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## **LEARNING FROM NOISE: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA'S IPO LOTTERIES**

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**FINANCIAL ECONOMICS**



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## Abstract

We study a natural experiment in which 1.5 million investors participate in allocation lotteries for Indian IPO stocks. Randomized IPO gains cause winning investors to increase applications to future IPOs and substantially increase portfolio trading volume in non-IPO stocks relative to lottery losers; the effects are symmetrically negative for experienced losses. Investors who have received multiple past IPO allocations show smaller responses, suggesting learning/selection moderates responses to noise shocks. The evidence is most consistent with investors learning about their own ability from experienced noise, drawing inferences about their skill from luck.

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# Learning from Noise: Evidence from India's IPO Lotteries\*

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October 22, 2018

## Abstract

We study a natural experiment in which 1.5 million investors participate in allocation lotteries for Indian IPO stocks. Randomized IPO gains cause winning investors to increase applications to future IPOs and substantially increase portfolio trading volume in non-IPO stocks relative to lottery losers; the effects are symmetrically negative for experienced losses. Investors who have received multiple past IPO allocations show smaller responses, suggesting learning/selection moderates responses to noise shocks. The evidence is most consistent with investors learning about their own ability from experienced noise, drawing inferences about their skill from luck.

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# 1 Introduction

Substantial evidence shows that economic agents learn from experience. These findings form a core rationale for economists' use of the rational utility maximizing agent model as a benchmark even in complicated and dynamic decision environments. The workhorse economic model of learning assumes that agents learn optimally via Bayes' rule, carefully distinguishing signals from noise in past experiences. Nonetheless, accumulating evidence suggests that agents learn differently from this characterization: in a wide variety of economic decision making contexts, agents seem to be influenced by both the signal and noise components of their past experiences (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer, 2015; Kuchler and Zafar, 2015; Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel, 2010; Malmendier and Nagel, 2015).

What drives learning from noise? One theory is that noise affects decision-making because humans (and other species) practice reinforcement learning; i.e., they pursue actions that have been rewarding in the past without distinguishing whether those experiences reflect signal or noise. In economics, laboratory experiments have shown that simple reinforcement learning models (Roth and Erev, 1995; Camerer and Ho, 1999) can go a long way towards explaining laboratory subject behavior. For example, Charness and Levin (2005) find, using a carefully designed lab experiment, that subjects respond to a noise shock even when Bayesian updating would predict alternative actions. A second (related) possibility is that humans incorrectly update their beliefs in line with previously experienced noise, either along the basis of cohort specific experiences as in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) or more generally, by extrapolating from recent data as in Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015). A third possibility is that agents draw more introspective inferences from random experiences, believing that chance outcomes are informative about their own ability. A large literature in the psychology of attribution (e.g., Haggag, Pope, Bryant-Lees, and Bos, 2018; Kelley, 1973; Bem, 1965; Fitch, 1970; Blaine and Crocker, 1993) and the psychology of gambling (e.g., Gilovich, 1983; Gilovich and Douglas, 1986) explores related ideas. A fourth possibility is that noise attracts and focuses agents' attention, which then creates a link between noise and subsequent outcomes (Gabaix, 2017; Barber and Odean, 2008).

In this paper, we present evidence on how randomly experienced noise affects behavior in a field setting with experienced participants, and explore which of these theoretical mechanisms is

best able to explain the observed responses to noise. We begin by introducing a new research design to estimate the causal relationship between experienced noise and future behavior, exploiting the fact that (owing to excess demand) shares in initial public offerings (IPOs) are often allocated to retail investors using randomized lotteries. By comparing allocated versus non-allocated investors, we can identify the causal effect of the random shock of experiencing gains or losses on their future behavior in the market.

We apply this research design to India<sup>1</sup>, where we have data from 54 different IPOs in which 1.5 million retail investor accounts experienced randomized allocation in lotteries between 2007 and 2012. For all 469,288 treatment and 1,093,422 control accounts, we are able to track the details of investment in their equity portfolios on a monthly basis both prior to and following treatment.<sup>2</sup> We first test whether investors that are randomly allotted shares are more likely to apply for future IPOs. Similar to previous non-experimental results (see Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008; Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman, 2011) we find that investors who are randomly allotted IPO shares that rise in value are significantly more likely to apply for future IPOs, whereas those that are randomly allotted IPOs that fall in value are less likely to do so. This evidence suggests the importance of noise in changing behavior, but does not help in distinguishing between the theoretical mechanisms discussed above.

We next test whether investors' randomized IPO return experiences cause substantially different trading decisions in their *non-IPO* portfolios. We find that the exogenous shock of receiving a gain in an IPO security strongly increases treated investors' propensity to trade stocks, causing substantial increases in their trading volume. In particular, winning a positive return IPO lottery makes the investor far more likely to buy *and* sell stocks. Symmetrically, a loss in the IPO security decreases investors' propensity to trade, as well as the intensity of their stock trading.<sup>3</sup> The magnitudes are

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<sup>1</sup>Regarding external validity, in Appendix Figure A.4. we show that the distribution of account values and trading experience of our IPO lottery applicants are similar to these distributions in the full sample of Indian investors, and also similar to individual investors in the United States (suitably adjusted for GDP per capita differences).

<sup>2</sup>While our specific data and analysis focus on India, we also note that this research design could be applied to many countries that use lottery systems to allocate IPO shares, including Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Germany, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sweden, and Taiwan. In addition, several brokerages, such as TD Ameritrade, E-Trade and Fidelity in the United States, allocate shares to individual investors using random assignment or cut-off rules in trading activity or portfolio values; our methodology could also be applied to data from such individual brokerages.

<sup>3</sup>All these results are estimated removing the direct allocation of the IPO stock that treatment accounts have because they were "winners" of the lottery.

large – the average experienced gain is a 3.5% increase in the investor’s portfolio, which results in an average increase of 7.2% in trading volume over the subsequent six months relative to the control group. The exogenous shock of receiving a gain in an IPO security also causes treated investors to tilt their portfolios towards the industry sector of the randomly allocated IPO security. For example, when investors randomly experience a gain from an IPO of a tech sector firm, they increase their portfolio allocation (over and above the IPO allocation) to the tech sector. Symmetrically, a loss in the IPO security decreases investors’ allocation to the sector of the IPO.

We are careful to rule out the possibility that wealth effects or rebalancing<sup>4</sup> are the main driver of our results. First, the value of the gain IPO winners get (US\$ 62 on average) is small relative to the fact that investors must put US\$ 1,750 in an escrow account to participate in the IPO in the first place. This fact makes it unlikely that winning the IPO lottery is somehow relieving a wealth constraint that causes a change in behavior across lottery winners and losers. Second, while the effects of experience appear to be stronger for smaller accounts, we find that even for investors with average portfolio sizes in excess of US \$10,000, the same small gains in IPO lotteries continue to produce economically and statistically significant effects. These results also suggest that randomly experienced noise exerts a powerful influence on investor behavior, even on sophisticated investors.<sup>5</sup>

Which existing models of learning from noise are best able to rationalize our results? We consider a number of different possibilities. To begin with, we consider reinforcement learning, the use of naïve win-stay-lose-shift type heuristics, and simple extrapolative beliefs. These models can explain the tendency of IPO lottery winners experiencing gains to apply more to future IPOs, but have a hard time explaining why winners would choose to both buy and sell more actively in the market.

We also consider whether agents create a separate “mental account” for their winnings (see, for e.g., Thaler (1985) and Barberis and Huang (2001)), and increase their trading volume accordingly,

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<sup>4</sup>For example, it is difficult to explain how rebalancing would predict trading volume decreases in response to a loss in the randomly allocated IPO stock, as we find. If our results were simply explained by investors rebalancing towards optimal portfolios, losses experienced on IPOs with initial negative returns should also increase trading volume as simple predictions on rebalancing are symmetric across loss and gain domains. Moreover, the magnitude of the trading volume increases appear an order of magnitude larger than the size of the gain or loss in the IPO stock, meaning that rebalancing cannot explain the size of the effects that we detect.

<sup>5</sup>Wealth is generally considered to be highly correlated with sophistication in work on household finance (see, for example, Campbell, 2006).

in a manner reminiscent of the “house money” effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). In our setting, all agents participating in a specific IPO lottery receive the *same* gains, as the lottery for each IPO is for the minimum lot size. Yet, we find widely differing responses to the initial shock across agents, in a manner that is not strictly proportional to the size of the gains as a percentage of their portfolios. Moreover, we find similar trading volume responses for agents that more often realize their paper gains and for those who do not realize these gains. Given the quickly dissipating performance of IPOs, and the persistence of the trading volume responses over time that we detect, any mental accounting explanation would have to be quite contorted to fully explain our results.

We then consider the possibility that agents may be attempting to learn the parameters of the underlying distribution (see, for example, Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016); Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard, and Tallon (2018)), but misinterpret the noise shock as an informative signal about returns. However, we find that a simple model in which the agent updates their expectations of the mean and variance of returns according to Bayes’ rule in response to the noise shock is unable to explain our results. For example, this model predicts that investors winning positive return lotteries should increase their overall allocation to market, which is contrary to our empirical findings. Moreover, this model is unable to explain why treated agents’ trading volume increases.

Another possibility is that agents are learning about their own ability to operate in the market environment,<sup>6</sup> and misinterpret experienced noise as useful information about their own skill.<sup>7</sup> We find that a model in which agents learn from noise in this manner is able to rationalize our results, especially on trading volume, because perceived updates to the agent’s signal precision imply that future signals are seen as more informative. This in turn predicts that the agent randomly

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<sup>6</sup>Related work on individual investors has carefully studied learning about ability over time (Gervais and Odean (2001); Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010); Linnainmaa (2011)). The literature has focused both on rational learning about ability, as well as biases in such rational learning which lead to overconfidence. The analysis in this paper is complementary, because by construction, differences in outcomes across treatment and control solely arise from responses to noise rather than informative signals.

<sup>7</sup>The fact that IPO lottery players choose which IPO lotteries to participate in makes this potential explanation plausible, as Langer (1975) and Langer and Roth (1975) present lab experimental evidence that infusing a gambling context with some element of choice increases the subjects tendency to interpret random outcomes as reflective of their own choices (the “illusion of control.”) In the financial market context, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) propose a theory where investors’ confidence increases more in response to positive outcomes versus negative outcomes, and argue this theory can explain short-run momentum and earnings drift, among other market anomalies.

experiencing gains will be more likely to react to future incoming signals, trading more in response to their arrival.<sup>8</sup>

We also consider a model in which experienced noise increases the agent's attentiveness; this also has the potential to explain our results. This explanation does face some challenges – we find that investors who win the lottery and are allocated IPOs which deliver losses *reduce* their trading volume, suggesting that this explanation would require agents randomly experiencing losses to *reduce* the level of attention that they pay to stocks. We also note that we find large trading volume effects even amongst sub-samples of highly active traders. The additional attention impacts of winning the lottery for these active traders are plausibly small, suggesting that while we cannot completely distinguish between the ability and attention models, attention is not the only driver of the results.

Finally, we explore how investors' responses to random shocks vary with the extent of their prior participation in the IPO market. The fundamental difference between our setting and prior work on investor learning is that, because the experiences we study are randomized, there is no reason that they should cause the lottery winners in our setting to update their beliefs. The deeper question is whether investors can “learn” by experiencing these shocks multiple times that there is, in fact, nothing to learn from such random shocks.

Even without any deep introspection on the part of investors, any additional shock for such experienced investors may have smaller effects as they become jaded. Of course, another possibility is that investors might just *select* into having more IPO experiences, and the factors determining such selection could be correlated with their responsiveness. For example, investors with a better understanding of how the lottery works might choose to experience more IPOs, and also respond less to the shock of winning the lottery.

Rather than distinguishing these two mechanisms, i.e., learning and selection, we simply focus on the the relationship between the level of past experience and the response to the random shock. We find a clear negative relationship – investors with four or more past IPO experiences no longer respond to their next random IPO lottery win by increasing their future probability of applying to

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<sup>8</sup>We also explore the extent to which these results vary with the distribution of all returns that the agent has experienced prior to the shock (a simple way to measure the agent's priors), and find additional evidence to support the predictions of this model.

IPOs. There is a similar linear decline in the response of trading volume to winning subsequent IPO lotteries, though the effect does not die off to zero even after four or more IPO experiences. Whether the result is causal or a result of selection, we find a striking attenuation in the response to the random shock of winning the lottery with the level of past experience.

Past experience in the IPO market could simply proxy for sophistication. This might be measured by time spent in the market as a whole (i.e., “age” in the market), levels of trading activity, or portfolio size. When we re-estimate the effect sizes accounting for this possibility, we find that reductions in the response of investors occur primarily within, rather than across, age, portfolio size, or trading intensity group bins, along the dimension of the number of past IPO experiences. Put differently, the attenuation in the effect of winning the lottery occurs with past experiences in the IPO domain rather than with the other measures of sophistication. These patterns are interesting in light of prior work on the relationship between experience and market anomalies (as in List, 2011, 2003, 2004), and suggest that theories of learning in market settings might profitably focus on the number of times a particular action is performed, rather than on the role of time or changes in broader measures of sophistication.

The next section describes the natural experiment that we study, describing the details of the Indian IPO lottery process. Section (3) describes the data that we employ, Section (4) describes how we estimate treatment effects on investment behavior using these lotteries, Section (5) describes the results, Section (6) presents and discusses theoretical explanations, Section (7) explores the heterogeneity of our estimated treatment effects, and finally, Section (8) concludes.

## **2 The Experiment: India’s IPO Lotteries**

Our identification strategy is to analyze investor responses to randomly experienced returns using a natural experiment, namely, the Indian retail investor IPO lottery. This lottery arises in situations in which an IPO is oversubscribed, and the use of a proportional allocation rule to allocate shares would violate the minimum lot size set by the firm. In such cases, regulation mandates that a lottery is run to give investors their proportional allocation *in expectation*. The outcome of the lottery is that some investors receive the minimum lot size of shares (this is the treatment group) and others receive no shares (the control group).

Indian IPO regulations require that a firm must set aside 30% or 35% of its shares (depending

on the type of issue) to be available for allocation to retail investors at the time of IPO. For the purposes of the regulation, “retail investors” are defined as those with expressed share demands beneath a pre-set value.<sup>9</sup> At the end of the sample period that we consider, this pre-set value was set by the regulator at Rs. 200,000 (roughly US \$3,400); this value has varied over time.<sup>10</sup>

The share allocation process in an Indian IPO begins with the lead investment bank, which sets an indicative range of prices. The upper bound of this range (the “ceiling price”) cannot be more than 20% higher than the lower bound (or “floor price”). Importantly, a minimum number of shares (the “minimum lot size”) that can be purchased at IPO is also determined at this time. All IPO bids (and ultimately, share allocations) are constrained to be integer multiples of this minimum lot size.

Retail investors can submit two types of bids for IPO shares. The simplest type of bid is a “cutoff” bid, where the retail investor commits to purchasing a stated multiple of the minimum lot size at the final issue price that the firm chooses within the price band. To submit a cutoff bid, the retail investor must deposit an amount into an escrow account, which is equal to the ceiling of the price band multiplied by the desired number of shares. If the investor is allotted shares, and the final issue price is less than the ceiling price, the difference between the deposited and required amounts is refunded to the investor. In our sample 93% of IPO applicants elect to submit cut-off bids.

Alternatively, retail investors have the option to submit a “full demand schedule,” i.e., the number of lots that they would like to purchase at each possible price within the indicative range. As in the case of the cutoff bid, the investor once again deposits the maximum monetary amount consistent with their demand schedule at the time of submitting their bid. If the bid is successful and the investor is allotted shares, the order will be filled at the investor’s stated share demand

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<sup>9</sup>In practice, each brokerage account is counted as an individual retail investor for the purposes of the regulation, meaning that a single investor could in practice exceed this threshold by subscribing using multiple different brokerage accounts. However, this is not a concern for us as we can identify any such behavior in our data. This is because our data are aggregated across all brokerage accounts associated with the anonymized tax identification number of the investor.

<sup>10</sup>The Indian regulator, SEBI, introduced the definition of a retail investor on August 14, 2003 and capped the amount that retail investors could invest at Rs. 50,000 per brokerage account per IPO. This limit was increased to Rs. 100,000 on March 29, 2005, and once again increased to Rs. 200,000 on November 12, 2010. This regulatory definition technically permits institutions to be classified as retail when investing amounts smaller than the limit, but over our sample period, we verify using independent account classifications from the depositories that this hardly ever occurs, and accounts for a tiny proportion of retail investment in IPOs. We simply remove these aberrations from our analysis.

associated with the final issue price, and a refund is processed for the difference between the final price and the amount placed in escrow – 7% of our sample submits full demand schedules.

Once all bids have been submitted, the firm and investors jointly determine the level of retail (and total) investor oversubscription. The two inputs to this are total retail demand, and the firm’s total supply of shares to retail investors, including any excess supply from other categories (for example, if employees and/or non-institutional investors participate in amounts less than they are offered, this can “overflow” into additional retail supply).<sup>11</sup>

To be more precise, retail oversubscription is defined as the ratio of total retail demand for a firm’s shares to total supply of shares by the firm to retail investors, i.e., the total number of shares made available by the firm for retail investors to purchase. There are then three possible cases:

1. Retail oversubscription is less than or equal to one. In this case, all retail investors are allotted shares according to their demand schedules.
2. Retail oversubscription is greater than one, and shares can be allocated to investors *in proportion to their stated demands without any violation of the minimum lot size constraint*. There is no lottery involved in this case.
3. Retail oversubscription is *far* greater than one (the issue is substantially oversubscribed), and a number of investors under a proportional allocation scheme would receive an allocation which is lower than the minimum lot size. This constraint cannot be violated by law, and therefore, all such investors are entered into a lottery. In this lottery, the probability of receiving the minimum lot size is proportional to the number of shares in the original bid.

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<sup>11</sup>Of course, total firm supply is restricted by the overall number of shares that the firm decides to issue, which is fixed prior to the commencement of the application process for the IPO.

This third case, in which the lottery takes place, constitutes the natural experiment that we study. Far from being an unusual occurrence, in our sample alone (which does not even cover all IPOs in the Indian market over the sample period), roughly 1.5 million Indian investors participate in such lotteries over the 2007 to 2012 period in the set of 54 IPOs in our sample. Note that the minimum allocation (minimum lot size times issue price), along with the listing return, i.e., the difference between the price at listing and the issue price, together determine the experimental stakes. The minimum allocation of shares is the base on which gains and losses for the treatment group are accrued, relative to the control group. A more formal description of the process can be found in subsections A.2, A.3, and A.4 of the online appendix to Anagol, Balasubramaniam, and Ramadorai (2018). We illustrate the process with a specific example from an Indian IPO in Appendix Section 1.

### 3 Data

To understand the causal effects of randomly experienced returns on investment behavior in this setting, we require two major sources of data. First, we need data on the full set of investors who applied for each IPO, i.e., both successful and unsuccessful applicants. These data are used to define our treatment and control groups. Second, we require investor-level data on portfolio allocations and trades to measure how investing behavior changes in response to the treatment, i.e., the noisy return shock in the IPO lottery.

**Data on IPO Applications:** When an individual investor applies to receive shares in an Indian IPO their application is routed through a registrar. In the event of heavy oversubscription leading to a randomized allotment of shares, the registrar will, in consultation with one of the stock exchanges, perform the randomization to determine which investors are allocated. We obtain data on the full set of applicants to 54 Indian IPOs over the period from 2007 to 2012 from one of India's largest share registrars. This registrar handled the largest number of IPOs by any one firm in India since 2006, covering roughly a quarter of all IPOs between 2002 and 2012, and roughly a third of all IPOs over our sample period.

For each IPO in our sample, we observe whether or not the applicant was allocated shares, the share category  $c$  in which they applied, the geographic location of the applicant by pin-code,<sup>12</sup> the

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<sup>12</sup>PIN codes in India are postal codes managed and administered by the Indian Postal Service department of the Government of India. They are similar to zipcodes in the US, or postcodes in the UK, although they cover a larger

type of bid placed by the applicant (cutoff bid or full demand schedule), the share depository in which the applicant has an account (more on this below), whether the applicant was an employee of the firm, and other application characteristics such as whether the application was supported by a blocked amount at a bank.<sup>13</sup>

**Data on IPO Applicants' Equity Portfolios:** Our second major data source allows us to characterize the equity investing behavior of these IPO applicants. We obtain these data from a broader sample of information on investor equity portfolios from Central Depository Services Limited (CDSL). Alongside the other major depository, National Securities Depositories Limited (NSDL), CDSL facilitates the regulatory requirement that settlement of all listed shares traded in the stock market must occur in electronic form. CDSL has a significant market share – in terms of total assets tracked, roughly 20%, and in terms of the number of accounts, roughly 40%, with the remainder in NSDL. While we do also have access to the NSDL data (these data are used extensively and carefully described in Campbell et al., 2014), we are only able to link the CDSL data with the IPO allocation information, as we describe below.

The sensitive nature of these data mean that there are certain limitations on the demographic information provided to us. While we are able to identify monthly stock holdings and transactions records at the account level in all equity securities in CDSL, we have sparse demographic information on the account holders. The information we do have includes the pincode in which the investor is located, as well as the investor type. The investor type variable classifies accounts as beneficial owners, domestic financial institutions, domestic non-financial institutions, foreign institutions, foreign nationals, government, and retail accounts. This paper studies only the category of retail accounts, as the IPO lottery only applies to this group of investors.

As described in Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish (2014), the share of direct household equity ownership in India in total equity investment is very large (roughly 80%-95%) relative to the share of indirect equity holdings using mutual funds, unit trusts, and unit-linked insurance plans. This means that we observe roughly the entire equity portfolio of the household in our analysis, allowing us to

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region in India.

<sup>13</sup>An application supported by blocked amount (ASBA) investor is one who has agreed to block the application money in a bank account which will be refunded should she not be allocated the shares in an IPO. The alternative is paying by cheque, i.e., in either case, the money is placed in escrow prior to the allotment process, but in the case of ASBA, any refunds are processed a few days faster.

interpret the treatment effects that we estimate as effects on household equity portfolio choice. This, among other things, helps to distinguish our study of investment behavior from those attempting to detect effects of experienced returns on trading, rather than investment behavior, such as Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) and Strahilevitz, Odean, and Barber (2011).

**Constructing the Final Sample:** In order to match the application data to the CDSL data on household equity portfolio choice, we obtain a mapping table between the anonymous identification numbers of household accounts from both data sources. We verify the accuracy of the match by checking common geographic information fields provided by both data providers such as state and pincode.

Every applicant for an IPO must register (or already have) an account with either of the two depositories (CDSL and NSDL), as electronic transfer of allocated shares in an IPO is mandatory. We observe all applicants to IPOs managed by the registrar with accounts in CDSL. This means that we can observe those that applied for an IPO and were allotted in the lottery, i.e., the treatment group, as well as those that applied, but due to randomized allocation did not get allocated any share in an IPO. The latter group is the universe of counterfactuals in the IPO randomized lottery, i.e., the control group.

All CDSL trading accounts are associated with a tax related permanent account number (PAN), and regulation requires that an investor with a given PAN number can only apply once for any given IPO.<sup>14</sup> Consistent with this, we observe that there are no two trading accounts in any single IPO that are associated with the same (anonymized) PAN number. Thus no investor account may simultaneously belong to both the control and treatment group, or be allocated twice in the same IPO. However, it is possible that a household with multiple members with different PAN numbers could submit multiple applications for a given IPO in an attempt to increase the household's likelihood of treatment. While we do not have a direct way to control for this possibility, given our sample size, we do not believe that this is likely to affect our inferences materially.

Finally, since our data additionally permit us to observe all allocations made to investors in IPOs *after* the selection process managed by share registry firms in CDSL data, we also observe

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<sup>14</sup>In July 2007 it became mandatory that all applicants provide their PAN information in IPO applications. SEBI circular No.MRD/DoP/Cir-05/2007 came into force on April 27, 2007. Accessed at <http://goo.gl/OB61M2> on 19 Sep 2014.

allotments (but not applications) to particular household accounts in IPOs *not* managed by the registrar who provides us data. We also use these data in some of our analysis below.

**Summary Statistics:** Between March 2007 and March 2012, the common sample period for our matched dataset, we observe 85 IPOs (of a total of roughly 240). Our sample coverage closely tracks aggregate IPO waves, with a severe decline in 2009, and high numbers of IPOs in 2008 and 2010 (Appendix Figure A.1). In our sample of 85 IPOs, 54 IPOs have at least one share category with a randomized lottery allocation, compared to the universe of 176 IPOs with randomized allocations over the period.<sup>15</sup>

Panel A of Table 1 presents summary statistics on the 54 IPOs with randomized allotments in our sample. The majority of IPOs in our sample, 31, are in the manufacturing sector, with 17 in the service sector, 4 in the technology sector, and 2 in the retail sector. The table shows that the IPOs in our sample account for 22% of all IPOs over this period by number, and US \$ 2.65 BN or roughly 8% of total IPO value over the period, varying from a low of 0.72% of total IPO capital in 2009 to a high of roughly 25% in 2011.

Between 32% and 35% of shares in these IPOs are allocated to retail investors who are not employees of the IPO firm.<sup>16</sup> The average IPO in our sample is 12 times oversubscribed, leading to an average of 8,691 treatment accounts and 20,248 control accounts per IPO, for a total of 1,562,710 accounts in our experiment. We observe a total of 383 randomized share categories (or experiments) across 54 IPOs.

Of the total number of 383 experiments, 323 experienced positive first-day listing gains in the stock market, and 60 experienced negative first-day listing gains. We naturally expect different results based on whether an IPO delivered a positive or negative experience. As a result, in the majority of our analysis, we focus on IPOs with positive first day returns as our main sample. We also discuss and contrast the results that we obtained using the 60 share categories from the 14 IPOs with negative first-day returns in the results, but do so separately from our primary analysis.

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<sup>15</sup>We only consider IPOs that both undertake a randomized allocation and are mentioned in public sources such as [www.chittorgarh.com](http://www.chittorgarh.com) in our analysis.

<sup>16</sup>This is slightly below the mandatory 35% allocation to retail investors because we do not include employees in this calculation as employees are not randomly assigned shares. For further details, refer to subsection A.2 of the online appendix in Anagol, Balasubramaniam, and Ramadorai (2018).

Appendix Figure A.2 plots the mean and distribution of first-day returns for our 54 IPOs across the five years of our sample. The figure shows that our sample contains significant dispersion in randomly experienced returns, with IPOs generating both large negative ( $< -50\%$ ) and large positive returns ( $> 150\%$ ) and a range in-between. The second panel shows the first day variability of the IPO stocks in our sample, measured by the first day high price minus the first day low price divided by the issue price. The IPO stocks in the sample also show large dispersion in first day return volatility, with intra-day dispersion of 50% not uncommon.

Panel B of Table 1 characterizes the treatment experience the investors in our analysis received upon being randomly chosen to receive IPO shares. Column (1) of the table shows the mean across all investors in the treatment groups or IPOs in our 383 share category experiments for each of the variables listed in the row headers.<sup>17</sup> Columns (2) through (6) present the percentile of each variable in terms of the distribution across all of the experiments.<sup>18</sup>

On average, applicants put approximately US\$1,750 in escrow to apply for the IPOs in our sample, although this amount varies substantially from US\$ 155 to 2,093 based on the number of shares for which the investor applied, as well as the issue price of the IPO. The mean probability of treatment is 36% which also varies substantially across experiments – as discussed earlier, this is because the probability of treatment is proportional to the number of shares that investors applied for.

The mean value of the share allotment from the lottery is US\$ 150. This is very similar across all of our experiments – recall that all treatment applicants in a randomized share category receive the same number of shares, namely, the minimum lot size, regardless of how many shares were applied for. This implies that within an IPO, the value of allotment is always the same across share categories; the value of allotments across IPOs also tend to be similar as there tend to be similar numbers of share categories in total, and the maximum application amount is typically roughly US\$ 2,500 over the sample period (Rs. 100,000, determined by regulation as the limit for retail investor classification, as discussed earlier).

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<sup>17</sup>The weighting across the different share categories is done in exactly the same way as in the regression framework. See Section 4 for details.

<sup>18</sup>We first calculate the mean within each experiment, and then report the corresponding percentile across the experiments. For example, the median share category experiment had a mean application amount of 791 dollars (first row of Panel B, Table 1).

We measure the experienced gain to the treatment group, relative to the control group, as the difference between the IPO issue price and the closing price of the IPO in the market at the end of the first day's trading. This assumes that the control group can access the IPO shares only at the beginning of the first listing day (note that the control group is refunded the money placed in escrow roughly two trading weeks following the allocation), but we note that the exact measurement of this gain does not affect our inferences about outcomes except that it affects our estimate of the magnitude of the stimulus.

Using this definition of the first day gain, the mean treatment across IPOs with positive first-day returns is a 39% gain relative to the IPO issue price, which translates into a US\$ 62 gain at the end of the first day (ranging from US\$ -11 at the 10th percentile to US\$ 136 at the 90th percentile). Despite the average percentage gain on the IPO being large, the absolute dollar gains are small relative to the application amounts required – this is again because the treatment group only gets allotted the minimum lot size in the case they win the lottery. They are also relatively small compared to the cross-sectional mean of the time-series median portfolio value of US\$ 1,750. For comparison purposes, these experimental gains are similar in size to the US\$ 300 tax stimulus payments studied in Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013). In general the size of these experimental stakes have two effects. First, it is difficult to interpret any results we find as arising from wealth effects or portfolio rebalancing given the low fraction of total invested equity portfolio wealth that these experimental gains represent. Second, and more generally, the smaller the experimental stakes, the greater the bias against finding any strong results from winning the IPO lottery.

## **4 Estimating Responses to Noise**

As mentioned earlier, we can view each randomized share category in each IPO as a separate experiment with a different probability of being allotted shares. The idea of our empirical specification is to pool all of these experiments to maximize statistical power, while ensuring that we exploit only the randomized variation of treatment status within each IPO share category.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Our strategy is similar to that employed in Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel (2003), who estimate the impact of a worker training program that was randomly assigned within 286 different groups of applicants.

Intuitively, this approach proceeds by stacking the different applicants from all of the experiments together into a single dataset, and then including a fixed effect for each experiment. These experiment-level fixed effects ensure that our identification of the treatment effect stems solely from the random variation in treatment within each experiment.

In particular, we estimate the causal effect of the experience of winning an IPO lottery on an outcome variable by estimating the cross-sectional regression in each (event) month  $t$ :

$$y_{ijct} = \alpha + \rho_t I_{success_{ijc}=1} + \gamma_{jc} + \beta X_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijct} \quad (1)$$

Here,  $y_{ijct}$  is an outcome variable of interest (for instance, the number of times the individual  $i$  applies for subsequent IPOs) for applicant  $i$  in IPO  $j$ , share category  $c$ , at event month  $t$  (we measure time in relation to the month of the lottery).  $I_{success_{ijc}=1}$  is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the applicant was successful in the lottery for IPO  $j$  in category  $c$  (investor is in the treatment group), and 0 otherwise (investor is in the control group). The coefficients on the indicator variable  $\rho_t$  are the estimated treatment effects in each event-month  $t$ . As we discuss more fully below, we estimate all treatment effects for  $t \in [-6, ..0, .. +6]$  where  $t = 0$  is the month in which the lottery takes place, with leads and lags of up to 6 months.  $X_{ijt}$  are account-level control variables – in our empirical implementation these include dummies for whether the investor bid using the cutoff or full demand schedule mechanisms, and whether the investor funded the application using ASBA or cheque payment.

$\gamma_{jc}$  are fixed effects associated with each experiment, i.e., each IPO share category in our sample. Angrist, Pathak, and Walters (2013) refers to these experiment-level fixed effects as “risk group” fixed effects. Conditional on the inclusion of these fixed effects, variation in treatment is random, meaning that the inclusion of controls should have no effect on our point estimates of  $\rho_t$ . Nevertheless, we include these controls to soak up additional variation in the dependent variable to increase the statistical precision of our estimates. Specification (1) identifies  $\rho_t$  as the causal impact of the experience of winning the IPO lottery on the outcome variable  $y_{ijct}$ .

Angrist (1998) shows that our estimated treatment effect  $\rho_t$  is a weighted average of the treatment effects from each separate share category experiment. In particular, the weights are constructed as:

$$w_c = \frac{r_c(1-r_c)N_c}{\sum_{k=1}^{323} r_k(1-r_k)N_k} \quad (2)$$

where  $r_c$  and  $N_c$  are the probability of treatment and sample sizes in share category  $c$ , and we have a total 323 share category experiments. Intuitively, the regression weights give more importance to experiments in which the probability of treatment is closer to  $\frac{1}{2}$ , and experiments with larger sample sizes. The basic idea is that the “good” experiments are ones in which there are many accounts in both treatment and control groups. This weighting scheme implies that our regression estimate only exploits purely random variation in treatment induced by the lotteries, since treatment versus control comparisons are only performed *within* share categories and given the fact that  $\rho_t$  is a weighted average of these share-category-specific effects.

The +1 to +6 window identifies the causal impact of the experience on future outcomes. Estimating equation (1) for time periods for event-times  $-1$  to  $-6$  outcome variable serves as a useful placebo test. If the lottery is truly randomized, we should find that receiving treatment at time zero does not, on average, predict outcomes in time periods *before* treatment was actually assigned. This placebo test is particularly useful because many outcomes are highly serially correlated over time, so we would be likely to pick up any selection into treatment (if it exists) by inspecting the behavior of treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment periods. For example, if particular applicants figure out a way to game the lottery then we might find that their treatment at time zero actually predicts their behavior in the  $-1$  to  $-6$  window.

Appendix Table A.2. presents summary statistics and a randomization check comparing our treatment and control groups. Columns (1) and (2) present the means of variables listed in the row headers in treatment and control groups respectively, and Column (3) presents the difference across the two samples with \*\*\*, \*\* and \* indicating statistically significant differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.<sup>20</sup> All of these variables are measured in the month prior to the treatment IPO. If the allocation of IPO shares is truly random, we would expect few statistically significant differences

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<sup>20</sup>These means are calculated using the weights defined in equation (2), which are the same weights that our main estimating equation uses to combine the share category by share category experimental results in to one treatment effect estimate.

across treatment and control groups prior to the assignment of the IPO shares. Column (4) calculates the percent of our 383 share category experiments in which the treatment and control groups were significantly different at the 10% level. Under the null hypothesis that treatment status is random, we expect that roughly 10% of these experiments will exhibit a significant difference at the 10% level.

Our first outcome variable of interest is whether investors randomly allocated IPO shares are more likely to apply for IPOs in the future. The construction of this outcome variable warrants further explanation. In the case of IPOs for which our data provider was the registrar, we can directly measure whether or not an account *applied* to an IPO in each of periods +1 to +6. For IPOs where our data provider was not the registrar, we can observe whether the account was *allotted* shares since we see allotments for the entire universe of IPOs from the CDSL data. We set the outcome variable to one in either case – if we see an application for IPOs for which our data provider was the registrar, or if we see an allotment for IPOs not covered by our registrar – and zero otherwise.<sup>21</sup> Appendix Table A.1. shows that virtually identical fractions (38%) of both treatment and control investors applied to an IPO with our registrar, or were allotted shares in an IPO not covered by our registrar, in the month *prior* to treatment.

The next set of variables describe the trading behavior of our treatment and control samples. We focus on the total dollar trading volume, calculated as the sum of the value of stocks bought and sold in a month. We find that the average monthly trading volume is roughly US\$ 275 including zeros. These values are highly skewed, so we transform this variable using the inverse hyperbolic sine function.<sup>22</sup> While 29% of accounts made no trades in the month prior to treatment, nearly half of the accounts observed traded more than US \$1,000 in the month prior to treatment. Overall, there are many investors in the sample that trade substantial amounts.

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<sup>21</sup>For the set of IPOs for which we can observe allotments but not applications, our measure is noisy, because although an account had to apply to receive shares, there are also accounts which applied but did not receive shares. We focus on this combined measure because it includes all of the information available to us, but we note that our results likely underestimate the full impact of IPO experiences on future IPO application behavior.

<sup>22</sup> $\sinh^{-1}(z) = \log(z + (z^2 + 1)^{1/2})$ . This is a common alternative to the log transformation which has the additional benefit of being defined for the whole real line. The transformation is close to being logarithmic for high values of the  $z$  and close to linear for values of  $z$  close to zero. See, for example, Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988), and Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene (1994).

The next block of rows of Appendix Table A.2. shows statistics about the distribution of investor portfolio values and the “age” of investors, i.e., the amount of time they have spent in the market. In much work in household finance (see, for example, Campbell (2006)), investor wealth is strongly associated with sophistication, suggesting that any treatment effects that we detect should attenuate or even disappear for larger accounts. The amount of time investors spend in the market is equally interesting, in light of important work in this area (see, for example, List, 2003, 2004), which posits that increasing experience of market interactions should cause market participants to behave increasingly rationally in these interactions. If this hypothesis is correct, treatment effects should once again attenuate or even disappear for “aged” accounts relative to “rookie” accounts.

Next, the table shows that 78% of treatment and control investors had an account value greater than zero in the month prior to the IPO. Portfolio value amounts are also highly skewed so we once again transform this variable using the inverse hyperbolic sine function. Portfolio values average US\$ 790 including zeros, and are not significantly different across treatment and control accounts.

The next few rows show the fractions of treatment and control accounts that fall into the range of portfolio values described in the row headers. The distribution of portfolio values is roughly U-shaped in both treatment and control accounts, with a relatively large number of accounts with zero value (some of these correspond to new market entrants (rookies), as we identify below), few accounts with portfolio value between US\$ 500 and 1,000, and roughly a quarter of the accounts with portfolio values over US\$ 5,000.

In terms of account age at the time of the treatment IPO, approximately 33% of accounts are less than six months old, 30% are between 7 and 25 months old, and about 37% are over 25 months old. We later explore how heterogeneity in both portfolio size and account age affects the treatment effects that we estimate.

Overall, we find that the differences across treatment and control groups are small, and importantly, not statistically significant. The fraction of experiments with greater than ten percent significance is around ten percent. Given the similarity of treatment and control groups across this wide set of background characteristics, the IPO shares do appear to be randomly assigned to investors.

## 5 Main Results

Table 2 (Panel A), presents our main estimates of equation 1 for our outcome variables of interest. Each numbered row delineated by lines in the table corresponds to a distinct outcome variable, and shows results for a set of applicants for the month  $t \in [-6, \dots, 0, \dots, +6]$  where  $t = 0$  is the month of the lottery. The first set of numbers within each panel shows the coefficients  $\rho_t$ , which are the estimated treatment effects from the cross-sectional regressions estimated for each event-time  $t$  in the window shown in the column header. The second row of numbers in each panel shows standard errors, and the third row of numbers in each panel shows the mean of the outcome variable for the control group, which we use to interpret the magnitudes of the treatment effects.

Across our outcome variables of interest, we find that there is one statistically significant relationship between treatment status in the outcome *prior* to treatment (event months  $-1$  to  $-6$ ). However, there is no pattern amongst these coefficients that suggest that the treatment and control groups are systematically different from one another after including risk-group fixed effects.<sup>23</sup>

**Treatment Effects on Future IPO Subscription:** We begin by testing how receiving a randomized allocation of IPO stock affects an investor's propensity to apply for other IPOs in the subsequent six months. This outcome has been studied in previous work, (see, for example, Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008; Chiang et al., 2011), but always in settings where the experience could either be interpreted as noise or signal, confounding interpretation. For example, Kaustia and Knupfer (2008) find that IPO investors who experience high returns in the past are more likely to invest in future IPOs. It is possible that their result is driven by irrational extrapolation, but it is equally possible that the result arises from investors in their sample *rationally* inferring their innate IPO investing skill when they experience high returns on their IPO investments. Our randomized setting substantially raises the bar on the skill-based rational interpretation.

Row 1 of Table 2 (A) shows that in the month of treatment, accounts that received a randomized allocation are 0.17 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to apply to an IPO in that month. In the month *after* treatment, treated accounts are 0.94 p.p. more likely to have applied for an IPO, and this effect is significant at the one percent level. This corresponds to a roughly 2% increase in the

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<sup>23</sup>Note that by chance some of the pre-period treatment effects are likely to show up as significant, but as seen in Appendix Table A.2, these are not systematic and not particularly economically meaningful.

probability of applying for an IPO relative to the base rate probability of applying in the control group (46.36%). The effect size in month two is substantial, raising the probability of applying relative to the base rate by 3%. The effect sizes in months three through five are smaller in levels (between 0.19 and 0.32 p.p. when significant), but are similar in magnitude to the effect sizes in the first few post-treatment months relative to the base rate of applying for IPOs (they all represent roughly a 2% increase in the base rate of applying). Cumulatively, simply assuming that these probabilities are independent, we see an increase in the probability of applying to a future IPO of roughly 12% relative to the base rate in the control group (in month zero) over the six months following the IPO.<sup>24</sup> Panel B of the table differentiates the effect between IPOs with positive returns and those with negative returns, and shows that the effect is symmetric, i.e., the effect of being allocated an IPO with a negative listing return makes treated investors less likely to apply for future IPO allocations. Taken together, the results in this table highlight that there is a significant causal effect of randomly receiving gains in an IPO on future IPO applications, which is an outcome variable most closely associated with the experience, i.e., winning/losing a lottery having applied to it.

**Treatment Effects on Trading Activity:** We next move to testing whether the experience of the IPO lottery allocation spills over to the investor's behavior outside the narrow sphere of the IPO market, i.e., whether the treatment makes investors trade more in stocks *other than the IPO stock*. In Row 2 of Table 2 (A) the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of the total value of purchase and sale transactions made during the month, excluding the value of trades made in the IPO stock itself. We find that this measure of trading volume is twice as high for the treatment group than for the control group in the month of the IPO, and almost 7.5% greater two months after the IPO. This difference in trading volume reduces as time elapses following the IPO, but the treatment group still has 3.5% higher trading volume fully six months after the IPO. These effects are substantial in light of the size of the average experience gain, which is US\$ 62, or 3.5% of the size of the average investor's portfolio.

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<sup>24</sup>As mentioned earlier, these are likely underestimates of the true effect as we only observe allotments and not applications for IPOs that were not handled by our data provider.

One of the possible drivers of the treatment effect on trading volume is that investors might be rebalancing their portfolios following the gains experienced in the IPO stock. However, under this explanation, it should occur regardless of whether the returns on the IPO stock are positive or negative. As we show below, this is not supported in the data, meaning that portfolio rebalancing is unlikely to be the driver of the patterns that we observe.<sup>25</sup>

To check this, Figure 1 presents a graphical analysis of the relationship between first-day return experience and the probability of future IPO participation (Panel A), the inverse-hyperbolic sine gross transactions value (Panel B), and the likelihood of trading (Panel C). Each triangle is the average of the experience-effects for each share-category for each IPO on the  $y$ -axis and the first-day returns (in percent) on the  $x$ -axis. Share categories with less than 1,000 observations are excluded from the sample to increase precision.

Across all panels, the Figure clearly shows that the effect size tends to be negative for negative return IPOs, and positive for positive return IPOs. Panel C, Table 2 formally estimates treatment effects for negative and positive first day return IPOs separately, estimating equation 1 separately for each sub-sample of IPOs and all of our outcome variables, aggregating over the six months after the IPO. The Table shows that treated investors are substantially *less* likely to apply for future IPOs over the 6 months following the negative treatment (the effect size is larger than the one from the positive treatment). Given that negative return IPOs cause investors to trade less, but positive return IPOs cause investors to trade more, it appears unlikely that trading activity is fully explained by the portfolio rebalancing requirements of investors.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>A growing body of literature also suggests that individual investors are very sluggish rebalancers, demonstrating inertia in this and other markets in which they participate. For instance, see (Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2009) and (Andersen, Campbell, Nielsen, and Ramadorai, 2018).

<sup>26</sup>Even though we measure trading activity *without* the IPO stock, increases in trading volume on their rest of the portfolio may be a result of investors rebalancing their portfolio once they *sell* their IPO stock holdings. To show that the observed results are not mechanical complements to Anagol, Balasubramaniam, and Ramadorai (2018), we estimate the treatment effect for two types of investors: those who tend to sell their IPO stocks soon after allotment (“flippers”), and those who do not. Table 4 presents these estimates. Panel A, Table 4., shows that past flipping activity by investors is a significant predictor of flipping in the IPO lottery, soon after allotment. Past flippers are 2.36 times more likely than non-flippers to sell their IPO lottery win. However, the treatment effect on trading volume (Panels B and C, Table 4) is broadly similar, with flippers exhibiting a *smaller* treatment effect than non-flippers, suggesting that these estimates are not a result of a mechanical relationship between investor decisions on the IPO lottery stock and the rest of their portfolio.

In order to assess whether the rise in trading activity is due to increases in purchase or sale activity, we separate trading volume into purchase and sale volume and estimate the experience effects. Appendix Table A.2. presents these results. We find that the effect of winning the IPO lottery in both purchase and sale transactions are of similar magnitude, and that rise in trading activity is not driven by one or the other alone. Additionally, Appendix Table A.2. also documents that increases in trading activity are not solely driven by trading activity in the industry of the IPO firm.

**Treatment Effects on Portfolio Allocation:** In Row 3 of Table 2 the dependent variable is the portfolio weight of the stocks held by the investor in the same industry sector as the IPO stock, *excluding* the holding of the IPO stock itself. These industry sectors are defined by the Indian National Industrial Classification Code (2004), and are a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categorization of firms in the economy, akin to SIC codes in the US. These classifications are readily available for all stocks in the dataset from CMIE Prowess, the source of our firm-level financial data. Using this classification, we use the second highest level of aggregation to classify firms into 21 sectors, such as consumer goods, information technology, mining, and financial services.

The table shows that treated investors on average increase their portfolio allocation to the industry sector of the IPO stock relative to the control group in the months after they win the IPO lottery. The effect is relatively small – an average 6 basis point increase in the portfolio allocation to the sector, but precisely estimated. Panel B of the table shows that the sign of the effect is the same as that of the listing return of the IPO – when the randomly allotted IPO stock has a negative listing return, treated investors *reduce* their portfolio allocation to the sector in question relative to the control group. Indeed, this negative effect is larger than the estimated positive effect, with an 11 basis point reduction. These changes in portfolio allocation also arise from the average randomly experienced gain of 3.5% of portfolio size. While these effects are smaller than those on total trading volume, they are precisely estimated.

Taken together, apart from the main thrust of the paper, it's worth highlighting that these findings that experiences in the IPO stock are able to explain behavior in the remainder of the portfolio bolsters a small, but growing empirical literature finding that experiences in individual securities have important spillover effects on the portfolio as a whole (Engelberg et. al 2018, Frydman et. al

2016). Many previous behavioral models assume that investors narrowly frame stocks separately when evaluating performance (see, for example, Shefrin and Statman (1985); Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and in this sense do not fully account for the possibility of cross-security effects within investor portfolios (see, for example, Barberis et al., 2006). For example, current models of “realization utility,” the idea that investors receive utility jolts at the time of selling an investment, generally assume that utility is defined at the asset level rather than allowing for the possibility of cross-asset realization utility effects (see Barberis and Xiong, 2012; Frydman et al., 2014). These findings suggest that experiences arising from one stock in a portfolio has a *causal* effect on decisions regarding other securities, or put differently, we find that there can be contagion effects even *within* an investor’s portfolio.

## 6 Theoretical Explanations

We have described how the random gains and losses experienced by lottery winners affect their subsequent behavior relative to that of losers. In this section, we consider a set of potential theoretical explanations for our empirical results. Our goal is not to arrive at a new theory, but rather, to carefully evaluate the extent to which existing theories of learning from noise can explain the various features of our empirical results.

### 6.1 Simple Learning Heuristics

**Win-Stay-Lose-Shift:** One possibility is that agents that win and lose the lottery are following a simple win-stay-lose-shift type learning heuristic (see, for example, Nowak and Sigmund (1993)). When they experience gains, they simply continue to engage in the types of behavior that produced the high payoff in the first place; conversely, experiencing losses causes them to shift away from behavior associated with the low payoff.

**Naïve extrapolation:** Another possibility is that agents’ return expectations can be represented as a moving average of past returns. In some formulations (Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer, 2015), this extrapolation occurs with respect to past observed market returns. In this case, we consider a related possibility, which is naïve extrapolation of *experienced* returns.<sup>27</sup> This is similar

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<sup>27</sup>We term this “naïve extrapolation,” contrasting this possibility with a more sophisticated version of extrapolation that we explore below, in which agents treat randomly experienced gains as a signal of stock return performance, and update using Bayes’ rule.

to win-stay-lose-shift, but differs from it in the length of the period for which the agent persists with the strategy following the initial experience. In the case of win-stay-lose-shift, we would see agents responding quickly to recent stimuli, regardless of the magnitude of past stimuli received. Naïve extrapolation is essentially a smoothed version of this behavior, with agents responding to an *average* of past stimuli.

Both win-stay-lose-shift and naïve extrapolation share a number of features that make them potentially convincing explanations for our results. Both explanations certainly help to explain our finding that lottery winners who experience gains on the IPO apply to a greater number of future IPOs, and those that experience losses on the randomly allotted IPO apply to fewer future IPOs than the control group of lottery losers. They can also explain the tendency of random positive experiences to cause portfolio tilts towards the sector of the IPO stock.

However, what both of these simple models are unable to explain is why lottery winners randomly experiencing gains increase their *trading volume* going forward relative to the control group, i.e., exhibit significant increases in their propensity to both buy *and* sell stocks more actively following the initial random shock. The second feature of the results that requires additional rationalization is that lottery winners do not respond to experienced gains by increasing their overall allocation to the market.<sup>28</sup> Any extrapolation or heuristic, therefore, has to be limited to specific stocks or sectors, while holding fixed the total amount of the portfolio allocated to directly held stocks. An additional assumption such as mental accounting, in which stock comprise a separate mental account, may therefore be required here.

The third feature of our results that these simple models cannot explain is one which we explore more fully in the subsequent section. In that analysis, we find that investors repeatedly experiencing random gains in successive lotteries respond less to the marginal lottery experience than those winning the lottery for the first time. The simple learning heuristics (without more sophisticated extensions) would not predict such attenuation of behavior. Of course, it is possible that the attenuation that we observe arises purely from selection, rather than treatment, as we discuss in more detail later.

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<sup>28</sup>Row 4, Table 3(A) presents the treatment effect on the total portfolio value (without the IPO stock). There are no statistically significant differences in the overall portfolio value (without the IPO stock) between lottery winners and losers.

Overall, the main feature that these models cannot explain is the trading volume increases that we observe in responses to randomly experienced noise. This is a strong feature of our results; since these simple models cannot explain it, we conclude that such learning heuristics cannot be the entire explanation for our results.

## 6.2 Feeling Lucky

A potential explanation for our results is that agents exhibit a version of the “hot hands” fallacy (see, e.g., (Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, 1985)), and interpret randomly experienced gains as evidence that they are on a “hot streak,” or put differently, that they are experiencing a period of unusual luck. Without seeking to delve too deeply into the sources of such beliefs (as in Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985)), this would imply that traders believe the probability of experiencing future high returns from trading (either buying or selling) should be greater following a random positive experience such as winning IPO lottery and getting a positive return. Conversely, an investor that wins the IPO lottery but then experiences a *negative* return on the IPO would infer that the probability of achieving high returns from trading would be *lower*.

However, this explanation has a harder time explaining why treated investors experiencing random gains do not increase their overall allocation to the market portfolio. It also has difficulty explaining why they tilt towards or away from the sector of the treatment IPO depending on the sign of the return on the randomly allocated IPO, especially since we see no unusual increase in trading volume that is particularly attributable to the IPO sector. Both of these findings require recourse to additional assumptions. One potentially promising avenue is that the beliefs about luck are accompanied by a shift of the agent’s attention towards more positive attributes of the sector of the treatment IPO in addition to the IPO stock itself (i.e., “warm glow” based explanations).<sup>29</sup> However, any such warm glow cannot be towards stocks as a whole, given the absence of an increase in the overall portfolio weight to stocks.

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<sup>29</sup>Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, and Wilson (2009) present laboratory evidence for such a mechanism, arguing that ownership of a good makes the positive aspects of the good salient, and therefore leads to an exchange asymmetry. Their key experiment was to endow all subjects with a mug, and then randomly choose some subjects to state their WTA for the mug, and some subjects to state their WTP for a second mug. They find no WTA-WTP gap in this comparison, suggesting that once an object is owned the subject focuses on positive features of the mug. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) present a formal theory of the endowment effect based on a similar mechanism, namely that ownership causes subjects to focus on the positive aspects of the owned good, and therefore makes them less likely to trade.

This explanation also has difficulty explaining the finding that we discuss in the next section, which is why investors repeatedly experiencing random gains in successive lotteries respond less to the marginal lottery experience than those winning the lottery for the first time. If agents do indeed believe that they are experiencing a period of unusual luck following an initial random experience, it would seem natural that the intensity of this belief would strengthen with the extent to which the initial experience is truly rare/random. Winning one lottery is far less likely than winning multiple lotteries given that these are independent draws; according to this explanation, if anything, the marginal response to the additional lottery win should be greater, contrary to the attenuation in the effect size that we see in the data.

### **6.3 Mental Accounting**

Another potential explanation for our results is that agents create a separate “mental account” for their winnings from the lottery, and that they increase trading, but only to an extent commensurate with these winnings (see, for e.g., Thaler (1985) and Barberis and Huang (2001)).

Of course, a strict version of this story implies that trading volume of all agents should only vary across, but not within lotteries, since all agents in a given IPO lottery make are the same. This is because all IPO lotteries result in winning allocations equal to the minimum lot size – i.e., winners all receive the same dollar gain in any given IPO. While the strict version of this explanation doesn’t hold true in our data, Figure 1B does show that the extent of the trading volume response is positively correlated with the size of the listing gain. We therefore investigate further.

On the y-axis of Figure 2, we plot the cumulative gross transactions value over the six months following the lottery, but now expressed as a fraction of the portfolio size in the month prior to the lottery. On the x-axis of the plot is the lottery listing gain, also expressed as as a fraction of total portfolio size in the month prior to the lottery. Both axes are on a log scale, and the points plot the averages of all lottery winners in each of our 323 positive listing gain experiments.

If agents simply created a new mental account for their winnings and only used this amount to trade, scaled trading activity would increase in a manner that was on or below the 45-degree line in Figure 2, since the scaled winnings from the lottery would be an upper bound for the scaled trading volume response. Contrary to this explanation, we find that lottery winners in nearly all experiments trade substantially more than their winnings, suggesting that this version of the mental accounting story cannot account for all trading activity by lottery winners. That said, we continue to

observe a positive relationship between trading volume and the listing gain, reaffirming our findings in Figure 1.

A more complicated version of the mental accounting story might involve agents trading until they *lose* all their gains, meaning that they would trade *more* than the total extent of their winnings, since not every trade results in a 100% loss. We therefore investigate further.

Anagol, Balasubramaniam, and Ramadorai (2018) show that a large proportion of these lottery winners do not sell their IPO stock, meaning that most lottery winners do not *realize* their winnings from the IPO lottery. We therefore check whether there is a difference in the magnitude of trading between those who realize their gains and those who do not. To do so, we estimate a heterogeneous treatment effect, differentiating accounts in our sample which sell past IPO stocks within a month of being allotted the IPO, i.e., whether they are IPO “flippers”.<sup>30</sup>

Panel A, Table 4, presents evidence that past flipping activity – measured as whether accounts have ever flipped in the past, or indeed, in the most recent IPO before our lottery – strongly predicts future flipping activity in the lottery IPO. However, we find that the trading volume response for predicted flippers and non-flippers (Panels B and C) are broadly similar. Indeed, the point estimates of the treatment effect for non-flippers are marginally higher than for the flippers who sell the IPO stock and realize their winnings.

This finding indicates that the mental accounting effect is not the main driver of the results. Of course, it is possible to come up with a more complicated version of the mental accounting hypothesis that involves keeping an account of paper (i.e., unrealized) gains and adjusting trading activity accordingly. However, we note here that paper gains from IPO stocks quickly vanish (in our sample, this happens on average two months after the initial listing). This makes it difficult to justify a complex mental accounting hypothesis involving paper gains, as we find that the trading volume responses persist for at least six months.

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<sup>30</sup>Estimating a heterogeneous treatment effect is necessary here. This is because it is impossible to condition the size of this effect on the outcome variable, i.e., selling the current IPO lottery stock. The reason is that we cannot observe selling behaviour in the IPO that was won, by definition, for the control group, i.e., lottery losers.

## 6.4 Bayesian Learning From Noise

Yet another possibility is that the random gains or losses that agents experience are misperceived as informative signals. The natural response in this scenario is for agents to update their prior beliefs accordingly. Agents in equity markets are generically involved in two types of learning.

First, they learn about the environment in which they operate, i.e., they update their expectations about the parameters of the return distribution (see, for example, Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2016); Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard, and Tallon (2018)).

Second, they may also learn about their own ability to operate in the market environment. Prior research on individual investors has studied learning about ability over time (Gervais and Odean, 2001; Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman, 2010; Linnainmaa, 2011), although this framework is distinct from our context where we know, by definition, that the initial stimulus for trading outcomes that separates treatment from control is pure chance and cannot arise from ability. In that sense, our context is more related to the large literature in psychology on how humans have biases in how they attribute their outcomes to causal factors, such as skill or chance (Haggag, Pope, Bryant-Lees, and Bos, 2018; Kelley, 1973), and in particular how they may attribute outcomes in ways that are favorable to themselves via self-serving biases (Bem, 1965; Fitch, 1970; Blaine and Crocker, 1993).<sup>31</sup> For example, Gilovich (1983) and Gilovich and Douglas (1986) study biased evaluation of outcomes in the context of gambling, where noise plays a large role in determining outcomes similar to ours, and find that winning bettors are more likely to interpret their outcomes to skill versus luck. The fact that IPO lottery players choose which IPO lotteries to participate in makes this interpretation more plausible, as Langer (1975) and Langer and Roth (1975) present lab experimental evidence that infusing a gambling context with some element of choice increases the subjects tendency to interpret random outcomes as reflective of their own choices (the “illusion of control.”)

To better understand whether our results can be rationalized by agents treating the random experience as an informative signal of either the parameters of the return distribution or of their own ability (i.e., as an informative signal about their signal precision), we set up a simple portfolio

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<sup>31</sup>In the financial market context, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) propose a theory where investors’ confidence increases more in response to positive outcomes versus negative outcomes, and argue this theory can explain short-run momentum and earnings drift, among other market anomalies.

choice problem with exponential utility, normally distributed asset returns and signals, and Bayesian learning. Using the model, we derive simple predictions and assess the extent to which they are consistent with our empirical results.<sup>32</sup>

We consider an agent maximizing exponential utility  $-\exp(-\gamma W)$  of terminal wealth  $W$ , with risk aversion coefficient  $\gamma$ .

$$\max_q -\exp(-\gamma W) \quad (3)$$

$$\text{s.t. } W = r_f(W_0 - q) + qr \quad (4)$$

The agent has to allocate initial wealth  $W_0$  between a risk-free asset with return  $r_f$ , and a risky asset with price normalized to 1, delivering a random gross payoff  $r$ . The true distribution of  $r$  is  $N(\bar{r}, \sigma_r^2)$  and the choice variable  $q$ , is the amount invested in the risky asset.

In this setting, the agent does not know the true distribution of the risky asset payoff  $r$ . She begins with a prior distribution and then updates to a posterior distribution based on signals (return experiences, winning the IPO lottery, etc.). We call the prior distribution of the risky asset payoff  $\hat{r}$  and assume that this prior distribution is normal with mean payoff vector  $\bar{r}_0$  and variance  $\sigma_0^2$  (i.e.  $\hat{r} \sim N(\bar{r}_0, \sigma_0^2)$ ). For our purposes it is useful to define the precision of the return as  $\rho_0 = \frac{1}{\sigma_0^2}$ .

Maximizing utility subject to the prior distribution of asset returns, the optimal portfolio allocation is:

$$q^* = \frac{(\bar{r}_0 - r_f)\rho_0}{\gamma} \quad (5)$$

As in standard mean-variance portfolio analysis, the agent allocates greater amounts to the risky asset when 1) the mean excess return  $(\bar{r}_0 - r_f)$  increases, and 2) the precision of her signal regarding returns increases.

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<sup>32</sup>We provide simple results from the case of investment in a single risky asset case here for expositional purposes. Appendix Section 1, generalizes this for settings with more than one risky asset, and provides more detailed explanations.

### 6.4.1 Learning about the distribution of market returns

The first case that we consider is that lottery winners experiencing gains or losses interpret the positive or negative noise shock as an informative signal about the distribution of future returns, whereas lottery losing agents act as if they receive no such signal.<sup>33</sup> We denote the signal by  $s$ , and define it as  $s = r + \varepsilon$  where  $r$  can be interpreted as the realized listing return on the randomly assigned IPO stock, and the noise in the signal  $\varepsilon$  is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance  $\sigma_\varepsilon^2$ . As in Chamley (2004), with Bayesian updating in response to this signal, the agent's posterior distribution is  $N(\bar{r}_1, \frac{1}{\rho_1})$ , with:

$$\rho_1 = \rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon \quad (6)$$

$$\bar{r}_1 = \alpha s + (1 - \alpha)\bar{r}_0 \quad (7)$$

$$\alpha = \frac{\rho_\varepsilon}{\rho_1} \quad (8)$$

Posterior signal precision increases as long as the precision of the incoming signal is greater than zero (i.e., if  $\rho_\varepsilon > 0$ ).<sup>34</sup> The posterior mean return is a weighted average of the signal and the prior mean return, and the signal gets more weight as the precision of the signal increases relative to the precision of the prior distribution. Taking the ratio of the portfolio allocation to the market subsequent to receiving the signal to the portfolio allocation amount prior to receiving the signal, the allocation to the market increases if and only if:

$$\frac{q_1}{q_0} = \frac{\rho_1(\bar{r}_1 - \bar{r}_f)}{\rho_0(\bar{r}_0 - \bar{r}_f)} = \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon)(\alpha s + (1 - \alpha)\bar{r}_0 - \bar{r}_f)}{\rho_0(\bar{r}_0 - \bar{r}_f)} > 1. \quad (9)$$

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<sup>33</sup>Of course, investors that process information completely would react to returns on the IPO stock regardless of whether or not they won the lottery. If this were true, we would expect to find no differences in trading behavior between winners and losers, which is clearly not borne out in the data.

<sup>34</sup>Note that the precision increasing is a consequence of the normal assumption; if returns and signals were assumed binary, it is possible that precision can decrease (Chamley, 2004). Given that the distribution of stock returns is closer to normal than binary we focus on the more natural case for this context of normal returns.

We know that  $\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon > \rho_0$  given the updating rule. For a signal that is larger than the mean of the prior distribution (i.e.,  $s > \bar{r}_0$ ) we also know that  $\bar{r}_1 > \bar{r}_0$ . This implies that agents will increase their allocation to the risky asset.

Given the average one-day return on IPOs is 42 percent, it seems reasonable to assume that average signal from winning the IPO is above the investors' prior expected return. Under this assumption, the prediction is that lottery winners in positive return IPOs should increase their allocation to the market; we do not observe this in the data, suggesting that learning about the level of returns available in the market is not the main mechanism driving our results.

We are also interested in the predictions of this model about the agent's trading volume. In this simple model, we interpret trading volume as the magnitude of the change in  $q^*$  in response to the arrival of future signals (e.g., any signals the investor might receive in subsequent periods). We interpret signals here broadly to mean any kind of information or news on the performance of stocks.

The key result here is that the larger the precision of the prior distribution of the agent, the less her risky asset share will respond to any given *new* signal on average. To see this, note that the relative change in  $q^*$  can be rewritten as:

$$\frac{q_1}{q_0} = \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon) \left( \frac{\rho_\varepsilon}{\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon} s + \frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon} \bar{r}_0 - \bar{r}_f \right)}{\rho_0 (\bar{r}_0 - \bar{r}_f)} \quad (10)$$

Two forces make the agent less likely to respond to signals when their prior precision is larger. First, the difference between the posterior and prior expected return ( $\bar{r}_0$ ) will be smaller, as a greater precision  $\rho_0$  means the prior is weighted more heavily in forming the posterior. Second, given  $\frac{\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon}{\rho_0}$  is decreasing in  $\rho_0$ , for any given change in posterior return, the agent changes her allocation less.

The point here is that treated agents update their beliefs relative to the control group, meaning that the posterior signal precision of the treated is  $\rho_1$ . This becomes their new prior, and so comparing the treated agents to the control agents, who continue to have signal precision  $\rho_0$ , we would expect *future* trading volume of the treated to be lower than that of control agents, given the discussion in the previous paragraph. This model therefore predicts that lottery winners should trade *less* than lottery losers after the noise shock; intuitively, winning the lottery provides information

which (at least weakly) reduces the value of future information in forming trading decisions. This prediction, however, is not supported in the data.

#### 6.4.2 Learning about own ability

We next consider the case in which the agent interprets the randomly experienced gains or losses from the IPO as a positive or negative shock about their own investment ability. To do so, we assume that a sensible measure of the agent's ability is the precision of the signal distribution  $\rho_\varepsilon$ ; the higher the agent's signal precision, the greater is the agent's ability. This is a common assumption in the literature on stock trading (see, for e.g., Gervais and Odean (2001); Linnainmaa (2011)).

The key prediction is that an agent who believes that the signals he receives are of higher precision will respond more to any given future signal, i.e., such an agent will trade more.

To see this, we present equation (10) again below:

$$\frac{q_1}{q_0} = \frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon) \left( \frac{\rho_\varepsilon}{\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon} s + \frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon} \bar{r}_0 - \bar{r}_f \right)}{\rho_0 (\bar{r}_0 - \bar{r}_f)}$$

There are two effects of a larger  $\rho_\varepsilon$  on the change in optimal portfolio allocation. First, for any given signal  $s$ , the agent updates the mean return of the distribution more when  $\rho_\varepsilon$  is larger, because the posterior of the mean of the return distribution  $\left( \frac{\rho_\varepsilon}{\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon} s + \frac{\rho_0}{\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon} \bar{r}_0 \right)$  is a weighted average of the signal and the prior mean distribution. Second, the agent responds more to any changes in the mean of the return distribution because the precision is higher for any signal (this is conveyed through the first term  $\frac{(\rho_0 + \rho_\varepsilon)}{\rho_0}$  of this equation). These two effects imply that responses to signals via trading activity will be larger for an agent who believes that their signal precision is higher.

This prediction is consistent with our findings of both greater buying and selling activity amongst positive return IPO lottery winners. Furthermore, if (as seems plausible) winning a negative return IPO lottery *reduces* the agent's perceived precision, then the model is also able to explain our finding that lottery winners of negative return IPOs reduce their buying and selling.

The model can also explain the attenuation in the marginal response to a lottery in an intuitive fashion — additional perceived signals about the agent's own ability/signal precision following the initial one will factor less into their inferences of their signal precision as they learn more in the usual Bayesian manner. Another positive feature of this model, in contrast with the model in which agents learn about returns, is that it does not necessarily predict that a winner of a positive IPO

lottery should increase their allocation to the market overall. If we interpret the model strictly as an alternative to the model in which agents learn about returns, there is no current signal about market returns conveyed by the IPO return; so the implications are solely about trading volume, since  $\rho_\varepsilon$  will differentially affect the responses only to future signals. Even if we were to relax this strict assumption and allow that winning an IPO lottery with a positive return signal might also increase perceived returns, the agent updating about her own ability is exposed to many new signals over time, and because of their greater precision, will respond to those as well, dampening the effect on the portfolio allocation overall.

We note that this model is not completely able to explain our results, however, as it cannot deliver the tilt towards the sector of the treatment IPO. To explain this feature of the data, we would need an auxiliary assumption such as a warm glow towards this sector following random gains on the IPO, and the reverse following losses. Another important consideration is that in the data, the increases in trading volume caused by the treatment are temporary. If signal precision is perceived to be permanently higher, we would see a long-run level of trading volume that is higher for the treated than for the control group – we do not have evidence of this in the data. To explain this feature of our results, in the model of learning about ability, perceived shocks to signal precision must also be temporary rather than permanent. Put differently, while investors appear to be learning about their own ability from noise, within a few months, they appear to learn that they have made a mistaken inference about their ability.

### **6.4.3 Past Experienced Returns and Priors**

In response to a new signal, the model predicts that treated and control agents will update their portfolios differently on average, which we see in the data. However the model also shows that the strength of the effect is dependent on a number of other parameters, including the agents' prior means and variances of the return distribution. In particular, the prediction is that the strength of the effect will be higher for those with lower prior mean returns  $\bar{r}_0$ , and those with higher prior variances (lower prior precisions  $\rho_0$ ).

We explore whether this is indeed borne out in the data. To do so, we assume that agents' priors are shaped by their past experienced returns on their portfolios. To be more specific, we check whether the experience effects vary by the mean and variance of past returns of the stocks previously held by the investors in our sample. These two measures should help predict the extent to which

investors react to the IPO lottery returns, if they were to compare these returns to the mean and variance of their experienced return distribution.

For every investor in the sample, we compute the mean and variance of the pooled distribution of daily returns on all securities ever held by the investor, over their holding period for these securities in the period prior to their entering the lottery.<sup>35</sup>

Table 4 presents our results on treatment effects by the mean and variance of past return experiences. Panel A of Table 4 bins investors on the basis of past mean return experiences in (Columns 1 – 3) – these columns correspond to those with negative mean returns, low (but positive) mean returns, and high mean returns defined using the median return experience in sample. Similarly, low and high variance (Columns 4 – 5) of past return experiences are defined by the median variance of past return experience across all investors. We find that winners in the negative mean past return experience bin increase their trading volume by 10.3 percentage points relative to the lottery losers in the same bin. This effect monotonically declines to 4.6 percentage points for those in the highest mean return experience bin. Lottery winners with high precision, i.e., low variance of their past experienced returns distribution (Column 4), trade 6.9 percentage points more than lottery losers in the same precision bin. With lower precision (high variance, Column 5), lottery winners trade 7.3 percentage points more than lottery losers, and 0.4 percentage points higher than lottery winners with lower variance in their experienced returns distribution. These effects are consistent with the predictions of the simple model, i.e., equation (7).

Arguably, these effects are also a function of the extent of time investors have been in the market. Panel (B) of Table 4 presents these results with age controls, and with both the mean and variance of the experienced returns distribution as simultaneous explanatory variables. Column (1) in Panel (B) presents these results for a sub-sample of investors who have been active for at least twelve months prior to the IPO lottery, and Columns (2) and (3) present the treatment effect after controlling for age in levels and by interacting with our treatment dummy in equation (1). After controlling for age,

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<sup>35</sup>For example, consider an investor entering the lottery in January 2008. If this investor only held stock A between January 2007 and April 2007, and stock B between June 2007 and December 2007, we compute the mean and variance of the pooled daily returns distribution for stocks A and B over the periods during which the investor held these stocks. Appendix Figure A.7. plots the pooled daily returns distribution of all securities in India for our sample period. We note that the daily mean is 0.16% and the daily variance 0.25%.

we find once again that the treatment effect declines with higher mean past experienced returns, and increases with higher variance of past experienced returns.<sup>36</sup>

We note that this prediction is hard to test because it is difficult to know what precisely shapes agents' priors – this gives rise to obvious measurement concerns. Nevertheless, it is interesting to document that measuring past return experience in the most general way possible lends support to the simple model that we consider.

## 6.5 Attention

Winning the IPO lottery may increase the attention that investors pay to their portfolio, and therefore make them more likely to respond to signals about individual stocks. This could explain why trading behavior increases. However, one challenge to this interpretation is that winning the IPO lottery, but then having the IPO stock go down might also plausibly increase attention. Contrary to this interpretation, we find that lottery winners whose IPO stock loses value appear *less* likely to trade in the future. It is of course possible that winning a negative return IPO lottery makes investors want to pay less attention to their portfolio – to bury their heads in the sand – and any explanation of our results based on attention would require this assumption.

One approach to test for whether changes in attention are responsible for our results is to understand whether investors who are more active in the market – defined by their trading intensity in the market – respond differently to the lottery. We estimate this heterogeneous treatment effect, binning all investors by the average number of trades executed by investors in the six months prior to the IPO lottery. Lottery winners who trade between 0 and 5 times, on average, every month, increase trading volume by about 7.5 percentage points more than lottery losers in the same bin. Winners who trade at least 30 times, on average, every month, also show a rise in trading volume of about 5 percentage points more than lottery losers in the same bin (Appendix Figure A.6.). This suggests that the results may not be driven solely by attention paid to the portfolio by investors because of winning the lottery.

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<sup>36</sup>Taking column (3) as our preferred specification, for an investor with 0.17% mean past returns, the treatment effect declines by  $-11.817 \times 0.17\% \sim -2$  percentage points. Similarly, with a variance of 0.24% for past return experiences, the treatment effect increases by  $0.676 \times 0.24\% \sim 0.16$  percentage points.

## 7 Repeated Experiences and Responses to Noise

Thus far, we have provided evidence that the random shock of winning an IPO lottery causes investors to have increased trading volume, as well as increasing the probability that they apply for future IPO lotteries. In this section we document an important heterogeneous treatment effect, namely, how investors' responses to this random shock vary with their experience in the IPO market.

There are two basic reasons why an investors' past experience in the IPO market could be related to the size of their response to this shock, which is essentially pure noise. The first is that investors' prior experiences in the IPO market could have a *causal* effect on their future responses to noise. One causal mechanism could be that investors learn from their prior experiences of winning lotteries that there is no information contained in the fact that they were randomly allotted shares. Of course, such "learning" might also reflect the tendency for those who have won past lotteries to simply respond less to the marginal experience over and above the effect of previous experiences, without any real introspection about the underlying causes of the experience. In this latter interpretation, any additional shock for investors who have had many in the past just "shocks" investors less as the effect wears off.

The second possible reason for expecting a relationship between investors' past experiences and the extent of their response to additional experiences is that investors might *select* into having more experiences. The factors that determine selection into new experiences also cause investors to respond less to noise shocks. For example, investors with a better understanding of how the lottery works might choose to experience more IPOs, and also respond less to the shock of winning the lottery.

Our goal in this analysis is not to distinguish these mechanisms, which would require us to find exogenous variation in experience. Instead, we focus on how much the effect of winning the lottery declines with experience, which we understand could occur via both mechanisms. We can also check how this heterogeneous treatment effect varies across investors' propensity to apply for future IPOs and the spillover effects on trading behavior in the non-IPO portfolio of the investor.

Figure 3 presents our main results on the relationship between previous experience and the effect of winning the lottery. We define past experience in IPOs in three different ways: 1) the number of random wins experienced by the investor in the past six months; 2) the number of random wins

experienced by the investor in the past 12 months; and 3) the number of random wins experienced by the investor measured from the beginning of our data. The x-axis bins the sample into investors who have experienced zero or one experience, two or three experiences, and greater than or equal to four experiences. For each definition of experience, and for each experience bin, we separately estimate the treatment effect of winning the lottery.

Panel A of the figure focuses on the probability that an investor will apply for or be allotted a future IPO in the month after winning the lottery as the outcome variable on the y-axis. The Panel shows a clear negative relationship between previous experience in the IPO market and investors' response to the random noise of winning the lottery. Investors with four or more IPO experiences no longer respond to a marginal IPO lottery win by increasing their future probability of applying to IPOs. Whether the result is causal or a result of selection, it is quite a striking attenuation in the response to the random shock of winning the lottery with increasing experience.

Panels B of the figure focuses on trading activity. Panel B shows, like Panel A, that there is a declining pattern of treatment effects – investors' trading volumes react less as past experience increases. That said, there is still a statistically significant non-zero increase in trading volume even for investors with four or more past experiences of winning the lottery. We estimate that this response on average amounts to four percentage points more trading volume for lottery winners than for lottery losers.<sup>37</sup>

Figure 4 separates the treatment effects presented in Figure 3, using the measure of experience measured since the beginning of the dataset, by three important investor characteristics, namely, account age in months (first column), portfolio size measured in the month of the IPO lottery (second column), and trading volume measured in the month of the IPO lottery (third column). The plots contain a significant amount of information, so it is worth carefully describing the top left-hand corner plot (Panel A.1) to provide an idea of the basic structure of all of the plots. Along the x-axis of this plot in Panel A, we still bin the sample into investors who have experienced zero or one experience, two or three experiences, and greater than or equal to four experiences. However, the difference is that *within* each such bin, there are three different sets of investors represented,

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<sup>37</sup>Appendix Figure A.5 plots the lottery-weighted (as in equation 2) returns and equal-weighted returns experienced by each experience bin. We find that the returns are very similar across experience bins, and the observed estimates on trading volume are not merely due to the selection of more experienced investors into lower return IPOs.

namely “young” investors represented as blue squares, averaging 2 months’ total time in the market, “middle-aged” investors represented by red circles who have spent an average of 16 months in the market, and “old” investors, represented as green triangles, with an average of 46 months in the market. Each circle, square, or triangle in Panel A shows the treatment effect for the specific group on the probability of applying (or being allotted) a future IPO arising from randomly winning the IPO lottery.

Having described its basic structure, we can see from Panel A.1 that there is mainly “within” age group variation in coefficients along the dimension of the number of IPO experiences, and very little “between” age group variation in coefficient sizes. Put differently, the attenuation in the effect of winning the lottery occurs with experiences rather than with calendar time spent in the market. This is important, as it suggests that explanations of the effect of experience on learning might wish to focus on the number of times an action is performed rather than the time elapsed in a particular environment. Panel A.2 and A.3 confirm this reasoning when we double sort by portfolio size and turnover size – in both cases, within-group variation along the dimension of IPO experience is greater than the across-group variation. Clearly there is something special about the role of actual past experience when it comes to future interest in repeating the same experience (i.e., investing in the IPO stock), whether this effect arises from selection or a causal mechanism such as learning.

Panels B.1 to B.3 show similar results to Panel A, with the difference here being that the outcome variable is now the effect on trading volume in the remainder of investors’ portfolios. Similar to Figure 3, even in the group of investors with 4 or more past experiences, and regardless of the double sort variable (i.e., age, portfolio value, or trading volume level), there is still a statistically significant response of trading volume to the shock of winning the lottery. However, another key pattern evident in these heterogeneous treatment effect results, which also shows up in Panel A of the figure, is that the negative relationship between past experiences and the treatment effect of winning the lottery is strongest for young investors, low portfolio value investors, and low trading volume investors. For the oldest investors, and those with the highest portfolio and trading values, we see a much weaker decline in treatment effects as experience in the IPO market increases.

While the effect of experience does still seem to matter, one possible interpretation of this finding is that older, larger, and more active accounts accumulate informative experience, or there may be self-selection of the more informed into multiple IPO lottery experiences, which renders the

narrow experience in the IPO market less important. Appendix Table A.3 presents statistical tests of these differences and shows that they are by and large statistically significant.

Overall, these results suggest that experience in the market reduces investors' response to a noise shock in a directly related behavior (applying to future IPOs), but that portfolio spillover effects from IPO shock on trading volume persist for investors with substantial experience in the market. They also shed light on the fact that the extent of direct experience in the domain being considered seems to be important for the attenuation of the effect, over and above any effects of age, size, or activity.

## 8 Conclusion

In this paper, we provide new estimates of how investment behavior changes in response to random positive and negative shocks to returns. To do so, we exploit a unique institutional setting in which 1.5 million investors between 2007 and 2012 participate in lotteries for shares in 54 Indian IPOs. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate the causal effect of randomly experienced noise on investment behavior using the randomized allotment of real securities.

Investors that experience exogenous gains in IPO stocks respond in a variety of interesting ways. They become more likely to apply for future IPOs. They exhibit strong portfolio spillover effects, in the sense that random positive or negative shocks on the IPO stock generate substantial increases or decreases in trading volume in, and allocations to, the other stocks held in their portfolios. They tilt their portfolios into the industry sector of the randomly allotted IPO stock. All of these effects are symmetric, with negative responses following randomly experienced losses on the IPO stock.

To explain these robust, causally estimated responses to noise, we evaluate a number of existing models of learning from noise. Theories of reinforcement learning, the use of simple heuristics such as win-stay-lose-switch, and models of extrapolative beliefs all find it difficult to rationalize the big increases in winning investors' trading volume, especially since both buy *and* selling volume rise considerably. A simple model in which agents misperceive noise as signal and update their priors about stock returns are also unable to explain our results. However, a model in which the agent misinterprets random gains and losses as signals about their own ability does help to rationalize the results – especially the increases in (buy and sell) trading volume – as this type of agent believes that future signals are more precise, and is likely to trade more. This is intriguing, and suggests that

the powerful effect of experiences on future behavior witnessed in many economic contexts may at least in part stem from more introspective sources of learning – agents learning about themselves, rather than solely about the environment in which they operate.

We explore how these responses vary with the number of experiences, measured in a number of ways, that agents have. We find that the treatment effects are stronger for smaller accounts and for accounts that have spent less time in the market. But importantly, the most significant type of repetition associated with reductions in the size of the effect of any additional IPO lottery is participating in and winning several past IPO lotteries. This suggests that models considering the role of learning in markets might wish to carefully consider the extent of relevant, narrowly defined experience in particular domains, in addition to the role of time spent in the market, and the level of activity in the market.

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
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
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Figure 1: Experience effects and first-day return experience

**Panel A:  $I(\text{Apply/Allot Future IPO} > 0)$**



**Panel B:  $IHS(\text{Gross transactions value} + 1)$**



**Panel C:  $I(\text{Gross transactions value} > 0)$**




Figure 2: Mental Accounting





Figure 3: Experience effects and number of past random wins

**Panel A:  $I(\text{Apply/Allot Future IPO} > 0)$**



**Panel B:  $I(\text{Gross transactions volume} > 0)$**







Figure 4: Experience effects by Age, Portfolio Value and Gross Transactions value

1. Age

2. Portfolio Value

3. Gross Transactions Value

Panel A:  $I(\text{Apply/Allot Future IPO} > 0)$



Panel B:  $I(\text{Gross transactions volume} > 0)$






Table 1: Summary statistics

## PANEL A: IPO CHARACTERISTICS

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	All
<b>IPOs in sample</b>						
Number of IPOs in sample	12	10	2	22	8	54
Percentage of all IPOs in India	12.04	31.58	11.76	32.84	20.51	22.13
Value of IPOs in sample (\$ bn)	0.28	0.42	0.03	1.58	0.34	2.65
Percentage of total value of IPOs in India	3.00	8.77	0.72	11.01	24.62	7.71
Percentage issued (Retail investors excl. employees)	33.01	34.33	34.88	32.71	35.00	33.50
Over-subscription ratio	21.95	12.63	2.11	10.10	6.72	12.06
No. of randomized share categories (“Experiments”)	109	55	2	177	40	383
Total no. of share categories	178	152	28	398	227	983
<b>No. of IPOs from different sectors</b>						
Technology	1	1	0	2	0	4
Manufacturing	8	6	2	12	3	31
Other Services	2	3	0	8	4	17
Retail	1	0	0	0	1	2

## PANEL B: CHARACTERIZING LOTTERY APPLICATION AND ALLOTMENT EXPERIENCE

Treatment characteristics	Mean	Percentile across experiments				
		10	20	50	75	90
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Application Amount (\$)	1,750	155	343	791	1,397	2,093
Probability of Treatment	0.36	0.09	0.20	0.37	0.64	0.84
Allotment Value (\$)	150	125	130	142	158	169
First Day Gain/Loss (%)	39.18	-7.57	6.10	17.13	37.08	87.77
First Day Gain/Loss (\$)	61.89	-11.14	8.49	24.78	53.03	136.94
Median Portfolio Value (t-2,\$)	1,748	722	1,088	1,594	2,270	2,999

Table 2: Experience effects on Investor behavior

PANEL A: EFFECTS BY EVENT-TIME

	Event-time									
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Future IPO participation	0.0005 (0.0008) [0.2172]	-0.0009 (0.0006) [0.3324]	-0.0001 (0.0010) [0.3786]	0.0017 (0.0011) [0.4850]	0.0094*** (0.0015) [0.4636]	0.0071** (0.0030) [0.2242]	0.0029** (0.0015) [0.1283]	0.0019** (0.0009) [0.0959]	0.0032** (0.0012) [0.1341]	0.0013 (0.0011) [0.0605]
2. Gross transaction value	0.0057 (0.0059) [0.4496]	0.0000 (0.0077) [0.9908]	0.0034 (0.0058) [1.6807]	0.0212** (0.0093) [1.6114]	0.0746*** (0.0121) [1.5832]	0.0742*** (0.0082) [0.9868]	0.0447*** (0.0118) [0.3052]	0.0333*** (0.0083) [0.2147]	0.0345*** (0.0089) [0.4525]	0.0345*** (0.0066) [0.2522]
3. Weight in IPO sector	0.0004 (0.0003) [0.0499]	0.0005 (0.0004) [0.1042]	0.0001 (0.0002) [0.0629]	0.0003 (0.0003) [0.0769]	0.0001 (0.0004) [0.0708]	0.0005* (0.0003) [0.0822]	0.0008*** (0.0003) [0.0811]	0.0009** (0.0004) [0.0823]	0.0008*** (0.0003) [0.0851]	0.0006*** (0.0002) [0.0808]
4. Portfolio value	0.0114 (0.0067) [1.9287]	0.0054 (0.0092) [3.1209]	0.0018 (0.0078) [4.1797]	-0.0023 (0.0073) [6.3721]	-0.0002 (0.0076) [8.0207]	0.0025 (0.0067) [8.7253]	0.0071 (0.0063) [9.0154]	0.0057 (0.0076) [8.0666]	0.0065 (0.0073) [7.6502]	0.0089 (0.0075) [7.5205]

PANEL B: BY IPO CHARACTERISTICS

	IPO characteristics	
	Positive Returns (1)	Negative Returns (2)
1. Future IPO Participation <i>Time: (t+1) to (t+6)</i>	0.0117*** (0.0013)	-0.0142** (0.0039)
2. Gross Transaction Value <i>Time: (t+1) to (t+6)</i>	0.0717*** (0.0071)	-0.0210 (0.0192)
3. Weight in IPO sector <i>Time: (t+1) to (t+6)</i>	0.0006*** (0.0002)	-0.0011* (0.0006)
Observations	1,473,073	89,637

Table 3: Treatment effect by past flipping activity

PANEL A: PREDICTING FLIPPING ACTIVITY BY LOTTERY WINNERS		
	$\beta$	Odds ratio
Type 1: Ever flipped in the past	0.859*** (0.007)	2.36*** (0.017)
Type 2: Flipped in most recent past IPO	0.304*** (0.011)	1.35*** (0.015)
PANEL B: TREATMENT EFFECT BY FLIPPING ACTIVITY (TYPE 1)		
Flippers	0.065*** (0.008)	
Non-flippers	0.088*** (0.008)	
PANEL C: TREATMENT EFFECT BY FLIPPING ACTIVITY (TYPE 2)		
Flippers	0.069*** (0.017)	
Non-flippers	0.078*** (0.006)	

Table 4: Experience effects by past return experiences

PANEL A: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY MEAN AND VARIANCE OF PAST DAILY RETURN EXPERIENCES

	Mean(Past daily return experience)			Variance(Past daily return experience)	
	$\mu_i \leq 0$	Low $\mu_i$	High $\mu_i$	Low $\sigma_i^2$	High $\sigma_i^2$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Coefficient	0.103*** (0.013)	0.067*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.069*** (0.011)	0.073*** (0.011)
Mean $\mu_i$ within each bin	-0.06%	0.10%	0.63%	...	...
Mean $\sigma_i^2$ within each bin	...	...	...	0.09%	0.65%
Mean IPO return	22.40%	19.89%	21.79%	20.55%	17.77%

PANEL B: TREATMENT EFFECTS WITH AGE CONTROLS

Dep Var: Gross Transactions Value	(1)	(2)	(3)
I(Allot)	0.079*** (0.008)	0.0923*** (0.006)	0.107*** (0.008)
Mean(Past Returns)	17.294*** (1.878)	24.066*** (1.016)	27.583*** (1.083)
Var(Past Returns)	-0.766*** (0.091)	-0.670*** (0.171)	-0.527*** (0.108)
I(Allot) $\times$ Mean(Past Returns)	-8.318*** (3.196)	-9.971*** (1.642)	-11.817*** (1.668)
I(Allot) $\times$ Var(Past Returns)	0.666*** (0.101)	0.524*** (0.180)	0.676*** (0.256)
Constant	5.053*** (0.004)	4.761*** (0.004)	4.752*** (0.007)
Age control	Age $\geq$ 12 months	In levels	levels + interaction
Avg. Mean(Past Returns)	0.13%	0.17%	0.17%
Avg. Var(Past Returns)	0.32%	0.24%	0.24%
No. of observations	934,504	1,561,496	1,561,496

# Online Appendix

Learning from Noise: Evidence from India's IPO Lotteries

Santosh Anagol\*      Vimal Balasubramaniam†      Tarun Ramadorai‡

October 22, 2018

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# 1 An Example: Barak Valley Cements IPO Allocation Process

Barak Valley Cements' IPO opened for subscription for the two day period October 29, 2007 through November 1, 2007. The stock was simultaneously listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) on November 23, 2007. The price that lottery winners paid for the stock, which we refer to as the "issue price" throughout the paper, was Rs. 42 per share. The price the stock first traded at on the market, which we refer to as the "listing price," was 62 rupees per share. The stock closed on the first day of listing at 56.05 rupees per share, for a 33.45% listing day gain (note that this gain is the positive shock experienced by those investors randomly allotted the IPO shares, as we describe more fully below). The retail oversubscription rate  $\nu$  for this issue was 37.62. Given this high  $\nu$ , all retail investors that applied for this IPO were entered into a lottery.

Appendix Table A.1 shows the official retail investor IPO allocation data for Barak Valley Cements.<sup>1</sup> Each row of column (0) of the table shows the share category  $c$ , associated with a number of shares applied for given in column (1), which, given the minimum lot size  $x = 150$  for this offer is just  $cx$ . In this case, the total number of share categories ( $C$ ) equals 15, meaning that the maximum retail bid is for 2,250 shares.<sup>2</sup> Column (2) of the table shows the total number of retail investor applications received for each share category, and column (3) is the product of columns (1) and (2). Column (4) shows the investor allocation under a proportional allocation rule, i.e.,  $\frac{cx}{\nu}$ . Given that these proportional allocations are all below the minimum lot size of 150 shares, regulation requires the firm to conduct a lottery to decide share allocations.

Column (5) shows the probability of winning the lottery for each share category  $c$ , which is  $p = \frac{c}{\nu}$ . For example, 2.7% of investors that applied for the minimum lot size of 150 shares will receive this allocation, and the remaining 97.3% of investors applying in this share category will receive no shares. In contrast, 40.6% of investors in share category  $c = 15$  receive the minimum lot size  $x = 150$  shares. For this particular IPO, *all* retail investors are entered into a lottery, and ultimately receive either zero or 150 shares of the IPO. Column (6) shows the total number of shares ultimately allotted to investors

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<sup>1</sup>These data are obtained from [http://www.chittorgarh.com/ipo/ipo\\_boa.asp?a=134](http://www.chittorgarh.com/ipo/ipo_boa.asp?a=134).

<sup>2</sup>The number of share categories is capped at 15 here because  $C = 16$  would correspond to 2,400 shares, and a subscription amount of Rs. 100,800 at the issue price of Rs. 42. This subscription amount would violate the prevailing (in 2007) regulatory maximum retail investor application constraint of Rs. 100,000 rupees per IPO.

in each share category, which is the product of  $x$ , column (2), and column (5). Columns (7) and (8) show the total sizes of the winner and loser groups in each share category for the Barak Valley Cements IPO lottery, respectively.

It is perhaps easiest to think of our data as comprising a large number of experiments, in which each experiment is a share category within an IPO. *Within* each experiment the probability of treatment is the same for all applicants, and we exploit this source of randomness, combining all of these experiments together to estimate the causal effect of randomly experiencing the IPO listing return on future investment behavior. We explain this more fully in the methodology section, following the data description below.

## 2 Bayesian Learning From Noise: Multiple risky-assets

Consider an agent maximizing exponential utility  $-\exp(-\gamma W)$  of terminal wealth  $W$ , with risk aversion coefficient  $\gamma$ .

$$\max_q -\exp(-\gamma W) \tag{1}$$

$$\text{s.t. } W = r_f(W_0 - \iota q) + q\tilde{z} \tag{2}$$

The agent has to allocate initial wealth  $W_0$  between a risk-free asset with return  $r_f$ , and a risky asset vector with prices normalized to 1, delivering a random payoff vector of  $\tilde{z}$ . The choice variable is  $q$ , the vector of amounts invested in the risky asset.  $\iota$  is a row vector of ones.

The agent does not know the true distribution of the risk asset payoff vector  $\tilde{z}$ ; he begins with a prior distribution and then updates to a posterior distribution based on signals (return experiences, winning the IPO lottery, etc.). We call the prior distribution of the risky asset payoff  $\hat{r}$  and assume that this prior distribution is jointly normal with mean payoff vector  $\bar{r}_0$  and variance-covariance matrix  $\Sigma_0$  (i.e.  $\hat{r} \sim N(\bar{r}_0, \Sigma_0)$ ). Maximizing utility subject to the prior distribution of asset returns, the optimal portfolio allocation vector  $q^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \Sigma_0^{-1} (\bar{r}_0 - r_f) = \frac{1}{\gamma} \Lambda_0 (\bar{r}_0 - r_f)$ , where  $\Lambda_0 = \Sigma_0^{-1}$  is the precision matrix of the agent's priors about risky asset returns.

## 2.1 Learning about the distribution of market returns

The first case that we consider is that agents randomly experiencing gains or losses interpret this as a signal about returns, whereas lottery losing agents that do not experience these returns act as if they receive no signal. We denote the signal by  $\tilde{s} \sim N(\tilde{r}, \Sigma_\varepsilon)$ , where  $\Sigma_\varepsilon = \Lambda_\varepsilon^{-1}$  is a matrix of noise variances and covariances associated with incoming signals.

If this were the case, following the IPO win, treated agents would use Bayes' rule to calculate the posterior distribution of returns.  $\Sigma_S$  denotes the posterior variance-covariance matrix of returns, and  $\tilde{r}_S$  the posterior mean returns:

$$\Sigma_S = \Sigma_0(\Sigma_0 + \Sigma_\varepsilon)^{-1}\Sigma_\varepsilon, \Lambda_S = \Sigma_S^{-1}. \quad (3)$$

$$\tilde{r}_S = \Sigma_0(\Sigma_0 + \Sigma_\varepsilon)^{-1}\tilde{s} + (\Sigma_0 + \Sigma_\varepsilon)^{-1}\Sigma_\varepsilon\bar{r}_0. \quad (4)$$

Agents would adjust their portfolio to  $q_S^* = \frac{1}{\gamma}\Lambda_S(\tilde{r}_S - r_f)$ . We can generically consider two potential types of signals. The first is that agents perceive the randomly experienced gains as a sign of returns on the market. Equivalently, this is a rise in the expected returns of all stocks, i.e., all elements of  $\tilde{r}_S - r_f$  are positive. The second type of perceived signal is more restricted, to particular stocks (say those in the sector of the treatment IPO). In this case, some elements of  $\tilde{r}_S - r_f$  are positive, while others are zero.

In the first case, i.e. a perceived rise in the expected return of all stocks, all elements of  $q_S^*$  should be greater than the corresponding elements of  $q^*$  as a result of the mean return expectation on risky assets increasing. Moreover, since the agents' perceived posterior total precision  $\Lambda_S$  is larger following the signal, this provides an additional upward kick to  $q_S^*$ .

In the second case, i.e., a rise in the perceived expected return of some stocks, some elements of  $q_S^*$  should be greater than the corresponding elements of  $q^*$ , and the agent's perceived posterior precision  $\Lambda_S$  is also greater, albeit for only some elements of the matrix.

In both cases, the model yields counterfactual predictions. This is for two reasons. First, as we know, the average allocation to risky assets for the treated does not rise — and this is predicted by

both types of signals about returns. It is true that a more restricted perceived signal does help to explain the tilt towards particular sectors, but without a corresponding reduction in the means of other sectors, or indeed an auxiliary assumption such as mental accounting, it is difficult to rationalize the observed lack of an increase in the overall portfolio weight to risky assets. The second counterfactual prediction is perhaps more troubling. Since the agent's posterior precision  $\Lambda_S$  is higher following the perceived signal, we should observe that treated agents' portfolio weights  $q_S^*$  react *less* to any *future* incoming signals of either direction, assuming that the post-IPO signal distribution is balanced across treated and control agents.<sup>3</sup> This would predict a *drop* in future trading volume for the treated agents, regardless of whether the initial signal was perceived to be positive or negative. This runs strongly counter to our empirical results.<sup>4</sup>

## 2.2 Learning about own ability

We next consider the case in which the agent perceives the randomly experienced gains or losses from the IPO as a positive or negative shock to their own investment ability.

To do so, we assume that a sensible measure of the agent's ability is the precision of the signal distribution, i.e.,  $\Lambda_\varepsilon$ . The greater the signal precision, the greater the agent's ability. This is a common assumption in the literature on stock trading (see, for e.g., Gervais and Odean 2001, and Linnainmaa, 2011).

To model agents drawing inferences about their own ability, we consider agents with priors over  $\tilde{\Lambda}_\varepsilon \sim \text{Wishart}(v, \Lambda_\varepsilon^0)$ , where  $v$  is the number of observations about own ability that the agent has previously experienced. If the treated agent updates their prior about their own ability in response to a randomly experienced gain (essentially, treating experienced luck as a signal of their own skill), then the agent will update perceived signal precision as  $\tilde{\Lambda}_\varepsilon^S$ , with some of its elements increasing or decreasing with the randomly experienced IPO return, and posterior  $v^S$  incremented as well.

The model yields a set of predictions that are closer to what we observe in the data. First, in

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<sup>3</sup>Intuition is provided by the single risky asset case. If the treated agent's posterior precision is  $\rho_S$ , and the control agent's is  $\rho$ , and  $\rho_S > \rho$ , any incoming signal with precision  $\rho_\varepsilon$  about returns will be weighted  $\frac{\rho_\varepsilon}{\rho_S} < \frac{\rho_\varepsilon}{\rho}$  by the treated agent, affecting the distribution of portfolio weights less. This is the standard result about additional informational updates affecting posteriors marginally less.

<sup>4</sup>We note also that any interpretation of the IPO lottery as a shock to the precision of the market return distribution also delivers the same (counterfactual) implication that the winners will be less responsive to all future signals.

response to an update to perceived signal precision, the model-predicted average allocation to risky assets for the treated does not rise, because there is no change in this model to the parameters of the currently perceived return distribution. Second, since the treated agent’s posterior precision of incoming signals is higher, we should observe that treated agents’ portfolio weights  $q_S^*$  react *more* to future incoming signals of either direction, once again assuming that the post-IPO signal distribution is balanced across treated and control agents.<sup>5</sup> This would predict a *rise* in future trading volume for the treated agents, with randomly experienced gains, and a *drop* for randomly experienced losses. This explains an important feature of our empirical results. Finally, the model can also explain the attenuation in the marginal response to a lottery in an intuitive fashion — additional perceived signals about the agent’s own ability/signal precision following the initial one will factor less into their inferences of their signal precision as they learn more in the usual Bayesian manner.<sup>6</sup>

That said, however, this model does not completely explain our results, as it cannot deliver the tilt towards the sector of the treatment sector IPO. To explain this result, we will require recourse to an auxiliary assumption such as a warm glow towards this sector following random gains on the IPO and the reverse following losses.

Another important consideration here is that in the data, the increases in trading volume caused by the treatment are temporary. If signal precision is perceived to be permanently higher, we would see a long-run level of trading volume that is higher for the treated than for the control group, which we do not. To explain this feature of our results, in the model of learning about ability, perceived shocks to signal precision must also be temporary. Put differently, while investors appear to be learning about their own ability from noise, within a few months, they appear to learn that they have made a mistaken inference about their ability.

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<sup>5</sup>Again, intuition is provided by the single risky asset case. If the treated agent’s prior precision is  $\rho$ , same as that of the control agent, and *incoming* signal precision  $\rho_\epsilon^S$  is greater for treated agents than the  $\rho_\epsilon$  of control agents new signals about returns will be weighted  $\frac{\rho_\epsilon^S}{\rho} > \frac{\rho_\epsilon}{\rho}$  by the treated agent, affecting the distribution of weights more.

<sup>6</sup>Intuition for this is available by considering the univariate case with a Gamma distributed signal precision—the conjugate distribution is Gamma, with the posterior shape parameter driving the nonlinear rate of convergence to the truth in the presence of incoming shocks with constant effects on the scale parameter. Put differently, increments to  $v$  drive the nonlinear rate of learning about signal precision in the model.

### 3 Empirical Appendix

Table A.1: EXAMPLE IPO ALLOCATION PROCESS: BARAK VALLEY CEMENT IPO ALLOCATION

Share Category	Shares Bid For	# Applications	Total Shares	Proportional Allocation	Win Probability	Shares Allocated	# Treatment group	# Control group
(c)	$(c \times x)$	$a_c$	$a_c \times c \times x$	$\frac{c \times x}{v}$	$\frac{c}{v}$		$\frac{c}{v} \times a_c$	$(1 - \frac{c}{v}) \times a_c$
(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	150	14,052	2,107,800	4	0.027	57,000	380	13,672
2	300	9,893	2,967,900	8	0.054	80,250	535	9,358
3	450	5,096	2,293,200	12	0.081	61,950	414	4,682
4	600	4,850	2,910,000	16	0.108	78,750	525	4,325
5	750	2,254	1,690,500	20	0.135	45,750	305	1,949
6	900	1,871	1,663,900	24	0.162	45,450	304	1,567
7	1050	4,806	5,046,300	28	0.189	136,500	910	3,896
8	1200	2,900	3,480,000	32	0.216	94,050	628	2,272
9	1350	481	649,350	36	0.244	17,550	117	364
10	1500	1,302	1,953,000	41	0.271	52,800	352	950
11	1650	266	436,900	45	0.298	11,850	79	187
12	1800	317	570,600	49	0.325	15,450	103	214
13	1950	174	339,300	53	0.352	9,150	61	113
14	2100	356	747,600	57	0.379	20,250	135	221
15	2250	20,004	45,009,000	61	0.406	1,217,700	8119	11,885

Note: Columns (7) and (8) are obtained after applying the regulation defined rounding off methodology as described in the Online Appendix to Anagol, Balasubramaniam and Ramadorai (2018).

Table A.2: RANDOMIZATION CHECK

	Winner Mean (1)	Loser Mean (2)	Difference (3)	% Experiments > 10% significance (4)
Applied/Allotted an IPO	0.379	0.379	0.000	8.97
Cutoff Bid	0.926	0.925	0.001	10.96
IHS Gross Transaction Value	5.619	5.616	0.003	11.45
Gross Transaction Value = 0	0.287	0.288	-0.001	8.97
Gross Transaction Value = 0 to 500\$	0.183	0.183	-0.001	9.90
Gross Transaction Value = 500 to 1000\$	0.127	0.127	0.000	9.59
Gross Transaction Value = 1000 to 5000\$	0.287	0.285	0.002**	14.55
Gross Transaction Value > 5000 \$	0.116	0.117	-0.001*	8.97
IHS Portfolio Value	6.673	6.667	0.006	13.05
Portfolio Value = 0	0.214	0.215	0.000	10.18
Portfolio Value = 0 to 500\$	0.129	0.129	0.000	12.94
Portfolio Value = 500 to 1000\$	0.087	0.087	0.000	10.18
Portfolio Value = 1000 to 5000\$	0.317	0.317	0.000	8.09
Portfolio Value > 5000\$	0.252	0.252	0.000	9.39
No. of Securities Held	9.091	9.013	0.077**	10.96
IHS Account Age	3.148	3.143	0.005*	12.53
New Account	0.055	0.055	0.000	5.74
1 Month old	0.067	0.067	0.000	9.14
2-6 Months old	0.191	0.192	-0.001	8.87
7-13 Months old	0.141	0.141	0.000	8.87
14-25 Months old	0.167	0.167	0.000	9.92
> 25 Months old	0.375	0.373	0.002**	12.01

Table A.3: GROSS TRANSACTION VALUE DECOMPOSITION  
BY PURCHASE AND SALE VALUE, AND IPO SECTOR

Event time	Purchase value	Sale value	Gross Transactions Value	
			Non-IPO Sector	IPO Sector
-3	0	0.004	0.006	0.004
-2	-0.002	0.008	0.007	-0.002
-1	0.007	0.01	0.009	0.004
0	0.011*	0.027***	0.021***	0.015***
1	0.063***	0.069***	0.057***	0.068***
2	0.057***	0.058***	0.048***	0.047***
3	0.037***	0.032***	0.025***	0.033***
4	0.023***	0.029***	0.028***	0.020***
5	0.022***	0.030***	0.019***	0.023***
6	0.023***	0.026***	0.024***	0.017***

Table A.4: STATISTICAL TESTS FOR DIFFERENCES IN MAGNITUDES

Part 1: By no. of past random wins					Part 2: By Age, within random wins bins				
	[0 – 1]	≥ 4	Difference		Random wins (all)	Young	Old	Difference	
			$\chi^2$	$p$ -value				$\chi^2$	$p$ -value
<b>Panel A: IHS(TV + 1)</b>					<b>Panel A: Experience bin [0 – 1]</b>				
Random wins (6M)	0.088***	0.045**	3.747	0.053	I(Apply/Allot > 0)	0.010***	0.008***	1.084	0.298
Random wins (12M)	0.088***	0.038***	7.130	0.008	IHS(TV + 1)	0.087***	0.069***	0.944	0.331
Random wins (all)	0.087***	0.046***	6.437	0.011	I(TV > 0)	0.013***	0.012***	0.279	0.598
<b>Panel B: I(TV &gt; 0)</b>					<b>Panel B: Experience bin [2 – 3]</b>				
Random wins (6M)	0.014***	0.004**	14.087	0.000	I(Apply/Allot > 0)	0.004	0.007***	1.152	0.697
Random wins (12M)	0.014***	0.005***	17.286	0.000	IHS(TV + 1)	0.067*	0.100***	0.654	0.419
Random wins (all)	0.014***	0.007***	10.224	0.001	I(TV > 0)	0.004	0.014***	3.764	0.052
<b>Panel C: I(Apply/Allot &gt; 0)</b>					<b>Panel C: Experience bin ≥ 4</b>				
Random wins (6M)	0.010***	0.002	6.263	0.012	I(Apply/Allot > 0)	-0.006	0.003	0.396	0.529
Random wins (12M)	0.011***	0.000	16.023	0.000	IHS(TV + 1)	0.052	0.048***	0.002	0.961
Random wins (all)	0.011***	0.002	18.789	0.000	I(TV > 0)	0.006	0.008***	0.041	0.840
<b>Part 3: By Portfolio value, within random wins bins</b>					<b>Part 4: By Trading value, within random win bins</b>				
Random wins (all)	Small	Large	Difference		Random wins (all)	Small	Large	Difference	
			$\chi^2$	$p$ -value				$\chi^2$	$p$ -value
<b>Panel A: Experience bin [0 – 1]</b>					<b>Panel A: Experience bin [0 – 1]</b>				
I(Apply/Allot > 0)	0.013***	0.007***	7.524	0.006	I(Apply/Allot > 0)	0.017***	0.007***	25.783	0.000
IHS(TV + 1)	0.129***	0.023*	37.203	0.000	IHS(TV + 1)	0.133***	0.037***	34.631	0.000
I(TV > 0)	0.020***	0.004***	50.124	0.000	I(TV > 0)	0.020***	0.006***	40.664	0.000
<b>Panel B: Experience bin [2 – 3]</b>					<b>Panel B: Experience bin [2 – 3]</b>				
I(Apply/Allot > 0)	0.001	0.006**	0.932	0.334	I(Apply/Allot > 0)	0.011**	0.006**	0.818	0.366
IHS(TV + 1)	0.087***	0.044**	1.190	0.275	IHS(TV + 1)	0.106***	0.071***	0.862	0.353
I(TV > 0)	0.012***	0.007***	1.086	0.297	I(TV > 0)	0.016***	0.009***	1.883	0.170
<b>Panel C: Experience bin ≥ 4</b>					<b>Panel C: Experience bin ≥ 4</b>				
I(Apply/Allot > 0)	0.006	0.000	0.828	0.363	I(Apply/Allot > 0)	-0.003	0.002	0.435	0.678
IHS(TV + 1)	0.057	0.036*	0.188	0.665	IHS(TV + 1)	0.060	0.030	0.356	0.551
I(TV > 0)	0.005	0.006***	0.029	0.865	I(TV > 0)	0.011	0.006***	0.564	0.453

This table presents a formal statistical tests documenting the channels of learning. Part 1 presents the tests of difference between a sub-sample of individuals with [0,1] past random wins and those with at least 4 past random wins for gross transaction value (Panel A) as the outcome variable, trading propensity (Panel B) and the likelihood of applying for future IPOs (Panel C). The first two columns present the coefficient estimates for the two sub-samples, the third column presents the Wald  $\chi^2$  test statistic of difference between them from a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimate, and the last column the  $p$ -value for this test-statistic. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote statistical significance of the coefficient estimate at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Part 2 presents the tests of difference between a sub-sample of individuals who are young (Mean age: 2 months), and old (Mean age: 46 months), across different past random wins bins (Panels A, B and C) for three outcome variables gross transactions value, trading propensity and the likelihood of applying for future IPOs. Similarly, Part 3 presents the tests for a sub-sample of investors with small portfolio size (Median = \$0) and large portfolio size (Median = \$6,548). And Part 4 presents tests for a sub-sample of investors with small amounts of trading (Median = \$0) and large buy and sell values (Mean = \$2,633). Cells highlighted in green represent a statistically significant difference between the sub-groups, and cells highlighted in red indicate the inability to reject the null of no difference in magnitude between the sub-groups.

Figure A.1: IPO FREQUENCY





Figure A.2: IPO EXPERIENCE

First-day returns



First-day returns variability




Figure A.3: TOTAL RETAIL TURNOVER IN THE INDIAN STOCK MARKET





Figure A.4: COMPARISON OF LOTTERY SAMPLE TO INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

(a) Portfolio value distribution



(b) Histogram of number of trades




Figure A.5: RETURN EXPERIENCE ACROSS EXPERIENCE BINS





Figure A.6: TREATMENT EFFECT BY PAST TRADING ACTIVITY




Figure A.7: DAILY RETURNS DISTRIBUTION:  
INDIAN STOCKS 2002 – 2012

