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**VALUING PRODUCT INNOVATION:
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED VARIETIES
IN U.S. CORN AND SOYBEANS**

Federico Ciliberto, GianCarlo Moschini and Edward
Perry

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

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Centre for Economic Policy Research
33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801
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Federico Ciliberto - ciliberto@virginia.edu
University of Virginia and CEPR

GianCarlo Moschini - moschini@iastate.edu
Iowa State University

Edward Perry - edperry@ksu.edu
Kansas State University

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Valuing Product Innovation: Genetically Engineered Varieties in U.S. Corn and Soybeans

Federico Ciliberto *

GianCarlo Moschini **

and

Edward D. Perry ***

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* University of Virginia; CEPR, London; DIW, Berlin; fc3p@virginia.edu.

** Iowa State University; moschini@iastate.edu.

*** Kansas State University; edperry@ksu.edu.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Innovation, in the form of new and improved crop varieties, has long played a critical role in the quest to ensure sufficient food supply for a rapidly growing world population. Conventional breeding activities have led to remarkable successes, such as hybrid maize (Griliches 1957) and the green revolution (Evenson and Gollin 2003). Genetically engineered (GE) crop varieties build on this tradition by exploiting the recombinant DNA tools of modern biotechnology. First introduced commercially in 1996, by most standards GE varieties have been very successful (Moschini, 2008). Despite being essentially limited to four main crops (maize, soybean, cotton, and canola), as of 2017 GE varieties were grown on more than 469 million acres worldwide. The United States has been at the forefront of these developments: in 2017, GE varieties were planted on more than 183 million acres of U.S. farmland, nearly 91% of which was maize and soybeans (ISAAA 2017).

Notwithstanding their productivity-enhancing potential, GE crops have been highly controversial. Concerns raised include the fear that GE products are harmful to human health and/or the environment, and ethical objections related to human manipulation of the DNA of living plants and animals. Many of these concerns have been allayed (Bennett et al. 2013). In particular, the environmental impacts of GE varieties appear to be generally positive (NRC 2010, Barrows, Sexton, and Zilberman 2014). However, a separate persistent source of public mistrust relates to the ownership interests of multinational corporations that commercialize GE products. Unlike innovations underpinning the green revolution, which were largely the result of publicly-sponsored research and development (R&D) activities (Wright 2012), GE crop varieties have been primarily developed by private firms, with U.S. seed companies (Monsanto *in primis*) at the forefront. The proprietary nature of GE technologies, and an ongoing consolidation of the seed and agrochemical industry, has heightened concerns about the pricing of these new products, their contribution to welfare, and the actual beneficiaries of the innovation (Clancy and Moschini 2017).

In this paper we provide novel econometric evidence on the welfare effects of the introduction of GE crop varieties. We draw on a large, proprietary dataset of plot-level seed choices by a representative sample of U.S. farmers for the two most important GE crops, corn and soybeans. The data span the period from 1996 (the year GE corn and soybean varieties were first introduced) to 2011 (by which time the average adoption rate of GE varieties exceeded 90%), and contain information on the specific seed products that farmers buy—brand, amount bought, area planted, price paid, and which (if any) GE traits are included in the seed. The richness of the data allows us to estimate an explicit structural model of farmers' demand for seed varieties rooted in the theory of discrete choice

in a differentiated product setting (Anderson, De Palma and Thisse 1992). Although this model pertains to a production input (seeds) used by competitive firms, rather than consumer products, it is nonetheless in the tradition of the empirical industrial organization (IO) literature on demand estimation in industries with differentiated products (Berry 1994; Goldberg 1995; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001). This demand model provides the structural foundation for evaluating the welfare impacts of the introduction of new characteristics—GE traits—into seed products, along the lines of the seminal contributions of Trajtenberg (1989) and Petrin (2002).

The discrete choice model of seed demand that we specify and estimate presumes individual profit maximizing choices, with farmers modeled as choosing between all corn and soybean varieties (in addition to the outside option). Specifically, we model the demand for corn and soybean seed products using a two-level nested logit specification (Verboven 1996; Bjonnerstedt and Verboven 2016). The upper level consists of the outside option (planting a crop other than corn or soybeans, or not planting at all) and the set of inside options, the latter encompassing all corn and soybean seed products. The inside options are partitioned into two subgroups, one for soybean seed products and the other for corn seed products. This two-level nested specification is particularly suited to the institutional realities of U.S. corn and soybean production, including the role played by the widespread practice of crop rotation.

Estimates from this demand model allow us to infer the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of farmers for seed products over time, and, more specifically, for the GE traits progressively embedded into seed varieties. The total WTP provides a first-order approximation to the *ex post* total surplus created by the innovation. We find that the introduction of GE traits in corn and soybeans, over the period 1996-2011, increased total surplus by \$30.6 billion. Using observed price premia commanded by GE varieties we estimate that seed companies' revenue increased by about \$24.3 billion, suggesting that innovating firms captured the larger share of the surplus created by the innovation.

Next, we implement an alternative, more structural, procedure that can account for two additional crucial effects: the contribution of GE varieties to increased seed product differentiation in the industry (which, *ceteris paribus*, is valuable to users and a potential source of additional revenues for sellers), and the competitive price effects caused by the innovation itself. Specifically, we use the structure of the estimated demand model to construct and simulate counterfactual scenarios of the U.S. corn and soybean seed markets without GE traits as an available technology. To this end, we first determine the seed prices that would have been charged had GE seeds not been introduced (the "counterfactual prices"). A structural equilibrium approach to this question is problematic because the

supply side is characterized by a complex web of GE trait cross-licensing agreements (the terms of which are confidential) between seed firms. Hence, we take a reduced-form approach that relies on a hedonic regression along the lines of Hausman and Leonard (2002).

Counterfactual prices, along with the estimated seed demand model, permit the computation of farmers' counterfactual expected profits. We do so for four alternative counterfactual choice sets. In one scenario we simply remove all seed products with GE traits from farmers' choice sets. This "naïve" scenario, however, ignores the fact that, as GE seeds became widely adopted over time, the set of available non-GE seeds was increasingly reduced. The crowding out of existing products by new products is an issue that has received relatively little explicit attention (an exception is Eizenberg 2014). In our context, the naïve scenario entails reduced farmers' choice sets, particularly later in the sample. Insofar as this feature of the counterfactual is artificial, it produces an upward bias in the estimated welfare gain from GE traits. To address this problem we consider three other counterfactual product choice sets, by removing the GE trait characteristics from any GE product available in a market while presuming that this results in a viable seed product. In all cases, the hedonic price function permits us to impute counterfactual prices for all products in the counterfactual choice sets.

In the most realistic scenario ("keep conventional"), we estimate that the availability of GE varieties increased farmers' welfare by about \$22.2 billion during the 1996-2011 period, with three quarters of these gains attributable to one trait: glyphosate tolerance in soybeans. Correspondingly, the same counterfactual scenario indicates that the development and diffusion of GE traits increased seed revenue, in the U.S. corn and soybean industry, by about \$25.3 billion. Hence, even under this approach, the seed industry was able to appropriate about 53% of the *ex post* value created by GE technologies. This additional revenue can be interpreted as the *ex post* return to R&D activities that led to the development of GE varieties.

Our analysis adds to the literature on the estimation of the value of product innovation (Trajtenberg, 1989; Hausman, 1996; Petrin, 2002; Nevo 2013; Eizenberg, 2014; Allenby et al., 2014) by focusing squarely on the introduction of new characteristics (the GE traits). In particular, both the data and the econometric framework employed in this paper are new for the purpose of assessing the welfare impacts of GE crops. Unlike much prior agricultural technological change that was rooted in publicly sponsored research, the proprietary nature of GE traits requires suitable non-competitive market settings to model their welfare impacts (Lapan and Moschini 2004). Previous studies that attempted to estimate these welfare effects (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000; Sobolevsky, Moschini and Lapan, 2005) lacked an econometric

backbone and instead relied on indirect evidence to parameterize partial equilibrium models used for counterfactual analysis. As such, they were ill suited to capture the impact of seed pricing of GE crops that is critical in this setting. Using a subset of the proprietary data employed in this paper, Shi, Chavas, and Stiegert (2010) (with extensions in Shi, Stiegert, and Chavas 2011, and Shi et al. 2012) estimate hedonic regressions for the period 2000-2007 and find positive premiums for most GE traits in both corn and soybeans. But, unlike the present paper, these studies do not model farmers' seed demand explicitly and thus lack the necessary structure to infer welfare effects.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the introduction of GE traits in soybean and corn seeds, their adoption, and the evolution of market shares. Section 3 presents the data used in the econometric analysis. Section 4 develops the discrete-choice farmers' seed demand model. Section 5 reports the estimation results for this model. Section 6 presents the welfare analysis: farmers' WTP estimates, farmers' estimated increase in expected profit due to GE innovations, and the increase in seed industry revenues due to GE traits. Section 7 concludes.

2. BACKGROUND: GE TRAITS IN U.S. CORN AND SOYBEAN SEEDS

GE crops (also known as transgenic crops) are the most visible agricultural manifestation of modern biotechnology and its use of recombinant DNA techniques. Their distinguishing feature is the insertion, in the plant's genome, of one or more foreign genes that express desirable traits. In corn and soybeans, these traits have encompassed two sets of attributes: herbicide tolerance (HT) and insect resistance (IR). The vast majority of HT crops are tolerant to glyphosate, a broad spectrum herbicide marketed by Monsanto under the trademark Roundup®. IR crops embed one or more genes from the bacterium *Bacillus thuringiensis* (hence the widely used “*Bt*” moniker), which emit proteins that are toxic to certain insects. For soybeans, the only trait with commercial relevance thus far has been glyphosate tolerance (GT), while for corn both GT and *Bt* traits have been commercialized. Initially, GE varieties had a single trait, but over time commercial varieties have come to embed multiple GE traits, or what are often referred to as “stacked” GE trait varieties. **Figure 1** charts the diffusion pattern of GE varieties in U.S. soybeans and corn, where “*Bt* maize” refers to varieties with at least one IR trait (alone or with the GT trait), and “GT maize” refers to varieties with the GT trait (alone or in combination with other traits). Adoption has been rapid: GE corn and soybeans were first introduced in the United States in 1996 and within just 10 years accounted for the majority of planted acres in both crops.

GE traits are valuable to farmers because they offer novel (cost-reducing and/or yield enhancing) tools for weed and insect control. To guarantee adoption, however, GE traits need to be combined with proven germplasm—the genetics accumulated from traditional breeding and selection activities that result in high-yielding and desirable commercial seed varieties. Thus, GE traits and germplasm are truly complementary assets (Graff, Rausser and Small 2003), both of which have become extremely valuable to seed manufacturers due to the increasing importance of intellectual property rights (Moschini 2010). Well before the advent of genetic engineering, the corn seed industry had already thrived through its use of hybridization (which requires farmers to buy first-generation seeds for each planting) and trade secrets, which together effectively prevent imitation. By contrast, commercial soybeans are self-pollinating and thus reproduce “true to type,” allowing farmers to replant seed from the previous season’s harvest without any loss in expected yield. The introduction of patented GE traits, and the ability of seed companies to write (and enforce) restrictive retailing contracts forbidding farmers to save and replant seeds that contain such traits, thus significantly increased the profitability of selling soybean seeds.

The company Monsanto played a pioneering role in this process,¹ and its commitment to the development of GE crops has had major implications for the seed industry. The quest to commercialize GE traits led to a wave of acquisitions and mergers that promoted a rapid consolidation in the seed industry (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004, Musselli Moretti 2006). When Monsanto originally developed and patented its GE traits it did not have a presence in the seed industry, and thus lacked direct access to commercial seed varieties. As a result, Monsanto pursued two parallel strategies for the commercialization of its GE traits. First, it embarked on a series of acquisitions that, over time, transformed it into the largest seed company in the world. At the same time, Monsanto aggressively licensed GE traits to other seed companies, which also sped up the availability of GE traits to farmers.

Monsanto’s critical acquisitions included Asgrow (in 1997), Dekalb (in 1998) and Holden Foundation Seeds (in 1997). The early emphasis on broad “life science” companies also led to Monsanto becoming the agricultural subsidiary of Pharmacia Corporation in 2000, only to be spun off as an independent company in 2002. Similar considerations led DuPont to acquire Pioneer, the dominant seed company at the time in 1999. Syngenta was formed in 2000 as an agrochemical and seed business from the consolidation and restructuring of major life science companies (Novartis and AstraZeneca). Dow AgroSciences, a subsidiary of Dow Chemical formed in 1997, acquired Mycogen

¹ Charles (2002) provides a fascinating account of the road to the commercial development and marketing of the first GE varieties.

in 1998. By the year 2000, when AgReliant (a joint venture of KWS and Limagrain) was also formed, the fundamental structure of the corn and soybean seed industry had been established, although a number of other, smaller acquisitions would be made in subsequent years (especially by Monsanto).

Market shares, reported as 4-year averages for the 2000-2015 period, are displayed in Table 1. Data for 2000-2011 are from GfK Kynetec, the source of the proprietary data used in the econometric analysis. For the most recent years the market shares reported in Table 1 are from the Farm Journal, a trade magazine.² These market share data show an industry with two dominant firms (Monsanto and DuPont) who control approximately 60% of the soybean seed market and 70% of the corn seed market. Three other firms (Syngenta, Dow AgroSciences, and AgReliant) have considerably smaller but significant presence, with the industry completed by a panoply of local and regional companies. Table 1 also shows the almost complete disappearance of the once-common practice of seed saving in soybeans (which accounted for more than 25% of soybean planting prior to the advent of GE varieties).

3. DATA

The data used in this study consists of a large set of farm-level observations of seed choices by U.S. corn and soybean farmers for the period 1996-2011. In particular, we use the soybean and corn TraitTrak® datasets, two proprietary datasets developed by GfK Kynetec, a unit of a major market research organization that specializes in the collection of agriculture-related survey data. GfK Kynetec constructs the TraitTrak® data from annual surveys of randomly sampled farmers in the United States. The samples are developed to be representative at the crop reporting district (CRD) level.³ From 1996-2011, the data are based on responses from an average of 4,716 farmers per year for maize and 3,573 farmers per year for soybeans. In the survey, farmers are asked about the types (brand and hybrid/variety identity), amounts, and cost of seed they purchase.⁴ Furthermore, with each purchase

² The market share data reported by Farm Journal are based on polling industry analysts and executives, and have been published since 2009. In the three years (2009-2011) that the Farm Journal and GfK Kynetec data overlap, the firm level shares are very similar.

³ CRDs are multi-county sub-state regions identified by the National Agricultural Statistics Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

⁴ The Supplementary Information online (Appendix B) provides a detailed description on the steps taken to elaborate the data.

instance we observe the list of GE traits (if any) embedded in the variety. Importantly, the period we observe covers the early stages of GE trait adoption up to its almost complete diffusion by 2011.

Traits

Each of the various GE traits were introduced at different times in our sample. In soybeans, the GT trait was introduced by Monsanto in 1996 as Roundup Ready® soybeans, and in corn the GT trait was first commercialized in 1998. The main attraction of the GT trait is that, by allowing post-emergence applications of glyphosate without causing injury to the crop, it greatly facilitates and reduces the cost of weed control.⁵ The first *Bt* trait in maize was introduced in 1996 and conferred resistance to the European corn borer (CB). Later *Bt* traits, which provided resistance to various species of corn rootworms (RW), were introduced in 2003. The attractiveness of *Bt* varieties is that they increase expected yields and reduce yield volatility (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2014; Xu et al. 2013), while also reducing the need for insecticides to control pests. Unlike GT traits, which are highly complementary to a specific chemical, *Bt* traits substitute for chemical inputs (Perry et al., 2016).

Figure 1 shows that the adoption of GE varieties, however fast by most standards, was gradual. This diffusion pattern is explained by both demand and supply-side factors. On the demand side, learning and farmer heterogeneity played a role. On the supply side, the nature of the technology to develop and bring GE crops to market is critical. Because this plays an important role in our identification strategy, we provide more details at that juncture.

⁵ The GT trait is not the only herbicide tolerant trait in corn and soybeans. There is also a GE trait that provides tolerance to the herbicide glufosinate. This trait was developed by Bayer and marketed under the tradename LibertyLink (LL). It has been available in some corn varieties since 1996 and in some soybean varieties since 2009. In our econometric analysis, we ignore this trait for two reasons. First, it has been rarely adopted, especially in soybeans, where it only became available in very limited quantities late in our sample. In corn, this trait can be found in more commercialized varieties, but this is mostly because it primarily served as a marker gene for the *Bt* traits (a marker gene is used to determine whether the insertion process was successful). Thus, most growers did not intend to use the LibertyLink trait when they purchased varieties that (incidentally) contained it. Indeed, based on pesticide data used in Perry et al. (2016), we found that only a small fraction of corn producers who purchased seed containing the LL trait actually used any glufosinate herbicide. There are also traditionally-bred varieties that are tolerant to the imidazoline herbicide (for corn) and to sulfonylurea herbicides (for soybeans). As with the LL trait, such varieties have had low adoption rates. Because our focus is on the difference in value between GE and non-GE crops, in our primary econometric analysis we ignore these other herbicide tolerance traits.

Table 2 reports detailed GE trait adoption rates (as a fraction of total planted acres for the corresponding crop). Each column provides the annual adoption rate for a specific GE trait combination (thus, in corn, the sum across columns is the total annual GE adoption rate). Among all GE-crop combinations, the most rapidly adopted were GT soybeans, which even surpassed the rate at which corn hybrids were adopted (Griliches 1957). By 2003, over 90% of land was planted to GT soybeans, and by 2011 it was 96%. The adoption of GT maize was slower but still achieved a 90% rate by 2011. The adoption of IR traits has been steady as well, with the CB traits (alone or in combination) attaining a 72% adoption rate and RW traits (alone or in combination) achieving a 55% adoption rate by 2011. This table also illustrates the gradual penetration of stacked- trait varieties. By 2011, the triple stack GT-CB-RW was adopted on 54% of maize acres. Note also that the RW trait, owing to its relatively late introduction, has had little diffusion as a standalone trait, instead becoming available to farmers primarily in combination with other traits.

Table 3 reports nominal per-acre average seed costs for each GE trait combination. These prices reveal three important stylized facts about the seed markets. First, all prices have trended up over time. Both GE and non-GE prices more than doubled from 1996 to 2011. Second, GE varieties command a substantial premium over non-GE varieties. In soybeans, the premium was around \$9/acre, and in corn the premium ranged from about \$9/acre for standalone trait varieties to nearly \$30/acre for varieties with all three GE traits. Third, over time GE prices increased by more than non-GE prices. In soybeans, the average premium in 2011 was about \$9, \$5 greater than the average premium in 1996, but actually smaller than the average premiums in 1999 and 2002. In corn, the price difference between GE and traditional varieties widened significantly over time. The average premium for corn with the GT trait, e.g., was just \$4-\$5 per acre prior to 2005, but then increased significantly to about \$16/acre by 2011. Similar increases occurred for the other corn GE combinations.

Brands

The marketing of seeds relies heavily on brand labels. Well-known and long-standing brands such as Dekalb and Pioneer identify germplasm that was developed over a long period of time, and carry an established reputation among growers. Some descriptive data for each of the major brands in our sample are reported in Table 4.

Most brands have a presence in both corn and soybeans, albeit at a different intensity. For example, Monsanto has primarily marketed corn under the Dekalb brand and soybeans under the Asgrow brand. By contrast, DuPont uses the Pioneer brand heavily in both corn and soybeans. There

is also variation in the number of brands held by the different parent companies. Monsanto and Syngenta utilize multiple brands, whereas DuPont almost exclusively uses Pioneer. Brand-specific average prices demonstrate significant variation, reflecting a number of effects, including the average value of the underlying germplasm, and the extent of inclusion of GE traits. The latter explains the particularly low average price of publicly available soybean seeds, which do not include any GE traits.

Product Lines

An essential step in our empirical discrete choice framework is the definition of a “product.” Our goal is to capture, in a tractable way, the essential seed characteristics that matter to buyers: that is, the nature of the germplasm, which is captured by the seed brand, and the presence of GE traits. Hence, for the purpose of this study, we define a seed “product” as a unique combination of four types of characteristics: i) the crop (corn or soybeans); ii) the parent company (e.g., Monsanto); iii) the brand (e.g., Asgrow); and, iv) the presence (or absence) of GE traits, specifically glyphosate tolerance (GT), corn borer (CB) resistance, and rootworm (RW) resistance.⁶

One of the important features to note about our product definition is that the number and type of varieties that are aggregated within each product change over space and time. For example, from 2003 to 2011, the number of Pioneer corn varieties purchased with the GT trait rose from 9 to 75. It is thus perhaps more appropriate to think of a “product” as a “product line,” one which is subject to change over time. One implication of this is that, within our econometric framework, the value of a GE product line should be permitted to change over time. As more and more hybrids are offered with a particular GE trait combination, a wider range of grower needs can be matched, raising the average value of that trait combination. Thus, in estimating our econometric model we permit the return to GE varieties to differ over three sub-periods. By doing so, we also accommodate other largely exogenous changes in the industry, such as glyphosate going off patent in 2000, and the commodity price boom of 2007-08.

⁶ In principle, we could define a product at the individual hybrid/variety level. The number of available varieties in any given year, however, is too large to be of practical use. For example, 5,065 distinct corn varieties and 2,141 distinct soybean varieties were purchased in 2007. By contrast, for that year, our definition results in 394 distinct products—small enough to be econometrically tractable, and large enough to still capture the fundamental elements of product differentiation in the seed industry.

Market Definition

The definition of a market determines the set of available products to residing farmers. We define a market as a CRD-year combination. As previously noted, CRDs are multi-county, sub-state regions. We define a market at this level for three reasons. First, a CRD is the level at which the GfK Kynetec survey data are designed to be representative. Second, corn and soybean varieties are bred to possess characteristics that suit particular agro-climatic conditions, and such conditions are relatively homogeneous within a given CRD. Finally, this is the spatial definition of markets that seed firms themselves use to analyze competitive issues (Monsanto, 2009). Overall, this definitions results in 3,874 markets (CRD-year combinations) encompassing 294 distinct CRDs.⁷

A delicate issue, in this context, concerns the definition of the potential market size. Ideally, in a given market, this is given by the amount of land that could realistically be planted to corn or soybeans. To identify this area, we use cropland measures from the Census of Agriculture (USDA-NASS 2014). This is the main source of data concerning land use in the United States, and it is available at 5-year intervals (Bigelow and Borchers 2017). The cropland measure we use includes “cropland used for crops” (itself encompassing three components: cropland harvested, crop failure, and cultivated summer fallow) and “idle cropland.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, we observe very little variation in cropland acres over time. Hence, within each CRD, we assume that the size of potential total seed demand is constant over our sample period, and specifically define it as the maximum of reported cropland across the four censuses that pertain to years encompassed by our sample period (1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012).⁸

Table 5 reports the average number of products in each market. For both corn and soybeans, the number of products increased steadily up until about 2007 and then declined thereafter. This pattern reflects the fact that, as the adoption of GE traits increased (recall Figure 1), more and more varieties became available to farmers both with and without GE traits. Later in the sample, as farmers’ demand for transgenic varieties exceeded that for traditionally bred varieties, some of the latter were

⁷ There are 303 CRDs in the contiguous 48 states, but some are never present in the data because of negligible corn and soybean production. Also, some CRDs that are present are not sampled every year by GfK Kynetec. This occurs when the expected number of acres grown were too low to warrant the collection of data. On average, our data encompasses 242 CRDs per year.

⁸ The Supplementary Information online (Appendix B) provides further discussion on the definition of the potential market size.

discontinued. This pattern is more marked in corn because there are three GE traits (GT, CB, and RW), compared to one in soy (GT). The fact that the number of products changed so significantly over time is a distinctive attribute of the industry. As we discuss in more detail below, this has certain challenging implications for estimating the welfare associated with the introduction of GE crops.

4. FARMERS' SEED DEMAND

Each unit of observation in the data is a farmer's choice of a seed product, denoted by j , to be planted on plot i of size L_i . We model this decision as a discrete choice with a profit maximization objective. The profit from planting plot i with seed product j can be expressed as $\Pi_{ij} = RY_i - W \cdot Z_i - P_j S_i$, where R is the output price, Y_i is total output produced, S_i is the quantity of seed, Z_i is the vector of all inputs apart from seed and land (e.g., fertilizers, labor, energy, ...), W is the corresponding vector of input prices, and P_j is the price of seed product j . Note that we are omitting the rental price of land in this representation, so profit represents the return to the quasi-fixed input land.

The production function is written as $Y_i = F_j(L_i, S_i, Z_i)$. Note that this function, in principle, is specific to the identity of seed product j (this captures the fact that, compared with traditional seed products, GE varieties may use different amounts and types of pesticides and/or a different quantity of labor). We assume that this production function satisfies two basic properties: constant returns to scale (i.e., doubling all inputs doubles total output); and, a fixed proportion of land and seed. That is, we can write the production function as

$$F_j(L_i, S_i, Z_i) = f_j(Z_i/L_i) \times \min\{L_i, S_i/\lambda_j\} \quad (1)$$

where the parameter λ_j denotes seed density (amount of seed per unit of land). By construction $f_j(Z_i/L_i)$ is strictly concave in the vector of input intensities Z_i/L_i . For a given plot of size L_i , and given that at an optimal solution we have $S_i = \lambda_j L_i$, optimal input intensities Z_i/L_i imply that the per-acre maximized profit can be represented as $\Pi_{ij}/L_i = \pi_j(R, W) - \lambda_j P_j$, where the per-acre profit function $\pi_j(R, W)$ is dual to the per-acre production function $f_j(Z_i/L_i)$.

Because of the linear homogeneity property of $\pi_j(R, W)$, the per-acre profit function is homogeneous of degree one in the vector of all prices (R, W, P_j) . In the econometric application that

follows, we pool seed choices across multiple years, during which prices changed dramatically. To account for this, we exploit the homogeneity property and deflate all prices by an appropriate input price index W_I and write per-acre profit in real terms, $\pi_{ij} \equiv \Pi_{ij}/(L_i W_I)$, to obtain

$$\pi_{ij} = \pi_j(r, w) - p_j \quad (2)$$

where π_{ij} is the profit per acre on plot i when using seed product j , (r, w) is the vector of deflated prices of output and all other inputs, and $p_j \equiv \lambda_j P_j / W_I$ is the deflated price of seed product j (expressed in per-acre terms).⁹

The econometric model

Building on equation (2), we model farmers as selecting the seed product that provides the highest expected profit per acre on plot i in market m , that is, they choose product j such that

$$\max_j \pi_{ijm}, \quad j \in \{0, 1, \dots, J_m\} \quad (3)$$

where J_m denotes the number of seed products available in market m , and $j = 0$ denotes the outside option.

We specify per-acre profits in (2) as being composed of an observable and unobservable part. The observable part is assumed to be linear in parameters, and to depend on product characteristics, as well as a number of fixed and random effects. Specifically, the per-acre profit of choosing seed product j on plot i in market m is written as:

$$\pi_{ijm} = x_j \gamma_{t[m]} - p_{jm} + \xi_{c[j],t[m]} + \xi_{c[j],l[m]} + \xi_{c[j],b[j]} + \xi_{jm} + v_{ijm} \quad (4)$$

or, following standard notation, $\pi_{ijm} = \delta_{jm} + v_{ijm}$, where δ_{jm} denotes the mean profit that is common across all plots within market m . Here, the vector x_j comprises indicator variables that code for the presence of one or more GE traits in seed product j (these variables take value zero for conventional seed products), and p_{jm} is the associated price. Note that we allow the impact of GE traits, via the

⁹ Specifically, for W_I we use the crop sector index for prices paid, published by the USDA. This index is normalized to equal 1 in 2011, so that all profit and price data are interpreted in 2011 dollars.

coefficient $\gamma_{t[m]}$, to possibly change over time (in the empirical results reported below, we specifically identify three distinct sub-periods with different values associated to GE traits). For the outside option, we follow standard convention and set $\pi_{i0m} = v_{i0m}$. Similar to most empirical discrete choice models, the price p_{jm} enters linearly in equation (4). However, in contrast to consumer demand models, where linearity is typically a functional form simplification, in our context it follows directly from the structural assumption of fixed proportions between land and seed, a property of the production technology that applies to this setting.

The terms $\xi_{c[j],t[m]}$, $\xi_{c[j],l[m]}$ and $\xi_{c[j],b[j]}$ are, respectively, crop-time, crop-region, and crop-brand fixed effects. The subscript notation follows Gelman and Hill (2007): $c[j]$ indicates the crop output associated with seed product j (either soybeans or corn), $b[j]$ indicates the brand of seed product j (for example, Dekalb), $t[m]$ denotes the year corresponding to market m , and $l[m]$ denotes the CRD corresponding to market m (l stands for location). This large set of fixed effects controls for unobservable heterogeneity in yields, output, and input prices across time, regions, brands, and crops. The term ξ_{jm} captures the unobserved product-market specific components that motivate our identification discussion below. Finally, v_{ijm} is the unobserved plot-specific component.

To make the choice model in (3)-(4) operational, we need distributional assumptions on the plot-specific unobservable v_{ijm} . We model the demand for corn and soybean seed products using a two-level nested logit specification (Verboven 1996; Bjornerstedt and Verboven 2016). We specify the upper level as consisting of the outside option and the set of inside options, where the latter consists of all corn and soybean seed products. We then further partition the inside options into two subgroups, one for soybean seed products and the other for corn seed products.

Partitioning the choice problem in this way is consistent with basic facts about U.S. corn and soybean production. Less than 5% of corn and soybean production occurs on farms with a single crop (MacDonald, Korb and Hoppe 2013). Farms that produce both corn and soybeans are ubiquitous, especially in the Midwest. Because planting and harvest timings differ somewhat between these two crops, economies of scope can be obtained in the use of farm labor and machinery. Crop diversification on the farm can also be motivated by rotation considerations (Hennessy 2006). Indeed, the practice of alternating between corn and soybeans on a given plot is widespread in U.S. agriculture, as it has been shown to increase profit by increasing yields, reducing fertilizer needs and improving

weed control (Bullock 1992). Hence, a given plot planted to corn (soybeans) in year $t - 1$ is much more likely to be planted to soybean (corn) in year t . Thus, our presumption is that, for example, if the expected return to a corn seed product on a given plot is unattractive, a grower will typically be much more likely to consider another corn seed product as an alternative, rather than switch to a soybean seed product instead. Furthermore, in the Midwest (where most of these two crops are produced) corn and soybeans are by far the dominant crops. That is, switching to the outside option, from planting either corn or soybeans, is uncommon and even less likely than switching between corn and soybeans.¹⁰ As shown by Grigolon and Verboven (2014), when such market segments are an important differentiating dimension, the nested logit model can perform as well as computationally more complex random coefficient models.

The assumed nesting structure is illustrated in Figure 2. Let the choice set in market m be partitioned into two mutually exclusive groups denoted by $g \in \{0, 1\}$, where $g = 0$ represents the outside option and $g = 1$ represents inside goods. The latter group is further partitioned into two subgroups denoted by $h \in \{1, 2\}$, where $h = 1$ represents corn seed products and $h = 2$ represents soybean seed products. Following Verboven (1996), we specify the plot-specific unobserved component as follows:

$$v_{ijm} = \varepsilon_{igm} + (1 - \sigma_2) \varepsilon_{ihgm} + (1 - \sigma_1) \varepsilon_{ijm}, \quad (5)$$

where we invoke the standard assumption that ε_{igm} , ε_{ihgm} , and ε_{ijm} possess the unique distribution such that the terms of interest have an extreme value distribution (Berry 1994, Verboven 1996).

The nesting parameters σ_1 and σ_2 measure the correlation between the unobservable components of different products within the same subgroup (σ_1) and within the same group (σ_2). To be consistent with random-utility maximization, it is necessary that $0 \leq \sigma_2 \leq \sigma_1 < 1$. If σ_1 is large, farmer preferences are strongly correlated across seed products in the same subgroup (soybeans or corn), and if σ_2 is also large then this increases the correlation across seeds of both crops. When $\sigma_2 = \sigma_1$ preferences are equally correlated among all seed products (the subgroup distinction between

¹⁰ Hendricks, Smith and Sumner's (2014) econometric analysis of supply response in Iowa, Illinois and Indiana show that the extensive margin response (transitions between corn or soybeans to other crops) is extremely small.

soybeans and corn is immaterial). The special case $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 0$ would reduce the model to the simple logit.

In any given market, let the set of seed products in subgroup h of group g be denoted J_{hgm} . Then, the choice probability for seed product $j \in J_{hgm}$ (the market share) is given by:

$$s_{jm} = \frac{\exp(\delta_{jm}/(1-\sigma_1)) \exp(I_{hgm}/(1-\sigma_2)) \exp(I_{gm})}{\exp(I_{hgm}/(1-\sigma_1)) \exp(I_{gm}/(1-\sigma_2)) \exp(I_m)} \quad (6)$$

where I_{hgm} , I_{gm} and I_m are “inclusive values” defined as follows (Björnerstedt and Verboven 2016):

$$I_{hgm} = (1-\sigma_1) \ln \sum_{k \in J_{hgm}} \exp(\delta_{km}/(1-\sigma_1)) \quad (7)$$

$$I_{gm} = (1-\sigma_2) \ln \sum_{h \in \{1,2\}} \exp(I_{hgm}/(1-\sigma_2)) \quad (8)$$

$$I_m = \ln(1 + \exp(I_{gm})) \quad (9)$$

Again, in our setting, $g = 1$ denotes the group of all inside goods, and this group comprises two subgroups ($h = 1, 2$). Based on this specification, recalling the definition of δ_{jm} , we obtain the estimating equation for our two-level nested logit:

$$\ln(s_{jm}/s_{0m}) = x_j \beta_{l[m]} - \alpha p_{jm} + \sigma_1 \ln(s_{jm}/S_{h1m}) + \sigma_2 \ln(S_{h1m}/S_{1m}) + \xi_{c[j],l[m]} + \xi_{c[j],l[m]} + \xi_{c[j],b[j]} + \xi_{jm} \quad (10)$$

where $S_{h1m} \equiv \sum_{j \in J_{h1m}} s_{jm}$ is the aggregate share of all products in subgroup $h \in \{1, 2\}$, and $S_{1m} = S_{11m} + S_{21m}$ is the total share of all inside goods. Hence, s_{jm}/S_{h1m} is the (conditional) share of seed product j within subgroup h (i.e., corn or soybean), and S_{h1m}/S_{1m} is the (conditional) share of subgroup h in group $g = 1$ (the group of all inside goods). Finally, $s_{0m} = 1 - S_{1m}$ is the share of the outside option.

As we discuss further below, these shares are endogenous and therefore require instruments. In addition, the coefficient that we estimate on the price variable, $\alpha \equiv 1/\mu$, is the reciprocal of the scale parameter μ associated with the IID extreme value error term. This parameter can be interpreted as

a measure of preference heterogeneity in the population (Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse 1992). Also, the parameters β in equation (10) are related to γ in equation (4) by $\gamma = \beta/\alpha$.

Identification

The key identification issue is the endogeneity of seed prices, which seed manufacturers set taking into account the fact that they are competing in an oligopoly, and factoring in differentiation across products. The solution to this problem, which was first proposed by Bresnahan (1987), and later adopted, among others, by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), consists of assuming that the location of firms' varieties in the product space is exogenous, and this source of exogenous variation across time and geographical markets can be exploited to identify the parameters of the econometric model.

This assumption seems particularly reasonable in the seed industry because individual firms have shown a clear willingness to introduce traits into their seed lines as soon as they become available. Furthermore, in this context, it is crucial to appreciate that the technology to bring GE seeds to market entails a lengthy and complex process (Mumm and Walters 2001). Molecular biology and tissue culture techniques are used to introduce the gene(s) of interest into plant cells. Such transformed cells are then regenerated into whole plants, each of which is a distinct transformation "event" (which thus embeds the particular genotype, often not of commercial interest itself, used at the transformation stage). Extensive molecular and agronomic testing selects the best among the many events that are generated. The next step is the integration of the selected event into elite germplasm. For each commercial variety eventually developed, this requires repeated iteration of backcross breeding (crossing to a recurrent parent) to achieve the desired germplasm purity.¹¹ A key role is also played by the GE regulatory structure adopted by the United States, where the unit of evaluation is a unique event (McHughen and Smyth 2008). The process of clearing the regulatory hurdles is onerous and, although it can be run concurrently with trait integration, is itself rather lengthy (Bradford et al. 2005).

The entire process of producing GE varieties is very long: even abstracting from gene discovery and the transformation phase, the average time for trait integration into elite germplasm, field testing, regulatory compliance, and seed bulk-up needed to launch a commercial product is about 7 years (Prado et al. 2014, p. 772). Moreover, this process is complex, and the need for extensive

¹¹ An alternative to backcrossing is forward breeding, which has some disadvantages in maize but may be preferable for crops (such as soybeans) for which cross-pollination is difficult.

testing introduces randomness at various junctures. Even at the last stage of field testing, the seed firm’s “... supply management may be dealing with a number of events or candidate products that ultimately will not proceed to commercialization.” (Mumm and Walters, 2001, p. 1384). Seed companies also invest in traditional breeding activities to improve germplasm, but again they have an incentive to commercialize their best products at any given point in time. Moreover, the turnover of commercialized varieties is fairly high, with varieties exiting a market sometimes after only two or three years (Magnier, Kalaitzandonakes and Miller, 2010). Overall, this suggests that the introduction of new products is predetermined, embeds stochastic elements, and is largely exogenous to pricing decisions.

Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, p. 861) we use functions of the traits in competing varieties as our instruments. Since GE traits are the main characteristics that vary over seed varieties, this amounts to counting up the unique number of competing GE seed products. Specifically, we compute the total number of competing products (irrespective of GE traits) by: market; market and brand; market and parent company; market and crop; market, brand, and crop; and market, parent company, and crop. This results in 6 instrumental variables. We then compute the same variables for each the three GE traits plus non-GE products: GT, CB, RW, and non-GE. This results in an additional 24 instrumental variables (in total, there are 30 instrumental variables).

5. RESULTS

Table 6 presents the estimation results for four different specifications of the seed demand model, which differ by the number of fixed effects that control for unobserved heterogeneity and by the type of logit model (simple logit vs nested logit). Specifically, columns 1 and 2 contain results for the two-level nested specification discussed in Section 4, and columns 3 and 4 contain results for the simple logit specification, which is equivalent to the special case $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 0$. Our primary goal with this table is to establish how these modeling differences, and the use of instrumental variables, affect the estimated coefficients and the implied elasticities.

In all four specifications in Table 6, the coefficients are estimated fairly tightly, and the pricing and nested logit terms have the expected signs and ordering. The specification in column 1 is estimated with the richest set of fixed effects, which include year, CRD, and brand fixed effects, each of which are also interacted with the crop dummy variable (permitting response to differ between corn and soybeans). The year fixed effects control for temporal industry-wide changes, such as changes in output (corn and soybeans) prices, or changes in the prices of non-seed production inputs (e.g., fuel).

The CRD fixed effects control for unobserved, time-invariant regional specific effects, such as the length of the growing season, soil quality, and weed pressure. The brand fixed effects control for unobserved (perceived and real) differences in the returns to each of the various brands. For example, in a given region, Pioneer seeds may be generally regarded by growers as high-yielding, and because of this their prices may be higher. As it concerns fixed effects, the difference between column 1 and columns 2-4 is that the fixed effects in the latter are not interacted with a crop dummy variable.

Column 1 of Table 6 contains the most general specification of this table. The price coefficient is statistically significant and negative, as expected, and the nesting parameters are tightly estimated, with an ordering that is consistent with profit maximization ($0 < \hat{\sigma}_2 < \hat{\sigma}_1 < 1$). Their magnitude indicates strong correlation within nests, suggesting that once producers decide on which crop to plant on a given plot they are unlikely to switch, both to another crop (corn or soybeans), and even less so to something besides corn or soybeans. This finding supports the rationalization of the two-level nested logit specification provided earlier. The remaining estimates presented in column 1 are for the coefficients associated with the GE trait dummy variables. In all cases the estimates are positive indicating that farmers are willing to pay a positive amount for each trait. These coefficients provide the basis for estimating farmers' willingness to pay (WTP) for the innovation of GE traits, which we consider extensively in section 6.

Column 2 in Table 6 includes fewer controls by postulating year, CRD, and brand fixed effects that are not crop-specific. Relative to column 1, the results remain mostly unchanged, however, the subgroup nesting parameter, σ_2 , increases in size and the price coefficient is significantly smaller. This likely reflects the fact that including crop-specific effects controls for crop-specific unobservable differences in products that are correlated with prices. In moving from column 2 to column 3 we move from the two-level nested logit model to the basic logit model. This reduces flexibility in the substitution pattern between seed products (and also means that the coefficients of the price variable are not directly comparable). Finally, column 4 presents results for the simple logit model without instrumental variables for prices. The price coefficient without instruments is substantially smaller (in absolute value) than in column 3. The fact that the price coefficient increases so significantly when going from column 4 to column 3 indicates that prices are indeed endogenous, a finding that is typical of differentiated product markets (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; Trajtenberg, 1989).

Elasticities

To better convey the implications of the different coefficients, Table 6 also reports mean own and cross-price elasticities. Elasticity formulae for our two-level nested logit model are derived based on Bjornerstedt and Verboven (2016). The coefficients of the model in column 1 imply a mean own-price elasticity equal to -7.04 , which is quite elastic. The estimated own-price elasticities get progressively smaller (in absolute value) in columns 2-4, as we include fewer controls and less flexibility in the substitution patterns. For the basic logit model in column 4, the implied mean own-price elasticity is just -0.25 , an inelastic response which is inconsistent with models of profit-maximizing seed firms that sell differentiated products. For the most general model of column 1, the mean cross-price elasticities are 0.48 within a crop (e.g., from a soybean seed product to another soybean seed product) and 0.05 across crops (e.g., from a soybean seed product to a corn seed product). The difference between these mean elasticities underscores the relevance of the assumed nesting structure: growers more readily substitute towards products of the same crop in response to price increases in any given seed product. The estimated cross-price elasticity for the outside good is very small at just 0.02 , or about one-fortieth the magnitude of the mean cross-price elasticity for products of the same crop. This indicates that the aggregate demand for corn and soybean seed products is rather inelastic.

Subadditivity and Time-Varying GE Trait Effects

Table 7 provides results for two additional, more general parameterizations of the nested logit model. The model in column (1) allows for complementarities (or rivalries) among GE traits as inputs. More specifically, there is an additional indicator variable, *Multiple Traits*, that takes a value of one whenever there is more than one GE trait in a seed product.¹² The negative and significant coefficient in Table 7 for *Multiple Traits* indicates sub-additivity in the *value* of products with multiple GE traits. That is, on average farmers are willing to pay a bit less for each of multiple GE traits compared to what they would pay for those traits in isolation. This result is related to, but distinct from that of Shi et al. (2010), who find sub-additivity in the pricing of stacked GE trait varieties. Our result, being rooted in a structural demand model, relates specifically to the value farmers place on GE traits.

¹² We also estimated regressions with stacked variables for all of the possible GE trait combinations: GT-CB, GT-RW, CB-GT, and GT-CB-RW. We use a generic stacked variable for its parsimony and because certain stacks are very seldom observed. Nonetheless, the results are largely unchanged in these alternative formulations.

Column (2) of Table 7 contains the estimates that we use for the welfare analysis. This representation permits the return to the various GE traits to differ across three sub-periods. As noted earlier, this allows for the possibility that the average return to GE traits vary in accordance with the range of germplasm that incorporates them, and it is also consistent with important events that likely affected the return to GE products: the expiration of Monsanto's glyphosate patent in 2000; and, the sharp increase in crop output prices in 2007 as part of the most recent major commodity price boom (Baffes and Hanjotis 2010, Wright 2011). The results in column 2 strongly indicate that the returns to GE varieties were indeed different and increasing over these three sub-periods. Specifically, the coefficient on the Soy GT Trait increased from 0.3075 in 1996-2000 to 0.4681 in 2007-2011, and the coefficient on the Corn GT Trait increased from 0.0251 in 1996-2000 to 0.3100 in 2007-2011. The *Multiple Traits* coefficient also changes over time, becoming more negative in the final sub-period.

6. WELFARE

The development and commercialization of GE crops has represented a major technological innovation for agriculture. The estimated seed demand model presented in the foregoing provides the ideal framework for a novel empirical assessment of the welfare effects of this innovation. To reach robust conclusions, we adopt a two-pronged approach. First, we use the estimated demand model to compute farmers' WTP for GE traits. This willingness to pay a premium for GE traits is equivalent to an upward shift in the demand facing seed companies. Hence, the ability to bundle GE traits with traditional germplasm holds the potential for seed companies to increase prices and boost revenues. Together with observed planted acres and price premia for GE products, estimated WTPs permits a first look at the total surplus created by GE varieties, as well as its distribution between farmers and seed firms. Alternatively, we use the structure of the estimated demand model to estimate the total *net* value of GE traits to farmers (increase in expected profit) by simulating a counterfactual in which GE traits are not available. This simulation requires knowledge of what conventional seed prices would have been in the absence of GE products. To compute such prices, we follow Hausman and Leonard (2002) by using a reduced-form hedonic price equation. By making assumptions on the nature of the unobservables, we estimate counterfactual prices (and counterfactual choice sets) had GE varieties not been introduced. The results of both of these approaches to welfare calculations are presented below.

Farmers' Willingness-to-Pay for GE Traits

The WTP for a given GE trait combination is the maximum amount (\$/acre) that a farmer would be willing to part with in order to have that particular combination added to a seed product line. To calculate farmers' WTP for GE traits, we use the demand estimates from the most general model (column 2 of Table 7). In a typical discrete choice random utility framework (e.g., the logit model), the (marginal) WTP for a particular characteristic is given by the ratio of the estimated coefficient on that characteristic to the estimated coefficient on the price variable (Train 2009). Although our latent return function is cardinal and denominated in dollars per acre (rather than utility), the general procedure remains the same: the WTP for a particular GE trait is the ratio of the coefficient associated with that trait and the estimated price coefficient. As noted earlier, the estimated price coefficient is the reciprocal of the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution. Thus, in dividing by the price coefficient, we are simply removing the scale factor from the trait coefficients. For example, the WTP for the GT trait in soybeans is: β_{SoyGT} / α . For a combination of GE traits, the relevant WTP is recovered by dividing the sum of the associated trait coefficients by the price coefficient. For example, the WTP for the stacked combination GT-CB-RW in corn is $(\beta_{CornGT} + \beta_{CB} + \beta_{RW} + \beta_{Multiple}) / \alpha$.

Table 8 contains WTP estimates for each of the GE-trait combinations in each of the various sub-periods. Because all prices in the analysis are deflated by an input price index normalized to equal 1 in 2011, all estimates are in real terms (2011 dollars). All of the estimates appear reasonable and are in line with what might be expected given knowledge of seed prices and the observed adoption patterns by farmers. The WTP for the GT trait in soybeans was \$16.88 per acre in the first sub-period, rose to \$23.96/acre in the 2001-2006 sub-period, and then rose slightly again to \$25.69/acre in the 2007-2011 sub-period. The WTP for the Corn GT trait also increased over time but followed a different pattern. From 1996-2000, the WTP for GT corn was only \$1.38/acre. It then grew to \$3.57/acre from 2001-2006, and then increased substantially to \$17.01 from 2007-2011. A similar pattern occurred for the other corn GE traits (CB and RW). For the standalone and stacked combinations, the increase in value was greatest from the second to the third sub-period. The increase in the value of the triple-stack GT-CB-RW was particularly large, from \$9.16 in second sub-period to \$35.30 in the last sub-period.

The standard errors reported in Table 8 suggest that, overall, the WTPs for the GT trait in soybeans and for the CB trait in corn are precisely estimated. WTPs for the GT trait in corn are tightly estimated for the last two sub-periods, and the WTPs for RW corn are only precise in the final sub-

period. This is consistent with the adoption patterns illustrated in Table 2: the earlier slower adoption of some corn GE traits translates in larger standard errors.

A common finding among all trait combinations is that their value increased over time, which is consistent with the temporal increase in the observed shares for GE products. One contributing factor has been falling glyphosate prices. Subsequent to the expiration of Monsanto's main glyphosate patent in 2000, the price of glyphosate fell from \$12.42/lb in 2000 to \$4.74/lb in 2011 (note: a standard application is 0.75 lb/acre). Because glyphosate is used more heavily with GT crops, a lower price for this herbicide reduces the farmers' production cost of GT crops relative to non-GT crops, reinforcing their adoption incentive. A second factor is rising output prices in the latter years of our sample. The average price received by farmers for corn, as reported by the USDA, increased from \$2.22/bu in the sub-period 2001-2006 to \$4.35/bu in the final sub-period 2007-2011, while for soybeans the corresponding price change was from \$6.03/bu to \$10.30/bu. Naturally, an increase in the output price increases the value of yield-enhancing inputs. As noted, previous work has shown that IR traits in corn increase yields (Nolan and Santos 2012, Xu et al. 2013), and thus higher output prices increase the relative value of the CB and RW traits. A third factor is learning, which may have played a role earlier on. Although the limited availability and breadth of GE seeds was another factor affecting adoption in the first few years, anecdotally it seems that most producers also had an initial trial run with GE crops before wholly committing to this technology. In other words, our WTP methodology is rooted in producers' perceived value of GE traits, which likely increased as evidence of the efficiency-enhancing properties of GE traits accumulated.

A final element to keep in mind in interpreting the results relates to our approach to product definition. Recall that we define a product as a crop-brand-trait combination, which means that we aggregate over varieties within each combination. Over time, the types and number of these varieties changed within each defined product. As noted earlier, for example, the number of Pioneer corn hybrids offered with the GT trait (across all markets) was 9 in 2003 and 75 in 2011. Thus, the various GE trait coefficients also capture the range of varieties that were offered within a particular product line. The wider the range of seeds offered within a product line, the more diverse the set of needs the line could match. For example, it is likely that the 9 corn GT hybrids offered by Pioneer in 2003 were not as ideally matched to farmer's needs as the 75 corn GT hybrids that the same company offered in 2011, and thus the average 2003 value of the Pioneer GT line across all farmers was correspondingly smaller.

Total Incremental Surplus and Seed Revenues from GE Traits

WTP estimates permit a first look at the welfare benefits that accrued to farmers and seed manufacturers from the introduction of GE traits. Specifically, multiplying the WTP estimates (as reported in Table 8) by the observed planted acres of each GE trait provides a first-order approximation to the total surplus created by the innovation. We can also use the average price premia from Table 3 (deflated by the crop input price index) along with observed planted acres of GE crops to compute an estimate of the seed industry revenues attributable to GE traits. The accuracy of these procedures rests on the assumptions that the number of acres cultivated to corn and soybeans would have been the same had GE traits not been introduced, and that observed conventional seed prices would have been the same absent the GE innovation. The results are reported in Table 9.

Over the entire period 1996-2011, total surplus is estimated at \$30.7 billion (in 2001 dollars)—\$19.4 billion for soybeans and \$11.2 billion for corn. During the same period, we find that the availability of GE traits increased seed industry revenues by \$24.3 billion—\$13.2 billion in corn seeds and \$11.1 billion in soybean seeds. Finally, the values in the last column of Table 9 report the net returns to farmers, imputed as the difference between total surplus and seed industry revenues, associated with the adoption of GE traits. Over the entire period 1996-2011, we find that farmers' net returns were \$6.3 billion higher because of the introduction of GE traits. Overall, these results suggest that seed manufacturers appropriated the larger portion of the surplus created by GE traits.

Imputed net returns to farmers show a clear difference between soybeans and corn. Perhaps surprisingly, the calculations reported in Table 9 suggest that net returns to corn farmers have been negative (a total loss of nearly \$2 billion, most of which occurred in the first two sub-periods of the analysis). To put this result in context, recall that the model's parameterization assumes that (within a given sub-period) all farmers have the same WTP parameters vis-à-vis GE traits. Insofar as the value of GE traits was heterogeneous across farmers, our WTP estimates, which reflect an average value across all farmers, under-represent the value of GE traits to actual adopters. Also, as noted, the WTP estimates for GE corn traits are imprecise in the first two sub-periods, which make the corresponding total surplus estimates less reliable. Moreover, whereas the procedure underlying Table 9 is attractive because it uses observed data and does not make additional assumptions on the structure of the unobservables, a major weakness is that it maintains that prices and quantities would have been the same had GE seeds not been introduced. This is an undesirable assumption for several reasons. First, the introduction of GE seeds resulted in more seed products available to farmers, especially in corn. This increased differentiation meant that farmers could choose seed products that better matched

their growing conditions.¹³ Second, standard considerations suggest that conventional seed prices would have been higher in the absence of GE traits. Similarly, if GE traits were indeed valuable, then total corn and soybean acres would have been lower in the absence of GE traits. Finally, observed average price premia fail to account for spatial price heterogeneity.

These limitations can be addressed by computing counterfactual prices that account for any competitive price effects that GE varieties may have exerted on non-GE products, by using the structure of the estimated demand model to compute counterfactual conventional seed products shares, and by developing counterfactual scenarios that can account for the impact of GE-induced product differentiation on farmers' expected profits and seed industry revenues.

Counterfactual Prices

To address the question of what (conventional) seed prices would have been without the GE technology, a possible approach is to construct a full structural equilibrium model embedding the main drivers of price changes in the industry. With this method the literature generally maintains that firms behave as Bertrand oligopolists with differentiated products, and then simulates counterfactual solutions under alternative assumptions (Nevo 2001, Petrin 2002, Goeree 2008). The upside of this approach is that it makes the assumed economic context fully transparent. Such a structural model presents challenges in our context, however. This is because, although seed firms own their own germplasm, most of them have engaged in extensive licensing (and cross-licensing) arrangements for GE traits. Hence, the standard Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium conditions for differentiated products are not appropriate for this setting. Furthermore, the terms of the GE trait licensing arrangements between firms are not in the public domain (Moss 2010), which makes it problematic to develop a suitable structural representation of the supply side, an undertaking we leave for future research.

To proceed, we use a reduced-form hedonic approach, as in Hausman and Leonard (2002). While this method permits us to avoid specifying an explicit structural equilibrium model, and thus eschew the thorny issue of what to do about GE trait licensing, the validity of this approach rests on

¹³ The proliferation of corn varieties documented in Table 5 reflects the fact that, upon the introduction of GE varieties, the same germplasm was often available to farmers both with and without GE traits. Farmers with plots exposed to higher pest pressure would have a higher propensity to adopt the GE variety, whereas farmers with lower pest pressure may find a better match with the corresponding conventional variety. This effect is arguably more important for IR traits in corn because “insect infestation varies much more widely across locations than does weed infestation” (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006, page 9).

some strong conditions. In general, the reduced-form procedure is valid if GE trait entry were exogenous across markets and time, which would exclude the possibility that entry responds to market demand or cost shocks. This condition is unlikely to hold strictly in any empirical context. Still, our setting and approach display features that make this assumption more tenable. As discussed extensively earlier, the technology of introducing GE traits into commercial germplasm takes several years, it involves stochastic elements, and the complexity of the process requires assets that likely differ across firms, such that “... the duration of the process may differ across organizations.” (Mumm, 2013, p. 8258). Hence, even firms starting on the same footing (which actually they do not, because of the asymmetry between firms that need to in-license GE traits and vertically-integrated firms that out-license such traits) can reach the market at different times.¹⁴ Our conclusion, therefore, is that the entry of GE varieties in a particular market results from decisions taken years in advance, its timing is affected by random outcomes, and it is clearly predetermined relative to firms’ pricing decisions. Furthermore, we include spatial and time fixed effects to control for unobserved differences in demand. Although we cannot entirely rule out correlation of unobservables over time, it seems reasonable to expect that, in our context, this effect (if present) is significantly attenuated.

To begin with, we estimate the following hedonic price equation:

$$p_{jm} = x_{jm}\phi_{t[m]} + \theta_{c[j]}D_{c[j],m} + \zeta_{c[j],t[m]} + \zeta_{c[j],l[m]} + \zeta_{c[j],b[j]} + v_{jm} \quad (11)$$

where $D_{c[j],m}$ are crop-specific post-GE indicator variables that equal to one for any observation in a market for which a GE variety is available (or was available in an earlier year for the CRD pertaining to that market), otherwise this variable is equal to zero. The coefficients on these ‘post-GE’ variables capture, in a reduced-form way, the overall price effects from the introduction of GE innovations. The price effects are identified from the fact that GE varieties were introduced at different times in different regions (i.e., CRDs). Conditional on CRD-specific and time fixed effects, the time of introduction can be assumed exogenous for reasons previously noted. The hedonic price equation in (11) also includes GE trait dummies x_{jm} . The remaining terms in this equation, $\zeta_{c[j],t[m]}$, $\zeta_{c[j],l[m]}$ and $\zeta_{c[j],b[j]}$ are, respectively, crop-year, crop-CRD, and crop-brand fixed effects, and v_{jm} is an idiosyncratic shock.

¹⁴ In the early years of GE commercialization, regional firms (all of whom needed to in-license GE traits) did enter the GE seed market at different times.

Table 10 presents the estimation results for the hedonic price equation. The first row shows the effect of the introduction of the GE varieties on the prices of *all* soybean seed products. We find that the prices of soybean seeds decreased, on average, by \$1.87 when GE products were present. The second row shows the corresponding impact on corn seed prices, which were lower by \$0.38. These are relatively small competitive price effects, suggesting that any substantial welfare effects primarily stem from an increase in the portfolio of choices that the farmers can make, or because of the difference between the prices charged for GE traits and farmers' willingness to pay for them.

The hedonic results also show that GE traits are associated with significantly higher prices, implying that farmers pay considerable premia for GE innovations, as anticipated by the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3. For example, we find that the premium for the Soy GT trait was \$15.46 in the 1996-2000 period; it declined to \$13.83 in 2001-2006, and to \$11.42 in 2007-2011. The corn GT trait, instead, saw the premium increase from \$11.43 in the first sub-period to \$13.22 in the final sub-period. The corn CB and RW traits saw the premium decline over time, but the premium was always greater than \$9 over the sample period. Finally, the *Multiple Trait* stack is associated with a subadditivity effect, with prices being lower when GE traits are stacked (this effect amounted to \$4.52 for the last sub-period, where the triple stack GT-CB-RW was widely adopted). This subadditive effect is consistent with previous findings by Shi, Chavas and Stigert (2010).

In addition to being informative of the price premiums that seed companies were able to charge for transgenic varieties, the estimated hedonic equation permits us to infer the prices that would have materialized had GE traits not been introduced in corn and soybean seed varieties. We do this by turning off the categorical variable that is equal to 1 if there was an innovation, and by turning off the variables associated with the various GE traits. More specifically, using the estimation output from Table 10, the *predicted* prices in the presence of GE traits are given by:

$$\hat{p}_{jm} = x_{jm}\hat{\phi}_{t[m]} + \hat{\theta}_{c[j]}D_{c[j],m} + \hat{\zeta}_{c[j],t[m]} + \hat{\zeta}_{c[j],l[m]} + \hat{\zeta}_{c[j],b[j]} \quad (12)$$

Had transgenic varieties not been introduced, counterfactual predicted prices without GE traits are given by:

$$\tilde{p}_{jm} = \hat{\zeta}_{c[j],t[m]} + \hat{\zeta}_{c[j],l[m]} + \hat{\zeta}_{c[j],b[j]}. \quad (13)$$

GE Seeds and Farmers' Welfare: Structural Approach

In combination with the structural demand model, the counterfactual prices thus constructed provide the basis for assessing the impact of GE product innovations on total surplus and its distribution. Because the demand model is rooted in farmers' expected profit maximization, it is natural to start with assessing farmer's net returns. Computation of farmers' welfare change attributable to the introduction of GE varieties relies on the change in the overall inclusive values, scaled by the price parameter (i.e., the coefficient α). Specifically, in each market m , the change in per-acre surplus (expected profit) due to GE traits is given by:

$$\Omega_m \equiv \frac{(\hat{I}_m - \tilde{I}_m)}{\alpha} \quad (14)$$

where \hat{I}_m is the predicted inclusive value with GE traits and \tilde{I}_m is the predicted inclusive value in a world without GE traits (see equation (9) for the definition of I_m). To obtain the total dollar value of GE traits in market m , we multiply Ω_m by the potential market size (in acres) of market m , and to compute the dollar value of GE traits in the entire sample, we simply add up the dollar values across all markets. As previously noted, the estimates thus obtained are expressed in 2011 dollars.

The primary inputs for equation (14) are the estimated demand parameters ($\alpha, \sigma_1, \sigma_2$) and mean farmers' profits δ_{jm} . Using the predicted hedonic prices with GE traits, and the estimated terms from the seed demand equations, predicted mean profits with GE traits are given by:¹⁵

$$\hat{\delta}_{jm} = x_{jm} \hat{\beta}_{t[m]} - \hat{\alpha} \hat{p}_{jm} + \hat{\xi}_{c[j],t[m]} + \hat{\xi}_{c[j],l[m]} + \hat{\xi}_{c[j],b[j]} + \hat{\xi}_{jm} \quad (15)$$

while predicted mean profits without GE traits are given by:

$$\tilde{\delta}_{jm} = -\hat{\alpha} \tilde{p}_{jm} + \hat{\xi}_{c[j],t[m]} + \hat{\xi}_{c[j],l[m]} + \hat{\xi}_{c[j],b[j]} + \hat{\xi}_{jm} \quad (16)$$

A feature to note about this procedure is that it involves the modification of *characteristics* associated with GE varieties. As previously noted, by the end of the sample GE varieties had not only significantly added to the set of available products, but had also replaced most conventional

¹⁵ Note that the baseline also uses predicted prices (rather than observed prices), just as the counterfactuals.

offerings.¹⁶ In 1996, for example, non-GE varieties comprised 57 out of 66 products; by 2011, they comprised just 38 out of 161 products. If we were to remove GE products entirely from the choice set in 2011 that would leave just 38 products available to growers, a number which likely underestimates what would have been available in the counterfactual. Maintaining such an artificial reduction in non-GE products in the relevant counterfactual has the potential to introduce bias in the estimated welfare gains from GE traits. This is especially problematic in the context of logit models. As noted by Petrin (2002) and Akerberg and Rysman (2005), among others, the postulated underlying structure implies that an additional option mechanically increases (expected) welfare because it provides another draw from the distribution of random shocks.¹⁷

We address this issue by considering results for four different counterfactual scenarios. In the first scenario we simply remove all the GE products from the choice set of the counterfactual scenario, adjust the prices of the remaining conventional products (as per the hedonic price regression), and compute the welfare change of seed users accordingly.¹⁸ As implied by the foregoing discussion, this approach (labeled the “naïve” scenario) is expected to penalize the non-GE counterfactual and thus inflate the estimated welfare effects.

Alternatively, instead of simply removing GE products from the choice set, we modify the characteristics of GE products by removing the GE trait, adjusting the price, and then maintain this “synthetic” product in the counterfactual choice set if it does not duplicate an equivalent non-GE product already present. The presumption is that seed manufacturers would have used the germplasm currently combined with GE traits to commercialize alternative conventional seed products instead. For example, suppose that in a given market there are three seed products: Dekalb-GE-corn, Asgrow-conventional-soybeans, and Pioneer-conventional-corn. If we followed the Naïve approach, removal of GE traits would drop one product from the choice set (the remaining two would be Asgrow-conventional-soybeans and Pioneer-conventional-corn). Instead, with the proposed alternative

¹⁶ The crowding out of old products due to the introduction of new ones is the main concern of Eizenberg’s (2014) study of the impact of innovation in central processing units for US personal computers.

¹⁷ Nevo (2011) provides an extended discussion of this point and notes that the logit model *per se* is actually not the source of biased welfare estimates. Rather, the bias may arise from using the logit model to predict counterfactual shares.

¹⁸ In equation (14), this amounts to an \tilde{I}_m in which the exponential terms for GE products have simply been deleted.

counterfactual we retain three products: the two pre-existing conventional seed products plus the synthetic Dekalb-non-GE-corn. Implementation of this alternative procedure to construct the choice set of the counterfactual requires the resolution of a possible ambiguity. In some markets, after modifying the characteristics of GE products, we can end up with “duplicates” vis-à-vis the definition of products used in this study, the only difference being in the unobservable component $\hat{\xi}_{jm}$.¹⁹ This presents the question of which duplicate product to keep in the counterfactual choice set. To proceed, we consider two versions of this alternative approach. In one case, we keep the duplicate with the largest $\hat{\xi}_{jm}$ (i.e., the largest mean expected profit for farmers). We call this the “keep best” scenario. In the other case, we keep the duplicate that was originally a non-GE variety, a situation that we label the “keep conventional” scenario.²⁰ Finally, we also consider the “keep all” scenario, where it is assumed that all synthetic products obtained from the removal of GE traits in the counterfactual are viable and are therefore kept in the choice set.

Table 11 reports the average number of products, for both corn and soybeans, that pertain to the foregoing four counterfactual scenarios for each of the three sub-periods of the analysis. Comparing the data in Table 11 with the number of products available prior to the advent of GE varieties, it is clear that the naïve and the “keep all” scenarios are not plausible. The naïve scenario is associated with a drastic reduction in the number of products, especially for the last sub-period. This is most apparent for soybeans, a reflection of the almost complete adoption of the GT trait in the latter years of the sample. Conversely, the “keep all” scenario displays an artificially large number of products, especially for corn.²¹ Clearly, neither of these two scenarios are likely to produce credible results. Hence, here we report the counterfactual results only for the other two scenarios, “keep conventional” and “keep best.”²² We note at this juncture that, by picking the seed product with the

¹⁹ For example, in a market where we have both conventional Asgrow soybeans and GT Asgrow soybeans, shutting down the GT traits yields two versions of Asgrow conventional soybean seeds.

²⁰ In cases where there are duplicate synthetic conventional products, but no pre-existing conventional product, we keep the synthetic conventional product with the highest mean return.

²¹ From Table 5, in 1996, at the dawn of the GE era, the average number of conventional seed products per market (i.e., CRD) was 3.9 for soybeans and 6.2 for corn. By contrast, for the last sub-period (2007-2011), the Naïve scenario entails 0.8 seed products per CRD for soybeans and 3.2 seed products for corn. By contrast, the average number of seed products in the “keep all” scenario in the same sub-period was 6.3 for soybeans and 19.9 for corn.

²² We report the full set of results in the Supplementary Information online (Appendix D).

largest $\hat{\xi}_{jm}$, the “keep best” scenario provides a more conservative estimated impact of GE traits on farmers’ expected profit than the “keep conventional” scenario. However, for this very reason, the “keep best” scenario can under-penalize the non-GE counterfactual. Indeed, when the unobserved component for a synthetic non-GE product exceeds that of a (pre-existing) conventional non-GE product, then it is possible for the mean expected return of this synthetic non-GE product to exceed the expected return of *any* seed product that existed when GE products were still available. For this reason, we view the “keep conventional” counterfactual scenario as the most realistic counterfactual.

The first two columns in Table 12 reports the estimated farmer welfare gains for the two scenarios of interest, and across the three sub-periods. For each scenario, we consider three distinct thought experiments: i) a market without GE soybean products; ii) a market without GE corn products; and, iii) a market that excludes GE products in both corn and soybeans. The three exercises are helpful in providing insights into whether GE traits affected the two crops differentially.

The first set of results in Table 12 pertains to the entire period 1996-2011. We find that, under the “keep best” scenario, total farmers’ welfare gain from GE innovations is estimated at about \$14.4 billion. It is interesting to note that three quarters of these gains are attributable to one trait: glyphosate tolerance in soybeans. For the “keep conventional” scenario, the estimated farmers’ welfare gains are larger, \$22.2 billion. The remainder data in the first two columns of Table 12 investigate how the estimated welfare gains changed over time. In addition to the results for the entire 1996-2011 period, in this table we also report results for the 1996-2000, 2001-2006, and 2007-2011 sub-periods. We see clearly that the estimated welfare gains increased over time, reflecting both increased adoption and rising WTP.

GE Traits and Seed Industry Revenue

Using the estimated counterfactual prices, we can also infer the additional revenue that accrued to the seed industry due to the ability to commercialize GE traits. To compute the benchmark seed revenues we compute the market shares, and associated value of all seed sold, by using the fitted prices of equation (12) along with the estimated seed demand model. For the counterfactual scenario of no GE traits, we compute predicted market shares by using the counterfactual prices of equation (13) along with the estimated demand model. We again report results for two scenarios, the “keep best” and “keep conventional.”

The last two columns in Table 12 report the estimated revenues for seed manufacturers attributable to the availability of GE traits. Focusing on the “keep conventional” scenario, we find

that over the entire 1996-2011 period, seed firms' sales were greater by \$25.3 billion, with more than two-thirds of these revenues attributable to the availability of GE corn varieties. Moreover, these revenues from GE traits increased over time, reflecting the increased adoption of GE seed varieties and, possibly, changing equilibrium pricing conditions (which, again, we are not modeling in a structural way). Over the last five years of our sample (2007-2011) we find that GE traits boosted seed industry revenue by a total of \$14.6 billion, or approximately \$2.9 billion per year, with corn contributing significantly more than soybeans to increases in seed industry revenues. This likely reflects the increase in farmers' WTP for corn GE traits (possibly associated with the commodity price boom noted earlier), as well as the increased diffusion of Bt traits in corn varieties (recall Table 2).

Discussion

The two approaches we have used to calculate the value of GE traits are based on different assumptions, as noted earlier. Upon comparing the results in Table 12 with those in Table 9, however, some common themes are apparent. First, the monetary benefits from GE innovations are significant. For the last five years of the period analyzed (2007-2011), when adoption of GE traits was widespread, estimated total surplus was between \$3.73 billion per year (Table 9) and \$5.18 billion per year for the "keep conventional" scenario (Table 12). We also find that seed manufacturers have been able to appropriate the larger share of this surplus, although the structural estimates suggest that it was closer to an even split. Specifically, in the last five years of the sample (2007-2011), the results in Table 9 imply that the seed industry captured 75% of the total surplus, whereas the results in Table 12 imply a fraction of 56% (for the "keep conventional" scenario).

It is also of some interest that results differ across soybean and corn seeds. Although farmers received the majority of their surplus from soybean GE traits, more total surplus has been generated by GE traits in corn, and the seed industry has been able to extract the larger share of total surplus in corn. In the final sub-period (2007-2011), Table 9 implies that 100% of the GE trait surplus created in corn seeds was appropriated by seed manufacturers, whereas in Table 12 this fraction ranges between 74% ("keep best" scenario) and 67% ("keep conventional" scenario).

The estimated seed industry revenue increases due to GE crops, and the estimated increases in farmers' expected profits, both measure *ex post* welfare gains from GE crops. The interpretation is somewhat different, though. For farmers, the figures in Table 12 can be interpreted as net welfare gains: that is, the dollar value of how much better off farmers have been by their ability to purchase GE varieties—notwithstanding the fact that they had to pay a premium for GE seeds. For the seed

industry, on the other hand, increased revenues can be interpreted as *ex post* returns to past investments in R&D activities.²³ Still, comparing the magnitude of gains accruing to farmers and the seed industry we see that the latter has been fairly effective at capturing the value created by GE trait innovations. For example, over the last five years of the sample (2007-2011), for the “keep conventional” scenarios, farmers’ net welfare increased by \$11.3 billion whereas seed industry revenue increased by \$14.6 billion. Thus, during this period, the seed industry appears to have been able to capture approximately 56% of the overall monetary value of GE traits.

7. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we provide an empirical assessment of the value of one of the major innovations affecting U.S. agriculture in the last several decades, the introduction of GE traits in U.S. corn and soybeans. Our approach is based on a two-level nested logit model of seed demand in which farmers choose the most profitable option among corn and soybean seed varieties (and an outside option). This specification is consistent with the important mechanism of corn-soybean rotations and it also partially addresses well-known limitations of using the basic logit model to estimate the welfare impact of new products. The model is estimated using a unique, large dataset on U.S. corn and soybean seed purchases during the 1996-2011 timeframe. Using the demand estimates, we find that farmers are willing to pay a significant premium for GE traits, and the extent of this willingness has increased significantly over time.

We estimate the total surplus created by the introduction of GE traits, and its distribution between farmers and seed manufacturers, with two alternative methods. In the first approach, we recover the total surplus created via the estimated farmers’ WTP for the various GE traits, along with observed plantings of GE varieties. With this approach, based on observed price premia between GE and conventional varieties, we also compute the additional revenues for the seed industry due to GE traits embedded into marketed seed varieties (as well as the implied net residual surplus left for

²³ The implicit assumption, here, is that the marginal production cost to seed firms for GE and non-GE varieties is the same. To put our estimates in context it may be helpful to consider the extent of R&D in this industry. For the five-year period 2007-2011, data reported by Phillips (2014) suggest that the R&D expenditure of the six largest agro-chemical firms, for the seed and GE trait segment, amounted to approximately \$13 billion. As for individual companies, publicly available data for Monsanto are most informative because this company’s R&D is almost exclusively devoted to seeds and traits. Monsanto’s annual disclosures to the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission indicate a total of \$5.45 billion in R&D expenditures for the 2007-2011 period.

farmers). In the second approach, we use the structure of the estimated demand model, along with counterfactual prices obtained from a reduced-form hedonic equation, to infer market conditions that would have prevailed had GE traits not been introduced. Our counterfactual scenarios are adjusted to account for the fact GE crop varieties gradually crowded out conventional varieties. More specifically, rather than simply removing a GE product from farmers' choice sets, we also simulate scenarios in which modified GE products are retained in farmers' counterfactual choice sets. In so doing, we avoid the bias that would result from conflating the removal of the GE technology with an artificial reduction in product diversity.

Our findings suggest that the welfare benefits from GE crops are significant. For the last five years of the period analyzed, when adoption of GE traits had reached maturity, estimated total surplus from the two methods discussed ranged from \$3.73 billion to \$5.18 billion per year. To put matters in context, over this five-year period, total planted acres to corn and soybeans averaged at 162.7 million per year. Hence, the estimated total surplus due to GE traits reported earlier ranged from \$22.9 to \$31.9 per acre of planted crop. We also find that seed manufacturers have been able to appropriate the larger share of this surplus. It is also of some interest that the results differ across soybean and corn seeds. Although farmers received the majority of their surplus from soybean GE traits, more total surplus has been generated by GE traits in corn, and the seed industry has been able to extract the larger share of total surplus in corn. These results are consistent with the observation that intellectual property rights have historically played a stronger role in the corn seed industry. As noted earlier, the commercialization of hybrid varieties, starting in the 1930s, provided the technology to develop improved germplasm as a proprietary asset. Conversely, for soybeans seeds, strong property rights only materialized in the 1990s with the diffusion of contractual clauses based on newly-asserted patent rights (Clancy and Moschini, 2017).

Our work has some important implications for the ongoing debate surrounding GE crops. First, our estimates suggest that, at least up to 2011, farmers still obtained significant net benefits from adopting GE crop varieties, notwithstanding the higher seed prices they paid. It is also notable that seed firms were able to extract the larger share of the *ex post* welfare effects of GE traits. Appropriability of *ex post* returns from innovation is essential to ensure that firms have continuing incentives to invest in R&D. This is particularly important in the modern seed industry, where private R&D funds have vastly exceeded public R&D investments in recent years (Clancy, Fuglie and Heisey 2016). Methodologically, our counterfactual approach to estimating welfare may be applied to settings in which new products tends to crowd out and replace existing products.

Some caveats are also worth noting in closing. Our analysis of the welfare effects of GE crops pertains to their direct economic consequences for farmers and the seed industry. Welfare implications arising from possible external effects, such as unintended environmental effects, are obviously not encompassed by our methodology. Also, our framework does not capture the possible impact of GE trait adoption on crop output prices, which precludes a fuller welfare impact assessment. Finally, a structural representation of the supply side might be preferable to the reduced-form approach used in this paper. This, however, would require a model that accommodates the complex web of GE trait cross-licensing agreements between seed firms, an undertaking that we leave for future studies.

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
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Figure 1. Adoption of GE Corn and Soybeans in the United States, 1996-2016



Note: “*Bt* maize” refers to varieties with at least one IR trait (alone or with the GT trait), and “GT maize” refers to varieties with the GT trait (alone or in combination with other traits). Source: USDA-NASS (2000-2016) and GfK Kynetec data (1996-1999).

Figure 2. Structure of the two-level nested logit model




Table 1. Market shares in the U.S. corn and soybean seed industry (percent), 2000-2015

	2000-03	2004-07	2008-11	2012-15
CORN				
Monsanto	11.2%	21.4%	34.0%	35.4%
DuPont	36.0%	31.3%	31.5%	35.4%
Syngenta	4.7%	10.3%	7.5%	5.7%
Dow AgroSciences	5.2%	3.6%	4.1%	5.7%
AgReliant	2.5%	4.8%	6.0%	6.8%
Local & Regional Companies	40.5%	28.6%	16.9%	11.1%
SOYBEANS				
Monsanto	21.9%	23.4%	28.2%	27.6%
DuPont	19.9%	24.9%	29.3%	33.3%
Syngenta	3.4%	10.4%	10.5%	10.0%
Dow AgroSciences	1.9%	1.6%	1.9%	4.8%
AgReliant	1.1%	1.9%	1.8%	3.1%
Local & Regional Companies	41.8%	36.0%	26.8%	18.6%
Public/Saved Seed	10.0%	1.8%	1.4%	2.7%

Note: The table reports market shares for the seed industry that emerged from the wave of market consolidation that followed the introduction of GE traits. Source: Computed from GfK Kynetec data (2000-2011), and Farm Journal Magazine (2012-2015).

Table 2. Adoption Rates for U.S. Corn and Soybeans, selected years

<i>Year</i>	<i>Soybeans</i>	<i>--- Corn Single Traits ---</i>			<i>----- Corn stacked traits -----</i>			
	<i>GT</i>	<i>GT</i>	<i>CB</i>	<i>RW</i>	<i>GT-CB</i>	<i>GT-RW</i>	<i>CB-RW</i>	<i>GT-CB-RW</i>
1996	2.4%		0.7%					
1999	51.4%	2.5%	20.8%		0.0%			
2002	80.8%	7.2%	24.0%		2.2%			
2005	90.4%	15.8%	23.9%	1.2%	12.9%	1.2%	0.8%	1.0%
2008	95.9%	19.2%	6.4%	0.1%	20.0%	0.8%	2.4%	36.6%
2011	95.4%	19.2%	1.2%	0.0%	16.3%	0.5%	0.5%	53.3%

Note: This Table reports detailed GE trait adoption rates (as percent of total planted acres for the corresponding crop). The Supplementary Information online (Appendix C) reports data for all years in the 1996-2011 period. Source: Computed from GfK Kynetec data.

Table 3. Seed Prices for U.S. Corn and Soybeans, selected years

<i>Year</i>	<i>--- Soybeans ---</i>		<i>Corn</i>	<i>--- Corn Single Traits ---</i>			<i>----- Corn stacked traits -----</i>			
	<i>Non-GE</i>	<i>GT</i>	<i>Non-GE</i>	<i>GT</i>	<i>CB</i>	<i>RW</i>	<i>GT-CB</i>	<i>GT-RW</i>	<i>CB-RW</i>	<i>GT-CB-RW</i>
<i>1996</i>	17.20	21.27	24.60		30.45					
<i>1999</i>	17.45	28.27	27.44	32.15	36.02		33.28			
<i>2002</i>	17.41	26.84	28.63	32.40	36.96		37.36			45.02
<i>2005</i>	21.82	32.88	31.61	36.08	38.74	42.63	41.60	44.70	47.19	49.21
<i>2008</i>	26.21	36.37	41.92	53.73	49.85	60.69	58.39	61.99	62.27	69.26
<i>2011</i>	40.62	49.70	53.86	68.69	67.42	66.21	75.09	86.25	70.72	91.32

Note: this table reports data on average nominal seed prices paid by farmers (\$/acre). The Supplementary Information online (Appendix C) reports data for all years in the 1996-2011 period. Source: Computed from GfK Kynetec data.

Table 4. Top Brands in Corn and Soybeans, 1996-2011

Brand	Parent Company ^(a)	Corn		Soybeans	
		Share ^(b)	Price ^(c)	Share ^(b)	Price ^(c)
Agrigold	Agreliant	1.88%	48.35	--	--
LG Seeds	Agreliant	1.00%	46.50	0.76%	32.74
Beck's Hybrids	Beck's Hybrids	1.07%	46.83	1.38%	36.95
Croplan	Croplan Genetics	1.66%	47.09	2.59%	33.74
Mycogen	Dow Agrosciences	3.55%	38.32	1.75%	28.13
Pioneer	DuPont	33.76%	43.21	23.86%	32.98
Asgrow	Monsanto	1.88%	34.57	16.74%	33.32
Dekalb	Monsanto	14.89%	57.18	4.75%	27.93
Fielder's Choice	Monsanto	1.68%	31.63	0.17%	44.57
Kruger	Monsanto	0.49%	51.77	1.49%	28.64
Public	Public / Universities	--		2.16%	15.32
Stine	Stine Seed	0.37%	42.49	2.92%	29.17
Garst	Syngenta	3.80%	37.68	2.12%	27.60
Golden Harvest	Syngenta	3.30%	39.01	1.85%	26.36
NK Seeds	Syngenta	4.62%	37.88	6.94%	34.90

Notes. ^(a) Parent company as of 2011. ^(b) Average share over the period considered (crop-specific percent of acres grown). ^(c) Average price (\$/acre) over the entire period. Source: Computed from GfK Kynetec data.

Table 5. Average Number of Seed Products in a CRD, selected years

Year	Total	Corn	Soybean	Corn with GE traits	Soybeans with GE traits
1996	10.8	6.5	4.3	0.3	0.4
1999	16.8	9.3	7.5	3.0	4.0
2002	18.0	11.1	6.9	5.3	4.9
2005	23.3	16.6	6.8	11.6	5.4
2008	27.9	21.7	6.2	18.1	5.6
2011	22.9	16.7	6.2	14.6	5.4

Note: A “seed product” is a unique combination of four types of characteristics—see Section 3 for more details. The number of seed products in 1996 provide a good approximation on the number of products per market prior to the introduction of GE traits. The Supplementary Information online (Appendix C) reports data for all years in the 1996-2011 period. Source: Computed from GfK Kynetec data.

Table 6. Estimated parameters of seed demand models

	Nested Logit		Basic Logit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Price	-0.0212 (0.0020)	-0.0155 (0.0012)	-0.0504 (0.0028)	-0.0049 (0.0005)
σ_1	0.8493 (0.0083)	0.8123 (0.0084)		
σ_2	0.3978 (0.0558)	0.6207 (0.0184)		
Soy GT Trait	0.4070 (0.0319)	0.3572 (0.0213)	1.4309 (0.0431)	0.8182 (0.0214)
Corn GT Trait	0.1962 (0.0204)	0.1296 (0.0132)	0.3410 (0.0328)	-0.1380 (0.0149)
Corn RW Trait	0.2053 (0.0219)	0.1515 (0.0150)	0.5177 (0.0357)	0.0229 (0.0189)
Corn CB Trait	0.1642 (0.0172)	0.1124 (0.0112)	0.2770 (0.0279)	-0.1179 (0.0140)
Soy Dummy		-0.2395 (0.0200)	-0.6811 (0.0447)	-0.0294 (0.0206)
Elasticities:				
Own	-6.990	-4.133	-2.637	-0.254
Cross: Within Crop	0.481	0.244	0.045	0.004
Cross: Across Crop	0.053	0.075	0.045	0.004
Cross: Outside Good	0.019	0.014	0.045	0.004
IVs?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Fixed Effects	Crop×Year, Crop×Brand, Crop×CRD	Year, CRD, Brand	Year, CRD, Brand	Year, CRD, Brand

Note: This table presents the estimation results for four different specifications of the seed demand model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. $N=79,260$.

Table 7. Nested Logit Model: Subadditivity and Time Variation of Trait Effects.

	(1)		(2)	
Price	-0.0182	(0.0023)	-0.0182	(0.0023)
σ_1	0.8642	(0.0079)	0.8176	(0.0096)
σ_2	0.4428	(0.0541)	0.3718	(0.0567)
Soy GT Trait	0.3549	(0.0341)		
Corn GT Trait	0.1925	(0.0278)		
Corn RW Trait	0.2062	(0.0306)		
Corn CB Trait	0.1693	(0.0250)		
Multiple Traits	-0.0687	(0.0172)		
Soy GT Trait, 1996-2000			0.3075	(0.0383)
Soy GT Trait, 2001-2006			0.4366	(0.0373)
Soy GT Trait, 2007-2011			0.4681	(0.0368)
Corn GT Trait, 1996-2000			0.0251	(0.0387)
Corn GT Trait, 2001-2006			0.0651	(0.0264)
Corn GT Trait, 2007-2011			0.3100	(0.0328)
Corn CB Trait, 1996-2000			0.0952	(0.0340)
Corn CB Trait, 2001-2006			0.1036	(0.0262)
Corn CB Trait, 2007-2011			0.2276	(0.0260)
Corn RW Trait, 2001-2006			0.0169	(0.0402)
Corn RW Trait, 2007-2011			0.2417	(0.0293)
Multiple Traits, 1996-2000			-0.0314	(0.0944)
Multiple Traits, 2001-2006			-0.0187	(0.0220)
Multiple Traits, 2007-2011			-0.1360	(0.0202)

Note: This table presents the estimation results for two different specifications of the seed demand model. Both models include the same fixed effects as model (1) in Table 6, as well as IVs. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. $N=79,260$.

Table 8. Willingness-to-Pay for GE Products (2011 \$/acre)

Trait(s)	1996-2000	2001-2006	2007-2011
Soy GT	16.88 (0.76)	23.96 (1.58)	25.69 (2.23)
Corn GT	1.38 (2.01)	3.57 (1.06)	17.01 (0.75)
Corn CB	5.22 (1.33)	5.69 (0.84)	12.49 (0.81)
Corn RW		0.93 (2.11)	13.26 (0.66)
Corn GT-CB	4.88 (5.1)	8.23 (1.13)	22.04 (0.82)
Corn GT-RW		3.47 (2.34)	22.81 (0.77)
Corn CB-RW		5.58 (2.11)	18.29 (0.56)
Corn GT-CB-RW		9.16 (2.97)	35.30 (0.99)

Note: This table contains WTP estimates for each of the GE-trait combinations, in each of the three sub-periods. These estimates are based on the most general estimated model (Column 2 of Table 7). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 9. Total Surplus and its Imputed Distribution from GE Innovation (\$ million)

Period	Crop	Total Surplus	Firm Revenues	Imputed Farmers' Net Returns
1996-2011	Soybeans	19,424	11,132	8,292
	Corn	11,233	13,206	-1,973
	Total	30,657	24,338	6,319
1996-2000	Soybeans	1,906	1,940	-34
	Corn	265	792	-527
	Total	2,171	2,733	-562
2001-2006	Soybeans	8,731	5,086	3,645
	Corn	1,122	2,531	-1,409
	Total	9,853	7,617	2,236
2007-2011	Soybeans	8,787	4,105	4,682
	Corn	9,846	9,883	-37
	Total	18,633	13,989	4,644

Note: Total surplus figures in column 3 of this table are obtained by multiplying the WTP estimates (as reported in Table 8) by the observed planted acres of each GE variety. The estimated seed industry revenues attributable to GE traits in column 4 are obtained by multiplying the average price premia (as reported in Table 3 for selected years, but deflated by the crop sector input price index used in estimation) with observed planted acres of GE crops. Imputed net returns to farmers due to GE traits, reported in the last column, are the difference between columns 3 and 4.

Table 10. Hedonic Prices

	Parameter	Standard Error
Soybean Post GE	-1.8746	(0.5311)
Corn Post GE	-0.3758	(0.3045)
Soybean GT Trait, 1996-2000	15.4602	(0.2401)
Soybean GT Trait, 2001-2006	13.8320	(0.2407)
Soybean GT Trait, 2007-2011	11.4231	(0.3637)
Corn GT Trait, 1996-2000	11.4280	(0.4607)
Corn GT Trait, 2001-2006	10.2175	(0.1904)
Corn GT Trait, 2007-2011	13.2164	(0.1794)
Corn Borer Trait, 1996-2000	12.9370	(0.2592)
Corn Borer Trait, 2001-2006	10.3001	(0.1785)
Corn Borer Trait, 2007-2011	9.5263	(0.2287)
Root Worm Trait, 2001-2006	15.0945	(0.2961)
Root Worm Trait, 2007-2011	11.5234	(0.1978)
Multiple Traits Stack, 96-00	-7.5542	(1.6407)
Multiple Traits Stack, 01-06	-5.9043	(0.2988)
Multiple Traits Stack, 07-11	-4.5185	(0.2994)
<i>N</i>	79,260	
<i>R</i> ²	0.686	

Note: The first row shows the effect of the introduction of the GE varieties on the prices of all soybean seed products. The second row shows the corresponding impact on corn seed prices. The model was estimated with crop-year, crop-brand, and crop-CRD fixed effects, which are not reported here.

Table 11. Average number of seed products per CRD, counterfactual scenarios

	Keep All		Keep Best and Keep Conventional		Naïve	
	Corn	Soybeans	Corn	Soybeans	Corn	Soybeans
1996-2000	8.28	6.45	6.42	4.67	6.21	3.72
2001-2006	14.14	6.76	6.86	5.42	5.59	1.66
2007-2011	19.95	6.25	7.64	5.65	3.19	0.78

Note: This table reports the average number of products, for both corn and soybeans, under four counterfactual scenarios. See the text for a description of each scenario.

Table 12. Farmers' Welfare Gains and Seed Industry Revenues from GE Traits (2011 \$ million)

Period		Farmers' Welfare		Seed Industry Revenues	
		Keep Best	Keep Conventional	Keep Best	Keep Conventional
1996-2011	Soy GE traits	10,019	12,137	7,406	7,211
	Corn GE traits	3,820	8,704	13,244	15,259
	All GE traits	14,385	22,199	22,550	25,262
1996-2000	Soy GE traits	1,062	1,796	1,319	1,355
	Corn GE traits	1	764	668	1,009
	All GE traits	1,063	2,625	2,019	2,493
2001-2006	Soy GE traits	4,318	5,321	4,043	3,938
	Corn GE traits	307	2,539	2,581	3,515
	All GE traits	4,674	8,251	6,940	8,177
2007-2011	Soy GE traits	4,640	5,020	2,044	1,917
	Corn GE traits	3,512	5,402	9,995	10,734
	All GE traits	8,648	11,323	13,591	14,592

Note: See the text for a description of “Keep Best” and “Keep Conventional” scenarios. The Supplementary Information online (Appendix D) reports a fuller set of results, including the two counterfactual choice sets omitted here (“Naïve” and “Keep All”), as well as the estimated counterfactual Ω_m terms (\$ per acre of total cropland) used in the calculations.