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## **BRANDS IN MOTION: HOW FRICTIONS SHAPE MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION**

Keith Head and Thierry Mayer

***INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND  
REGIONAL ECONOMICS***



**Centre for Economic Policy Research**

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## Abstract

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JEL Classification: F1

Keywords: cars, gravity, multinational production model, regional integration and structural estimation

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# Brands in Motion: How frictions shape multinational production\*

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August 26, 2015

## Abstract

We use disaggregated data on car assembly and trade to estimate a model of multinational production. Our framework delineates four theory-based specifications under which all frictions relevant to multinational production can be structurally estimated. In addition to the trade costs and multinational production frictions emphasized in past work, we incorporate a third friction: regardless of production origin, it is more difficult to make sales in markets that are geographically separated from the brand’s headquarters. The estimation transparently recovers internally consistent estimates of each type of friction cost. With structural parameters in hand, we investigate the consequences of three trade integration experiments: TPP, TTIP, and Brexit. We show that each type of friction makes a qualitative and quantitative difference in the reallocation of production caused by economic integration.

## 1 Introduction

Evaluations of economic integration agreements increasingly focus on their implications for multinational firms. This is true for critics—who voice suspicions that corporate interests drive the negotiations of recent mega-regional agreement such as TPP or TTIP<sup>1</sup>—as

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<sup>1</sup>TPP stands for Trans-Pacific Partnership and TTIP for Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Those two agreements are described in more detail in section 5, where we conduct our counterfactuals.

well as for proponents—who see integration as facilitating beneficial transfers of technology. One reason regional trade agreements (RTAs) matter for multinationals is that they enhance the relative appeal of peripheral members whom the RTA transforms into export platforms to serve the region’s entire market. A second reason why RTAs matter for multinationals is that modern RTAs involve *deeper integration* than just preferential tariff cuts. As Larry Summers put it, “What we call trade agreements are in fact agreements on the protection of investments and the achievement of regulatory harmonization and establishment of standards in areas such as intellectual property.”<sup>2</sup> Investment protections raise the benefits for firms based within the RTA of using other members as export platforms, *even to external markets*. On the other hand, regulatory harmonization allows multinationals to use a single design for an entire region. The increased focus on foot-loose producers and the complex implications of deeper integration highlight the need for quantitative models that can handle multinational production responses to integration agreements.

This paper estimates a model of multinational production (MP) that incorporates this range of responses to different forms of integration in a unified quantitative framework. We base our estimation on what we will refer to as the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model of multinational production (MP). The model combines a product market structure from Melitz (2003) with an intra-firm sourcing decision inspired by Eaton and Kortum (2002). Important contributors to the development of this model include Ramondo (2014), Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013), Irarrazabal et al. (2013), Arkolakis et al. (2013), and Tintelnot (2014). The models all feature CES demand at the consumer level, combined with another CES equation governing the sourcing decision. Firms decide on markups based on a constant price elasticity in the destination market and simultaneously choose which country to use as the source for the production for each market according to another constant elasticity describing interchangeability of potential production facilities. Within this class, our CES MP model is the first to consider two extensive margins (entry and sourcing of each variety for each market) and two intensive margins (variety-level and brand-level sales), which yield four equations that are directly amenable to empirical implementation.

The primary contribution of this paper is to use those four estimable equations in order to estimate friction parameters relevant to the MP model based on micro data. In contrast to Arkolakis et al. (2013), Tintelnot (2014), and Coşar et al. (2015) we have nearly exhaustive firm-variety-source-market level flows. This uniquely rich data, combined with the four structural equations, permits estimation in which all cost parameters are identified

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<sup>2</sup>*Financial Times*, July 14, 2015.

transparently through standard gravity and discrete choice regressions implied by the model. The same equations deliver credible estimates of the two pivotal elasticities of the CES MP model—one governing firm substitution between sources and the other consumer substitution between varieties. The second contribution of the paper is to extend the basic MP model to include a new friction, between HQ and market, and a new decision, which varieties to offer where. By way of contrast, Tintelnot (2014) assumes a unit mass of varieties for each firm, the entirety of which are offered in every market. The tertiary contribution exploits the fully estimated model to conduct novel investigations of important proposed changes in regional integration. This paper offers the first quantitative assessment of major integration agreements (TPP, TTIP, Brexit) that takes into account reallocation of production within multinational corporations.

We utilize data provided by an automotive industry consultant which tracks production at the level of *brands* (Acura, BMW, Chevrolet) and *models* (RDX, X5, Corvette). We view brands as the appropriate counterpart of firms in the MP models as they have much more continuity over time and similarity in product offerings than the parent corporations (for example, Tata’s \$1,600 Nano model has very little to do with the Jaguar-brand cars that came under Tata ownership in 2008). Car models correspond to the natural understanding of varieties in monopolistic competition. We organize the estimating framework around the brand-level decisions over which countries to offer each model and which countries to source assembly from for each model-market pair.

The “brands in motion” in the paper title refers to two types of metaphorical movement. The first is the transfer of brand-specific technologies from the headquarters to plants in other countries. This friction is already emphasized in the previously cited literature on multinational production. The second sense of mobility is one that has not yet figured explicitly prior work: To what extent can a brand transfer its success in the home market into foreign markets? Since the impediments to moving technology to the assembly location are called multinational production (MP) frictions, we term the impediments to moving market success abroad multinational sales (MS) frictions. We model MS frictions as a cost disadvantage when the market is distinct and distant from the headquarters country—regardless of the location of production.

The MP and MS frictions combine with the familiar trade frictions associated with separation between production and consumption locations to shape firms decisions between exporting from home and producing abroad to serve host, home, and third markets. To distinguish those new frictions from traditional trade costs, we show that one needs data tracking the three countries where a brand is headquartered, produces and sell its products. The idea is therefore to use the simplest modeling structure that permits

transparent identification of these new frictions without committing to sets of assumptions that are context-specific. The CES MP model yields such a structure and can be seen as an extension of the gravity equation to a setup where coordination of foreign assembly and distribution affiliates by headquarters is not costless. Gravity has proven to be a very powerful tool for understanding international trade flows, its most attractive features being tractability, straight-forward estimation, and good fit to the data. The gravity equation—extended here to incorporate MP—again performs strongly in our application to the car industry.

Because our paper utilizes car data, it invites comparison to a series of papers that have considered trade and competition in this industry. Goldberg (1995), Verboven (1996), and Berry et al. (1999) investigate quantitative restrictions on imports of cars into the US and EU markets. More recently, an independent and contemporaneous paper by Coşar et al. (2015) combines a demand side from Berry et al. (1995) with the MP model of Tintelnot (2014). These papers feature oligopolistic interactions and either nested or random coefficients differentiated products demand systems. The advantage of these approaches is that they allow for variable markups and yield richer and more realistic substitution patterns than the monopolistic competition with symmetric varieties demand assumed in the CES MP model.

Nested preference structures and attributes-based demand can capture the compelling idea that some car models substitute more readily for each other than they do for models in a different part of the nest or with very different attributes (size, horsepower, etc.). However, such richness comes at a cost. It severs the connection to the gravity equation from trade. To implement the richer nesting structures, the researcher is compelled to take positions on the structure of the nest. To implement the BLP method, the researcher needs to know the prices and attributes of all the models. Such data are only available for a drastically reduced set of brands, models, and markets.<sup>3</sup> This would make it impossible for us to consider the global production reallocations associated with the mega-regional agreements.

The advantage of the CES simplification is that we do not need to make industry-specific assumptions on cross-substitution patterns that generate heterogeneity in price elasticities. The equations we estimate are generic and can be readily applied to any sector that tracks firm-level origin-destination flows. Furthermore, we obtain linear-in-parameters specifications where identification of parameters is transparent and straight-forward to implement. Since the counterfactuals are not embedded in a setting containing

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<sup>3</sup>The Coşar et al. (2015) data set has 9 markets and 60 brands compared to the 73 markets and 184 brands in the quantities only data set we use.

many industry-specific assumptions, these exercises can be seen as illustrating general features of the MP model that would be expected to apply more or less equally well in other industries that share the same broad features. We are not complacent about the strong restrictions imposed in the CES monopolistic competition set-up. However, we take some comfort from the fact that the own-price elasticities we estimate and the implied markups are very much at the center of the set of estimates obtained using richer demand structures. This offers reassurance that the symmetry assumption of CES does not do too much violence to the central moments of the data and will be useful for public policy prediction.

The results obtained in this paper offer insights to the design of models of the allocation of multinational production across countries. They also improve our understanding of the impacts of regional integration agreements. With regard to the former, we find the CES multinational production model performs well when applied to the global car industry data. The core parameters we obtain are internally consistent across four different estimating equations. They also make sense when compared to estimates from independent sources. In terms of a simple measure of fit, the flows predicted by the model match the data with a correlation approaching 70%. The new features that we incorporate into the existing MP model—the variety-market entry margin and the multinational sales friction—prove to be quantitatively important. We think it is probably true more broadly that firms do not export all their varieties to every market. Including this margin does not over-complicate estimation or simulation. There are sizeable and fairly robust home, distance, and RTA effects associated with headquarter-market separation. The implied willingness to pay for a home-based model in an OECD market is more than twice as high as the corresponding premium for a locally assembled car. The RTA and distance frictions are almost 2/3 as high as the corresponding trade costs.

Our results also point to a broader view of the effects of regional agreements. The counterfactuals reveal large effects on non-participants. This happens via the path of erosion of trade preferences. For example, countries that had previously benefited from a narrower set of preferences (the United States' Nafta partners) lose production when the US integrates more closely with the EU. A qualitatively different effect comes from reduction in MP frictions associated with RTAs. They raise the competitiveness of multinational subsidiaries in the new integration area, boosting exports to the rest of the world. The inclusion of multinational sales frictions leads to mainly larger reallocations of production and greater increases in consumer surplus for member states. Car buyers in the US are predicted to have twice as large consumer surplus increases under the deepest form of integration than they would obtain under shallow agreements that only lower

trade costs.

The paper continues in four main sections. We first discuss and display some of the important empirical features of multinational production and trade in our dataset featuring nearly exhaustive firm-level information on where each variety is designed, assembled and sold. Drawing on these facts, the next section generalizes the existing models to include multinational sales frictions and a model-market entry decision. We show how the structural parameters of the MP model can be estimated using four estimating equations that capitalize on the disaggregated nature of our data. Then we report and interpret the results from our estimation of the four key equations. Finally, we evaluate the effects of two proposed “mega-regional” integration agreements (TPP and TTIP), as well as the possible UK exit from the EU (Brexit) using a counter-factual solution of the model.

## 2 Data and model-relevant facts

Recent work on multinational production uses data sets that cover all manufacturing or even the universe of multinational activities (including services). The drawback of such data sets is the absence of complete micro-level flows. This forces the theory to do more of the work in the estimation process. We concentrate on a single activity within a single sector—the assembly of passenger cars. As this focus raises the issue of the external validity of our results, we think it worthwhile to emphasize compensating advantages of studying the car industry.

The first and foremost advantage of the car industry is the extraordinary richness of the IHS Automotive (Polk) data. The consultancy tracks the location where 1775 car models are assembled for 184 distinct brands. Our models correspond to the IHS term “global nameplate.”<sup>4</sup> Using data based in part on new car registrations, IHS records the quantity of each model shipped from 49 assembly countries to 75 destination countries. It provides annual flows at the level of individual models identifying location of assembly and country of sale from 2000 to 2013.

The decision to map firms to brands and varieties to models requires some explanation since other levels of aggregation are conceivable. Models are the finest level of disaggregation that is widely applicable within our data.<sup>5</sup> There are several reasons to employ brands, rather than parent corporations, to correspond to the theoretical concept of the

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<sup>4</sup>The brand renames some models for certain markets but the global nameplate is defined by IHS as the “common name under which the vehicle of a brand is produced globally.” Examples of models with the brand shown in parentheses are the 500 (Fiat), Twingo (Renault), 3 (Mazda).

<sup>5</sup>Our data distinguishes between hatchbacks, sedans and convertibles but this is only relevant for a subset of models.

firm. First, the brand is the common identity across models that is promoted to buyers via advertising and dealership networks. This makes it clear that the brand's home is the one relevant for multinational sales frictions. Second, most of the brands under common ownership were originally independent firms (e.g. Chevrolet and Opel (GM), Ferrari and Chrysler (Fiat), Volvo (Geely), Mini (BMW)).<sup>6</sup> Partly for historical reasons, brand headquarters often correspond to the location where models are *designed*. For example, while Jaguar is owned by Tata Motors, based in India, Jaguar's cars are designed at the brand's headquarters in Coventry in the UK.<sup>7</sup> This suggests that in general technology transfer flows from the brand's headquarters to the assembly location.

The final assembly ( $\ell$ ) and sales ( $n$ ) countries are provided by IHS; we identify the brand headquarters ( $i$ ) as the country in which each brand was founded. In the case of spin-off brands like Acura, we use the headquarters of the firm that established the brand (Japan in this case). In most cases we believe  $i$  corresponds to location of design and also to the national identity of the brand in the eyes of consumers. Unlike the few available government-provided data sets used in the literature, we are not restricted to parent firms or affiliates based in a single reporting country. Rather our data set is a nearly exhaustive account of global car headquarters, assembly and sales locations.

Because we know the distribution of sales by market for each factory-model combination, we are uniquely able to distinguish for an entire global industry between five types of production carried out by multinational corporations. The traditional motive for production abroad was to get closer to customers, also referred to as "tariff-jumping" or horizontal MP. This type of MP is the focus of the models of Helpman et al. (2004) and the empirical implementation of Irarrazabal et al. (2013). A second type of MP involves shifting production for domestic consumers to overseas assembly plants while retaining design activities at home. We refer to it here as vertical MP.<sup>8</sup> We also quantify the importance of a third form of MP involving affiliate exports to third countries, referred to as either "export platforms" (by Ekholm et al. (2007) and Tintelnot (2014)) or "bridge" MP (by Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013)). The last two types are domestic production for the domestic market and for export markets.

Figure 1 illustrates the different types of production actually done by a large brand, Fiat in 2013, for two of its main models and seven markets. Fiat sells the Punto to domestic


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<sup>6</sup>Exceptions include the luxury brands that Japanese firms invented for marketing higher end models to North America (Acura, Infiniti, Lexus).

<sup>7</sup>The new Beetle is in some sense a counter example since the concept-car version was designed in California. However, much of the final design and engineering for the model occurred at VW's Wolfsburg headquarters.

<sup>8</sup>The "knowledge capital" model of Markusen (2004) synthesizes the horizontal and vertical motives for investing abroad.

Figure 1: Example: Fiat 500 & Punto production organization




and EU consumers from its home plant in Italy. Italian imports of the Fiat 500 from its Polish plant is an example of vertical MP. Horizontal MP occurs in each assembly location: sales in Mexico of the Mexican-made 500, and the local sales of the 500 from the Polish plant, as well as the Brazilian sales of the Punto assembled there. There are also many examples of export platform flows, which are mainly organized along RTA lines, a feature that our regressions will reveal is of key importance. A striking feature of the Fiat example is that no market is assigned to more than one assembly location for a given model. This pattern of single sourcing generalizes very broadly as we show below. The fact that the US does not import the Punto from any source provides an example of selective model-market entry. We show below that this phenomena is more the norm than the exception.

Figure 2 in its panel (a) considers the global evolution of each of the five types of production carried out by multinational car companies. We see that in 2000 home production was still prevalent, accounting for about two thirds of total production. By 2013, foreign production—mainly oriented towards consumers in the same country as the overseas assembly plant—had taken the lead. Surprisingly, vertical MP (foreign production for the home market) remains the least important type of production, despite the negative political attention it garners.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup>Head and Mayer (2015) show that a small number of firms account for the majority of vertical MP, or

Restricting attention to the traditional major markets for cars in panel (b) of Figure 2, the picture is substantially altered in one respect: most of the rise in horizontal MP disappears. This change reflects the massive importance China has assumed as host of MP. In OECD markets, export platform MP starts out with the largest share of the three forms of foreign-based MP and then increases further. This underscores the empirical relevance of incorporating export platform MP as in Tintelnot (2014).

Figure 2: Five types of multinational production the model incorporates



The size and perceived importance of the industry makes the car industry worthy of study on its own right and not just as an illustration of the MP model. Americans spent \$448bn on “Motor vehicles and parts” in 2014, about 3.8% of personal consumption expenditures (larger than any category of goods other than food and beverage).<sup>10</sup> Including indirect workers, the auto sector accounts for 5.8% of the total employed population of the EU<sup>11</sup> and nearly 5% of US employment.<sup>12</sup> The car industry was deemed sufficiently important to receive billions in emergency loans under both the Bush (December 2008) and “offshoring.”

<sup>10</sup>Source: BEA, National Income and Product Accounts.

<sup>11</sup>European Automobile Manufacturing Association (ACEA), 2014–2015 “Pocket Guide.”

<sup>12</sup>Hill et al. (2015) report that “auto manufacturers, suppliers, and dealers employ over 1.5 million people and directly contribute to the creation of another 5.7 million jobs.” Total employment in 2014 was about 145 million.

Obama (February 2009) administrations and ultimately for General Motors to be largely nationalized in June 2009.

Despite the richness of the data and the importance of the industry, it would not make sense to use it as a laboratory for estimating the MP model if it were obviously ill-suited to that model. Fortunately, the main observable features of the car industry, while not a perfect fit, are broadly consistent with the MP model.<sup>13</sup> For one thing, cars are obviously tradable, unlike many industries where multinationals are prominent, e.g. retail and banking.<sup>14</sup> Also, car makers have made greater use of greenfield investments than other sectors that rely mainly on acquisitions as a means of expansion abroad.

We now turn to describing three empirical facts that bear on the specific features of the model we estimate. The first two relate to key tractability assumptions of the existing model whereas the third represents a feature that we argue should be added to the standard model.

## 2.1 Fact 1: Almost all models are single-sourced

At the level of detail at which trade data is collected (6 digit HS or 8 digit tariff classifications), most large countries import from multiple source countries. This is part of the reason why the Armington assumption that products are differentiated by country of origin became so commonplace in quantitative models of trade.

In the car industry we have finer detail because specific models of a car are more disaggregated than tariff classifications. And, at the level of models, for a specific market, firms almost always source from a *single* origin country. This is not because all models are produced at single locations. About a quarter of all models are produced in more than one country and we observe six that are produced in ten or more countries. Rather, it is because firms match assembly sites to markets in a one-to-many mapping.

Table 1 shows that 95% of the model-market-year observations feature sourcing from a single assembly country. Sourcing from up to five countries happens occasionally but it is very rare. This is true for models produced by brands that have ten or more *potential* production countries, where potential sites are measured by the number of countries where the brand conducts assembly (of any model). In 94% of the cases, these models are still single-sourced.

The implication appears to be that cars are not Armington differentiated, so long as

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<sup>13</sup>The most problematic exception, conformity with CES on the demand side, was discussed in the introduction.

<sup>14</sup>Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) footnote 2 reports that half the sales of US affiliates of foreign multinationals are in non-traded sectors.

Table 1: Numbers of sources for each market-model-year

# Sources	All model-markets			Brands with 10+ locations		
	Count	Col %	Cum %	Count	Col %	Cum %
1	197,983	95.3	<b>95.3</b>	117,217	94.0	94.0
2	8,435	4.1	99.4	6,343	5.1	99.1
3	1,191	0.6	100.0	1,022	0.8	100.0
4	54	0.0	100.0	50	0.0	100.0
5	6	0.0	100.0	6	0.0	100.0

they are measured at the model-level. Lacetera and Sydnor (2012) study one of the rare cases where two origins of the same model are available, the US market for popular Honda models. They report “little or no differences in the sale prices of Hondas produced in Japan versus the U.S.” This is consistent with the view that consumer are either unaware of, or indifferent to, assembly location.<sup>15</sup>

## 2.2 Fact 2: Market shares are mainly small

The CES multinational production model assumes monopolistic competition. This may be considered unrealistic given that presumption in prior work that the industry is characterized by oligopoly. The very serious drawback of assuming oligopolistic price setting as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008), is that we would no longer be able to express flows as a closed-form multiplicative solution in terms of frictions. This would lose the connection to gravity and therefore also make it impossible to use the simple and direct estimation methods derived in the next section.

Here we present data on the world car industry to address the issue of whether monopolistic competition can be regarded as a plausible approximation. The median number of brands across 73 markets in 2013 is 42. All but one market has ten or more brands (Pakistan has five). Many of these brands are of course small players. Another way of characterizing competition is to invert the Herfindahl concentration index to obtain the number of equal size firms that would be consistent with observed concentration. In the car industry the median across 73 markets is 12.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup>Equal prices are also consistent with horizontal differentiation by place but if such differentiation exists, it is insufficient to motivate sourcing from multiple locations.

<sup>16</sup>Based on the Herfindahl index for brand market shares, the United States horizontal merger guidelines would classify 56 out of 73 markets as “unconcentrated” and a further 12 as moderately concentrated. <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf>

Table 2: Market shares in car sales, world in 2013

Level	mean	median	95th pct.
model	0.38	0.08	1.74
brand	2.34	0.52	10.23
parent firm	3.49	0.79	16.21

Under symmetric product differentiation, oligopoly effects on pricing become more important as market shares increase. Fortunately, as shown in Table 2, market shares in the world car industry tend to be small. Consequently, as long as we maintained symmetric differentiation between all firms, oligopoly markups would on average be close to those implied by monopolistic competition. Adapting the formula of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) expressing Cournot markups in terms of market share,  $s$ , when consumers have a CES utility with parameter  $\eta$ , markups are given by  $\epsilon(s)/(\epsilon(s) - 1)$ , where  $\epsilon(s) = [s(1 - 1/\eta) + 1/\eta]^{-1}$ . As  $s \rightarrow 0$ , we see  $\epsilon(s) \rightarrow \eta$ . Market shares are especially small at the model level, as can be seen in the first row of the table, which provides the average, median and top 5% values of market shares in 2013 at several levels. 95% of model-country pairs have market shares that are below 1.74%. With greater aggregation, the levels are naturally higher, but even at the highest level of ownership, the average market share is below 3.5%.<sup>17</sup>


To be clear, we are not arguing against the view that oligopoly is important in the industry. The very largest firms are big enough to have endogenous markups even under CES. When one also considers that some models are much closer substitutes for each other than others, there are going to be cases where competition effectively occurs between just a few firms. The point is that considered within the lens of symmetric product differentiation, market shares appear small enough to make monopolistic competition a useful approximation, given all the benefits it brings in terms of tractability and connection to the gravity framework.

### 2.3 Fact 3: The majority of models are offered in a minority of markets

The CES MP models we draw from assume that all varieties are sold in all markets. However, an extensive margin for firms on which markets they export to is a well-established

<sup>17</sup>Describing the observed market shares as “small” is also consistent with the way Canada evaluates mergers. It does see “a concern related to the unilateral exercise of market power when the post-merger market share of the merged firm would be less than 35 percent.” (part 5 of <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03420.html>)

Figure 3: Market coverage by multi-model brands



fact. Here we show that even conditional on serving a market with some model, firms only rarely serve it with *all* their models. This fact is illustrated in Figure 3. It depicts a histogram of  $\bar{y}_m$  the model-level mean of the variable  $y_{mn}$  where  $y_{mn} = 1$  if the firm offers model  $m$  in in market  $n$  at some time in our sample (2000–2013) and  $y_{mn} = 0$  in cases where the model is not offered, even though some other model from that brand *is* available.<sup>18</sup> We consider only brands with more than one model. The share of market-years where multi-model brand offers *all* its models is just 6%. The median market entry frequency is 27%.

### 3 The CES model of multinational production

The central trade-off in the model—conditional on the location of the multinational’s production facilities—is “cost advantage versus frictions.” The firm would ideally site all assembly in the country offering the lowest input costs. However, it also wants to be close to consumers (to avoid trade costs) and close to headquarters (to avoid MP frictions). The geographic distribution of consumers depends on aggregate demand for cars in each country and also on the costs of translating a brand’s success in home markets

<sup>18</sup>If the brand is absent from market  $m$  altogether,  $y_{mnt}$  would be considered missing.

into foreign markets (MS frictions).

Figure 4: Frictions impeding multinational flows




Figure 4, adapted with one major change from Arkolakis et al. (2013), depicts the three frictions schematically. The first friction, conventionally denoted  $\tau_{\ell n}$ , is the multiplicative increase in costs associated with shipping goods from assembly location  $\ell$  to destination market  $n$ . A second friction, denoted  $\gamma_{il}$  following Arkolakis et al. (2013), is the penalty in terms of lost productivity that a brand pays when it produces remotely from the headquarters.<sup>19</sup> The novel MS friction we introduce in Figure 4 is  $\delta_{in}$ , which we model as a rise in delivered marginal costs due to separation between market and headquarters—regardless of production location.

There are three model-level decisions to be made for each model  $m$ : whether to offer it in a given market, where to source it from, and the amount to ship from each source to each market. The next subsections solve these decisions in reverse order.

### 3.1 Consumer preferences and demand

In our data we observe only quantities, not expenditures, and therefore need a specification in which firm-level sales volumes are expressed as a share of total quantity demanded. As in the recent work of Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), we derive demand from the discrete choices across models by logistically distributed consumers. In contrast to that

<sup>19</sup>Javorcik and Poelhekke (2014) provide support for the hypothesis that foreign affiliates are more productive due to continuous injections of HQ services.

paper, however, our formulation retains the constant elasticity of substitution. In contrast to standard CES models, our approach yields quantity shares, rather than value shares, as the dependent variable, and it does not assume homothetic demand. Following Hane-  
mann (1984), under conditions detailed in the appendix, households denoted  $h$  choose  $m$  to minimize  $p_{mn}/\psi_{mh}$ , where  $p_{mn}$  is the price of model  $m$  in market  $n$  and  $\psi_{mh}$  is the quality as perceived by household  $h$ . We parameterize  $\psi_{mh}$  in terms of a common reputation and a household-level idiosyncratic shock:  $\psi_{mh} = \beta_m \exp(\epsilon_{mh})$ , where  $\epsilon$  is Gumbel with scale parameter  $1/\eta$ . The probability household  $h$  chooses model  $m$  from the set  $\mathcal{M}_n$  of models available in  $n$  is given by

$$\mathbb{P}_{mn} = \frac{\beta_m^\eta p_{mn}^{-\eta}}{\Phi_n}, \quad \text{where} \quad \Phi_n \equiv \sum_{j \in \mathcal{M}_n} \beta_j^\eta p_{jn}^{-\eta}.$$

To facilitate aggregation, we set  $\beta_m = \beta_b$  for all models of a given brand. Quantity demanded for model  $m$  in market  $n$  is therefore given by

$$q_{mn} = \mathbb{P}_{mn} Q_n = \frac{\beta_b^\eta p_{mn}^{-\eta}}{\Phi_n} Q_n.$$

The key difference with respect to conventional CES is that quantity demanded is expressed in terms of *quantity* shares,  $\mathbb{P}_{mn}$ , and aggregate quantities ( $Q_n$ ), rather than value shares and aggregate expenditures.

### 3.2 Quantities conditional on sourcing location

Equilibrium price  $p_{mn}$  depends on delivered unit cost to market  $n$  for model  $m$  when  $\ell$  is the location of production:

$$c_{m\ell n} = \frac{w_\ell}{z_{m\ell}} \tau_{\ell n} \delta_{mn},$$

where, as in Eaton et al. (2011),  $w_\ell$  is a composite index of wages and intermediate input prices and  $z$  is TFP. Including intermediates is important since they account for around 75% of the value of motor vehicles shipments (source: STAN for 2007).

The other cost determinants are  $\tau_{\ell n}$ , which captures all trade costs for cars shipped from  $\ell$  to  $n$  and multinational sales (MS) frictions,  $\delta_{mn}$ . MS frictions are the systematic increases in marginal cost attributable to separation between the headquarters of model  $m$  and the market  $n$ . We assume  $\delta_{mn} = \delta_{in}$  for all models of brands based in country  $i$ . The  $\delta_{in}$  may capture the added cost of operating dealership networks abroad, as they may be easier to manage over shorter distances, and with RTA visas (or free movement in the case

of customs unions) facilitating visits of the head office to the distributors. They may also capture costs of compliance with foreign product regulations. For example, when Canada imposed a requirement of daytime running lamps, foreign car-makers complained about the additional costs of such lamps. Regulations are often claimed to mandate product specifications that the home-based firms have already adopted, fitting well with our friction view of  $\delta$ .

In a way that is isomorphic with the functional form assumptions of Arkolakis et al. (2013) and Tintelnot (2014), we specify productivity as

$$z_{m\ell} = \frac{s_\ell \varphi_b}{\gamma_{i\ell}} \exp(\zeta_{m\ell}).$$

We use  $s_\ell$  to denote the skill of workers available at the production location,  $\varphi_b$  for the (Melitzian) technology available to the maker of model  $m$ . Model-location heterogeneity,  $\zeta_{m\ell}$ , is distributed Gumbel with scale parameter  $1/\theta$ , i.e. with CDF  $\exp(-\exp(-\theta\zeta))$ . Parameter  $\gamma_{i\ell}$  is the friction (expressed as a penalty in terms of lost productivity) associated with transfer of operational methods from HQ to assembly country. Loosely, the  $\gamma_{i\ell}$  can also be thought of as capturing trade costs for inputs provided to the plants by HQ. Irarrazabal et al. (2013) take this approach explicitly, and assume that the same trade costs apply to HQ-supplied inputs as to final goods.

Delivered price of model  $m$  in  $n$  (when  $\ell$  is selected) is related to marginal costs via the constant markup of CES monopolistic competition:

$$p_{mn} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} c_{m\ell n} = \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{w_\ell \tau_{\ell n} \delta_{in} \gamma_{i\ell}}{s_\ell \varphi_b \exp(\zeta_{m\ell})},$$

Substituting price into the demand curve, the equilibrium quantity of model  $m$  made in  $\ell$ , delivered to  $n$  is

$$q_{m\ell n} = \begin{cases} \beta_b^\eta \left( \frac{\eta}{\eta - 1} \frac{w_\ell \tau_{\ell n} \delta_{in} \gamma_{i\ell}}{s_\ell \varphi_b} \right)^{-\eta} Q_n \Phi_n^{-1} \exp(\eta \zeta_{m\ell}) & \text{if } \ell = \ell_{mn}^* \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where  $\ell_{mn}^*$  is the optimal location, for which  $c_{m\ell n}$  is minimized.

The above equation shows how the three frictions enter multiplicatively as  $\tau_{\ell n} \delta_{in} \gamma_{i\ell}$ . As our empirical implementation of the MP models considers flows  $q_{m\ell n}$  as a function of frictions, it does not distinguish cost-based interpretations of  $\tau_{\ell n}$ ,  $\gamma_{i\ell}$ , and  $\delta_{in}$  from preference-based interpretations. For example, a consumer desire to “buy local” to support workers has the same effect on flows as an increase in  $\tau_{\ell n}$ . Similarly, if Japanese

workers had a reputation for quality control, then Toyota’s assembly facilities outside Japan would have their sales reduced in a way that was iso-morphic to an increase in  $\gamma_{il}$ . Finally, spatially correlated taste differences (e.g. for fuel economy, safety, or shape) could be equivalent in their effects on flows to a rise in  $\delta_{in}$  due to higher distribution costs in remote markets. Allowing for such preference effects in the utility function, would just add three more parameters that could not be identified separately from the existing three in our specifications.

To estimate separately the cost and demand-side effects would require a different estimation strategy that uses price information. Such a data requirement would severely limit the geographic scope of the study. For the purposes of our counterfactuals on how integration affects production and trade, we do not need to disentangle cost mechanisms from preference mechanisms. Instead, our priority is to use the near-exhaustive coverage of markets and models found in the quantity data. We leave to other work the decomposition of frictions into cost and preferences. In that vein, Coşar et al. (2015) restrict the number of markets they study so that they can use price data and estimate cost-based ( $\gamma_{il}$ ) frictions of distance from a brand’s home. They also have a home-brand effect in preferences that would operate as a  $\delta_{in}$  effect in our model.

Expected  $q$  depends upon the expected  $\exp(\eta\zeta_{m\ell})$ . Hanemann (1984) shows that the expected  $\exp(\eta\zeta_{m\ell})$ , conditional on  $\ell$  being the lowest cost location for  $m$  is

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{\eta\zeta_{m\ell}} \mid \ell = \ell_{mn}^*] = \mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn}^{-\frac{\eta}{\theta}} \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{\eta}{\theta}\right),$$

with  $\mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn}$  the probability of selecting origin  $\ell$  as source of model  $m$  for brand  $b$ , and  $\Gamma()$  is the Gamma function. Therefore expected sales are multiplicative in determinants of market, origin, brand, frictions and of the probability of choosing  $\ell$ .

$$\mathbb{E}[q_{m\ell n} \mid \ell = \ell_{mn}^*] = \kappa_1 \frac{Q_n}{\Phi_n} \left( \frac{w_\ell \tau_{\ell n} \gamma_{il} \delta_{in}}{s_\ell \beta_b \varphi_b} \right)^{-\eta} \mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn}^{-\frac{\eta}{\theta}}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\kappa_1 \equiv \left(\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}\right)^{-\eta} \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{\eta}{\theta}\right)$ . We refer to equation (1) as the model-level quantity equation. As it depends on the optimal location for model-market combination, we now turn to that choice.

### 3.3 Sourcing decision

Brands choose the optimal source for each model they intend to sell in a market from the set of countries where the brand has assembly facilities, denoted  $\mathcal{L}_b$ . The probability that

$\ell \in \mathcal{L}_b$  is selected is the probability that  $c_{m\ell n}$  is lower than the brand's alternatives:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}(\ell = \ell_{mn}^*) &= \text{Prob}(c_{m\ell n} \leq c_{mk n}, \forall k \in \mathcal{L}_b) \\ &= \text{Prob}(\zeta_{m\ell} + \ln s_\ell - \ln \gamma_{i\ell} - \ln \tau_{\ell n} > \zeta_{mk} + \ln s_k - \ln \gamma_{ik} - \ln \tau_{kn}) \end{aligned}$$

The MS friction  $\delta_{in}$  cancels out of this probability since it affects all  $\ell$  locations the same way. The probability of selecting origin  $\ell$  as the source of model  $m$  in market  $n$  is the same for all models of a given brand.

$$\mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn} = \frac{s_\ell^\theta (w_\ell \gamma_{i\ell} \tau_{\ell n})^{-\theta}}{D_{bn}}, \text{ with } D_{bn} \equiv \sum_{k \in \mathcal{L}_b} s_k^\theta (w_k \gamma_{ik} \tau_{kn})^{-\theta} \quad (2)$$

Versions of this equation appear in Arkolakis et al. (2013) as equation (6) and Tintelnot (2014) as equation (9), who use it as a building block in their models.<sup>20</sup> In contrast, we estimate the equation directly. So far as we know, no previous study has been able to do so, mainly because variety-level sourcing data is so hard to find.

### 3.4 Model-market entry decision

The incentive to enter a market depends on expected profitability. We assume that brands choose to enter markets prior to learning the realizations of the shocks to model-location productivity realizations  $\zeta_{ml}$ . Therefore entry decisions are made assuming that optimal assembly locations will be chosen.

Profit maximization, following the usual monopolistic assumption of “massless” firms ( $\mathbb{P}_{mn} \approx 0$ ) implies  $(p - c)/p = 1/\eta$ . This allows us to express expected profit net of entry costs for model  $m$  in market  $n$  as a function of revenues and then of the price.

$$\mathbb{E}[\pi_{mn}] = \mathbb{E}[p_{mn} q_{mn}]/\eta - f_{mn} = \mathbb{E}[p_{mn}^{1-\eta}] \beta_b^\eta K_n - f_{mn},$$

where  $K_n \equiv Q_n \Phi_n^{-1}/\eta$ . The probability that entry occurs is the probability that expected profits (net of fixed costs) are positive:

$$\text{Prob}(\mathbb{E}[\pi_{mn}] > 0) = \text{Prob}(f_{mn} < \mathbb{E}[p_{mn}^{1-\eta}] \beta_b^\eta K_n)$$

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<sup>20</sup>Like Tintelnot (2014), we assume independent productivity shocks whereas the Arkolakis et al. (2013) formulation allows for them to be correlated.

Taking logs on both sides of the inequality,

$$\text{Prob}(\mathbb{E}[\pi_{mn}] > 0) = \text{Prob}(\ln f_{mn} < \ln \mathbb{E}[p_{mn}^{1-\eta}] + \eta \ln \beta_b + \ln K_n).$$

To explain why all models of a given brand do not always enter (or stay out of) a given market, we need to introduce some heterogeneity at the  $mn$  level. One way to do this would be to reformulate  $\delta_{mn}$  such that it retained a model-specific component rather than depending solely on the identity of the HQ country  $i$  of the brand responsible for that model. However, this would have ripple effects on the specification and estimation of the other equations.<sup>21</sup> We therefore opt to place the  $mn$  heterogeneity in the fixed model-market entry costs. One way to imagine this is that each model receives a draw of the necessary amount of advertising costs that would be required to allow it to compete symmetrically with other models in a given market.

We model fixed costs of model entry as  $f_{mn} = \exp(J_n + \phi_{mn})$  where  $\phi_{mn}$  is assumed to be logistic with scale parameter  $1/\lambda$  and CDF  $\Lambda[\phi] = (1 + \exp[-\lambda\phi])^{-1}$ . The entry probability for a model is given by

$$\text{Prob}(\mathbb{E}[\pi_{mn}] > 0) = \Lambda[\lambda \ln \mathbb{E}[p_{mn}^{1-\eta}] + \eta\lambda \ln \beta_b + \lambda(\ln K_n - J_n)].$$

We now need to take into account how the firm forms expectations for prices. Using the moment generating function, we obtain

$$\mathbb{E}[p_{mn}^{1-\eta}] = \kappa_2 \varphi^{\eta-1} \delta^{1-\eta} D_{bn}^{(\eta-1)/\theta},$$

where  $\kappa_2 \equiv \left(\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}\right)^{1-\eta} \Gamma\left(1 + \frac{1-\eta}{\theta}\right)$ . Hence, after substitution of the components of  $K_n$  and of the expected price, the probability of entering is

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}(\mathbb{E}[\pi_{mn}] > 0) = & \Lambda\left[\lambda(\ln \kappa_2 - \ln \eta) - \lambda(\eta - 1) \ln \delta_{in} + \overbrace{\frac{\lambda(\eta - 1)}{\theta} \ln D_{bn}}^{\text{brand-market}} \right. \\ & \left. + \underbrace{\lambda(\eta - 1) \ln \varphi_b + \lambda\eta \ln \beta_b}_{\text{brand}} + \underbrace{\lambda(\ln Q_n - \ln \Phi_n - J_n)}_{\text{market}}\right]. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

This entry equation produces the sensible prediction that the likelihood of entering a market increases with its size, quality and efficiency of the brand, and declines with frictions, fixed costs and local competition ( $\Phi_n$ ).

<sup>21</sup>As shown in Crozet et al. (2012), the introduction of a  $mn$  demand shock creates a selection bias in the estimation of all variables that affect both entry probability and equilibrium sales. Accounting for this would therefore substantially complicate the estimation procedure.

### 3.5 Brand-level quantities (aggregation across models)

Summing over the set  $\mathcal{M}_{bn}$  of models that  $b$  sells in  $n$ , brand-level flows are denoted  $q_{b\ell n}$ . The realized flow depends on all the  $\zeta_{m\ell}$  shocks that determine the sourcing decisions for each model. It also depends on the set of models that brand  $b$  decides to offer in market  $n$ . The *expected* sales of brand  $b$  to market  $n$ , conditional on the set of models offered in each market and  $\ell$  being chosen as the low-cost assembly location is given by

$$\mathbb{E}[q_{b\ell n}] = \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}_{bn}} \mathbb{E}[q_{m\ell n} \mid \ell = \ell_{mn}^*] \times \mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn}$$

Substituting equation (2) into (1) and simplifying, we re-express expected model-level flows from  $\ell$  to  $n$  as

$$\mathbb{E}[q_{m\ell n} \mid \ell = \ell_{mn}^*] = \frac{\kappa_1 (\varphi_b \beta_b / \delta_{in})^\eta D_{bn}^{\eta/\theta}}{\Phi_n}.$$

Note that expected flows of each model depend positively on the denominator term from the sourcing decision (equation 2). The reason is that expected cost of serving a given market will be lower for a brand if its plants are located in countries that are low cost suppliers to market  $n$ , either because they have low assembly costs or low transport costs to the market, since both costs are contained in  $D_{bn}$ .

Multiplying this value by the formula for  $\mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn}$  from equation (2) and summing across the  $M_{bn}$  models that brand  $b$  offers in  $n$ , we obtain

$$\mathbb{E}[q_{b\ell n}] = \kappa_1 (\gamma_{i\ell} \tau_{\ell n})^{-\theta} \underbrace{\left(\frac{w_\ell}{s_\ell}\right)^{-\theta}}_{\text{origin}} \underbrace{(\varphi_b \beta_b)^\eta}_{\text{brand}} \underbrace{\frac{Q_n}{\Phi_n}}_{\text{market}} \underbrace{M_{bn} \delta_{in}^{-\eta} D_{bn}^{\frac{\eta}{\theta}-1}}_{\text{brand-market}}. \quad (4)$$

This is the equivalent of equation (10) of Tintelnot (2014), except for the discrete choice CES demand (where aggregate quantity demanded replaces aggregate expenditure), non-unit masses of models, and the presence of MS frictions. The key result is that aggregation of models changes the parameter governing the responses of trade flows to the  $\gamma_{i\ell}$  and  $\tau_{\ell n}$  frictions. Whereas it was  $\eta$  in the model-level equation (1), it is  $\theta$  here in the brand-level equation (4). The former captures the homogeneity of tastes of consumers over models, whereas the latter characterizes the homogeneity in productivity across locations that might assemble a given model. An interesting difference arises with responses to  $\delta_{in}$ , which persist in being governed by the demand-side elasticity,  $\eta$ . This is because the MS friction characterizes the HQ-destination pair of countries, and therefore does not include any determinant related to the cost of where the car is actually produced.

## 4 Results

We now turn to delivering our results for the four key equations describing firms' behavior in our model. For each of those equations, we start by expressing it in an estimable way in terms of fixed effects and observed variables with associated coefficients. For each of those equations, we use the following notation (taking the  $\ell n$  case as an illustration):  $\mathbf{X}_{\ell n}$  represents the vector of frictions determinants comprising  $\text{home}_{\ell n}$ ,  $\text{dist}_{\ell n}$ ,  $\text{contig}_{\ell n}$ , and  $\text{RTA}_{\ell n}$ . Home is a dummy variable set to one when  $\ell = n$ , dist is the physical distance separating the two countries, while contig and RTA are two dummies indicating the presence of a common border, and the membership of a common Regional Trading Agreement. As De Sousa et al. (2012) find large differences in border effects between OECD members and less developed countries, our baseline specification interacts  $\text{home}_{\ell n}$  with an indicator for  $\ell$  being a member of the OECD.<sup>22</sup> Our three frictions are therefore given by

$$\tau_{\ell n} = \exp(\mathbf{X}'_{\ell n} \boldsymbol{\rho}), \quad \gamma_{i\ell} = \exp(\mathbf{X}'_{i\ell} \mathbf{g}), \quad \delta_{in} = \exp(\mathbf{X}'_{in} \mathbf{d}), \quad (5)$$

where  $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ ,  $\mathbf{g}$  and  $\mathbf{d}$  are vectors of coefficients transforming each of the four variables into an ad-valorem (iceberg) equivalent.

The model is static and we specify it as if estimated in a cross-section. This is in line with the fact that the geography variables determining trade costs and frictions are constant over time except for RTAs, which were already well established for the relevant markets before our estimation begins. However, as our data do vary over time, we include two proxies accounting for the change in input costs,  $\ln w_i - \ln s_i$ , over time. The first is the log of GDP per capita and the second is the price of GDP (the variable used to convert nominal GDPs to PPP GDP). The coefficient on the former is ambiguous since it is influenced by productivity growth (positively) and wage growth (negatively). On the other hand, the log price level, conditional on GDP per capita, is expected to have a negative effect as it is an indicator of exchange rate over-valuation.

### 4.1 Sourcing Decision

We start by implementing equation (2), which describes the choice of a brand about where to source a particular model when serving a market. Substituting (5) into (2), the proba-

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<sup>22</sup>In an alternative specification, presented in section 4.5, we use tariffs instead of RTA and the OECD interaction.

bility of sourcing from  $\ell$  when serving  $n$  can be expressed as

$$\text{Prob}(\ell = \ell_{mn}^*) = \mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn} = \frac{\exp[\text{FE}_\ell - \theta \mathbf{X}'_{\ell n} \boldsymbol{\rho} - \theta \mathbf{X}'_{i\ell} \mathbf{g}]}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{L}_b} \exp[\text{FE}_k - \theta \mathbf{X}'_{kn} \boldsymbol{\rho} - \theta \mathbf{X}'_{ik} \mathbf{g}]} \quad (6)$$

The assembly-country fixed effects are structurally interpreted as  $\text{FE}_\ell = \theta \ln(s_\ell/w_\ell)$ . All the parameters of  $\gamma$  and  $\tau$  are estimated up to the scalar  $\theta$ .

The model implies that we should estimate a standard conditional logit where each brand-destination combination is faced with as many choices the number of countries in which it has plants, the set denoted  $\mathcal{L}_b$ . This approach differs from Coşar et al. (2015) who estimate a cost function that assumes that only the countries currently producing a model enter the set of alternative sourcing locations. For example in the Coşar et al. (2015) approach the choice set for the Renault Twingo would be France and Colombia in 2006, whereas in 2008 the choice set would switch to Colombia and Slovenia (because Renault relocated all its Twingo production for Europe from France to Slovenia in 2007). In our approach, all the countries where Renault is active in a given year are included in the choice. Thus, France, Slovenia, and Colombia (and Turkey etc.) are sourcing options in every year. The distinction between these approaches could be seen as one of short and medium runs (in the long run, brands can expand the set of countries where they have factories).

The estimates for the whole sample shown in column (1) reveal the importance of trade costs in selecting sources. Home effects are large, especially in less developed countries. The implied increase in the odds of choosing a location is obtained by exponentiating the coefficient. In the OECD, plants located in the market being served have more than double the odds of being chosen, whereas outside the OECD the impact rises to a factor of 65. Regional trade agreements also double the odds of being chosen. Distance from the market significantly reduces the probability of being selected.

The estimates of the MP frictions are much less precise, with standard errors several times those estimated for trade frictions. Two of the effects, distance and contiguity, do not even enter with the expected sign, although neither is significantly different from zero. The significant effects are for assembly locations in the parent home country. Assembly in the HQ country is strongly preferred for brands based in LDCs. The OECD effect is also big but estimated with little precision.

Columns (2)–(6) investigate how results vary across periods and car sizes. The periods correspond to eight years before the 2008 financial crisis and the six years thereafter. None of the cross-period differences in coefficients are large compared to the standard errors. This is reassuring since we have no reason to believe the state of the economy would

Table 3: Conditional logit estimates of sourcing equation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Period		Size of model		
	all	boom	bust	small	medium	large
	00–14	00–07	08–14			
ln GDP/pop	0.655 (0.825)	0.015 (2.142)	0.828 (0.882)	0.584 (1.061)	0.322 (1.308)	0.462 (2.012)
ln GDP price	-0.543 (0.895)	0.128 (2.183)	-0.675 (1.135)	0.123 (1.128)	-0.522 (1.343)	-0.585 (2.268)
<i>Trade costs</i> ( $\tau_{\ell n}$ )						
mfg at dest - OECD	0.776 <sup>a</sup> (0.212)	0.851 <sup>a</sup> (0.279)	0.710 <sup>a</sup> (0.202)	0.309 (0.218)	0.980 <sup>a</sup> (0.373)	0.892 <sup>a</sup> (0.249)
mfg at dest - LDC	4.189 <sup>a</sup> (0.453)	4.500 <sup>a</sup> (0.509)	3.993 <sup>a</sup> (0.453)	3.339 <sup>a</sup> (0.543)	4.642 <sup>a</sup> (0.578)	5.212 <sup>a</sup> (0.443)
ln dist <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	-0.333 <sup>a</sup> (0.091)	-0.367 <sup>a</sup> (0.106)	-0.305 <sup>a</sup> (0.085)	-0.753 <sup>a</sup> (0.117)	-0.342 <sup>a</sup> (0.113)	-0.146 (0.093)
contig <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	0.132 (0.164)	0.077 (0.158)	0.177 (0.175)	-0.008 (0.230)	0.251 (0.242)	0.088 (0.096)
RTA <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	0.765 <sup>a</sup> (0.176)	0.843 <sup>a</sup> (0.209)	0.714 <sup>a</sup> (0.193)	0.895 <sup>a</sup> (0.203)	0.864 <sup>a</sup> (0.215)	0.693 <sup>a</sup> (0.211)
<i>MP frictions</i> ( $\gamma_{i\ell}$ )						
mfg at HQ - OECD	2.579 <sup>c</sup> (1.342)	2.313 <sup>c</sup> (1.310)	2.640 <sup>c</sup> (1.434)	4.235 <sup>a</sup> (1.245)	4.372 <sup>a</sup> (0.972)	1.110 (2.045)
mfg at HQ - LDC	3.578 <sup>a</sup> (1.005)	4.279 <sup>a</sup> (1.068)	3.606 <sup>a</sup> (1.026)	4.523 <sup>a</sup> (1.405)	4.726 <sup>a</sup> (0.978)	3.569 <sup>b</sup> (1.499)
ln dist <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	0.231 (0.414)	0.064 (0.431)	0.300 (0.427)	0.715 (0.448)	0.743 <sup>b</sup> (0.332)	-0.302 (0.675)
contig <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	-0.021 (0.494)	-0.083 (0.453)	-0.032 (0.578)	-0.348 (0.454)	0.717 (0.621)	-0.465 (0.950)
RTA <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	0.548 (0.643)	0.370 (0.634)	0.606 (0.696)	2.298 <sup>a</sup> (0.708)	1.050 <sup>b</sup> (0.476)	-0.356 (0.981)
Observations	2314831	1122551	1192280	480230	748636	1085965
log-likelihood	-233450	-104819	-127272	-50533	-66121	-91407
Pseudo $R^2$	0.509	0.554	0.472	0.482	0.569	0.593
Number of clusters	49	48	48	48	49	49

Standard errors, origin  $\ell$  clustered, in parentheses. Significance: <sup>c</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , <sup>b</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>a</sup>  $p < 0.01$ . All regressions have origin (location of production  $\ell$ ) effects.

change the structural parameters governing the sourcing decision.

Car size is based on the categorical variable “global sales segment” which IHS bases loosely on the length of the model. We lumped the six original categories into small ( $< 4\text{m}$ ), midsize ( $\approx 4\text{m}$ ), and big ( $\geq 4.5\text{m}$  and luxury cars of all sizes). The preference for sourcing assembly within the market being served shows up for all car sizes. The within-RTA preference is largest for small cars but remains strong even for big cars. The finding that distance effects shrink as car size increases is somewhat surprising given that bigger cars must be more expensive to transport (and therefore have higher  $\rho$ ). In the context of our model, the result implies smaller cars have higher  $\theta$ . In other words, assembly locations for small cars have less variation in idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Loosely speaking, the technology for assembling small cars has diffused more uniformly across candidate locations.<sup>23</sup> MP frictions exhibit strong RTA effects and “home-field advantages,” with the exception of larger cars, where RTAs and for the home effects of OECD brands are statistically insignificant.

## 4.2 Model-level intensive margin for sales

Having estimated the determinants of the sourcing of model  $m$ , we turn to the analysis of the micro-level sales equation (1). Using the matrix notation for frictions, this equation is transformed into the following estimating form:

$$\ln q_{m\ell n} = \text{FE}_b + \text{FE}_\ell + \text{FE}_n - \eta \mathbf{X}'_{\ell n} \boldsymbol{\rho} - \eta \mathbf{X}'_{i\ell} \mathbf{g} - \eta \mathbf{X}'_{in} \mathbf{d} - (\eta/\theta) \ln \hat{\mathbb{P}}_{b\ell n} + \nu_{m\ell n}, \quad (7)$$

where the structural terms underlying fixed effects are  $\text{FE}_b = \eta \ln(\beta_{b(m)} \varphi_{b(m)})$ ,  $\text{FE}_\ell = \eta \ln(s_\ell/w_\ell)$ , and  $\text{FE}_n = \ln Q_n - \ln \Phi_n$ . An important question relates to the presence of the  $\ln \hat{\mathbb{P}}_{b\ell n}$  term on the RHS of the regression equation. We observe  $\ln q_{m\ell n}$  only for the locations actually chosen by the brand as the lowest cost sources for model  $m$  deliveries to market  $n$ . Locations with high  $s_\ell$  and low  $\tau_{\ell n}$  and/or  $\gamma_{i\ell}$  are attractive locations and can be chosen even if  $\zeta_{m\ell}$  (the random part of productivity that is specific to that model and plant) is low. Therefore, the error term is negatively correlated with variables that increase attractiveness, leading to biased estimates. Hanemann (1984)’s results suggests a Heckman-like two stage procedure. In the first step, one estimates equation (6), the conditional logit sourcing decision. From the results, we then calculate  $\ln \hat{\mathbb{P}}_{b\ell n}$  and add it to RHS of the  $\ln q_{m\ell n}$  equation. The error term,  $\nu_{m\ell n}$  includes the  $\zeta$  productivity shock as well as any errors that arise from mis-measuring frictions or mis-specification.

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<sup>23</sup>Head and Mayer (2015) show that small, low-priced models are more likely to be offshored and that the brands that do the most offshoring are those, like Renault, that mainly produce small cars.

The linear in logs estimation should be consistent under standard assumptions about the error term's distribution. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Eaton et al. (2012) we estimate two additional specifications that are robust to deviations from homoskedasticity. The Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) equation can be obtained by returning to equation (1) and considering it as a conditional expectation. The method we refer to as EKS in Table 4 maintains Poisson PML as an estimator but divides  $q_{m\ell n}$  by  $Q_n$  (from the right hand side) to create a market share for model  $m$  made in  $\ell$  in market  $n$ . This specification should be just as robust as standard Poisson PML but it puts less weight on the larger trade values since its objective function is focused on minimizing deviations in shares.<sup>24</sup> Note that Hanemann (1984)'s correction highlighted above conditions on the best location being chosen, and therefore does not include zeroes even when PPML or EKS regressions are run.

Table 4 reports our estimates with (even columns) and without (odd columns) the selection correction inspired by Hanemann (1984). In keeping with the estimates from the sourcing decision, we find the quantity conditional on being selected to respond strongly and robustly to trade frictions. In this case the robustness is across estimation methods rather than samples. As with sourcing, MP frictions are mainly insignificant, and sometimes take the incorrect sign. The EKS with the Hanemann correction (column 6) provides the strongest results, with home effects for LDCs and RTAs both achieving reasonable coefficients with some statistical significance as well.

Multinational sales (MS) frictions are somewhat unstable across specifications but the column (6) estimates point to distance effects that are about two thirds the strength of the corresponding trade friction. There also appears to be significant consumer bias towards home brands. This bias is stable and very robust in the case of OECD-origin brands, corroborating the finding of Coşar et al. (2015). In addition, we estimate that increasing consumer distance from headquarters lowers market shares and entry propensities, even controlling for distance from the consumer to the assembly location. Sharing a common border or being members of a regional trade agreement (RTA) also reduce the MS frictions between the HQ and the destination country, which will be important for our counterfactuals where we experiment with different scenarios of RTA changes.

The Hanemann-inspired correction of including estimated selection probabilities from the conditional logit as covariates in the intensive margin equation works well for Poisson and EKS. The structural interpretation of this term's coefficient is  $-\eta/\theta$ . The estimates of  $-0.23$  and  $-0.27$  imply that  $\theta$  is much larger than  $\eta$ . We shall provide corroborating

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<sup>24</sup>Head and Mayer (2014) provide a detailed analysis of gravity-related estimation methods including these two.

Table 4: Quantity sold and market share at the model level

Method LHS	OLS		PML		EKS	
	ln sales		sales		mkt. share	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ln GDP/pop	0.087 (0.249)	0.069 (0.249)	0.007 (0.241)	0.090 (0.246)	-0.072 (0.289)	0.033 (0.278)
ln GDP price	-0.791 <sup>b</sup> (0.341)	-0.777 <sup>b</sup> (0.342)	-0.481 (0.424)	-0.551 (0.426)	-0.569 (0.389)	-0.670 <sup>c</sup> (0.372)
<i>Trade costs</i> ( $\tau_{\ell n}$ )						
mfg at dest - OECD	0.979 <sup>a</sup> (0.222)	0.924 <sup>a</sup> (0.233)	0.817 <sup>a</sup> (0.240)	0.977 <sup>a</sup> (0.238)	0.934 <sup>a</sup> (0.171)	1.125 <sup>a</sup> (0.189)
mfg at dest - LDC	2.046 <sup>a</sup> (0.260)	1.747 <sup>a</sup> (0.523)	1.363 <sup>a</sup> (0.261)	2.277 <sup>a</sup> (0.546)	1.633 <sup>a</sup> (0.221)	2.690 <sup>a</sup> (0.504)
ln dist <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	-0.218 <sup>b</sup> (0.082)	-0.196 <sup>b</sup> (0.096)	-0.380 <sup>a</sup> (0.087)	-0.440 <sup>a</sup> (0.099)	-0.270 <sup>a</sup> (0.083)	-0.347 <sup>a</sup> (0.091)
contig <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	0.208 <sup>c</sup> (0.111)	0.197 <sup>c</sup> (0.109)	0.039 (0.116)	0.075 (0.117)	0.219 <sup>a</sup> (0.070)	0.254 <sup>a</sup> (0.070)
RTA <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	0.451 <sup>a</sup> (0.137)	0.400 <sup>b</sup> (0.163)	0.396 <sup>b</sup> (0.162)	0.540 <sup>a</sup> (0.168)	0.286 <sup>a</sup> (0.105)	0.464 <sup>a</sup> (0.136)
<i>MP frictions</i> ( $\gamma_{i\ell}$ )						
mfg at HQ - OECD	0.216 (0.513)	0.017 (0.598)	-0.188 (0.297)	0.397 (0.321)	-0.022 (0.377)	0.682 (0.495)
mfg at HQ - LDC	0.317 (0.455)	0.011 (0.590)	0.136 (0.615)	1.137 (0.739)	0.238 (0.433)	1.425 <sup>b</sup> (0.676)
ln dist <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	0.193 (0.145)	0.177 (0.144)	0.065 (0.088)	0.101 (0.081)	0.087 (0.102)	0.139 (0.106)
contig <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	-0.084 (0.274)	-0.082 (0.275)	-0.364 <sup>b</sup> (0.169)	-0.364 <sup>b</sup> (0.167)	-0.112 (0.195)	-0.112 (0.194)
RTA <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	0.097 (0.237)	0.053 (0.273)	0.243 (0.182)	0.362 <sup>b</sup> (0.176)	0.137 (0.165)	0.288 <sup>c</sup> (0.170)
<i>MS frictions</i> ( $\delta_{in}$ )						
sell at HQ - OECD	0.708 <sup>a</sup> (0.206)	0.748 <sup>a</sup> (0.202)	0.762 <sup>a</sup> (0.208)	0.645 <sup>a</sup> (0.223)	0.710 <sup>a</sup> (0.175)	0.569 <sup>a</sup> (0.156)
sell at HQ - LDC	1.038 (0.683)	1.318 (0.836)	1.918 <sup>a</sup> (0.347)	1.050 <sup>c</sup> (0.608)	1.267 <sup>a</sup> (0.258)	0.257 (0.552)
ln dist <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)	-0.115 <sup>c</sup> (0.066)	-0.133 <sup>c</sup> (0.077)	-0.013 (0.084)	0.024 (0.083)	-0.280 <sup>a</sup> (0.079)	-0.230 <sup>a</sup> (0.087)
contig <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)	0.197 <sup>c</sup> (0.100)	0.203 <sup>b</sup> (0.099)	0.191 <sup>c</sup> (0.103)	0.162 <sup>c</sup> (0.097)	0.024 (0.079)	-0.002 (0.075)
RTA <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)	0.242 <sup>c</sup> (0.131)	0.279 <sup>c</sup> (0.145)	0.113 (0.137)	0.018 (0.145)	0.089 (0.105)	-0.034 (0.109)
ln $\mathbb{P}_{b\ell n}$		0.078 (0.121)		-0.231 <sup>c</sup> (0.133)		-0.273 <sup>b</sup> (0.135)
Observations	234296	234296	234296	234296	234296	234296
R <sup>2</sup>	0.492	0.492	0.451	0.451	0.345	0.345

Standard errors, origin  $\ell$  clustered, in parentheses. Significance: <sup>c</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , <sup>b</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>a</sup>  $p < 0.01$ . All regressions have origin, destination-time, and brand effects.

evidence in the brand-level and market-entry regressions. Then we use tariff data to estimate  $\eta$  and  $\theta$  directly and confirm  $\theta > \eta$ .

### 4.3 Brand-level intensive margin for sales

Brand-level exports are predicted in equation (4). This equation includes  $M_{bn}$ , the number of models that a brand chooses to sell in  $n$ , on the right-hand side. As it is an endogenous variable that enters with a unitary elasticity, we pass it to the left-hand side and re-express the dependent variable as average sales per model,  $q_{b\ell n}/M_{bn}$ . There are two possible implementations of the resulting equation.

Method 1 estimates with brand-market ( $bn$ ) fixed effects and assembly country ( $\ell$ ) fixed effects that capture the cost index of producing each model:

$$\ln(q_{b\ell n}/M_{bn}) = -\theta \mathbf{X}'_{\ell n} \boldsymbol{\rho} - \theta \mathbf{X}'_{i\ell} \mathbf{g} + \text{FE}_\ell + \text{FE}_{bn} + \xi_{b\ell n}. \quad (8)$$

The structural parameters underlying the fixed effects are  $\text{FE}_{bn} = \ln\left((\varphi_b \beta_b)^\eta (Q_n/\Phi_n) \delta_{in}^{-\eta} D_{bn}^{\frac{\eta}{\theta}-1}\right)$  and  $\text{FE}_\ell = -\theta \ln(w_\ell/s_\ell)$ . With method 1,  $\delta_{in}$  is not identified since brands have only one HQ  $i$ . However, we can identify the parameters of  $\gamma_{i\ell}$  and  $\tau_{\ell n}$ .

Method 2 includes as a control the  $\ln D_{bn}$  term estimated as part of the sourcing probability from equation (6). This method has the advantage of permitting estimation of the  $\delta_{in}$  terms because it employs brand and destination effects but does not require brand-destination effects:

$$\ln(q_{b\ell n}/M_{bn}) = -\theta \mathbf{X}'_{\ell n} \boldsymbol{\rho} - \theta \mathbf{X}'_{i\ell} \mathbf{g} - \eta \mathbf{X}'_{in} \mathbf{d} + \text{FE}_\ell + \text{FE}_b + \text{FE}_n + \left(\frac{\eta}{\theta} - 1\right) \ln \hat{D}_{bn} + \xi_{b\ell n}. \quad (9)$$

As in the model-level equation, the error term ( $\xi_{b\ell n}$ ) is a mixture of structural residuals and statistical noise. The interpretation of the origin FE is unchanged, while  $\text{FE}_b = \eta \ln(\varphi_b \beta_b)$  and  $\text{FE}_n = \ln(Q_n/\Phi_n)$ .

The estimates in Table 5 show that methods 1 and 2 deliver similar messages even though the coefficients move around both between and within the methods. The first key finding is that the coefficients on the brand-level  $\tau$  and  $\gamma$  frictions determinants tend to be considerably larger than their model-level counterparts. For example, the model-level  $\tau$  distance elasticity in column (6) of Table 4 is  $-0.347$ , whereas the the brand-level distance elasticities are about twice as large:  $-0.72$  (method 1) and  $-0.65$  (method 2) in the EKS specifications (columns 3 and 6) of Table 5. This is exactly what one should expect if  $\theta > \eta$ , a relationship that already found some support in Table 4. Another piece of evidence for  $\theta > \eta$  can be obtained from the coefficient on  $\ln D_{bn}$ . Its theoretical value is  $\eta/\theta - 1$ . The

Table 5: Quantity sold and market share at the brand level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	PML	EKS	OLS	PML	EKS
ln GDP/pop	0.329 (0.589)	1.166 <sup>a</sup> (0.202)	0.147 (0.143)	0.528 (0.392)	0.567 <sup>b</sup> (0.277)	0.394 (0.339)
ln GDP price	-0.731 (0.758)	-1.461 <sup>a</sup> (0.309)	-0.433 <sup>b</sup> (0.210)	-1.163 <sup>b</sup> (0.553)	-1.029 <sup>b</sup> (0.429)	-0.918 <sup>b</sup> (0.467)
<i>Trade costs</i> ( $\tau_{\ell n}$ )						
mfg at dest - OECD	1.118 <sup>a</sup> (0.254)	2.057 <sup>a</sup> (0.082)	1.649 <sup>a</sup> (0.068)	1.470 <sup>a</sup> (0.303)	2.110 <sup>a</sup> (0.385)	1.936 <sup>a</sup> (0.256)
mfg at dest - LDC	2.646 <sup>a</sup> (0.319)	5.329 <sup>a</sup> (0.103)	5.119 <sup>a</sup> (0.077)	3.176 <sup>a</sup> (0.350)	5.485 <sup>a</sup> (0.549)	5.368 <sup>a</sup> (0.479)
ln dist <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	-0.462 <sup>a</sup> (0.089)	-0.628 <sup>a</sup> (0.027)	-0.719 <sup>a</sup> (0.018)	-0.341 <sup>a</sup> (0.099)	-0.617 <sup>a</sup> (0.139)	-0.654 <sup>a</sup> (0.107)
contig <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	0.181 (0.116)	0.200 <sup>a</sup> (0.046)	0.264 <sup>a</sup> (0.036)	0.335 <sup>b</sup> (0.132)	0.339 (0.212)	0.473 <sup>a</sup> (0.158)
RTA <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	0.711 <sup>a</sup> (0.140)	1.547 <sup>a</sup> (0.054)	1.226 <sup>a</sup> (0.037)	0.787 <sup>a</sup> (0.181)	1.477 <sup>a</sup> (0.246)	1.209 <sup>a</sup> (0.154)
<i>MP frictions</i> ( $\gamma_{i\ell}$ )						
mfg at HQ - OECD	1.337 (0.798)	1.531 <sup>a</sup> (0.138)	2.670 <sup>a</sup> (0.083)	1.741 <sup>b</sup> (0.828)	1.699 <sup>a</sup> (0.601)	2.657 <sup>a</sup> (0.761)
mfg at HQ - LDC	1.592 <sup>a</sup> (0.581)	2.966 <sup>a</sup> (0.244)	4.036 <sup>a</sup> (0.245)	1.330 <sup>b</sup> (0.499)	3.443 <sup>a</sup> (0.902)	4.052 <sup>a</sup> (0.677)
ln dist <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	0.005 (0.218)	-0.084 <sup>c</sup> (0.043)	0.324 <sup>a</sup> (0.027)	0.138 (0.217)	-0.045 (0.200)	0.252 (0.223)
contig <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	-0.729 <sup>c</sup> (0.384)	-0.407 <sup>a</sup> (0.060)	-0.194 <sup>a</sup> (0.039)	-0.513 (0.397)	-0.375 (0.282)	-0.189 (0.296)
RTA <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	-0.276 (0.395)	0.883 <sup>a</sup> (0.090)	0.948 <sup>a</sup> (0.052)	-0.081 (0.375)	0.842 <sup>a</sup> (0.303)	0.812 <sup>b</sup> (0.333)
<i>MS frictions</i> ( $\delta_{in}$ )						
sell at HQ - OECD				1.080 <sup>a</sup> (0.213)	0.222 (0.320)	0.460 <sup>c</sup> (0.278)
sell at HQ - LDC				2.398 <sup>a</sup> (0.805)	1.059 (0.767)	0.624 (0.760)
ln dist <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)				-0.193 <sup>b</sup> (0.092)	-0.025 (0.141)	-0.238 <sup>b</sup> (0.121)
contig <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)				0.314 <sup>a</sup> (0.102)	0.079 (0.167)	-0.046 (0.146)
RTA <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)				0.472 <sup>a</sup> (0.176)	-0.194 (0.229)	-0.096 (0.180)
<i>Sourcing inclusive value:</i>						
ln $\widehat{D}_{bn}$				-0.578 <sup>a</sup> (0.114)	-0.740 <sup>a</sup> (0.194)	-0.782 <sup>a</sup> (0.158)
Observations	88308	308563	308563	88308	315956	315956
R <sup>2</sup>	0.334			0.585	0.490	0.351

Standard errors are in parentheses, robust and origin  $\ell$  clustered in columns (1) to (4). Significance: <sup>c</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , <sup>b</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>a</sup>  $p < 0.01$ . Columns (1) to (3) have origin, and brand-destination-time effects, while columns (4) to (6) include origin, destination-time, and brand effects.

large negative estimates on  $\ln D_{bn}$  in Table 5 imply that  $\theta$  is much larger than  $\eta$ .

The second key finding from Table 5 is the striking evidence of important  $\delta_{in}$  frictions in Column (4). For each of the 5 determinants, the effects are sizable and correctly signed, although uniformly somewhat smaller than the corresponding  $\tau_{ln}$  effects. Their average ratio is 72%. In contrast, among the  $\gamma_{il}$  determinants, only the home effect seems strong. The  $\delta_{in}$  estimates in Table 5 are not as robust as the  $\tau_{ln}$  effects when moving to Poisson on sales (PML) and market shares (EKS). However, as we see in the next subsection, the  $\delta_{in}$  estimated off the model-entry extensive margin are much more robust.

#### 4.4 Market entry decision

Define  $y_{mn}$  as an indicator of market entry. It takes a value of one if model  $m$  is sold in market  $n$  (from any source) in a given year and zero otherwise. Substituting  $\delta_{in} = \exp(\mathbf{X}'_{in}\mathbf{d})$  into equation (3) and introducing fixed effects, we obtain the estimable version of the model-market entry equation.

$$\text{Prob}(y_{mn} = 1) = \mathbb{P}_{bn} = \Lambda[-\lambda(\eta - 1)\mathbf{X}'_{in}\mathbf{d} + \frac{\lambda(\eta - 1)}{\theta} \ln \hat{D}_{bn} + \text{FE}_b + \text{FE}_n]. \quad (10)$$

The presence of the logistic scale parameter  $\lambda$  implies that the other coefficients are only estimable up to a scalar. However, once we obtain estimates of the structural parameter  $\eta$  from other regressions, we can verify the prediction on the sign of the coefficient on  $\ln \hat{D}_{bn}$  in the market entry discrete choice regression.

In the market entry logit, all the effects of geography that work through  $\gamma$  and  $\tau$  are captured in the  $\ln D_{bn}$  term, which can be seen as an index of how well-positioned brand  $b$ 's assembly plants are to serve market  $n$ . All that is left to be estimated are the  $\delta_{in}$  effects. As shown in column (1) of Table 6, MS frictions coefficients are significant and take the expected signs. Even relative magnitudes appear to bolster the results of the linear-in-logs estimation of the brand-level equation. For example, the ratio of the distance elasticity to the RTA coefficient is  $-0.44$  in the current table, compared to  $-0.43$  in column (4) of Table 5.

Given its theoretical importance, the low significance of  $\ln D_{bn}$  in column (1) is disappointing. It does better when we split the sample in two in columns (2) and (3). The  $\delta_{in}$  frictions do not differ across the two periods by more than one would expect given the precision of the estimates.

As with the sourcing decision, the model entry decision exhibits reasonably high uniformity in the signs and significance of the frictions determinants. RTAs between the

Table 6: Logit estimates of the market entry equation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	all	Period	bust	small	medium	large
	00–14	boom 00–07	08–14			
				Size of model		
<i>MS frictions</i> ( $\delta_{in}$ )						
sell at HQ - OECD	0.861 <sup>a</sup> (0.161)	0.928 <sup>a</sup> (0.197)	0.718 <sup>a</sup> (0.147)	0.865 <sup>a</sup> (0.315)	0.533 <sup>a</sup> (0.146)	1.050 <sup>a</sup> (0.193)
sell at HQ - LDC	2.533 <sup>a</sup> (0.505)	3.117 <sup>a</sup> (0.606)	2.063 <sup>a</sup> (0.495)	2.461 <sup>a</sup> (0.691)	2.406 <sup>a</sup> (0.673)	3.341 <sup>a</sup> (0.673)
ln dist <sub>in</sub> (MS)	-0.112 <sup>b</sup> (0.048)	-0.061 (0.056)	-0.117 <sup>a</sup> (0.045)	-0.185 <sup>c</sup> (0.106)	-0.139 <sup>b</sup> (0.068)	-0.137 <sup>a</sup> (0.052)
contig <sub>in</sub> (MS)	0.214 <sup>a</sup> (0.078)	0.242 <sup>a</sup> (0.088)	0.184 <sup>b</sup> (0.076)	0.066 (0.101)	0.171 <sup>b</sup> (0.078)	0.249 <sup>a</sup> (0.079)
RTA <sub>in</sub> (MS)	0.252 <sup>a</sup> (0.062)	0.228 <sup>a</sup> (0.074)	0.189 <sup>a</sup> (0.063)	0.021 (0.141)	0.198 <sup>a</sup> (0.075)	0.419 <sup>a</sup> (0.098)
<i>Sourcing inclusive value:</i>						
ln $\hat{D}_{bn}$	0.091 (0.069)	0.235 <sup>a</sup> (0.086)	0.113 <sup>c</sup> (0.065)	0.205 (0.132)	0.060 (0.112)	0.010 (0.090)
Observations	678161	353032	325129	173480	177473	326768
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.154	0.166	0.146	0.150	0.129	0.212


Standard errors, brand  $b$  clustered, in parentheses. Significance: <sup>c</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , <sup>b</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>a</sup>  $p < 0.01$ . All regressions have destination-year and brand effects.

headquarter country ( $i$ ) and the market ( $n$ ) have strong effects on model entry in each sample other than small cars. As it seems unlikely that RTAs change preferences, we interpret the  $RTA_{in}$  effects as being supportive of our cost-shifter interpretation of  $\delta_{in}$ . Under this approach,  $\delta_{in}$  includes various types of marketing efforts, in particular managing dealership networks. This may be facilitated by the freer movement of skilled workers that is commonly included provision of RTAs (e.g. Nafta, EU). The  $RTA_{in}$  effect may also capture the greater ease of compliance with regulatory standards if the head office lies within the region and is therefore more able to exert influence on specific requirements in harmonized rules.

### 4.5 Tariff regressions

Our measures of  $\tau$  up to this point have been distance, contiguity, a home dummy, and whether the two countries belong to the same RTA. None of these is a direct price shifter, which means each coefficient is the product of  $\eta$  or  $\theta$  and another parameter that converts the friction into its *ad valorem* equivalent. We now make use of an additional piece of data: applied tariffs reported at the bilateral level in the WITS/TRAINS dataset for cars.<sup>25</sup>

Figure 5: Country-specific “home” effects explained by tariffs



<sup>25</sup>Since we don't have the detailed information on the type of fuel or the size of the engine, we use the 4-digit level HS 8703.

As a preliminary, we first investigate the repeated finding in our estimations that the coefficient on  $\text{home}_{\ell n}$  is so much higher for LDCs than OECD assembly countries. Instead of restricting the home effect to be one of two values, for OECD countries and the rest (LDCs), we instead allow for a different coefficients on the  $\text{home}_{\ell n}$  variable for each assembly country  $\ell$ . Figure 5 depicts these coefficients from the brand-level quantity equation, plotted against tariffs. As implied by the higher home coefficients, we see that non-OECD countries have much larger MFN tariffs on cars. The best fit line in the figure has a slope of 10.8 which provides a first estimate of  $\theta$ . The  $R^2$  of 0.48 shows that tariffs by themselves can explain almost half the cross-country variation in the  $\text{home}_{\ell n}$  effect.

The success of this initial approach suggests that tariffs could do a good job of explaining the RTA effect as well, since applied tariffs include preferential treatment of different partners. If the main impact of the RTA is to lower tariffs below their MFN level, we can drop the RTA dummy for this exercise, to leave more variation to identify the tariff coefficient. Therefore, we re-estimate all the regressions where  $\tau_{\ell n}$  enters using tariffs in place of  $\text{RTA}_{\ell n}$ . With the same motivation, we use a single dummy for identification of the border effect, letting tariffs explain the larger impact of national borders on developing countries.

Results are reported in Table 7, where the first column is the sourcing equation (2), the next two are model-level analysis (1), and the last three are brand-level regressions (4). The coefficient on the log of one plus the applied tariff rate estimates  $-\theta$  or  $-\eta$  depending on the equation. We find large estimates for  $\theta$  ranging from about six in the linear in logs brand-level sales equations (both methods 1 and 2) to over nine in the EKS version of the method 2 specification. The conditional logit estimate of 9.2 confirms the brand-level EKS one and, accordingly, is our preferred estimate for  $\theta$ . The model-level sales equation estimates  $\eta$  to be 4.4 for OLS and 4.2 for EKS.<sup>26</sup> The finding that  $\hat{\theta} > \hat{\eta}$  corroborates several other results commented on earlier in the paper. It implies that there is considerably more heterogeneity in consumer evaluations of brands than in car maker evaluations of assembly locations.

We use our preferred estimate of  $\eta$  to compute equilibrium markups and compare those to the existing evidence in the same industry. The markup estimates of Coşar et al. (2015) vary from 8% to 24% depending on the model-market combination. Fajgelbaum et al. (2015) report an average markup of 18%, while Verboven (1996) reports markups of specific models ranging from 8 to 36%. Goldberg (1995) finds an average markup of 38%.

<sup>26</sup>This is not far from the average model-based estimate of 3.28 obtained by Goldberg (1995) who uses a rich nesting structure of automobile demand. Bas et al. (2015), using a sample of Chinese and French exporters and pooling over numerous 6-digit industries, find an estimate an elasticity of five, for a parameter that corresponds to our  $\eta$ .

Table 7: Re-estimating equations (1), (2), and (4) with tariffs

Equation:	sourcing	model-level $q$			brand-level $q$	
Method:	cond. logit	OLS	EKS	OLS	OLS	EKS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Coef. on tariff	$-\theta$	$-\eta$	$-\eta$	$-\theta$	$-\theta$	$-\theta$
ln GDP/pop	0.759 (0.755)	0.371 (0.272)	0.100 (0.337)	0.329 (0.684)	0.869 <sup>c</sup> (0.487)	0.585 (0.489)
ln GDP price	-0.664 (0.801)	-1.234 <sup>a</sup> (0.408)	-0.815 (0.500)	-0.782 (0.834)	-1.678 <sup>b</sup> (0.663)	-1.215 <sup>c</sup> (0.732)
<b>Trade costs (<math>\tau_{\ell n}</math>)</b>						
mfg at dest	0.682 <sup>b</sup> (0.332)	0.562 <sup>a</sup> (0.179)	0.668 <sup>a</sup> (0.134)	0.491 <sup>b</sup> (0.201)	0.805 <sup>a</sup> (0.238)	1.267 <sup>a</sup> (0.334)
ln dist <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	-0.321 <sup>b</sup> (0.125)	-0.199 <sup>a</sup> (0.070)	-0.294 <sup>a</sup> (0.063)	-0.509 <sup>a</sup> (0.067)	-0.397 <sup>a</sup> (0.076)	-0.731 <sup>a</sup> (0.093)
contig <sub><math>\ell n</math></sub>	0.092 (0.139)	0.167 (0.101)	0.158 <sup>b</sup> (0.065)	0.099 (0.103)	0.246 <sup>b</sup> (0.118)	0.322 <sup>b</sup> (0.146)
ln (1+ applied tariff)	-9.205 <sup>a</sup> (1.602)	-4.411 <sup>a</sup> (0.845)	-4.188 <sup>a</sup> (0.720)	-5.844 <sup>a</sup> (0.711)	-6.093 <sup>a</sup> (0.723)	-9.478 <sup>a</sup> (0.815)
<b>MP frictions (<math>\gamma_{i\ell}</math>)</b>						
mfg at HQ - OECD	2.558 <sup>b</sup> (1.283)	0.165 (0.604)	0.182 (0.354)	1.421 (0.876)	1.817 <sup>c</sup> (0.916)	2.565 <sup>a</sup> (0.684)
mfg at HQ - LDC	3.073 <sup>a</sup> (0.975)	-0.025 (0.635)	0.154 (0.450)	1.507 <sup>b</sup> (0.632)	1.173 <sup>c</sup> (0.589)	3.329 <sup>a</sup> (0.790)
ln dist <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	0.237 (0.399)	0.207 (0.154)	0.126 (0.101)	0.028 (0.239)	0.156 (0.236)	0.234 (0.209)
contig <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	-0.013 (0.470)	-0.120 (0.297)	-0.144 (0.197)	-0.738 <sup>c</sup> (0.402)	-0.543 (0.427)	-0.204 (0.285)
RTA <sub><math>i\ell</math></sub> (MP)	0.448 (0.630)	0.081 (0.289)	0.187 (0.173)	-0.351 (0.442)	-0.131 (0.428)	0.688 <sup>b</sup> (0.311)
<b>MS frictions (<math>\delta_{in}</math>)</b>						
sell at HQ - OECD		0.922 <sup>a</sup> (0.220)	0.730 <sup>a</sup> (0.157)		1.335 <sup>a</sup> (0.231)	0.083 (0.299)
sell at HQ - LDC		1.425 (0.917)	1.612 <sup>a</sup> (0.326)		2.620 <sup>b</sup> (1.014)	0.960 (1.224)
ln dist <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)		-0.113 <sup>c</sup> (0.065)	-0.250 <sup>a</sup> (0.072)		-0.144 (0.098)	-0.122 (0.103)
contig <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)		0.128 (0.095)	-0.003 (0.075)		0.238 <sup>b</sup> (0.104)	-0.114 (0.135)
RTA <sub><math>in</math></sub> (MS)		0.421 <sup>a</sup> (0.131)	0.145 <sup>c</sup> (0.087)		0.722 <sup>a</sup> (0.191)	0.089 (0.151)
ln $\mathbb{P}_{b\ell n}$		0.032 (0.067)	-0.055 (0.060)			
ln $D_{bn}$					-0.529 <sup>a</sup> (0.127)	-0.402 <sup>a</sup> (0.147)
Observations	1882328	194964	194964	72870	72870	253770
$R^2$		0.508	0.377	0.336	0.605	0.333

Standard errors, clustered by assembly country  $\ell$  in (). Significance: <sup>c</sup>  $p < 0.1$ , <sup>b</sup>  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>a</sup>  $p < 0.01$ .

With  $\eta = 4.4$  our implied markup is 29%, which places it in the reasonable range of the literature.

## 4.6 Backing out the frictions and assembly costs

Armed with estimates of the cost response elasticities  $\eta$  and  $\theta$ , we can calculate the underlying friction parameters from equation 5. These are the parameters that convert, for example, distance differences into cost differences. We also infer the relative costs (before frictions) of each assembly country.


The estimates of the sourcing equation (2) reported in column (1) of Table 3 provide estimates of  $\widehat{\theta\rho}$  and  $\widehat{\theta g}$ . We obtain estimates of  $\rho$  and  $g$  simply by dividing by the  $\widehat{\theta} = 9.2$  from the sourcing decision using tariffs, i.e. column (1) of Table 7.

Estimates of multinational sales friction parameters ( $d$ ) could be obtained from the model-level sales equation, from method 2 of the brand-level equation, or from the model-market entry equation. We opt for the last of these. Dividing the coefficients from equation (3) by  $(\widehat{\eta} - 1)\widehat{\lambda}$  yields  $\widehat{d}$ . In this calculation we use  $\widehat{\eta} = 4.4$  from the OLS estimates of equation (1). Obtaining  $\widehat{\lambda}$ , the inverse of the logistic scale parameter, is more problematic as we can not back out  $\lambda$  from the coefficient  $(\eta - 1)\lambda d$  unless we already know both  $\eta$  and  $d$ . The way we resolve this is to first obtain estimates of  $d$  from the model-level and brand-level equations using  $\widehat{\eta} = 4.4$ . We average them and then divide the market entry parameters by  $(\widehat{\eta} - 1)\widehat{d}$ . The mean value of  $\lambda$  obtained that way is our benchmark  $\widehat{\lambda} = 1.2$ . Then we can go back and infer the  $\widehat{d}$  implied by the market entry logit estimates. Table 8 summarizes our set of preferred coefficients and associated parameters for each of the friction variables.

The discussion above reinforces the fact that our four estimating equations yield multiple estimates of the same underlying frictions. Equations (4) and (1) both provide estimates for structural parameters of all three sets of frictions, while (4) and (2) are alternative sources for  $\tau$  and  $\gamma$ . One approach would be to estimate a system in which a given parameter is constrained to take the same value in each equation where it appears. This would be more efficient if the equations are all correctly specified. However, our approach allows us to avoid mis-specification from one equation contaminating estimates from a correctly specified equation. We then can compare estimates from different equations to determine how much robustness there is in the estimates each equation offers.

Figure 6 shows that the alternative estimates of structural parameters are very strongly correlated. Panel (a) compares estimates for all three sets of frictions obtained from the model and brand-level sales equations respectively, and finds a correlation around 0.9.

Figure 6: Friction parameters across equations



Parameters  $\tau$  and  $\gamma$  can also be obtained from the sourcing equation, and panel (b) shows another impressive and quite comparable co-movement with the corresponding frictions obtained from brand-level sales. This congruence of structural parameters estimated from quite different firm-level decisions and econometric models gives an added degree of confidence in the robustness of our structural parameters estimates. This is of course of primary importance before turning to counterfactuals in the next section.

Table 8 restates the set of estimated coefficients and corresponding cost parameters for each type of friction. In the case of the  $\tau$  frictions, we can relate our estimates to what is known from direct measurement of the frictions. First, the main observed component of home and RTA effects are tariffs. The tariff component of home OECD is the average  $\ln(1 + \text{applied tariff})$  for OECD markets, which is 0.064 (a 6.6% tariff). For LDC markets the average is 0.161. In both cases the means are taken on non-RTA partners so as to hold RTA constant (it is coded as 0 when  $\ell = n$ ). The tariff component of RTA effects is the average  $\ln(1 + \text{applied tariff})$  for RTA members (0.023) subtracted from the average for RTA non-members (0.105), or 0.082. Comparing these numbers to the implied  $\tau$  frictions shown in column (4) of Table 8, we see that tariffs explain about three quarters of the home effect for OECD members, just about one third for LDCs, and virtually all of the RTA effect. These results imply very small non-tariff barriers for OECD members. This is not as counter to conventional wisdom as it seems. Regulatory barriers (e.g. daylight

Table 8: Friction estimates and parameters

Variable	Estimated coefficients			Implied frictions		
	trade ( $\tau$ )	MP ( $\gamma$ )	MS ( $\delta$ )	$\tau$	$\gamma$	$\delta$
Estimate:	$-\hat{\theta}\hat{\rho}$	$-\hat{\theta}\hat{g}$	$-\lambda(\hat{\eta}-1)\hat{d}$	$\hat{\rho}$	$\hat{g}$	$\hat{d}$
home (OECD)	0.776	2.579	0.861	-0.084	-0.280	-0.218
home (LDC)	4.189	3.578	2.533	-0.455	-0.389	-0.641
ln distance	-0.333	0.231	-0.112	0.036	-0.025	0.028
contiguity	0.132	-0.021	0.214	-0.014	0.002	-0.054
RTA	0.765	0.548	0.252	-0.083	-0.060	-0.064

Elasticities used to obtain frictions:  $\hat{\theta} = 9.2$ ,  $\hat{\eta} = 4.4$ ,  $\hat{\lambda} = 1.2$ . Coefficients for the first two columns come from estimation of equation (2) whereas the third column comes from equation (3).

running lamps, or specific bumper requirements) generally add costs for outsiders' designs *regardless* of where the car is assembled. Hence, these barriers should show up in the form of  $\delta$  frictions. Our friction estimates of  $-0.064$  for RTA  $\delta$  suggest a tariff-equivalent for such frictions of about  $(\exp(0.064) - 1 = 6.6\%)$ .

The elasticity of  $\tau$  with respect to distance is of particular interest to us since it has been estimated on its own using various types of data in the literature, including the effect of physical distance on freight costs. Our preferred estimate of the  $\ln$  distance effect in column (4) of Table 8 is  $\hat{\rho} = 0.036$ . This is larger, but still very comparable to the  $\hat{\rho} = 0.028$  that Coşar et al. (2015) report in Table 13, column IV. Both estimates of  $\hat{\rho}$ , the delivery cost of distance, fit in the "reasonable range" of 0.01 to 0.07 in the literature summarized by Head and Mayer (2013). Our results imply that the distance effects on trade flows can be fully explained without reference to the "dark matter" invoked by Head and Mayer (2013) to explain aggregate distance elasticities of  $-1$  or higher. In a way this is not surprising in this context. Information is clearly not a problem in the sourcing equation since car firms presumably know their own costs. Moreover taste differences and trust issues (other candidates for dark matter) should show up mainly in the  $\delta_{in}$ , where we find an elasticity of variable marketing costs to distance to be  $\hat{d} = 0.028$ , about three quarters of the transport costs effect.

The cost of assembling cars in each country,  $w_\ell/s_\ell$ , is a key parameter of the model because it tells us where production would gravitate in the absence of frictions. Equation (2) shows that the fixed effect for each assembly country in equation (2) is  $FE_\ell = \theta \ln(s_\ell/w_\ell)$ . Starting with the fixed effects from column (1) of Table 3, we divide by  $\hat{\theta} = 9.2$ , the

estimate from the restricted sample sourcing decision estimates from column (1) of Table 7. Then we exponentiate to obtain  $\widehat{s_\ell/w_\ell} = \exp(\widehat{FE_\ell/\hat{\theta}})$ . Since one fixed effect (Italy) is excluded, one of the  $\widehat{s_\ell/w_\ell}$  is normalized to be one. We express the results as percent difference in  $s_\ell/w_\ell$  from Italy (positive numbers mean lower assembly costs than Italy).

Figure 7: Cost advantage inferred from sourcing decisions




Figure 7 (a) graphs the cost advantage of the twenty three countries revealed by the fixed effects to be lowest cost assemblers. The clear “winner” for the car industry is South Korea with Japan as runner up. Egypt is the outlier in the other direction in Figure 7 (b), which depicts the 25 highest cost countries. The implied differences in unit assembly costs ( $w_\ell/s_\ell$ ) are quite small for the main European brand headquarters. France, the UK, and Germany are within a few percentage points from each other. Canada is also very similar to its southern neighbor, while both appear to have a large cost disadvantage relative to Mexico. The similarity in costs between these countries suggests that friction changes have the potential to cause substantial reallocations in production.

## 5 Counterfactuals

We motivated the paper with the issue of how regional integration agreements reshape the spatial allocation of multinational production and trade. Having estimated the equations implied by the model, we conduct counterfactual policy changes to investigate the impact of preferential integration on the location of production (sourcing), allocations of models (entry), shipments across markets (brand-level sales) and consumer surplus.

Three prospective RTA changes are the subject of public debate at the time of writing:

1. Enactment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Australia, Brunei (not in IHS data), Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.
2. Enactment of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), an integration agreement between the European Union and the United States.
3. Brexit: the potential exit of the United Kingdom from the EU.

A fourth counterfactual, the dissolution of Nafta, is presented in Appendix C. In the next two subsections, we provide some detail on the data and parameters that are the inputs into the counterfactual as well as the algorithm that generates the outputs: changes in how much is produced where and changes in consumer surplus.

### 5.1 Summary of exogenous variables and parameters

The exogenous variables related to the determinants of frictions (distance, home, contiguity, RTA) come from the CEPII gravity database. Country-level car purchases ( $Q_n$ ), the brand's total number of models ( $M_b$ ), each brand's set of production locations,  $\mathcal{L}_b$ , and its set of countries with brand dealerships are compiled from the IHS database. RTA is the only one of these variables that the counterfactual changes.

The estimations reported in section 4 provide the "raw materials" for extracting all the structural parameters. As detailed in the previous section, estimates from the sourcing equation (2) deliver the  $\tau$  and  $\gamma$  friction parameters, as well as the assembly costs,  $w_\ell/s_\ell$ . The  $\delta$  frictions are principally derived from the entry equation (3). There are two remaining sets of brand-specific and country-specific variables that both play important parts in the analysis:

**Brand effects** are obtained by combining estimates derived from equations (4) and (1). In both equations,  $\widehat{\beta_b \varphi_b} = \exp(\widehat{FE_b}/\hat{\eta})$ . Therefore, we divide the estimated brand fixed effects from each equation by  $\hat{\eta} = 4.4$ , exponentiate, and then average.

**Model-entry fixed costs** : We solve for the implied market-specific fixed costs of adding a model,  $J_n$ , utilizing the market fixed effects and our estimate of  $\hat{\lambda} = 1.2$ .

$$J_n = \widehat{\text{FE}}_n / \hat{\lambda} + \ln Q_n - \ln \widehat{\Phi}_n,$$

where  $\widehat{\Phi}_n = \hat{\kappa}_1 \sum_b M_{bn} (\widehat{\beta_b \varphi_b} / \hat{\delta}_{in})^{\hat{\eta}} \widehat{D}_{bn}^{\hat{\eta}}$ , our estimate of  $\Phi_n$  that uses actual data for  $M_{bn}$  (rather than solving for endogenous entry levels as we do in the actual simulation stage). At this stage,  $\widehat{D}_{bn} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{L}_b} (\widehat{s_\ell / w_\ell \hat{\gamma}_{ik} \hat{\tau}_{kn}})^{-\hat{\theta}}$  can be completely calculated from the set of parameters at hand.

## 5.2 Algorithm solving for endogenous variables

The endogenous variables in our model are  $M_{bn}$  (entry counts),  $\Phi_n$  (needed for consumer surplus), and  $q_{bln}$  (which determines the impact of changes on firms and workers). The counterfactual exercises require an algorithm for dealing with the simultaneity between the model entry decision and the overall index of competition in the market,  $\Phi_n$ .

The goal is to solve for expected values of brand-origin-destination flows under factual,  $\bar{q}_{bln}$ , and counterfactual,  $\tilde{q}_{bln}$ , settings of RTA. It is useful to express the brand-level equation (4) for factual and counterfactual sales as being multiplicatively separable between two probabilities:

$$\bar{q}_{bln} = Q_n \bar{\mathbb{P}}_{bn} \bar{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn} \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{q}_{bln} = Q_n \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{bn} \tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn}$$

The first probability,  $\mathbb{P}_{bn}$  gives the expected share of sales in  $n$  going to brand  $b$ . The second probability,  $\mathbb{P}_{\ell|bn}$ , governs the sourcing decision. It is straightforward to calculate  $\tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn}$ , since this only involves an update of the frictions in the numerator and denominator,  $\tilde{D}_{bn} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{L}_b} (\widehat{s_\ell / w_\ell \tilde{\gamma}_{ik} \tilde{\tau}_{kn}})^{-\hat{\theta}}$ , of the probability formula. Calculating  $\tilde{\mathbb{P}}_{bn}$  is trickier since model choice depends on the availability and prices of models in each market, captured in  $\tilde{\Phi}_{bn}$ , but entry itself depends on the same index. We therefore need to solve simultaneously for equilibrium levels of  $M_{bn}$  and  $\Phi_{bn}$ , first as expected values, the factual, and then in the counterfactual scenario.

The expected price index in  $n$ ,  $\bar{\Phi}_n$ , is the same as  $\hat{\Phi}_n$  except that the actual number of models sold by brand  $b$  in market  $n$  is replaced with its expected value ( $\bar{M}_{bn}$ ):

$$\bar{\Phi}_n = \hat{\kappa}_1 \sum_b \bar{M}_{bn} (\widehat{\beta_b \varphi_b} / \hat{\delta}_{in})^{\hat{\eta}} \widehat{D}_{bn}^{\hat{\eta}}. \quad (11)$$

Using the logit estimates of the brand effects ( $\widehat{FE}_b$ ), together with other estimated parameters, The expected number of entrants is  $M_b$  times the probability of models from brand  $b$  entering market  $n$  (equation 3):

$$\bar{M}_{bn} = \Lambda \left[ \hat{\lambda}(\ln \hat{\kappa}_2 - \ln \hat{\eta}) - \hat{\lambda}(\hat{\eta} - 1) \ln \hat{\delta}_{in} + \frac{\hat{\lambda}(\hat{\eta} - 1)}{\hat{\theta}} \ln \hat{D}_{bn} + \widehat{FE}_b + \hat{\lambda}(\ln Q_n - \ln \bar{\Phi}_n - \hat{J}_n) \right] M_b. \quad (12)$$

The algorithm solves this set of nonlinear equations through an iteration process using (11) and (12). We begin with a guess of  $\bar{\Phi}_n$  in equation (11), where  $\bar{M}_{bn}$  is *initialized as the count of realized entrants*. This permits calculation of the implied model entry flows,  $\bar{M}_{bn}$  from equation (12), leading to a new value of  $\bar{\Phi}_n$  in (11). This *tâtonnement* process is not a contraction mapping so a dampening factor (set equal to 0.3) is used to reach the fixed points for each market. Since there is no feedback to  $\widehat{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn}$  we can use the  $\hat{D}_{bn}$  obtained at realized friction values for all iterations.

Substituting in those factual expected values  $\bar{M}_{bn}$  and  $\bar{\Phi}_n$ , the expected brand-market shares are given by

$$\bar{\mathbb{P}}_{bn} = \frac{\hat{\kappa}_1 \bar{M}_{bn} (\widehat{\beta_b \varphi_b / \delta_{in}})^{\hat{\eta}} \hat{D}_{bn}^{\frac{\hat{\eta}}{\hat{\theta}}}}{\bar{\Phi}_n}. \quad (13)$$


To obtain expected brand-level shipments from  $\ell$  to  $n$ , one then just needs to plug in values to  $\bar{q}_{bln} = Q_n \bar{\mathbb{P}}_{bn} \bar{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn}$ .<sup>27</sup>

Figure 8 provides an illustration of how the model fits the data. It graphs actual brand-origin-destination sales ( $q_{bln}$ ) against simulation-predicted sales ( $\bar{q}_{bln}$ ) with both expressed on a log scale. The data cluster around the 45 degree line, obtaining a correlation (in logs) of 0.69. We should not overplay this performance since it is undoubtedly aided by the presence of  $Q_n$  in the predicting model. The figure does show the model is capable of capturing the main variation in the data, whereas failure to do so would have cast substantial doubt on the counterfactual results.

At this stage, the model is calibrated out of the estimated structural parameters after solving for endogenous equilibrium variables under the factual vectors of frictions:  $\bar{M}_{bn}$  and  $\bar{\Phi}_{bn}$ , yielding  $\bar{q}_{bln}$ . Each counterfactual is then obtained after changing the frictions  $\tau$ ,  $\gamma$ , and  $\delta$  to their counterfactual settings by turning on or off the corresponding RTA indicator. The iteration described above provides  $\widetilde{M}_{bn}$  and  $\widetilde{\Phi}_{bn}$ , giving counterfactual market shares  $\widetilde{\mathbb{P}}_{bn} = \left[ \hat{\kappa}_1 \widetilde{M}_{bn} (\widehat{\beta_b \varphi_b / \delta_{in}})^{\hat{\eta}} \widetilde{D}_{bn}^{\frac{\hat{\eta}}{\hat{\theta}}} \right] / \widetilde{\Phi}_n$ . Combining with new sourcing probabilities, one can calculate the counterfactual flows  $\widetilde{q}_{bln} = Q_n \widetilde{\mathbb{P}}_{bn} \widetilde{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn}$ .

<sup>27</sup>Again, since  $\hat{D}_{bn}$  does not involve either  $\bar{M}_{bn}$  or  $\bar{\Phi}_n$ ,  $\widehat{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn}$  is not affected by the iterative looping proce-

Figure 8: Fit of  $q_{b\ell n}$  data to expected values of solved model



### 5.3 Results

For each policy change, we consider three levels of integration

1. Free trade agreement ( $\tau$  only): changes  $RTA_{\ell n}$
2. Deeper integration ( $\tau$  and  $\gamma$ ): also changes  $RTA_{i\ell}$
3. Deepest integration ( $\tau$ ,  $\gamma$ , and  $\delta$ ): also changes  $RTA_{in}$

Tables 9, 10 and 11 report the results of our counterfactual experiments. The tables depict changes in production destined to three aggregated markets: the domestic market of the country listed, members of the RTA other than that country, and the rest of the world (ROW). We also show the level of *expected* production in the baseline (factual) situation.

Consumer surplus changes are reported in percent in the final column. They are calculated as  $\left(\frac{\tilde{\Phi}_n}{\bar{\Phi}_n}\right)^{1/\hat{\eta}} - 1$  (this formula is the logit equivalent of the change in the price index in the CES demand system, see Anderson et al. (1992) for details). We leave exhaustive welfare analysis (including changes in profits, impact on workers, and tariff revenues) for future work.

Table 9 displays the predicted impact of TPP on the ten countries with the largest changes in output. The first panel of the table treats the TPP as if it were a standard free

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dure, and we can use  $\bar{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn} = \hat{\mathbb{P}}_{\ell|bn}$ .

Table 9: Implementing TPP

Country	Change in production by market (# cars)				% Chg.	Base (mn)	CS % Chg.
	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>RTA</i>	<i>ROW</i>	<i>Total</i>			
<b>FTA: changing <math>\tau</math></b>							
JPN	-89098	1711448	0	1622350	12.4	13.033	.3
USA	-671650	-41331	0	-712981	-9.3	7.707	2.11
KOR	0	-203910	0	-203910	-3.8	5.325	0
CAN	-23099	-139837	0	-162936	-9.5	1.712	2.57
MEX	-281	-118235	0	-118516	-8.8	1.348	.06
DEU	0	-62170	0	-62170	-1.8	3.55	0
GBR	0	-59117	0	-59117	-4.1	1.429	0
BRA	0	-33427	0	-33427	-1.3	2.556	0
FRA	0	-32295	0	-32295	-1.3	2.465	0
TUR	0	-28926	0	-28926	-4.1	.708	0
<b>Deeper integration: changing <math>\tau</math> and <math>\gamma</math></b>							
JPN	-176125	1395705	-108321	1111259	8.5	13.033	.54
KOR	-4380	-244353	-22529	-271262	-5.1	5.325	.09
USA	-517984	82586	188506	-246892	-3.2	7.707	2.59
CAN	-1448	95800	134332	228684	13.4	1.712	3.15
MEX	-2508	-145667	-5450	-153625	-11.4	1.348	.59
DEU	-4555	-75459	-16976	-96990	-2.7	3.55	.13
GBR	-4294	-72525	-14016	-90835	-6.4	1.429	.16
FRA	-3154	-40510	-19784	-63448	-2.6	2.465	.13
BRA	-19086	-40159	-3690	-62935	-2.5	2.556	.1
TUR	-723	-35714	-8846	-45283	-6.4	.708	.17
<b>Deepest integration: changing <math>\tau</math>, <math>\gamma</math> and <math>\delta</math></b>							
JPN	-206249	2293566	-108321	1978996	15.2	13.033	.7
USA	-1018936	46515	188506	-783915	-10.2	7.707	5.7
KOR	-4380	-431954	-22529	-458863	-8.6	5.325	.09
CAN	134	105493	134332	239959	14	1.712	6.79
MEX	-2508	-193310	-5450	-201268	-14.9	1.348	.59
DEU	-4555	-143391	-16976	-164922	-4.6	3.55	.13
GBR	-4294	-58646	-14016	-76956	-5.4	1.429	.16
BRA	-19086	-38111	-3690	-60887	-2.4	2.556	.1
FRA	-3154	-35950	-19784	-58888	-2.4	2.465	.13
CHN	-25519	-18887	-1798	-46204	-.3	14.638	.03

Elasticity parameter relevant for the Consumer Surplus calculation is  $\eta = 4.4$ .

trade agreement. As shown in Table 8, the average treatment effect of an RTA is equivalent to an 8% tariff reduction.<sup>28</sup> As one would expect, each of the major car-producing members reduces output for its home market. In the case of the US, the reduction amounts to 672 thousand cars. Japan's 89 thousand reduction in home market sales is dwarfed by a 1.7 million increase in car sales to the other TPP countries. Overall Japan expands production by 12.4% while the US industry contracts by 9.3%. One explanation for the big surge in Japanese production is that it is estimated to have a significant cost advantage over the other TPP producers as seen in Figure 7. Another reason is that as of 2013, Japan does not have tariff-free access to any of the major TPP partners.

From the point of view of Japanese workers, deeper integration is unappealing, as it reduces the gains in production by about 500 thousand cars (1.1m vs 1.6m). This occurs because TPP raises efficiency in Japanese plants in the US, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Malaysia, and Vietnam by 6%. This  $\gamma$  effect is big enough to convert Canada from a net production loss of 163 thousand to a production gain of 229 thousand. Deepest integration is the best of three scenarios for Japanese producers, with export gains to the other TPP members rising to 2.3 million (i.e. more than offsetting the losses from lower  $\gamma$ ). Aggregate Japanese production rises by 15% as a consequence of the removal of all three frictions.

While the TPP looks bad for US auto workers, there are large predicted benefits for US consumers. The US price index for cars falls by 2.6% to 5.7% with the largest gains when all three frictions are removed. Canadian consumers gain 6.8% (the biggest increase in all the experiments we have run) under deepest integration. This is because the reduced cost of distributing Japanese models in Canada leads to greater variety of Japanese models available at lower prices.

Let us now turn to another prospective agreement, TTIP, which would liberalize trade between the US and the EU. This scenario turns a RTA dummy on between our sample's members of the EU (as of 2013) and the US, again with three levels of depth of integration, shown in the three panels of Table 10. Japan loses the greatest number of cars assembled under the three scenarios, with 2 to 4% of production lost. A preferential trade agreement between the EU and the US would lower Canadian and Mexican auto production by about 6% each. Canada's losses rise to 9.4% when considering  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  effects. This shows that erosion of preferences can be a major concern and helps to explain why Canada has been negotiating its own integration agreement with the EU.<sup>29</sup> We have also included the

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<sup>28</sup>This approach may underestimate the actual tariff reductions for countries like Malaysia and Vietnam that currently impose high tariffs.

<sup>29</sup>Canada and the EU signed in 2014 an agreement in principle on the pact known as CETA but it has yet to be finalized and ratified.

Table 10: Implementing TTIP

Country	Change in production by market (# cars)				% Chg.	Base (mn)	CS % Chg.
	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>RTA</i>	<i>ROW</i>	<i>Total</i>			
<b>FTA: changing <math>\tau</math></b>							
JPN	0	-274141	0	-274141	-2.1	13.033	0
DEU	-22552	209263	0	186711	5.3	3.55	.42
GBR	-9365	154394	0	145029	10.2	1.429	.49
KOR	0	-113484	0	-113484	-2.1	5.325	0
CAN	0	-105378	0	-105378	-6.2	1.712	0
BEL	-1052	96800	0	95748	17.2	.558	.4
MEX	0	-85673	0	-85673	-6.4	1.348	0
ESP	-2389	72908	0	70519	6.7	1.053	.53
POL	-290	48000	0	47710	19.2	.249	.47
CZE	-379	42901	0	42522	4.9	.872	.4
USA	-406415	394013	0	-12402	-.2	7.707	.98
<b>Deeper integration: changing <math>\tau</math> and <math>\gamma</math></b>							
JPN	-3486	-340736	-30765	-374987	-2.9	13.033	.02
BEL	2117	265158	38900	306175	54.9	.558	.64
DEU	-33449	219644	-1106	185089	5.2	3.55	.63
KOR	-1668	-145718	-12541	-159927	-3	5.325	.03
CAN	-2377	-143308	-4255	-149940	-8.8	1.712	.2
POL	500	125198	23854	149552	60	.249	.68
ESP	-1375	130553	17021	146199	13.9	1.053	.71
GBR	-12739	140320	-3469	124112	8.7	1.429	.69
MEX	-1290	-115827	-4412	-121529	-9	1.348	.2
BRA	-9504	-21274	-2149	-32927	-1.3	2.556	.05
USA	-507575	443414	43276	-20885	-.3	7.707	1.29
<b>Deepest integration: changing <math>\tau</math>, <math>\gamma</math> and <math>\delta</math></b>							
JPN	-3486	-500506	-30765	-534757	-4.1	13.033	.02
BEL	5594	317233	38900	361727	64.8	.558	1.22
DEU	-46455	370049	-1106	322488	9.1	3.55	1.18
KOR	-1668	-192170	-12541	-206379	-3.9	5.325	.03
POL	1320	143564	23854	168738	67.7	.249	1.31
CAN	-2377	-154419	-4255	-161051	-9.4	1.712	.2
ESP	-1622	141790	17021	157189	14.9	1.053	1.37
GBR	-22172	142471	-3469	116830	8.2	1.429	1.32
MEX	-1290	-91160	-4412	-96862	-7.2	1.348	.2
FRA	-23670	-19931	-4598	-48199	-2	2.465	1.13
USA	-621882	590749	43276	12143	.2	7.707	1.97

Elasticity parameter relevant for the Consumer Surplus calculation is  $\eta = 4.4$ .

US in the first panel of the table, even though its aggregate changes in production are negligible, because there are major reallocation and consumer effects. Losses from domestic sales (because of increased competition in the US market) are almost fully compensated by increased sales to EU countries. Note that in all three scenarios, the gains to the US consumer are quite large, due to cheaper access to EU-produced models.

The cases of Belgium and Poland are quite interesting. With TTIP, Ford's Belgian factory approximately doubles its probability of being selected as the low-cost source for shipments to the US. Deeper ( $\gamma$  and  $\tau$ ) integration triples the probability of sourcing from Poland for Chrysler and Ford (relative to the status quo). Fiat in Poland benefits from the reductions in  $\delta$  in the deepest integration scenario because the Fiat share of the US market rises from 0.7% to 1.1%.

The last case we consider is the UK exiting from the European Union in 2013. In this case, we run the changes in RTA in reverse order, first eliminating  $\delta$  preferences, then  $\delta$  and  $\gamma$ , and finally all three. We hold constant all the RTA relationships the UK currently enjoys through its EU membership (e.g. the customs union with Turkey and the EU-Mexico FTA).

The first level of Brexit captures the scenario in which Britain outside of the EU would retain tariff-free access to the EU but would lose its ability to influence EU regulations on car standards. The rise in  $\delta$  in this scenario might also be thought of as capturing "freedom fries" type consumer reactions associated with the breakup of the Union (as in Michaels and Zhi (2010)). The first panel of Table 11 shows that the  $\delta$  increases have a negligible impact on car production in the UK, because production for the home market rises to fully offset losses in EU exports. Consumer surplus in the UK falls because the price index for cars rises by about 2.4%.

The impact of rising  $\gamma$  hits EU brands with assembly operations in the UK, namely Mercedes, Opel, and Peugeot. We can interpret this as greater difficulties in supplying inputs from these brands' headquarters in Germany and France. The  $\gamma$  rise induces a further 20 thousand car sales loss in the EU and 11 thousand fewer cars exported to non-EU members. The French, German, and (to a lesser extent) Spanish car plants have corresponding gains in production relative to the  $\delta$ -only scenario. Austria, on the other hand, suffers a big reduction in production because it hosts three UK brands (and no home-based brands). Consumers losses rise only slightly.

The big changes occur under the scenario that the UK fails to maintain tariff-free access to the EU market. Advocates of UK withdrawal from the EU tend to dismiss this scenario but there has been no guarantee of Swiss-style market access following a breakup. Without an FTA with the EU, consumer losses more than double to 4.9% while UK car

Table 11: Brexit: UK exit from the EU

Country	Change in production by market (# cars)				% Chg.	Base (mn)	CS % Chg.
	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>RTA</i>	<i>ROW</i>	<i>Total</i>			
<b>Loss of <math>\delta</math> preferences</b>							
JPN	0	65470	0	65470	.5	13.033	0
DEU	2177	-52174	0	-49997	-1.4	3.55	-.06
FRA	1446	-34384	0	-32938	-1.3	2.465	-.07
KOR	0	21714	0	21714	.4	5.325	0
USA	0	13719	0	13719	.2	7.707	0
ESP	259	-10747	0	-10488	-1	1.053	-.07
GBR	35351	-29453	0	5898	.4	1.429	-2.36
SVK	11	-5536	0	-5525	-1.1	.487	-.07
AUT	-165	-4324	0	-4489	-2.7	.168	-.07
PRT	12	-4382	0	-4370	-1.7	.257	-.08
<b>Loss of <math>\delta</math> and <math>\gamma</math> preferences</b>							
JPN	189	68833	2724	71746	.6	13.033	0
DEU	6178	-44324	3638	-34508	-1	3.55	-.09
FRA	1949	-32363	436	-29978	-1.2	2.465	-.09
GBR	31004	-49425	-11409	-29830	-2.1	1.429	-2.39
KOR	103	23616	1392	25111	.5	5.325	0
USA	1609	14779	984	17372	.2	7.707	0
AUT	-347	-10244	-6534	-17125	-10.2	.168	-.09
ESP	381	-9364	331	-8652	-.8	1.053	-.09
SVK	15	-5108	95	-4998	-1	.487	-.09
CAN	35	3875	415	4325	.3	1.712	-.01
<b>Total loss of integration: including <math>\tau</math> preferences</b>							
JPN	189	213370	2724	216283	1.7	13.033	0
GBR	90728	-254167	-11409	-174848	-12.2	1.429	-4.94
FRA	8874	-95765	436	-86455	-3.5	2.465	-.37
DEU	18649	-105019	3638	-82732	-2.3	3.55	-.37
KOR	103	79701	1392	81196	1.5	5.325	0
USA	1609	50936	984	53529	.7	7.707	0
TUR	61	30218	145	30424	4.3	.708	-.02
ESP	1664	-32018	331	-30023	-2.9	1.053	-.39
CZE	363	-22800	175	-22262	-2.6	.872	-.36
MEX	22	21414	302	21738	1.6	1.348	-.01

Elasticity parameter relevant for the Consumer Surplus calculation is  $\eta = 4.4$ .

production shrinks by 175 thousand cars, about 12% lower than the model predicts it to produce when fully integrated with the EU. The large rises in production in Turkey (4.3%) and Mexico (1.6%) are consequences of the assumption that the UK stays in trade agreements with those countries that previously signed RTAs with the EU.

The three counterfactuals show quantitatively important effects for each of the frictions. Incorporating the joint reductions in trade costs, MP and MS frictions leads to consumer surplus increases from RTAs that are about twice as large as removing only trade costs for the most affected countries.

## 6 Conclusion

Using standard econometric methods we estimate the structural parameters of a rich model of multinational production developed from the recent literature. A major contribution of this approach to modeling MP is that we obtain four “workhorse” equations that can be applied in many contexts. Two of them describe choices at the extensive margins, whether to offer each variety in each market, and which factory to source each variety for the markets in which they are offered. Two other decisions, the sales of each model and brand total sales, are intensive margins. The variety entry decision is new to our model, and we have uniquely detailed data to estimate all four decisions exactly as the model dictates, in particular because we observe the location of production and consumption of each variety for the whole industry. There are however major decisions we do not consider. We take the set of countries where the brand has assembly capability (measured by positive production in a year) as given. The firm’s decision of which countries to place brand production facilities would depend on the frictions and the origin and destination effects we estimate. It would also depend on plant-level fixed costs that we do not estimate.<sup>30</sup> We also take as given the countries in which the brand has positive sales. The firm’s decision of which countries to establish a brand presence would depend again on brand effects, frictions, and markets sizes that we estimate. It would also depend on the fixed cost of setting up a brand-level dealership network, which we cannot recover with our four estimating equations. To keep the scope of the paper finite, we leave estimation of the car makers’ decisions to establish production and distribution operations in new countries for future research.

One clear takeaway from our results is that, for both car makers and car buyers, “There’s no place like home.” Home had strong significant effects on all three of our frictions, trade, multinational production, and multinational sales. For OECD countries

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<sup>30</sup>Tintelnot (2014) estimates firm-level fixed costs of MP.

the ad valorem equivalent of these frictions were, respectively 8%, 24%, and 20%. For less developed countries the frictions were much larger. The other clear message is that multinational firms operate on a regional basis. Regional trade agreements have significant effects on all three frictions (8%, 6%, 6%). Part of the reason our results do not point to larger friction costs is that we estimate (via tariffs) large response elasticities: 4.4 for substitution between models ( $\eta$ ) and 9.2 for substitution between assembly sites ( $\theta$ ).

Going beyond our specific frictions estimates, our results show that the new multinational production models work quite well. We have shown how to confront one version of the model with its detailed micro predictions. The data do not seem to “object” to the many strong functional form assumptions these models impose to gain tractability. Indeed, many internal consistency checks are passed. While availability of the type of data we have found is likely to remain limited to specific industries, we have at least shown that estimation of the MP model can be direct, structural, and relatively easy.

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## A Data Appendix

In this appendix, we start by describing different treatments we applied to the raw Polk data:

- We delete shipments of unknown brand or assembly country. There were 22 countries in the IHS data where assembly location was unavailable for all sales. We also required that at least 90% of the total car sales in a country must come from identified brands, leading us to drop Algeria and Cuba as well. The remaining 73 markets constituted 98% of world automotive sales in the 2013 IHS data.
- Since Norway only has one manufacturer in our sample, (Think), it is impossible to estimate an effect for this country of assembly and this brand in the same regression. We therefore drop both.
- In order to restrict attention to vehicles with comparable substitution patterns, we eliminated light commercial vehicles as a car type, to work only with passenger cars. We also dropped pick-up trucks and vans because over 90% of their sales are registered as commercial vehicles.

## B Constant elasticity of substitution discrete choice

Following Hanemann (1984)'s equation (3.5), let utility of household  $h$  be given by

$$U_h = u \left( \sum_m \psi_{mh} c_{mh}, z_h \right),$$

with  $z$  the outside good. The model-household parameters  $\psi_{mh}$  convert car use into equivalent units of psychological car services.<sup>31</sup>

Unlike the more familiar RUM with unitary demand, we model the  $c_{mh}$  as continuous choice variables. There are two interpretations for cars. One involves households with multiple members who share some number of cars. For example with two adults and one teenager in the household  $c_h = 1$  if each member has their own car, but would be  $c_h = 1/3$  if the three household members shared a single car. Obviously, unless households are very large (car-sharing groups might be an illustration), the continuity assumption is violated by integer issues.

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<sup>31</sup>For example,  $\psi_{mh}$  could be the number of driving kilometers expected by the buyer over the lifetime of the model.

A second interpretation involves endogenous use of a durable good. Suppose that each new car delivers 1 unit of lifetime services. Then  $\sum_t c_{ht} = 1$ . By driving sparingly or maintaining intensively in a given year,  $c_{ht}$  can be reduced, prolonging the duration of use. In this case  $c_{ht} = 0.2$  would correspond to using 1/5 of the car's operating life each year. Assuming a steady state and aggregating over all households, the annual demand for new cars of model  $m$  in market  $n$  is given by  $q_{mn} = \sum_h c_{mh}$ . Summing across all models, the household's annual consumption is  $c_h \equiv \sum_m c_{mh}$ . Summing across all households and models, we have  $\sum_h \sum_m c_{mh} = Q_n$ , where  $Q_n$  denotes aggregate number of new cars sold in country  $n$ . We have implicitly assumed that in our steady state car replacements are spread evenly over periods, to avoid all consumers buying new cars in the fifth year and no sales at all in between.

Consumers choose  $c_{mh}$  for each model of the set of models available in market  $n$  and spend the remainder of their income,  $y_h$ , on outside good  $z$  with price normalized to one. Thus they maximize  $U_h$  subject to  $\sum_m p_m c_{mh} + z_h = y_h$ . Denoting the Lagrange multiplier as  $\lambda$ , and the partial derivatives with respect to  $\sum_m \psi_{mh} c_{mh}$  and  $z_h$  as  $u_1$  and  $u_2$ , the first order conditions are

$$u_1 \psi_{mh} = \lambda p_m \quad \forall m \text{ with } c_{mh} > 0; \quad \text{and} \quad u_2 = \lambda.$$

Combining we have

$$\frac{u_1}{u_2} = \frac{p_m}{\psi_{mh}} \quad \forall m \text{ with } c_{mh} > 0$$

This equation implies a relationship between  $\sum_m \psi_{mh} c_{mh}$  and  $p_m/\psi_{mh}$  that can only hold for  $c_{mh} > 0$  and  $c_{mh'} > 0$  under the measure 0 event that  $\frac{p_m}{\psi_{mh}} = \frac{p_{m'}}{\psi_{m'h}}$  for  $m \neq m'$ . Otherwise each household  $h$  will select its preferred model  $m_h^*$  and consume  $c_h$  units while consuming  $c_{m'h} = 0$  on all  $m' \neq m_h^*$ . In other words, the indifference curves between any pair of varieties  $m$  and  $m'$ , holding  $z$  constant, are linear, implying a corner solution. Thus  $c_h$  is given by

$$\frac{u_1(\psi_{mh} c_h, y - p_m c_h)}{u_2(\psi_{mh} c_h, y - p_m c_h)} = \frac{p_m}{\psi_{mh}} \quad \text{for } m = m_h^*$$

The preferred choice,  $m^*$ , is given by the argmin of  $p_m/\psi_{mh}$  (Hanemann, 1984, p. 548). Since a monotonic transformation of  $p_m/\psi_{mh}$  preserves the ranking, this is equivalent to maximizing  $\ln \psi_{mh} - \ln p_m$ . Parameterizing  $\psi_{mh} = \beta_m \exp(\epsilon_{mh})$ , the probability a given household chooses model  $m$  is

$$\text{Prob}(p_m/\psi_{mh} < p_j/\psi_{hj}) = \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{mh} + \ln \beta_m > \epsilon_{jh} + \ln \beta_j + \ln p_m - \ln p_j), \forall j \neq m.$$

With  $\epsilon$  distributed according to the CDF  $\exp(-\exp(-\eta\epsilon))$  (Gumbel with scale parameter  $1/\eta$ ), the resulting choice probabilities at the level of market  $n$  are

$$\mathbb{P}_{mn} = \frac{\beta_m^\eta (p_{mn})^{-\eta}}{\Phi_n}, \quad \text{where} \quad \Phi_n \equiv \sum_{j \in \mathcal{M}_n} \beta_j^\eta (p_{jn})^{-\eta}.$$

The above equation can be re-expressed in the standard conditional logit form by taking logs and then taking the exponential of each term in the numerator and denominator.

Aggregate expected sales of model  $m$  in  $n$  are

$$\mathbb{E}[q_{mn}] = \sum_h \mathbb{P}_{mn} c_h = \mathbb{P}_{mn} \sum_h c_h = \mathbb{P}_{mn} Q_n.$$

The elasticity of demand with respect to the price of model  $m$  is  $-\eta(1 - \mathbb{P}_{mn})$ , which goes to  $-\eta$  as  $\mathbb{P}_{mn} \rightarrow 0$ . Intuitively, demand becomes more responsive to price as  $\eta$  increases because  $\eta$  is *inversely* related to the amount of heterogeneity in consumer preferences.

Expected sales of any model are proportional to the aggregate size of the market expressed in volumes, regardless of  $u()$ . Relatedly, *income does not affect the choice between models* but, depending on the form of  $u()$ , the consumption of cars can have any income expansion path. For example, under the Cobb-Douglas case, explored by Anderson et al. (1992), the optimal consumption of the chosen car is  $c_{mh} = (\alpha y_h)/p_m$ , for  $m = m_h^*$ . Non-homothetic demand will be obtained from all other assumed  $u()$ . The quasi-linear case where  $U_h = (\sum_m \psi_{mh} c_{mh})^\alpha + z_h$ , yields  $c_{mh} = \left(\frac{p_m}{\alpha \psi_{mh}^\alpha}\right)^{1/(\alpha-1)}$ . The share of expenditure spent on cars will therefore fall with income. An opposite conclusion can be obtained with  $U_h = \sum_m \psi_{mh} c_{mh} + z_h^\alpha$ , which gives the demand for the chosen car model  $c_{mh} = \frac{y_h - \left(\frac{\psi_{mh}}{\alpha p_m}\right)^{1/(\alpha-1)}}{p_m}$ . In this case, car expenditure as a share of income is increasing in income.

## C Counterfactual NAFTA removal

This appendix reports the predicted outcomes of an unlikely scenario, the removal of RTA preferences between Canada, the US, and Mexico. It remains of interest partly because it bears on the old question of whether free trade with Mexico was bad for US manufacturing and partly because it quantifies the importance of  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  changes in a scenario where the multinationals are based in only one of the members of the integration agreement (there are no Canadian or Mexican brands). This Nafta dissolution experiment also entails removing pre-Nafta agreements between Canada and the US such as the 1965

## Canada-US Auto Pact.

The simplest case to analyze is the undoing of NAFTA in terms of trade costs only, in the first third of Table 12. Not surprisingly, the biggest changes in total output happen for the three members of the agreement, with Canada and Mexico seeing impressive drops (around 30%) in production due to the loss of their favored status on the US market. The second thing to note is the trade-off between two effects. Because the US-made cars are less easy to export to Canada, local production grows. This reverses the trade creation effect of NAFTA as consumers switch back to domestically assembled cars. This effect is too small to counterbalance the drop in export platform production for Canada and Mexico, but big enough in the USA, which actually *gains* production in this scenario. This is a case where the interests of producers and consumers are not aligned: Consumer surplus falls everywhere, because of the drop in cheap imports from the two former partners. Another country that sees its total production rise is Japan. This is due to the fact that vehicles exported from Japan now face weaker competition in each of the three NAFTA markets. Note that part of the competition actually occurs from Japanese brands whose production is located within NAFTA. Toyota cars made in the US are now worse competitors in Canada, making it easier to export Toyotas, Hondas, and Nissans from Japan. This is a change in sourcing effect, active when a brand has plants both in NAFTA and in another country. Those two effects (lower competition and increased sourcing) are also active for German-made cars, which all see rises in their exports to NAFTA. In contrast, Korean makers only experience the competition effect. With production facilities in the US only, NAFTA brings about no changes in Hyundai's incentives to source cars for the US market from the US instead of (primarily) Korea. Under the FTA only scenario, we also observe no changes in the consumer surplus for non-members.

Things are different in the counterfactuals affecting not only  $\tau$  but also  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$ . The Canadian and Mexican cases are further worsened by changing the efficiency of production within the agreement ( $\gamma$ ) because US brands are now less efficient at producing there. So the two partners of the US now lose not only more on the US market than in the FTA scenario, but also on domestic, and most importantly, on ROW markets. Since there are no Canadian or Mexican brands operating in the US, production in the US actually benefits from that fall in  $\gamma$  since plants in the US now face weaker competition at home and abroad from affiliates of US brands in NAFTA. The overall production level is now up 5% in the US, and down by nearly 45% in Canada. Note also that production in Korea, Japan, Germany and Belgium now rise not only because of higher sales in NAFTA, but also because of higher market shares in ROW markets, due to worse productivity of US branded cars manufactured in Canada or Mexico.

The worst case-scenario for Canada and Mexico arises when  $\delta$  falls as well, i.e. the variable costs of marketing NAFTA-made cars, independent of trade costs or efficiency. The drop in market share of NAFTA (US) brands affects Canada and Mexico. US-based production also falls considerably compared to the intermediate level of integration. This does not come from higher costs for domestically produced US brands (we leave those border effects unaffected in our counterfactuals), but from a steep drop in sales to Canadian and Mexican consumers (which also have a large drop in surplus under that scenario). Domestic sales in Korea, Japan, Germany etc. are unaffected, since their consumers were never concerned by this  $\delta$  (same for their sales to ROW). However their sales to NAFTA show interesting pattern in the deepest integration scenario. One can notice the disappearance of Belgium and the appearance of France in the table. This is because France does not have any US brand production. Therefore France did not have any of the additional sourcing gains that affected Belgium plants of Ford or GM, but it also does not suffer from the fall in demand for those brands in this last scenario.

Table 12: Undoing NAFTA

Country	Change in production by market (# cars)				% Chg.	Base (mn)	CS % Chg.
	<i>Domestic</i>	<i>RTA</i>	<i>ROW</i>	<i>Total</i>			
<b>FTA: changing <math>\tau</math></b>							
CAN	36848	-582295	0	-545447	-31.9	1.712	-2.48
MEX	11163	-407361	0	-396198	-29.4	1.348	-1.67
JPN	0	325055	0	325055	2.5	13.033	0
USA	491312	-260326	0	230986	3	7.707	-.85
KOR	0	111363	0	111363	2.1	5.325	0
DEU	0	52802	0	52802	1.5	3.55	0
GBR	0	26278	0	26278	1.8	1.429	0
BEL	0	18765	0	18765	3.4	.558	0
ESP	0	17694	0	17694	1.7	1.053	0
BRA	0	17257	0	17257	.7	2.556	0
<b>Deeper integration: changing <math>\tau</math> and <math>\gamma</math></b>							
CAN	9835	-722671	-38189	-751025	-43.9	1.712	-2.74
MEX	1367	-502352	-38271	-539256	-40	1.348	-1.84
USA	633412	-240520	12828	405720	5.3	7.707	-1.03
JPN	2176	367965	10765	380906	2.9	13.033	-.01
KOR	595	134111	7206	141912	2.7	5.325	-.01
DEU	1248	59607	4499	65354	1.8	3.55	-.03
GBR	550	29783	1614	31947	2.2	1.429	-.03
BEL	122	23074	2706	25902	4.6	.558	-.03
BRA	4187	20232	839	25258	1	2.556	-.02
ESP	203	20685	2215	23103	2.2	1.053	-.04
<b>Deepest integration: changing <math>\tau</math>, <math>\gamma</math> and <math>\delta</math></b>							
CAN	7800	-723479	-38189	-753868	-44	1.712	-4.2
MEX	-390	-502602	-38271	-541263	-40.2	1.348	-2.81
JPN	2176	436953	10765	449894	3.5	13.033	-.01
USA	633412	-322780	12828	323460	4.2	7.707	-1.03
KOR	595	135613	7206	143414	2.7	5.325	-.01
DEU	1248	65173	4499	70920	2	3.55	-.03
GBR	550	35386	1614	37550	2.6	1.429	-.03
BRA	4187	20894	839	25920	1	2.556	-.02
FRA	632	20525	3504	24661	1	2.465	-.03
ESP	203	20707	2215	23125	2.2	1.053	-.04

Elasticity parameter relevant for the Consumer Surplus calculation is  $\eta = 4.4$ .