all low-performing agents in active treatments benefited, even when paired with low-performing partners (baseline estimates in Column 2). When paired with a high-performing partner, captured through the interaction terms in Column 2, low-performing agents had additional positive gains in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments of \$17.25 and \$21.55, respectively. When the agent himself or herself is a high-performer (Column 3), we can reject a zero effect only when they are partnered with another high-performing agent in the *Structured-Meetings* or *Combined* treatments.<sup>29</sup> Said another way, we are unable to detect sales gains in any treatment for high-performing agents when they are paired with low-performing partners. Importantly, high-performers themselves did not see a decrease in RPC during treatment, suggesting that their performance on calls was not harmed by the interventions. To further probe whether meetings came at the expense of sales, we also estimate equation (2), where the dependent variable is total calls per week. Table OA.5 in the Online Appendix shows that there are no significant differences in calls answered across treatments during the intervention period. This is true regardless of agents' pre-intervention performance and their partner assignments. That high-performers do not change their total calls even when matched with low-performers indicates that time spent conversing with other agents did not detract from selling opportunities.

Column 4 of Table 5 examines the persistence of high-performer effects in the post-intervention period. Most of the long-run sales increases from the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments arise from agents who in the past were paired with a high-performer. Columns 5 and 6 again split the sample based on the agent's own baseline classification, showing that persistent effects are greatest for low-performers who were previously paired with high-performing partners. Although having a high-performing partner benefits all agents, the larger interaction terms in Columns 2 and 5 compared to Columns 3 and 6 indicate that low-performers benefit most from matching with high-performers.

These results highlight the role of initiation costs as a limiting factor to knowledge exchange and, hence, productivity growth. Worksheets in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments directed individual agents to reflect on their own recent sales strengths and weaknesses before directing a similar set of questions to their partners in face-to-face meetings. Neither the self-reflection exercise nor the (potentially) improved ability to formulate or articulate requests for help can fully explain the differing treatment effects across agents

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<sup>29</sup>For the *Pair-Incentives* treatment, no significant partner quality interactions are present within subsamples of low- and high-performer agents.

matched with high-performing partners, and those matched with low-performing partners. This is because agents paired with low-performers could have decided themselves to reach out for help from high-performers; i.e., absent initiation costs, there was nothing preventing agents from using the worksheets in an unofficial capacity. Section 5.1.2 discusses what can be said about the sources of these initiation costs in more detail.

## 4.6 Sales Dispersion in the Post-Intervention Period

The evidence that low-performers have the largest gains from treatments suggests that the experiment reduced sales dispersion. To examine this, Figure 5 plots the density of log RPC in weeks 5 to 24 for the *Internal Control* and for the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments. The standard deviation of log RPC actually increases between the pre-intervention and post-intervention periods for agents in the *Internal Control* group, moving from 0.50 to 0.55, consistent with productivity becoming more dispersed over time. In contrast, the standard deviation of log RPC falls for agents in the *Structured Meetings* and *Combined* treatments. The standard deviation of log RPC for the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments is 0.49 in the pre-intervention period and 0.40 in the post-intervention period. For the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests reject the null of equal variances in the post-intervention period against the *Internal Control* group, both in isolation and when the *Pair-Incentives* treatment is included.

A related question is how the assignment of high- and low-performing partners changed the baseline gap in RPC between high- and low-performers. Prior to the intervention, low-performers in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments had an average RPC of \$43.31, whereas high-performers had an average RPC of \$69.74. Said differently, there was an average gap between high- and low-performers of \$26.43 per call. Returning to the estimates in Table 5, Column 5, the sales lift to a low-performer from having a high-performing partner is \$21.55 compared to a sales lift of \$7.89 from having a low-performing partner.<sup>30</sup> Under these estimates, assigning high-performers to low-performers closed 82% of the initial \$26.43 gap in RPC, whereas pairing low-performers with each other closed 30% of the initial RPC gap. The comparable numbers for high-performers can be found in Column 6, where the sales lift associated with high- and low-performing partners are \$7.69 and -\$1.18, respectively. Using these numbers, we evaluate how an assignment rule that rotates high-performers across all agents would influence the gap between ex-ante high- and low-performers. We focus on this rule because subsequent results suggest that rotating between partners, after at least one week of being paired with a high-performer, has a statistically insignificant interaction

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<sup>30</sup>Calculations for the effect of high-performers includes the High-Performer  $\times$  Post interaction, which is -5.66 (standard error = 3.38) in Column 5.

effect on post-intervention sales. Under this rule, the gap between high- and low-performers would be \$12.57 in revenue-per-call, significantly lower than the initial gap in performance absent the intervention.<sup>31</sup>

## 5 Additional Evidence and Discussion

This section provides additional evidence on the mechanism, considers alternative explanations, and discusses the generalizability of our findings.

### 5.1 Evidence on the Mechanism

#### 5.1.1 Knowledge Exchange in Worksheet Content

Agents in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments largely complied with the instructions to meet and fill out the worksheets, as over 80% of agents completed a worksheet every week (see Appendix Table A.1). The worksheets provide a partial record from which we can extract proxies for the content of conversations. We note that agent-pairs likely did not record everything shared in their conversations, meaning that the worksheet content is incomplete. Still, the worksheets capture instances of contextual knowledge being transferred between agents. The most relevant worksheet field was the prompt “Please write down one thing **your partner recommended you** to try.” Of the 497 completed worksheets, 390 included entries to this prompt.<sup>32</sup>

Two clear types of responses emerge. First, and most prevalent, is contextual knowledge useful for the sales process. The knowledge exchanged largely consists of changes that agents could implement on calls. Examples include advice to use a pre-recorded list of questions on the computer notepad while transcribing customer responses; and to quote prices that include add-ons rather than giving an itemized breakdown; to wait before offering discounts until the caller reveals their needs; to quote full, higher prices first and then highlight the value of sign-up specials. The second type of response consists of supportive comments and encouragement. A third type is other content, which is neither knowledge nor support.

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<sup>31</sup>Evaluating alternative assignment rules is more challenging, especially those that do not involve managers choosing assignments. Although Hamilton et al. (2003) show, in the context of team formation in a garment production facility, that high performers have positive spillovers and are willing to team with others, the extent that they would choose the right allocation in the absence of managerial intervention is an open question.

<sup>32</sup>Fewer worksheets were collected than the reported completion rates would indicate. Worksheets were handed into sales managers and then collected by the support personnel before being returned to the authors. It is likely that some worksheets were completed but were never officially recorded.

Two approaches were used to classify worksheet content for analysis. The first, which we label the word presence classification, associates key words or phrases with either knowledge/advice/techniques, support/encouragement, or both.<sup>33</sup> In the second approach, which we label the blinded classification, we used a third-party student research assistant to categorize responses. This student was not aware of the purpose of the work, only that we were studying whether salespeople converse with each other about knowledge to improve the sales process or provide support or encouragement. There is high agreement between classification schemes.

The word presence classification scheme involved parsing the 30 most prevalent non-stop words from the worksheet text entries to classify the types of responses recorded. Responses that do not include one of these 30 most prevalent non-stop words are initially categorized as “other.” Table A.6 lists these words, along with examples, and displays the response type, either knowledge or support.<sup>34</sup> This classification approach labels 282 responses (72%) as conveying knowledge, 60 responses as providing support, 26 responses as communicating both, and 74 responses as “other.” We augmented this approach by manually inspecting text entries that lacked any word used in the main classification scheme.<sup>35</sup> After manual classifications, 80% of all completed worksheets included evidence of contextual knowledge exchange between partners. The blinded classification yields slightly more entries as containing contextual knowledge (322, compared to 310) and fewer entries as containing support (78, compared to 92). Eighty-six percent of the classifications are identical, and 94% of entries classified as containing contextual knowledge with the word presence scheme are classified as containing contextual knowledge in the blinded review.

We use this data to assess whether knowledge transfer from the worksheet content is associated with post-intervention sales performance. We interact the dummy variable *Received Knowledge*, which equals one if an agent’s worksheet is classified as conveying knowledge, and

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<sup>33</sup>Many responses appear to be shorthand for a particular sequence of offers or product pitches, like “High-Quality Bundle 1 at \$X price point, then Mid-Quality Bundle 2 and Additional Product A at \$Y price point,” etc.

<sup>34</sup>The word “pitch,” or a response that is a dictation of an advised pitch, occurs the most often (N = 76), followed by the words “call,” “customer,” and “positive.” Twenty-four out of the 30 most prevalent words are attributed to conveying knowledge. These are: “pitch,” “call,” [product name], “customer,” “time,” “assume,” [brand name], “sell,” “process,” “push,” “ask,” “value,” “\$”, “slow,” “phone,” “offer,” “control,” “hold,” “discover,” “rebuttal,” “price,” “close,” “quality,” and “connect.” The six words or phrases attributed to support are: “positive,” “confident,” “patience,” “breath,” “laugh,” and “don’t give up.”

<sup>35</sup>Most of these responses are clearly identifiable as either conveying knowledge or providing support. Of these 74 responses, 28 were classified as providing knowledge. Two examples of these responses are, “Have all [of the] info right in front of you, [and] say it like a normal conversation” and “Try to find ways to solve the problem if it’s a credit fail.” Of the remaining 46 responses, 32 were classified as providing support, with examples including: “Don’t let the fear of striking out keep you from playing the game” and “[My] partner is new, he said I got it down.” After this second categorization procedure, 14 responses remained as “other.”

zero otherwise, with an indicator for the post-intervention period, *Post-Period*. The sample is restricted to agents in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments for whom we have at least one worksheet. We then estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Received Knowledge}_i \times \text{Post-Period}_t) + \beta_2(\text{Received Knowledge}_i) + \lambda_t + \theta_g + \varepsilon_{i,t}. \quad (3)$$

The base specification compares agents who received any knowledge to those who received only support from their partner. Accordingly, the coefficient on *Received Knowledge*  $\times$  *Post-Period* in Column 1 of Table 6 can be interpreted as the persistent benefit to individual sales performance from receiving knowledge. In Column 1, we restrict the sample to include only worksheets that were codified using the 30 most prevalent non-stop words. In Columns 2 and 3, we incorporate the additional 60 worksheets that were manually inspected and categorized. Column 3 allows content categorized as conveying both knowledge and providing support to have a different effect from those providing knowledge alone. The small and insignificant point estimate on *Received Knowledge and Support*  $\times$  *Post-Period* suggests that there was little benefit from receiving support in addition to knowledge. Column 3 also incorporates agent fixed effects (omitting “received knowledge”), rather than manager fixed effects, and the results remain similar. Column 4 changes the classification to use the blinded third-party scheme, and the point estimates on *Received Knowledge*  $\times$  *Post-Period* increase, relative to the prior columns. Finally, Columns 5 and 6 use total revenue per week as the dependent variable. The point estimates yield substantial effects on overall revenue for agents who document knowledge exchange on their worksheets. These results indicate that knowledge flows between workers occurred among agents in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments. The large sales effects also suggest that it was knowledge transfers that drove the increases in sales performance.

Note that this exercise of correlating worksheet responses with sales performance is exploratory, meant to illuminate the underlying mechanism. We are not attempting to identify a causal relation between what agents wrote down and their future sales. Because the majority of worksheet responses show examples of knowledge exchange and this correlates with subsequent sales, the evidence suggests that the most likely mechanism behind the experimentally identified sales gains are knowledge spillovers, rather than explanations based on agents’ improved sentiment or gains from agents reflecting upon the sales process. Linking these results to effects by high-performing partners, 74% of low-performing partners are classified as providing advice/knowledge on one or more worksheets, whereas 93% of high-performing partners do so. The difference is significant at the 1% level, but we cannot

determine whether it arises because high-performers are more likely to provide knowledge, or whether their partners are more likely to record the knowledge provided by high-performers.

### 5.1.2 Evidence on the Sources of Initiation Costs

Based on their commission rates, agents had been leaving, on average, about \$35 to \$43 per week on the table by not previously self-organizing to exchange knowledge with others. What is it that stops agents from seeking out knowledge in the absence of explicit instructions to do so? Survey evidence and auxiliary tests suggest that search costs and coordination difficulties are unlikely to explain the results. Interview evidence points to social costs.

Search costs based on not knowing who to ask for advice, or failing to anticipate the benefits of asking, appear small in this context. Agents know where they stand in the sales distribution and can identify high-performers. Survey responses show that agents can identify their relative standing compared to that of top-performing agents (see Figure OA.2 in the Online Appendix) and 93% of survey respondents can name three agents in the top 10% of the sales distribution for their division and location. Agents themselves estimate positive treatment effects from asking others for help, suggesting they understand the benefits of seeking out knowledge (see Figure OA.4 in the Online Appendix).

Proximity governs communication patterns between agents at baseline, but proxies for social or physical distance do not yield differences in post-intervention sales gains. Twenty-five percent of survey respondents report: “When I ask other agents for help, I always (100% of the time) look for someone seated beside me.” Another 36% of agents report: “When I ask other agents for help, I usually (greater than 75% of the time) look for someone seated beside me.” If distance were the main impediment to knowledge exchange in this workplace, we might expect those paired with partners on another team to have larger gains because of the lower likelihood of redundant information coming from non-proximate individuals. There is little evidence for this channel, as agents paired with those on different teams, who are likely both physically and socially distant, have similar post-intervention gains to agents paired exclusively with partners on their own teams. Each week, the probability that an agent was matched with a partner on his or her own team was 0.4. Table OA.7 in the Online Appendix fails to detect heterogeneous treatment effects in the post-intervention period for agents matched with partners on different teams.<sup>36</sup> This suggests that barriers to knowledge

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<sup>36</sup>We also estimate heterogeneous effects in Online Appendix Table OA.6 based on whether the agent in question reported an above-median number of work-related conversations per week (5) prior to the beginning of the intervention period. The results show modestly larger effect sizes for agents who previously had more frequent work-related conversations in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments during the intervention period, but interaction effects are small in the post-intervention period. These results provide further support for the notion that even agents who are more likely to know their partners or who already



exchange exist even for those who are co-located and familiar with one another.

The lack of evidence for search and coordination costs motivates an exploration of social-based initiation costs. Interview evidence points in this direction, but the exact source of social costs is difficult to identify and different forces may matter for some agents. [Chandrasekhar et al. \(2016\)](#) suggest that knowledge seekers may refrain from asking for help in order to mitigate feelings of shame or to avoid sending negative signals about their type—two potential social costs. Other agents report an intimidation factor to approaching others. One sales agent in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment expressed her excitement to us when she learned she had been paired with a very skilled coworker. Specifically, she said: “I would never have had the courage to approach him for help or advice. But since we are paired together for lunch, I get to learn from one of the best sales agents in the company!” Collectively, the evidence suggests that the *Structured-Meetings* protocol enabled agents to address knowledge gaps with others—something that even the well-connected among them had previously failed to accomplish. Resolving the precise nature of the underlying social cost(s), however, requires a more targeted research design, which falls outside the scope of the present experiment.

## 5.2 Did Treatments Cause Changes in Retention?

The estimates with a balanced panel and with agent fixed effects in [Table 3](#) suggest that turnover differences were not responsible for the sales changes. The similarity of the estimates suggests that the productivity gains are due to within-worker changes, rather than differential turnover of unproductive agents across the different treatments. A more direct examination of turnover shows that the propensity for agents to leave the sample did not change for those in the *Structured-Meetings* or *Combined* treatments, relative to those in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment or *Internal Control* group. These results are in [Appendix Table A.7](#). We focus on turnover among agents in the two offices that were aware of the experiment, as there are seasonal differences in staffing across locations.<sup>37</sup> Across the active treatments, there are no statistically significant differences in agent turnover over any horizon, ranging from 8 to 24 weeks after the beginning of the interventions.

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engage in work-related conversations with peers, benefited from the interventions.

<sup>37</sup>In particular, locations with active treatments relied more heavily on seasonal hiring and had (predictably) higher natural attrition during the post-treatment period as summer was ending. There are, however, no differences in turnover between active treatments and the *Internal Control* group.

### 5.3 The Firm’s Return on Investment

The economic significance of the findings was apparent to the firm. The firm previously relied exclusively on short-term, temporary boosts to monetary incentives to influence agents’ performance. Controlled experiments of other practices, especially around knowledge sharing, had not been conducted. Following the experiment (after week 34), the firm implemented a mentoring program, where seasoned agents were partnered with new recruits, following the protocols of the *Structured-Meetings* treatment.

To estimate total returns to the firm, we pool all of the data and estimate treatment effects by week for total revenue. This has the advantage of allowing the estimates to vary based on the agents who remain in each future period. Using these estimates, we conservatively adjust for an 8% commission paid to agents, multiply by the number of agents, and discount future revenue using a 12.5% annual rate. Through the 24 weeks in which we track sales, the present value of revenue increases to the firm is \$1.29 million for the *Structured-Meetings* treatment, \$1.14 million for the *Combined* treatment, and \$457,000 for the *Pair-Incentives* treatment. The per-treatment variable implementation costs (lunches, printed worksheets, prizes) were under \$15,000 for each treatment, with the lowest cost for the *Structured-Meetings* treatment. These calculations do not include staff and academic overhead.

### 5.4 The Results in Context

How do the results compare with other studies on group incentives? Many studies find positive effects, and one might have anticipated, following [Englmaier et al. \(2018\)](#), that incentives would encourage leadership to foster knowledge transmission. The lack of persistence in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment suggests that these incentives were insufficient to overcome initiation costs. Because many group incentive studies occur in settings where there is some degree of baseline goal alignment, these settings likely have somewhat lower initiation barriers. [Blader et al. \(2019\)](#) emphasize that the effects of incentives, especially those around competition, depend on whether the firm has a cooperative “relational contract” with employees. In this firm, despite agent reports that others would provide help, a factor contributing to initiation costs may be the perception of an individually oriented workplace, driven by relative performance evaluation in pay and the firm’s tendency to celebrate individual achievement. An area for future work is to better understand the response to joint incentives and how that response varies with firm culture. Still, the reluctance to seek out knowledge is likely general to many environments, as recent evidence points to widespread frictions around information sharing in other contexts. For example, [Cullen and Perez-Truglia \(2018\)](#) quantify how frictions limit the spread of information that all cowork-

ers appear to value. In their setting, even when information is not considered sensitive and rewards are offered for sharing, employees who are not connected (measured through overlap at the firm) exhibit reluctance to approach one another for information.

Despite the ubiquity of production differences across workers in many industries, another consideration is whether the results generalize beyond sales. Relative to many other industries, sales positions provide rapid feedback. Sales workers may avoid the costs of acquiring job-specific knowledge until they gain information about their match with the job. Under these dynamics, highly tenured agents would endogenously choose to acquire knowledge in the absence of intervention, as their longer anticipated tenure with the firm would allow them to spread initiation costs over many future transactions. To assess how this might influence the estimates, we exclude the agents with the lowest quartile of tenure and re-estimate treatment effects for more highly tenured agents. Point estimates in Table OA.8 for the post-intervention period, excluding the lowest tenured agents, are greater than 80% of the estimates for the full sample in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments; confidence intervals always include the original estimates. This suggests that tenure and rapid on-the-job feedback alone are unlikely to close the original performance gaps that motivated the experiment.<sup>38</sup>

## 6 Conclusion

In many workplaces, output varies dramatically across individuals. Managers are quick to credit workplace interactions—and their effort to stimulate such interactions—as a driving force behind employee productivity. Economists might point to these interactions as one reason that firms exist. Careful examination surfaces a host of economic questions. In particular, what are the economic costs that limit peer knowledge flows in the workplace? Two theorized frictions are contracting difficulties and initiation costs, with the latter defined as barriers preventing one from seeking assistance. Contracting difficulties concern the lack of incentives for others to share information, as highlighted in the team incentives literature (Bandiera et al., 2013; Friebel et al., 2017). Initiation costs are less studied inside firms, but adjacent literature suggests they may be important. In urban economics and the economics of innovation, distance is one such barrier to finding information (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Glaeser et al., 1992; Catalini, 2017); search costs are another (Boudreau et al., 2017). A newer literature studies the (micro) social frictions that may burden those seeking help

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<sup>38</sup>A focal metric for the firm is the number of agents' who make it past ninety days of tenure, as this is the point where agents are thought to become full-performers. Our estimates include only agents with greater than 88 days of tenure, suggesting that knowledge transfers were important sources of gains even for experienced agents who had achieved the background productivity growth through on-the-job learning.

(Chandrasekhar et al., 2016).

Within firms, little evidence exists on the role of management practices to spark knowledge sharing. Instead, the focus is largely on formal reporting practices or patterns of delegation. To get at the importance of knowledge flows between coworkers, we ran a field experiment that randomly paired more than 650 call center sales agents and then assigned the pairs to treatments that addressed different frictions to knowledge flows. One treatment, *Structured-Meetings*, targeted initiation costs by guiding randomly paired workers to participate in structured, work-related conversations. A second treatment, *Pair-Incentives*, targeted contracting frictions by tying together partners' expected contemporaneous earnings. A third treatment, *Combined*, simultaneously addressed both frictions.

Although all treatments raised contemporaneous individual sales, relative to the control groups, workers in the *Structured-Meetings* treatment had persistent performance gains, while the performance gains from the *Pair-Incentives* treatment subsided at the end of the intervention period. A number of additional results suggest that the management-led approach to breaking down initiation costs resulted in knowledge transfers from highly skilled workers to less skilled ones. These findings add to a small but growing set of studies showing that simple management interventions can dramatically raise productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011; Bloom et al., 2013; Cai and Szeidl, 2017; Haynes et al., 2009; Englmaier et al., 2018), while highlighting the role of social factors in the adoption of different practices (Shue, 2013).

While our setting provides a nearly ideal environment for measuring the effects of coworker knowledge spillovers, the managerial lessons for unlocking knowledge flows are more general (Chandrasekhar et al., 2016). Many settings provide performance incentives and opportunities to interact with other individuals, such as classrooms, academic departments, or cities. A fruitful area of future research surrounds how different matching protocols vary in their propensity to facilitate knowledge flows between individuals.

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
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
## Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Dispersion in Log Revenue-Per-Call




This figure displays density plots of raw log revenue-per-call (Overall) and estimated log revenue-per-call agent fixed effects (Due to Person Effects) using the eight weeks of data prior to the intervention period. The sample includes 623 agents and 3,026 agent-weeks for those in the two treatment-eligible offices. The sample does not include the 26 agents who joined during the intervention period, nor does it include an additional four agents who moved from positions outside of the six main sales divisions. The agent fixed effects come from a regression that nets out sales division-by-week fixed effects, after which we apply the shrinkage procedure in [Lazear et al. \(2015\)](#). The interquartile range and standard deviation of log RPC are 0.60 and 0.47, respectively. The interquartile range and standard deviation of agent fixed effects are 0.39 and 0.30.

Figure 2: Mean Revenue-per-Call by Treatment Assignment During the Pre-Intervention and Intervention Periods




This figure displays means of revenue-per-call (RPC) using four weeks of pre-intervention data and four weeks of data during the intervention period (N=736 unique agents over 3,821 agent-weeks). To facilitate visual comparisons of changes across time periods, data for each group are normalized to the grand mean as of the week immediately prior to treatment (week 0), approximately \$60 in RPC. Table 1 provides additional detail on non-normalized revenue measures in the pre-period.

Figure 3: The Evolution of Revenue-per-Call Over Time, by Treatment Group




This figure displays weekly averages of revenue-per-call (RPC) by week and treatment group (N=736 agents over 10,651 agent-weeks). Each series is normalized to the grand mean of RPC in week 0. The intervention period begins in week 1 and continues through week 4. The post-intervention period tracks agents based on their original treatment assignment through week 24.

Figure 4: Average Revenue-per-Call in the Intervention and Post-Intervention Periods by High-Performer Partner Assignment



This figure displays average revenue-per-call (RPC) by treatment group during the intervention period (N=1,654 agent-weeks) and the post-intervention period (N=4,472 agent-weeks), based on whether the agent was randomly paired with a high-performer (defined as above median RPC within division in the pre-intervention period). Agents are classified as being paired with a high-performer during the intervention period based on their concurrent partner match (N=833 agent-weeks with a high-performer partner). In the post-intervention period, agents are classified as paired with a high-performing partner if they were ever assigned a high-performer partner (N=2,896 agent-weeks after pairing with a high-performer partner). The *External Control* group is not included in this sample due to lack of a partner pairing.

Figure 5: Dispersion in Log Revenue-per-Call in the Post-Intervention Period



This figure displays log revenue-per-call density plots in the post-intervention period for agents assigned to the *Internal Control* and the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments (N=397 agents over 3,438 agent-weeks).

Table 1: **Pre-Experiment Agent Demographics and Sales**

	Full Sample	Structured Meetings	Pair Incentives	Combined	Internal Control	External Control	P-Value
Age (yrs.)							
Mean	26.08	25.76	26.61	26.43	25.14	27.19	0.62
Median	23.39	22.51	23.55	24.02	22.97	24.63	
Std Dev.	8.14	8.20	9.61	8.10	6.66	8.41	
Tenure (log days)							
Mean	5.25	5.14	5.38	5.59	5.18	4.67	0.61
Median	5.15	4.62	5.40	5.37	4.62	5.18	
Std Dev.	1.18	1.12	1.07	1.10	1.22	1.24	
Percent Female							
Mean	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.25	0.95
Revenue-per-call (log)							
Mean	3.92	3.90	4.06	3.94	3.92	3.62	0.69
Median	3.97	4.04	4.09	3.99	3.99	3.69	
Std Dev.	0.49	0.52	0.37	0.47	0.55	0.33	
Revenue-per-hour (log)							
Mean	4.51	4.48	4.69	4.56	4.51	4.11	0.54
Median	4.62	4.64	4.78	4.65	4.63	4.18	
Std Dev.	0.60	0.69	0.45	0.59	0.59	0.46	
Commission							
Mean	217.78	202.65	230.41	230.64	202.31		0.75
Median	185.45	168.42	192.28	209.73	169.73		
Std Dev.	155.61	159.99	156.09	157.73	147.70		
Total Calls							
Mean	61.53	57.56	64.16	65.81	58.89		0.33
Median	60.43	57.22	62.41	65.29	58.63		
Std Dev.	21.32	19.16	22.02	20.81	22.43		
Weekly Phone Hours							
Mean	32.61	32.52	33.76	33.17	31.22		0.32
Median	34.05	34.08	34.77	33.33	33.75		
Std Dev.	7.36	7.01	6.09	6.74	8.95		
Adherence							
Mean	0.80	0.80	0.84	0.79	0.77		0.19
Median	0.83	0.83	0.85	0.83	0.82		
Std Dev.	0.14	0.11	0.07	0.14	0.21		
N Managers	58	13	12	14	13	6	
N Agents	736	158	135	174	186	83	

*Notes.* Sales agent demographics (age, tenure with the firm, and gender) and performance measures are displayed by treatment group. The unit of observation is an agent, with data averaged over the pre-intervention period. Agent totals are the number of agents assigned to a treatment and include the 26 agents who enter the sample during the intervention period. P-values in the final column are tests for mean differences between treatments for agents in the firm’s two primary offices. These tests are computed as the joint hypothesis test of equality of treatment groups from a regression of the variable of interest on treatment assignment dummies after clustering standard errors based on the manager’s identity (the level of assignment). Missing data for the *External Control* reflects different reporting across offices. *Weekly Phone Hours* captures an agent’s time at work while logged into the phone system, which is roughly equivalent to total potential hours less any time designated for non-production activities. *Adherence* is then calculated as the sum of an agent’s time available to receive a call plus time spent on calls divided by the total time logged into the phone system. Other measures are defined in the text.

Table 2: **Log Revenue-per-Call Treatment Effects During the Intervention Period**

Control Group:	Internal	External	Both	
	(Passive Pairs)	(No Pairs)	(3)	(4)
	(1)	(2)		
Structured-Meetings	0.241*** (0.045)	0.247*** (0.044)	0.247*** (0.044)	0.224*** (0.065)
Pair-Incentives	0.131*** (0.048)	0.141*** (0.046)	0.140*** (0.046)	0.126** (0.061)
Combined	0.255*** (0.043)	0.266*** (0.057)	0.265*** (0.057)	0.265*** (0.071)
Internal Control			0.010 (0.044)	0.058 (0.060)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	
Individual FE ( $\theta_i$ )				✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.470	0.416	0.417	0.536
Observations	3,418	2,856	3,821	3,821
Individuals	653	550	736	736
Managers	52	45	58	58
P-Value from Randomization:	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
P-Values from Wald Tests:				
H <sub>0</sub> : Meetings = Incent.	0.048	0.017	0.014	0.044
H <sub>0</sub> : Meetings+Incent. ≤ Comb.	0.049	0.044	0.044	0.162

*Notes.* This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of treatment effects on log revenue-per-call using data from the four-week pre-intervention period and the four-week intervention period. The variables *Structured-Meetings*, *Pair-Incentives*, and *Combined* are shorthand for “Structured-Meetings x Intervention Period,” “Pair-Incentives x Intervention Period,” and “Combined x Intervention Period” and they are set to one in the intervention period for those randomly assigned to those treatments, and zero otherwise. Dummy variables for treatment assignment in the pre-period are absorbed by manager fixed effects, as randomization is at the sales manager level. In Column (1) the *Internal Control* (passive pairs) is the omitted category. Column (2) omits the *Internal Control* group and instead uses the *External Control* group (that was not aware of the experiment and had no partner pairing) as the excluded category. Other columns include both control groups, with an indicator for the *Internal Control* during the treatment period. The p-value from randomization tests reports the Young (2018) test of the sharp null of no treatment effects for the three active treatments. The p-values from Wald tests in the bottom rows are tests of two null hypotheses using the asymptotic covariance matrix: i) equality of effects between *Pair-Incentives* and *Structured-Meetings*, and ii) the *Combined* group had sales gains that exceed the sum of the gains in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* groups. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively, using the asymptotic covariance matrix.

Table 3: **Log Revenue-per-Call Treatment Effects Post-Intervention**

Control Group:	Internal (Passive Pairs)	External (No Pairs)	Both		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Structured-Meetings	0.189** (0.077)	0.204** (0.084)	0.204** (0.084)	0.211** (0.085)	0.174** (0.076)
Pair-Incentives	0.069 (0.052)	0.085 (0.070)	0.084 (0.069)	0.128 (0.087)	0.127 (0.080)
Combined	0.210*** (0.078)	0.225*** (0.080)	0.225*** (0.080)	0.231*** (0.081)	0.276*** (0.078)
Internal Control			0.017 (0.076)	0.038 (0.068)	0.063 (0.063)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Balanced panel				✓	
Individual FE ( $\theta_i$ )					✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.351	0.396	0.389	0.415	0.528
Observations	6,236	6,026	7,334	5,518	7,334
Individuals	628	535	711	388	711
Managers	52	45	58	58	58
P-Value from Randomization:	0.041	0.044	0.027	0.026	<0.01
P-Values from Wald Tests:					
H <sub>0</sub> : Meetings = Incent.	0.068	0.135	0.129	0.538	0.464
H <sub>0</sub> : Meetings+Incent. ≤ Comb.	0.253	0.284	0.287	0.393	0.358

*Notes.* This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of persistent treatment effects on log revenue-per-call using data from the four-week pre-intervention period and the 20-week post-intervention period (weeks 5-24). The variables *Structured-Meetings*, *Pair-Incentives*, and *Combined* are shorthand for “Structured-Meetings x Post-Intervention Period,” “Pair-Incentives x Post-Intervention Period,” and “Combined x Post-Intervention Period” and they are set to one in the post-treatment period for those randomly assigned to those treatments, and zero otherwise. Sales manager fixed effects correspond to the manager at the time of treatment assignment. Dummy variables for treatments are absorbed by the individual or manager fixed effects. In Column (1) the *Internal Control* (passive pairs) is the omitted category. Column (2) omits the *Internal Control* group and instead uses the *External Control* group (that was not aware of the experiment and had no partner pairing) as the excluded category. Other columns include both control groups, with an indicator for the *Internal Control* during the post-treatment period. The balanced sample panel includes only agents who remain in the data after week 19. The p-value from randomization reports the [Young \(2018\)](#) test of the sharp null of no treatment effects for the three active treatments. The p-values from Wald tests in the bottom rows are tests of two null hypotheses using the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix: i) equality of effects between *Pair-Incentives* and *Structured-Meetings*, and ii) the *Combined* group had sales gains that exceed the sum of the gains in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Pair-Incentives* groups. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.



Table 4: **Analysis of Other Sales Measures in the Intervention and Post-Intervention Periods**

	Revenue-Per-Week		Revenue-Per-Hour		Log Revenue-Per-Hour		Revenue-Per-Call	
	Intervention	Post	Intervention	Post	Intervention	Post	Intervention	Post
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Structured-Meetings	578.784*** (143.585)	816.750*** (295.604)	32.910*** (6.876)	25.360*** (9.043)	0.222*** (0.082)	0.141* (0.072)	19.252*** (3.975)	15.664** (6.740)
Pair-Incentives	474.945** (207.817)	475.052 (371.261)	16.893** (6.841)	13.977 (10.247)	0.086* (0.051)	0.052 (0.092)	12.622*** (3.582)	5.009 (3.299)
Combined	722.538*** (182.514)	810.716*** (215.616)	28.351*** (5.433)	30.058*** (7.496)	0.187*** (0.059)	0.159** (0.080)	17.171*** (5.373)	9.950** (3.747)
Internal Control	-7.525 (229.956)	-21.21 (321.602)	10.606 (6.415)	8.557 (8.801)	0.03 (0.058)	-0.002 (0.059)	1.795 (2.491)	2.224 (3.802)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.467	0.401	0.274	0.252	0.371	0.372	0.444	0.362
Observations	3,821	7,334	3,821	7,334	3,821	7,334	3,821	7,334
P-Value from Randomization:	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	0.012	0.165	<0.01	0.013

*Notes.* This table reports difference-in-differences regressions for the outcome displayed in the column headings. Samples contain the four weeks of pre-intervention data and either the four weeks of intervention data or the 20 weeks of post-intervention data. Specifications in odd-numbered columns mimic those in Table 2 Column 3 and specifications in even numbered columns mimic those in Table 3 Column 3. The p-value from randomization reports the Young (2018) test of the sharp null of no treatment effects for the three active treatments. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table 5: Revenue-per-Call Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Partner and Agent Performance

	Intervention Period			Post-Intervention Period		
	Full sample	Low-Performer Agents	High-Performer Agents	Full sample	Low-Performer Agents	High-Performer Agents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Structured-Meetings $\times$ High-Performing Partner	10.888** (4.763)	17.246*** (5.826)	12.448** (5.803)	12.525* (6.298)	19.318** (8.556)	6.854 (6.234)
Pair-Incentives $\times$ High-Performing Partner	4.925 (4.259)	7.780 (4.962)	6.928 (5.366)	6.658 (4.730)	7.280 (4.403)	3.389 (5.675)
Combined $\times$ High-Performing Partner	15.867*** (4.886)	21.554*** (6.555)	16.682*** (5.194)	12.114*** (4.260)	19.353*** (5.228)	10.103* (5.178)
Structured-Meetings	11.937*** (4.089)	9.138* (4.705)	9.786 (5.974)	4.588 (6.492)	4.203 (7.286)	6.026 (7.266)
Pair-Incentives	8.683*** (2.796)	16.702*** (4.236)	3.574 (3.427)	-2.005 (5.133)	-0.964 (6.237)	1.524 (6.240)
Combined	7.509 (5.873)	15.421*** (4.498)	1.162 (7.515)	-0.377 (5.517)	11.557* (6.048)	-8.395 (7.138)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.358	0.444	0.317	0.324	0.421	0.322
Observations	3,418	1,484	1,934	6,236	2,745	3,491
P-Value from Wild Bootstrap:	0.02	< 0.01	0.01	0.12	0.03	0.18

*Notes.* The table reports regressions of RPC with additional interactions for treatment assignment and random pairing with a high-performing partner. An agent is defined as a high-performer if their RPC is above the median within their own sales division in the pre-intervention period. Agents without pre-intervention data are classified as low-performers (they are almost always below the median when first observed). The *Internal Control* group is the baseline category because agents in the *External Control* do not have partner assignments. In the intervention period analysis in Columns 1–3, High-Performing Partner is defined based on the concurrent partner. In the post-intervention period analysis in Columns 4–6, High-Performing Partner is defined based on whether the agent was ever paired with a high-performer. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 further split the sample based on whether the individual agent is a high-performer. Each regression includes week fixed effects and fixed effects for the manager at the time of treatment assignment. Standard errors are clustered by manager. Wild bootstrap p-values display the test of the joint null that the High-Performing Partner interactions for the active treatments are zero. This test imposes the null and re-samples over clusters, as described in [Roodman et al. \(2019\)](#). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table 6: **Post-Intervention Correlations Between Knowledge Documented in Worksheets and Sales**

	Log RPC				Revenue	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Received Knowledge $\times$ Post	0.169** (0.068)	0.187** (0.074)	0.168** (0.084)	0.243*** (0.056)	897.498*** (232.026)	873.536** (202.090)
Knowledge and Support $\times$ Post			-0.053 (0.045)	0.044 (0.051)	-90.817 (378.663)	-82.712 (136.455)
Word presence classification	✓					
Word and manual classification		✓	✓		✓	
Blinded classification				✓		✓
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Individual FE ( $\theta_i$ )			✓			
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.331	0.335	0.322	0.337	0.232	0.223
Observations	1,929	2,102	2,102	2,218	2,102	2,218

*Notes.* This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of log revenue-per-call and total revenue in the post-intervention period for agents in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments for whom we have at least one completed worksheet. The reported coefficients represent the post-intervention change in the dependent variable for agents who received knowledge, or received knowledge and support, relative to agents who received supportive advice alone (the baseline). In Column 1, these classifications come from the prevalence of the 30 most common words (excluding stop-words) as detailed in Table A.6. Columns 2, 3, and 5 include manually classified worksheet responses based on the authors’ readings. Columns 4 and 6 use classifications where a third-party student who was not briefed on the research was asked to classify some text snippets from from the worksheets into categories. These categories were “The Statement Provides Knowledge/Advice/Tips to Improve Sales Performance,” “The Statement Provides Support,” “Both Knowledge and Support,” and “Other.” Eighty-six percent of the classifications between the Blinded 3rd party classifications and the Word presence and Manual classifications align, while the Blinded 3rd party coding has more entries classified as “Received Knowledge.” Ninety-four percent of the entries classified as “Received Knowledge” in the Word presence and Manual scheme were also classified as “Received Knowledge” in the Blinded 3rd party coding. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table A.1: **Pre-Experiment and Post-Experiment Survey Responses for Treatment-Eligible Agents**

	Full Sample	Internal Control	Pair-Incentives	Structured-Meetings	Combined
Panel A: Pre-Experiment Survey					
<i>On a scale of 1-5, how connected do you feel to others within the firm?</i>	3.7	3.7	3.4	3.7	3.8
<i>How many work-related interactions do you initiate in an average work week?</i>	5.8	5.0	5.3	7.1	6.1
<i>On a scale of 1-5, how beneficial are these interactions to you personally?</i>	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0
<i>What dollar value would you be willing to spend on the proposed incentives?</i>	\$40.20				
Panel B: Post-Experiment Survey					
<i>I was aware of the [treatment] that took place this past month.</i>	82.5%	77.4%	78.3%	84.8%	92.0%
<i>We turned in a completed worksheet each week.</i>				82.6%	88.2%
<i>I spent [ ] minutes with my partner on the worksheet.</i>				6.3	7.3
<i>These interactions with my partner were beneficial.</i>				78.6%	76.0%
$N_A$ (Agents)	378	115	83	105	75

Panel A contains answers from the preliminary survey that we administered one week prior to the start of the experiment. The survey was not given to the *External Control* group. The question wording, as displayed, has been adapted from its original form to remove institutionally distinct jargon. Agents were provided with a link to the survey and were asked to complete it while at work. Agents were not aware of which treatment they were going to be placed in at the time they took the survey. The question regarding the dollar value of the proposed incentives is the average valuation for the set of prizes offered in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment. Panel B contains responses given at the end of the intervention period using the same protocol.

Table A.2: **Balance Across Managers**

	Full Sample	Structured Meetings	Pair Incentives	Combined	Internal Control	External Control	P-Value
Manager Age (yrs.)							
Mean	29.27	29.38	29.15	28.97	30.62	27.02	0.853
Std Dev.	4.972	4.336	4.209	6.269	5.775	2.085	
Manager Tenure (yrs.)							
Mean	3.065	3.688	3.449	2.742	3.094	1.634	0.542
Std Dev.	1.777	1.566	1.968	1.603	1.967	1.224	
Manager Female							
Mean	0.138	0.0769	0.167	0.0714	0.154	0.333	0.827
Std Dev.	0.348	0.277	0.389	0.267	0.376	0.516	
Average log(RPC) of Agents on Team Pre-Intervention							
Mean	3.958	3.917	4.127	4.044	3.877	3.655	0.601
Std Dev.	0.430	0.400	0.369	0.388	0.614	0.109	
Number of Agents on Team during Intervention							
Mean	12.69	12.15	11.25	12.43	14.31	13.83	0.870
Std Dev.	4.07	3.60	3.68	3.06	4.40	3.13	
N Managers	58	13	12	14	13	6	

*Notes.* Manager demographics and average team characteristics are displayed by treatment group. P-values in the final column are tests for differences between groups for treatment-eligible agents in the firm's two primary offices. These tests are computed as the joint hypothesis test of equality of treatment group indicators from a regression of the variable of interest on treatment assignment dummies.

Table A.3: **Estimates of Persistence of Log RPC Gains Over Different Intervals in the Post-Intervention Period**

	Weeks <u>5-8</u> (1)	Weeks <u>9-12</u> (2)	Weeks <u>13-16</u> (3)	Weeks <u>17-20</u> (4)	Weeks <u>21-24</u> (5)	Weeks <u>5-24</u> (6)
<i>Weeks 5-8</i>						
Structured-Meetings	0.208*** (0.061)					0.258*** (0.077)
Pair-Incentives	0.030 (0.057)					0.058 (0.071)
Combined	0.242*** (0.062)					0.288*** (0.084)
<i>Weeks 9-12</i>						
Structured-Meetings		0.090 (0.075)				0.087 (0.078)
Pair-Incentives		0.039 (0.060)				0.019 (0.063)
Combined		0.147** (0.071)				0.123 (0.074)
<i>Weeks 13-16</i>						
Structured-Meetings			0.176 (0.108)			0.185* (0.108)
Pair-Incentives			0.044 (0.093)			0.076 (0.094)
Combined			0.144 (0.095)			0.142 (0.096)
<i>Weeks 17-20</i>						
Structured-Meetings				0.177 (0.140)		0.216 (0.130)
Pair-Incentives				0.064 (0.125)		0.140 (0.116)
Combined				0.231* (0.130)		0.259** (0.119)
<i>Weeks 21-24</i>						
Structured-Meetings					0.136 (0.113)	0.188* (0.105)
Pair-Incentives					0.030 (0.096)	0.129 (0.089)
Combined					0.154 (0.104)	0.211** (0.096)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.418	0.290	0.319	0.301	0.306	0.339
Observations	3,252	2,724	2,545	2,426	2,341	6,236

This table presents estimates of log RPC persistence using a specification analogous to Table 3 Column 1. Columns 1–5 include the pre-period and a different four-week interval in the post-intervention period. The variables *Structured-Meetings*, *Pair-Incentives*, and *Combined* are set to one in the weeks after the intervention for those assigned to the treatment and are zero otherwise. The specification in Column 6 includes separate interactions for each of these four-week intervals. The *Internal Control* group is the omitted category. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table A.4: **Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Treatment Effects at the Manager Level**

	Intervention Period		Post-Intervention Period		Intervention Period		Post-Intervention Period	
	Log RPC (1)	Revenue (2)	Log RPC (3)	Revenue (4)	Log RPC (5)	Revenue (6)	Log RPC (7)	Revenue (8)
Structured-Meetings	0.279*** (0.048)	715.383*** (162.036)	0.235*** (0.084)	1045.497*** (373.066)	0.247*** (0.044)	578.784*** (143.604)	0.204** (0.084)	816.750*** (295.624)
Pair-Incentives	0.163*** (0.052)	377.841 (246.178)	0.082 (0.077)	635.538 (479.794)	0.140*** (0.046)	474.945** (207.844)	0.084 (0.069)	475.052 (371.286)
Combined	0.284*** (0.063)	551.714** (273.671)	0.240*** (0.080)	869.862*** (259.115)	0.265*** (0.057)	722.538*** (182.538)	0.225*** (0.080)	810.716*** (215.630)
Internal Control	0.026 (0.052)	-56.733 (243.890)	0.007 (0.086)	85.567 (320.078)	0.010 (0.044)	-7.525 (229.986)	0.017 (0.076)	-21.210 (321.624)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Weighted by Team Size					✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.777	0.563	0.670	0.499	0.855	0.681	0.767	0.625
Observations	433	433	1,271	1,271	433	433	1,271	1,271

Difference-in-differences estimates where the dependent variable in each column is averaged at the manager-week level. Here the manager-week level comes from fixed manager groupings at the time of assignment, and agents in the original group are averaged together even if working under a different manager in the post-intervention period. Columns 5–8 weight by the number of agents on a team in each week, as suggested by Chandar et al. (2019). Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table A.5: **Estimates of Quality Changes During the Intervention Period**

Structured-Meetings	0.118 (0.104)
Pair-Incentives	0.087 (0.097)
Combined	-0.069 (0.088)
Adj. R-Square	0.338
Observations	2,400

*Notes.* This table reports analysis of how a quality proxy changes by treatment during the intervention period. The fraction of revenue paid to agents as commissions is a function of relative RPC, relative RPH, and audited call quality. Because we lack data on audited call quality, we proxy for it by asking whether the fraction of revenue paid as commissions changes with treatment. The quality proxy is  $\log(\text{Commission}) - \log(\text{Revenue})$ . We regress this proxy on indicators for treatments x Intervention Period, quintiles of RPH-by-division fixed effects, quintiles of RPC-by-division fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and week fixed effects. Commission calculations are not centralized, so we do not have data on the *External Control*. We are also missing two weeks of pre-intervention data and all commission data in the post-intervention period. Standard errors are clustered by manager.



Table A.6: Example Worksheet Responses Organized by Word Prevalence

Please write down one thing <b>your partner recommended you</b> to try.			
Type	Key Word	N	Example Response
Knowledge	Pitch*	76	“Naturally pitch extras...”
	Call	64	“Follow call flow to offer [specific product].”
	Product**	57	“Work on [product name] pitch, be more strategic.”
	Customer	39	“Match and mirror the customer.”
	Time	26	“Be more direct and shorten call time.”
	Brand***	22	“...assume [brand] as part of up-front costs...”
	Assume	22	“Study packages! Be assumptive [of the sale].”
	Sell	18	“Don’t be afraid to up-sell and provide the details ...”
	Push	15	“Push for [add-on features] when closing...”
	Ask	14	“Use the notepad... to remember what questions to ask...”
	Process	12	“Make sure to follow new updated sales process...”
	Value	11	“Educate them on the value of [product].”
	\$	11	“...set the expectation of \$2.99.”
	Slow	10	“Slow down [when] reading recaps.”
	Phone	9	“Remember we can always pitch cell phones.”
	Offer	8	“Lead offer with 2nd year price...”
	Control	8	“Get info on them to use later to regain control.”
	Hold	8	“Don’t go on hold until after credit check.”
	Discover	7	“Get the most out of discover before lead offer.”
	Rebuttal	7	“Rebuttal when you get ... a no, and ask why.”
Price	7	“Give non-sales price before promotional price.”	
Close	7	“Gave me points on how to close on the 1st call.”	
Quality	6	“... make sure you achieve 8/8 quality scores.”	
Connect	6	“Use hold time to connect [with the customer].”	
Support	Positive	27	“Stay positive.”
	Confident	10	“Be confident.”
	Patience	7	“Be more patient.”
	Breath	6	“Breathing, everything will work out.”
	Laugh	6	“Laugh often.”
	Don’t Give Up	6	“Find your drive! Don’t give up!”

*Notes.* \*Responses are marked as containing “Pitch” if either the word “pitch” is present in the response or if the response itself is the advised pitch. \*\*This includes responses that use the word “product” or that mention a specific type of product—e.g., “TV” or “security.” \*\*\*This indicates responses that mention a specific brand name. Responses that include common variants of words—e.g., “positive” versus “positivity”—are marked as containing the main word. Similarly, “patience” gets grouped under the “patient” category, and “confidence” gets grouped under the “confident” classification, etc.

Table A.7: **Agent Turnover at Different Horizons**

Turnover by:	Week 8	Week 12	Week 16	Week 20	Week 24
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Structured-Meetings	0.022 (0.065)	0.045 (0.070)	-0.021 (0.065)	-0.004 (0.061)	-0.010 (0.062)
Pair-Incentives	0.013 (0.060)	0.020 (0.071)	-0.044 (0.079)	-0.027 (0.075)	-0.057 (0.077)
Combined	0.004 (0.074)	-0.000 (0.083)	-0.078 (0.080)	-0.065 (0.084)	-0.074 (0.090)
Adj. R-Square	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
Observations	653	653	653	653	653

*Notes.* This table reports regressions of an indicator for agent turnover across different horizons after interventions begin on treatment assignment indicators. The dependent variable is an indicator that the agent is no longer included in the sample. The omitted category is the *Internal Control*. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

# A Appendix

## A.1 Theory Development

We provide a parsimonious model to specify costs that hinder agent knowledge transfer and to illustrate how treatments potentially allow agents to overcome these costs. It is important to note that we do not attempt to characterize an optimal contract; instead, we consider comparative statics based on features of observed contracts. For simplicity, we focus on two agents,  $L$  and  $H$ . Suppose each agent has a commonly known body of knowledge,  $Z_i \subset \Omega$  for  $i \in \{L, H\}$ , where  $z \in \Omega$  is knowledge required to complete an individual sale. The random variable  $z$  can be thought of as the issue (or collection of issues) that arise in a transaction, and  $f(z)$  is the probability that issue  $z$  arises on any given call. Thus,  $\theta_i = \int_{z \in Z_i} f(z) dz \leq 1$  is a measure of agent  $i$ 's knowledge, capturing the probability that the agent has the necessary knowledge required to successfully close a transaction. To simplify what follows, we further assume that agents' knowledge is ordered, such that  $\theta_L < \theta_H \Rightarrow Z_L \subset Z_H$ .<sup>39</sup> Put simply, agents with a higher probability of closing sales possess a broader body of knowledge.

Agents may connect with other agents to transfer knowledge, but establishing a connection is potentially costly and requires one or both agents to invest in the relationship ex-ante. We analyze a two-stage model where the agents choose how much to invest toward establishing a relationship,  $k_i \geq 0$ , simultaneously in the first stage. If the sum of the relationship-specific investments exceeds a commonly known threshold,  $K > 0$ , then we say that a connection is forged between the two agents. When a connection is forged, the lesser informed agent,  $L$ , absorbs their better informed colleague's knowledge, such that  $\theta'_L = \theta_H > \theta_L$ . On the other hand, agent  $H$ 's knowledge,  $\theta_H$ , is unaffected by the connection with their less informed colleague. Finally, if no connection is made, then both agents' knowledge remains constant.

In the second stage, each agent takes their knowledge,  $\theta_i$ , as given and chooses their sales effort,  $e_i \geq 0$  with a personal cost of effort  $e_i^2/2$ . Sales effort and knowledge combine to produce expected sales:  $E[Y_i] = \theta_i e_i$ , upon which agents earn a commission of  $B \in (0, 1)$ . Taking agent  $-i$ 's relationship-specific investment strategy,  $k_{-i}$ , as given, agent  $i$  solves:

$$\max_{e_i} \left( \max_{k_i} U(e_i, k_i; \theta_i, \theta_{-i}) \right) = B\theta_i(k_i; k_{-i}, \theta_{-i})e_i - e_i^2/2 - k_i. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Working backwards from the second stage, the first-order condition yields  $e_i^* = B\theta_i$ , allowing us to write agent  $i$ 's equilibrium utility as:  $(B\theta_i)^2/2 - k_i$ . In the first stage, each agent chooses their relationship-specific investment as a function of the potential gains from connecting with their peer; specifically, the amount of knowledge that they can glean from the relationship. Because the better informed agent has nothing to gain from connecting with the less informed agent, the former will be unwilling to make relationship investments absent additional incentives. Accordingly, the knowledge seeker (agent  $L$ ), optimally invests:

$$k_L^* = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } B^2(\theta_H^2 - \theta_L^2)/2 \leq K \\ K, & \text{if } B^2(\theta_H^2 - \theta_L^2)/2 > K. \end{cases}$$

Our model highlights two types of frictions to knowledge exchange, *initiation costs* and *contracting costs*. *Initiation costs* capture the knowledge seeker's costs, including overcoming social

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<sup>39</sup>This assumption is justified if agents endogenously choose which knowledge to invest in acquiring. Knowledge about the most frequent problems has the highest payoff for sales, which gives rise to this ordering.

stigmas and search costs. The magnitude of these costs are incorporated in the connection threshold,  $K$ . Because we model the relationship-specific investment as a threshold, *initiation costs* may also include transfers between the agents required to compensate knowledge providers for help. *Contracting costs* limit the knowledge provider’s ability to benefit from improving their partner’s performance. In our model, the firm collects a tax of  $(1 - B)$  on sales, which limits the knowledge seeker’s willingness to shoulder all of the upfront relationship development costs. Other considerations include the inability of knowledge seekers to borrow from future human capital (Garicano and Rayo, 2017), which could be incorporated in richer models that limit the transfer of resources between knowledge seekers and providers more generally.

### A.1.1 Structured-Meetings Treatment

The *Structured-Meetings* treatment targets initiation costs by decreasing the investment threshold needed to forge a connection from  $K$  to  $K' < K$ , via a series of worksheets and partner lunches. Relative to the *Internal-Control* benchmark, only the cost of connecting changes, as the benefit to the less informed agent remains at  $\frac{B^2(\theta_H^2 - \theta_L^2)}{2}$  whereas the benefit to the better informed agent remains at zero. Consequently the *Structured-Meetings* treatment:

- Induces more connections due to the decreased connection investment threshold,  $K'$ .
- Induces the (ex-ante) less knowledgeable agent to connect, leading to increased sales, if and only if they expect their sales productivity will subsequently increase.
- Will result in a sales productivity increase whenever agent  $L$  is paired with agent  $H$ , with all returns accruing to agent  $L$ , as highlighted in Figure OA.1.

### A.1.2 Pair-Incentives Treatment

The *Pair-Incentives* treatment targets contracting costs by providing partnered agents with additional incentives to increase their joint sales. In particular, the treatment provided agent  $H$  with an explicit incentive to transfer knowledge to the less informed partner to increase their sales. We model this incentive with an expected bonus commission  $b > 0$  paid to each agent on their joint sales. Accordingly, when agent  $i$  and  $-i$  are formally paired together, agent  $i$  expects to collect  $(B + b)Y_i + bY_{-i}$ .<sup>40</sup> Relative to the benchmark, *Internal-Control* treatment, both agents in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment explicitly gain from the less-informed agent increasing their knowledge. In particular, the benefit to agent  $L$  of connecting with agent  $H$  is given by  $\frac{(B+b)^2(\theta_H^2 - \theta_L^2)}{2}$ , whereas the direct benefit to agent  $H$  is given by:  $\frac{b^2(\theta_H^2 - \theta_L^2)}{2}$ . In the *Internal-Control* treatment, the equivalent benefits are given by  $\frac{B^2(\theta_H^2 - \theta_L^2)}{2}$  and 0, respectively. Consequently, relative to the *Internal-Control* treatment, the *Pair-Incentives* treatment:

- Induces both agents to exert more sales effort due to the increased commission,  $b$ , on their own output,  $Y$ .
- Induces more connections by raising both agents’ returns to first-stage, relationship-specific investments.

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<sup>40</sup>The actual treatment compensated sales gains relative to the pre-treatment period and awarded prizes to agent-pairs who managed to outperform two other, randomly selected agent-pairs. We follow Bandiera et al. (2013) in modeling this with linear profit-sharing rules.

### A.1.3 Combined Treatment

The *Combined* treatment included both the *Pair-Incentives* and *Structured-Meetings* interventions. Relative to the *Internal Control* treatment, agents in the *Combined* treatment faced both a reduced connection threshold,  $K'$ , and an additional commission,  $b$ , on joint output. The treatment thus provides a test of whether:

- Both initiation costs and contracting costs were both restricting knowledge transfers.
- The interventions are themselves complements or substitutes (Athey and Stern, 1998).

### A.1.4 Graphical Representation of Comparative Statics

We plot the potential effects of each treatment in Figure OA.1. In particular, the figure shows that knowledge transfers occur in equilibrium whenever the knowledge gap between paired agents is sufficiently large. The solid line demarks the minimum spread in knowledge between two agents in the *Internal Control* group needed to overcome the first-stage, relationship-specific investment threshold. The long-dashed line plots the minimum knowledge spread among agents in the *Pair-Incentives* treatment, the short-dashed line plots the same threshold for the *Structured-Meetings* treatment, and the dashed and dotted green line represents the minimum spread for agents in the *Combined* treatment. The shaded knowledge transfer region expands with the interventions. However, the ordering of the treatments (based on which treatment expands the knowledge transfer region most) and the sub- or super-modularity of the *Combined* treatment are only illustrated for arbitrary parameter values of  $K, K', B$ , and  $b$ . The relative cost and benefit of relaxing initiation and contracting costs are empirical questions.

Figure OA.1 highlights the empirical prediction that knowledge transfers are most likely to occur between agents with vastly different levels of knowledge. Agents are more likely to connect with significantly better- or worse-informed peers, because the value to doing so increases with the provider's relative knowledge advantage. The same logic suggests that if knowledge transfers are at the root of any observed productivity gains, then the greatest gains should occur between agent-pairs with highly differentiated knowledge levels; for example, between below- and above-median agent pairs.

## A.2 Survey Responses

Several survey results are compiled in Table A.1. All surveys were administered through Qualtrics and distributed via email and links on the experiment website. Over 300 agents completed the preliminary survey, answering questions about their social and work-related conversations with coworkers. These results are contained in Panel A of Table A.1. Post-experiment survey results are in Panel B. These questions allow us to obtain an approximate measure of the effectiveness and salience of the experiment as a whole and of the *Structured-Meetings* treatment specifically.

## B Documentation

### B.1 Timeline of Events

The following timeline documents the implementation of the experiment:

Week -2, Day 6 (Friday): Posters placed at entrance and throughout sales floor in the two buildings housing (future) treated agents.

Week 0, Day 2 (Monday): Email blast promoting the opening survey.

Week 0, Day 7 (Saturday): Opening survey closed.

Week 1, Day 1 (Sunday) July 16: Kickoff of Week 1 treatments. Pairs announced on website and worksheets made available to agents.

Week 1, Day 3 (Tuesday) July 18: Deadline for worksheets to be handed in.

Week 1, Days 4 and 5 (Wednesday and Thursday) July 19–20: HR hands out lunches to qualifying pairs.

Week 1, Day 7 (Saturday): Week 1 treatment ends, brackets are drawn, prize winners announced.

Week 2, Day 1 (Sunday): Kickoff of Week 2 treatments. Pairs announced on website and worksheets made available to agents.

Week 2, Day 3 (Tuesday): Deadline for worksheets to be handed in.

Week 2, Days 4 and 5 (Wednesday and Thursday): HR hands out lunches to qualifying pairs.

Week 2, Day 7 (Saturday): Week 2 treatment ends, brackets are drawn, prize winners announced.

Week 3, Day 1 (Sunday): Kickoff of Week 3 treatments. Pairs announced on website and worksheets made available to agents.

Week 3, Day 3 (Tuesday): Deadline for worksheets to be handed in.

Week 3, Days 4 and 5 (Wednesday and Thursday): HR hands out lunches to qualifying pairs.

Week 3, Day 7 (Saturday): Week 3 treatment ends, brackets are drawn, prize winners announced.

Week 4, Day 1 (Sunday): Kickoff of Week 4 treatments. Pairs announced on website and worksheets made available to agents.

Week 4, Day 3 (Tuesday): Deadline for worksheets to be handed in.

Week 4, Days 4 and 5 (Wednesday and Thursday): HR hands out lunches to qualifying pairs.

Week 4, Day 7 (Saturday): Week 4 treatment ends, brackets are drawn, prize winners announced.

Week 5, Day 1 (Sunday): Final survey handed out.

Week 5, Day 5 (Thursday): Final survey closed.

## B.2 Text of Website Communications to Agents

Posters around the office announcing a “Sales Sprint” directed agents to a website that revealed the details of their treatment assignment. The following text details how each treatment was presented, but agents were only able to see the text corresponding to their own treatment.

### Pair-Incentives

**Competition** You and a partner will compete against other pairs in your tournament. Together, you will work to increase your average RPC over the course of a week. Each week we will either pair you with a new partner, or re-pair you with your last partner, and the two of you compete from Sunday till Saturday against other pairs based on your average RPC. We’ll surface a leaderboard so you can keep track of your progress against everyone else.

**WHY?** We want to encourage you to talk about your calls with colleagues, and possibly meet some new people along the way. When the books close on Saturday, we will combine your average RPC growth relative to your average individual RPC in the last two weeks.

**Scoring** To score each pair and keep the tournament fair, we will be measuring your joint, weekly RPC relative to your individual RPCs in the last two weeks of June. So, for example:

	<b>You</b>	<b>Your Partner</b>	<b>Total</b>
Week 1	\$70	\$60	= \$130
June 17 - 30	\$50	\$50	= \$100
Group RPC Growth			30%
Group Score			130

**Next Steps...** Reach out to your partner, ask them about their calls, you never know, it might help your numbers.

**Week 2 Results**<sup>41</sup> Winners in green. How did we pick winners? We didn't. Winners won. We randomized all pairs into brackets of three, and the best team won. The scoreboard is reset every Sunday, do it again and win a 30-min on-site massage next week.

## Structured-Meetings

**(FREE) Lunch** You and your partner will be involved in our lunch chat initiative where you two meet over lunch on Wednesday or Thursday, provided you have both filled out a simple worksheet and handed it to your employee advisor by Wednesday.

**WHY?** We want to encourage you to talk about your calls with colleagues, and possibly meet some new people along the way. We encourage you to meet and learn from your partner as early in the week as possible. When the books close on Saturday, we will combine your average RPC growth relative to your average individual RPC in the last two weeks.

**How it works** 1) Please print out the worksheet on the right or ask [your manager] for a golden worksheet. 2) Fill out the front side on your own. 3) Work face-to-face with your partner to complete the back of the worksheet and agree on when you'd like to lunch. 4) Once you are finished, please go together and hand in both completed worksheets to your employee adviser. 5) Pick-up your lunch on Wednesday or Thursday, on us...

**Scoring** To score each pair and keep the tournament fair, we will be measuring your joint, weekly RPC relative to your individual RPCs in the last two weeks of June. So, for example:

	<b>You</b>	<b>Your Partner</b>	<b>Total</b>
Week 1	\$70	\$60	= \$130
June 17 - 30	\$50	\$50	= \$100
Group RPC Growth			30%
Group Score			130

## Internal Control and Combined

Agents in the *Internal Control* received only the “Why” and “Scoring” parts of the communication that was given to the *Pair-Incentives* treatment. Agents in the *Combined* got descriptions for both the “Competition” and the “Free Lunch.”

## B.3 Worksheets Given to Partners in the Structured-Meetings and Combined Groups

The following are the materials that were provided to sales agents in the *Structured-Meetings* and *Combined* treatments. The first two pages show the front and back sides of the collaboration

<sup>41</sup>This text referenced a table that listed the Group Score for each group. This table was only added after results were present, but is an example of how feedback was communicated to agents.

worksheets handed out to agents and completed at the beginning of each week. The third page contains the lunchtime talking points that were given to partners as they ate their free lunch.



████████ Sales Representative Collaboration Worksheet  
PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY

Your Full Name: \_\_\_\_\_ ████████: \_\_\_\_\_

Think about the **most successful** sales call **you** had in the last week. What did you do that made it successful?

Think about the **least successful** sales call **you've** had in the last week. How could you have done better?

Describe the most difficult deal-breaker that **you've** come across **in the last week**; for example: *upgrading callers to a specific new bundle.*

Please write down two goals for **you** to work on for the **rest of this week**; for example: *be braver in suggesting products.*

Goal 1:

Goal 2:

If you did the same exercise **last week**: were you successful in executing your goals? If no, why not?

Goal 1:

Goal 2:

**Your Partner's** Full name and [REDACTED] ID: \_\_\_\_\_

Please TALK to your partner about the questions below and write down their responses.

Ask **your partner** about their **most successful** sales call **last week**, what did they do right?

Ask **your partner** about their **least successful** sales call from the **last week**. What advice did **you** offer your partner?

Was **your partner** successful in accomplishing their goals **last week**? If no, why not?

Goal 1:

Goal 2:

What are **your partner's** two goals for **rest of this week**?

Goal 1:

Goal 2:

Please write down one thing **your partner recommended you** to try:

What day would you and our partner like to pick-up lunch from 12-2? (must hand in with 24 hour notice!):  **Thursday**  **Friday**

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RXd by Adviser:

date/time:

## Lunch Talking Points

3 & 4


You do not need to turn this sheet in, but please read through it: is designed to help you make the most of the time with your partner.

- 1) *Bon Appetit!*
- 2) Have either of you had an awesome sale since you last met? What made it great?
- 3) Have either of you had a call go completely sideways? What happened? Does your partner have any advice?
- 4) Your partner gave you some advice on how to handle difficult stations earlier this week. Did it help?
- 5) You and your partner each made goals earlier this week, what progress have you each made on those goals?
- 6) If you have suggestions on how this lunch program could be more productive, please let your adviser know—we greatly appreciate your feedback.

Thank you!


# Figures and Tables for Inclusion in the Online Appendix

Figure OA.1: Knowledge Transfer Region




This figure plots the region in which knowledge transfers will occur in the knowledge seeker - knowledge provider space. All curves reflect a baseline commission rate of  $B = 0.425$ , and the underlying cost threshold is given by  $K = 0.075$  (see Theory Appendix for definitions). The solid curve plots the provider's level of knowledge,  $\theta_H$ , required by the knowledge seeker as a function of their own knowledge level,  $\theta_L$  for the *Internal Control* group. The long-dashed curve (*Pair-Incentives* threshold) reflects the knowledge seeker's reduced requirements vis-à-vis the knowledge provider when both earn a marginal commission of  $b = 0.05$  on their joint output. The small-dashed curve (*Structured-Meetings* threshold) reflects a reduced threshold cost,  $K' = 0.035$ , which further reduces the knowledge seeker's requirements regarding the knowledge provider's knowledge level. Finally, the dashed and dotted curve reflects the *Combined* threshold with  $b = 0.05$  and  $K' = 0.035$ .

Figure OA.2: Perceived and Actual Differences Between Individual and the Top Sales Agents




This figure plots the difference between i) the maximum RPC in a division/office and the agent’s own RPC against ii) the agent’s report of their perceived maximum RPC in their own division and office relative to their own RPC (N=469). The upward sloping fit indicates that agents who perceive a greater distance between themselves and the top performers in their division are likely to have the largest actual distance from the top agents. These measures were collected in a follow-up survey done over a year after the end of the intervention. The standard deviation of the perceived versus actual difference is similar for agents who were present during the experiment and those who joined the firm after interventions had concluded.

Figure OA.3: Revenue-per-Call Over an Extended Post-Intervention Period



This figure replicates Figure 3 but extends the data through 34 weeks after the beginning of interventions. There are 736 agents over 13,321 agent-weeks.

Figure OA.4: Agents' Reported Estimates of Perceived Treatment Effects After Help from High-Performers



This figure plots agents' responses to a survey question asking for their estimated percentage change in RPC if they were to receive help from the top agent on their team. This measure was collected in a follow-up survey done over a year after the end of treatment (N=327 for this question). There are no differences for agents who joined the firm after interventions concluded and who were not exposed to treatments. Prior to the experiment, agents responded that they believed reaching out to coworkers had positive benefits. In response to the question "On average, when you reach out to others about individual calls or selling, how beneficial are those conversations to you?," 0.8% of respondents answered "Always disappointing," 3.5% answered "Often disappointing," 20% answered "OK," 54% answered "Often helpful," and 21% answered "Always helpful."

Table OA.1: **Do Agents Give-up After Winning or Losing a Prize**

	Pair-Incentives	Combined	Both
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Won Last Week	-0.031** (0.015)	-0.029* (0.016)	-0.035*** (0.011)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓
R-Square	0.110	0.156	0.134
Observations	744	912	1,656

This table reports regressions of log RPC on an indicator that the agent received a prize in the prior week. The estimate is relative to a baseline of agents who did not win in the previous week. The sample contains only those agents in either the *Pair Incentives* or *Combined* treatments during the intervention period.



Table OA.2: **Two-Way Cluster Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Log Revenue-per-Call Changes During the Post-Intervention Period**

Control Group:	Internal	External	Both		
	(Passive Pairs)	(No Pairs)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Structured-Meetings	0.189** (0.075)	0.204** (0.082)	0.204** (0.082)	0.211*** (0.081)	0.174** (0.077)
Pair-Incentives	0.069 (0.065)	0.085 (0.067)	0.084 (0.067)	0.128 (0.087)	0.127 (0.080)
Combined	0.210*** (0.073)	0.225*** (0.081)	0.225*** (0.081)	0.231*** (0.077)	0.276*** (0.076)
Internal Control			0.017 (0.071)	0.038 (0.067)	0.063 (0.056)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Balanced panel				✓	
Individual FE ( $\theta_i$ )					✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.336	0.396	0.389	0.420	0.528
Observations	6,236	6,026	7,334	5,518	7,334
Individuals	628	535	711	388	711
Managers	52	45	58	58	58
P-Values:					
H <sub>0</sub> : Meetings = Incent.	0.068	0.135	0.129	0.538	0.464
H <sub>0</sub> : Meetings+Incent. ≤ Comb.	0.253	0.284	0.287	0.393	0.358

*Notes.* This table replicates the specifications in Table 3, except standard errors are two-way clustered by sales manager and week. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table OA.3: **Estimates of Log Revenue-per-Call Changes During the Post-Intervention Period Weighting by the Inverse Number of Weeks an Agent Is in the Sample**

Control Group:	Internal	External	Both		
	(Passive Pairs)	(No Pairs)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(1)	(2)			
Structured-Meetings	0.217** (0.090)	0.238** (0.108)	0.237** (0.107)	0.244*** (0.090)	0.280*** (0.084)
Pair-Incentives	0.016 (0.079)	0.033 (0.098)	0.035 (0.097)	0.037 (0.096)	0.070 (0.095)
Combined	0.169* (0.096)	0.186 (0.111)	0.188* (0.111)	0.302*** (0.102)	0.341*** (0.094)
Internal Control			0.021 (0.112)	0.140* (0.072)	0.112 (0.073)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Balanced panel				✓	
Individual FE ( $\theta_i$ )					✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.375	0.388	0.397	0.412	0.598
Observations	6,236	6,026	7,334	4,811	7,334

*Notes.* This table replicates the specifications in Table 3, except regressions are weighted by the inverse number of weeks an agent is observed in the sample. Standard errors are clustered by manager, with statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table OA.4: **Treatment Effect Heterogeneity on Log Revenue-per-Call by Partner and Agent Performance**

	Intervention Period			Post-Period		
	Full sample	Low-Performer Agents	High-Performer Agents	Full sample	Low-Performer Agents	High-Performer Agents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Structured-Meetings $\times$ High-Performing Partner	0.120** (0.045)	0.217*** (0.050)	0.159*** (0.054)	0.238** (0.096)	0.353** (0.138)	0.079 (0.085)
Pair-Incentives $\times$ High-Performing Partner	0.047 (0.047)	0.080 (0.059)	0.073 (0.053)	0.085 (0.078)	0.025 (0.089)	0.040 (0.089)
Combined $\times$ High-Performing Partner	0.189*** (0.055)	0.250*** (0.080)	0.200*** (0.051)	0.245*** (0.083)	0.374*** (0.102)	0.115 (0.083)
Structured-Meetings	0.180*** (0.039)	0.228*** (0.052)	0.071 (0.056)	0.021 (0.094)	0.087 (0.117)	0.054 (0.089)
Pair-Incentives	0.115*** (0.036)	0.209*** (0.055)	0.056 (0.040)	-0.061 (0.092)	-0.099 (0.112)	0.089 (0.096)
Combined	0.164** (0.068)	0.247*** (0.062)	0.089 (0.065)	0.043 (0.100)	0.158 (0.111)	0.038 (0.111)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.422	0.478	0.370	0.341	0.449	0.296
Observations	3,418	1,484	1,934	6,236	2,745	3,491
P-Value from Wild Bootstrap:	0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.13	0.08	0.47

*Notes.* This table reports regressions of log RPC with interactions for treatment assignment and random pairing with a high-performing partner. See notes for Table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table OA.5: **Treatment Effect Heterogeneity on Total Calls by Partner and Agent Performance**

	Intervention Period			Post-Intervention Period		
	Full sample	Low-Performer Agents	High-Performer Agents	Full sample	Low-Performer Agents	High-Performer Agents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Structured-Meetings $\times$ High Performing Partner	1.061 (3.229)	-3.496 (4.200)	5.406 (4.330)	6.489 (4.846)	6.589 (6.058)	2.349 (6.033)
Pair-Incentives $\times$ High Performing Partner	-6.194 (4.212)	-3.935 (3.988)	-7.661 (5.393)	2.338 (5.013)	1.125 (3.441)	-8.232 (9.629)
Combined $\times$ High Performing Partner	1.719 (3.695)	-0.032 (5.192)	4.040 (4.723)	5.202 (4.529)	10.913 (7.464)	-2.317 (6.092)
Structured-Meetings	0.450 (5.058)	0.509 (6.511)	0.817 (4.529)	-6.612 (4.418)	-4.581 (7.404)	1.382 (8.181)
Pair-Incentives	0.596 (4.530)	-6.676 (5.196)	7.203 (4.627)	-2.948 (4.802)	-12.230* (6.798)	11.970 (10.253)
Combined	-3.714 (4.998)	-5.345 (6.594)	-2.027 (5.594)	-8.975** (3.707)	-16.077** (7.068)	0.027 (8.354)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.153	0.241	0.100	0.140	0.205	0.179
Observations	3,020	1,327	1,693	9,804	2,605	3,288
P-Value from Wild Bootstrap:	0.23	0.81	0.19	0.75	0.11	0.13

*Notes.* The table reports regressions of total calls per week, with interactions for treatment assignment and random pairing with a high-performing partner. For details on the specification, see notes for Table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table OA.6: Estimates of Log Revenue-per-Call Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Rotation and Baseline Connections

	Intervention	Post-Intervention		Intervention	Post
		Never with High-Perf.	Paired with High-Perf.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Structured-Meetings x Rotating	0.012 (0.051)	-0.098 (0.103)	-0.089 (0.084)		
Pair-Incentives x Rotating	-0.116*** (0.026)	0.039 (0.091)	0.000 (0.066)		
Combined x Rotating	-0.063 (0.037)	0.063 (0.088)	0.021 (0.068)		
Structured-Meetings x Connected				0.115** (0.044)	0.006 (0.106)
Pair-Incentives x Connected				0.023 (0.050)	0.016 (0.098)
Combined x Connected				0.127** (0.045)	-0.036 (0.107)
Structured-Meetings	0.238*** (0.053)	0.078 (0.107)	0.261*** (0.092)	0.248*** (0.052)	0.123 (0.106)
Pair-Incentives	0.183*** (0.051)	-0.065 (0.102)	0.103 (0.070)	0.144*** (0.037)	0.001 (0.088)
Combined	0.290*** (0.037)	0.124 (0.115)	0.200** (0.081)	0.231** (0.078)	0.130 (0.095)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Adj. R-Square	0.416	0.328	0.373	0.396	0.315
Observations	3,418	2,214	4,019	1,776	3,922

*Notes.* This table displays point estimates of log RPC treatment effect interactions for agents who were re-paired with different partners and who have high baseline workplace connections with other agents. Coefficients come from difference-in-differences regressions including the pre-intervention period and either the intervention period or the post-intervention period. The Rotating interaction indicates that the agent was randomized into being re-paired with a different partner each week. Because rotating agents are more likely to ever have at least one high-performing partner, the post-intervention analysis is split by those who ever have a high-performing partner and those who never have a high-performing partner. Connected agents are those who report 5 or more work-related conversations per week on pre-experimental surveys. Specifications in Columns 4 and 5 exclude agents who did not respond to the pre-experiment survey, limiting the sample size. Standard errors are clustered by manager. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table OA.7: Estimates of Log Revenue-per-Call Treatment Effects During the Post-Intervention Period, Allowing for Heterogeneous Effects if Partners Report to Different Managers

Control Group:	Internal (Passive Pairs)	External (No Pairs)	Both		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Structured-Meetings	0.189** (0.087)	0.237*** (0.084)	0.216** (0.082)	0.216** (0.089)	0.258*** (0.078)
Pair-Incentives	0.093 (0.090)	0.146 (0.087)	0.121 (0.085)	0.135 (0.112)	0.133 (0.111)
Combined	0.162* (0.091)	0.207** (0.090)	0.188** (0.087)	0.236** (0.106)	0.216* (0.118)
Internal Control			0.038 (0.086)	0.135 (0.096)	0.050 (0.077)
Structured-Meetings x Distant	0.001 (0.057)	-0.044 (0.057)	-0.016 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.080)	-0.021 (0.047)
Pair-Incentives x Distant	-0.029 (0.051)	-0.075 (0.053)	-0.046 (0.050)	-0.027 (0.076)	-0.026 (0.096)
Combined x Distant	0.076 (0.046)	0.030 (0.051)	0.059 (0.047)	0.024 (0.069)	0.092 (0.107)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Balanced panel				✓	
Individual FE ( $\theta_i$ )					✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.337	0.397	0.390	0.420	0.529
Observations	6,236	6,026	7,334	4,811	7,334

*Notes.* This table mimics the specifications in Table 3 but adds interactions for Distant, an indicator that in at least one week during the intervention period the agent had a partner who reported to a different manager. Each week, the probability of being paired with a partner reporting to the same manager is 0.40. Standard errors are clustered by manager. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Table OA.8: **Estimates of Treatment Effects on Log Revenue-per-Call During the Post-Intervention Period for Agents in the Top 75% of the Tenure Distribution**

Control Group:	Internal	External	Both		
	(Passive Pairs)	(No Pairs)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Structured-Meetings	0.195** (0.080)	0.165* (0.086)	0.164* (0.085)	0.183** (0.090)	0.144* (0.075)
Pair-Incentives	0.101 (0.062)	0.074 (0.069)	0.071 (0.069)	0.107 (0.074)	0.122* (0.069)
Combined	0.241*** (0.075)	0.212** (0.081)	0.210** (0.081)	0.252*** (0.088)	0.268*** (0.079)
Internal Control			-0.030 (0.068)	0.084 (0.072)	0.031 (0.061)
Manager FE ( $\theta_g$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Balanced panel				✓	
Individual FE ( $\theta_i$ )					✓
Week FE ( $\lambda_t$ )	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R-Square	0.313	0.403	0.390	0.421	0.518
Observations	5,597	5,623	6,695	4,747	6,695

*Notes.* This table reports results from Table 3 but is restricted to agents in the top three quartiles of tenure at the time they are first observed in the sample. This restriction excludes agents with less than 88 days of completed tenure when first observed in the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the sales manager level and are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.