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**MIND WHAT YOUR VOTERS READ:  
MEDIA EXPOSURE AND  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY  
MAKING**

Giovanni Facchini, Tommaso Frattini and Cora  
Signorotto

***INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND  
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# MIND WHAT YOUR VOTERS READ: MEDIA EXPOSURE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING

## Abstract

We investigate how media exposure affects elected representatives' response to preferences on immigration and trade policy. Using a novel dataset spanning the period 1986-2004, in which we match individual opinion surveys with congressmen roll call votes, we find that greater exposure to media coverage tends to increase a politician's accountability when it comes to migration policy making, while we find no effect for trade policy. Our results thus suggest that more information on the behavior of elected officials affects decisions only when the policy issue is perceived to be salient by the electorate.

JEL Classification: F22, H89

Keywords: political economy, Public Opinion, Roll Call Votes, Media exposure

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# Mind what your voters read: Media exposure and international economic policy making\*

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April 6, 2016

## Abstract

We investigate how media exposure affects elected representatives' response to preferences on immigration and trade policy. Using a novel dataset spanning the period 1986-2004, in which we match individual opinion surveys with congressmen roll call votes, we find that greater exposure to media coverage tends to increase a politician's accountability when it comes to migration policy making, while we find no effect for trade policy. Our results thus suggest that more information on the behavior of elected officials affects decisions only when the policy issue is perceived to be salient by the electorate.

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*“To better understand the impact the media has on political accountability at the level of the politician, we need more studies of decisions made by individual politicians.”* (Lim, Snyder, and Stromberg 2015)

## 1 Introduction

Liberalizing trade and migration policies brings about efficiency gains, that have been documented in several studies, using a variety of theoretical frameworks.<sup>1</sup> Still, as argued by many observers, important distortions continue to exist to the international flow of both goods and workers, and a distinguished literature has developed over the years to understand why and how these distortions are put in place. As argued by Rodrik (1995), the starting block of all these analyses is represented by individual preferences towards globalization. While several studies have investigated the drivers of attitudes towards globalization, little *direct* evidence exists on the process through which they are taken into account in the actual policy making. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap by analyzing how media exposure affects elected representatives’ response to constituent’s preferences for immigration and trade reform.

Our analysis focuses on the United States, a country for which we have been able to gather information on the preferences of the electorate on these two issues, and for which we also have data on the decisions taken by elected officials. In particular, we have constructed measures of aggregate opinion towards trade and migration at the congressional district level, and combined that information with data on the voting behavior of each congressman on trade and migration policy, together with a wealth of additional district and individual policy maker information. Our sample covers two decades spanning the period 1986-2004 during which Congress acted on several key pieces of legislation, like the 1993 approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the 1994 ratification of the Uruguay Round Agreements of the GATT and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. To capture the role played by the media we build on previous work by Snyder and Strömberg (2010) who have convincingly argued that the geographic mismatch between the market for local newspapers and the shape of the congressional district provides useful insights on the actual information that is *exogenously* available to the individual constituent.

Our findings indicate that important differences exist on how preferences towards international trade and migration inform actual policy making. In particular, we find that greater exposure to the scrutiny exercised by the media has a statistically significant and sizeable disciplining effect

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<sup>1</sup>E.g. see Hamilton and Whalley 1984, Feenstra 1995, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez – Clare 2012, di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Ortega 2012, Battisti et al. 2014.

when it comes to migration policy. The same is instead not true when we consider international trade. This basic result continues to hold when we control for a variety of additional district and individual level characteristics that have been found in the previous literature to be important drivers of representative's voting behavior in international economic policy making. The same is true when we address potential reverse causality concerns using an instrumental variable strategy exploiting the exogenous determinants of individual attitudes towards globalization. Furthermore, by comparing representatives elected in competitive races with those holding safe seats, we find evidence suggesting that electoral considerations drive our results: greater media exposure makes House members more accountable to their constituency on migration policy issues only if they have been elected in contested races.

How can these findings be rationalized? Standard economic models in the tradition of Heckscher and Ohlin suggest that trade and migration share similar causes and have analogous consequences when it comes to the labor market position of workers in the destination country. At the same time, it is well known that there are important differences between the drivers of preferences towards trade and migration. For instance, welfare state considerations are likely to play a much bigger role for the latter rather than the former, and the same is true when it comes to cultural factors (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). As a result, while in many opinion surveys immigration appears as one of the most important issues facing the individual respondent, this is hardly the case for trade policy. For example, data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study highlight that in 2006 over 40% of the respondents in the United States thought that migration was an extremely important issue in determining whom they voted for, suggesting that this issue is as relevant as social security, taxes and education. Trade, on the other hand, was rated at the same level of salience only by 16% of the respondents (see Guisinger 2009). One possible explanation for our results is thus that media exposure enhances accountability only for issues which are perceived to be salient by the electorate.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the existing literature, whereas section 3 presents the measure of media exposure. Section 4 presents our dataset, and section 5 discusses our main results. Section 6 addresses potential reverse causality concerns, while 7 assesses the robustness of our findings. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Literature

The analysis carried out in this paper contributes to fill an important gap in the literature by directly exploring the link between individual preferences towards globalization and the voting behavior of U.S. representatives on trade and migration policy reforms. In particular, our focus

is on the role of the media in enhancing political accountability. Thus, our work is related to at least three strands of literature: the growing set of studies that have analyzed public opinion towards globalization and its determinants; the research that has investigated the drivers of the voting behavior of elected officials on these matters in the U.S. Congress, and the more recent contributions that have studied the causal effect of media exposure on political accountability.

The literature on public opinions has analyzed and emphasized the role that both economic and non-economic individual-level characteristics play in shaping preferences towards trade and migration. The main message that emerges from studies in this tradition is that economic drivers that work through the labor market and the welfare state do play an important role in informing opinions towards migration and (at least when it comes to the labor market channel) trade (see for instance Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Facchini and Mayda 2009, Blonigen 2011 etc.). Non-economic drivers are also found to matter. This is true both in the case of opinions towards migration – where the role of cultural and national-identity issues and of racial and cultural prejudice has been emphasized (see Mayda 2006, Dustmann and Preston 2007, Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012 and Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015) – and towards trade (Mayda and Rodrik 2005), where patriotic and nationalistic feelings have been found to reduce support for opening up the economy to international competition. Importantly, while many studies have highlighted the role that the public’s preferences play in a democratic society as a key driver of economic policy making (e.g. Rodrik 1995), very limited evidence is available on how this process actually takes place (for an exception, see Facchini and Mayda 2010).

The determinants of congressional action on trade and migration policy have been extensively analyzed. Several contributions have examined individual pieces of legislations (for trade, see for instance Baldwin 1985, Marks 1993 and Baldwin and Magee 2000; for migration, see Gonzalez and Kamdar 2000, Fetzner 2006). A few studies have instead taken a broader, longer term perspective. Hiscox (2002) has investigated the determinants of support for thirty major pieces of trade legislation introduced between 1824 and 1994 to compare the relative performance of the Heckscher–Ohlin and Ricardo–Viner models in explaining support for trade reforms. Lake and Millimet (2016) have studied instead the role played by trade-related redistribution in shaping congressional support for 11 free trade agreements introduced between 1998–2013. Milner and Tingley (2011) and Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) focus instead on a large set of migration policy reforms, introduced after 1970, and investigate the role of both economic and non-economic determinants. In a recent paper, Conconi, Facchini, Steinhardt, and Zanardi (2012) consider congressional action on both trade and migration liberalization during the same period. Interestingly, they find that economic factors that work through the labor market play a similar role in both areas. Importantly, in these studies, the role of public opinion towards trade and migration is not

explicitly considered as a driver of the voting behavior of individual representatives. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap, by modeling the impact that the scrutiny of a representative's action by the media has in shaping her voting behavior.

For this reason, this paper is also related to the growing literature in economics and political science that studies how the media affect the electoral accountability of politicians. As argued by Ashworth (2012) in his recent, comprehensive review, the key challenge in this research area is to identify plausibly exogenous variation in the features that the theory identifies as important determinants of the responsiveness of politicians to their electorate. To this end in their pioneering contribution Snyder and Strömberg (2010) have exploited geographical mismatches between the congressional districts and media markets in the United States to trace the entire process through which an increase in information leads to greater or smaller responsiveness to election concerns. Interestingly, in their analysis of broad patterns in roll call votes, Snyder and Strömberg (2010) find that representatives of districts characterized by higher congruence tend to vote less often in line with their party orientation, and they also find that the extra news coverage induced by higher congruence makes representatives' roll call votes less ideologically extreme.<sup>2</sup> In our analysis of roll call votes on trade and migration we contribute to this literature by investigating whether the media's information transmission has a different impact depending on the saliency of the issue at stake, which as argued by Guisinger (2009) is likely to be comparatively high in the case of migration and low in the case of trade.

### 3 Measuring media exposure

Assessing the role of media exposure on a politician's responsiveness to his/her constituency preferences presents a series of significant challenges. First and foremost, media coverage is typically endogenous vis a vis most of the outcomes we might be interested in studying. For instance, consider the role that the media can play in supporting the work of democratic institutions. The fact that countries with a freer press are more democratic does not necessarily imply that free media *cause* an increase in democracy, as it is governments that are in the position to allow or not political coverage, and less democratic governments have stronger incentives to silence the press. Similarly, evidence suggesting that greater news coverage of political activities results in better informed citizens can hardly be deemed causal, as both higher demand for news and better knowledge could be simply the result of the unobserved preferences of the electorate for more information (see Ashworth 2012).

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<sup>2</sup>See also Lim, Snyder, and Stromberg (2015) for a study of the role of media exposure on the behavior of elected and appointed judges using a similar methodology.

Several attempts have been made to address the potential endogeneity of media coverage with respect to political accountability. Particularly relevant for our analysis is the recent contribution by Snyder and Strömberg (2010), who introduce the measure of “congruence” between the electoral district of a representative and local media markets in the United States, which we will be using throughout our analysis. As it had already been pointed out by Hess (1991) and Vinson (2003) media like local television provide substantially less coverage of congressmen activities than local newspapers. For this reason Snyder and Strömberg (2010) build their measure focusing on the markets for local newspapers. To grasp the basic idea behind their research design, consider a metropolitan area including an inner city district and multiple suburban districts. In this example, it is likely that many of the suburban voters will obtain their local news from a paper based in the big city and sold all over the metropolitan area. If the newspaper dedicates more attention to the politician elected in the inner city district, then inner city voters will obtain more information on their representative than their suburban counterparts. If models of electoral accountability are correct (see Ashworth 2012), this will lead to greater responsiveness to the electorate for the inner city representative, closely scrutinized by the media, than for the representatives elected in the suburbs receiving only limited attention.

The basic assumption that must hold for this type of measure of political coverage to be exogenous is that the “economic geography” factors that shape media markets should be different from the “political geography” factors that determine congressional district boundaries. This is likely to be the case, as on the one hand congressional districts boundaries are drawn so that all districts in each state have the same population, representation is guaranteed to different racial groups, incumbents are protected etc. On the other hand, the boundaries of local newspaper markets are driven by other factors. In particular, local newspapers are typically based in urban areas, with strong demand for advertising and news about the city’s public affairs. At the same time, their sales in the surrounding areas strongly depend on the distance between the suburb and the newspaper’s headquarters and on the socio-economic characteristics of the area’s residents.<sup>3</sup> As a result, the overlap of congressional districts and local newspaper markets exhibits substantial variation across space.

Formally, Snyder and Strömberg (2010) define their measure of congruence for district  $d$  as follows:

$$Congruence_d = \sum_n MarketShare_{nd} ReaderShare_{nd} \tag{1}$$

where  $MarketShare_{nd}$  indicates newspaper’s  $n$  share of total newspaper sales in district  $d$ , and

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<sup>3</sup>For an excellent analysis of the working of the US newspaper market, see Fan (2013).

$ReaderShare_{nd}$  is the share of newspaper’s  $n$  readers that live in district  $d$ . This measure varies depending on the number of newspapers serving a given district, their respective market shares and the importance that each district has for a newspaper’s total sales. The measure ranges between zero and one, with the latter value representing a situation in which an electoral district is perfectly matched with newspapers’ markets. As noted by Snyder and Strömberg (2010) “...since *Congruence* is defined using market shares, it is not dependent on total newspaper penetration... This is important since total newspaper readership in an area is related to characteristics such as education and income levels which are also related to political knowledge” (see also Lim, Snyder, and Stromberg 2015).

[INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROX HERE]

To fix ideas consider Figure 1, where we illustrate three equally sized congressional districts  $A, B, C$  covered by three local newspapers  $a, b, c$ . In the left panel we consider the situation in which there is perfect overlap between congressional districts and media markets, i.e. each district is served by only one newspaper ( $MarketShare_{nd} = 1$  if  $n = d$ , and 0 otherwise), and each newspaper is only sold in one district ( $ReaderShare_{nd} = 1$  if  $n = d$ , and 0 otherwise). As a result, congruence takes a value of one everywhere. In the central panel, we depict instead an alternative scenario, in which newspaper  $a$  sells only in district  $A$ , and no other paper is read there. Newspapers  $b$  and  $c$  are instead sold in both districts  $B$  and  $C$  and split each market equally. In this case congruence takes a value of 1 in district  $A$  and a value of  $1/2$  in districts  $B$  and  $C$ . Finally, the right most panel illustrates a situation in which all newspapers are sold in all districts, and they enjoy the same market share in each of them. Consequently, congruence takes a value of  $1/3$  everywhere.

Using this measure, Snyder and Strömberg (2010) show that greater congruence implies that more information about the representative is available to a district’s resident. In particular, their results suggest that in each electoral term “...congruence going from zero to one is associated with 170 more articles about the congressman appearing in an average paper selling in his or her district. It is associated with 100 more articles reaching an average household and around 30 more articles being read.” Furthermore, they provide evidence that the average district resident takes advantage of this increased information flow and is better able to recognize her representative’s name, ideological leanings etc. For all these reasons, *Congruence* appears to be a good proxy for the amount of information available on the behavior of House Representatives to their constituents, and we will use it to study the role that media exposure might play in insuring that an elected politician’s choices will reflect her constituency preferences on international economic policy.

## 4 Data

The construction of our dataset draws on a number of different sources. We collect information on legislative votes on trade and migration policy measures in the U.S. House of Representatives, which have been obtained from the Congressional Roll Call Voting Dataset of the Policy Agenda Project and the Library of Congress (THOMAS). Since these datasets provide only rough information about the content of the bills, we have supplemented them using additional sources, like the Congressional Quarterly publications and existing historical accounts like the ones by Gimpel and Edwards (1999) and Destler (2005) (see also Conconi et al. 2012 for more details).

As for legislation related to trade, we focus on all major trade bills introduced in the U.S. Congress between 1986 and 2004 (see Table 1).<sup>4</sup> In particular, we include in our analysis votes on the implementation of multilateral trade agreements (Tokyo and Uruguay rounds of the GATT) and preferential trade agreements (e.g. NAFTA) negotiated in this period, as well as the votes on the conferral and extension of fast track trade negotiating authority to the President, which, as it has been argued by the literature, makes it easier to negotiate trade agreements (see Conconi et al. 2012). With respect to immigration, following Facchini and Steinhardt (2011) we restrict our analysis to bills with a potential impact on labor supply, i.e. that either regulate legal immigration or tackle illegal immigration. We proceed in this way to more closely match the voting behavior of elected representatives to the available information on individual preferences towards immigration.<sup>5</sup>

We restrict our attention to final passage votes, which determine whether a bill clears the House or not. In particular, we do not consider votes on amendments. We follow this approach because voting on amendments is often strategic and therefore is less likely to distinctly reflect the interests of a legislator's constituency. Table 1 summarizes the votes on trade and immigration legislation that took place in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1986 and 2004, which constitute the basis of our empirical analysis.<sup>6</sup>

[INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

Next, we combine our data on trade and immigration bills with the corresponding records of individual voting behavior of House representatives. This information is provided by the VOTE-

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<sup>4</sup>In particular we cover bills granting or extending fast track authority and ratifying bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.

<sup>5</sup>In particular, we exclude, for instance, bills that deal primarily with the provision of public goods to illegal migrants or the federal reimbursement of health and education costs to states.

<sup>6</sup>Note that this is not an exhaustive list because of limits to the availability of our key explanatory variable. For details on the full sample of votes on migration and trade that took place in this period, see Conconi, Facchini, Steinhardt, and Zanardi (2012).

VIEW project (<http://voteview.ucsd.edu>) of Poole and Rosenthal (1997). In addition, the VOTEVIEW database includes information on congressmen’s name, party affiliation, state of residence, and congressional district, which enable us to link legislators to their constituencies. With respect to information on representatives’ age and gender, we use data from three sources: up to 2000, we rely on ICPSR Study number 7803 and the data base built by Swift et al. (2000); from 2001 onwards, we rely on data provided by the Biographical Directory of the US Congress.

Finally, we match our data on individual voting records with information on the characteristics of electoral constituencies. For this purpose, we use data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), a biannual representative survey carried out in election years that contains detailed information on the place of residence of individual respondents,<sup>7</sup> and the Congressional District Data Files of Lublin (1997) and Adler (2003), who have aggregated Census data at the congressional-district level, taking into account the decennial redistricting. We supplement them using information taken directly from the U.S. Census whenever needed.

Our dependent variable is district  $d$ ’s representative vote on a bill  $b$  regulating trade or immigration at time  $t$  ( $Vote_{bdt}$ ). In the case of bills liberalizing trade or migration, a vote coded 1 indicates that the district’s representative supports more open trade or immigration, and 0 otherwise. In the case of legislation restricting trade or immigration, a vote is coded 0 if the representative votes in favor of a restrictive policy and 1 otherwise. In other words, we have coded these variables so that a value of 1 indicates a vote supporting the liberalization of trade or immigration, or opposing their restriction. Conversely, a value of 0 indicates that the representative has voted in favor of restrictions, or against lifting restrictions, on trade or migration.

Our key explanatory variables are a measure of a district’s preferences towards trade and migration and the indicator for congruence between media markets and congressional districts described in section 3. We assess individual opinions towards international economic policy using two questions that have been asked in several waves of the ANES, and which have been extensively used in the literature to study the determinants of preferences towards trade and migration (e.g. see Citrin et al. 1997, Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, Scheve and Slaughter 2001b and Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). The question on trade reads as follows: “Some people have suggested placing new limits on imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor placing new limits on imports, or not?” and the possible answers are “Favor new limits”, “Oppose new limits”, “Don’t know” and “Haven’t thought much”.<sup>8</sup> We have constructed a “pro-trade” dummy that takes a value of one

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<sup>7</sup>This data has been used extensively in the literature. For recent analyses based on it, see for instance Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) and Snyder and Strömberg (2010).

<sup>8</sup>In 1986 the “Haven’t thought much” option was not available.

if the respondent answered “Oppose new limits” and zero if the answer was “Favor new limits”, while we have disregarded “Don’t know” and “Haven’t thought much” replies. As for the question on migration, it reads as follows in all years: “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, stay as now, or decreased?”. We have constructed a “pro-immigration” dummy that takes a value of one if the individual is in favor of increasing migration or leaving it as it is now, and zero otherwise. Also in this case we have disregarded “Don’t know” and “Not available” replies.<sup>9</sup> We use these dummies to construct a measure of opinions on the topic dealt with by each bill ( $Op_{bdt}$ ). For bills related to trade, we take the mean of the “pro-trade” dummy, whereas for bills related to migration we take the mean of the “pro-immigration” dummy. In robustness checks we have also experimented using their median values.

Two additional sets of drivers are used to explain voting behavior. The first focuses on district-level characteristics, whereas the second considers instead individual features of the representative. As it has been argued in the literature (see for instance Conconi et al. 2012) a district’s factor endowment might play an important role in shaping policy preferences, and we capture it using the variable  $SkillRatio_{dt}$ , which measures the proportion of high-skilled individuals in the total population over 25 years of age in each congressional district. High-skilled individuals are defined as those having earned at least a bachelor’s degree. To proxy for the sectoral structure of the local economy, we use instead the share of individuals in the labor force employed in each one digit sector.<sup>10</sup> We also include a measure of district-level unemployment rate ( $Unemployment_{dt}$ ), which is defined as the share of individuals in the total labor force not having a job, but who have been looking for it in the past four weeks.

The literature on public opinions towards trade and migration has emphasized that the redistribution among different groups within society carried out by the welfare state is an important driver of preferences towards globalization (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007, Facchini and Mayda 2009). To capture the role of the welfare state in our analysis, we consider the mean family income within a district ( $Log\ mean\ family\ income_{dt}$ ). Alternatively, in robustness checks we experiment with the median family income ( $Log\ median\ family\ income_{dt}$ ) or with the ratio of average to median family income, which measures the extent of inequality within a district ( $Inequality_{dt}$ ).

Finally, we include also proxies for the degree of urbanization and ethnic composition. To

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<sup>9</sup>The share of “Don’t know” and “Haven’t thought much” in the migration question is approximately 3 percent, whereas for the trade question, it is consistently above 30 percent. In our robustness checks we experiment with different definitions of both variables, obtaining broadly similar results.

<sup>10</sup>Details on the data construction are available from the National Geographic Information System website, <https://www.nhgis.org/> and Bureau of Labor Statistics website <http://www.bls.gov/iag/home.htm>.

this end we use Census data, and construct the variable  $Urban_{dt}$  that captures the share of the population living in urban areas, to account for potential differences in attitudes towards immigration and trade between rural and urban areas. In a robustness check we use also a measure of population density per square mile ( $Log\ Pop\ Density_{dt}$ ). Next, we define the variable  $Foreign - born_{dt}$ , which measures the share of foreign-born in the district's population. Finally, we explore the existence of possible coalitions among minorities in shaping migration policy by including  $African - American_{dt}$ , i.e. the share of blacks in the population.

Turning now to individual-level controls for the representative's characteristics, we start with a measure of ideology, which is proxied by  $Democrat_{dt}$ , a dummy variable taking a value of one if the representative is a member of the Democratic party. We have also used two alternative indicators: the first dimension of the DW nominate score ( $DW - Nominate\ score_{dt}$ ), and the ADA score ( $ADA\ score_{dt}$ ), which have been normalized so that a higher score identifies a more liberal politician.<sup>11</sup> Age ( $Age - Representative_{dt}$ ) and gender ( $Gender - Representative_{dt}$ ) have been shown to play a significant role in shaping individual attitudes towards trade and migration (see for instance Mayda and Rodrik 2005 and Facchini and Mayda 2009). For this reason, we also include these demographic characteristics of legislators in our analysis, and in robustness checks we also experiment with a measure of tenure in office ( $Tenure_{dt}$ ). As educational background might affect the voting behavior on globalization, in some specifications we account also for whether a representative has attended an elite educational institution ( $Educ - Representative - ivy_{dt}$ ). This information is recorded in the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress.<sup>12</sup> The last individual-level controls we use are proxies for the influence of pressure groups on U.S. representatives. In particular, we employ data on labor and corporate Political Action Committees (PACs) contributions ( $PAC\ Labor_{dt}$  and  $PAC\ Corporate_{dt}$  respectively), which are provided by the Federal Election Commission (<http://www.fec.gov/>).

Opinions on trade and migration are not elicited in every bi-annual wave of the ANES. In particular, the former are available for the 1986 through 2000 and 2004 election cycles, and the latter for the 1992 through 2000 and 2004 election cycles. Thus, our sample covers those Congresses during which a bill on trade or migration came to the floor and information on public opinion on the two issues is available in the ANES. As a result, our analysis considers the 13 bills listed in Table 1. For an overview of the content of the various pieces of legislation we include in our

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<sup>11</sup>The DW-nominate measure is provided by the VOTEVIEW project (<http://voteview.ucsd.edu>), whereas the ADA score is constructed by the American for Democratic Action, a lobby group. The main difference between the former and the latter is that the ADA score uses only votes on a sub-sample of bills, whereas the DW nominate score employs every roll call votes in each congress, and is based on a more sophisticated estimation procedure.

<sup>12</sup>This information is available in digital format as ICPSR Study 3371 until 1989, and then from the following website <http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp>.

analysis, see Conconi et al. (2012).

[INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

Table 2 provides summary statistics for the data used in our analysis, where we report separate figures for votes on trade and migration. The first stylized fact that emerges is the broad difference in support for trade and migration in the US House of Representatives: while in only 40% of our observations a vote in favor of freer immigration was recorded, the corresponding figure for trade was 63%. Turning to our main explanatory variables, the value of congruence is similar in the two samples at about 35 percent. As for the opinion variables, the mean value of the pro-trade dummy is 39% while the value of the pro-immigration dummy equals 47%. Note, though, that given the difference in the phrasing of the two questions, the two measures are not directly comparable.<sup>13</sup> As for the other regressors, they all appear not to differ significantly across samples.

[INSERT FIGURES 2,3 APPROX HERE]

Figures 2 and 3 highlight a clear pattern that emerges from the data. The first illustrates Florida’s congressional districts 3 and 15 in 1998. Both districts are characterized by electorates that support more open immigration policies. In particular, over 62 percent of the population in district 3 and 56 percent of the population in district 15 have declared to be in favor of increasing migration or leaving it as it is now (panel 2.2). At the same time, only district 15 exhibits a high level of congruence (76 percent), whereas district 3 is characterized by low levels of congruence (20 percent; see panel 2.3). Interestingly, Dave Weldon, the representative of the “high congruence” district 15 voted in favor of freer migration, supporting H.R. 3736, whereas Corrine Brown, the representative of the “low congruence” district ended up opposing that bill (panel 2.4).

Figure 3 focuses instead on Texas’ districts 7 and 9 in 1998. Also in this case, public opinion in the two constituencies is similar: in both cases well over two thirds of the electorate is in favor of trade liberalization, but while in district 9 congruence is high at 63.3 percent, in the case of district 7 congruence is low, at approximately 14 percent. Importantly, in this case, there is no obvious relationship between the electorates’ preferences and the voting behavior of House Representatives. Focusing on H.R. 2621, we see that Nick Lampson, elected in district 9, ended up voting against trade liberalization, even if the congruence between his district and the local newspaper market was very high, while William Archer Jr. ended up voting in favor of it even if congruence was low.

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<sup>13</sup>Given that in our empirical analysis we will exploit the variation of opinions on each separate topic across districts, this is not a concern for the interpretation of our main results.

While these examples suggest that congruence plays an important role in shaping the voting behavior of elected officials when it comes to migration, they also indicate that this is not true in the case of trade policy. In the remainder of the paper, we will systematically investigate the role that the media play in enhancing the accountability of elected officials on these two dimensions of international economic policy.

## 5 Empirical Analysis

In this section we present the core of our analysis. We start by describing our empirical strategy, we turn then to discuss our main results and finally we present evidence on the role played by electoral concerns in explaining our findings.

### 5.1 Specification

In our empirical analysis we study to what extent the probability that a representative votes pro-trade or pro-migration depends on the preferences of its electorate and on the press coverage that the politician’s behavior receives. Specifically, we estimate two linear probability models, taking the following form:

$$\text{Vote}_{bdt}^M = \alpha^1 \text{Op}_{bdt} + \beta^1 \text{Cong}_{dt} + \gamma^1 \text{Op}_{bdt} \times \text{Cong}_{dt} + \mathbf{X}_{dt} \delta^1 + I_{st} + u_{bdt}^M \quad (2)$$

$$\text{Vote}_{bdt}^T = \alpha^2 \text{Op}_{bdt} + \beta^2 \text{Cong}_{dt} + \gamma^2 \text{Op}_{bdt} \times \text{Cong}_{dt} + \mathbf{X}_{dt} \delta^2 + I_{st} + u_{bdt}^T \quad (3)$$

where  $\text{Vote}_{bdt}^M$  and  $\text{Vote}_{bdt}^T$  are dummy variables taking a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted respectively pro immigration or pro trade on a bill  $b$  at time  $t$ .  $\text{Op}_{bdt}$  is the share of residents of district  $d$  that, in year  $t$ , are in favor of more open policies on the subject dealt with by bill  $b$  (either migration or trade).  $\text{Cong}_{dt}$  is the *Congruence* measure of overlap between the electoral district and the market for local newspapers defined in section 3, to which we have subtracted its year-specific average. By de-meaning our measure of *Congruence*, the coefficients  $\alpha^1$  and  $\alpha^2$  capture the effect of the electorate’s opinion on politicians’ voting behaviour for districts with mean *Congruence*. These are our key variables of interest. The vector  $\mathbf{X}_{dt}$  contains instead additional controls at the district and individual representative level. In particular, we account for a district’s economic characteristics – skill composition, unemployment rate, income level, sectoral composition of employment – and demographic features like the share of urban, foreign born and African-American in the population. As for the individual representative, we control for party affiliation, age and gender. In all our specifications we include also a set of state-year

interaction dummies  $I_{st}$  to account for unobserved state-specific effects, which can vary over time.  $u_{bdt}^M$  and  $u_{bdt}^T$  are mean zero idiosyncratic shocks, which we assume to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. We allow for the shock to be correlated within congressional districts and cluster standard errors at the district–decade level.<sup>14</sup>

The key parameters of interest in our analysis are the coefficients  $\gamma^1$  and  $\gamma^2$ . A positive sign indicates that an increase in congruence will make the elected official’s behavior more in line with the prevailing opinion of her electorate. Conversely, a lack of significance would instead indicate the absence of any accountability–enhancing effect of press coverage.

## 5.2 Main results

Our main findings are contained in Table 3, where we report in each pair of columns results from equivalent specifications of equations (2), on migration bills, and (3), on trade bills. In column (1) we simply regress our dependent variable on districts’ average opinion and state–year interactions. Our results suggest that representatives of more pro–migration districts are more likely to support legislation aimed at liberalizing the flow of foreigners, and this effect is significant at the ten percent level. At the same time, the electorate’s opinions do not play a significant role when it comes to trade. What drives this finding? In the remaining columns of the Table, we show that the impact of migration attitudes is driven by more congruent districts. In particular, in column (2) we allow the effect of opinion to vary across districts depending on their level of *Congruence*. The results show that the estimates of the coefficients of the interaction term between opinion and congruence is different between immigration and trade. In the former case it is positive and highly significant, whereas in the latter it is not different from zero. This suggests that – in the case of migration – higher congruence between the representatives’ district and local newspapers’ markets makes it more likely that the elected official will cast a ballot in accordance with the preferences of her constituency. This is not true for the case of trade.

[INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

When deciding how to vote, a representative is likely to have imperfect information on the exact distribution of opinions in the district. For this reason, she might base her choices on a broader set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics that would allow her to better infer the preferences of her electorate. In column (3) we start by controlling also for the skill composition, unemployment rate and mean family income of the district. We additionally account

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<sup>14</sup>Decadal redistricting implies that district borders are redrawn every ten years and we need to take this into account while clustering.

for the sectoral composition of employment by including the share of employees in each one digit sector, whereas in column (4) we include also a set of district level demographic controls, i.e. the share of the urban population, the share of foreign born and the share of African Americans. Last, in column (5) we add also a set of representative’s characteristics including her party affiliation, age and gender. Introducing all these additional controls does not alter the sign, significance and magnitude of our key coefficient of interest.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, focusing on the result reported in column (5), several interesting patterns emerge. First, our findings suggest that a higher average skill level is associated to a more open stance towards migration, while this effect is not significant for trade. As for family income, it does not play a role on either dimension of international economic policy. Turning to sectoral cleavages, we find that the share of workers employed in agriculture positively affects support for trade liberalization, and this result could be driven by the comparative advantage enjoyed by the United States in agricultural products. We also detect a positive impact of employment in the wholesale and retail trade and transportation sector on support for migration liberalization, and this finding could be driven by the fact that these service sectors tend to employ large numbers of immigrants.

Finally, we find that districts characterized by a higher share of foreign born tend to be more in favor of both migration and trade liberalization.<sup>16</sup> This result is likely to be driven by the role that ethnic communities play in channeling support for migration, as well as by the role that ethnic networks play in international trade. During the first half of our sample in particular, growing regional integration with Mexico and other Latin American countries was at the forefront of the political debate and several Latino pressure groups were actively engaged in the promotion of these preferential trading arrangements (see Baldwin and Magee 2000).

All other controls do not play a role. Among the representatives’ characteristics, we find that only affiliation with the democratic party has an effect, negatively influencing support for trade liberalization, whereas it has a positive impact on migration, even if the latter is not statistically significant. These results are broadly consistent with previous findings in the literature (see for instance Baldwin and Magee (2000), Conconi et al. (2012) etc.).<sup>17</sup>

[INSERT FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

To quantify the impact of public opinion on the representative’s voting behavior on migration and trade, we focus on our benchmark specification in column (5), and in Figure 4 we illustrate

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<sup>15</sup>Wald tests reject the equality of  $\gamma^1$  and  $\gamma^2$  in all specifications, with p-values ranging from 9% in the basic specification of column (2) to 0.55% in the full specification of column (5).

<sup>16</sup>The latter effect is significant at the 10 percent level.

<sup>17</sup>Note that – differently from previous studies in the literature – in all our specifications we are already capturing the pro-migration stance of the democratic electorate by including average opinions in the district.

how the marginal effect of public opinion on the representative’s voting behavior changes with congruence. Panel (a) focuses on migration, whereas panel (b) illustrates the effect for trade. As we can see, the marginal impact of a district’s average opinion on support for migration is not statistically significant for low levels of congruence. For values of congruence about 0.1 points above the mean (i.e. for values of congruence around 0.46) – like in the case of Florida’s 4th district in 1996 – the effect becomes instead positive and significant at the five percent level. As a result, a ten percentage points increase<sup>18</sup> in the share of the population which favors pro-migration policies would lead to a 2.4 percentage points<sup>19</sup> increase in the probability of the representative casting a pro-migration vote. At the same time, for a congressional district with a congruence score of 0.34 above the mean (at the 90th percentile of the congruence distribution) like Pennsylvania’s 5th congressional district in 1998, the same increase in the share of pro-migrant’s population would lead to a 5.5 percentage points (or about 14%, relative to the sample mean) increase in the probability of a pro-migration vote. On the other hand, as it is apparent from panel (b) of the figure, even for very high levels of congruence, public opinion does not significantly affect a representative’s voting behavior on trade policy.

### 5.3 The role of electoral accountability

Why are elected officials from more “congruent” districts more likely to follow their constituents’ preferences on migration? In this section we provide evidence suggesting that electoral considerations play a key role. In particular, we show that the results uncovered in section 5.2 are driven by those districts in which politicians in office have faced more competitive races. The basic idea we exploit is that if representatives respond to electoral pressures, they should adhere more closely to the preferences of their constituents whenever they won their seat in a more closely contended election (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2010). To empirically assess this hypothesis, we allow for the effect of congruence to be heterogeneous by defining an indicator variable  $Competitive_{dt}$  that takes a value of one if the representative’s seat has been won in a competitive election, and zero otherwise. We measure a district’s electoral “competitiveness” in two ways. First, we focus on the margin with which the politician won the seat, and let  $Competitive_{dt} = 1$  if the representative in office has been elected with a “small” margin of victory, i.e. if the margin of victory was less than one standard deviation higher than the average in that congressional election.<sup>20</sup> Formally, we have estimated the following specification, where to simplify notation we define the vector

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<sup>18</sup>Corresponding to approximately one third of a standard deviation.

<sup>19</sup>An increase of about 6.1% relative to the sample mean.

<sup>20</sup>Using alternative definitions of “small” margin of victory like e.g. margin of victory below the mean, or less than two standard deviations higher than the mean does not qualitatively affect our results. Likewise, results are robust to the use of the median, rather than the mean as a measure of centrality.

$(t_o, t_c, t_m) = (\text{Op}_{bdt}, \text{Cong}_{dt}, \text{Competitive}_{dt})$ :

$$\text{Vote}_{bdt}^M = \left( \sum_i \alpha_i^1 t_i \right) + \beta_{oc}^1 t_o t_c + \beta_{om}^1 t_o t_m + \beta_{cm}^1 t_c t_m + \gamma^1 t_o t_c t_m + \mathbf{X}_{dt} \delta^1 + I_{st} + u_{bdt}^M \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Vote}_{bdt}^T = \left( \sum_i \alpha_i^2 t_i \right) + \beta_{oc}^2 t_o t_c + \beta_{om}^2 t_o t_m + \beta_{cm}^2 t_c t_m + \gamma^2 t_o t_c t_m + \mathbf{X}_{dt} \delta^2 + I_{st} + u_{bdt}^T \quad (5)$$

where  $i \in \{o, c, m\}$ . We report the results of our estimation in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.

[INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

We are interested in studying the behavior of the marginal effect of opinion on the probability to vote for migration or trade liberalization for representatives elected in districts with respectively a low and high margin of victory. The former is given by  $\alpha_o^j + \beta_{om}^j + (\beta_{oc}^j + \gamma^j) \text{Cong}$ , whereas the latter is given by  $\alpha_o^j + \beta_{oc}^j \text{Cong}$  where  $j \in \{1, 2\}$ . We illustrate them in Figures 5a and 5b.

[INSERT FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

In Figure 5a we display the marginal effects for votes on migration, respectively in districts with high (left panel) and low (right panel) margin of victory. As we can immediately see, opinion does not have any effect on the voting behavior of representatives for any value of congruence when the past election was not close. On the other hand, in competitive districts a higher congruence leads to greater responsiveness of politicians to the preferences of their electorate. These results indicate that the average effect we have uncovered in Figure 4 is driven by competitive districts. Turning now to votes on trade, Figure 5b shows that constituents' opinions do not have an impact on politicians' voting behavior in either competitive or non competitive districts and for any value of congruence.

Our second way of assessing the role of electoral competitiveness is based on the frequency with which the winning party has changed over time in a given district. Specifically, we expect elections in “swing” districts to be more competitive relative to congressional districts that are firmly Democratic or firmly Republican. To assess this idea we have redefined *Competitive<sub>dt</sub>* as taking a value of one if the representative in office has been elected in a district where the winning party has changed at least once in the last four congressional elections.<sup>21</sup> We have then repeated the analysis carried out in equation 5. We report results from these regressions in column (2) of Table 4, and display the marginal effects of opinion on the probability to vote for migration

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<sup>21</sup>Basing the definition of “swing” districts on the results of the last three, five, six or seven congressional elections does not qualitatively affect our results.

or trade liberalization for non-“swing” (left panel) and “swing” (right panel) districts in Figures 6a and 6b, respectively. Our results confirm the patterns we have observed in Figure 5, i.e. the average effect we uncovered for votes on migration is driven by “swing” districts. Interestingly, in swing districts the marginal effect of opinion is an increasing function of *Congruence* also on trade votes, although the effect is never statistically significant.

[INSERT FIGURE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

## 6 Reverse Causality

One concern with the estimates of section 5.2 is that they may be biased because of reverse causality. If the political discourse shapes individual opinions, then politicians can influence their electorate’s views towards migration and trade. What is more, their influence could well be greater in districts where newspapers’ coverage of local politicians’ is higher, i.e. in districts characterized by higher congruence. This would lead to an upward bias in our estimates of  $\gamma^1$  and  $\gamma^2$ , as they would measure not only the influence of the electorate’s opinions on the voting behavior of the representative for a given level of congruence, but also the influence of the representative’s stand on international economic policy issues on her electorate’s attitudes.

We are particularly concerned with the possibility that the political discourse may influence the electorate’s opinions through local media, as this would directly bias our estimates of  $\gamma$ . Therefore, we start by investigating whether congruence and opinions are systematically correlated. To this end, we run a series of specifications reported in Table A1, which show that district–level opinions are not systematically correlated with congruence, both in the case of migration and trade. These results are reassuring evidence against the possibility of reverse causality. Still, since the presence of one endogenous regressor might bias all our estimates, to further address this concern, we implement an IV strategy that builds upon the literature on individual level determinants of attitudes towards trade and migration. We proceed in two steps. In the first step, we construct for each individual a measure of opinion based on individual characteristics that are predetermined with respect to politicians’ terms in office and that is therefore arguably exogenous to politicians’ stand and voting behavior on any issue. To this end, we build on Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007 and use data from the ANES to regress individual opinions on trade and on migration on education (dummies for high-school not completed, high school completed, some college, BA level degree and advanced degree, with grade school or less as the reference category), gender, age (we include dummies for 10-years age groups), race/ethnicity (Black, Asian, native American, Mexican and Hispanic non Mexican, with White the reference category), allowing the effects of

both education and age to vary by race/ethnicity. We report the main results of this regression in Table A2 in the Appendix. Consistently with expectations (see Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007) we find that a higher level of education is associated with a higher likelihood of being both pro-migration and pro-trade, and these effects do not vary across race/ethnicity, with the only exception of educated blacks that appear to be less in favor of globalization than their white counterparts.<sup>22</sup> Females are less likely to support trade liberalization than males, whereas gender does not affect support for migration. On average, Black respondents appear to be more in favor of free migration than whites, and the same is true for Asian and Native American when it comes to trade. Based on the results of these individual-level specifications we then construct an individual level “predicted opinion” on trade and migration. In the second step we compute district-level averages of individual “predicted opinions”, and construct a variable  $\widehat{Op}_{bdt}$  which can be interpreted as the share of residents of district  $d$  predicted to be in favor of more open migration and trade policies in year  $t$  based on their personal characteristics. We then estimate (3) by 2SLS using  $\widehat{Op}_{bdt}$  and  $\widehat{Op}_{bdt} \times Cong_{dt}$  as instruments for  $Op_{bdt}$  and  $Op_{bdt} \times Cong_{dt}$ .

IV regressions results are reported in Table 5. Like in Table 3 we gradually include additional control variables as we move from columns (1) to (4). The last row of each column reports the Kleibergen-Paap version of the Wald F statistic routinely performed, and the results suggest that our instruments are sufficiently strong.<sup>23</sup> Importantly, the IV results are reassuringly in line with the OLS findings of Table 3: the coefficient on the interaction term between opinion and congruence is positive and significant only for migration bills. It is instead close to zero and not statistically significant, once districts’ characteristics are controlled for, in the case of trade bills. The marginal effect of a district’s average opinions on the probability of representatives’ casting a pro-migration vote are larger than those implied by the OLS estimates, and only statistically significant at 5% for values of congruence 0.25 points above the mean (i.e. for values of congruence around 0.61). Our IV estimates imply that for a district characterized by that level of congruence a ten percentage points increase in the share of the population which favors pro-migration policies would lead to a 8.7 percentage points increase in the probability of the representative casting a pro-migration vote. Note that IV estimates indicate a stronger (about twice as large) marginal effect of opinions on representatives’ voting behavior than implied by OLS estimates. This suggest that reverse causality is not a concern as it would have led to a higher OLS estimates compared to the IV. On the other hand, our IV estimates suggest that if anything the OLS estimates may

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<sup>22</sup>The coefficients are not reported in the Table and are available from the authors upon request.

<sup>23</sup>The values of this statistics for votes on trade and migration are always high, i.e. they are above the “rule of thumb” value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock 1997. They are also above the values tabulated by Stock and Yogo 2005 under the assumption of i.i.d. errors, which give a critical value of 7.03 for maximum 10% bias of the IV estimator in the case of two endogenous regressors and two instruments.

suffer from measurement error–induced attenuation bias. In section 7 we systematically tackle this issue pursuing several alternative strategies.

## 7 Additional results

In this section, we assess the robustness of our empirical findings by implementing a number of additional specifications. We start by experimenting with different sub–samples of our votes. We turn next to consider alternative measures and definitions of our key explanatory variable. We then experiment with alternative district level controls and politician’s characteristics. Next, we carry out a series of placebo tests, taking advantage of the richness of the issues covered in the ANES public opinion questions. Finally, we experiment with an alternative econometric methodology.

Our first concern is that the results in column (5) of Table 3 might be driven by differences in the sample of votes on trade and migration. In fact, as shown in Table 1, we can match individual opinion with votes on eleven trade related bills, but only with votes on two migration related initiatives, which were on the House floor respectively in 1996 and 1998. To address this concern we have experimented by restricting our sample of trade bills to those that took place in years close to 1996 and 1998, and the results are reported in Table 6. In column (1) we start by restricting our sample of trade votes to those two bills that were voted during or immediately before the congresses for which we have observations on migration policy initiatives (i.e. H.R. 5110 of 1994 and H.R. 2621 of 1998). In column (2) we slightly expand that set to include also H.R. 1876 and H.R. 3450 of 1993. In column (3) we focus instead on the trade votes that took place during or immediately after the congresses for which we have observations on migration policy initiatives (i.e. we include H.R. 2621 of 1998 and H.R. 2738 and H.R. 2739 of 2003), whereas in column (4) we expand that sample to include also H.R. 4759 and H.R. 4842 of 2004. Importantly, the results we have uncovered for the full sample of trade bills presented in Table 3 continue to hold when we look at all the different subsamples considered in this Table. In particular, greater congruence between the congressional district and the local newspaper market does not increase the likelihood that the elected official will vote in favor of trade liberalization.

[INSERT TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

Our second set of concerns is with our measure of individual opinion towards trade and migration. First, we are worried with the fact that while the ANES is a representative study of the U.S. population, its sample size is not very large, as each cross–section included in our analysis on average involves 1800 individual observations. As a result the number of datapoints available for some districts might be low, and we are concerned with the accuracy of the opinion measures

included in our sample. We address this issue in several ways in Table 7.<sup>24</sup> First, in column (1) we use information on the average opinion by district during the decade in which the bill was voted on, in other words we take advantage of information contained in up to five rounds of the ANES survey. In columns (2), (3) and (4) we drop instead from our analysis districts for which respectively a maximum of one, two or three individual observations are available. Our main results are unaffected (note that the estimated interaction coefficient in column (1) is significant at the ten percent level), i.e. greater media exposure continues to increase accountability on migration, whereas there is no significant effect when it comes to trade policy. Second, in our benchmark analysis the district level measure of preferences is based on the average opinion; in column (5) we replace this with a measure based on the district’s median opinion. While the standard errors tend to be larger in this case, the basic patterns we have uncovered in our benchmark specification continue to hold.<sup>25</sup> Finally, in column (6) instead of using the mean or the median of our pro-migration dummy, we take full advantage of the three possible answers for the migration question listed in the ANES survey – “increased”, “same as now” and “decreased” – and code them as 2, 1 and 0 respectively. We then use the mean of this variable in our regression, and obtain results which are similar to those in the benchmark.<sup>26</sup>

[INSERT TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

A related concern is that while constructing our measure of opinion, we have disregarded replies suggesting that the respondent did not have a view, namely “Don’t know” and “Haven’t thought much” answers. This choice is unlikely to have an impact on our results for migration as less than 3 percent of the individuals surveyed did not express a preference. At the same time, when it comes to trade, these answers might contain valuable information on individual preferences, given the large proportion of “Don’t know” answers. To tackle this issue in Table 8 we have redefined our key explanatory variable by respectively classifying the “Don’t know” and “Not available” answers together with the “Pro liberalization” and “Against liberalization” opinions respectively in columns (1) and (2). Importantly, including these answers in the construction of our main explanatory variable does not affect our benchmark results.

[INSERT TABLE 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

In Table 9 we assess the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of alternative district level controls. In columns (1) and (2) we further explore the role that welfare state considerations might

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<sup>24</sup>To increase the table’s readability we only report estimates for our three main coefficients of interest. Estimates for other coefficients are not significantly affected, and are available from the authors upon request.

<sup>25</sup>The coefficient of the interaction term is significant at the ten percent level.

<sup>26</sup>Note that the answer to the trade question only takes two values, and as a result we cannot carry out a similar robustness check.

play in shaping a representative’s voting behavior on international economic policy. In column (1) we control for median rather than mean family income in the district, whereas in column (2) we include also a measure of the extent of inequality within the district. Neither of these controls appear to play an important role, but more importantly, they do not affect our main results.<sup>27</sup> In our benchmark specification we control for the potential differences in attitudes towards trade and migration by accounting for the share of the population living in urban areas. In column (3) we additionally control for population density, but this does not have a direct impact on the representative’s voting behavior on either dimension of globalization. Moreover, doing so does not affect our main results. Finally, as the ANES is designed to be a representative sample of the US population, and it is well known that turnout rates in congressional elections are often low,<sup>28</sup> the set of individuals actually voting might have preferences that differ from those of the underlying population. To account for this possibility, in column (4) we control also for the turnout rate in the previous election and we find that differences in voters’ electoral participation rates do not affect the representative’s voting behavior. More importantly, accounting for differences in turnout does not affect our main results.

[INSERT TABLE 9 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

Our benchmark analysis accounts for a wealth of individual level characteristics of the representatives. In Table 10 we expand/experiment with this set of controls in several ways. First, in column (1) we replace the representative’s age with his/her tenure in office, and we find that more experienced members of the House are more likely to support migration liberalization, but not trade. In column (2) we additionally control for a representative’s education, using information taken from the Congressional Directories and digitized in ICPSR study 3371. Interestingly, we find that representatives who attended an Ivy League school are more likely to support both immigration and trade liberalization than members of the House who either did not go to college or attended another type of higher education institution, even if only the latter effect is strongly statistically significant. In columns (3) and (4) we experiment with alternative measures of the ideological orientation of the representative and replace democratic party affiliation with the normalized DW nominate score (column 3) and ADA score (column 4). More liberal-leaning representatives are more likely to vote against trade liberalization and in favor of migration liberalization. Importantly, our main result continues to be unaffected. So far, our analysis has focused on the role played by the opinions of the districts’ average or median voter. In column (5), we

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<sup>27</sup>Note that any heterogeneity in the size of welfare provisions at the state level are already accounted for with the inclusion of a full set of state-year interactions.

<sup>28</sup>In particular, the average turnout in our sample is 0.43.

include information on organized groups, which have received great attention both in the trade and migration literature. Our measure of the intensity of the lobbying activity is given by Political Action Committee Contributions (PACs), which can be easily traced to the elected officials receiving them. In particular, we focus on the role played by contributions offered by corporations (*PacCorporate*) and by unions (*PacLabor*). As PACs measure lobbying effort on a variety of different issues, we have considered a politician to have been “influenced” if the corporate (labor) contributions he/she has received are at or above the eightieth percentile of all corporate (labor) contributions in that year.<sup>29</sup>

In line with the existing literature, we find that lobbying activities do affect the voting behavior of elected representatives on trade policy. In particular, larger contributions by labor organizations tend to result in a more protectionist bias by the politician, whereas larger contributions by business related lobbies have the opposite effect. This result confirms earlier findings by Baldwin and Magee (2000). At the same time, corporate and labor PAC contributions do not appear to affect the voting behavior of elected officials on immigration policy. This is in line with the findings of Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011), who show that PAC contributions are not a significant driver of immigration policy, whereas the opposite is true for lobbying expenditure directly related to migration policy.<sup>30</sup>

[INSERT TABLE 10 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

Next, in Table 11 we carry out a series of placebo tests on the effects of individual voters opinion on representatives’ voting behavior. In particular, while our robustness checks indicate that greater congruence between a congressional district and local newspaper markets increases the accountability of elected officials to local voters’ preferences towards immigration, but not on trade, we expect that opinions towards other issues should not have an impact on how elected officials vote on migration or trade. For this reason, we take advantage of the richness of the range of preferences elicited in the ANES dataset to carry out a falsification exercise using opinion on three additional public policy matters, that are not directly related to either migration or trade.

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<sup>29</sup>We have experimented with different thresholds, and the results are unaffected.

<sup>30</sup>Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011) use a dataset that allows to identify the purpose of the lobbying activity in the United States, showing that pressure groups at the sectoral level have a statistically significant and important effect on the allocation of work and related visas. Unfortunately, this data cannot be used in our analysis of congressmen’s voting behavior, since it does not contain information on the identity of politicians contacted by lobbies.

The first is based on opinion towards abortion;<sup>31</sup> the second on opinion towards religion<sup>32</sup> and the third on trust in the federal government.<sup>33</sup> Our results, reported in columns (1)-(3), show that – as expected – the patterns are quite different from those identified in our benchmark specification. In fact, the direct impact of opinion is never significant and, more importantly, the same holds true for the sign of the interaction term between the opinion variable and congruence. This confirms that opinions towards other issues do not affect voting behavior on migration or trade.

[INSERT TABLE 11 APPROXIMATELY HERE]

Our last set of robustness checks concerns the econometric methodology we have followed. All of our specifications have been run using linear probability models. We have employed this approach because the linear probability model is consistent under weak assumptions, it works well with fixed effects, and its coefficient estimates – especially in the presence of interaction terms – are simple to interpret. In Table A3 in the Appendix we reproduce our main results from Table 3 using instead a probit specification and reporting the corresponding coefficient values. As it can be immediately seen, the broad patterns we have identified in Table 3 continue to hold.

## 8 Conclusions

In this paper we have carried out what is – to the best of our knowledge – the first empirical analysis of the effect of media exposure in shaping the accountability of individual representatives’ to public opinion towards trade and migration. Focusing on the role of local newspapers, we have shown that greater congruence between a representative’s district and a local newspaper market makes congressmen more accountable to their constituency on international migration, whereas we do not find a systematic effect when it comes to international trade. This result continues to

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<sup>31</sup>In particular, we use question VCF0838 “There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?” The possible answers are “By law, abortion should never be permitted”, “The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger”, “The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established”, “By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice”. After excluding the “Not Available” and “Don’t know” responses, we construct an *Opinion on Abortion* dummy that takes a value of one if the individual suggests one of the two last options, and zero otherwise.

<sup>32</sup>In particular, we use question VCF0846 “Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?” The possible answers are “Yes, important” or “No, not so important”. After excluding the “Not Available” and “Don’t know” responses, we construct an *Opinion on Religion* dummy that takes a value of one if the individual chooses the first answer and zero otherwise.

<sup>33</sup>In particular, we use question VCF0605 “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” The possible answers are “Few big interests” or “Benefit of all”. After excluding the “Not Available” and “Don’t know” responses, we construct an *Opinion on TrustinFedGov* dummy that takes a value of one if the individual chooses the last answer and zero otherwise.

hold when we address potential reverse causality concerns using an instrumental variable strategy exploiting the exogenous determinants of individual attitudes towards globalization. Furthermore, by comparing representatives elected in competitive races with those holding safe seats, we find evidence suggesting that electoral considerations drive our results: greater media exposure makes House members more accountable to their constituency on migration policy issues only if they have been elected in contested races. How can this result be explained?

The very heated debates during the last US presidential election indicate that migration continues to be perceived as a “salient” issue by the electorate. At the same time, a large literature suggests that trade is a much less important issue. In a recent contribution, Guisinger (2009) finds “...trade policy salience to be relatively low in terms of stated importance, in voters knowledge of their representatives policy positions...” Importantly, this pattern is confirmed if we use information from the ANES for the time period covered by our analysis. In particular, our data point out that very few respondents did not have a well defined opinion on migration – between 1 and 3 percent of the total, whereas the corresponding figure was between 25 and 45 percent for trade. Thus, one possible explanation for our findings is that media exposure can succeed in making a politician accountable to her electorate, but only if the issue is perceived to be important enough.<sup>34</sup>

We can think of at least two directions along which our analysis could be extended. First, the empirical measure we have used for the information conveyed to the electorate is based on the congruence between the market for local newspapers and electoral districts. In recent years, the printed press has seen its readership decline and at the same time new media have started to play an increasingly important role. In particular, in the recent US presidential campaign social media and blogs have been the focus of much attention,<sup>35</sup> and it would be interesting to construct indicators that would allow us to measure the individual’s exposure to these additional sources and assess their effect on electoral discipline.

Second, our analysis has pointed out the role that the salience of the issue plays in making the elected official accountable to her electorate. It would be interesting to investigate whether the pattern we have identified for migration and trade policy holds also in other areas, like like gun control or environmental issues. While these are interesting questions, they are left for further research.

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<sup>34</sup>In fact, if we restrict our analysis only to those districts in which a vast majority of the respondents has an opinion on trade, we find that growing media exposure tends to make the politician accountable to its constituency also on this policy issue. See Figure A1 in the Appendix, where we contrast the marginal effect of opinion on support for trade liberalization in districts in which at least 95% of the respondents express a view on the subject, with districts where trade is not as important.

<sup>35</sup>See for instance the article by David Rehr on the 2012 campaign “Social media’s impact on the presidential election” available at [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-k-rehr/social-medias-impact-on-t\\_b\\_2504414.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-k-rehr/social-medias-impact-on-t_b_2504414.html).

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**Table 1: Final passage votes on trade and migration reforms in the House of Representatives 1986-2004**

Cong.	Date	Bill	Description	Issue	Dir	Votes			Districts covered in ANES		
						Yes	No	Sum	Yes	No	Sum
99	22.05.1986	H.R.4800	Omnibus Trade Bill, incl. fast track authority	Trade	Contra	295	115	410	96	47	143
100	13.07.1988	H.R.4848	Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, incl. fast track authority	Trade	Pro	376	45	421	108	14	122
100	09.08.1988	H.R.5090	Approval of CUSFTA	Trade	Pro	366	40	406	111	10	121
103	22.06.1993	H.R.1876	Extension of fast track authority	Trade	Pro	295	126	421	114	44	158
103	17.11.1993	H.R.3450	Approval of NAFTA	Trade	Pro	234	200	434	86	75	161
103	29.11.1994	H.R.5110	Approval of Uruguay Round Agreements	Trade	Pro	288	146	434	96	40	136
105	25.09.1998	H.R.2621	Approval of fast track authority	Trade	Pro	180	243	423	49	68	117
108	24.07.2003	H.R.2738	Approval of US-Chile FTA	Trade	Pro	270	156	426	71	49	120
108	24.07.2003	H.R.2739	Approval of US-Singapore FTA	Trade	Pro	272	155	427	72	49	121
108	14.07.2004	H.R.4759	Approval of US-Australia FTA	Trade	Pro	314	109	423	90	29	119
108	22.07.2004	H.R.4842	Approval of US-Morocco FTA	Trade	Pro	323	99	422	88	24	112
104	21.03.1996	H.R.2202	Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act	Migration	Contra	333	87	420	172	50	222
105	25.09.1998	H.R.3736	Skilled Immigration. Skilled Workers and H-1B	Migration	Pro	288	133	421	85	38	123

Cong. and Date describe the congress/date in which/when the vote took place. Bill shows the name under which the bill is originating in the House of Representatives ("H.R."). Description provides some basic information about the content of the legislation. Dir. shows the direction of the bill, i.e. whether the bill is pro or contra liberalizing trade. In "Votes": Yes/No show the overall number of Yes/No Votes, Sum shows the overall number of votes. In "Districts covered in Anes" we only focus on those districts for which we have observations on opinion in the American National Election Survey dataset. All figures are calculated on the basis of individual voting records. FTA stands for free trade area.

**Table 2: Summary statistics**

Variable		Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Vote<sub>bdt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.391	0.489	0	1
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.652	0.477	0	1
<i>Opinion<sub>bdt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.465	0.304	0	1
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.386	0.313	0	1
<i>Congruence<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.360	0.219	0.038	0.892
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.337	0.219	0.035	0.897
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.220	0.092	0.053	0.514
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.220	0.096	0.041	0.569
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.058	0.027	0.018	0.204
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.061	0.027	0.018	0.219
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	30.808	0.280	3.124	4.681
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	30.764	0.475	2.400	4.953
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.020	0.022	0.002	0.209
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.017	0.022	0.000	0.209
<i>Construction<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.058	0.016	0.023	0.130
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.058	0.018	0.010	0.130
<i>Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.161	0.061	0.044	0.351
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.167	0.067	0.038	0.347
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.243	0.035	0.171	0.554
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.227	0.031	0.130	0.376
<i>Finance<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.070	0.023	0.022	0.159
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.069	0.023	0.022	0.171
<i>Professionals<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.070	0.023	0.030	0.164
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.074	0.033	0.024	0.197
<i>Education and Health<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.168	0.031	0.078	0.262
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.177	0.038	0.092	0.310
<i>Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.015	0.011	0.006	0.101
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.043	0.030	0.006	0.183
<i>Public Administration<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.049	0.026	0.016	0.192
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.047	0.025	0.016	0.243
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.715	0.294	0.001	1
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.797	0.241	0	1
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.091	0.104	0.004	0.585
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.107	0.110	0.004	0.585
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.237	0.769	-0.819	50.458
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.328	0.617	-0.819	50.458
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.130	0.178	0.001	0.739
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.138	0.180	0.001	0.921
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	51.449	9.959	29	86
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	52.043	10.012	28	87
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.113	0.317	0	1
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.116	0.320	0	1
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>	<i>Migration</i>	345	0.467	0.500	0	1
	<i>Trade</i>	1430	0.553	0.497	0	1

*Vote<sub>bdt</sub>* is coded as 1 if the representative of district *d* at time *t* votes pro trade or pro migration on bill *b*, 0 otherwise. *Opinion<sub>bdt</sub>* is the average opinion of district *d* at time *t* on the issue dealt with by bill *b* and ranges between 0 and 1 (the closer to 1 the more in favor of trade liberalization or pro-immigration). *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* measures the match between newspaper markets and U.S. congressional districts. *SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub>* measures the percentage of the population over 25 with at least a bachelor degree. *Unemployment<sub>dt</sub>* is the share of unemployed individuals in the total labor force. *Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub>* measures the logarithm of mean family income within a district in dollars. *Farmer<sub>dt</sub>* measures the share of farm workers in the total labor force. *Construction<sub>dt</sub>* measures the share of people employed in construction in the total labor force. *Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub>* is the share of people employed in the manufacturing industry in the total labor force. *Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub>* is the share of people employed in the wholesale, retail trade and transportation sectors in the total labor force. *Finance<sub>dt</sub>* measures the share of people employed in the financial, insurance and real estate industry in the total labor force. *Professionals<sub>dt</sub>* measures the share of people employed in professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services in the total labor force. *Education and Health<sub>dt</sub>* is the share of people employed in the educational sector and in the health and social services sector in the total labor force. *Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub>* measures the share of people employed in the entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services industries in the total labor force. *Public Administration<sub>dt</sub>* measures the share of individuals employed in public administration in the total labor force. *Urban<sub>dt</sub>* is a measure of the share of population living in urban areas. *Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub>* is the share of foreign-born individuals in the total population. *Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub>* measures how the share of Foreign-Born has changed relatively to the previous period. *African - American<sub>dt</sub>* is the share of African-American individuals in the total population. *Age - representative<sub>dt</sub>* is the age of congressperson of district *d* at the beginning of current congress. *Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub>* is coded as 1 for female congresspersons, 0 otherwise. *Democrat<sub>dt</sub>* is coded as 1 if the representative of the district belongs to the Democratic Party.

**Table 3: Baseline specification**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion<sub>bdt</sub></i>	0.250 (0.137)	0.038 (0.085)	0.279* (0.137)	0.073 (0.090)	0.208 (0.120)	-0.067 (0.082)	0.123 (0.117)	-0.079 (0.081)	0.115 (0.118)	-0.088 (0.073)
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>			-0.614* (0.272)	-0.038 (0.173)	-0.527 (0.312)	-0.293 (0.194)	-0.345 (0.334)	-0.231 (0.214)	-0.242 (0.351)	-0.217 (0.198)
<i>Opinion<sub>bdt</sub> * Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>			1.263* (0.489)	0.450 (0.396)	1.285** (0.468)	0.256 (0.354)	1.332** (0.474)	0.252 (0.351)	1.275* (0.495)	-0.050 (0.341)
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>					3.088* (1.435)	1.835* (0.892)	3.489* (1.437)	1.801* (0.885)	3.341* (1.588)	0.895 (0.841)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>					5.496 (3.145)	-3.081* (1.257)	4.237 (2.811)	-2.815* (1.259)	4.201 (2.595)	-1.974 (1.266)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>					-0.625 (0.395)	-0.205 (0.272)	-0.615 (0.398)	-0.156 (0.279)	-0.456 (0.419)	-0.157 (0.253)
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>					1.185 (2.253)	5.678** (1.509)	2.654 (2.641)	5.433** (1.500)	2.986 (2.663)	3.968** (1.533)
<i>Construction<sub>dt</sub></i>					2.086 (3.181)	5.164** (1.832)	3.930 (3.304)	5.441** (1.950)	3.433 (3.635)	2.277 (2.037)
<i>Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub></i>					0.819 (1.584)	1.225 (1.104)	1.411 (1.518)	1.355 (1.101)	1.436 (1.563)	0.697 (1.170)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>					1.885 (1.757)	0.499 (1.298)	2.303 (1.676)	0.404 (1.383)	2.998 (1.740)	-0.590 (1.409)
<i>Finance<sub>dt</sub></i>					0.495 (2.569)	2.913 (1.821)	0.269 (2.443)	3.134 (1.814)	0.309 (2.450)	1.566 (1.861)
<i>Professionals<sub>dt</sub></i>					-1.203 (3.334)	-1.860 (2.135)	-3.120 (3.459)	-2.369 (2.106)	-3.383 (3.530)	-1.955 (2.216)
<i>Education and Health<sub>dt</sub></i>					-1.049 (1.779)	0.530 (1.303)	-0.746 (1.695)	0.952 (1.339)	-0.757 (1.676)	0.768 (1.426)
<i>Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub></i>					0.615 (3.763)	1.763 (1.847)	1.131 (3.550)	1.767 (1.855)	0.883 (3.538)	1.512 (1.760)
<i>Public Administration<sub>dt</sub></i>					-0.759 (1.929)	2.232 (1.253)	-0.166 (1.803)	2.776* (1.280)	-0.027 (1.950)	2.423 (1.381)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.127 (0.191)	0.014 (0.147)	0.071 (0.181)	0.174 (0.142)
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>							1.284** (0.488)	0.456 (0.329)	1.182* (0.462)	0.613 (0.326)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>							-0.038 (0.034)	-0.027 (0.032)	-0.048 (0.035)	-0.021 (0.034)
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.329 (0.377)	-0.092 (0.200)	0.368 (0.365)	-0.231 (0.183)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>								0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>								0.075 (0.082)	0.002 (0.062)	
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>								0.087 (0.081)	-0.285** (0.050)	
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	345	1,430	345	1,430	345	1,430	345	1,430	345	1,430
R-squared	0.547	0.441	0.556	0.444	0.586	0.507	0.601	0.509	0.610	0.537

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong<sub>dt</sub>* is *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* after de-meaning.

**Table 4: The role of election competitiveness**

	(1)		(2)	
	Margin of victory		Swing district	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion</i> <sub>bd<sub>t</sub></sub>	0.173 (0.274)	-0.404 (0.226)	0.008 (0.144)	-0.150 (0.084)
<i>Cong</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.298 (0.779)	-0.510 (0.406)	0.012 (0.393)	0.096 (0.221)
<i>Competitive</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.159 (0.186)	-0.210* (0.092)	0.004 (0.128)	-0.073 (0.072)
<i>Opinion</i> <sub>bd<sub>t</sub></sub> * <i>Cong</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.703 (1.125)	-0.177 (1.138)	0.548 (0.607)	-0.581 (0.404)
<i>Competitive</i> <sub>dt</sub> * <i>Opinion</i> <sub>bd<sub>t</sub></sub>	-0.057 (0.303)	0.349 (0.229)	0.156 (0.253)	0.154 (0.141)
<i>Competitive</i> <sub>dt</sub> * <i>Cong</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.628 (0.825)	0.359 (0.423)	-0.767 (0.473)	-0.822** (0.276)
<i>Competitive</i> <sub>dt</sub> * <i>Opinion</i> <sub>bd<sub>t</sub></sub> * <i>Cong</i> <sub>dt</sub>	2.206 (1.292)	0.019 (1.187)	1.860 (0.994)	1.477* (0.648)
<i>SkillRatio</i> <sub>dt</sub>	3.206* (1.562)	0.759 (0.829)	3.373* (1.569)	0.897 (0.813)
<i>Unemployment</i> <sub>dt</sub>	4.672 (2.527)	-2.261 (1.274)	4.603 (2.600)	-2.162 (1.289)
<i>Log mean family income</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.408 (0.413)	-0.100 (0.253)	-0.397 (0.416)	-0.181 (0.248)
<i>Farmer</i> <sub>dt</sub>	3.245 (2.644)	4.345** (1.564)	3.161 (2.478)	3.674* (1.487)
<i>Construction</i> <sub>dt</sub>	3.811 (3.720)	2.728 (2.018)	3.62 (3.446)	1.714 (1.942)
<i>Manufacturing</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.649 (1.655)	0.891 (1.158)	1.681 (1.416)	0.458 (1.138)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation</i> <sub>dt</sub>	3.525 (1.960)	-0.454 (1.408)	3.326* (1.629)	-0.822 (1.345)
<i>Finance</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.349 (2.589)	1.812 (1.871)	0.131 (2.334)	1.449 (1.897)
<i>Professionals</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-2.993 (3.522)	-1.733 (2.241)	-3.337 (3.548)	-2.242 (2.096)
<i>Education and Health</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.157 (1.807)	1.205 (1.451)	-0.117 (1.676)	0.513 (1.385)
<i>Entertainment Services</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.081 (3.545)	1.796 (1.783)	1.62 (3.259)	1.305 (1.733)
<i>Public Administration</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.111 (2.067)	2.553 (1.355)	0.150 (2.039)	2.305 (1.371)
<i>Urban</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.05 (0.180)	0.182 (0.140)	0.072 (0.180)	0.203 (0.138)
<i>Foreign - born</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.062* (0.477)	0.622 (0.324)	1.167* (0.464)	0.567 (0.323)
<i>Foreign - born growth</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.041 (0.033)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.049 (0.034)	-0.028 (0.031)
<i>African - American</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.398 (0.367)	-0.349 (0.194)	0.362 (0.392)	-0.245 (0.181)
<i>Age - representative</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.006 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>Gender - representative</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.097 (0.086)	0.020 (0.063)	0.087 (0.084)	0.025 (0.059)
<i>Democrat</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.066 (0.084)	-0.270** (0.048)	0.113 (0.081)	-0.303** (0.049)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES	
Observations	345	1430	345	1430
R-squared	0.606	0.518	0.617	0.544

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong*<sub>dt</sub> is *Congruence*<sub>dt</sub> after de-meaning. *Competitive*<sub>dt</sub> is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the representative in office has been elected with a low margin of victory (column 1) or in a swing district (column 2).

**Table 5: IV Results**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub>t</i>	0.091 (0.359)	0.582** (0.203)	-0.094 (0.330)	0.211 (0.198)	-0.321 (0.366)	0.193 (0.199)	-0.280 (0.350)	0.138 (0.175)
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	-1.948** (0.557)	-0.287 (0.233)	-1.928** (0.602)	-0.498* (0.231)	-1.887** (0.606)	-0.433 (0.247)	-1.927** (0.640)	-0.425 (0.220)
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub>t * Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	4.019** (1.116)	1.284* (0.583)	4.344** (1.194)	0.951 (0.531)	4.584** (1.210)	0.913 (0.535)	4.620** (1.259)	0.705 (0.502)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>			4.484 (2.984)	-3.128** (1.202)	4.036 (2.677)	-3.027* (1.179)	4.285 (2.637)	-2.166 (1.170)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.007 (0.311)	0.220 (0.137)	0.101 (0.319)	0.272 (0.144)	0.127 (0.332)	0.102 (0.138)
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>			-0.323 (2.226)	5.763** (1.372)	0.159 (2.536)	5.623** (1.346)	0.973 (2.497)	4.257** (1.379)
<i>Construction<sub>dt</sub></i>			1.040 (3.083)	3.833* (1.709)	1.345 (3.403)	4.118* (1.799)	0.125 (3.607)	1.654 (1.823)
<i>Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub></i>			-0.128 (1.552)	1.500 (1.027)	0.518 (1.589)	1.604 (1.019)	0.841 (1.596)	0.870 (1.057)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.365 (1.839)	0.566 (1.251)	0.876 (1.901)	0.643 (1.303)	1.769 (1.949)	-0.095 (1.316)
<i>Finance<sub>dt</sub></i>			-1.659 (2.358)	2.948 (1.754)	-1.130 (2.461)	3.128 (1.761)	-1.036 (2.408)	1.333 (1.782)
<i>Professionals<sub>dt</sub></i>			5.070 (3.351)	0.593 (1.685)	3.261 (3.340)	0.189 (1.689)	2.687 (3.212)	-0.534 (1.752)
<i>Education and Health<sub>dt</sub></i>			-1.569 (1.827)	1.370 (1.120)	-0.634 (1.842)	1.643 (1.126)	-0.174 (1.796)	0.926 (1.188)
<i>Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub></i>			-2.432 (4.073)	2.667 (1.795)	-2.379 (4.464)	2.639 (1.796)	-1.616 (4.245)	1.996 (1.664)
<i>Public Administration<sub>dt</sub></i>			-2.776 (2.037)	2.648* (1.155)	-1.326 (1.937)	3.014* (1.217)	-0.339 (2.047)	2.408 (1.281)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>					0.057 (0.199)	-0.026 (0.123)	0.067 (0.199)	0.102 (0.120)
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>					1.672** (0.534)	0.394 (0.292)	1.535** (0.491)	0.660* (0.296)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>					-0.063 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.031)	-0.065* (0.033)	-0.021 (0.032)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.007* (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.070 (0.079)	-0.008 (0.057)
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>							-0.025 (0.075)	-0.284** (0.047)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic	15.35	48.57	15.79	35.38	13.97	35.28	13.88	34.90
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	342	1,406	342	1,406	342	1,406	342	1,406

**Table 6: Years included in the analysis**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Years 94-96-98		Years 93-94-96-98		Years 96-98-03		Years 96-98-03-04	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub>t</i>	0.115 (0.118)	-0.224 (0.146)	0.115 (0.118)	-0.006 (0.123)	0.115 (0.118)	-0.234* (0.107)	0.115 (0.118)	-0.151 (0.087)
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.242 (0.351)	0.309 (0.447)	-0.242 (0.351)	-0.421 (0.351)	-0.242 (0.351)	0.188 (0.369)	-0.242 (0.351)	-0.120 (0.337)
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub>t * Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.275* (0.495)	-0.324 (0.635)	1.275* (0.495)	-0.286 (0.586)	1.275* (0.495)	-0.321 (0.540)	1.275* (0.495)	-0.107 (0.459)
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.341* (1.588)	0.627 (2.124)	3.341* (1.588)	2.101 (1.511)	3.341* (1.588)	0.216 (1.601)	3.341* (1.588)	-0.134 (1.308)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>	4.201 (2.595)	-3.751 (3.254)	4.201 (2.595)	-0.260 (1.884)	4.201 (2.595)	-1.331 (3.874)	4.201 (2.595)	-4.400 (3.394)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.456 (0.419)	0.034 (0.625)	-0.456 (0.419)	-0.383 (0.398)	-0.456 (0.419)	0.382 (0.526)	-0.456 (0.419)	0.153 (0.405)
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>	2.986 (2.663)	7.754 (4.656)	2.986 (2.663)	8.848** (2.828)	2.986 (2.663)	1.267 (3.177)	2.986 (2.663)	3.547 (2.832)
<i>Construction<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.433 (3.635)	-6.135 (5.650)	3.433 (3.635)	2.494 (3.503)	3.433 (3.635)	-6.731 (4.726)	3.433 (3.635)	-2.308 (4.056)
<i>Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.436 (1.563)	0.561 (3.289)	1.436 (1.563)	2.551 (1.959)	1.436 (1.563)	-3.101 (2.559)	1.436 (1.563)	-2.667 (2.119)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportatio<sub>dt</sub></i>	2.998 (1.740)	-2.773 (3.564)	2.998 (1.740)	-1.285 (2.453)	2.998 (1.740)	-3.150 (2.798)	2.998 (1.740)	-1.794 (2.480)
<i>Finance<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.309 (2.450)	0.382 (5.392)	0.309 (2.450)	0.950 (3.247)	0.309 (2.450)	1.508 (3.395)	0.309 (2.450)	1.836 (2.483)
<i>Professionals<sub>dt</sub></i>	-3.383 (3.530)	-4.758 (6.252)	-3.383 (3.530)	-3.362 (4.643)	-3.383 (3.530)	-8.582* (4.150)	-3.383 (3.530)	-5.608 (3.137)
<i>Education and Health<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.757 (1.676)	0.839 (3.285)	-0.757 (1.676)	4.373 (2.277)	-0.757 (1.676)	-3.209 (3.284)	-0.757 (1.676)	-2.010 (2.603)
<i>Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.883 (3.538)	-3.010 (5.746)	0.883 (3.538)	-0.596 (3.272)	0.883 (3.538)	0.156 (4.689)	0.883 (3.538)	3.085 (3.233)
<i>Public Administration<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.027 (1.950)	1.180 (3.794)	-0.027 (1.950)	4.619 (2.500)	-0.027 (1.950)	-1.010 (3.544)	-0.027 (1.950)	-1.332 (2.952)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.071 (0.181)	0.333 (0.296)	0.071 (0.181)	0.626** (0.207)	0.071 (0.181)	-0.179 (0.241)	0.071 (0.181)	-0.115 (0.221)
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.182* (0.462)	-0.127 (0.811)	1.182* (0.462)	-0.549 (0.601)	1.182* (0.462)	0.794 (0.605)	1.182* (0.462)	0.945 (0.505)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.048 (0.035)	0.026 (0.050)	-0.048 (0.035)	0.013 (0.049)	-0.048 (0.035)	0.051 (0.048)	-0.048 (0.035)	0.031 (0.052)
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.368 (0.365)	-0.046 (0.389)	0.368 (0.365)	-0.839** (0.273)	0.368 (0.365)	-0.146 (0.401)	0.368 (0.365)	0.139 (0.363)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.004 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.075 (0.082)	0.049 (0.102)	0.075 (0.082)	0.017 (0.082)	0.075 (0.082)	-0.027 (0.110)	0.075 (0.082)	0.017 (0.095)
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.087 (0.081)	-0.342** (0.117)	0.087 (0.081)	-0.367** (0.073)	0.087 (0.081)	-0.494** (0.098)	0.087 (0.081)	-0.438** (0.088)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	345	253	345	572	345	358	345	589
R-squared	0.610	0.580	0.610	0.542	0.610	0.697	0.610	0.646

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables.

*Cong<sub>dt</sub>* is *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* after de-meaning.

**Table 7: Alternative measures of opinion**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Migration	Trade										
<i>Mean opinion decade</i> $_{b dt}$	0.351	-0.120										
	(0.204)	(0.086)										
<i>Mean opinion</i> $_{b dt}$			0.147	-0.090	0.177	-0.146	0.058	-0.157				
			(0.137)	(0.076)	(0.162)	(0.092)	(0.229)	(0.095)				
<i>Median opinion</i> $_{b dt}$									-0.027	-0.016		
									(0.063)	(0.044)		
<i>Mean opinion rescaled</i> $_{b dt}$											0.089	-0.088
											(0.095)	(0.073)
<i>Cong</i> $_{dt}$	-0.425	-0.279	-0.407	-0.215	-0.308	-0.233	-0.555	-0.230	0.154	-0.239	-0.238	-0.217
	(0.464)	(0.205)	(0.399)	(0.202)	(0.466)	(0.220)	(0.542)	(0.229)	(0.300)	(0.166)	(0.344)	(0.198)
<i>Mean opinion decade</i> $_{bdt} * Cong_{dt}$	1.562	0.134										
	(0.833)	(0.396)										
<i>Mean opinion</i> $_{bdt} * Cong_{dt}$			1.627**	-0.057	1.564*	-0.159	2.027*	-0.125				
			(0.591)	(0.358)	(0.723)	(0.456)	(0.853)	(0.484)				
<i>Median opinion</i> $_{bdt} * Cong_{dt}$									0.463	0.022		
									(0.281)	(0.197)		
<i>Mean opinion rescaled</i> $_{bdt} * Cong_{dt}$											1.056*	-0.050
											(0.412)	(0.341)
State*year fixed effect	YES											
District-level demographic controls	YES											
District-level economic controls	YES											
Representatives' characteristics	YES											
Observations	345	1,430	293	1,359	245	1,155	205	1,083	345	1,430	345	1,430
R-squared	0.609	0.538	0.622	0.538	0.635	0.555	0.657	0.560	0.607	0.536	0.612	0.537

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. District-level economic controls include skill level, unemployment rate, log mean family income, distribution of employment across sectors. District-level demographic controls include share of urban residents, share of foreign born population and its growth rate, share of African-American residents. Representative characteristics include representative's age, gender, and a dummy affiliation with the Democratic party. Specification (1) measures opinion as the average opinion of district d over decades. Specification (2) drops all districts in which we observe one single individual expressing her/his opinion on migration or trade issues. Specification (3) drops all districts in which we observe less than three individuals expressing their opinion on migration or trade issues. Specification (4) drops all districts in which we observe less than four individuals expressing their opinion on migration or trade issues. Specification (5) measures opinion as the median opinion of district d at time t. Specification (6) measures opinion on immigration as the average opinion of district d at time t where the original individual opinion variable is a categorical variable taking values 2, 1 and 0 (the closer to 2 the more in favor of immigration).

**Table 8: Alternative definitions of opinion**

	(1)		(2)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion<sub>bdt</sub></i>	0.099 (0.121)	0.047 (0.084)	0.118 (0.120)	-0.158 (0.099)
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.287 (0.354)	-0.390 (0.247)	-0.220 (0.354)	-0.228 (0.204)
<i>Opinion<sub>bdt</sub> * Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.359** (0.502)	0.317 (0.396)	1.245* (0.503)	-0.013 (0.468)
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.370* (1.587)	0.946 (0.836)	3.354* (1.596)	0.990 (0.841)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>	4.226 (2.602)	-1.886 (1.263)	4.173 (2.591)	-1.972 (1.263)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.451 (0.420)	-0.171 (0.251)	-0.466 (0.420)	-0.172 (0.251)
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>	2.878 (2.658)	3.741* (1.523)	3.095 (2.677)	3.932* (1.537)
<i>Construction<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.482 (3.638)	2.009 (2.008)	3.436 (3.644)	2.294 (2.034)
<i>Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.434 (1.566)	0.570 (1.149)	1.438 (1.556)	0.663 (1.169)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>	2.971 (1.745)	-0.478 (1.395)	3.012 (1.727)	-0.559 (1.401)
<i>Finance<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.210 (2.452)	1.388 (1.903)	0.380 (2.460)	1.513 (1.872)
<i>Professionals<sub>dt</sub></i>	-3.426 (3.533)	-2.117 (2.198)	-3.380 (3.526)	-2.116 (2.215)
<i>Education and Health<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.820 (1.678)	0.572 (1.403)	-0.693 (1.676)	0.707 (1.429)
<i>Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.673 (3.544)	1.408 (1.745)	0.963 (3.537)	1.499 (1.746)
<i>Public Administration<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.046 (1.953)	2.315 (1.374)	-0.053 (1.944)	2.397 (1.380)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.068 (0.181)	0.156 (0.141)	0.076 (0.181)	0.176 (0.140)
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.202* (0.464)	0.593 (0.323)	1.179* (0.462)	0.614 (0.326)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.047 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.049 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.034)
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.381 (0.366)	-0.201 (0.188)	0.362 (0.364)	-0.236 (0.180)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.074 (0.081)	-0.001 (0.062)	0.078 (0.082)	0.006 (0.063)
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.088 (0.081)	-0.282** (0.050)	0.087 (0.081)	-0.287** (0.051)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES	
Observations	345	1,430	345	1,430
R-squared	0.611	0.536	0.610	0.538

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong<sub>dt</sub>* is *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* after de-meaning. In columns (1) and (2) the opinion variable is redefined by classifying the “Don’t know” and “Haven’t thought much” answers together with the “Pro liberalization” and “Against liberalization” opinions respectively

**Table 9: Alternative district level controls**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub></i>	0.123 (0.117)	-0.089 (0.073)	0.124 (0.116)	-0.089 (0.073)	0.112 (0.118)	-0.086 (0.072)	0.133 (0.117)	-0.082 (0.074)
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.256 (0.356)	-0.215 (0.197)	-0.254 (0.355)	-0.218 (0.198)	-0.264 (0.353)	-0.225 (0.197)	-0.264 (0.355)	-0.210 (0.203)
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub> * Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.232* (0.494)	-0.052 (0.341)	1.227* (0.492)	-0.049 (0.341)	1.261* (0.492)	-0.048 (0.340)	1.305* (0.514)	-0.035 (0.346)
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.401* (1.532)	0.832 (0.728)	3.403* (1.601)	0.896 (0.843)	3.285* (1.605)	0.916 (0.843)	3.006 (1.639)	0.979 (0.816)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.310 (2.741)	-2.108 (1.316)	3.239 (2.807)	-2.081 (1.351)	4.248 (2.655)	-1.982 (1.271)	4.052 (2.629)	-1.884 (1.262)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>			-0.534 (0.443)	-0.167 (0.251)	-0.479 (0.422)	-0.166 (0.253)	-0.436 (0.424)	-0.136 (0.258)
<i>Log median family income<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.530 (0.421)	-0.147 (0.222)						
<i>Inequality<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.431 (0.544)	0.066 (0.328)				
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>	2.533 (2.453)	3.851* (1.538)	2.490 (2.645)	3.907* (1.524)	2.135 (2.658)	3.863* (1.548)	2.981 (2.741)	3.789* (1.514)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.053 (1.701)	-0.528 (1.419)	3.017 (1.708)	-0.549 (1.431)	2.676 (1.743)	-0.580 (1.411)	2.948 (1.821)	-0.431 (1.451)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.083 (0.178)	0.175 (0.141)	0.086 (0.179)	0.176 (0.141)	0.203 (0.206)	0.197 (0.159)	0.090 (0.186)	0.151 (0.142)
<i>Log Pop Density<sub>dt</sub></i>					-0.051 (0.041)	-0.008 (0.024)		
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.099* (0.467)	0.592 (0.333)	1.093* (0.474)	0.598 (0.328)	1.414** (0.486)	0.661 (0.346)	1.364* (0.648)	0.460 (0.369)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.019 (0.034)	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.020 (0.034)	-0.038 (0.034)	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.047 (0.035)	-0.018 (0.034)
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.361 (0.359)	-0.232 (0.183)	0.362 (0.359)	-0.232 (0.183)	0.406 (0.373)	-0.219 (0.189)	0.414 (0.387)	-0.261 (0.183)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.063 (0.084)	-0.001 (0.062)	0.062 (0.086)	0.001 (0.063)	0.058 (0.085)	0.001 (0.062)	0.070 (0.095)	0.006 (0.063)
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.083 (0.082)	-0.284** (0.050)	0.082 (0.083)	-0.285** (0.051)	0.093 (0.082)	-0.284** (0.050)	0.086 (0.082)	-0.285** (0.051)
<i>Turnout Rate Previous Elections<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.453 (0.613)	-0.289 (0.460)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Other sectors	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	345	1,430	345	1,430	345	1,430	340	1,420
R-squared	0.611	0.537	0.611	0.537	0.613	0.537	0.608	0.535

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong<sub>dt</sub>* is *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* after de-meaning. In column (1) we control for median rather than mean family income in the district, *Log median family income<sub>dt</sub>* measures the logarithm of the median family income within a district in dollars. In column (2) we include *Inequality<sub>dt</sub>* which measures the ratio between mean and median family income within a district. In column (3) we control for *LogPop Density<sub>dt</sub>*, that is logged population per square mile. In column (4) we control for the turnout rate in the previous election in district *d* (*Turnout Rate Previous Elections<sub>dt</sub>*)

**Table 10: Alternative controls for representatives' characteristics**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub></i>	0.114 (0.113)	-0.089 (0.073)	0.114 (0.118)	-0.109 (0.074)	0.119 (0.117)	-0.073 (0.074)	0.131 (0.133)	-0.075 (0.074)	0.115 (0.126)	-0.057 (0.073)
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.211 (0.330)	-0.220 (0.200)	-0.263 (0.360)	-0.259 (0.191)	-0.157 (0.352)	-0.274 (0.203)	-0.182 (0.346)	-0.327 (0.202)	-0.157 (0.362)	-0.270 (0.184)
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub> * Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.316** (0.488)	-0.045 (0.341)	1.267* (0.494)	-0.110 (0.341)	1.192* (0.500)	0.095 (0.333)	1.172* (0.517)	0.029 (0.335)	1.164* (0.509)	-0.088 (0.334)
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.363* (1.431)	0.871 (0.840)	3.475* (1.611)	0.779 (0.808)	3.434* (1.539)	1.089 (0.856)	3.081 (1.711)	1.237 (0.830)	3.650* (1.616)	0.972 (0.777)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>	4.373 (2.508)	-2.048 (1.258)	4.244 (2.627)	-2.009 (1.268)	4.085 (2.586)	-2.476 (1.322)	1.934 (2.458)	-2.468 (1.359)	2.940 (2.410)	-2.001 (1.258)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.501 (0.403)	-0.163 (0.254)	-0.493 (0.431)	-0.127 (0.246)	-0.416 (0.413)	-0.165 (0.263)	-0.450 (0.436)	-0.181 (0.251)	-0.527 (0.442)	-0.157 (0.230)
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.299 (2.731)	4.133** (1.529)	3.013 (2.680)	3.638* (1.527)	2.808 (2.658)	4.697** (1.565)	1.315 (2.409)	4.425** (1.535)	2.407 (2.660)	4.720** (1.511)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>	3.059 (1.790)	-0.398 (1.420)	2.947 (1.727)	-1.127 (1.338)	2.867 (1.739)	-0.450 (1.459)	1.984 (1.807)	-0.148 (1.442)	3.572 (1.991)	0.201 (1.339)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.110 (0.183)	0.171 (0.141)	0.066 (0.183)	0.194 (0.139)	0.043 (0.181)	0.116 (0.148)	-0.035 (0.198)	0.126 (0.144)	-0.074 (0.189)	0.205 (0.135)
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>	1.124* (0.453)	0.588 (0.326)	1.203* (0.467)	0.639* (0.323)	1.167* (0.458)	0.636 (0.339)	1.037* (0.471)	0.558 (0.334)	1.285** (0.485)	0.530 (0.321)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.040 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.046 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.033)	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.020 (0.033)	-0.044 (0.037)	0.004 (0.035)
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.438 (0.344)	-0.208 (0.182)	0.372 (0.368)	-0.267 (0.178)	0.364 (0.363)	-0.113 (0.188)	0.450 (0.383)	-0.149 (0.188)	0.568 (0.365)	-0.136 (0.183)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
<i>Tenure<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.020* (0.008)	0.002 (0.005)								
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.113 (0.086)	0.004 (0.062)	0.080 (0.082)	0.024 (0.064)	0.057 (0.081)	0.025 (0.063)	0.063 (0.088)	0.028 (0.066)	0.062 (0.085)	0.029 (0.060)
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>	0.038 (0.082)	-0.290** (0.050)	0.081 (0.083)	-0.302** (0.050)					0.056 (0.089)	-0.242** (0.052)
<i>Educ - representative - ivy<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.055 (0.076)	0.150* (0.062)						
<i>DW - nominate score<sub>dt</sub></i>					0.161 (0.102)	-0.272** (0.064)				
<i>ADA score<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.002 (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)		
<i>PACLabor<sub>dt</sub></i>									0.164 (0.111)	-0.093* (0.046)
<i>PACCorporate<sub>dt</sub></i>									0.043 (0.074)	0.173** (0.044)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Other sectors	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	345	1,430	345	1,430	345	1,430	326	1,410	321	1,407
R-squared	0.619	0.537	0.611	0.541	0.613	0.526	0.615	0.542	0.623	0.560

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong<sub>dt</sub>* is *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* after de-meaning. In column (1) we replace the representative's age with *Tenure<sub>dt</sub>*, which is a measure of tenure in office. In column (2) we additionally control for *Educ - representative - ivy<sub>dt</sub>*, which is a dummy that takes a value of one if the representative attended an elite educational institution and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4) we use alternative measures of the ideological orientation of the representative and replace *Democrat<sub>dt</sub>* with *DW - nominate score<sub>dt</sub>*, which is the normalized DW nominate score (column (3)) and with the *ADA score<sub>dt</sub>* (column (4)). Both variables have been normalized so that a higher score identifies a more liberal politician. In column (5), we control for *PACLabor<sub>dt</sub>* and *PACCorporate<sub>dt</sub>* which are measures of the intensity of the lobbying activity and take a value of one if the labor/corporate contributions that the representative received are at or above the eightieth percentile of all labor/corporate contributions in that year and zero otherwise.

**Table 11: Placebo Tests**

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Abortion		Religion		Trust in Government	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Placebo Opinion</i> <sub>bd<sub>t</sub></sub>	-0.053 (0.150)	0.080 (0.093)	-0.040 (0.147)	-0.066 (0.099)	0.081 (0.146)	0.086 (0.092)
<i>Cong</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.358 (0.385)	-0.552 (0.324)	0.449 (0.601)	-0.036 (0.399)	0.233 (0.342)	-0.455 (0.240)
<i>Placebo Opinion</i> <sub>bd<sub>t</sub></sub> * <i>Cong</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.060 (0.551)	0.587 (0.481)	-0.077 (0.720)	-0.237 (0.501)	0.523 (0.736)	0.656 (0.401)
<i>SkillRatio</i> <sub>dt</sub>	3.593* (1.646)	0.752 (0.820)	3.524* (1.646)	0.817 (0.824)	3.496* (1.670)	0.763 (0.908)
<i>Unemployment</i> <sub>dt</sub>	4.620 (2.616)	-1.901 (1.243)	4.638 (2.718)	-2.014 (1.284)	4.620 (2.649)	-2.758* (1.376)
<i>Log mean family income</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.474 (0.426)	-0.118 (0.242)	-0.475 (0.424)	-0.147 (0.248)	-0.463 (0.433)	-0.183 (0.272)
<i>Farmer</i> <sub>dt</sub>	4.046 (2.780)	3.910* (1.517)	4.135 (2.830)	3.956* (1.535)	3.905 (2.729)	4.521** (1.661)
<i>Construction</i> <sub>dt</sub>	4.469 (3.665)	1.813 (2.024)	4.322 (3.668)	1.940 (2.055)	4.075 (3.635)	1.850 (2.155)
<i>Manufacturing</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.983 (1.501)	0.625 (1.146)	2.083 (1.547)	0.664 (1.177)	1.918 (1.526)	0.733 (1.254)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation</i> <sub>dt</sub>	3.584* (1.731)	-0.632 (1.381)	3.519* (1.719)	-0.506 (1.429)	3.200 (1.718)	-0.873 (1.552)
<i>Finance</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.103 (2.510)	1.402 (1.877)	1.281 (2.540)	1.398 (1.908)	0.944 (2.461)	1.461 (2.012)
<i>Professionals</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-3.096 (3.551)	-2.011 (2.187)	-3.153 (3.525)	-2.053 (2.215)	-3.194 (3.596)	-1.548 (2.362)
<i>Education and Health</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.170 (1.680)	0.655 (1.410)	-0.138 (1.695)	0.749 (1.439)	-0.356 (1.703)	0.527 (1.504)
<i>Entertainment Services</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.150 (3.608)	1.344 (1.759)	1.247 (3.670)	1.479 (1.775)	0.729 (3.536)	1.547 (1.979)
<i>Public Administration</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.354 (1.945)	2.318 (1.366)	0.509 (2.040)	2.430 (1.406)	0.209 (1.883)	2.243 (1.502)
<i>Urban</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.122 (0.187)	0.160 (0.138)	0.131 (0.192)	0.179 (0.139)	0.139 (0.189)	0.159 (0.144)
<i>Foreign - born</i> <sub>dt</sub>	1.165* (0.470)	0.689* (0.319)	1.153* (0.473)	0.670* (0.327)	1.127* (0.478)	0.600 (0.343)
<i>Foreign - born growth</i> <sub>dt</sub>	-0.050 (0.036)	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.050 (0.037)	-0.022 (0.034)	-0.054 (0.035)	-0.024 (0.036)
<i>African - American</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.370 (0.377)	-0.211 (0.184)	0.357 (0.384)	-0.207 (0.184)	0.331 (0.385)	-0.205 (0.205)
<i>Age - representative</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
<i>Gender - representative</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.094 (0.083)	-0.001 (0.062)	0.090 (0.084)	0.006 (0.061)	0.081 (0.083)	0.014 (0.063)
<i>Democrat</i> <sub>dt</sub>	0.105 (0.080)	-0.285** (0.049)	0.104 (0.081)	-0.289** (0.050)	0.104 (0.081)	-0.241** (0.055)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES	
Observations	345	1,428	345	1,420	343	1,280
R-squared	0.601	0.538	0.601	0.536	0.602	0.516

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong*<sub>dt</sub> is *Congruence*<sub>dt</sub> after de-meaning. In column (1), *Placebo Opinion*<sub>dt</sub> measures the average opinion in district d at time t where the original individual level variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the individual suggests that law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life and zero if he/she states that abortion should not be permitted at all or that it should be permitted only under particular circumstances. In column (2), *Placebo Opinion*<sub>dt</sub> measures the average opinion in district d at time t where the original individual level variable is a dummy that takes a value one if the respondent considers religion to be an important part of his/her life and zero if not. In column (3), *Placebo Opinion*<sub>dt</sub> measures the average opinion in district d at time t where the original individual level variable is a dummy that takes a value of one if the individual suggests that the government is run for the benefit of all the people and zero if he/she states that the government is run by a few big interests.

**Table A1: Opinions and Congruence**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Opinion on Migration	Opinion on Trade						
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>	-0.060 (0.080)	-0.101 (0.057)	0.007 (0.113)	-0.034 (0.086)	0.141 (0.112)	-0.014 (0.093)	0.136 (0.119)	-0.012 (0.100)
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>			1.089 (0.743)	0.027 (0.588)	1.286 (0.683)	-0.057 (0.588)	1.211 (0.720)	-0.051 (0.604)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>			2.173 (1.324)	-0.681 (0.992)	1.053 (1.283)	-0.357 (1.059)	1.163 (1.267)	-0.396 (1.135)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>			-0.215 (0.210)	0.101 (0.175)	-0.170 (0.195)	0.120 (0.180)	-0.154 (0.202)	0.122 (0.180)
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.727 (1.371)	0.638 (1.066)	1.086 (1.234)	0.358 (1.124)	1.294 (1.235)	0.508 (1.139)
<i>Construction<sub>dt</sub></i>			2.957 (1.913)	1.843 (1.256)	3.958* (1.780)	1.812 (1.343)	4.094* (1.868)	1.945 (1.372)
<i>Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub></i>			1.381 (0.901)	-0.041 (0.751)	1.568 (0.867)	0.028 (0.750)	1.713* (0.846)	0.118 (0.752)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>			1.257 (1.151)	-1.509 (0.979)	1.920 (1.187)	-1.702 (0.990)	2.086 (1.119)	-1.554 (1.010)
<i>Finance<sub>dt</sub></i>			1.533 (1.424)	0.927 (1.320)	1.230 (1.390)	1.149 (1.354)	1.217 (1.363)	1.305 (1.372)
<i>Professionals<sub>dt</sub></i>			1.865 (2.122)	1.381 (1.609)	0.860 (2.081)	1.127 (1.690)	1.061 (2.015)	1.260 (1.695)
<i>Education and Health<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.909 (1.075)	0.063 (0.980)	0.718 (1.079)	0.411 (0.967)	0.864 (1.065)	0.455 (0.976)
<i>Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub></i>			-0.668 (1.888)	-0.625 (1.163)	-0.318 (1.801)	-0.600 (1.202)	-0.068 (1.750)	-0.560 (1.210)
<i>Public Administration<sub>dt</sub></i>			0.456 (1.133)	-0.934 (0.795)	0.604 (1.144)	-0.485 (0.775)	0.798 (1.154)	-0.411 (0.772)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>					-0.056 (0.100)	0.033 (0.077)	-0.047 (0.100)	0.025 (0.081)
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>					0.833** (0.180)	0.223 (0.243)	0.822** (0.187)	0.204 (0.251)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>					-0.008 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.022)
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>					0.380** (0.141)	-0.155 (0.122)	0.378** (0.142)	-0.141 (0.122)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.051 (0.054)	-0.016 (0.049)
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>							-0.008 (0.033)	0.009 (0.033)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	345	1,430	345	1,430	345	1,430	345	1,430
R-squared	0.254	0.358	0.296	0.416	0.340	0.422	0.342	0.423

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong<sub>dt</sub>* is *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* after de-meaning.

**Table A2: Individual level determinants of opinions**

	Opinion on Migration	Opinion on Trade
<i>High-School - No diploma</i> <i>it</i>	-0.017 (0.071)	-0.012 (0.036)
<i>High-School - Diploma</i> <i>it</i>	0.065 (0.065)	0.017 (0.030)
<i>Some College- No degree</i> <i>it</i>	0.118 (0.064)	0.143** (0.032)
<i>BA level degrees</i> <i>it</i>	0.264** (0.069)	0.309** (0.034)
<i>Advanced degrees</i> <i>it</i>	0.334** (0.070)	0.360** (0.036)
<i>Female</i> <i>it</i>	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.090** (0.012)
<i>Age Group 25-34</i> <i>it</i>	-0.041 (0.057)	-0.002 (0.029)
<i>Age Group 35-44</i> <i>it</i>	0.004 (0.056)	-0.044 (0.029)
<i>Age Group 45-54</i> <i>it</i>	-0.027 (0.057)	-0.023 (0.030)
<i>Age Group 55-64</i> <i>it</i>	-0.010 (0.062)	-0.034 (0.030)
<i>Age Group 65-74</i> <i>it</i>	-0.041 (0.064)	-0.027 (0.032)
<i>Age Group 75-over</i> <i>it</i>	0.008 (0.062)	-0.052 (0.035)
<i>Black</i> <i>it</i>	0.570** (0.165)	0.022 (0.088)
<i>Asian</i> <i>it</i>	0.285 (0.211)	0.453** (0.159)
<i>Native-American</i> <i>it</i>	-0.069 (0.211)	0.322* (0.152)
<i>Mexican</i> <i>it</i>	0.240 (0.187)	0.275 (0.164)
<i>Hispanic - not Mexican</i> <i>it</i>	0.660* (0.256)	0.114 (0.171)
Race*Educational Attainment	YES	YES
Race*Age group	YES	YES
State*year fixed effect	YES	YES
Observations	2,708	6,390
R-squared	0.111	0.155

The table reports coefficients from a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses. \*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%.




**Table A3: Baseline specification: probit model**

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade	Migration	Trade
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub></i>	0.939*	0.136	1.363**	0.294	1.154*	-0.163	0.769	-0.213	0.676	-0.265
	(0.457)	(0.274)	(0.488)	(0.306)	(0.459)	(0.298)	(0.471)	(0.295)	(0.464)	(0.280)
<i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>			-3.171**	-0.071	-2.902*	-1.402	-1.948	-1.188	-1.264	-1.065
			(0.998)	(0.591)	(1.186)	(0.726)	(1.293)	(0.775)	(1.305)	(0.751)
<i>Opinion<sub>bd</sub></i> * <i>Cong<sub>dt</sub></i>			6.572**	1.675	6.925**	0.916	7.912**	0.992	7.592**	-0.162
			(1.937)	(1.286)	(1.969)	(1.211)	(2.094)	(1.217)	(2.070)	(1.241)
<i>SkillRatio<sub>dt</sub></i>					9.959	7.495*	13.258*	7.511*	14.141*	2.170
					(5.176)	(3.254)	(5.589)	(3.195)	(6.366)	(3.215)
<i>Unemployment<sub>dt</sub></i>					22.638*	-15.984*	23.405*	-15.104*	27.246**	-14.083*
					(10.972)	(6.513)	(10.604)	(6.609)	(10.207)	(6.485)
<i>Log mean family income<sub>dt</sub></i>					-2.197	-1.034	-1.998	-0.897	-1.376	-0.951
					(1.565)	(0.933)	(1.619)	(0.976)	(1.698)	(0.913)
<i>Farmer<sub>dt</sub></i>					11.186	25.998**	26.199*	25.455**	31.284*	22.186**
					(11.393)	(7.699)	(13.182)	(7.642)	(13.508)	(7.724)
<i>Construction<sub>dt</sub></i>					8.642	13.734	22.959	15.044	30.025	-3.601
					(14.440)	(8.428)	(16.518)	(8.630)	(16.836)	(9.734)
<i>Manufacturing<sub>dt</sub></i>					6.280	3.823	14.764	4.145	17.773	1.254
					(8.821)	(4.604)	(9.040)	(4.672)	(9.171)	(4.948)
<i>Wholesale, Retail and Transportation<sub>dt</sub></i>					16.340	0.947	31.618*	-0.144	38.211**	-4.227
					(10.186)	(5.795)	(12.392)	(6.142)	(12.674)	(6.184)
<i>Finance<sub>dt</sub></i>					6.996	10.425	10.104	10.627	17.052	6.000
					(12.586)	(7.328)	(13.411)	(7.513)	(12.901)	(7.934)
<i>Professionals<sub>dt</sub></i>					6.846	-10.932	4.955	-13.590	6.215	-7.944
					(16.959)	(9.739)	(18.332)	(9.652)	(19.441)	(9.657)
<i>Education and Health<sub>dt</sub></i>					-1.256	0.845	3.092	2.641	3.141	1.427
					(8.920)	(5.366)	(8.407)	(5.716)	(8.424)	(6.017)
<i>Entertainment Services<sub>dt</sub></i>					1.190	6.959	16.289	6.929	12.083	4.734
					(17.541)	(7.330)	(18.207)	(7.321)	(20.962)	(7.172)
<i>Public Administration<sub>dt</sub></i>					-0.396	9.887	10.682	12.885*	12.868	9.734
					(9.370)	(5.421)	(9.733)	(6.112)	(10.072)	(6.439)
<i>Urban<sub>dt</sub></i>							0.536	0.283	0.079	1.195*
							(0.762)	(0.556)	(0.797)	(0.579)
<i>Foreign - born<sub>dt</sub></i>							7.192**	1.857	6.209**	1.891
							(2.331)	(1.251)	(2.027)	(1.222)
<i>Foreign - born growth<sub>dt</sub></i>							-0.222	-0.166	-0.266	-0.112
							(0.185)	(0.135)	(0.195)	(0.149)
<i>African - American<sub>dt</sub></i>							2.275	-0.496	2.750*	-1.142
							(1.304)	(0.753)	(1.333)	(0.733)
<i>Age - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>									0.017	0.002
									(0.011)	(0.008)
<i>Gender - representative<sub>dt</sub></i>									0.414	-0.153
									(0.327)	(0.273)
<i>Democrat<sub>dt</sub></i>									0.718*	-1.373**
									(0.355)	(0.223)
State*year fixed effect	YES		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139	265	1,139

The table reports coefficients from a probit model. Standard errors, clustered at the district-decade level are reported in parentheses.

\*\*Significant at 1%, \* significant at 5%. See end of Table 2 for the definition of the variables. *Cong<sub>dt</sub>* is *Congruence<sub>dt</sub>* after de-meaning.

**Figure 1: Congruence**



**Figure 2: Individual opinions on migration, congruence and voting behavior on HR 3736 (1998)**




Figure 2.1: Florida – Congressional Districts Map



Figure 2.2: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 - Opinions on migration




Figure 2.3: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 - Congruence




Figure 2.4: Florida - Districts 3 and 15 – Vote on migration

**Figure 3: Individual opinions on trade, congruence and voting behavior on HR 2621 (1998)**




Figure 3.1: Texas – Congressional Districts Map



Figure 3.2: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 - Opinions on trade




Figure 3.3: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 - Congruence




Figure 3.4: Texas - Districts 7 and 9 – Vote on trade

**Figure 4 (a): Migration**




**Figure 4 (b): Trade**




**Figure 5- Marginal effects of opinion on vote, by margin of victory**

**Figure 5 (a): Migration**




**Figure 5 (b): Trade**




**Figure 6- Marginal effects of opinion on vote, swing districts**


**Figure 6 (a): Migration**



**Figure 6 (b): Trade**



**Figure A1: Effect of trade opinions on voting**



Note: In every year, trade is defined as salient in districts where at least 95% of respondents have an opinion on trade policy.